

THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

A REVISED TEXT

WITH INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

BY

FRANZ SUSEMIHL

PROFESSOR IN GREIFSWALD

AND

R. D. HICKS

FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

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BOOKS I.—V.

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PREFACE.

IN the work, of which this volume is an instalment, I have undertaken to reproduce in an English dress Professor Susemihl's edition of the *Politics* in Greek and German as issued by him, with notes explanatory of the subject-matter, in 1879. It is not, however, a simple reproduction, but a minute and scrupulous revision, the translation having been dropped and the plan of the work sensibly modified to adapt it to the wants of English students. Some changes have been made in the Introduction, to which a section has been added, though naturally the materials of this section are by no means new. The text (for which Professor Susemihl is solely responsible) has been corrected in some hundreds of places, mostly to bring it into agreement with his later edition in the Teubner series, of which a *nova impressio correctior* was issued in 1894, only a few months ago. The great majority of the changes which distinguish the *impressio* of 1894 from that of 1883 have, however, to be sought in the Corrigenda. By the simple device of a change of type it has been found possible to exhibit to the eye the effect of the numerous transpositions here recommended, and yet to retain the received order of the text for facility of reference. In the notes explanatory of the subject-matter bearing his signature Professor Susemihl has introduced comprehensive changes. No one therefore should be surprised if these notes fail to correspond in substance (as they correspond in appended number) to those of the German edition.

Where it seemed expedient, they have been supplemented from my own collections. It can be said with truth that difficulties have never been shirked, numerous as they undoubtedly are. Wherever a note grew to an inordinate length or threatened to digress from the context, it has been relegated to an excursus.

In compiling additional notes I have received the greatest stimulus and advantage from the writings and correspondence of my collaborator, whose patience and forbearance have not been exhausted in the long interval preceding publication. He has always been willing to lavish upon me every assistance from the stores of his erudition, and to aid me with the latest results of his experience and ripened judgment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that not only primarily, but in the additions of date subsequent to 1879 indirectly, this volume, and the *Politics* as a whole, owes far more to him than to all other sources put together. Next to him I am most indebted to Dr Henry Jackson, who has never failed to give me encouragement and assistance, and in 1880 most kindly placed at my disposal a selection of valuable notes, critical and exegetical, which are published in the course of the volume with his signature. Moreover, as in private duty bound, I acknowledge that it is to the stimulus of his inspiring lectures that I, like Dr Postgate and Mr Welldon, owe my first interest in Aristotelian studies. I have naturally endeavoured to profit by the publications of recent years, so far as they bore upon my author, and I may especially mention the contributions to the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society* and *Journal of Philology* by Dr Jackson, Professor Ridgeway, Dr Postgate and Professor J. Cook Wilson. I have taken the liberty of consulting any materials to which I had access, such as the marginalia of the late Richard Shilleto in the Cambridge University Library, and of the late Edward Meredith Cope in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge. In common with the publishers I deplore and apologise for the long delay between the announcement and the publication of this work, although this delay has enabled me to secure a collation of the oldest extant source of the text, the fragments of the Vatican palimpsest, and to incorporate in the Addenda the most import-

ant of the references to the recently discovered *Constitution of Athens*. Thus supplemented the commentary will, it is hoped, be found more adequate than any of its predecessors to our existing materials and means of information.

Some will be surprised that more attention has not been bestowed upon the superb Introduction or the full and lucid commentary upon Books I and II published by Mr W. L. Newman in 1887. The truth is that, at the time of its appearance the earlier part of this volume had been printed off, and the publishers did not see their way either to issue this part (pp. 1—460) separately, as I personally should have preferred, or to incur the heavy expense of cancelling the printed sheets. Some valuable annotations of Mr Newman's, however, which I should have been glad to incorporate in the proper place, receive a brief recognition in the Addenda.

I have further to add that I began to print before Professor Suscnihl had collected into a permanent form his first set of *Quaestiones Aristoteleae* I—VII, and that for greater clearness I refer to the invaluable pamphlet issued by him in 1886, in which the main results of the seven *Quaestiones* are combined, as *Quaestiones criticae collectae*, although the last word *collectae* forms no part of the title proper.

My best thanks are here duly tendered to my friends Mr William Wyse, late Professor of Greek in University College, London, for valuable suggestions and criticisms, and numerous additional references, particularly in all that bears upon Greek Antiquities; Miss Alice Zimmern, author of *Home Life of the Greeks*, Mr Hartmann W. Just, sometime scholar of C. C. C., Oxford, and Mr H. J. Wolstenholme, for timely assistance in the laborious task of translating from the German; further, to my brother-in-law, Mr T. L. Heath, formerly Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who read most of the earlier proof-sheets. Occasional notes of his and one by Mr H. W. Just bear the authors' initials. To guard against all misapprehension I should add that the excursus on Greek Music was already printed off before the Provost of Oriel's recent work on that subject reached me.

The want of an index, which renders this instalment of the work much less useful than it might otherwise have been, will be remedied when the remaining three books are published.

R. D. HICKS.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,

Oct. 15, 1894.

ON REFERENCES TO THE *POLITYCS* BY BOOKS, CHAPTERS,
SECTIONS, PAGES.

THE text of this edition with its double numbering of certain books, its double system of chapters and sections, and of marginal pages, may well perplex an unfamiliar reader unless a word or two be added as to the origin of this aggravated confusion and the various methods by which any given passage may be cited.

The manuscripts exhibit the eight books in the old order, viz. A B T Δ E Z H Θ according to the left heading of each page (not in the order of this edition which is A B Γ Δ E Z H Θ). There is no subdivision of the books in the Aldines and other early printed editions, any more than in the MSS. The Latin translations had been subdivided before this into chapters and sections, a division almost inevitable when the continuity of the text is disturbed by paraphrase and commentary. Thus the second edition of Victoriæ (Florence 1576) presents the text in a series of short sections, although these are never numbered or otherwise utilized for purposes of reference.

The system of chapters here adopted, as cited in the head lines and on the left hand of the pages of this volume, is that most widely known through its adoption by Immanuel Bekker in the great edition of the Berlin Academy (quarto 1831), and by Hermann Bonitz in the *Index Aristotelicus* to the same edition (1870). It may be traced back to the editions of Zwinger (1582), Sylburg (1587), Casaubon (1590). It seems that Zwinger merely modified another arrangement into chapters, derived from the Latin Aristotle (e.g. the edition of Bagolinus), and found in the third Basel edition (1550) of Conrad Gesner, also in Giphanius (1608). Sylburg (1587) and Conring (1656) give both schemes, calling Gesner's "vulgo." In this now obsolete arrangement Book I. made eight chapters, not thirteen, Book II., ten, not twelve, Book III., twelve, not eighteen.

The sections into which Bekker's chapters are divided are taken from the Oxford reprint of Bekker in ten octavo volumes (1837), in which unfortunately Bekker's pages and lines are wholly ignored. These sections have been retained in this volume because Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon, and some other authorities, cite the *Polities* by them. They are numbered on the left side of the page with § prefixed.

The chapters (in Roman figures) and sections on the right side of the page are those introduced by J. Gottlob Schneider in his valuable edition of 1809. Schneider broke with all his predecessors by adopting longer chapters and fewer of them, e.g., 5 in Book I., 9 in Book II. He was followed amongst subsequent editors by Götting

(1824), Adolf Stahr (1839), Susemihl (1879): Grote in his history always cites the *Politics* by Schneider's edition.

But the tendency in modern times has been not to employ for citation either the sections of Bekker or the chapters and sections of Schneider, but rather the chapter, page, column, and line of the quarto of the Berlin Academy above mentioned. In this edition of all Aristotle the *Politics* occupies pages 1252—1342. The quarto volume is printed in double columns, cited as column a, column b. For example, 1252 a 18, 1276 b 4 (or in the *Index Aristotelicus* 1252^a18, 1276^b4) are used to denote, the one, line 18 of the left column of page 1252, the other, line 4 of the right column of page 1276. The closer definition which this method of citation by lines secures is a great recommendation, but it is balanced by one drawback, viz. that to be quite sure of finding a passage the Berlin Aristotle is required, and after sixty years the supremacy of even this edition no longer remains unquestioned. In the present volume the pages and lines of Bekker's quarto are cited on the left hand side of the page, while in the heading over the right hand page the whole extent of the text on both left and right pages is recorded: (e.g. 1263 b 23—1264 a 4 for the text upon pp. 238 and 239 of this volume).

Lastly, there are a few writers, Bernays and Oncken among them, who prefer to quote passages by the page and line, *not* of the Berlin quarto, but of the octavo reprint of it issued a little later, of which a third edition came out in 1855 and a fourth edition in 1878. For comparison, this system of pages has been recorded on the right hand margin, the reference being enclosed in a bracket, thus: (p. 31).

For an example of these rival methods of citation take the sentence *οὐδὲ μὴδὲ τοῖσιν ἀγνοεῖν οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ* upon p. 239 of this edition. The reference (i) in the *Index Aristotelicus* would be II 5, 1264 a 1 sq.; we prefer to cite it as (ii) Book II, c. 5 § 16 (or II. 5. 16) by Bekker's chapters and sections: or dropping the book and chapter (which are really superfluous) as (iii) 1264 a 1, 2 by Bekker's pages, columns and lines. No references in this English edition are given by Schneider's chapters and sections, which were followed in Susemihl's German edition of 1879: but on that method the passage could be cited as (iv) Book II c. 5 § 10. Lastly, Bernays or Oncken would refer to it as (v) p. 31, l. 6.

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CORRIGENDA.

- Page 8, line 2 : for *M.* read *ISAAC*
P. 18, note 7, line 5 : for *πολιτικων* read *πολιτικῶν*.
P. 56, line 14 : for *Stageira* read *Stagira* (*cp.* Meisterhans³ p. 43, n. 373)
P. 69, note 2, line 3 : for *νόμον* read *νόμων*
Ib. line 4 : for *πολιτειων* read *πολιτειῶν*
P. 82, line 2 : for *ἀπορίαν* read *εὐπορίαν* (*cp.* below p. 312)
P. 144, text, 1252 b 16, 17 : for *μάλιστα δ' εἵκοι κατὰ φύσιν*
read *μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἵκοι*
Ib. commentary, 118th column, last line : for *coediche* read *coediche*
P. 146, critical notes, line 3 : after 28 insert *ἡδη*]
P. 147, text, 1253 a 3 : omit *ἐστὶ*
Ib. critical notes, line 6 : transpose
δ omitted by Π² Bk
to precede || 3 ἐστὶ M²
That is, the δ omitted by Π² Bk is in 1253 a 2 before *ἀνθρώπος*. *Stohr* reads
ἀνθρώπος : *cp.* Addenda p. 663
P. 150, crit. notes, line 5 : for *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff. read *Quaest. crit. coll.*
(Lips. 1886) p. 334 ff
Ib. line 8 : *dele* *Ar.*
P. 151, crit. notes, line 8 : after *Quaest. Cr.* II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. insert *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 336 ff
P. 153, crit. notes, line 4 : after *Quaest. Cr.* II. 7 ff. insert *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f
P. 156, text, 1254 a 8, right margin : for (p. read (p. 6)
P. 157, text, 1254 a 27 : for *ἀπὸ* read *ἐν*
Ib. crit. notes, line 3 : for *Dittographia* read *Dittography*
crit. notes, line 9 : after *ἀπὸ* read *ΠΙ Bk.*¹ *Susem.*¹⁻²
P. 160, text, 1254 b 14 : omit *καὶ*
P. 161, crit. notes, line 1 : after 18 insert *ἐστὶν*]
P. 176, crit. notes, line 9 : after *Quaest. Cr.* III. 5 ff. insert *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 352 f
P. 178, comm. left column, line 9 : for *κεκτῆσθαι* read *κεκτῆσθαι*
P. 180, crit. notes, line 3 : for *ἦν* read *ἦν*
P. 182, text, 1257 a 38 : for *καὶ ἐλ* read *καὶ ἐλ*
P. 183, comm. left col. line 8 : for 5, read *see*
Ib. line 9 : for *μετατιθεμένων* read *μεταθεμένων*
P. 190, comm. left col. line 7 from below : after *selling* insert *and*

- P. 195, comm. right col. line 17: *after citizens insert a comma*
 P. 197, text, 1259 b 32: *for [καὶ] read καὶ*
 P. 200, text, 1260 a 30, right margin: *remove 9 from line 30 to line 31*
 Ib. comm. left col. line 5 from below: *for μέρος read μέρος*
 P. 201, text, 1260 a 35, right margin: *remove 10 from line 35 to line 36*
 P. 209, 2b Excursus II. *also belong remarks on B. I. c. 6 in Addenda p. 672*
 P. 213, text, 1260 b 31: *for καὶ εὖ read καὶ εὖ*
 P. 216, comm. right col. line 14: *for III. 8 § 4, 16 § 2, read III. 16 § 2,*
 IV (VII) 8 § 4,
 P. 231, crit. notes, line 3: *for Bk. 1 end Bk. 1*
 P. 232, text, 1263 a 2: *for ἔχει, πᾶσι read ἔχει πᾶσι,*
 P. 233, comm. right col. line 26: *for I. 126 read I. 141 § 3*
 P. 234, comm. left col. line 19: *for I. 9. 9 read I. 7. 2, 1255 b 24 f*
 P. 235, text, 1263 a 29: *for προσεδρεύοντες read προσεδρεύοντος*
 P. 265, text, 1267 a 11: *for δύναμιο read βούλουτο*
 P. 273, comm. left col. line 6: *for II. § 9 read c. 11 § 9*
 P. 279, crit. notes, last line: *after Ephesus insert op. c. fol. 186^v p. 610, 16 ff.*
 ed. Hayduck
 P. 281, comm. left col. line 5: *for evidences read evidence*
 P. 282, text, 1269 b 18: *for δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι read εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν*
 P. 284, comm. right col. line 12: *read διασφίεται*
 P. 287, comm. left col. line 21: *for 8 § 6 read 7 § 6*
 P. 297, comm. left col. line 13: *for p. 9 read p. 20*
 P. 300, comm. left col. last line: *for Otthiel read Otfried*
 P. 301, comm. left col. line 4: *for πολέμιον read πόλεων*
 P. 305, text, 1272 b 9: *for δυναστῶν read δυνατῶν*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 7: *after Schneider || add δυναστῶν II¹ Susem. 1² ||*
 P. 306, text, 1272 b 13: *for τι read τί*
 Ib. text, 1272 b 23: *for τσαυθ' ἡμῶν εἰρήσθω read εἰρήσθω τσαυθ' ἡμῶν*
 P. 312, text, 1273 b 6 (*dis*, line 4 and line 18): *for ἀπορίας read ἐπορίαν*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *for 6 ἐπορίαν P¹II²Ald. read*
6 ἀπορίαν ΓM²Ald. Bk. Susem. 1²
 P. 314, text, 1273 b 25, left margin: *dele (12)*
 P. 317, comm. left col. line 16: *dele Aristides*
 P. 326, line 9: *for IV. 130 read IV. 180*
 P. 331, heading, line 13: *for II. 7. 1 read II. 8. 1*
 P. 356, comm. left col. line 11: *for βολαῖαι read βόλαιαι*
 P. 359, text, 1275 b 17, left margin: *dele (2)*
 P. 362, text, 1276 a 5: *for φαμέν read ἐφαμεν*
 Ib. text, 1276 a 10: *read δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ*
 P. 363, text, 1276 a 13: *dele " "*
and read συμφύρον) εἴπερ οὖν
The parenthesis extends from 1276 a 10 (τότε γὰρ to 1276 a 13 συμφύρον)
 Ib. text, 1276 a 14: *for καὶ read [καὶ]*
 Ib. text, 1276 a 15: *omit <οὐ>*
 Ib. text, 1276 a 16: *for τυραννίδος. read τυραννίδος;*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *after 14 read [καὶ] Niemeyer (untranslated by William)*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 4: *dele incorrect*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 5: *after Hayduck add Susem. 1²*

- P. 364, text, 1276 a 26: *for τὴν read [τῆν]*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 3: *before 27 add [τῆν]* Schneider Niemeyer *Jahrb. f. Phil.*
 CXLIII. 1891, p. 414 ||
 P. 367, text, 1276 b 30: *for διόπερ read διὸ*
 P. 370, comm. left col. last line: *for δυνανται read δύνανται*
 P. 380, text, 1278 b 8. *for καὶ εἰ read καὶ εἰ*
 P. 382, crit. notes, line 2: *after (collector) add a semicolon*
 P. 389, comm. right col. line 18: *for VII(V) read VIII(V)*
 P. 396, text, 1281 a 16. *with change of punctuation read ἔστιν (ἔδοξε γὰρ...δικαίως)**
 P. 397, text, 1281 a 35, 36: *transpose φαῖλον to precede ἔχοντα and read*
φαῖλον ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαλόντα πάθη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον.
 P. 430, comm. left col. line 21: *for αρχεν : ead αρχεν*
 Ib. line 23: *for ἐπιθυμία read ἐπιθυμία*
 Ib. line 26: *for δ read ὁ*
 P. 431, text, 1287 a 39: *for πιστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 10: *after right insert a comma and read πιστευθέντας II fr.*
 Bk.¹ Susem.^{1,2}
 P. 434, comm. right col. line 7: *for εὐ read εὖ*
 P. 438, comm. left col. line 1: *after turn out insert anyhow," i.e. "*
 P. 441, text, 1287 a 39. *for πιστευθέντας read πεισθέντας*
 P. 444, crit. notes, line 11: *for dittographia read dittography*
 P. 464, line 44: *for 24 read 23*
 P. 467, line 5 ff.: *dele the sentence* Again, one might have imagined...πολιτεία.
 Not so.
 P. 475, text, 1323 b 18: *for καὶ read [καὶ]*
 P. 497, text, 1327 a 23: *for πρὸς read [πρὸς]*
 Ib. crit. notes, line 2: *for υπάρχοντα read υπάρχοντα*
 P. 503, text, 1328 a 16: *for οἱ δὲ read οἷδε*
 P. 521, text, 1330 b 30: *for πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν read μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν*
 P. 529, text, 1332 a 13: *omit καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι*
 P. 534, comm. left col. line 14: *for 1284 read 1254*
 P. 535, text, 1332 b 31: *for τούτων πάντων read πάντων τούτων*
 P. 537, text, 1333 a 26: *transpose διηρησθαι to precede καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος*
 Ib. comm. right col. line 17: *for correlation read correlative*
 P. 540, comm. right col. line 18 f.: *for VIII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 read VIII(V). 1 § 10, 7 § 4*
 P. 541, text, 1334 a 8. *for ἀνίσιν read ἀφίσις*
 P. 545, head line: *for 1333 a 40 read 1334 a 40*
 P. 546, text, 1334 b 24: *for πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι read ἐγγίνεσθαι πέφυκεν*
 P. 549, text, 1335 a 27: *for χρόνος ὠρισμένος read ὠρισμένος χρόνος*
 P. 559, text, 1336 b 34: *for ὅσα αὐτῶν read αὐτῶν ὅσα*

INTRODUCTION.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS OF *THE POLITICS*.

ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* has come down to us in manuscripts for the most part of the fifteenth century; there are indeed two, P^a and P^b (Bekker's I^b), which date from the fourteenth century, but none earlier. There is the Latin version by Lionardo Bruni of Arezzo (Leonardus Arctinus), made from the first manuscript brought into Italy from Greece in the fifteenth century, a manuscript now lost, which was probably older than the fifteenth century¹. There is further an older translation, word for word into barbarous Latin, made in the thirteenth century, before A.D. 1274², by the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke. Its lost original was a Greek codex³ which we will call T; written, at the latest, in the early part of the thirteenth or latter part of the twelfth century, and probably of not much older date⁴. This translation⁵ primarily, together with four of the existing Greek manuscripts, three at Paris P¹ ² ³, one at Milan M¹, is now the critical basis for the text. All that the remaining manuscripts or the translation of Arctinus can claim is to supply confirmatory evidence in isolated passages: Arctinus, in particular, is much too free and arbitrary in his rendering, so that it is often impossible to infer, at least with any certainty, the reading of his Greek codex; hence many peculiarities of his translation must be passed over or regarded as merely his own conjectures.

¹ Very likely Francesco Filelfo brought it from Constantinople in 1429 at the request of Palla Strozzi: see the evidence for this in Oncken *Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1870. 8vo) vol. 1. p. 78. Compare my large critical edition, *Aristotelis Politicorum libri octo cum vetusta translatione Gulielmi de Moerbeke* (Leipzig 1872. 8vo) p. xv.

² See Sussemlahl *op. cit.* p. vi. with note 4. [Von Herling places it about 1260, *Rhein. Mus.* xxxix. 1884. p. 457.

Thomas Aquinas twice quotes it in the *Summa contra Gentiles*, writing probably A.D. 1261—1265. Tr.]

³ The best manuscript of this 'Old Translation' expressly states it. See Sussemlahl *op. cit.* xxxiv. See also below p. 49 n. 2, p. 71 ff.

⁴ On the date see Sussemlahl *op. cit.* xii.

⁵ With the text restored from manuscripts and old printed editions in my edition above mentioned.

All these sources of the text fall into two families or recensions. One of them, on the whole the better, but often the worse in particular points, seems to be derived from a codex of the sixth or seventh century¹, although in the quotations of single passages in Julian and even as early as Alexander of Aphrodisias the readings peculiar to this recension are partially, but only partially, found. Besides T the only manuscripts which belong, in the main, to this family are the following two:

M^a = Mediolanensis Ambrosianus D. 105² (in the Ambrosian Library at Milan), of the second half of the fifteenth century, much corrected by the copyist himself and in a few passages by a later hand; collated by R. Scholl and Studemund:

P¹ = Parisinus 2023 (in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), written by Demetrios Chalkondylas at the end of the fifteenth century, and then much corrected with a paler ink from a manuscript of the other family. Corrections of this sort are hereafter denoted by p¹, those made in the same black ink as the original text by (cor.¹), corrections which do not belong to either of these classes, or at all events are not with certainty to be reckoned with one or the other, are quoted simply as (corr.). In regard to this and all the other manuscripts, it is distinctly stated when any correction stands in the margin. P¹ was last collated by Dahms and Patzig.

Just as in P¹ the two families are blended³, so conversely traces of the better recension are met with even in some manuscripts which belong, in the main, to the other family. This is true of many corrections and most of the glosses which are found in P², the principal manuscript of this second family⁴; still more frequently of the readings, corrections, and variants in P⁴; so also of Aetius' translation and especially of I¹; to a less extent of the corrections by a later hand in some other manuscripts, and hardly ever of their original readings. The few excerpts from

¹ On the one hand the commentary of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Proclus (died 485) upon Plato's *Republic* is quoted in a gloss on VIII (v). 12. 8, which in all probability (see note⁴) proceeds from this archetype; on the other, certain corruptions common to all the sources derived from this family point to the conclusion that the archetype was written in uncials (particularly III. 14 §§ 12, 13 *ὁρίων* and *ορίων* for *ὀρίων* and *ὀρίων*). Now uncial writing ceased generally in the eighth century. Cp. Susemihl *op. c.* XIV f., XLVI f.

² Ordinis superioris.

³ On its archetype, if Demetrios found the corrections which betray the second recension in the few cases where they are written with the same ink as his original text - already made.

⁴ For the same glosses which in I¹ can be shown to be derived from the first recension meet us again in I², and a similar origin may be proved for others in P² in another way. On the other hand I² has few glosses in common with I¹, and the number in I² is but scanty, so that the second recension appears to have had only a few glosses altogether. See Susemihl *op. c.* VIII f., XVII f.

Aristotle's *Politics* in Codex Paris. 963, of the sixteenth century, are also derived from the better recension.

Subject to these exceptions, all other manuscripts but those above-mentioned are to be reckoned with the second family, the text of which may be called the vulgate. They may be further subdivided into two classes, a better and a worse, and the latter again into three different groups: an intermediate position between the two is taken up by the translation of Aretinus and in a different way by C⁴. A more precise statement is afforded by the following summary.

I. Better class: II^a.

P^a = Coisl. 161 (brought originally from Athos: now with the rest of the Coislinian collection in the Bibliothèque nationale at Paris), of the 14th century; Bekker's I^b; last collated by Susemihl. The corrections and variants are written partly (1) in the same ink as the original text, partly (2) in darker ink, partly (3) in paler, yellower, partly (4) in red. ink: these are indicated hereafter by (corr.¹), (corr.²), (corr.³) and p^a respectively: where the ink appears to be wholly different, or cannot be brought with certainty under any of these classes, the sign will be (corr.⁴). But all without exception, and the glosses as well, are in the same handwriting as the codex.

P^a = Paris. 2026 of the beginning of the 14th century, for the greater part written by the same scribe, but finished by another hand; the oldest manuscript that we have, but not so good as P^a, especially in its original form before it had been corrected by a third and later hand and thereby made still more like P^a than it was at first. It is true that most of these later corrections were subsequently scratched out again or wiped off, yet even then they remain legible enough. P^a, like P^a, was last collated by Susemihl.

II. Worse class: II^a.

1. First group.

P¹ = Paris. 2025 of the 15th century, much corrected but, with the exception of a single passage, only by the scribe himself, with various readings in the margin; last collated by Susemihl.

P² = Paris. 1857, written in the year 1492 in Rome by Johannes Rhosos; a priest from Ciete; last collated by Patzig for the first four chapters of Book I. Statements as to the readings of this manuscript in other single passages come from Bekker, from Barthélemy St Hilaire, and in particular from Patzig.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200 (in the library of St Mark at Venice), also written by Johannes Rhosos, but as early as 1457: collated by Bekker for Book I, and since then afresh for the first four chapters of that book, as above, by R. Schöll and F. Rohde.

M^a = Marcianus Venetus 213, of the beginning of the 15th century, collated by Bekker for l. c. 1—c. 6 § 8 and again by Rohde for l. cc. 1—4.

U^b = Marcianus Venetus, append. iv. 3, written in Rome in the year 1494, collated by Bekker for II. cc. 1—7; III. 2 § 3 (1275 b 32—34), 14 §§ 2—10; VI (iv). 3 § 8—4 § 3, 7 § 2—8 § 4; VIII (v). 3 § 5—4 § 10, and by Rohde for l. cc. 1—4.

L^a = Lipsiensis (bibliothecae Paulinae) 1335, in the University library at Leipzig, of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century, most closely related to U^b, collated by Patzig for l. 1—4 and other single passages. We have information about readings in other parts of Books I. II. and V (VIII). from Stahl and Schneider.

C^c denotes the codex used by Camerarius.

Ar. = Aretinus, who must have used for his translation a codex of a very peculiar kind in which the two recensions were blended. For the translation is often in remarkable agreement with the manuscripts of this group; though often, too, with the better class. Not seldom again it agrees with the first family: lastly, it here and there shows peculiarities belonging exclusively to itself which can hardly be all set down to mere conjecture or arbitrariness on the part of the translator.

2. Second group.

C^a = Florentinus Castiglioneensis (in the Laurentian library at Florence) iv. (Acquisti nuovo), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for l. 1—4; II. 1—2 § 3; VI (iv). 1: in the opening chapters it is more in agreement with the better class.

Q^b = Laurentianus 81, 5 (in the Laurentian library at Florence), of the fifteenth century, collated by R. Schöll for l. 1—4 and single passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books II. III. VI (iv).

R^b = Laurentianus 81, 6, written by Johannes Thettalos in the year 1494 at Florence, collated by Schöll for the same opening part and for isolated passages elsewhere, by Bekker for Books VII (vi). VIII (v). It bears a great resemblance to Q^b, particularly to the corrections of Q^b in a later hand: but it has some peculiarities of its own.

S^b = Laurentianus 81, 21, of the fifteenth century, written more probably before than after Q^b, to which it bears an extraordinary resen-

blance; collated by Bekker for Books i. iv (vii). v (viii), and again by Schöll for the first four chapters of Bk. i, and for single passages elsewhere.

T^b = Urbinas 46 (transferred from Urbino to the Vatican library at Rome), of the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for the first three books and for Bk. v (viii), then again by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4 and for detached passages by Schöll. It seems to be more nearly related to V^b than to Q^b, R^b, S^b.

V^b = Valicano-Palatinus 160 (transferred from the Palatine library to the Vatican), also written by Johannes Thetialos in the fifteenth century, collated by Bekker for Bks. iv (vii). vi (iv). viii (v), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, and by Schöll for several single passages. The corrections by a later hand in the opening paragraph (Bk. i. 1—4) are in striking agreement with C⁴.

3. Third group, more nearly related to the first group, in particular to U^b L^a, than to the second.

W^b = Reginensis 125 (Christinae reginae—in the Vatican library), collated by Bekker for Bk. viii (vi), by Hinck for Bk. i. 1—4, by Schöll for several single passages. This manuscript will have to be wholly neglected for the future, because, as I learn from communications made to me by Von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, it is no earlier than the sixteenth or perhaps the seventeenth century, and was undoubtedly copied from the Aldine edition.

Ald. = Aldina, the first edition of Aristotle published by Aldus Manutius, Venice, 1498, last collated for Bk. i. 1—4 and for numerous single passages by Susemihl.

Lastly an unique position amongst the manuscripts is taken by P^a = Paris. 1858 or Colbert. 2401, dating from the sixteenth century. On the one hand this codex must be one of the worse manuscripts of the second family, although it cannot be exclusively assigned to any one of the three groups into which they fall¹. On the other hand it frequently agrees with the first family, and not seldom alone of all the manuscripts that have come down to us it agrees with the old translation of William of Moerbeke: here and there it presents single readings, good or at least deserving of attention, which are to be found nowhere else, although it may very well be that they are not derived from earlier sources, but are, wholly or in part, mere conjectures of the scribe himself or of other scholars of that time. The

¹ Nor is P^a now quoted under II¹ II² or II³ in the critical notes of this edition.

manuscript now contains only Bk. VIII (v). from c. 6^a § 9 onwards, Bk. VII (vi). Bk. IV (vii). and Bk. V (viii), the preceding part having been torn away; the corrections are all by the scribe himself, except a few which are divided between two later hands. It was last collated by Susemihl¹.

From all this it may be seen that, leaving out detached passages, the manuscripts collated, besides P^a M^a P^b 1^a 2^a 3^a 4^a Ar., are:

for I. 1—4:	P ^a C ¹ Q M ^b Q ^b R ^b S ^b T ^b U ^b V ^b W ^b I ^a Ald.	
I. 4—6 § 8:	Q M ^b S ^b T ^b .	for VI (iv). 1: C ¹ Q ^b V ^b .
I. 6 § 9—13 § 16 (end):	Q S ^b T ^b .	VI (iv). 2-3 § 7: Q ^b V ^b .
II. 1, 2:	C ⁴ Q ^b T ^b U ^b .	VI (iv). 3 § 8-4 § 4: Q ^b U ^b V ^b .
II. 3—7 § 21:	Q ^b T ^b U ^b .	VI (iv). 4 § 4-7 § 1: Q ^b V ^b .
II. 8—III. 2 § 3:	Q ^b T ^b .	VI (iv). 7 § 2-8 § 6: Q ^b U ^b V ^b .
III. 2 § 3:	Q ^b T ^b U ^b .	VI (iv). 8 § 6-16 § 8 (end): Q ^b V ^b .
III. 2 § 3—14 § 1:	Q ^b T ^b .	VII (vi): I ^a R ^b V ^b .
III. 14 §§ 2—10:	Q ^b T ^b U ^b .	VIII (v). 1-3 § 5: R ^b V ^b .
III. 14 § 10—18 § 2 (end):	Q ^b T ^b .	VIII (v). 3 § 5-4 § 10: R ^b U ^b V ^b .
IV (vii):	P ^a S ^b V ^b .	VIII (v). 4 § 11-6 § 8: R ^b V ^b .
V (viii):	P ^a S ^b T ^b .	VIII (v). 6 § 9-12 § 18 (end): I ^a R ^b V ^b .

In addition some readings of three late and bad Paris manuscripts, 2041, 2042, 2043, containing only fragments of the work, have been made known by Baithélemy St Hilaire.

II denotes the agreement of all the manuscripts we have,

II¹ that of all the manuscripts of the first family (or at least their first hand), including P,

II² that of all the manuscripts of the second family (and the Aldine edition), excluding P^a,

II³ that of all the worse manuscripts of this second family (*i. e.* all the mss. known *except* P^a M^a P^b 1^a 2^a 3^a 4^a), so far as they have been collated, and the Aldine edition.

Bas.^{1 2 3} denotes the three Basel editions of the years 1531, 1539, 1550, the first complete editions of Aristotle published after the Aldine. Only the third is important, since in it the first use was made of the old Latin translation, and a great number of mistakes of preceding printed editions thereby corrected. The text so formed remained essentially,

¹ For more precise information on all these manuscripts see Susemihl *l. c.* pp. v—xxviii.

though of course with numerous alterations, the basis for succeeding editors (who consulted new manuscripts but sparingly and, if at all, for single passages only), until Götting's time. He first used collations, but very insufficient ones, of P^{1.2 3.4.5} and of a few leaves of M³, which had been made by Hase; and Bekker, while completely ignoring P^{1.2} M³ and almost completely P^{1.5}, founded his edition with undue arbitrary eclecticism either upon P³ (Bekker's I^b) or upon that text which preceding editions had made the *textus receptus*. There was no collection of critical apparatus at once sufficiently complete and trustworthy before my critical edition, which rests so far as possible upon Π¹, the consensus of the mss. of the first family, viz. P¹, M³, P¹: failing that, upon P^{2.3}. There is less need then in a work, where the basis is the same, to give more than a mere selection of the most important and valuable readings. I shall, however, quote in full those which are found in Stobaeus' extract (*Eccl. eth.* II. p. 322 foll.), and in the few citations of single passages in ancient writers, as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Julian, Pseudo-Plutarch *περὶ εὐγυνείας*, etc.¹

But however methodically we turn to account all these authorities we only obtain a text abounding in errors and defects of every kind. Accordingly a long series of editors, translators, and commentators from Sepulveda onwards have not failed to suggest numerous emendations and attempts at emendation, of which all the more important will be found recorded in the present edition. The following is a list in chronological order of the scholars to whose conjectures an improved text is due.

Sepulveda. Latin translation; first published at Paris, 1548. 4to.

Camot. The fourth complete edition of Aristotle, Aldina minor or Camotiana; Venice, 1552. 8vo.

Vettori (Victorius). First edition of the *Politics*; Florence, 1552. 4; a second edition with commentary; Florence, 1576 fol. In the copy of the first edition now belonging to the Munich Library, there are marginal notes in Vettori's own handwriting, which have been used by me. Where necessary the two editions are distinguished as Vettori¹, Vettori².

Morel. Edition, Paris, 1556. 4; closely following the first edition of Vettori.

Lambin. Latin translation; first edition, Paris, 1567. 4.

Camerarius. *Politiconum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis Interpretationes et explicationes*; Frankfurt, 1581. 4.

Zwinger. Edition of the *Politics*; Basel 1582 fol.; closely following Vettori's 2nd ed.

¹ Further particulars in Susenmühl's larger edition as quoted above, p. xlv ff.

References to these citations will be found in Clarendon type in the critical notes.

- Sylburg.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Frankfurt, 1587. 4.
- M. Casaubon.** Edition of the whole of Aristotle; Lyon, 1590. fol.
- Montecatino.** Latin translation and commentary on the first three books of the *Politics*; Ferrara, 1587 (Bk. I), 1594 (Bk. II), 1598 (Bk. III), fol. (3 vols.). See Schneider's edition, II. p. v.
- Ramus** (Pierre de la Ramée). Edition and Latin translation of the *Politics*; Frankfurt, 1601. 8.
- Giphanius** (Van Giffen). *Commentarii in politicum opus Aristotelis*; Frankfurt, 1608. 8. A posthumous work: wanting the whole of Bk. V (VIII) and Bk. IV (VII) from c. 7 § 5 to the end.
- Scaliger.** See *Scaligerana* published by Oncken in *Bes.* I. 1864. 410 ff.
- Piccart.** *In Politicos Aristotelis libros commentarius*; Leipzig, 1615. 8.
- D. Heinsius.** Edition of the *Politics*; Leyden, 1621. 8.
- Conring.** Edition, Helmstadt, 1656. 4.
- Reiske and Gurlitt.** In the *addenda* to Schneider's edition, II. 471 ff.
- Reiz.** Edition of IV (VII). 17 and the whole of V (VIII), *περὶ τῆς πόλεως μακαρίας* κτλ, Leipzig, 1776. 8.
- J. G. Schlosser.** German translation of the *Politics* and *Constitution*; Lubeck and Leipzig, 1798. 8 (3 vols.). The notes appended are in every respect of great interest for the reader even now, and have proved especially valuable. The memory of this excellent man should ever be cherished in Germany.
- Garve.** A German translation of the *Politics* edited by Fülleborn; Leipzig, 1799. 1802. 8 (2 vols.).
- J. G. Schneider.** Edition of the *Politics*; Frankfurt on the Oder, 1809. 8 (2 vols.).
- Koraeus.** Edition, Paris, 1821. 8.
- F. Thurot.** French translation of the *Ethics* and *Politics*; Paris, 1823. 8.
- Götting.** Edition of the *Politics*; Jena, 1824. 8. To this must be added the short dissertations: *Commentariolum de Arist. Politicorum loco* (II. 6. 20); Jena, 1855. 4. *De machaera Delphica quae est ap. Arist.* (I. 2. 3); Jena, 1858. 4. *De loco quodam Arist.* (I. 2. 9); Jena, 1858. 4. (In his collected writings *Opusc. acad.* ed. Cuno Fischer, Jena, 1869. 8. 274 ff.)
- Barthélemy St Hilaire.** Edition of the *Politics* with French translation; Paris, 1837. 8. A second edition of the translation appeared, Paris, 1848. 8.
- A. Stahr.** Edition with German translation; Leipzig, 1839. 4. To this should be added the German trans. by C. Stahr and A. Stahr; Stuttgart, 1860. 16.
- Lindau.** German translation (Oels, 1843. 8), unfortunately not accessible to me for my critical edition.
- Spengel.** *Ueber die Politik des Aristoteles*, in the *phil. Abhandl. der Münchner Akad.* V. 1 ff. *Aristotelische Studien III.* (p. xi. 55 ff.); Munich, 1868. 4. Compare *Arist. Stud. II.* (ib. x. 626 ff.); Munich, 1865. 4. 44 ff.

- Bojesen.** *Bidrag til Fortolkningen om Aristoteles's Bøger om Staten*; Copenhagen, 1844, 1845. 8 (Two Sober Programmes).
- Nickes.** *De Aristotelis Politicorum libris*; Bonn, 1851. 8 (Degree dissertation).
- Eaton.** Edition of the *Politics*; Oxford, 1855. 8.
- Congreve.** Ed. of *Politics*; London, 1855. 8. A second edition (unaltered), London, 1874. 8.
- Engelhardt.** *Loci Platonici, quorum Aristoteles in conscribendis Politicis videtur memor fuisse*; Danzig, 1858. 4. 24 p. (In a collection of essays celebrating the jubilee of the Danzig Gymnasium).
- Rassow.** Short Gymnasium-Programmes: *Observationes criticae in Aristotelem*, Berlin, 1858. 4. *Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik*; Weimar, 1864. 4. Comp. also his *Emendationes Aristoteleae*, Weimar, 1861. 4 (p. 10); and *Beiträge zur Nikom. Ethik*, Weimar, 1862. 4.
- O. Thurot.** *Observationes criticae in Arist. politicis libris*, an article in *Jahrbucher für Philologie*, LXXXI. 1860. 749—759; and especially *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1860. 8.
- Schütz.** Gymn.-Programmes: *De fundamentis reipublicae, quae primo Politicorum libro ab Aristotele posita sunt*, I. II.; Potsdam, 1860. 4. 18 p., III. Potsdam, 1860. 4. 12 p.
- Oncken.** Degree dissertation: *Emendationum in Arist. Eth. Nic. et Polit. specimen*; Heldelberg, 1861. 8; and the large work in two volumes *Staatslehre des Aristoteles*; Leipzig, 1870, 1875. 8.
- Bonitz.** *Aristotelische Studien II. III.*; Vienna, 1863. 8. *Zur Aristot. Pol.* II. 3. 1262 a 7, an article in *Hermes*, VII. 1872. 102—108.
- Bernays.** *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*; Berlin, 1863. 8. A German translation of the first three books, Berlin, 1872. 8. *Zu Aristoteles und Simonides*, an article in *Hermes*, V. 1870. 301, 302; *Aristoteles über den Mittelstand in Hermes*, VI. 1871. 118—124.
- Hampke.** Gymn.-Programme: *Bemerkungen über das erste Buch der Polit.*, Lyck, 1863. 4; and four articles in *Philologus*, on *Arist. Pol.* IV (VII). cc. 2, 3 in vol. XIX. 1863. 614—622, on II. 5, XXI. 1864. 541—543, on Book I. XXIV. 1866. 170—175, *Zur Politik* XXV. 1867. 162—166.
- Schnitzer.** *Zu Arist. Pol.*, an article in *Eos*; I. 1864. 499—515. His German translation was published in the series of Osiander and Schwab at Stuttgart, 1856. 16.
- Böcker.** Degree dissertation, *De quibusdam Pol. Arist. locis*; Greifswald, 1867. 8. 45 p.
- Susemihl.** Three editions, see *Preface*: articles in *Rheinisches Museum*, XX. 1865. 504—517, XXI. 1866. 551—571; in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCIII. 1866. 327—333, CIII. 1871. 790—792; in *Philologus*, XXV. 1867. 385—415, XXIX. 1870. 97—119; in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—595; and *Indices Scholarum, De Polit. Arist. questionum criticarum part. 1—VII.*; Greifswald 1867—9. 1871—23—5. 4.
- Büchsenenschütz.** An article on I. cc. 8—11 in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* XCV. 1867. 477—482, 713—716.

- Chandler.** *Miscellaneous emendations and suggestions*; London, 1866.
- Madvig.** *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Græcos*; Copenhagen, 1871. 8, 461 ff.
- H. Sauppe. Hayduck. M. Vermehren.** In communications made to me for my first critical edition of 1872, together with one or two conjectures of **Godfrey Hermann** sent me by Sauppe. Cp. also Sauppe's *Epist. crit. ad G. Hermannum*.
- Bücheler.** In my first critical edition and in Part I. of my *Quæstiones criticae*; Greifswald, 1867. 4.
- Mor. Schmidt.** In communications for my first critical edition; also an edition of Book I. *Arist. Pol. Liber I.*; Jena, 1882. 4 (2 parts); and an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. 1882. 801—824.
- Vahlen.** *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II.; Vienna, 1872. 8; reviewed by me in *Philol. Anzeiger* V. 1872. 673—676; and an article on II. 5, 1264 a 1, in the *Zeitschrift f. d. ostr. Gymn.* XXI., 1870. 828—830.
- Polenaar.** Degree dissertation; *Trocinia critica in Arist. Politica*; Leyden, 1873. 8.
- Triehar.** In communications with me by letter.
- Henkel.** *Studien zur Geschichte der Griechischen Lehre vom Staat*; Leipzig, 1872. 8.
- Riese.** An article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIX. 1874. 171—173.
- Diebitsch.** Degree diss., *De rerum conexu in Arist. libro de re pub.*; Breslau, 1875. 8.
- Heitland.** *Notes critical and explanatory on certain passages in Pol. I.*; Cambridge, 1876. 8.
- Broughton.** Edition of Books I. III. IV (VII) with short notes, Oxford and London, 1876. 16.
- Bender.** *Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen*; Heilsfeld, 1876. 4; further in communications with me by letter.
- Freudenthal.** In communications with me by letter.
- H. Jackson.** Articles in the *Journal of Philology* on I. 3. VII. 1877. 236 . 243; on IV (VII). 13. 5—7, X. 1882. 311, 312: also in communications by letter published in the Addenda of my third edition, Leipzig, 1882.
- Postgate.** *Notes on the text and matter of the Politics*; Cambridge, 1877. 8.
- Von Kirchmann.** German translation with notes; Leipzig, 1880. 8 (2 vols.).
- Tegge.** In oral communications to me.
- J. Cook Wilson.** Article in the *Journal of Phil.* x. 1881. 80—86.
- Busse.** Degree diss., *De praesidiis Arist. Pol. emendandi*; Berlin, 1881. 8. 52 p.
- Ridgeway.** *Notes on Arist. Pol.* in the *Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society*, II. 1882. 124—153.
- Welldon.** English translation with notes; London, 1883. 8.
- H. Flach.** An article on Book V (VIII) in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXVII. 1884. 832—839.

II. THE COMPILATION AND SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF THE TREATISE.

In recent times critics seem more and more disposed to agree that the systematic writings of Aristotle, that is to say, most of the works that have come down to us together with others that have perished, were never actually published by their author himself¹. At the end of the fifteenth chapter of the *Poetics* he contrasts the exposition there given with that contained in his published works, to which upon certain points the student is referred, εἰρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐκδεδωμένοις λόγοις ἱκανῶς, the reference being undoubtedly to one of his own dialogues, that namely *On Poets*². Of the works which had thus been given to the world some information may be gathered, as that they chiefly comprised popular writings like the dialogues, adapted to the intelligence of a wider public; perhaps also descriptive works on natural science, 'histories' of plants and animals. But not the *Poetics*, nor indeed any of the similar treatises strictly philosophical and systematic which make up "our Aristotle," to use Grote's phrase: we may safely conclude that they were none of them in circulation at the time. It has indeed been doubted whether they were primarily written with a view to publication. They had their origin in the oral lectures of the Stagirite, and stood in the closest connexion with his activity as a teacher; this much is clear, but the precise nature of the connexion has been sorely disputed. The materials of these works may have been on the one hand Aristotle's own notes; either sketches drawn up beforehand for his lectures; or, which is more likely, reproductions of them freely revised and enlarged for subsequent study in the school. Or, again, they may have been merely lecturo-notes taken down by pupils at the time. The former supposition is favoured by the analogy of Aristotle's master, Plato, who takes this view of his strictly philosophical writings in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*³. Nor is there any reason to distrust the evidence that shortly after his master's

¹ [What follows has been freely condensed from a paper *On the composition of Aristotle's Politics* in *Verhandlungen der xxx. Philologen-Versammlung*, 17 ff. (Leipzig, 1876), and from the Introduction to the *Poetics* (Greek and German), edited by Susenmihl (Leipzig, 1874. ed. 2) 1-6. It is thus mostly earlier than the discussion in the 3rd edition of Zeller, *Phil. d. Griechen* II ii chap. 3. 126-138, which should be compared.] See also *Jahrbücher f. Phil.* CIII. 1871, 122-124;

Bursian's Jahresbericht XVII. 1879. 251-254; and Zeller *On the connexion of the works of Plato and Aristotle with their personal teaching* in *Hermes* XI. 1876. 84-96.

² 15 § 12, 1454 b 17; see note (208) to Susenmihl's edition of the *Poetics*.

³ 276 D: εὐνοῦν τε ὑπομνήματα θεσάυοντες, εἰς τὸ λήθης γήρας ἐὰν ἔλθῃ, καὶ παντὶ τῶ ταῦτ' ἔχουσιν μεμνῶντι, 278 A: ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδόντων ὑπομνήσας γεγραμέναι.

death Theophrastos had Aristotle's autograph of the *Physics* in his possession¹. Something similar may be inferred for other works if it be true that Eudemos edited the *Metaphysics*², and that Theophrastos (probably also Eudemos) supplemented modified and commented upon the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* in writings of his own bearing the same titles³: this is at any rate precisely the relation in which the *Physics* and *Ethics* of Eudemos stood to those of his master. The writings of Aristotle then were destined to serve as aids to the further study of his pupils: they were the text-books of the Aristotelian school.

In support of the other hypothesis has been adduced a number of passages which contrast decidedly with the immediate context by unusual vivacity or sustained style, or by especially prominent allusions to an audience as if present. Here the readiest explanation is that the editors have actually made use of notes taken down by pupils. Such passages have been collected by Oncken from the *Nicomachean Ethics*⁴; the latter part of *Politics* iv (vii). c. 1, and the conclusion, if genuine, of *De Soph. Elench.* are further instances. It should be remembered also that in one catalogue of the Aristotelian writings the *Politics* appears as πολιτικὴ ἀκρόασις⁵, while φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις is still the title borne by the *Physics* in our manuscripts. All these circumstances however can be satisfactorily explained in other ways, partly upon the former hypothesis, partly by assuming a merely occasional use to have been made of pupils' lecture-notes as subsidiary sources:—an assumption which it is hardly possible to disprove⁶.

In the Aristotelian writings we find a great diversity of treatment and language; at one time the briefest and most compressed style carried to the extreme of harshness, at another numerous needless redundancies, and often literal repetitions. The careless familiar expressions natural in oral discourse alternate with long artistic periods absolutely free from anacoluthia; at times the composition of one and the same book appears strangely unequal, as if the material which at

¹ See Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften* 12. Eudemos wrote to Theophrastos to enquire concerning the reading of a passage in the *Physics*, Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Πλάτωνα περὶ τίνος αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀναμετρημένων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον βιβλίον. "ὡπὲρ ὧν" φησὶν "ἐπεστείλας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστείλαι ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν, ἧτοι ἐγὼ οὐ ξυνίημι, ἢ μικρόν τι παρελθὼς ἔχει τοῦ ἀναμέσσω τοῦ ὅπου ἡμεῶν καλῶς τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον." Simplificus Comm. in *Arist. Physica*, 231 a 21, *Schol.* in *Arist.* (Bianchi), 404 b 11 ff.

² Alexander of Aphrodisias in his com-

mentary on the *Metaphysics* 483. 19 vd. Bonitz: καὶ οἶμαι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνοις εἶναι συντάττειν, καὶ ὥς ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλους συντάτταται, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῖς Πλάτωνα κεχωριστά.

³ Alexander, *Schol.* in *Arist.* 128 b 8, 161 b 9, 184 b 36, and Simplificus 16. 509 a 6; see Zeller 11 ff. 71.

⁴ *Staatslehre des Arist.* i. 60 (1).

⁵ *Diag. Laert.* v. 24.

⁶ See the arguments advanced against Oncken by *Neue Mittheil. Jahrb. für Phil.* CIII. 1871, 122—124.

first flowed abundantly had suddenly become scanty. Such peculiarities however generally admit of more than one explanation; even where the same question is treated independently two or three times over (unless indeed one of the versions is to be regarded as the paraphrase of a Peripatetic) the inference may be *either* that different drafts of Aristotle's own have been incorporated side by side¹, or that a pupil has supplemented the notes which he had actually taken by a statement in his own words of their substance. Yet at other times the contrast is unmistakeable, as when we compare the *Posterior* with the *Prior Analytics*, or the third book of the *Psychology* with the two preceding books: we seem to have before us nothing but disjointed notes or rough drafts badly pieced together. Such imperfection in whole works can hardly be referred to any one but Aristotle². If some treatises, again, or at least considerable portions of them, prove upon examination so far advanced that the author's last touches hardly seem wanting, the inference is irresistible that, granted they arose at first out of Aristotle's oral lectures, with such fulness of details and elaboration they must have been intended for ultimate publication, whether in the author's lifetime or subsequently. Thence it is easy to pass on to the provisional assumption that Aristotle intended to bring his entire *Encyclopaedia* to the same degree of completeness, but was prevented by death from executing his design. As it is, we seem justified in concluding that the unfinished works were brought out by his immediate pupils from a combination of the materials above mentioned, pieced together and supplemented by not inconsiderable additions: much in the same way (to use Bernays' instructive analogy) as most of Hegel's works for the first time saw the light in the complete edition made by his pupils after his death.

There is a further circumstance which must be taken into account. From this edition, of which comparatively few copies were ever made or in circulation³, the works as they have come down to us must be allowed to deviate considerably. Our present text can be traced back in the main to the revised edition of Andronikos of Rhodes, a contemporary of Cicero⁴. This edition is known to have differed as to order and

¹ As in the *Metaphysics*, K cc. 1—7 = B. Γ. 10; A cc. 1—5; M cc. 4, 5 = A c. 9.

² In the *Physics*, Bk. VII, *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, are other instances only less striking than those named.

³ So far we may accept Strabo's inferences (XIII. 608, 609), although his story of the fate of Theophrastus' library contains a gross exaggeration: see now *Bursian's Jahrbuch*. IX. 338; XVI. 253 f.

II. 5, Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 187 f., 215 ff., Zeller *op. c.* II li 138—154.

⁴ Strabo l. c., Plutarch *Sulla* 26, Porphyry *Vita Plotini* 26, Gellius XX. 5. 10; Ptolemaeus as cited by Ibn el-Kifl and Ibn Abi Oseibia, Rose (in vol. V of the Berlin ed.) p. 1472, Casiri *Bibliotheca Arab.-Hispana* p. 308 b, Wenrich *De auctoribus Graec. versionibus* p. 157; also by David and Simplicius Scholia in *Arist.*

arrangement from the former one; besides, in the intervening 250 years the text had received considerable damage. Thus may be explained the appearance of numerous Peripatetic interpolations; also cases where a series of fragments represents the original work, as in Bk. VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in some measure in the *Poetics*¹; or where excerpts from another work are inserted, e.g. from the *Physics* in the latter part of Bk. XI (K) of the *Metaphysics* and in part of what is now Bk. V (Δ) of the same work².

Only by such a combination of assumptions is it possible satisfactorily to interpret the present condition of the *Politics*, where traces of its mode of compilation may clearly be discerned in interpolations, glosses incorporated in the text, abrupt transitions, inequalities of execution, frequent lacunae, transpositions and double recensions. Yet the whole is pervaded by an organic plan well considered even to the finest details³, and beyond all doubt the actual execution is mainly based upon written materials from Aristotle's own hand⁴. There is only one

(vol. IV of the Berlin ed.) 25 b 42 f., 81 a 27 f., 404 b 38 f.; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 50 ff. 139 mm. (1), (2), III i 620 ff.; Heitsch *Die verlorenen Schriften* I—53.

¹ See Susemihl's ed. of the *Poetics*, pp. 5—6.

² The hypotheses above noticed may thus be recapitulated. Aristotle did not himself publish his scientific works. They may have been edited *primarily*

(i) from Aristotle's own drafts as revised after his lectures for the use of his pupils: supplemented by the use, as

(ii) *subsidiary* sources, of

(a) Aristotle's own sketches, prepared for use at his lectures:

(β) lecture-notes taken by pupils (with or without supplements of their own):

(γ) passages from works by his pupils:

(δ) additions by editors: very rarely

(ε) excerpts from his own works.

³ Sober criticism will not be deterred from attributing the plan to Aristotle simply because at the beginning of Bk. III there is no *δε* in the received text to correspond to a preceding *μὲν οὖν*, or because a connecting *δε* is sought in vain in III¹ at the opening of Bk. II, and should at least be altered to *γάρ*, if this opening and the close of Bk. I are to be kept side by side. Such twofold transitions from one book to another are found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* between IV and V, VII and VIII, IX and X; while between VIII and IX Giant has good ground for suggesting the words *καὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον ἐστὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπὸ τοῦ* 1163 b 27. [On the

transition from *Metaph.* VI (B) to VII (B) see Bonitz II 294.]

⁴ That the work in its present shape is, as late as Cicero's time is the opinion of Kiuhn *Zur Kritik aristotelischen Schriftst.* I 29 ff. (Brandenburg 1872. 4), and Polenaar *Thauma critica in Aristotelis Politica* (Leyden 1873. 8), and in one sense they are not far wrong; cp. the introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* 4 n. (1). They suppose the compiler or compilers to have had mere fragments of Aristotle's own composition before them, which they arranged and pieced together for themselves into a whole full of contradictions by borrowing from the writings of Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, or, as Polenaar thinks, by additions of their own. Polenaar's arguments, however, rest almost entirely on misapprehensions, and this is partly true of Kiuhn's, while others do not in the remotest degree suffice to establish such sweeping assertions. Kiuhn does indeed allow that the first book is by Aristotle; but from 13 § 15 he infers that it was originally an independent work, not reflecting that, when taken in connexion with 3 § 1, this passage proves just the opposite; that further the first chapter has no sense except as an introduction to the whole of the *Politics*, of which we have also an express anticipation at the commencement of c. 3, where there is no trace of a change by another editor. The greater part of Bk. II, in which only "isolated pillars" of Aristotle's structure have been left

passage of any length, IV (VII). 1, where we seem to catch the tones of the more animated oral lecture in such marked contrast to all the rest of the work as forcibly to suggest the idea that here we have the lecture-notes of a pupil¹. But the parts executed are often unequal; they never grew to the dimensions of a book actually fit for publication; and when such a work made its appearance after the master's death the editors did not refrain from adding a good deal of foreign matter contradictory of the spirit and interdependence of the work². Here and there, again, we find a twofold discussion of the

standing, he assigns to Theophrastos; c. 6, he says, is wholly spurious and of very late origin, c. 5 defective and largely interpolated: and that there is much to offend us in both these chapters is undeniable: see below p. 33 n. (4). The third book he seems to regard as a medley taken from Theophrastos, and various writers of his school, and from other Peripatetics: c. 14 in particular as an excerpt from Theophrastos, *Περὶ βασιλέως*: cp. p. 18 n. (7) and n. on III. 14. 9 (624). In the principal part of Bk. IV (VII) he finds "fragmentary sketches"; he agrees with Niebuhr (*Rom. Alterth.* 578 Isen) in deciding that the second and larger part, if not the whole, of Bk. V (VIII) was not written by Aristotle, any more than a considerable part of Bk. VI (IV), of which c. 15 together with VI (VI). 8 is an excerpt from a work by Theophrastos on magistracies; while the greater part of Bk. VIII (V) probably consists of excerpts and pieces retouched from Theophrastos, *Περὶ κατῶν*: comp. n. on III. 14. 9 (624) and VIII (V). 11. 9 (1720*). There are some resemblances to the *Aroopagitikos* of Isocrates: see on III. 3 § 2, § 9, 6 § 10, 7 § 1, 11 § 20, IV (VII). 4 § 5, VI (IV). 9 § 7, VII (VI). 5 § 10, VIII (V) 1 § 2. Yet Spengel's assertion "totum Isocratis Aroopagiticum in usum suum Aristoteles verit, tam multi sunt loci, qui eadem tradunt" (*Aristotelische Studien* III. 59) is a gross exaggeration, as unproved as it is impossible to prove. But why Aristotle should not be credited with them, why we must follow Krohn in rejecting as spurious all the passages where they occur, is simply inexplicable. Compare further my review of Krohn in *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873. 676—680. The most material objection which he raises to the genuineness of Bk. V (VIII) is that *ἐνθουσιάζειν*, *ἐνθουσιάζειν* are elsewhere only found in spurious or semi-spurious Aristotelian writings, — *ἐνθουσιαστικός* only

in the *Problems*, *ἐνθουσιάζειν* only in the dialogue *On Philosophy*, — whereas Theophrastos paid great attention to this morbid state of ecstasy or delirium.

¹ But a pupil of Aristotle, not necessarily of Theophrastos, as Krohn thinks: see notes on IV (VII). 1 § 2 f., § 13. Another well-written chapter is VI (IV). 11, and this even Krohn reckons as part of "the well-preserved patrimony of Aristotelian thought." His attempt even there to ferret out at least an interpolation, § 15, rests upon nothing but a gross misconception, as is shown by Sussehl *loc. cit.* p. 679.

² To start from the internal connexion of a work as a whole is the only safe mode of procedure in all so-called higher criticism. By discarding this principle Krohn and Polmann lose all solid footing, preferring, as they do, to regard mere unconnected fragments as the genuine kernel of the work: Sussehl *loc. cit.* 679. Not every contradiction is sufficient proof of diversity of authorship; however small the dimensions within which this genuine Aristotelian kernel is reduced, we shall never succeed in eliminating from it all discrepancies of doctrine. Nay, Krohn justly reminds us that "even this original kernel can only be understood on the assumption of a gradual advance in the great thinker's development." After we have detected interpolations, and restored by their excision the connexion which they restored, only an accumulation of difficulties, or such contradictions as strike at the very heart of the system, need be taken into account. Further it must be admitted that no hard and fast line can be drawn here, so that at times the decision is doubtful. Upon such considerations a list of spurious or suspected passages (without reckoning glosses of later introduction and other smaller matters) might be drawn up, in partial agreement with Krohn, as follows

same topic¹; either both were found amongst Aristotle's materials and then included that nothing might be lost, or else only one was written by Aristotle and the other was derived from a pupil's notes. The work is disfigured by numerous *lacunae* of greater or less extent: entire sections of some length are wanting altogether². The right order has often been disturbed³. The two grossest instances are that Books VII and VIII should come before Bk. IV, and Bk. VI before Bk. V (counting the books in the order in which they have come down to us)⁴. No scruple has been felt about restoring the proper sequence in this edition, though the dislocation was unquestionably very ancient⁵. Nor to all appearance

II. 8 § 1 (ὁς...βουλόμενος), 10 §§ 3, 4, 12 §§ 6—14;

III 17 §§ 3, 4;

IV (VII). 2 § 3—4 § 1, 10 §§ 1—9;

V (VIII). 7 §§ 13, 14;

VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19.

VII (VI). 2 § 7 (ἐπὶ...βασιλεύσας), 2 § 9—3 § 6;

VIII (V). 6 § 5, 6 §§ 12, 13, 7 §§ 5—10, 12 §§ 1—6, perhaps also 12 §§ 7—18.

To this total of about 515 lines shorter bits must be added from II. 6 § 18; III. 14 § 15, 15 § 11; VI (IV). 7 § 5, 14 § 5. On VI (IV). 14 §§ 11—15 see below p. 65 n. (1). Several of these passages display historical erudition valuable in itself but out of place—a characteristic of the school as contrasted with the master. As to the doubts recently cast upon IV (VII). 7 by Broughton, and upon IV (VII). 13 by Broughton and Wilson (and earlier still by Congreve), see the critical notes and n. on IV (VII). 13 § 8 (881).

² Besides the end of Bk. III and the beginning of IV (VII) see II. 7 §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—21, III. 15 §§ 7—10 = 16 §§ 10—13; IV (VII). 1 §§ 11, 12 = 2 §§ 1, 2; VIII (V). 1 § 1; 7 § 1; 10 § 24 = 10 § 25.

³ See particularly I. 8 § 3, 10 § 1, 12 § 1; II. 2 § 6, 5 § 2, 11 § 5;

III. 3 § 2, 12 § 6, 13 § 3, 8 § 6, 16 § 2;

IV (VII). 11 § 2, 13 § 11, 14 § 7;

V (VIII). 7 § 15;

VI (IV). 8 § 7, 8 § 8, 10 § 2, 11 § 1, 12 § 5;

VII (VI). 4 § 1, 8 § 24;

VIII (V). 1 § 7, 7 § 9, 10 § 26, 12 § 11,

§ 18. Congrav saw this, but carried it too far: "notem aristoteliam quasi stellis illustrare satagit" Gottling sneeringly writes, taking credit for having put all these "stars" out. But when the asterisks are removed the lacunae are still plain enough if the critic has the eye to see them. Cp. my critical edition p. 117.

⁴ [On these transpositions see pp. 78

—95.]

The one transposition was first made by Nicolas Oresme (died 1382) in his French translation, not published until long afterwards (Paris 1489); and again by Segni in his Italian translation (Florence 1549). A more detailed proof of its correctness was undertaken by Scimone da Salo *Quingue Quaestiones ad eto librum de republica* (Rome 1577), Coning, Bartholmey St Hilaire, Spengel *Über die Politik* Transactions of the Munich Acad. v. 1 ff. *Arist. Studien* II. 44 ff. (Munich 1865), Niecks *De Arist. Politikon libri* (Bonn 1861), Brandis in his history *Geschichte d. Philos.* II ii 1666 ff., 1679 ff. and by others. It has been disputed without success, amongst others by Wollmann in the *Rheinisches Museum* (New Series) I. 1842. 321—354, Forchhammer in *Philologus* XVI. 1861. 50—68, Wendt in *Philologus* XIII. 1858. 264 ff., XIV. 332 ff., XVI. 408 ff. and in *Der alte Staat der Aristoteles* (Hamburg 1868. 410), by Krohn *op. c.* 30, and Dietrich *De rerum comen in Arist. libris de re publica* (Braunau 1875).

The other transposition was very nearly assumed by Coning; the first who actually made it and tried to demonstrate it was St Hilaire. It was followed by Spengel and even by Wollmann, but was opposed not merely by Brandis, Forchhammer, Krohn, and Dietrich, but even by Hildebrand *Geschichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (Leipzig 1860) 371 f., and by Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 672 f. n. (2), although they have accepted the first transposition, Hildebrand under certain conditions, and Zeller unreservedly. See below p. 58 n. 2.

⁵ See *Jahrbücher für Philologie* XIX. 1869. 693—710, ci. 1870. 343 f., 349 f. and the following paragraph in the text.

even the epitome in Stobaeus¹ presents the traditional arrangement and this epitome was taken from a more comprehensive work by Ari Didymos of Alexandria, the friend of Augustus and of Maecenas. Didymos naturally followed the new recension, the work, beyond doubt, of his contemporary Andronikos of Rhodes, in which, as has been said⁴, the text of the *Politics* has come down to us. Yet, as shall see⁵, in the incomplete sentence with which the third book breaks off sufficiently clear and certain evidence remains that in the old edition Bk. iv (vii) still stood in its right place after Bk. iii.

But there is another circumstance which makes it very questionable to start with, whether the work ever existed in a more complete form. There was a *Politics* in the Alexandrian library attributed some to Aristotle, by others to Theophrastos⁶, consisting, it would seem, of exactly eight books; a numerical correspondence not easy to ascribe to mere accident. This fact we learn from the catalogue of Aristotle's writings in Diogenes of Laerte⁷ and in the Anonymus Ménage⁸. The catalogue goes back to the biographies of Hermippos of Smyrna, a pupil of Callimachus, as its ultimate authority; and doubt that author followed closely what he found in the Alexandrian library⁹. Before this the Peripatetic philosopher Hieronymos of Rhodes appears to have used the Aristotelian *Politics*¹⁰; even Eudemos may possibly betray an earlier acquaintance with the treatise¹¹. And it

¹ *Ecl. eth.* 326 ff.

² See Henkel's careful investigation *Zur Politik des Aristoteles* (a Gymnasium Programm of Seehausen) Stendal 1875. 4. pp. 10—17. Buchsenschütz in his *Studien zu Aristoteles Politik* 1—26 (*Festschrift zu der 2ten Sacularfeier des Friedrichs-Weyderschen Gymnasiums*, Berlin 1881) judges differently, but see the review by Cook Wilson in the *Philol. Rundschau* 1882. pp. 1219—1224.

³ See Meineke *Zu Stobaeus* in the *Zeitschrift f. Gymnasialw.* XIII 1859. 563 ff., Zeller *op. c.* III i 614 f., Diels *Doxographi Graeci* 69 ff.

⁴ See p. 13 n. 4.

⁵ See p. 47 f.

⁶ Zeller suggests that this confusion may be explained if Theophrastos edited the work: *op. c.* II ii 678 (1).

⁷ v. 24: πολιτικῆς ἀκρόασις [ἡ] ἧ [for the ms. ἡ] Θεοφράστου ἀ—ῆ. Cp. Usener *Analecta Theophrastae* 16 (Leipzig 1858): Zeller *op. c.* II ii 679 (1); Sussemlil's critical edition of the *Politics* XLIII n. (73).

⁸ πολιτικῆς ἀκρόασις ἧ (so the Ambrosian MS. discovered by Rose: see

Bealin Aristotle v. 1467. No. 70). Ménage incorrectly gave K, which Zeller *op. c.* II ii 75 ed. 2 had conjectured to be a mistake for H. Rose suggests that Anonymus was Ilesychios of Milest. 500 A.D. In Ptolemy's catalogue work occurs as No. 32, *liber de regim. civitatum et nominatur bulitikon tractus VIII* (Berlin Ars. vol. v. p. 1471).

⁹ See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* (ed. 2) 19 f.

¹⁰ He is quoted in Diog. Laert. I. c. p. Pol. I. 11. 9 with the critical notes.

¹¹ See my third edn. of the *Politics* 2 note 7: *End. Eth.* VII. 2 1238 b 1 should be compared with *Pol.* IV 13 88 5—7: *End. Eth.* VIII. 3 1242 26 ff., 1249 a 12, with *Pol.* IV (VII). § 7. Compare further *End. Eth.* III 1231 b 38—1232 a 5 with *Pol.* I. 9 1257 a 6—10; *End. Eth.* II. 11 1221 19—23 with *Pol.* IV (VII). 13 § 2 1232 26—38; *End. Eth.* VII. 10 1242 a with *Pol.* III. 6 88 3—5 1278 b 21—esp. 21 f., 25 f. See also Zeller in *Her.* xv. 1880. 553—556, who compares *End. Eth.* II. 1. 1218 b 32 ff. with *Pol.*

highly improbable, to say the least, that in the century (200 B.C.—101 B.C.) which elapsed between Hermippos and Apellikon of Teos, the precursor of Tyrannion and Andronikos¹, this older edition should have been so completely lost that the new editors had not a single copy of it at their disposal², while it is equally incredible that they should intentionally have declined to use it. The exact agreement in the number of the books would undoubtedly render it a far more reasonable conclusion that—except for the transposition, to which we have now no clue—the new edition of this work differed much less from the old than was the case with some other Aristotelian writings.

The first distinct traces of actual use of the treatise are next to be found in Cicero³. It is true he did not use it directly⁴ and the new recension of Andronikos was not at the time in existence. Yet we are not obliged to assume that he drew from an earlier writer who availed himself of the former edition⁵: it is quite as conceivable that Tyrannion, with whom he was in frequent intercourse, may have provided him with extracts from the work suitable for his purpose, and these may have been his sources⁶. Even when the new edition appeared, it found but few readers; the traces of its use are extremely scanty⁷, and it is in

(vii). i. 1323 a 23, b 18, b 27; and *Eud. Eth.* II. i. 1219 a 33 with *Pol.* IV (vii). 8. 5, 1328 a 35.

¹ See Strabo *l.c.*; Plutarch *l.c.*

² Polenar *op. cit.* p. 78 finds no difficulty in this.

³ *De fin.* V. 4. 11, *ad Quint. frat.* III. 5. 1, *De leg.* III. 6. 14, *De rep.* I. c. 25 (comp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 11, 12, 6 § 3 f., I. 2 § 9), c. 26 (cp. *Pol.* III. 1 § 1, 6 § 1, 7 §§ 1, 2), c. 27 (cp. *Pol.* III. 9 §§ 1, 2, 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 6, 7, 16 § 2), c. 29 (cp. *Pol.* VI (IV) cc. 8, 11). The doubts of Heitz (*op. c.* 241), whether after all we get any real evidence from Cicero, are unreasonable in face of the quotation *ad Quint. fr.*

⁴ See Zeller *op. c.* II ii 151 n. (6).

⁵ So Zeller *l.c.* Whether the author of the *Magis Moralia* in I. 4, 1184 b 33 f. shows any acquaintance with *Politics* IV (vii). 13. 5 Zeller rightly regards as uncertain.

⁶ Cp. *ad Ath.* IV. 4 § 1, 8 a § 2, *ad Qu. fr.* II. 4 § 2, III. 4 § 5, 5 § 6.

⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias *On the Metaphysics* 15, 6 (ed. Bonitz); Eubulos, a contemporary of Longinus, *Ἐπιστολὴς τῶν πρὸς τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνα πολιτικῶν ἀναρμένων* ed. Mai *Script. vet. nov. coll.* Vat. II. 671 ff.; Julian *Letter to The-*

musius 26017, 26311; *Scholion Aldina* upon Aristoph. *Alcherm.* 92, 980; *Scholion* on Lucian *Diadem* 3 (ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ); Michael of Ephesus *On the Nicom. Ethics* fol. 70 a, 186 a, 187 b, 188 b, 189 a; Pseudo-Plutarch *De nobil.* c. 6 932 b ff., c. 8 937 a ff.; Suidas and Photius *s.v.* ἐκτατάς; Eustathios *On the Ilud* p. 625, 36, p. 126, 12 ff.; *De Theol. urb.* p. 281, 60 (ed. Tafel); Theodoros Metochites *Alacell.* 644, 667 (ed. Knechtling). Thus Dionysios of Halikarnassos in his description of the Greek ἀστυνομία *Roman Antiquities* V. 73 has not used Aristotle III. 14 §§ 8, 9 as his authority, but the similar account in Theophrastos *πρὸς παιδείας*. In his critical edition, p. XLIV and note (82), Summil wrongly followed Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57 n. (4) in maintaining that everything which Dionysios relates *l.c.* V. 73 f. exactly agrees with Aristotle (II. 14 f.), and consequently that Theophrastos *πρὸς παιδείας* is borrowed altogether from Aristotle. Meanwhile Krohn, *op. c.* 47, pointed out certain essential differences, and Henkel, *op. c.* 3 note 1, has more accurately explained where Theophrastos' line of thought diverges and becomes original. Hence what Dionysios has here borrowed from Theophrastos could not have been derived from Aristotle. But this only

keeping with their infrequency that we do not possess a single ms. of the *Politics* of earlier date than the fourteenth century. Amongst the Arabs it remained quite neglected. To the reading public of the west in the Christian middle age it was introduced by the Latin translation of the Dominican monk William of Moerbeke¹: on the basis of his version Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas wrote commentaries to the work².

III. GENERAL ESTIMATE.

At the time when the *Politics* was first made known to mediæval students, and for some centuries afterwards, the ground was not prepared for a due appreciation of it. It was only by degrees, as the development of the modern state went on, that the treatise began to be rightly understood³, until at last even in its present incomplete and fragmentary condition we have learnt to recognise in it 'the richest and greatest contribution of antiquity, or, allowing for the difference of the times, perhaps the greatest of all the works we have upon political science'⁴. There is certainly no second work to be named in this field of enquiry which in a like degree displays the rare combination of statesmanlike intellect, a scholar's acquaintance with history, and the observation of a man of science, with the philosopher's systematic arrangement of phenomena and keen penetration into their inmost nature⁵. Marvellous student of human nature that he was, Aristotle, although never actually engaged in public affairs, has observed with all a statesman's shrewd sense the complicated political and social relations

increases the improbability of Krohn's assertion mentioned p. 15 n. above, for which these two passages are his sole authority,—that *Pol.* III. 14 is an excerpt from that very work of Theophrastus. Compare the note on III. 14. 9 (624).

¹ See above p. 1.

² That of the two Thomas wrote his earlier than his master Albert, between 1261 and 1269, was the view of Jourdain *Recherches critiques sur les anciennes traductions d'Aristote* 393 f., 456 (Paris 1819). Nearly the whole text of the old Latin version was incorporated in the commentary of Albert, who in this work imitated the method of his pupil. Cp. my critical edition VI III. (4) & (5). [Von Hertling in *Rh. Mus.* XXXIX. 1884. 446—457 argues that the question of relative priority cannot be decided, but that S. Thomas left his commentary unfinished at his death in 1274. Albertus Magnus

died 1280.]

³ On this subject generally see Oncken *l. c.* I. 64—80. The first beginnings of such an appreciation are to be found in Oresme: cp. Roscher in the *Zeitschrift f. d. Staatswissenschaft*. XIX. 1863. 305 ff.

⁴ Zeller *op. c.* II II 753 f. Compare Bradley's admirable exposition in *Hellenica* (Oxford, 1880) 181—183. Lang is certainly not far wrong when he remarks in the Introductory Essays to Bolland's translation of Bks. I, III, IV (VII) p. 15 (London 1877. 8), 'Indeed, when we come to analyse his method we find three incongruous elements, really scientific enquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysic which literally *sublimi fert sidera vertice*, and listens for the eternal harmonies of Nature'. This thought is worked out more fully by Giant *Aristotle* 117 ff.

⁵ Zeller *op. c.* II II 707, 708.

of his nation, and in part of other nations. He has analysed them with the cool indifference of the biologist, with the same unwearied calm and caution which characterize his treatises on natural science. The astonishing store of information which he had amassed upon history in general and the special history of nearly all the Greek communities is here turned to the best account. At the same time there is diffused throughout the work a warm genial breath of philosophic and moral idealism, which, however closely allied to some of its defects, nevertheless reconciles us to certain harsh traits in it. From the writer's peculiar point of view however this very tendency to idealism, so far from softening such traits, serves only to bring them into stronger relief: so that every now and then we see the shrewd thinker, elsewhere so strictly logical, entangle himself in a network of contradictions.

The peculiarity of his point of view and therewith the distinctive importance of the work, historically and for all time to come, consists in this, that Aristotle alone with full and complete success has given expression in theory to the whole import of the Greek state and of Greek political life in all its bearings. The only limitation to this is the decided repugnance he manifests to certain political and social ideas, the outcome of that development of democracy, whereby we may fairly admit the Greek state to have been, so to speak, carried beyond itself. This success deserves to be all the more highly estimated in proportion as his position is in this respect unique. Certainly even before he wrote, not to mention Plato's trenchant dialogues, there was a literature—it may be a tolerably large literature—upon political, legal and social questions, as may be learnt from his own¹ and Plato's² cursory notices, although we know next to nothing else about these writers³. The passages quoted show how many ideas deserving of consideration they had disclosed, but at the same time how far they fell short of the goal which Aristotle attained. Here again his dependence on Plato is

¹ I. 3. 4. with *n.* (31), I. 6 §§ 1—5 *nn.* (49 b) (50 b), I. 9. 11 *n.* (88 b), II. 6 §§ 17—19 *nn.* (219) (221), II. 8. 16 *n.* (269), II. 9. 33 *n.* (342), II. 12 §§ 2—4 *nn.* (400) (404), III. 3. 1 *n.* (454), III. 13. 11 *n.* (596), IV (VII). 2. 5 II., IV (VII). 6. 1 *n.* (770), IV (VII). 14. 16 *n.* (911), VI (IV). 1 § 5, § 6 *nn.* (1118) (1123). Comp. also III. 4. 8 *n.* (476), VI (IV). 3. 7 *n.* (1158). To this list may be added Phaleas II. 7, 12 § 12, Hippodamos II. 8, Thubron or Thibron, IV (VII). 14. 17 and perhaps Telekles VI (IV). 14. 4. *n.* (1321). Aristotle makes no mention of Xenophon: yet see *n.* on IV (VII). 14. 16

(911). In many of the passages cited above it is doubtful whether he means statements in writing. See L. Stein's paper *Greek theories of political science before Aristotle and Plato in the Zeitschrift f. d. gesamte Staatswissenschaft*. IX. 1853. 115—182.

² *Laws* I. 630 E, XII. 972 E. (3). on the latter passage *n.* on II. 6. 17 (219), on the former Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 395 *n.* (2).

³ See Henkel's exhaustive collection of *facis Studien zur Geschichte der griech. Lehre vom Staat* (Leipzig 1872, 8) p. 2 ff.

evident; a dependence far greater than was once imagined or than might be expected from the severity of his polemical criticism, which is frequently, nay in most cases, successful. For firstly, Aristotle's criticism touches what are merely external excrescences of the two pattern states sketched by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*; enough of common ground still remains on which to raise his own design of an absolutely best constitution side by side with them¹. Further, the *Laws* proves Plato by no means deficient in exact knowledge of Athenian public life; while above all, his descriptions in the *Republic* of other constitutions besides the 'only perfect state', i.e. of the actually existing forms of government, suffice to show 'that he did not lack experience or penetration for judging of political conditions'. In short Aristotle is indebted to his master for numerous ideas in every department of political speculation². But it should not be forgotten how often these ideas in Plato are mere germs which only received a fruitful development at the hands of his disciple; or random statements which require to be demonstrated and expanded by Aristotle, and to be fitted into their place in the whole framework of his system, before their full scope is attained. When all has been deducted that can in any way be regarded as an inheritance from Plato, quite enough remains which Aristotle can claim for his very own. One great difference in the works of these two men is most characteristically presented. When Plato comes to deal with existing forms of government he depicts them in a rough and ready way; whereas Aristotle bestows

¹ I may refer to the notes on

I. 13. 16 (127) IV (VII). 6. 5 (774),
 II. 5. 2 (153) IV (VII). 10. 13 (828),
 II. 5. 7 (158) IV (VII). 12. 2 (859),
 II. 5. 15 (166) IV (VII). 14. 10 (936),
 II. 6. 5 (192) IV (VII). 16. 1 (937),
 II. 6. 10 (208) IV (VII). 16. 12 (944),
 II. 6. 15 (215) IV (VII). 16. 14 (945),
 II. 7. 6 (236 b) IV (VII). 16. 15 (946),
 II. 9. 5 (285) V (VIII). 5. 4 (1024),
 II. 9. 23 (325) V (VIII). 5. 5 (1025):
 also to Thünot *Études sur Aristote* 109 ff.
 (Paris 1866. 8), Van der Rest *Platon et*
Aristote 452 ff. (Bruxelles 1876. 8).

² Zeller *op. c.* II i 783 (Eng. tr. *Plato*
 p. 492). More precise details are given
 in Steinhauf *Introductions to Plato's Works*
 v. 238 ff., Sussemlil *Plat. Phil.* II. 226 ff.

³ Reference may be permitted to the
 notes on the following passages:

Bk. I. 2 § 2 ff. (5); 5 § 9 (46); 6 § 8
 (54); 9 § 18 (93); 10 §§ 4, 5 (98); 11 § 6
 (103); 13 § 12 (121), 13 § 16 (127):

Bk. II. 5 §§ 1, 2 (153), 5 § 16 (167),
 5 § 17 (168), 5 §§ 19—24 (172); 6 § 5

(192), 6 § 6 (201), 6 § 9 (206 b) (207),
 6 § 15 (215); 8 § 21 (273) (274), 8 § 25
 (277); 9 § 2 (279), 9 § 5 (283) (285),
 9 § 11 (295 b), 9 § 13 (297), 9 § 20 (318),
 9 § 25 (330), 9 § 27 (335), 9 § 31 (341),
 9 § 34 (344):

Bk. III. 3 § 9 (466); 4 § 18 (499);
 7 § 1 (533); 11 § 19 (579); 16 § 2 (673),
 16 § 11 (652):

Bk. IV (VII). 6 § 5 (774); 7 § 2 (781),
 10 § 13 (828); 12 § 2 (859), 12 § 3 (860),
 12 § 8 (866) (867); 14 § 13 (907), 14 § 14
 (908); 15 § 10 (936); 16 § 1 (937), 16
 § 12 (944), 16 § 14 (945), 16 § 15 (946),
 16 § 17 (948); 17 § 1 (950), 17 § 5 (959):

Bk. V (VIII). 4 § 2 (1006), 4 § 7
 (1014), 4 § 9 (1015) (1016); 5 § 3 (1022);
 6 § 2 (1061), 6 § 9 (1071); 7 § 9 (1105):

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 1 (1114); 2 § 3
 (1139) (1140):

Bk. VII (VI). 2 § 3 (1391):

Bk. VIII (V). 9 § 13 (1644); 11 § 10
 (1724) (1725), 11 § 11 (1727), 11 § 12
 (1729); 12 § 8 (1763), 12 § 9 (1764).

the most affectionate care on explaining and reproducing their minutest details; it is evident that he lingers over them involuntarily, as if they were his own peculiar province, with far greater pleasure and patience, in spite of his theories, than when he is treating of his own ideal state.

From the point of view which has just been characterized the horizon is to Aristotle necessarily limited. Here, too, it is to the limitation that he owes most of what he has in common with Plato upon this subject. In both, the close connexion of Politics with Ethics has a beneficial effect; in both, it is a weakness that this connexion becomes, in genuine Greek fashion, too much like entire unity. Each of them recognises in the state itself the school of morality in the Greek sense of the word, as the harmonious development of all the powers with which individuals in different kind and degree have been endowed; the preparation, therefore, for true human happiness. Only from this point can we explain the peculiar assumption, common to these two thinkers, of a pattern state to be specially constructed in contrast to all actually existing constitutions; a state only possible amongst Hellenes as the most highly gifted race; in which the perfect citizen is also the perfect man¹. Further, these two philosophers have no higher or more comprehensive conception of the state than as merely a Greek city-community, a canton with hamlets and villages: hence their ideal of a perfect state never really emerges from this narrow setting². Nay more, it is saddled with all the conditions of a small Greek city-state: slavery in the first place; depreciation of labour; contempt for commerce, industry, and trade; and the peculiarly Greek conception that leisure, to be devoted to the exclusive pursuit of the affairs of the state, and to the intellectual and moral culture of himself and his fellow-citizens, free from all compulsion to trouble about a living, is the only thing worthy of a true freeman; a conception that to our present view savours strongly of idleness. Lastly this makes it necessary that the minority, consisting of an exclusive body of full citizens, should have a secure capital guaranteed to them³.

But there is this vast difference between Aristotle and Plato. By the latter this very limitation of the Greek city-community is carried to the

¹ I may refer the reader to the somewhat daring but ingenious attempt of my excellent colleague Von Wilamowitz-Möllerndorff *Aus Kydathen* 47-64 (Berlin 1880. 8) to trace the growth of this idea in Plato and his predecessors, and the rise of political speculation generally, to the internal history of the Athenian people and state.

² Comp. on I. 2. 4 note (11), I. 2. 6

II. 1 (131), II. 2. 3 (132), III. 3. 4 (460). Wilamowitz on the other hand endeavours to show, *op. cit.* 110-113, that the Athenian state of Cleisthenes and Pericles, as it actually existed, was not really subject to this limitation.

³ See the notes on I. 9 § 18, 10 § 4, 11 § 6, 13 § 13; II. 9 § 2, 11 § 10; III. 13 § 12 (599).

extreme, and the state as it were forced back into the family, becoming under the ideal constitution nothing but an expanded family. The former on the other hand gives all prominence to the conception of the state, so far as the above limitation allows; he is careful to draw the sharpest distinction between the state and the family at the very time when he is demonstrating the true significance of the latter in relation to the former. This is made the starting-point not simply of his whole exposition, wherein at the outset he assumes a hostile attitude to Plato¹, but in II. 2 § 2, § 7, of his attack upon Plato's ideal state in particular². By exploring, in all directions farther than did his master, the nature of the Hellenic state, he has penetrated to the inmost essence of the state in general, of which this Hellenic state was at any rate an important embodiment. He has thus succeeded in discovering for all succeeding times a series of the most important laws of political and social life. Here first, for example, not in Plato, do we find the outlines of Political Economy. At the same time in this limitation of his point of view must be sought the reason why from the soundest premisses, from observations of fact most striking and profound, he not unfrequently deduces the most mistaken conclusions.

IV. ECONOMIC (O'IKONOMIKH)—SLAVERY AND THE THEORY OF WEALTH³.

The opening chapters, Bk. I. cc. 1, 2, form the introduction to the work, and here we follow our author with undivided assent. In opposition to Plato he traces the origin of the family to a process of organic natural growth, and next shows how the state arises out of the family through the intermediate step of the clan-village⁴. At the same time he states what is the specific difference between the state and the family, and characterizes the former as the product of no arbitrary convention, but rather of a necessity arising from man's inner nature. He proclaims a truth as novel as it was important⁵ that man, and

¹ See the notes on I. 1 § 2, 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2.

² See further II. 3 § 4—4 § 10, 5 §§ 14—26 and note on II. 2. 2 (131).

³ On this and the following sections comp. Sussehl *op. cit.* On the composition of the *Politics* 17—29.

⁴ Mommsen's account in the *History of Rome*, I c. 3, p. 37 ff. of the Eng. trans. (London 1877. 8), may be compared.

⁵ Van der Rest *op. c.* 372. That from this proposition there follows for Aristotle the natural right of slavery, as Oncken (*op. c.* II. 29 f.) maintains, is undeniable; yet he deduces it only by the aid of his other assumptions. Oncken (p. 23) thinks no one would now subscribe the further proposition that he who is by nature outside the state, *deōlos*, is either exalted above humanity or a degraded savage. I am of the contrary opinion;

properly speaking he alone of all creatures upon the earth, is a being destined by nature for political society. Nevertheless the actual combination to form the state appears (see 2 § 15) to be man's own spontaneous act¹, quite as much as the actual formation of poetry out of its germs in man's inner nature and the first rude attempts to develop them².

The expositions which form the first main division of the work, the theory of the household or family as the basis of the state (*οἰκονομική*) i. cc. 3—13), make a mixed impression upon the reader: especially is this true of the account of slavery c. 4. ff.

Besides (1) the view of those in favour of simple adherence to custom, who would maintain the existing slavery due to birth, purchase, or war, as perfectly justified, and (2) the more moderate view accepted by Plato, which pronounced against the extension of slavery to Hellenes³, Aristotle found a third theory already in the field which rejected all slavery as contrary to nature. However true in itself, this last-named theory was many centuries in advance of the age⁴; and beyond all doubt its defenders had lightly passed over what was the main point, the possibility namely of making their principle a living reality at the time⁵. Either Plato was unacquainted with this view or he considered that it did not require to be refuted; in any case it was an axiom with him, that within the limits assigned slavery was justified. Thus Aristotle deserves unqualified approval for having been the first to appreciate the

the proposition is just as true now as when Aristotle wrote it.

¹ Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 393 f., Oncken *op. cit.* II. 18 f. Comp. n. on i. 2. 15 (28 b).

² *Poet.* c. 4 §§ 1—6.

³ See on i. 5 § 9 n. (46), 6 § 8 (54).

⁴ Even in the time of the Roman empire voices like Seneca's remained unsupported. The whole order of ancient society was once for all established on the basis of slavery, and even Christianity, although it contained in itself the principle which must lead to its extinction, could make no alteration for the time being. The primitive Christian Church may have indirectly prepared for the abolition of slavery (see Locky *History of Rationalism* II. 238 ff.), but it was directly hostile to such a change. See for proof and elucidation of this statement L. Schiller *Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Sklaverei* 3 ff. (Erlangen 1847. 4) and Oncken *op. cit.* II. 60—74. It should be remembered that even now all the traces of slavery have not as yet disappeared

amongst Christian nations, one of the most important having only been destroyed by the recent civil war in North America; that serfdom was but lately abolished in Russia, and the last remnants of it in Germany were not removed until the present century. [If the status of slavery is not tolerated openly in Christendom, there is much analogy to it in the position of uncivilized tribes in relation to European peoples in colonial settlements, e.g. that of the South-African natives to the Boers, under the guise of indenture. But the system of labour recruiting in the Western Pacific for Queensland and Fiji, even assuming that no irregularities occur, and the cattle traffic generally (whether in English, French, or Spanish possessions) have equally the effect of placing ignorant and unprotected natives entirely at the mercy of their employers, and that, too, in a strange country. II. W. J.]

⁵ So Hildenbrand rightly thinks *op. cit.* 405.

difficulties of the question in their full extent. But a successful solution of it was for him impossible. With a clear and true insight he saw that the theory referred to could not practically be carried out in the Greek state; a higher conception of the state, as we have said, he neither did nor could possess. It was inevitable that this insight should mislead him into the belief that the view itself was theoretically incorrect: that he should honestly endeavour to find scientific grounds for this belief of his, is entirely to his credit. It was just as inevitable that the attempt merely involved him in self-contradictions, and indeed resulted in the proof of the exact opposite¹. In substance he decides in favour of a view similar to Plato's, which he more exactly determines and modifies by saying that there are certain slaves by nature who are to be sought for amongst non-Hellenes, and that none but these ought actually to be enslaved². 'The thought that slavery is incompatible with 'the dignity of man' has occurred to him as well as to the unconditional opponents of the institution, but not as yet 'the thought of the universality of man's dignity'³. In contradiction to his own psychological principles he makes the difference between the most perfect and the least perfect of men as great as that between man and beast, and thinks that thereby he has theoretically discovered his slaves by nature. But he has himself to admit that there is no certain practical criterion by which to distinguish these men from others. It is quite possible that a slave's soul may dwell in a nobly formed body, and the soul of one of nature's freemen in an ignoble frame; furthermore men of truly free and noble mind may be born amongst the non-Hellenes, or men of servile nature amongst the Hellenes. The consequence is that the criterion of Hellenic birth, to which on the whole Aristotle adheres, ought not to serve as an unconditional protection against well deserved slavery⁴. These, he thinks, are only exceptions to the rule; but he cannot deny that these exceptions are numerous; and yet he does not observe, that therefore of necessity there must be many cases where slavery as it actually exists is in perpetual conflict with the law of nature, even as laid down by himself. His remarks on the need of domestic servants for the house, and on the natural antithesis of ruler and subject pervading all relations of existence are clear and striking; but they by no means warrant the conclusion that these servants must at the same time be slaves or serfs⁵. Yet in all fairness it ought to

¹ See on I. 4 § 2, 5 § 8, § 9 n. (45), 6 § 3, 8 § n. (55), § 9 n. (56), § 10 n. (57). Compare also the notes on I. 4 § 5, 13 § 12.

² Comp. the notes on I. 5 § 10 (47), 6 § 8 (34).

³ Hildenbrand *op. cit.* 404 f.

⁴ Comp. the notes on I. 6 § 9 (56), and 6 § 3 (50).

⁵ See the notes on I. 5 § 8 (43) and 5 § 9 (45).

be borne in mind not merely that the Fathers of the early Church used arguments in favour of slavery which are no better¹, but that in all ages attempts have been made to justify serfdom or slavery by similar fallacies². Nay more, Aristotle's arguments, when properly qualified, are well suited to become the subject of grave consideration even in our own day; to make us aware of contradictions in our present views; and thus to suggest some modest restraint upon a too vehement criticism of the great thinker of antiquity. Or does the conviction, which is forced upon us by experience, that whole races of men lack the capacity for civilization, so readily accord with our belief, no less well founded, in the dignity of human nature everywhere? And does the interval between the lowest individual of such a race and the greatest spirits of humanity really fall far short of that which separates man from the animals? If lastly it is not to be denied, that even within the pale of civilized nations Providence ensures the necessary distinction between some men adapted to physical toil and others who are suited to intellectual exertion, should we not be as perplexed as Aristotle if we were required to set up a valid criterion between the two sorts of natures? As a matter of fact he who has to live by the labour of his hands will always be debarred from that complete participation in political life which constitutes the citizen proper. Even the educated man of our own day is so fully occupied with the discharge of his professional duties that frequently he has no time to take that share in politics which the modern state, if it is to prosper, is obliged to demand from him³.

The more general discussions on production and property⁴ which follow the investigation into slavery, I. 8—11, cannot be said to be attached to it 'in a fairly systematic manner'⁵, but on the contrary quite loosely and lightly⁶. It is open to question, however, whether the passage which we must in all probability assume to be lost a little further on (I. 12. 1) did not originally supplement and complete the requisite organic connexion of these discussions with the theory of the family as a whole⁷.

¹ Oncken *op. cit.* II. 73 f.

² Oncken *op. cit.* II. 38.

³ On this subject see some remarks of Lang, *op. c.* 60, and Bradley *op. c.* 215 f., 217 f., which are quoted in the notes on I. 5, 70 (47) and III. 5, 7 (511).

⁴ (Both are included under *χρηματιστική*. The Greek *κρίσις* and the German 'Erwerb' more properly mean 'Acquisition'. Plato indeed, *Soph.* 219 C, D, opposes *κρημνική* to *τεχνική*, classing all the 'arts'

under one or the other of these two divisions. But it is convenient to retain the established technical term in English treatises on Political Economy, viz. 'Production', that is, production of wealth. Tr.]

⁵ As Teichmüller asserts *Die Einheit der aristotelischen Eudamonia* 148 (St. Petersburg 1859. 8).

⁶ Zeller *op. c.* II li 693.

⁷ See on I. 12. 1 n. (107).

However that may be, certain it is that the principle of exclusive slave labour, which Aristotle has adopted, has robbed his economic theory of precisely that which must be taken to be the soul of the modern science, the conception of economic labour. It has already been remarked that he cannot help sharing to the full the national prejudice of Greece against all industrial labour as something degrading and servile. As Oncken in particular has excellently pointed out¹, his sort of distinction between direct or natural production and indirect acquisition by means of exchange, and further between the subdivisions of the two species, derives its peculiar colouring from this defect. 'The axiom 'that man must consider himself the born proprietor of all the treasures 'of the earth, we also hold to be true'; and the proposition, which Aristotle is fond of repeating and which we meet with once more here, that nature makes nothing in vain, should continue to be respected in spite of the thorough-going or half-and-half materialism of our times. But one essential side of man's relation to his planet and to the rest of its productions and inhabitants has escaped Aristotle altogether: of the important part borne by labour in determining this relation he knows nothing: in common with all the ancients he lacked the idea of the gradual acquisition of command over nature and of the gradual unfolding of human culture which accompanies it step by step. Hence it is that he has no presentiment of the epoch-making importance of agriculture as the transition to a settled life; he sets this occupation completely on a level with that of the nomad, the hunter, or the fisherman. He does not separate settled cattle-breeding from the pastoral life of the herdsman who wanders without a home; nor does he bring it into inseparable connexion, as he should do, with agriculture². Agriculture, moreover, he thinks, can be carried on by slaves just like other trades³, and 'the owner of a piece of ground tilled in this way stands to the 'fruits of the earth in much the same relation as the herdsman, the 'hunter and fisherman. He gets them ready made into his hands, and 'with even less trouble than they do: thus the notion of individual 'labour, of personal acquisition in agriculture, falls into the background 'in Aristotle's view. And this explains the gross inexactitude in his 'notion of property, which is disclosed when he treats plunder as a 'further natural species of production standing on the same footing with 'the former species.' Besides, in so doing he overlooks the fact that

¹ *op. cit.* II. 75—114: whence the passages with quotation marks are taken.

² Cp. also on VII (VI). 4. 11 n. (1422).

³ See IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4 οὗτοι βέλαντες βίαν οὐτ' ἀγοράων δὲ ἔχουσιν τοὺς πολέτας...

οὐδὲ δὲ γεωργούς εἶναι, § 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργούς δοῦλοις ἢ βαρβάρους [?] περιποιεῖν: 10 §§ 9—13; further *Exc.* III. on Bk. I and n. (282) on II. 9. 4.

plunder by its very nature cannot possibly be included, as it is by him, with direct appropriation of the gifts of nature as distinct from sale and barter, that is, from every kind of voluntary exchange: for it is nothing else than the transfer of property in the rudest form by violence and without compensation. Whoever then regards the most violent form of this transfer as natural would be bound in all fairness to hold the same of its milder forms, fraud and theft. Nothing but personal labour creates a valid and incontestable right to property, and such a right over the soil can only be won by the plough. Thus Aristotle can make an excellent defence of the utility of property against Plato and can set it in its true light; but missing the conception of economic labour he misses therewith the full and logically clear notion of property. His notion too of what is natural must under such circumstances lose all definiteness when it comes to be applied to civilized nations in advanced stages of development. He certainly never intended to concede to plunder a place in his model state; but he is exposed to the charge of inconsistency, when he nevertheless declares it to be something natural on the ground that it undoubtedly is so to men in a state of nature, without seeing that what is natural for men in a state of nature is not natural for civilized men¹. Indeed he has in general no sort of insight into the nature of historical development; for in history he discerns, not the reign of general laws, but merely the action of individual men, free or even capricious, although often wrecked on circumstances.

When he comes to treat of exchange, not merely do we find Adam Smith's distinction between value in use and value in exchange already anticipated², but the whole discussion is evidence 'how acutely Aristotle has thought out a subject which Hellenic philosophy before him seems at the best to have barely touched. The successive steps in the rise of commerce and the origin of money could not be exhibited with more of truth to fact or of historical accuracy than has been here accomplished in a style of unerring precision, piercing to the heart of the subject to reproduce it with classic brevity and definiteness, yet so exhaustively that modern science has found nothing to alter or to add.' Besides admitting that exchange of commodities is not contrary to nature he goes on to show how from it buying and selling necessarily arose, and from that again a new mode of acquisition, trade in merchandise. Apparently he would further allow exchange to be carried on through a coined medium, so long as it is merely to relieve indispensable barter and not as a business of its own. But here comes in again his want of clearness and that inconsistency which leads

¹ See on I. 8. 7 *ss.* (71) and I. 9. 8 *ss.* (82).

² Van der Rest *op. cit.* p. 382.

him to see an ever increasing degeneracy and departure from the paths of nature¹ in what he himself recognises as a necessary development: 'starting with the most accurate views on the nature and necessity of monetary exchange he is led in the end actually to reject all commerce and all practical trading with capital.' He rightly sees how essential it is that the article chosen as the medium of exchange should be useful in itself², but at the same time as the determinate value of each coin is regulated by law and convention he is misled into the belief that nothing but pure caprice has a hand in this convention: that it was by mere chance that metals have been selected out of all useful articles, and in particular that amongst all the more highly civilized nations gold and silver are exclusively employed for coining into money, at all events for foreign trade. Once for all he states the case in such a way that it might easily be believed he has come, a few lines further on, in contradiction to himself, to hold that coined money no longer current loses even its value as a metal³.

Further, while correctly explaining the origin of money, 'he nevertheless fails to recognise to the full extent the way in which its introduction must naturally react upon the value of natural products: how they are all without exception thereby turned into wares, whose value is regulated by their market-price, so that anything which finds no market, or no sale in the market, possesses no more value than heaps of gold on a desert island; the richest harvest of the productions of nature, if its abundance does not attract a purchaser, being just as useless rubbish as the wealth called into existence by Midas'. After the later stage of a monetary system has been attained Aristotle makes the vain attempt to preserve in his conceptions the primitive economy of nature, which has come to an end simply because it has become impossible. In the business of the merchant he sees no more than what lies on the surface, speculation, money-making, the accumulation of capital: accordingly he condemns it as a purely artificial and unnatural pursuit. There too he overlooks the mental labour, the economic service which trade renders, not by any means exclusively to benefit the purses of those engaged in it.' The insatiable nature of unscrupulous avarice he opposes in most forcible language, but it is in vain that 'he endeavours to restrict productive labour in domestic economy within any other limits than those which are set by the powers and conscience of the individual'. Of industry as

¹ See on I. 9. 8 n. (82).

² Cp. on I. 9. 11 n. (88).

³ See on I. 9. 8 n. (84).

⁴ Compare the notes on I. 9. § 13 (90).

⁵ But see on the other hand the note on I. 9. 11 (87).

§ 18 (93).

understood in Political Economy he has no more conception than of labour.' Having failed to recognise the importance of agriculture in human development he now mistakes still more the benefits introduced by property, which money first made really capable of transfer, 'that second great victory in the struggle between human labour and the forces of nature'. To this great democratic revolution it is impossible to accommodate' his thoroughly aristocratic economic theory, which, at the expense of toiling slaves and resident aliens, guarantees in true Hellenic fashion to the handful of privileged citizens their leisure and the secure provision of their subsistence from their family estates, so that in fact they need take no trouble to increase their possessions. 'Aristotle's freeholder,' in Oncken's words, 'is not a producer at all, but consumes what is given by nature. Aristotle has no insight into the true natural law of economic development, the aim of which is to overcome nature by freeing industrial life from the vicissitudes of her smile and frown.' Of the importance herein attaching to capital antiquity generally and the middle age never had an inkling; as little did they perceive that to receive interest on capital is not really different from selling the produce of labour. On the perverse view which Aristotle took of money¹ it is intelligible, that in accord with all ancient philosophy and the whole of the middle age², he declares lending money upon interest to be the most shameful of all modes of gain; yet it is certainly true on the other hand that 'the free community of antiquity was in reality nothing but an association of capitalists who lived on the interest of the capital they had invested in their slaves.'

Lastly, it is interesting to see how inconsistent this whole economic theory becomes when it passes over to the 'practical part'. What is etc (I. II §§ 1, 2) described as the most natural mode of life is nothing but cattle-raising and tillage pure and simple on a large scale, which is impossible without considerable capital, an industrial spirit and a knowledge of the market. Consequently 'the separation which Aristotle has made between artificial and natural modes of life cannot be strictly maintained even in the case of those who rear cattle and till the soil, for whom nature herself, in the strictest sense of the word, provides a field of labour. He proves in his own case the truth of his profound remark made in this same connexion: that in all such matters, while speculation is free, practice has its necessary restrictions.' It is no less noteworthy that in his economic theory he completely loses sight of that

¹ Cp. *ib.* on I. 9. 18 (93).

² Cp. *ib.* on I. 10 §§ 4, 5.

³ Comp. Lecky *op. cit.* II. 277—289,

Lang *op. cit.* 59. [See however Cunningham *Christian Opinion on Usury* pp. 26—33, 36 (Edinburgh 1884).]

essential distinction between the family and the state upon which he insists so much elsewhere. Several times in these discussions he mentions the *πολιτικός* who controls the finances of a state as well as the *οικονόμος* who manages the property of a household, and that too in a way which forces the reader 'to assume that the task and the procedure in both cases are completely similar': I. 8 §§ 13—15, 10 §§ 1—3, 11 § 11. With this agrees the decided irony¹ with which he speaks of those statesmen whose whole political wisdom lies in their financial devices, while these devices amount to nothing but keeping the state coffers constantly filled by all kinds of monopolies. And yet 'the great revolution caused by the necessity of exchange he has deduced with perfect correctness from the fact that entirely new conditions of life and of production arise as soon as ever a single family develops into a circle of several families (I. 9. 5). What changes then are to be anticipated when small communities coalesce into a political unity; when intercourse springs up between different political bodies and reacts in a modifying and transforming manner upon the internal condition of each of them! Had Aristotle gone into this question the untenableness of his economic theory would have been made even more glaringly manifest than is at present the case.'

In the last chapter of the first book, when Aristotle comes to enquire into the treatment of the slave and his capacity for virtue, his peculiar view of natural slavery involves him in an awkward dilemma, from which he cannot be said to have escaped very happily. The slave by nature to a certain extent remains a human being, and yet again to a certain extent he has, properly speaking, ceased to be one. On the one hand Aristotle demands that there should be a specific difference, and not merely one of degree, between the virtue (*ἀρετή*) of the man, the woman, the child, and the slave (e.g. 13 §§ 4, 5). On the other, his own subsequent elaborate enquiry into ethical virtue², as soon as the question is started, wherein consists the distinction between the virtue which commands and the virtue which obeys, tends far more to a mere quantitative variation than to really distinct species³—to say nothing of the further question, wherein the obedience of the wife differs from that of the child, and both from that of the slave. And this is not the only defect which this enquiry displays⁴.

¹ Strangely misunderstood by Oncken *l.c.* II. 173, who in consequence unjustly accuses Aristotle of a fresh contradiction here. While admitting that many states need such devices, Aristotle does not thereby imply that he thinks this a proof of the excellence of such states.

² On the way in which Aristotle distinguishes intellectual from moral excellence see on I. 13. 6 *h.* (112).

³ Van der Kolk *op. c.* 378. Comp. also *iii.* on I. 13 § 7 (114 l.) and on §§ 11—13 (120—122).

⁴ See the *iii.* on I. 13. 12.

V. THE REVIEW OF PRECEDING THEORIES AND APPROVED CONSTITUTIONS.

With the second book we come at once to the theory of the state properly so called; divided, according to Aristotle's own statement, into two parts which treat (1) of the constitution, and (2) of legislation. From two passages in the later books, III. 15 § 2, VI (IV). 1 §§ 9, 10, it is unquestionable¹ that the philosopher intended to treat of both in his work; but in the form in which it has come down to us it has not advanced beyond the former, and even of this considerable sections are wanting.

The second book more especially constitutes the critical part, the remainder of the work the positive or dogmatic part, of the theory of the constitution. In the former is contained an examination of the model constitutions proposed by other theorists, Plato, Phaleas, and Hippodamos, as well as of the best amongst the forms of government actually established, Sparta, Crete, Carthage, and the Solonian constitution; a criticism which of course gives us glimpses² of many of the positive features of Aristotle's own ideal of a constitution. His attack upon the polity of pure reason, as it claims to be, in Plato's *Republic* ranks among the most successful parts of the whole work. In a higher degree perhaps than anywhere else is here displayed 'the philosopher's practical sense, his clear eye open to the conditions' and 'laws of the actual, his profound comprehension of human nature and of political and domestic life'.³ Against every form of socialism and communism it remains unrivalled in cogency up to the present day. All the well meaning attempts that have been made to defend Plato against this criticism⁴ have disclosed very little that will

¹ If this sense could be disputed for the latter passage, the former at all events excludes all objection. Cp. the notes on these passages, (636) and (1150); also Hildebrand *op. c.* 351 f., Zeller *op. c.* II i 677.

² See II. 5 § 7 n. (188), § 15 n. (166), § 17 n. (168), § 25 n. (189); 6 § 7 f. n. (207), §§ 10—14 n. (208—211), §§ 16—19 n. (216—219), § 22 n. (230); 7 § 5 n. (234, 236), § 6 f. n. (236 b, 237 b); 9 § 2 n. (279), § 5 n. (285), § 14 n. (300), § 18 n. (313), § 30 n. (339), § 31 n. (341); 10 § 8 n. (365), § 9 n. (368); 11 § 3 n. (381), § 4 n. (383), § 6 n. (388), § 7 n. (391), § 10 n. (393), § 15: 12 § 5 n. (413).
³ Zeller *op. c.* II i 697 f.

⁴ The oldest attempt of this kind known to us is that of the Neo-Platonist Eubulios, mentioned above p. 18 n. 7. It has been submitted to an examination in detail by Ehrlich *De iudicio ab Aristotele de republica Platonica facto* (Halle 1868, 8). Amongst the moderns similar attempts have been partially made by Camerarius, J. G. Schneider, &c.; more thoroughly by Schörsner, who displayed a singular and ungularly unfortunate zeal against Aristotle; much more moderately and impartially by Fülleborn; lastly by Pöirger *De iis quae Aristoteles in Platonis politica reprehendit* (Leipzig 1822, 8). These have also been answered by Ehrlich, as well as by other writers.

stand proof; nor have the charges of sophistry brought against it been to any extent successfully made out¹. Only this much is true, that however forcible this criticism is in general it nevertheless contains misapprehensions in particulars, some of which are very serious²; and its author had not the power, if indeed he ever had the will, to transfer himself to the innermost groove of Plato's thought³.

These defects stand out far more forcibly when in the following chapter he treats of the state described in Plato's *Laws*. Upon this criticism we cannot pronounce a judgment by any means so favourable: indeed it contains some things which are all but incomprehensible⁴. Even the refutation of community of goods has not altogether that full cogency, derived from the essential nature of the case, which is apparent in the refutation of community of wives and children⁵. As we see from this criticism, and yet more clearly from that upon Phaleas, 7 § 6 f, Aristotle is himself in favour of considerable restrictions upon the rights of property⁶. Every difference of principle in this respect between his own ideal state and Plato's in the *Laws* disappears: when all things are taken into account Aristotle is no further removed from Plato's first ideal state in the one than Plato himself in the other⁷. Here, therefore, Aristotle's criticism can only affect what are relatively subordinate points, and under these circumstances it frequently assumes a petty and generally unfair character⁸. The refutation of

¹ See on II. 2 § 4 (133), 3 § 9 (142): 4 § 1 (145), § 2 (146) (147), § 9 (151) (152): 5 § 3 (154), § 10 (162), § 16 (167), §§ 20—23 (172), § 25 (181) (182), § 27 (184).

² See on II. 5 § 17 (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), § 27 (184): 6 § 3 (187) (189); also on 5 § 22 (177), 6 § 5 (195).

³ See Zeiler *Plat. Studien* 203 ff. (Tübingen 1839, 8).

⁴ Even Zeiler and Oncken do not seem as yet to have observed this difference. It was fully recognised by Van der Rest *op. c.* 108 ff., 121 ff., 221 ff., 348 ff.: but he did not investigate its causes, and in one particular he should be corrected by the notes on II. 5, 25. It would be quite possible to suspect with Krohn (see p. 14 n. 4) that, wholly or in part, c. 6 is not genuine. But it is hard to see who but Aristotle could have written §§ 10—15, and scarcely anywhere are the difficulties greater. See the notes on these sections.

⁵ See on II. 5, 5.

⁶ See on II. 6 § 7 n. (158), § 15 n. (166), 7 § 6 n. (236 b). Now Van der Rest *op. c.* 349 can blame Aristotle for requiring the public education to aim at creating

such a spirit of fraternity that we willingly grant our fellow-citizens a share in the enjoyment of our own possessions, is incomprehensible.

⁷ It is much to be regretted that all comparisons between the ideal states of Plato and Aristotle—such as Broeker *Politicism, quæ docuerunt Plato et Aristoteles, disquisitio et comparatio* (Leipzig 1824, 8), Ortes *Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis librorum de republica* (Berlin 1843, 8), Pierson *Vergleichende Charakteristik der Platonischen und der Aristotelischen Ansicht vom Staate in the Rhein. Mus.* XIII. 1858, 1—48, 209—247, Ransow *Die Republik des Plato und der beste Staat des Aristoteles* (Weimar 1866, 4)—have either been expressly confined to the ideal state of the *Republic*, or, being left incomplete, contain no sort of collection of the similarities and differences between the political ideal of the *Laws* and that of Aristotle. See further the notes on I. 13 § 16: II. 6 § 5 (192), § 6 (201), § 14 (212): 7 § 5 (234), § 6 (236 b): 9 § 5 (285): IV (vii), 16 § 15.

⁸ See the notes on II. 6 § 3 (188) (189), § 4 (190), § 5 (192) (193), § 6 (201), § 7

Phaleas, again, is enriched with the fruits of extensive observation of mankind; but, like the review of Plato's *Laws*, it leaves untouched the kernel of the matter, the inalienability and indivisibility of the equal portions of land allotted to the citizens. Furthermore Aristotle sees with keen perception that if this measure is to be carried out, a normal number of births and deaths must be calculated and the surplus population, on the basis of this calculation, removed by a resort to abortion, in order that the number of citizens may always remain the same. Nor has he any scruples about recommending this horrible measure and thus invading far more than Phaleas, or Plato in the *Laws*, the sanctities of marriage and family life¹. What he further insists upon in reply to Phaleas is the same thing which he had already insisted upon when criticizing Plato (c. 5 § 15), namely that uniformity of education of the right kind is the main point, while all the other institutions have only a subsidiary importance².

We may admit then with Oncken³ that Aristotle belonged to the few privileged spirits of antiquity who were the pioneers of progress towards that richer and nobler humanity which remained foreign to the heathen world at large. In defending the natural law of marriage and private property he first discovered the fundamental laws of the independent life of the community: the position which he assigns to women goes far beyond the Hellenic point of view; and he was the first who, by adjustment of the unity of the state to the freedom of its citizens, at least attempted to determine the limits of the state's activity. But we must also bring out more forcibly than Oncken has done how far, even in Aristotle, all these great conceptions fall short of attaining their clear full logical development to important results. And the review of Hippodamos shows us how little, after all, he was disposed, or even qualified, to follow ideas even then not unknown to Greek antiquity, the tendency of which was by a sharper limitation of the field of law and justice so to break the omnipotence of the state that its legislation should be confined to the maintenance of justice within these limits; this, rather than education, being made its function⁴. Here, as in the defence of slavery, we see that along with the excesses of democracy Aristotle rejected many just conceptions which had grown out of it⁵. However much to the purpose the

(204), § 9 (206 b), § 10 (208), § 13 (210), § 14 (212), § 15 (213—215), § 18 (220), § 19 (225—227).

¹ See *nn.* on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 10 (208), §§ 12, 13 (209) (210), 7 § 5 (234).

² See *nn.* II. 5 § 15 (105 b), 7 § 8

(238).

³ *op. cit.* I. 191 f.

⁴ See the Excursus II on Hippodamos at the end of Bk. II.

⁵ See above p. 20; and further the Excursus on Hippodamos just cited.

objections which he brings against Hippodamos with regard to his division of the civic body¹, they are defective from the jurist's point of view²; while he makes not a single attempt to refute what is the real foundation of the whole scheme, the need for the restriction upon legislation described above. Evidently he thinks it not worth while to do so, just as in a later passage (III. 9. 8) he treats every opinion on the function of the state which implies such a mode of regarding legislation as *ipso facto* disproved.

The review of the political institutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage is primarily of great historical value for our knowledge of their constitutions³: indeed apart from it we should know next to

¹ Compare the notes on II. 8 § 2 (253), § 9 (264), § 24 (276): but on the other hand II. 8 § 12 n. (265).

² See the notes on II. 8 § 5 (258), § 15 (263).

³ Triebler *Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte* 99 f. (Healin 1871. 8) endeavoured to prove that, in his account of Sparta and Crete, Aristotle chiefly followed Ephoros. He is I in the main agreed with him in my critical edition p. LXII f., with considerable qualifications however in regard to Sparta. Meanwhile Gilbert *Studien zur altpartanischen Geschichte* pp. 86—109 (Göttingen 1872. 8) endeavoured to show that on the contrary Ephoros made use of the *Politics* of Aristotle. Frick in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cv. 1872 p. 657 made reply to him that Ephoros's work, as is well known, only went down to the year 340 B.C. (It would have been more correct if he had said to 355: for all that follows was added by Demophilos, the son of Ephoros, probably after his father's death.) But it can be proved that Aristotle wrote at his *Politics* as late as 331, and for the proof Frick refers to Müller *Fragm. hist. Gr.* II p. 121. Both Gilbert and Frick ought to have known that, from the dates there quoted by Müller on the authority of Meier, Rose *Aristoteles pseudepigraphus* p. 397 ff. had with far greater reason inferred that the *Memorabilia* did not appear until the period between the years 318 and 307, and further that it is only on account of the uncertainty of the dates themselves that Heitz *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* (Leipzig 1865. 8.) p. 247 sq., *Aristot. fragm.* (p. 242 in the Paris edition of Aristotle), rejects this inference. Even if Rose is right we should conclude from this, not as he does, that Aristotle cannot have been the true au-

thor, but only that the work was first published after his death with additions by the editor. For the genuineness of the groundwork at least has been sufficiently made out by Heitz and by Beigk *Zur Aristotelischen Politik der Athener* (On a fragment of the *Politics* found lately, treating of Athens), in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXVI. 1881. 87—115: cp. Nussimil in *Rursman's Jahresber.* XXX. 1882. 20—22. If the matter rested thus Gilbert would be completely refuted. But leaving the correctness of these dates an open question, it is not very probable, to say the least, that Aristotle should have published thus early a work like the *Memorabilia* based upon such comprehensive studies. On another side Oncken *op. c.* II p. 330 f. by the help of fragments of this work which we still possess on the *Polity of Lacadaemon*, has tried to prove that Aristotle, quite independently of Ephoros, was the first to investigate Spartan constitutional history in true scientific spirit; that he probably visited Sparta himself for this purpose and drew information there from living oral tradition. The difficulties in connexion with this hypothesis are patent, and with reference to Crete at any rate the coincidence between Aristotle and Ephoros is of such a kind that in accordance with the line of argument above Aristotle must have used either Ephoros or his authority: see the notes on II. 10 § 1 (351), § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359), § 6 (360). Even with reference to Sparta hardly any other conclusion seems possible: see the notes on II. 9 § 17 (310); 10 § 1, § 2 (352, 354), § 5 (359); VIII (v). 1 § 10 (1498), 7 § 2 (1592), II § 3 (1710), 12 § 12 (1771), and compare Rose *op. cit.* §§ 398, 490. Only we are not to infer from this that Ephoros was Aristotle's only authority

nothing of the Carthaginian constitution : moreover we are bound on the whole to subscribe to Aristotle's estimate of them¹. We shall not venture however to rank his merits quite so highly as Oncken has done. Certainly there never was before so mercilessly destructive and yet so just a criticism upon that Spartan state which up till then had been, most unwarrantably, the idol of all aristocratic and oligarchical circles. Yet on the one hand we must remember that close as were his relations with those circles, and although in essentials his own pattern-states were based upon similar foundations, Plato had been by no means blind to the defects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions. Indeed in important particulars, and even in those of the greatest importance, Aristotle can but repeat the censure pronounced by his master². On the other hand it is really necessary to reflect how, after so crushing a criticism which leaves scarcely anything untouched, Aristotle can possibly still be content, like Plato, to pronounce the Cretan and

here. On the contrary while it is more than doubtful whether he has Ephoros in view when he quotes certain opinions and statements (see on II. 6. 17, II. 9. 11), it is quite certain that in regard to both states Aristotle diverges considerably in details from Ephoros, partly indeed from all other authorities. This divergence must be due to another source, and here and there to one which he alone has utilized : see on II. 10 § 6 (360), § 10 (369) : VI (IV). II § 15 (301).

¹ In spite of Oncken's opposition it will still remain the universal belief that the picture which Aristotle draws of the condition of Sparta agrees fully and completely only with the Sparta of later times. But the extreme view that this description in no respect applies to the Sparta of the earlier times should perhaps be modified. What is to be said, for instance, when Tücher *op. cit.* p. 136 ff. actually praises Aristotle for having in his criticism of the Spartan constitution taken into account simply the existing historical relations of his age, thereby fulfilling a condition laid down generally by the science of history in our time ; while at the same time he would fain persuade us that this procedure, so far as the history of Spartan antiquity was neglected, was due to ignorance and resulted in misstatement ! Why should not a part of the mischiefs discovered by him, and the germ at least of the remainder, have always existed in the Spartan state, even if it was not perhaps until after the Persian wars that this germ developed with gradually increasing strength and

banefulness ? And the procedure which Tücher commends only deserves to be praised because in fact even in historical matters we are fully entitled to argue from consequences to their causes, from the end to the beginning. Whoever considers the facts collected in the note on II. 9. 37 (350) will hardly find the suggestion of Tücher and others—that the readiness of the Spartan ephors and senators to receive bribes only belongs to later times—particularly credible ; but first of all he will enquire, with what date these later times ought rightly to commence. Fülleborn in a note to Garve's translation II p. 242 says most sensibly : ' Aristotle's remarks are very strangely contradicted by all the famous anecdotes of the heroism and chastity of the Spartan women. But different periods must be distinguished in Spartan history.....and it should be borne in mind that Aristotle "after all deserves more credit than scattered anecdotes of such a kind." But should not this consideration be extended to other cases ? When Aristotle assumes that Spartan institutions were always thus and thus, while later writers contradict him and even claim to know the names of those who introduced the change, should we directly and unhesitatingly pronounce these later authorities right ? See the notes on II. 9 § 14 (299, 300), § 15 (303).

² Of what is really the main point Aristotle says this himself II. 9 § 34 (cp. note). See further the notes on II. 9 § 6 (283), § 11 (295 b), § 20 (318), § 23 (324), § 25 (330), § 27 (335), § 31 (341).

Spartan constitutions (with the addition merely of the Carthaginian) to be the next best after his own model state, and thus himself to sacrifice to the idol he has just destroyed. As to the socialist elements in those constitutions, they certainly do not go too far for him, but on the contrary not far enough, like his master, he is far more rigidly logical. The social principles of Aristotle's model state are as strictly deduced as those of Plato's.

It would be quite incredible that, amongst the best approved constitutions actually established, Aristotle should not have mentioned Solon's as well as the other three. For this reason alone it is hardly conceivable that the section in which it is discussed should not be genuine: rather is it matter of surprise that the subject is dismissed so briefly. But the mere list of legislators, with which the second book ends, is certainly a foreign interpolation which contradicts the clearly expressed purpose of the book¹.

VI. THE LEADING PROPOSITIONS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

We might naturally expect the exposition of Aristotle's own model constitution to follow directly upon this criticism of those which claim that title. But here again, with that characteristic unlikeness to Plato which was before remarked², our philosopher declines to regard as comparatively unimportant everything else in political theory except the perfect state. The positive or constructive side of the theory of the constitution, to which we now come, includes two parts, one general, the other special. The former³ and much shorter portion, III. cc. 1—13, treats of the fundamental conditions of the healthy working of constitutions, which, as such, apply equally to the best form of state and to all others⁴. More explicitly, this portion falls into two main divisions: the first (A), cc. 1—5, while touching here and there by anticipation⁵ upon the classification of separate constitutions, for the most part merely prepares for this by a discussion of the fundamental political conceptions which must be assumed for all of them. the true citizens cc. 1,

¹ See further the notes on II. 12 § 1, § 10 (421), § 12 (423, 425), § 13 (427)

² p. 21

³ On what follows compare Susemihl *On the Third Book of Aristotle's Politics in Philologus* xxix. 1870. 97—119

⁴ Hildenbrand, *op. c.* 408 f. He rightly points out another reason why Bk. III should follow closely on Bk. II; 'the latter, at its very outset, along with its task of criticism attempts a positive

'solution of the problem'—of the utmost importance for all constitutions and intimately connected with the subject of Bk. I 'whether and to what extent the family and private property, institutions, subserving individual interests, have any right to continue in the presence of the state, the organization for the common weal.'

⁵ III. 1 § 9 n. (439 b), 3 §§ 1, 2 n. (456), 5 §§ 5—7 n. (508)

2: the essential identity of a state c. 3. the relation between the virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man cc. 4, 5. Now this relation will vary under different constitutions and thus determine their nature and comparative merit. The subject of the remaining chapters (B), cc. 6—13, is, *firstly*, a definition of constitution (πολιτεία) in general, and a preliminary classification of the several forms of the state (πολιτεῖαι). As we are told in Bk. 1, the end of the state is Happiness, the true well-being and common weal of the citizens. All constitutions which make the interest of the governed the end of government are normal constitutions (ὀρθαὶ πολιτεῖαι): those which exist for the interest of the governors are corruptions or degenerate varieties (παρεκβάσεις) c. 6. Then, by a merely numerical standard, the normal constitutions are provisionally divided into Monarchy, True Aristocracy and Polity (Πολιτεία proper); the corrupt forms into Tyranny (τυραννίς), Oligarchy, Democracy; according as one man, a minority, or the majority respectively rule (c. 7). We pass on (c. 8) to consider *secondly* a series of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι). From the discussion of the first of these it appears that it is merely an accident of Oligarchy and Democracy that a minority governs in the one, a majority in the other. It is essentially the selfish government of the rich by the poor which constitutes Democracy, the selfish government of the poor by the rich which constitutes Oligarchy (c. 8). The remaining discussions treat at greater length three separate inquiries: (α) in c. 9, (β) in cc. 10, 11, (γ) in cc. 12, 13¹. From the definitions just framed the first (α) draws the inference that in reality the true end of the state is not adequately secured upon the democratic principle—equal political privileges to all citizens who are equal in respect of free birth: nor yet upon the principle of oligarchy; for the state is no joint-stock trading company: the aristocratical principle of intelligence, virtue, and merit is alone sufficient

¹ The subdivisions of III. cc. 1—13 may thus be tabulated:

- (A) First main division: cc. 1—5
 - (α) Who is the true citizen? cc. 1, 2
 - (β) What constitutes the identity of a state? c. 3
 - (γ) Is the virtue of the good citizen the same with the virtue of the good man? cc. 4, 5.
- (B) Second main division: cc. 6—13
 - (I) Constitution defined; preliminary classification of constitutions: cc. 6, 7.
 - (II) Discussion of difficult problems (ἀπορίαι) · cc. 8—13

More precise definitions of Democracy and Oligarchy: c. 8

The comparative merit of constitutions: cc. 9—13

- (α) the aristocratical principle preferable to that of democracy and of oligarchy: c. 9
- (β) the mass of the citizens and the laws in what sense sovereign on an aristocratical principle: cc. 10, 11
- (γ) the claims of the better citizens and of the mass how best accommodated on this principle, and the varieties (monarchy, pure aristocracy, polity) thence resulting: cc. 12, 13.

(c. 9). This is followed by the inference (β) that the higher the capacity of a body of citizens, and consequently of a state, the more as a rule does the worth of eminent individuals fall short of that of the great mass of other citizens taken collectively, just as the wealth of the richest individuals amongst them is outweighed by the total property belonging to the remainder. Hence, even on an aristocratical principle, sovereignty belongs to the whole body. Yet this many-headed sovereign, besides being restrained by the laws, must always in the direct exercise of its powers be confined to the election of magistrates (*ἀρχαίφρολοι*) and to the scrutiny of their conduct, when, at the expiry of their term of office, they render an account of their stewardship (*εὐθυναί*). All the details of state affairs will be entrusted to the magistrates elected by such a competent civic body from amongst its ablest members.

A marvellously profound thought this, marking its author's essential independence of Plato¹, and proving how powerfully he had been influenced by democracy and the Athenian polity. However distinctly he, like Plato, disapproves of its unrestrained development in Athens and elsewhere subsequently to the time of Pericles², he has nevertheless laid down for all time the justification of the democratic element in political life³, and has done something at least to set a proper limitation to it. Moreover this thought has a far wider bearing. A true constitutional state combining freedom and order, whether under a monarchy or a republic, whether prince or people is sovereign within it, is only conceivable if the sovereign has definite limitations imposed by law upon the direct exercise of his sovereignty, in keeping with the true

¹ Spengel *Ueber Arist. Pol.* 15 n. 18, Henkel, *op. cit.* 80, n. 12, Oncken *op. cit.* 116 f., 174. The last rightly remarks that with this proposition Aristotle set himself free from the conceit of philosophic omniscience, while to Plato 'no thing was so certain as that the Demos meant the sovereignty of folly, and the rule of philosophers the reign of wisdom itself.' But how can Congreve conceive of Aristotle's own ideal state if he thinks (p. 737) that this proposition is only relatively true (not the slightest trace of this is to be found in its author), and is intended only to indicate that of the two evils, democracy and oligarchy, the former is the lesser? This is strange exegesis.

² For this reason Oncken's assertion *l. c.* 173, that the exposition given 1183 16, 16 is borrowed from observation of the Attic democracy, as it was even after Pericles' time, is not correct.

³ Whether Trendelenburg in *Natur-*

recht p. 463 ff. (Leipzig 1860. 8) has really shown "the fallacy of his analogies" as Henkel thinks *l. c.*, may be seen from the note on III. 11. 2 (565 b). Zeller (*op. cit.* II ii 717) on the other hand finds them to the point, and Henkel himself continues: "However, as Spengel remarks *Arist. Stud.* II. 56 n. 1, "even Aristotle is not disposed to allow the public a correct judgment on that which is strictly scientific. But of that which concerns mankind at large—what the Greeks denote by *κοινὰ θνῶτα*—every one can judge, and the multitude often judges more correctly than a specialist; who is often prejudiced without knowing it." Or as Goethe in one passage expresses it, "There is no doubt this public, so much honoured and despised, is almost always wrong in particulars, hardly even in its broad views." That Aristotle's confidence goes somewhat too far is shown in the note on III. 15 8.

external and internal relations of power. No doubt the restraints imposed by a constitutional state of large size in modern times are very different from those devised by Aristotle for his Greek canton-state, and suggested by the forms most suited to his purpose amongst those in actual existence. Yet after all, although the idea was foreign to him and to all antiquity, it is upon just this principle that representative government rests. Now-a-days the people does not elect the magistrates, unless it be the president of a republic, the borrowed monarchical head of the whole state: they are nominated by the monarch or his republican fac-simile, and there is no popular court to which they are directly accountable. Legislation again, the settlement of the state revenue and expenditure, and all that is included therein, are no longer directly in the hands of the entire body of the citizens. But even under a strict constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is the only recognized sovereign, the people have a most substantial share of political privilege, in that through their representatives they take part indirectly in legislation, in voting the budget, the ratification of treaties and the control of the administration. Even the most conservative modern statesman no longer overlooks the fact that the strange phenomenon, changeable as the wind, called public opinion¹, may in certain circumstances be consolidated into a firm, enduring, real popular will, which even under the most absolute monarchy gradually becomes the most powerful and irresistible of all political forces; and that thus the so-called sovereignty of the people, which as a legal principle is more than doubtful, yet in fact indirectly and ultimately ever prevails. No one knows better than Aristotle that nothing is more foolish than the masses; but he is quite as well aware, that again there is nothing wiser. Where the one quality ceases and the other begins he has not attempted to determine and perhaps this is an attempt which no mortal man can make with success. He is 'far too well-trained a realist,' to fall into the error of those who treat that Proteus, the public, as if it did not exist, or who do not know how to reckon with such a force². He was, so far as we know, the first to expound, prove, sift, and limit this thought which up till then had only been thrown out by democratic party leaders³; the first who, while accepting it not with interested views merely but from full conviction, yet considers it impartially in the spirit of the true statesman 'who has in view only the welfare of all, and of the psychologist who

- ' has an understanding for the instincts of a great people. He believes

¹ Demosth. *Fals. leg.* 135: *ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἔστιν ἀσταθμητότατον πρᾶγμα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυμβεβηότατον, ὥστερ ἐν θαλάττῃ πνέυμα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς δὲ τύχη κινούμενον.*

² Oncken *op. c.* II. 168.

³ Compare Athenagoras in Thucyd. vi. 39. 1: also Pericles *ib.* II. 40, Otanes in Herod. III. 80 *s. fin.*

'the individual can be ennobled through the common feeling of the body corporate to which he belongs; that his powers and intelligence can be multiplied, his good instincts raised, his bad ones corrected through being merged in a higher unity; and this is the only ethical point of view, under which an intrinsic right to political elevation can be ascribed to the people. Aristotle uses an example here (c. 11 § 3) which contains in itself a great concession. The capacity of the public for judging in matters of artistic taste he touches upon as a truth which needs no proof; and yet on this very field the right of the masses to decide is much more disputed and much more disputable than on that of public life, where the weal and woe of each individual is in question and the healthy instinct frequently sees further than all the intelligence of the experts'.¹ Plato is of quite another opinion (*Laws* III. 700 E ff.),² and 'nothing is easier than by resolving the public into its elements to show that it really consists of mere cyphers': but it is impossible to do away with the fact that the poet or artist is nothing without this public, which he must conquer in order to rule, and that the judgments of this court have a force with which the view of the experts, who are seldom agreed, can never be matched'.³ Spengel⁴ is undoubtedly right: these chapters (III. cc. 9—13) contain doctrines more important than any to be found elsewhere in the work, doctrines 'which deserve to be written in letters of gold.'

This section ends with the remark (III. 11. 20) that all this does not as yet inform us what kind of laws there ought to be, but simply that those made in the spirit of the right constitution are the right ones. In other words, the order of merit of the normal constitutions, and in its complete form that of the degenerate varieties⁵, is not yet decided. We

¹ See however the notes on III. 11 § 2 (565 b), 15 § 8 (647).

² Yet on the other hand see *Symp.* 194.

³ Such a resolution Socrates undertakes in Xenoph. *Memor.* III. 7 in the case of the popular assembly (Vettori).

⁴ Oncken II. 165 f. 'What,' he rightly adds, 'would have become of the German drama of Lessing, Goethe, and Schiller, had its fate rested solely with the critics, from Gottsched and Nicolai down to the romantic school?' It is however a mistake to suppose that the further step from this 'passive' popular sovereignty to the 'active' sovereignty, which finds expression in the self-government of the *Demos* by the *Demos* was also taken by Aristotle, 'when he recognized Polity as a form of government on an equality with Monarchy and Aristocracy' (Oncken II. 169, 239 f.). For

(1) Aristotle did not recognize Polity as standing on an equality with the other two forms of government, VI (IV). 8. 1; and (2) no greater rights are granted to the people in a Polity than in an aristocracy or a moderate democracy, VI (IV). 14 §§ 10, 14. And when Oncken made the assertion (II. 174) that Aristotle invariably subordinated to the law and the popular decree the wisdom and virtue of even the best individual citizen, he must surely have forgotten the substance of III. c. 13, c. 17 §§ 5—8.

⁵ *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 54 (646).

⁶ In general the result of the preceding statements is that Democracy is preferable to Oligarchy, and the latter preferable to a Tyranny, but whether and how far a moderate oligarchy deserves to rank before an untruncated democracy has not yet been decided.

naturally expect the remaining discussion (γ), cc. 12, 13, to give at least the outlines of such a decision, bringing the whole exposition into real organic connexion with the previous classification of forms of government, and thus concluding the general theory of the constitution. But at first sight this expectation would seem to be wholly disappointed. Schlosser¹ was the first to find fault, not without reason. So much of the previous discussion (cc. 8—11) is repeated in cc. 12, 13 that he conjectured, not very happily, that these chapters had been transposed. After him Bernays² declared cc. 12, 13 to be simply another version of cc. 9—11 and cc. 16, 17. This view requires careful examination. Against it may be urged that the subject of cc. 14, 15 (indeed the whole discussion *περί βασιλείας*, cc. 14—17) is quite as closely connected by its contents with c. 11 as it is with the latter half of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), and much more so than it is with cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12; and as it most naturally follows upon c. 13³, there would be a tremendous gap, in accordance with the remark above made, between the end of c. 11 and the discussion on Monarchy at the beginning of c. 14, which on Bernays' view would directly follow. Notwithstanding this, cc. 12, 13 §§ 1—12 might well pass for another version of cc. 9—11, lacking only the important second question as to the limits to the sovereignty of a competent body of citizens. In that case, however, the editor must have made more than a slight change in the passage to adapt it to its present place. For though the reference in 13 § 1 to c. 9 ff. as preceding might be cut out as a loose addition, that contained in 13 § 2 is firmly embedded in the context⁴. On the other hand, the latter part of c. 13 (§§ 13—25), which is really devoid of all connexion with the earlier part as it at present stands⁵, might conveniently come immediately after c. 11 as an exception to the rule there set forth, thus: 'if however an individual man is superior to all the citizens together, then in the best state he stands above the law 'as absolute king and ruler.' The question of 11 § 20 noticed above⁶ would then remain unanswered, but it might be urged that it belongs to the theory of the special constitutions to provide the answer. But graver considerations remain. From 11 § 8 it would

¹ In his translation vol. I. p. 296 n. 79. Cp. my note on III. 13. 12 (599).

² In the note to his translation, p. 172.

³ Bernays indeed disputes this. He maintains that the sentence which states the propriety of this transition, *φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην* i. e. *βασιλείαν* (III. 14. 1) finds no point of connexion in the last words of c. 13, since the normal constitutions are not there men-

tioned. But surely it is enough that in 13 § 20 the mention of them as opposed to the corrupt forms serves to introduce the whole of the succeeding exposition, although at last this stops short (§ 24) merely at the antithesis of the *best* constitution and the corrupt forms.

⁴ Cf. the notes on III. 13 §§ 1, 2.

⁵ As Conring saw.

⁶ P. 41: see also p. 43 n. 2.

follow, in contradiction to Aristotle's view, that even in the best state the magistrates might be elected from men of a definite census only'. Further there is one short sentence in c. 13, in its traditional place entirely unconnected with what precedes or follows, § 6, which however would be quite in place immediately before § 13. The close of § 12 has no counterpart at present in the previous chapters, yet it cannot be separated from its immediately preceding context; and it is evident that the subsidiary question here raised,—'Are the best laws to be made for the advantage of the better citizens or of the majority?'—stands in the closest connexion with the main question at 11 § 20²; but no less evident that the answer to it here given is incomplete³. There is then in any case a lacuna after 13 § 12: we can easily imagine something to fill it, after which what in our present order stands as § 6 followed quite naturally⁴.

If therefore we really have two versions of the same subject-matter before us, then the older one contained in cc. 12, 13 has been handed down to us in worse condition and is the more incomplete; the later version, cc. 9—11, must have been left unfinished. In any case there is no redundancy noticeable here, but rather a lamentable deficiency. But on the other hand, the inquiry as to which is the most normal and best of the normal constitutions (11 § 20) can only be conducted by a more exact determination and modification of the previous result with regard to the most legitimate holder of sovereign power; and this consideration seems to render necessary a certain review of all the political factors, whatever their justification. It was further stated expressly, 11 § 1, that all the cases except that in which the sovereignty of the people is justified are to be afterwards discussed. Now it cannot be denied that c. 12 does make a start in this direction by first deciding universally which factors really can lay claim to political rule and thereby granting at the outset that wealth (and therefore Oligarchy) has a certain justification⁵. The diffuseness of the repetition is not commendable⁶, but in such works as those of Aristotle's which have been preserved it has simply to be accepted

¹ See the note on III. 11. 8 (569).

² πότερον τῶ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλόμενῳ τίθεσθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόωντων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων; III. 13 § 12. Compare ὁποῖους μέντοι τινὲς δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν πῶ εἶλον. πλὴν τοῦτο γε φανερόν ἐστι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους, 11 § 20.

³ See Thurot's excellent and convincing analysis *Études* 47 ff., from which Susemihl should not have expressed par-

tial dissent in *Philologus* xxix. 113—15 and in the critical edition. It requires conviction in one important point only which does not affect the present question: see the note on III. 13. 12 (599). Compare also Susemihl *Comp. der Arist. Pol.* 23 ff (where however the last sentence of n. 19 should be rescinded) and in part Spengel *Arist. Stud.* III. 24.

⁴ See again the note on III. 13. 12.

⁵ Cp. the note on III. 11. 1.

⁶ See on III. 13. 12 n. (599).

in silence. The main point is that in the lacuna following 13 § 12, before § 6 (the proper place of which is between § 12 and § 13), a convenient place presented itself for a discussion declaring the true Aristocracy to be an unlimited democracy of none but competent men and ranking it above Polity (*Πολιτεία*)¹, as in the latter the inferior capacity of the body of citizens leads to the introduction of a property qualification to ensure the election of none but men of special excellence as magistrates. Lastly, it is clear from cc. 14—17, that in the developed Greek state there is only one case where Aristotle admits monarchy, namely, when the monarch is superior in ability to all the rest taken together; and he assumes that only the citizens of the best state, all men of ability themselves, will accept such a monarchy. It becomes doubly difficult then, nay almost impossible, that such a case should ever occur. Still it remains just conceivable, and as long as this condition of things lasts the best state, instead of being an aristocracy, is, in this exceptional case, the only true monarchy: this then is the absolutely best constitution, superior even to Aristocracy².

VII. MONARCHY AND THE BEST STATE.

If the foregoing arguments are sound, the special theory of the constitution falls into three parts; the theory (i) of monarchy, (ii) of the best constitution, (iii) of the remaining constitutions. The first comprises Bk. III cc. 14—17, the second Bk. IV and V. (in the old order VII, VIII), the third the remaining three books.

Aristotle's conception of monarchy as explained above not unnaturally determines the very character of his discussion of it. This discussion has indeed come down to us in the utmost confusion, and appears somewhat defective; but even after a clear order of thought has been attained by means of various transpositions, the impression it makes upon us is, from the standing of our own political development and experience, highly unsatisfactory. The cause of this is not far to seek. The only true and proper monarchy which Aristotle from his point of view can recognise, is absolute monarchy: we may for the most part entirely concur in his objections to this form, and yet consider that, treated thus far, the subject has been by no means exhausted. In Aristotle's time the sole monarchies of any note which history had

¹ See the note last quoted.

² See VI (IV). 2. 2 with *nn.* (1136, 1137). If this premiss be granted, the unlimited rule of a person superior in

ability to all the others together, including even the best, must certainly be absolutely the best.

produced, except the Greek tyrannies, were despotism, as found in the huge empires of the east, and the so-called patriarchal kingship of the heroic age—the rule of a chief over a small clan and territory, over a Phœnician or Hellenic city-state or canton in prehistoric centuries. Even the rule of the Macedonian kings was, by him at least, regarded in no other light. For the small Greek state, which he keeps solely in view, monarchy is hardly deserving of much more consideration than as the imperfect historical starting-point of all subsequent development¹. In the organism of the large modern state, absolute monarchy, where it has rightly understood its task, has actually helped to educate men for a reign of law under a constitutional monarchy. Nowhere else could this latter arise. The ancient state had not got so far as its very first condition, which is representation; and like all other political thinkers of antiquity even Aristotle, as was remarked above (p. 40), was as yet far removed from the faintest idea of this kind². It was his too one-sided conception of the state as the exclusive means of educating men to mental and moral excellence that gave rise to his ideal state, and made him set ideal monarchy in it above ideal aristocracy, thereby declaring the form of government proper for intellectual minors to be the highest form for the most enlightened,—although, this being so, he can scarcely hide from himself its impossibility³. This however did not hinder him from seeking, by the adjustment of opposite forces, a further practical ideal amongst the degenerate constitutions in *Polity* (Πολιτεία) and so-called aristocracy. Here he has rightly pursued the thought of elevating the authority of the state above the strife of divergent interests; yet from the circumstances, the most effective realization of this thought in limited monarchy never came under his ken. He can finely describe the functions of the king⁴, but the real significance of this form of government is concealed from him: he gets no farther

¹ Spengel *Arist. Stud.* II. 57: "*Βασιλεία* is to Aristotle a historical tradition rather than a form with any further capacity for life in the mental development of his own nation;—and like all Greek philosophers and political writers he rarely notices any other. Thus he is careful to set forth in various *droplai* the difficulties involved in the practicability and proper limits of this government." Our astonishment at this defective method of treatment, which first surprised Schlosser, hereupon ceases. Spengel put the question *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 16—² Did Aristotle conceive the theory of monarchy to be complete with the dis-

cussions of cc. 14—16? The way kings govern, their inner life, their influence on the people is quite lost sight of.³ This must be answered in the affirmative with one exception, to be afterwards mentioned p. 46, for which we can easily account. The ideal king, the preeminently best man, can have no instructions given him (c. 13 § 14, c. 17 § 2).

⁴ And therefore far from any idea that true popular liberty thrives best under wisely limited monarchy.

⁵ See the notes on III. 13 § 14 (601), § 25 (615).

⁶ See Heuskel *op. cit.* 95. n. 25; also VIII (v). 10 §§ 9, 10 with n. (1665).

than to base it exclusively upon personal merits¹, so that no place is left for it in the practical ideal of mixed constitutions². This inevitably causes an internal inconsistency in the work. According to his plan, the last three books ought to have treated exclusively of the remaining constitutions other than monarchy and pure aristocracy. But on the historical ground of revolutions and their prevention he cannot help treating of monarchy over again in Bk. VIII (v).

It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that nothing can be a greater mistake than the assertion, sometimes made of late, that in his ideal king Aristotle had his own pupil, Alexander, before his mind³. It may be surprising that the philosopher's relations with the court of Macedon failed so completely to influence his political theory, that he had no apprehension that he was living right at the close of Hellenic history, with its political development, its system of great and small states; but on the contrary saw nothing impossible in such a new development of a Greek city-state as his ideal constitution would present. But the fact that it is so cannot be altered by our astonishment and inability, with the means at our disposal, satisfactorily to explain it. This ideal of Aristotle's is in reality a small Hellenic city and not a large state like Macedon, which ceases to be a state (πόλις) in his sense of the term, and is no more than a race or nationality (ἔθνος), carrying out a policy of conquest and not, as he requires, a policy of peace. If then the ideal king is to arise only in the ideal state, he cannot be an Alexander. Once no doubt the thought flashes forth, IV (VII). 7. 3, that the Greeks united in one could conquer the whole world⁴. But to Aristotle the end of the state is, as we said, not the conquest of the world but something quite different; no longing for such a state

¹ See the *u.* on III. 13. 9; also VI (IV). 2. 2, VIII (V). 1 § 11 with *u.* (1503), 10 §§ 36, 37 *u.* (1708).

² Henkel *op. c.* 86.

³ So Hegel *Gesch. d. Phil.* II. 401, Hildenbrand *op. c.* 426. Recently Oncken (*op. c.* I. 16 f., 188 f., II. 261 ff.) fancied he had discovered traces of Macedonian sympathies completely pervading the *Politics*. How unsuccessful this attempt was may be judged upon referring to Torstrik *Litt. Centralbl.* 1870 coll. 1177—1179; Henkel *op. c.* 89 *u.* (19), 97 *u.* (26); Bradley *op. c.* 179, 138 f.; Susemihl in the *Fachr. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871. 133—139 (where too much is conceded to Oncken) and Bursan's *philol. Jahrbuch*. III. (1874—5). 376 ff.; or to the notes on III. 13 § 13 (601), § 25 (615); 14 § 15 (633); 17 § 5 (678); VI (IV). 11 § 19 (1303). The

last attempts to stamp Aristotle as a Macedonian partizan, made by Bernays *Phokion*, pp. 40—42 (Berlin 1881), and Willamowitz *Antigonos von Karystos* 182 f., 185 f. (Berlin 1881), have not proved more fortunate; see *Bursan's Jahrbuch*. XXX. 1882. 11, 15 ff. Compare also Hug *Demosthenes as a political thinker* (*Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum* 1. 51—103, Freiburg 1881), who goes still further than I do. Willamowitz in a review of Hug (*Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 1882, col. 1081 f.) has already somewhat modified his position: see *Jahrbuch*. I. c. 18 f., where I have also explained why the passage IV (VII). 2. 11 (*cp.* the *note*) is still important for this question although the whole chapter, to which it belongs, is spurious.

⁴ Cp. the note there (782).

of united Hellas, which would contradict all the rest of the *Politics*, is in the least discoverable in this passage.

On the subject of historical science Aristotle's notions are very defective: he is in truth still far removed from that 'which we ourselves have only learned to know within the last century, that which Turgot and Lessing intended by the improvement and education 'of humanity, and Hegel defined as its organic development.' He altogether mistook the true importance of labour, 'the mightiest lever 'in this process' Yet it would be going too far to deny him all insight into the course of development of the Greek nation from the state of nature to the state of civilization, and from one grade of civilization to another, or into the features of this progress stamped upon the history of the Greek constitutions¹. We are set right on this point by a brief but especially interesting part of the discussion on monarchy (III. 15 §§ 10—13), when taken in connexion with similar passages further on'. 'Aristotle has not simply observed for himself the career of the 'separate states; he knows that they have also a common constitutional 'history: that a definite order of polity belongs to an entire period: 'that the same development of mental culture, of social and military 'organisation, is accomplished all through a group of connected states 'and causes their political relations to assume an homogeneous form. 'And so he depicts with a few masterly strokes the chief stages of 'development through which the political world of Hellas passed². The first development embraces the normal constitutions as far as Polity: the second, in another order, the degenerate forms as far as democracy: the former carrying us to restrained, and the latter to unrestrained, popular supremacy. The main character of both periods is republican. In the first of them Monarchy is only a starting-point, as has been said, for Aristocracy and Polity; in the second Tyranny is only a stage in the transition to Democracy³.

Any one who has followed the order of our work up to this point will be bound to admit that the description of the ideal Aristocracy, or the normal and absolutely best constitution, can now no longer be deferred. If so, then the two books containing it, which have come down to us as the seventh and eighth, should according to Aristotle's design follow directly as the fourth and fifth. Now the last chapter of Book III, c. 18, forms an immediate transition to this description, breaking off with an unfinished sentence, which is repeated in another

¹ Oncken II. 169, cp. 137 f.

² Cp. the notes on III. 14 § 12 (627),
15 § 11, § 12 (662), § 13 (663).

³ Henkel *op. c.* 94. But certainly this

description leaves much to be desired, as may be gathered from Oncken's remarks.
Cp. also the notes on III. 15 §§ 11—13.

⁴ Henkel *op. c.* 96 f.

form at the beginning of the seventh book of the old order¹, but with an apodosis here added and the sense complete as follows: 'He who would investigate wherein the best constitution consists *must first determine what is the best life*,'—since on Aristotle's view of the end of the state the one serves as an aid to the other². And this circumstance loses none of its weight by the fact that this transition can hardly be by Aristotle himself, but by the author of the older edition. For even then it shows (see above, p. 17) that he at all events found the seventh and eighth books still arranged correctly as the fourth and fifth.

It can hardly be maintained that the discussion contained in the first chapter of the seventh or, more correctly, the fourth book, as to where that best and most desirable life, the life of happiness, is to be sought, is not by Aristotle: but while appropriate to his oral lectures, as was remarked above (p. 12), it is to all appearance very foreign to this written work³. And this is no less true of the treatment of a second preliminary question which follows in close connexion, in cc. 2 and 3 and the beginning of c. 4; namely, whether capacity in war or in peace is more desirable for the state, and in particular whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific inquirer is the happier for the individual. Further, the way in which this subject is settled or rather left unsettled is quite unlike Aristotle⁴. To the genuine Aristotle this is no preliminary question, but the really fundamental problem of his whole ideal of the state. The one side of it he has himself settled with the most desirable clearness when describing his ideal, iv (vii). 14. 10 ff., in such a way that he at the same time lays down the principles for the solution of the second and much more difficult question, which is really the cardinal problem of his whole practical philosophy. For here no less than in what follows⁵, as in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*⁶, he ranks the theoretical life above the life of practical politics, and yet he considers the individual to be merely one living member of that corporate body the state: and the reconciliation of this antithesis can only be found in a political life which itself regards the promotion of art and science as its highest and ultimate aim⁷. This

¹ In the text both versions will be found at the commencement of Book iv (vii).

² Cp. in particular Spengel *Ueb. Arist. Pol.* 17 ff., *Arist. Sturz.* II. 60 (652) ff., and Sussehl in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcix. 1869. 604 ff.

³ See the notes on iv (vii). 1 § 2, § 10 (704), §§ 13, 14.

⁴ See the notes on iv (vii). 2 §§ 3—6, § 11 (745), § 16 (729); 3 § 3, § 6 (741),

§ 8 (713), § 9 (745), § 10: 4 § 1.

⁵ iv (vii). 15 §§ 8—10, v (viii). c. 3, c. 5 § 4 with *iii.* (1023, 1024) §§ 12—14. Cp. the notes on iv (vii). 14 § 8 (903), 15 § 2 (921): v (viii). 2 § 1 (977): also on c. 3 § 5 (991, 992), 5 § 10 (1032), and Excursus I upon Bk. v (viii).

⁶ See the passages quoted by Zeller II i 614 n. 1.

⁷ Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. v (viii).

is really the fundamental thought of Aristotle's ideal state, but we nowhere find it worked out; nor could the editor to whom we must attribute the section in question, cc. 2, 3. He would not else have attempted in his clumsy manner, unlike Aristotle's¹, to solve the problem and fill up the lacuna which he had rightly perceived to exist. This circumstance shows then, either that Aristotle stopped short on the very threshold of his description of the ideal state, or else that his continuation of it, which has not come down to us, had disappeared remarkably early.

With the fourth chapter the outline of this best constitution really begins. Aristotle sets out with the external conditions, treating first of the natural conditions, of the land and the people (cc. 4—7); then of the social and socio-political conditions, the exclusion of the citizens from all work for a livelihood, the proper division of the soil, the proper qualifications and position of the cultivators, the regulations for the building of the city, its small towns and villages (cc. 9—12). Here at length begins the internal development of the best constitution: yet by the end of Bk. v (VIII). it has advanced no further than its first stage, the education of the boys, in the middle of which it comes to a dead stop, so that the third of the three questions proposed in the last chapter—namely whether melody or rhythm is of greater importance for the purposes of musical instruction—is never discussed at all, and the question what sorts of time are to be employed for the same purposes remains undecided². We may at all events be thankful to fate for sparing us a section of the work, which is rich in interest for the science of education in all ages, though it fails to satisfy our curiosity as to the further organisation of the ideal state. Some compensation for the deficiency in this direction is afforded by many observations not merely, as has been said before, in Bk. II, but also in Bk. III. Thus in the latter we learn how this or that ought to be regulated in the state, or sometimes even how it should be in the best state or the best constitution, or in the Aristocracy³. And Aristotle's many previous intimations⁴,

¹ See the notes on IV (VII). 1 § 10 (705); 2 § 6 (717), 3 § 3 (736), §§ 8—10

² Cp. the note on v (VIII) 7. 1 (1081). Even Wilhelm of Moerbeke writes at the end of his translation, *remedium huius operis in greco nondum invenit*. Of older scholars Comting in particular endeavoured to determine more accurately the parts missing, of the moderns more especially Hildenbrand (*op. c.* 449 foll.), who at the same time refutes, most successfully in the main, the arguments by which others have in vain sought to show that the deficiency

does not exist or is at any rate unimportant. So too Zeller *op. c.* II II 676 f., 736 ff. Compare further Spengel *Ueb. die Pol. des Arist.* 8 foll.

³ See III 1 § 9, 10 *nn.* (440, 441); 4 §§ 4, 5 *n.* (471), *n.* (491) on 4 § 16, 5 §§ 2, 3 *n.* (504), § 5 *n.* (509); 7 § 3 *nn.* (536, 537); 11 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (569); 13 §§ 8, 9 *n.* (595), §§ 11, 12 *n.* (599), §§ 24, 25; 15 §§ 4—6, 9, 10; 16 §§ 2—12; 17 §§ 1, 2; c. 18 with the notes.

⁴ I. 13, 15 with *n.* (126)—cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 *n.* (285)—II. 9 § 1, 10 § 9 *n.* (368),

taken along with other considerations, give us at least partly to understand what portions are wanting.

When we consider the very high mission of culture with which Aristotle's ideal state is entrusted in the promotion of the sciences, and the preference which Aristotle expressly concedes to the education of the intellect over that of the character¹, it is surprising that he takes up the whole of early education until the twenty-first year with gymnastic and military exercises, so as to leave no more than three years, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth, for all the other subjects of instruction². Moreover one of them, music, is so limited that an influence upon the formation of character, or very little else, is all that is left to it³. Besides this, only reading, writing, numeration, and drawing are noticed; and this short course of three years will be wholly taken up with them. Hence we cannot look for more advanced scientific instruction, and even poetry can scarcely be employed for anything further than learning to read and write, or getting by heart lyric pieces to sing⁴. The exclusion of comedy, moreover, and of all connected kinds of poetry, from the domain of youth is expressly mentioned IV (VII). 17. 11; and the same holds of all music with a 'cathartic' effect, V (VIII). 7. 3 ff.⁵. On this analogy it can scarcely be doubted that the exclusion must be assumed to apply in general to all the kinds of poetry to which solely this sort of effect is ascribed by Aristotle, that is, to epos and tragedy⁶ as well as to comedy: and that Aristotle wished to restrict attendance at the theatre and the recitals of the dhapsodes to grown-up persons, or at any rate not to allow them to young men until after their seventeenth year. Thus the use made of poetry for the education of the young in Aristotle's ideal state could hardly go beyond a mere chrestomathy from Homer, Hesiod, perhaps also from a few tragedies and easy prose writers, in learning to read and write. But Aristotle states, IV (VII). 15. 9, V (VIII). 3. 13, that the education of the body must form the commencement, while the moral education must advance within the soul, from "which we inductively learn that a chapter on

IV (VII). 5 § 2; 10 § 10, § 14, 16 § 12; 17 § 12—cp. 17 § 5 § 7: V (VIII). 3 § 10—cp. 7 § 3; 6 §§ 15, 16. Cp. also the note on V (VIII). 2 § 2 (979). On II. 6 § 14, III. 3 § 6 foll. see below.

¹ See IV (VII). 14 § 8 foll. n. (903), 15 § 8 and generally the passages quoted on p. 48 n. 5.

² See V (VIII). 4 §§ 7—9 with Eac. I at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

³ See V (VIII). 5 §§ 4—7 with n. (1044-57); § 15 foll. n. (1044, 1045);

6 § 1 ff. n. (1061-2-7-8, 1071-3); 7 § 5 ff. n. (1086-7, 1098, 1104-5-9); also the Excursus I, II, III, IV at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

⁴ Zeller *op. c.* II ii 737 should be corrected by this.

⁵ Cp. V (VIII). 6 § 9 with n. (1073); also n. on 7 § 4 and Excursus V at the end of Bk. V (VIII).

⁶ See the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* pp. 8 f., 15, 64 f.

'scientific education was intended to follow'. And the question, how far the 'higher' sciences are to be considered for educational purposes, is assuredly not proposed, v (VIII). 2. 2, in order to remain unanswered. Lastly, in v (VIII) 3. 10, a later investigation is expressly announced to decide whether one or more subjects should belong to the more refined training which aims at the highest intellectual satisfaction: but in the account which has come down to us we seek in vain for the fulfilment of this promise. On the other hand every direct influence in this direction is expressly excluded from the boys' education up to their twenty-first year, v (VIII). 5. 4. Hence we may infer from his own words that Aristotle, like Plato¹, intended a later training in the higher sciences for state purposes to follow this lower educational course²; and this would furnish the solution of the riddle³. Even as to the subjects of this higher instruction Aristotle can hardly have thought differently from Plato, except that perhaps he added poetry; Pure Mathematics, however, Astronomy, the Theory of Music, and lastly, for natures most scientifically endowed, Philosophy proper, were certainly the means of instruction enjoined. There is ample time for them, as the active duties of full citizens do not begin until military service is over, iv (VII). 9 § 5 f, 14 § 5; and no one will be eligible for a civil magistracy much before his fiftieth year, even if he enters the popular assembly earlier, 9 § 9 n. Thus their service in the army leaves the younger man leisure for scientific studies. Only Aristotle must have maintained, in opposition to Plato, that this extended course should be different for practical minds and for those whose bent is more towards theory; in order to make of the former officials for the state, and of the latter its men of science, who in other respects may, and indeed ought to rest satisfied with the fulfilment of their general civic duties'. In this particular Aristotle approached the modern idea of the state more nearly than any other ancient thinker. Yet when looked at in the light of his own premisses this solution of the problem cannot be said to be altogether happy. If in the best state the best man is to be at the same time the best citizen and statesman⁴, if moreover scientific activity

¹ Zeller *op. c.* II i 737 n. 4.

² See *iii.* on II. 5. 25 (187), iv (VII). 17 15 (970).

³ No previous enquirer has thought of this. Oncken alone felt the difficulty, but did not also see that with the means at our disposal the veil may be sensibly lifted. See next note.

⁴ This disposes for the most part of Oncken's objections *op. c.* II 204 ff,

218 f. He does not see that it is only in the instruction in practical music and in gymnastic that Aristotle maintains a mean which must not be exceeded; he never says a word to the effect that in the sciences also one can learn too much. See Exc. I at the end of Bk. v (VIII).

⁵ See the note on iv (VII). 3. 8 (743).

⁶ See III. c. 4 with the notes on § 1 (468), § 5 (471), § 16 (491); c. 5; 18 § 1:

is to be the higher, moral and practical excellence the lower, part of human virtue, then the only logical consequence is Plato's government by philosophers—which, taken in itself, Aristotle rightly rejects, II. 5. 25¹.

The chapters on the education of the boys are incomplete: this theory of the subsequent higher training of our future citizens, as well as the discussion on female education which was expressly promised I. 13. 15 (cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6)², is wanting. We lack too the entire regulations for the external life of children and adults whether men or women,—or in other words the whole of civic discipline; for Aristotle no less than Plato conceived the state to be an educational institution. As a necessary consequence, he took this discipline and moral guidance through the whole of life to be simply a continued course of education³, and both alike to be the proper field of state-activity. Almost all the other intimations of Aristotle, to which we find nothing corresponding in the execution, relate to this comprehensive subject. One special division which he mentions IV (VII). 16 §§ 12, 13, 17 § 12 (comp. I 7 §§ 5, 7, 10), is the superintendence of the morals of the boys and their education under Inspectors (*παιδονόμοι*), officers appointed on the Spartan precedent⁴. They are to have their official quarters near the gymnasium for the young, IV (VII). 12. 5: to take care that no stories unseemly to their age are told to children even under five years of age, c. 17 § 5, and that they have as little as possible to do with the slaves, § 7. They have also to take precautions that no improper statues or pictures are exposed to view within sight of the children (§ 10), from whom even the paintings of a Pausan with their comical and satirical exhibitions of what is low and hateful must be kept at a distance: V (VIII). 5. 21¹. In this part of the work too we were to have been more precisely informed what habit of body in the parents is best adapted to give them healthy offspring⁵; whether comedies should be exhibited, and the recital of satirical poems (*e.g.* *ῥαμβοί*) allowed, and in what manner; perhaps also how far drinking

IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, 9 § 3 ff. (808). 13 §§ 9, 10; 14 §§ 7, 8; V (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2 ff. (974): VI (IV) 7 § 2.

¹ See the note on II. 5. 25 (182): *Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 7 (VI. 8 1144 b 14 ff.) *Metaph.* I 1 11 ff. (981 a 12 ff.)

² See the notes on both passages (126-7), (285)

³ *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 9, 1180 a 1 ff. This is not expressly stated in the *Politics*, but the same thought forms the basis of

the remarks in IV (VII). 12 §§ 4—6; 17 §§ 8, 9, as Zeller *op. c.* II 11 739 ff. 4 rightly reminds us. Cp. *ibid.* on IV (VII). 12 § 5 (863), 17 § 9 (962).

⁴ See Schomann's *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 248, Eng. trans. by Mann and Hardy (London, 1880. 8).

⁵ See the notes on IV (VII). 12 § 5, 16 § 12, 17 § 5, § 10, § 12; V (VIII). 5 § 21.

⁶ See on IV (VII). 16. 12.

parties of adults are to be countenanced, IV (VII). 17. 12¹. Inspectors for the women (*γυναικονόμοι*) are also mentioned along with the inspectors of boys as officials in aristocracies, VI (IV). 15. 13, VII (VI). 8. 23: they certainly ought not to be absent from the true Aristocracy². We can hardly be wrong in assuming that on the decision of these two boards of officers the exposure or rearing of new-born infants depended³, and that for the purpose of maintaining the same fixed number of citizens they were authorized, nay were bound, to enforce abortion if necessary, II. 6. 10 ff., IV (VII). 16. § 15, § 17⁴.

This unalterable number of citizens is bound up with the equally unalterable number of inalienable and indivisible family properties, IV (VII). 10. 11, of which, as in Plato's *Laws*⁵, each citizen holds two, one near the town, and one further off in the country towards the boundaries of the territory. This indicates a second treatment of the same subject, comprising the more accurate discussion of property in general and of national wealth which was expressly promised, IV (VII). 5. 2, and here the propriety of the provisional definition of national wealth adopted in the passage just cited should have been submitted to a second and more detailed examination⁶. Here also a place would no doubt be found for explaining more fully the reasons promised IV (VII). 10 § 10, § 14, why Aristotle was induced to adopt *σοφιστία*, why it is better to promise and grant freedom to serfs and slaves as a reward for good conduct, together with the discussion of their general treatment announced in this passage⁷; also the consideration of the question postponed in II. 10. 9, as to what means it may be expedient to tolerate in order to prevent an increase of population beyond the limits fixed⁸.

But there is an explicit proof, that even the political organization of the ideal state was to be treated in detail. In one passage, II. 8. 25, the more precise solution of the question whether and under what conditions and at whose instance changes in the established laws are admissible is left over for further consideration⁹. What sort of restrictions Aristotle wished to introduce in this respect we cannot tell: it is only certain that, while he did not allow the popular assembly the initiative, he yet made every new law dependent upon their consent¹⁰.

¹ Zeller, *op. c.* II 11 739 n. 3, assumes a discussion on this last point to be promised. The context does not appear to me to warrant this. See the note there.

² See the notes there.

³ The usage was somewhat different, though still analogous, at Sparta. see II. on IV (VII). 16. 15.

⁴ See the notes there, also II. 7. § with II. (236).

⁵ Cp. the notes on II. 6. 15, IV (VII). 10. 11.

⁶ Cp. the note on IV (VII). 5. 2.

⁷ Cp. the notes there.

⁸ Cp. II on II. 10. 9 (368).

⁹ Cp. the note there, (278).

¹⁰ Of course constitutional changes are not permissible if it is seriously meant that this constitution is in all points absolutely the best.

Moreover, the powers of the popular assembly were but limited even in this best of all communities, composed of men not under thirty-five¹ nor yet over seventy years of age. Apart from the election of magistrates they were not to extend much beyond the acceptance or rejection, without further debate or amendment, of treaties, and of peace or war, as previously determined upon and proposed by the senate and the highest magistrates². Yet on the other hand popular courts of justice on the Athenian model were to decide charges brought against magistrates during the time of their accountability³. Equal in birth, in landed estate, in immunity from all remunerative or productive labour⁴, and in respect of a public education from their seventh year⁵, all citizens of this state enjoy equal rights. Any qualified citizen may, it seems, vote for any other for any magistracy, such a civic body being credited with the intelligence and good will to nominate to each branch of the government the persons most suitable on the ground of the distinctions in capacity and training which, in spite of equal circumstances, have manifested themselves⁶. But Aristotle certainly did not intend to leave undecided at what precise age the entrance upon full citizenship was to take place; nor again at what age men were superannuated, and upon retiring became priests, IV (VII). 9. 9, whereby almost entire leisure for science was secured to them in their old age⁷. The figures 50 and 70 which have been tentatively assumed will at least be not far removed from his view; and thus this governing civic body will be considerably in the minority when compared with the total number of citizens superannuated or not yet fully qualified, the boys, younger men, and the aged of the citizen order⁸. Only foreigners and resident aliens are allowed to engage in trade, industry, or manual labour: a pro-

¹ See *infra* on IV (VII). 9 § 9, 16 § 9.

² This follows from II. II 6, III. II. 8 *ff.*, taken in connexion with the other passages quoted in *Exc.* IV at the end of *Bk.* II.

³ This may be inferred from II. 12. 5, III. II. 8: see notes there: also *Exc.* V at the end of *Bk.* II. But Aristotle might have required that the jurors in these courts should be elected instead of being chosen by lot; see II. II. 7 *n.* (391).

⁴ II. 9 § 2 *ff.*, II § 10 III. 5 § 2 *n.* (504), § 3, § 5 *n.* (509): IV (VII). 9 § 1, § 3 *f.*, § 9, 10 § 13, 12 § 4. V (VIII). 2 § 3. 6 *n.* (982); 4 § 1 *n.* (1004); 5 § 8 *n.* (1028); 6 § 4 *ff.*; § 16, 7 § 1 with notes. Cp. also *Exc.* I at the end of *Bk.* V (VIII); *n.* on I. 11 6 (103) with the passages there quoted.

⁵ IV (VII). 17 § 7, and the note on § 4; § 15 *n.* (970): V (VIII). 3 § 13 *n.* (1003); 4 § 7 *ff.* and *Exc.* I at the end of *Bk.* V (VIII).

⁶ See I. 7 § 1 *n.* (58 b); II. I § 9, 10 *n.* (440, 441), II § 2 *ff.*, 13 § 9 *n.* (595), 16 § 2 *n.* (672), § 13; 17 § 1, 2: IV (VII). 8 § 4; 9 § 7, 8; 13 § 9 *n.* (885), 14 § 5: VI (IV). 11 § 8; also II. 2 § 6, 7, and cp. the notes on II. 2. 4 (133) and III. 13. 12. Other passages seem to contradict this, as II. 2 § 2 *ff.* § 4 *n.* (133); III. 4 § 5 *n.* (477); 5 § 10, 6 § 8 1, 2; 7 § 8 1, 2; 15 § 8 8—10; 18 § 1. but see the notes: also *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9.

⁷ Because old men are no longer of service for government II. 9. 25. See the note there and on IV (VII). 9. 9 (816).

⁸ Cp. *n.* on IV (VII). 9. 9 (817).

hibition which strikes a severe blow at the cultivation of the imitative arts, that is, at the fine arts¹. The soil is to be cultivated by serfs who are not free, or at all events by vassals of non-Hellenic descent who are but half free².

But, while emphatically not a conquering military power any more than a trading community, this state with its one aim of culture³ makes the largest concessions possible in both these directions. It is to be a maritime state, iv (vii). 6. 1 ff.⁴, as well as, like Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, to exercise an hegemony; that is, to stand at the head of a more or less dependent confederation, in which union has been achieved, if necessary, with the edge of the sword⁵. In this way Aristotle thinks that the peculiar spirit and core of Athenian social and political life, that wonderfully noble union of manliness with culture, has been best preserved and promoted by a partial fusion with Spartan forms. He may even have counted on the tribute of the allies to fill the treasury. Otherwise it is not easy to see why, after the wise regulation that only a part of the soil should be broken up into family properties, the rest being reserved as domain land, only the expenditure upon public worship and the common messes, not that upon any other state function, is taken into account when he comes to deal with the revenue from this domain land, iv (vii). 9. 7. 'The messes (*συσσίτια*) are with Aristotle, as they were at Sparta⁶, at once common meals and military unions. Some of them are to be held in the guard-houses inside the city wall'. All boards of officials have their messes, each in its own official quarters: so, too, the priests; even the rangers and field-patrols in the country⁷. The rule of a common mess-table is binding on all collective members of the political body corporate⁸. In particular from them springs that voluntary communism which Aristotle praises in the Spartans⁹, and the entry into them was undoubtedly to begin with enlistment amongst the recruits at the age of seventeen¹⁰. Later on, but yet hardly before the training of these recruits is completed¹¹ with their twenty-first year¹², they are also per-

¹ Even vocal and instrumental music in music are classed with manual labours (*βιβάσματα*), v (viii). 5 § 8, ii. (1028) 6, § 4 ff., §§ 15, 16; 7 § 6 comp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. v (viii).

² iv (vii) 9 § 8, 10 § 13.

³ ['Culture-state', one which exists to promote the highest civilization: see p. 48. Ta.]

⁴ Cp. notes on iv (vii). c 6.

⁵ See iv (vii) 14. 21 with ii. (917).

⁶ Cp. Schömann *op. c.* pp. 272, 279

Eng. trans., *Triber op. c.* 1—26.

⁷ iv (vii). 12. 1.

⁸ iv (viii) 12 §§ 2, 7, 8.

⁹ Oucklen *op. c.* II. 198.

¹⁰ 11. 5. 5 ff., iv (vii). 10. 9, cp. 11. 5 §§ 15, 16, with notes, also the notes on 11. 5 § 6 (156 b), § 7 n. (158), also vii (vi). 5. 10 with note.

¹¹ v (viii). 4. 9, cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. v (viii).

¹² See on iv (vii). 17. 11 n. (966).

¹³ iv (vii). 17 15.

mitted to attend drinking-parties¹ and there to sing,—which under all other circumstances is strictly prohibited to adults²; further to visit the theatre and musical and poetical entertainments of all kinds³.

From the foregoing it is also clear now that the passages to which we are referred in II. 6 §§ 12, 13, are still extant⁴, but that more precise explanations ought to follow. Similarly the promise of future discussions upon the size of the town and the question whether it is essential that the citizens should be of the same descent, III. 3 § 6, is fulfilled as far as the first part is concerned in IV (VII). c. 4; but the second part was scarcely to be dismissed with merely the subsequent remark VIII (V). 3 § 11 f.; it was no doubt to be more thoroughly discussed in the examination of the absolutely best constitution⁵.

It appears to us, it was remarked before (p. 46), not so easy to understand how the resident alien of Stageira, the great realist, the friend of the Macedonian kings under whose spear the last energies of Greek life were bleeding away, was still Greek and Athenian enough to dream of the possibility that the 'nobility of mankind,' the Greek nation, had yet to wait for the future to produce its noblest race, who alone would be one day capable of creating this pattern state, IV (VII). c. 7. More intelligible, but all the more repulsive, is it to note how Aristotle sets about the propagation of this noblest of civic bodies, in true Spartan or Platonic fashion⁶, by tyrannical marriage-laws and matrimonial supervision and inhuman exposure of children, as if he were raising a breed of race-horses: to see the successful defender of the family and of property, who investigates with admirable profundity the moral nature of marriage⁷, at the same time hampering and almost stifling the free use of property and of the mental faculties, and destroying the healthy vital atmosphere of marriage. And this by measures which, as we have said (p. 34), go far beyond those of Plato in the *Laws*, by fixing a normal number of children which the whole body of citizens are permitted to have and sanctioning abortion in order to secure that the number is never exceeded.

VIII. THE PATHOLOGY OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTIONS.

The opening words of the sixth book—Bk. IV. in the old order—are in their most suitable connexion when following directly upon the

¹ IV (VII). 17. 11.

² V (VIII). 5 § 8, 6 § 4 with notes: cp. n. on IV (VII). 17. 11 (966). No weight can be given to V (VIII). 7. 13 f., as the passage is conjectured to be spurious;

see n. (III 13).

³ IV (VII). 17. 11.

⁴ Cp. n. on II. 6. 14.

⁵ Cp. n. on III. 3. 6.

⁶ Cp. Exc. I at the end of Bk. II.

description of the ideal state. The task of Politics, we read, is not simply confined to an examination of the absolutely (*ἀπλῶς*) best constitution. It equally includes the determination of what is best on the average (*ταῖς πλείοταις πόλεσι*); and of the best constitution under the given circumstances (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*), or in other words the best for a given people or a given population. If finally it happens that even this last is out of the question, political science has to treat of the best possible form of some worse constitution; and hence must investigate all possible species and even sub-species of constitutions. The third book, for example, spoke of democracy and oligarchy; this is now corrected by the statement that there are several subordinate varieties of both. But while those fundamental distinctions of the third book are again resumed, we are expressly told in c. 2 that the first problem has already been solved by an account of the absolutely best constitution, or, what is the same thing, of monarchy and aristocracy proper; thus only the remaining normal constitutions and their corruptions have still to be discussed. The order in which these stand is as follows: mixed or so-called Aristocracies¹, Polity (*Πολιτεία*), Democracy, Oligarchy, Tyranny². The problems to be solved are as follows; to determine (1) how many subordinate kinds of constitutions there are, (2) what is on the average the best constitution; (3) for what different sorts of people the different forms are adapted; (4) how we ought to set to work in regulating each form of democracy and of oligarchy, and, last of all, (5) what are the causes which overthrow and the means to preserve the various constitutions. Thus, first of all, we here find from Aristotle himself an express corroboration of the view that the seventh and eighth books (old order) came fourth and fifth in the work as he wrote it: and in c. 7 § 2, he once more repeats the same declaration, that the absolutely best constitution discussed in those books alone deserves to be called Aristocracy in the strict sense of the word, just as the interpolator of c. 3 § 4, refers to this part of the work under the name of the "discussions on Aristocracy" (*ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν*), and so must still have had the original order before him. In the next place the order given in the above arrangement is adhered to most strictly in the exposition which follows.

For setting aside c. 3 and c. 4 §§ 1—19, which certainly do not contradict this procedure, but, as was just remarked, can hardly³ be by

¹ αἱ ὀνομαζόμεναι ἀριστοκρατίαι vi (iv). § 4 (1151), § 8; 4 § 1, § 4 (1164), §§ 5, 6, 9, 10: see note on vi (iv) 2. 4.
² See the note on vi (iv). 1. 4 (1116).
³ See the notes on vi (iv). 3 § 1, § 2, § 8 (1176), § 12 (1182, 1183), § 13 (1185) § 15 (1187), § 17 (1189), §§ 19, 20.

Aristotle himself, there is, first, an enumeration (1) in c. 4 §§ 20—31 of the four varieties of Democracy and at the beginning of c. 5, §§ 1—3, of the four varieties of Oligarchy passing from one resembling Polity to one which approaches Tyranny; then, c. 6, it is shown why there can only be four varieties for each of these two constitutions: next follows a discussion of mixed or spurious Aristocracy in its two varieties, when mixed with democratic and oligarchical, or merely with democratic elements, c. 7; cc. 8, 9, treat of the constitution most nearly allied to this last, Polity (*Πολιτεία*) or equal combination of Oligarchy and Democracy; and c. 10 of Tyranny and the forms in which it blends with Monarchy. Then (2) c. 11 presents *Πολιτεία* in its character as the rule of the well-to-do middle class, as the best constitution on the average. The next investigation (3) breaks off unfinished in § 5 of c. 12¹: the passage which follows (12 § 6, 13 § 1—11), i.e. all the following chapter except § 12, does not belong to this subject but to the regulation of Polity: had it been more correctly edited it would have been worked into c. 9 to which I would transpose it. Only one circumstance is out of harmony in the order which has come down to us, (5) the theory of revolutions and the safeguards of constitutions does not come last of all, but takes up the whole of (old) Bk. v, while (4) the regulation of the different forms of Democracy and Aristocracy does not appear till the first four chapters of (old) Bk. vi. The last three chapters of (old) Bk. iv, cc. 14—16, are taken up with fundamental considerations of a general kind on the regulation and organization of all possible constitutions, except Monarchy, Tyranny, and true Aristocracy, according to each of the three authorities in the state. Thus the deliberative or decreeing body is treated in c. 14, the administrative body or the organisation of the officials and magistrates in c. 15, the judicial power in c. 16. In accordance with this it has been proposed to transpose the (old) Sixth Book before the (old) Fifth, so that the former becomes the (new) Seventh and the latter the (new) Eighth: and this order has been followed in the text². If it is right

¹ See the note there, (1315).

² Hildenbrand *op. cit.* p. 372 ff. defends the received order here by saying that Aristotle intended to lay down in VI (iv) cc. 14—16 the elements of the constitutions and then in the first place in Book v of the old order, went on to describe their practical working, because upon this depends the right combination of the elements which follow in the (old) Book vi. Zeller on the other hand *op. cit.* II ii 675 ff., evidently with the right view that thus to

interlace questions (4) and (5) directly contradicts Aristotle's express announcement above, makes this whole announcement refer only to the contents of Books IV and V of the old order: in these two books Aristotle, as he thinks, gives a complete discussion of the theory of the imperfect constitutions with regard to their general underlying principles, in the (old) Book vi he adds a more special exposition. I have explained in the *Fährb. f. Philol.* CI. 1870. 343—346, 349 f. why

it must certainly be assumed that the four references back to the (old) Fifth Book which we find in the (old) Sixth do not, at least in their present form, belong to Aristotle, but at the earliest to the author of the later edition which has come down to us. One of them, VII (VI). 4. 15, is in fact so little suited to its context that it at once proclaims itself to be a spurious insertion¹. Two of the others, VII (VI). 1 § 1 and 1 § 10, may be removed, at least without much harm, on the same grounds². But the fourth, VII (VI). 5. 2, is so firmly embedded in the context that there is no resource but to assume that the interpolator has changed the future, which Aristotle himself used here, into the past³; an assumption quite as possible for the third passage as that of an interpolation⁴. The two parts of the work thus moved into immediate proximity—the three concluding chapters of Bk. VI (IV) and the first seven chapters of Bk. VII (VI)—then become the general and particular parts of the same discussion⁵. But we miss the account, promised at the beginning of Bk. VII (VI), of the possible combinations which may arise when in one and the same state the several political authorities are regulated according to the principles of *different* constitutions, VII (VI). 1. 3 ff.⁶ Nor is this the only defect. In the eighth and last chapter of Bk. VII (VI) the theory of the organization of the executive still remains a rough sketch, not yet worked out in detail. It certainly brings to a real solution a part of the questions merely proposed or mentioned provisionally in VI (IV). c. 16⁷; but it contributes hardly anything towards a more thorough solution of a problem expressly mentioned there VI (IV). 15 § 14, as not yet satisfactorily solved, namely a discussion of the differences between magistrates in different constitutions; while it omits altogether any mention of the influence of the various departments of public business on the mode of election to different offices, which was also expressly promised there, VI (IV). 15. § 22⁸. But these are inconsiderable defects, and if on the transposition

I cannot accept this solution: the main points of my explanation will be found with some modifications in the notes on VI (IV). 2 § 5 (1143), § 6 (1144).

¹ See the note there (1142).

² Only in the latter passage the *de* which follows must be changed into *di*, or else the whole of the following clause *πῶς δὲ τὰ ἀξιόματα λέγουμεν* expunged.

³ See the note there, and Spengel *Ueber die Politik* 36 ff.

⁴ In that case the change of *de* into *di*, slight as it is, will be unnecessary.

⁵ See the note on VI (IV). 2. 6 (1144). Oncken, *op. c.* II. 253, thinks these seven

chapters contain nothing but repetitions of propositions enlarged upon long before; but this statement is not proved, and is quite incorrect.

⁶ E.g. the deliberative body and the election of magistrates on oligarchical, the lawcourts on aristocratical, principles. Cp. the last note (1188) at the end of Bk. VII (VI).

⁷ Cp. upon this point the more precise explanation in the note on VI (IV). 15. 1 (1143).

⁸ Oncken *l. c.* complains of the way in which this sketch, modelled in its main features on the organization of the Attic

proposed this book, VII (vi), no longer forms the conclusion of the discussion on imperfect forms of the state it will be most obvious to treat them like other spaces left blank in the course of, and not at the end of, principal sections: where we have more reason to conjecture subsequent losses than to infer that the execution on Aristotle's own part was deficient.

For the highly artistic construction of Book VIII (v) it will be sufficient to refer to the *Analysis*; on the transpositions necessary even in this book, as well as on the spurious passages in all the books, to the *Commentary*¹. It would be superfluous to commend to the thoughtful reader the ripe political wisdom shown in the account of the forms of government actually established; and this eighth book in particular preeminently reveals the statesman². In his picture of the despot of the shrewder type who skilfully copies the genuine king, VIII (v). II. 17—34, it really looks as if he had anticipated with prophetic eye the second French Empire and the third Napoleon. Can these precepts on despotism (*τυραννίς*) have actually been read by the latter and turned to account? That question no one perhaps is in a position to answer.

There is yet another fact which quite apart from this may be emphasized here. As Teichmüller especially has shown³, Aristotle recognised even in his day the importance of the influence which the mode of life and the social relations of a nation exercise upon the form of its political development and of its constitution. Yet Zeller's remarks⁴, that he nevertheless does not speak of civil society as distinct from the state, and that the different principles of classification which he assigns for the forms of government will not quite blend into a unity, appear to be by no means completely answered by Teichmüller's explanations. It is true that in III. 5. 9 ff., IV (VII). 7 f., Aristotle draws a definite distinction between social relations and the political relations proper which

government, follows without any introduction upon what precedes. This is quite true, but he appears to overlook *ἅμα τε περὶ δεινῶν ἐστὶ λατῶν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκιάσθαι* in the announcement of the contents VII (vi). 1. 1, which points to a supplement with such additions; since in the execution it is the first four chapters that answer to the following words *καὶ τὸν οὐκ εἶναι καὶ τὸν συμμέμεντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκείνων*, but in reverse order. That the whole book is 'a regular medley of' motley elements, which, although perhaps of the same date, certainly never stood in the same original connexion'

is therefore (see p. 59 n. 5) an ungrounded assertion. See the note on VIII (vi). 1. 2 (1379 b).

¹ [See also below, pp. 93 ff.]

² Cp. Hildenbrand *op. c.* 469—486; Zeller *op. c.* II ii 760; Oncken *op. c.* II. 241—252; Henkel *op. c.* 91; Van der Ree *op. c.* 519 ff.

³ In *Die aristotelische Einteilung der Verfassungsformen* 12 ff (St Petersburg 1859. 8). Compare the review by Susenmühl *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CIII. 1871 p. 137 sqq., from which is taken all of importance in what follows.

⁴ *op. c.* II ii 699, 708 foll., 749.

in various ways depend upon them: VI (IV). 4 §§ 20—22, 6 §§ 1—3, 12 § 2; VII (VI). 4 §§ 1—3, 8—14; cp. III. 12 § 7 f.; IV (VII). cc. 8, 9; VI (IV). cc. 3, 4. But he nowhere attributes to the former independent importance, or a separate province of their own: they are generally regarded only as the condition which is requisite in order that the life of the state may take this or that form. But this leaves the distinction imperfect. In general, where Aristotle discovers a new conception he also coins his own term for it, or at any rate remarks that there is as yet no appropriate word for it in Greek. But here, in keeping with this imperfection, there is no such remark with reference to civil society; but, as Teichmüller¹ himself quite rightly observes, the word 'city' or 'state' (*πόλις*) is sometimes used in a narrower sense to exclude the merely social elements, sometimes with a wider meaning to include them. Further, the distinction of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity, and so also amongst the degenerate forms, that of Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy, merely according to the number of the rulers (III. 7. 2 f.), is certainly only provisional. Immediately afterwards (III c 8; see above p 38) it is described as something merely accidental in the case of Democracy and Oligarchy, which in the extreme case might even be absent, the real ground of the distinction being poverty and wealth. Indeed later on the mere distinction in number is, in the case of Aristocracy and Polity, completely abandoned. Even in the ideal Aristocracy the whole civic body rules itself, and although here, as was remarked above (p. 54), the real governing body of fully qualified citizens forms a minority of the whole number, yet one can see no reason why in a spurious Aristocracy the actual civic body must necessarily be a smaller number than in a Polity. Thus the only normal constitutions proper that remain are ideal Monarchy and ideal Aristocracy, see VI (IV). 7 § 2, 8 § 1; spurious Aristocracies and Polity only occupy the place of intermediate or transitional forms between the normal constitutions and their corruptions. The so-called Aristocracies are said to be mixed forms combining aristocratic with democratic elements or both with Oligarchy, VI (IV). 7 § 4, 8 § 9; why there should not also be among them combinations of aristocratic and oligarchical elements² without democratic admixture, is not quite clear. Polity appears as a mixture of Oligarchy and Democracy: if this is the case, both these extremes, to which it is intermediate, must be considered to be perverted forms of it, instead of Oligarchy being a corruption of Aristocracy and Democracy of Polity, as was said at first (III. 7. 1 foll.) and again repeated VI (IV). 8. 1. There are however even later passages

¹ *l. c.* 14 ff.

² See the note on VI (IV). 7. 4 (1238).

in which Oligarchy is defined as a corruption of Aristocracy, and his qualification of prevailing views, that it is the rule of the rich rather than of the minority, is in some measure ignored VIII (v) 7 1.¹ In Polity then no aristocratic element is recognised; for the principle of Aristocracy is virtue or superior excellence², while the only excellence discoverable in Polity is superiority in war; III 7. 4, comp VI (iv). 13. 7 foll.³ This is just what Aristotle censures in Sparta, II. 9. 34 f., IV (vii) 14 § 15 ff (cp. 2 § 9); and consequently he ought not to have reckoned the Spartan constitution, as he does, with spurious aristocracies, but with Politics. But on the other hand how should Politics be counted amongst normal constitutions of even the second rank unless a certain excellence of the citizens was also required in them? Or is the public education, for which Sparta is praised, v (viii). 1. 4⁴, to make the difference? But there was nothing of the sort at Carthage, and yet Aristotle classes the constitution there with aristocracies and not with Politics⁵. Again, the rule of the majority and of the minority is represented as quite indispensable to the notions of oligarchy and democracy, VI (iv). 4 §§ 5, 6; while in VIII (v). 7 §§ 5—9, VI (iv). 7 § 4, 8 § 3 ff., Aristotle is made to adopt—at one moment to adopt and then at the next to contradict—a view which is altogether incompatible with such definitions, viz. that the mixed constitutions which incline more to democracy should be called Politics, and those which incline more to oligarchy, Aristocracies⁶. Such inconsistencies would certainly be too glaring even for a far less able thinker. They are not made a whit more intelligible by the fact that the conception of Oligarchy oscillates somewhat between a government of wealth, of birth, and of a minority: on the contrary they bear the clearest marks of interpolation⁷. But further: the best of the four varieties of democracy is a departure from Aristotle's conception of democracy, the government of the rich by the poor, for it represents both as sharing the government equally, VI (iv). 4. 22. Even the conception of a degenerate constitution as government in the interest of the governors is not at all applicable here, if we follow the description given in VII (vi). 4 §§ 1—7, nor yet in the case of the best and most moderate oligarchy. Thus both should be reckoned

¹ See note there, and on VIII (v). 7 6 (1599).

² See the note on III. 7 3 (536).

³ See the note on III 7. 4 (538).

⁴ So *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 3, 1102a 10 l., x. 9. 13, 1180a 29 ff.

⁵ VI (iv). 7 § 4. 11, VIII (v). 7 § 4 and also perhaps 12 § 15. In II. 11 § 5 the expression is more hesitating.

⁶ It is a strange misconception of Oncken's *op. c.* II. 236 f., to attribute the propositions contained in VI (iv). 8 §§ 3, 4 to Aristotle himself, whereas in fact the whole chapter is written to refute them.

⁷ See the notes on VI (iv). 4 § 4 (1164); 7 § 4 (1238); VII (vi). 27 (1402); VIII (v). 7. 6 (1599).

amongst the normal constitutions of the second class: and even the second and third varieties of oligarchy would have to be included with them as forming the lowest types of normal constitutions; since they are still governed by the laws, and so are constitutional, not arbitrary, governments¹. It is surprising how Teichmüller² could overlook the fact that on his own showing, the social element—whether the predominating employment is agriculture and cattle-rearing, or trade and industry, or something intermediate, the pursuit of both equally—only suffices to distinguish three varieties of democracy, so that Aristotle is obliged to take other points of view in order to make out four. In the case of oligarchy the distinction, which Aristotle certainly makes, between the rich nobles and merchants or manufacturers who have made money, does not come into consideration to mark the distinction which he draws between the four varieties of this constitution. In place of it we have merely the ever increasing growth of wealth and its accumulation in fewer and fewer hands, and here again in the account which Teichmüller³ himself gives of these varieties this is precisely the case. In the whole scheme of the successive grades of constitutions from the Ideal Monarchy downwards, through the genuine and spurious Aristocracies, Polity, first Democracy, first Oligarchy, &c., down to the most extreme Democracy, then the most extreme Oligarchy (government by Dynasts)⁴, and finally Tyranny, this being the ultimate stage of development⁵, there is no place where the historical forms of the monarchy could be fitted in. Lastly, from what precedes it is seen that the early and provisional statement of the relation of the constitutions to one another, *III. c. 7*, has not simply been modified by the further course of the discussions, but that in the end hardly any part of it is left standing, so that it may well be asked whether under these circumstances Aristotle was justified in putting it forward even provisionally. No doubt all these vacillations, inequalities, and contradictions, affect the husk rather than the core of Aristotle's political theory: indeed a certain portion of them are by no means to be regarded as actual mistakes. The main supports of this political system are, that the unqualified principle of democracy and the absolute principle of oligarchy, the latter more even than the former, introduce the same sort of arbitrary government, which comes to a head in Tyranny—that a good middle class is the foundation of a healthy political life: and

¹ Comp. Oncken *op. cit.* II. 252, who however is not altogether right; he goes too far in maintaining that hence under certain conditions an oligarchy does not differ from an aristocracy, nor a demo-

cracy from a polity

² *op. cit.* 18 f.

³ *op. cit.* 20 f.

⁴ See *ibid.* on II. 10, 13.

⁵ See *ibid.* on VI (IV). II. 21 (1305).

then strength has outlasted the storms of centuries. Poets like Phocylides and Euripides (the latter with a political intention), had, it is true, sung the praise of the middle class¹; 'but Aristotle is the first thinker who makes the functions of the middle class in society and in politics the foundation of his practical political theories, and of his explanation of political history. His love of the mean in all things is nowhere so systematically and so consistently carried out as here².' He forcibly depicts the equalizing force of the well-to-do middle class and the permanence of the constitution where it is most strongly represented, that is, *Politeia*. The next best condition is one where it is at least as strong as one of the two contending extremes, rich and poor, and thereby is enabled to stave off the decisive victory of either. Even then it is possible to maintain, according to circumstances, either another Polity, or at least a law-abiding and moderate Democracy or Oligarchy, as the case may be. But where the middle class is weaker than either separately a perpetual struggle prevails between the two extremes, with 'never-ending revolutions, 'and the end is the fatal exhaustion of both: 'while Tyranny succeeds to their inheritance³.'

But the more essential the part played by Polity in the philosopher's political system, the more surprising does it appear that his remarks on this form of government cannot be combined in all their details into a consistent whole, a complete picture which shall be quite distinct. At one time he represents it as being in accordance with an aristocracy and a 'polity' to fill all offices by election, without a property qualification; in the case of polity, therefore, by no higher qualification than is generally requisite here for actual citizenship VI (IV). 9. 5. At another time however the application of the lot, either alone or accompanied by election with restriction of the right of voting or being voted for, VI (14). 15 § 19 f, is said to be characteristic of Polity. This contradiction may not be so important perhaps as at first sight appears⁴; yet we are all the more surprised to find in the same chapter the restriction of the popular assembly to the mere election of the council and the magistrates represented as characteristic of Polity, VI (IV). 14 § 10⁵, and then to hear (§ 15) that usually in Politics the resolutions of the popular assembly may be annulled by the council and the questions which they affect brought before the former assembly again and again, until it passes a resolution conformably⁶. In the same place exactly the opposite procedure is recommended as more just, and that, too, for Democracy.

¹ See *u.* on VI (IV). 11. 9.

² Oncken *op. cit.* II. p. 225.

³ Oncken *op. cit.* II. 227, 228.

⁴ See the note on VI (IV) 15 21

(1371).

⁵ See *u.* on VI (IV). 9. 5 (1255).

⁶ See *u.* on VI (IV). 14. 15 (1340).

thus then the latter, by adopting it, would become even better than the ordinary *Polities*. Must we here recognise another of those additions whereby the school obscured the master's work? Who again can fail to be surprised at the great concession which is made to unqualified popular rule and paid democracy, VI (IV) 9 § 2, 13 § 5, when Aristotle states that the combination of the two measures, payment of the poor for attendance in the popular assembly the council and the law-courts, and punishment of the rich for their non-attendance, is appropriate to *Polity*? It may be that he is thinking only of those *Polities* in which the middle class is not numerous enough to maintain a decided preponderance as compared with the two extreme parties, where consequently its deficiency must be artificially made good in this way¹. But this, to say the least, has never been expressly mentioned by Aristotle², and there is all the more reason to hold³, that in the end he has approximated, much more than he himself believes, to unqualified government by the people, and that his *Πολιτεία* is nothing but Attic democracy without its unfavourable side. Aristotle himself remarks, III. 15. 13, that when once states have grown more populous and cities increased in size it is not easy to call into life any constitution except a democracy; and in VII (VI). 5 §§ 5, 6, that since then even the older moderate patriarchal democracy of peasant proprietors has come to an end. It is a result that he laments, but he is aware that it is unalterable. All that remains is so to shape the most advanced democracy itself that it may lose as far as may be its arbitrary, despotic character and wear the appearance of something like *Πολιτεία*. This may be done by regulating for the advantage of all the system of payment, which cannot be altogether avoided here, and by checking the demagogues in their practices of vexatious accusations. The detailed proposals which Aristotle makes in this direction VII (VI), 5 §§ 3—8, 6 § 4; VIII (V). 8. 15 ff, 9 §§ 5—11 ff, prove his lively interest in this question. Oncken⁴ has well said: "Either renounce freedom and equality, that is, the essential nature of the constitutional state in Hellas, and give up the community to the despotic rule of violent oligarchs; or make the whole civic body legislators and judges, summon the rich to take honorary magistracies, compensate the poor for the service of watching over them. It was

¹ The practical proposals in VI (IV) 14 §§ 11—15 which Kiohn refuses to attribute to Aristotle, would certainly not be missed, if omitted altogether.

² As Oncken thinks *op. c.* II. 239.

³ Not can it be inferred from the following words in VI (IV). 13. § 7 on the amount of the property qualification in

the *Polity*, to which Oncken appeals, if these words are rightly taken—see the note there (1269); and on 9 § 3 (1254).

⁴ With Oncken *op. c.* II. p. 240, though his assertions require considerable modification in accordance with what is stated in *μ.* 4 on p. 41.

⁵ *op. c.* II. 259, 260.

"the only alternative which could be found. This once conceded, even
 "an opponent could not deny that the embodiment of the Athenian
 "spirit in Athens was without parallel in Hellas. With all its failings
 "it was the only state in which the political idea of the Hellenes at-
 "tained to complete expression, the community in which dwelt the
 "heart and soul of the Hellenic race; with whose power and liberty the
 "national life of Hellas became extinct. With deep dislike Aristotle
 "watches the great multitude in this mighty city reigning and ruling
 "like an all-powerful monarch; few there are whose observation traces
 "the mischiefs of its constitution so clearly to their causes. But the
 "idea of this state conquered even him. He investigated, observed,
 "described¹ Athens, its history and its organization, as no one ever
 "did before him. The study which he devoted to it was the only
 "homage which he voluntarily paid it: no word of acknowledgment
 "escapes him. But throughout it receives from him involuntary hom-
 "age, since it is the only state whose actual life he could or did take
 "as a model for his own political design. He imagined himself stand-
 "ing as a physician at a sick bed; but the patient revealed, what no
 "healthy subject could teach him, the very idea of the Hellenic state."

IX. DATE OF THE WORK AND ITS ASSUMED CONNEXION WITH THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

"There are notices in the *Politics* of the Sacred War, VIII. (v). 4. 7,
 "as of something in the past; of Phalaecus' expedition to Crete, which
 "took place at the end of it, Ol. 108, 3 (B.C. 346)², as a recent event,
 "νεωστὶ πόλεμος ξενικὸς διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, II. 10. 16: lastly, of
 "the assassination of Philip (B.C. 336), VIII. (v). 10. 16³, without any
 "intimation that it had but very lately happened⁴." On the other hand
 the passage II. 10. 16 appears to have been written before B.C. 333⁵.
 The *Politics* as a whole must have been written later than the *Nico-*
machean Ethics, which is quoted six times, II. 2 § 4, III. 9 § 3, 12 § 1;
 IV (VII). 13 §§ 5, 7; VI (IV). 11. 3⁶, and earlier than the *Poetics* which is
 announced as to follow in V (VIII). 7. 3⁷.

¹ In his *Constitution of Athens* in the *Πολιτικά*: see above, p. 35 n. 3.

² Diod. XVI. 62.

³ Cp. the note there (1673).

⁴ Zeller *op. cit.* II n. 154 n. (4).

⁵ See the note there (375).

⁶ See *sup.* on these passages.

⁷ Cp. the Introduction to my edition of

the *Poetics*, p. 11 f. Heitz' objection (in *Die verlorenen Schriften* 99 ff.) there mentioned in n. 2 on p. 12 has in the meantime been answered in detail by Vahlen *Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXVII. 1874. 293—298: he has made it tolerably certain that the chapter on *κἀδαρσις* in question, which is now lost,

It must indeed be admitted, and has already occasionally been pointed out above, that a part of the inconsistencies in the work were, from Aristotle's general position, inevitable, nay even characteristic; that on the most careful revision he would never have detected them. Others again are such as might easily have escaped his notice. Yet after all, enough inconsistencies repetitions and other discrepancies remain¹ to compel the inference that not only did Aristotle never give the finishing touches to this work, but that he must have been a long time over it, taking it up at intervals and with many interruptions through other works. In consequence of this he had altered his views on many points, and had not always the details of the earlier portions fully present to his mind when he came to write the later ones. The view here taken would be materially confirmed if the larger sections which are wanting were never really written, the work never having been completed as a whole.

It will be hardly possible to substantiate a well-grounded objection to the Aristotelian origin of the six citations of the *Ethics*², and yet that work itself calls the theory developed in it not *Ethics* but *Politics*, and the same title is confirmed by passages of the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*³. For the intermediate expression of the *Rhetoric* (l. 4. 5, 1359 b 10 f.), ἡ περὶ τὰ ἠθὴ πολιτικῆ, is here our guide, by making *Ethics* and *Politics* in the narrower sense appear as parts of *Politics* in the wider sense. The matter is thus stated with perfect correctness by the author of the *Magna Moralia* at the commencement of his work⁴, and Aristotle himself explains in the last chapter of the *Ethics* that a full realization of the principles laid down in it can only be expected from political education and legislation.

stood at the conclusion of the whole treatise after the discussion on Comedy, and not where I looked for it. Yet my remarks *loc. cit.* p. 8 still retain their force.

¹ Comp. the notes on Bk. II 4 § 4 (149); 5 §§ 1, 2 (153); § 14 (164); 6 § 15 (215), § 18 (220), 10 § 8 (366).

Bk. III 4 § 5 (471), § 9 (478).

Bk. IV (VII). 13 § 4 (872), § 8 (881); 14 § 6 (899).

Bk. V (VIII). 3 § 6 (993), § 11 (1000), 5 § 4 (1024), § 15 (1041); 6 § 14 (1079).

Bk. VI (IV). 1 § 7 (1124—5); 2 § 3 (1140), § 5 (1143); 4 § 21 (1194, 1198), § 22 (1199—1201), § 24 (1203), § 25 (1204); 6 § 4 (1223); 7 § 1 (1230 b), 9 § 9 (1265), 14 § 3 (1319), § 9 (1331), § 10 (1334), § 13 (1337), § 14 (1338); 15 § 16 (1360), § 19 (1369), § 21 (1371);

Bk. VII (VI). 1 § 6 (1383); 7 § 1

(1450);

Bk. VIII (V). 1 § 2 (1493), § 13 (1504); 3 § 4 (1511), 5 § 9 (1559); 10 § 3 (1649), § 5 (1650), § 6 (1657), 11 § 16 (1731), 12 § 11 (1767), § 14 (1777).

² See however the notes on IV (VII) 13 §§ 5, 7 (876, 879, 881) and VI (IV) 11 § 3 in regard to the citations there.

³ I. 2. 3 1094 n 24 f.

I. 3. 5 1095 n 2.

I. 4. 1 1095 a 14 f.

cp. I. 13. 2. 1102 a 7 ff.

VII. 11. 1. 1152 b 1 f.

⁴ *Poet.* 6. 16. 1450 b 6 sqq. (cp. note 71 to my edition of this work). *Rhet.* I. 2. 7 1356 a 26 sqq.

⁵ Brundage *op. cit.* II ii 1335 n. certainly expounds his words differently, but see Zeller *op. cit.* II ii 608 n.

To regard the *Ethics* and *Politics* however as forming the first and second parts of one and the same work, as has now and then been done, is certainly not correct¹. Yet this view is undoubtedly very old. For it must even have been adopted by the writer who at the close of the *Ethics* appended that introduction to the *Politics* now to be read there which may be translated somewhat as follows²: "Since then previous writers have omitted to make legislation the subject of their enquiries, it might perhaps be as well that we should ourselves take this subject into consideration together with the theory of the constitution generally, in order that the philosophy of Man may be as far as possible brought to a conclusion. First then let us try to review whatever has been rightly stated at various times by our predecessors; next from a comparison of the constitutions to investigate what it is which preserves and destroys states and individual constitutions, and from what causes some are ordered well and others ill. For when this has been considered we should perhaps be more likely to gain a comprehensive view not only of what constitution is absolutely the best, but also how each separate constitution should be regulated, and what laws and customs it must adopt (in order to be the best of its kind). Let us begin then with our discussion."

Schlosser long since, with good reason, doubted the genuineness of this patchwork in the forcible and cogent remark³: "there is no coherence between the close of this passage and the beginning of the *Politics*, and Aristotle does not follow the plan here marked out." The opening of the *Politics* is only intelligible when regarded as belonging to an independent work which starts from the notion of its own subject-matter, the state. We are not told that something similar was stated rather differently at the commencement of the *Ethics*; the state is here first constructed as the all-comprehensive association which has the highest good for its end: nor is there the least intimation that for the realization of unimpeded virtuous activity, the full meaning of this highest good, we were referred in the last chapter of the *Ethics* to the *Politics*. The supposed transition then is pure fancy with nothing here

¹ So recently by Nicksa for example.

² Nic. *Eth.* X. 9 §§ 22, 23 1187 b 12 f. παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερευνήσαντες τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκῆψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ εἰσὶν οὖν περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ τι κατὰ μέρος εἰρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενεστέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρεῖν τὰ ποῖα σῶζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς

πολεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκδστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται· θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἐν μᾶλλον συνίδομεν καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκδοτὴ ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθουσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρχόμενοι.

³ In his translation of the *Politics* i. xviii. His further conjectures need not be refuted now.

to support it. In keeping with the announcement contained in it Aristotle should rather have begun with the second book¹, making what is contained in Bk VII (v). come next, and then developing the contents of IV (vii), V (viii), and lastly of VI (iv). and VII (vi). What must be understood by a 'comparison of constitutions' we see clearly from X 9 §§ 20, 21, 1181 a 16, 17, b 7², at the same time we also see how much the interpolator has misunderstood the expression he borrows. There it denotes the combination of different laws and elements of different constitutions into a new constitution and new legislation: here it can only denote an accumulation of information on the constitutions of as many different states as possible and on the history of their development, because only from that can we gather what is here intended to be gathered from this 'comparison'. That before Aristotle no scientific enquiry into legislation existed is palpably untrue, and had the absence of such enquiry been the only inducement to the composition of his work, how could this have sufficed to make him lay down "the theory of the constitution generally"? That no writers had been found to elaborate this is not asserted even here; on the contrary we are promised an exposition and estimate of all the facts already discovered by earlier enquirers. Even the words *καὶ ὁλος δὲ περὶ πολιτείας* contain an un-Aristotelian idea, for they imply that Legislation must be a part of the theory of the Constitution, while to Aristotle, we have seen, both are parts of Politics proper. Of the incredible mode of expression in the concluding words from *καὶ πόλις πολιτεία ἀρίστη* onwards we will say nothing—it is sufficient to remark that the interpolator has left out just what is most important, which in the translation above has been added within brackets. In short, to whatever period this interpolation belongs its author did not himself know what he was about, and it would be for the most part lost labour to seek to discover "method in his madness."

That in spite of their close connexion⁴ the *Ethics* and the *Politics* are regarded by Aristotle as two independent works, is sufficiently shown by the way in which the one is quoted in the other. Until sufficient reason

¹ For the interpretation which Nickses, *l.c.* pp. 29, 30, puts upon the concluding words,—“Let us then follow this statement of ours, but only after prefixing ‘a commencement dealing with other matters,’—is not calculated to inspire confidence.

² οὐδ' ἂν φητο (οὐ αἱ σοφισταὶ) βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετεῖν συναγωγῇ τοῦ εὐδοκμοῦντος τῶν νόμων, ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων καὶ

τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί, where the expression certainly tends to pass over into the meaning put upon it by the interpolator, but goes no farther.

³ This disposes of the unhappy attempt of Nickses *l.c.* 25 f. to interpret the passage. In his refutation of the earlier attempt he is on the whole successful.

⁴ As Zeller observes *op. c.* II ii 104 f. π. (1).

is adduced for transferring the first chapter of Bk. IV (VII). from Aristotle to Theophrastos or some one else¹, the yet more unequivocal mention of Ethics there (§ 13) as 'another study,' *ἐτέρας σχολῆς*², has the most decisive importance: although the term 'another study' would mean no more when so applied than it does in the case of the *Prior* or *Pure* and *Posterior* or *Applied Analytics*, for example. Yet no one has tried to show from the close connexion between them that these latter treatises are merely parts of one and the same work. In fact Politics³ in Aristotle's sense, so far as the state according to its idea is a means of training to human virtue and therefore to happiness, is nothing but Applied Ethics: the problem of Pure Ethics being to show wherein virtue and happiness consist. But since this idea of the state could only be truly realized in the absolutely best state, which does not as yet exist, which even if it did exist would only be one state amongst many—since therefore the virtue of the citizen is dissociated from the virtue of the man—Ethics has to deal with the moral activity of the individual, Politics with that of the state⁴.

In Aristotle's classification of the sciences, both studies, in common with Poetics, have a somewhat uncertain place and worth assigned them, as Zeller⁵ and Walter⁶ have shown: nor does it appear that Aristotle cleared this up sufficiently to himself, or even tried to do so. It is a peculiar weakness of his Ethics that it has no purely scientific importance for him; it merely serves as an introduction to practical morality⁷: but again, as he himself explains, the direct value of mere theoretical instruction for this purpose is very slight, nay, quite insignificant⁸. Yet practical insight (*φρόνησις*), without which there is no moral virtue⁹, can be materially promoted by Ethics¹⁰, although it does not by any means coincide with Ethics in subject-matter¹¹. So too the practical insight of the leading statesman in political life can exist in a purely

¹ See above, p. 15 n. 1.

² Cp. the note there (709).

³ Cp. Zeller *op. cit.* II. 1. 104 f. n. 1, 182, 607 n. 3. Oncken *op. cit.* I. 164 ff.

⁴ *op. cit.* II. 1176—185.

⁵ *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft* 537—554 (Jena 1874. 8). But not every statement in that work is correct.

⁶ *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff., II. 2, 1 1103 b 26 ff. Cp. Walter *op. cit.* 151 ff. Zeller *op. cit.* II. 11631.

⁷ *Nic. Eth.* I. 3 §§ 5—8 1095 a 3 ff.; cp. I. 9. 10 1100 a 1 ff.; II. 1. 1 1103 a 14 ff., II. 4 §§ 3—6, 1105 a 26—b 18; X. 9=X. 10 (Bekk.): cp. *Pol.* IV (VII). 13. 11 f., *Nic. Eth.* II. 6 §§ 4—8, § 15 1106 a

26—b 7, and 1106 b 36 ff.; II. c. 9. Comp. also Walter *op. cit.* 151—162 who certainly should not have relied upon the probably spurious chapter II. 7.

⁸ Cp. *ms.* in I. 5. 9 (45), I. 13. 6 (112).

⁹ *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 2 1094 a 22 ff., I. 3. 7 1095 a 10 ff., I. 4. 6 1095 b 4—13, VI. 7. 7 1141 b 21 ff. Comp. Walter *op. cit.* 157, 400 ff.

¹⁰ As Zeller thinks, *op. cit.* II. 11608 n.; he has been refuted by Walter p. 151. There is no doubt that the passage of the *Nic. Eth.* adduced by Zeller, VI. 8 §§ 1—4 1141 b 23—1142 a 11, is not by Aristotle, as was long ago shown by Fischer Fritzsche and Rasso.

empirical manner without a comprehensive theory of politics; but on the other hand there is much to learn from such a theory, and the great practical statesman will be all the greater the more he has appropriated it to himself. That the main value of πολιτικὴ consists in affording this important contribution to the education of capable statesmen is stated by Aristotle III. 1. 1; VI (IV). c. 1; VII (VI). 5. 1, IV (VII) 13. 5, and in other passages, and this fully agrees with his analogous view about Ethics. But his inconsistency with himself does not go so far here as before; rather he demands of political theory III. 8. 1 (cp. VI [IV]. 13. 5), that it should exhaust all conceivable cases, even those of which it can be foreseen that they will seldom or never actually occur¹.

[X. THE MOST RECENT CRITICISM OF THE TEXT.

The comparative worth of the Manuscripts.

This question, of which some notice will be found above², has recently been raised anew by Busse in an excellent dissertation *De praesidii emendandi Aristotelis Politica*³. By a minute analysis of the old Latin version, Busse proves beyond all doubt that it has been over-estimated by Vettori and Schneider, and even by Susemihl, and is by no means so strictly literal or correct as they supposed⁴.

To begin with, William of Moerbeke's ignorance of Greek was something deplorable⁵. He renders περὶ τῶν ἀποφηναινμένων περὶ κτλ., *de pronunciatis de optima civitate*; πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀριθμῶν αἰός, ἐπιπροσθεῖναι *praeferrī*; ἐπισημαίν *praefectum populū esse*, evidently arriving at the meaning of a compound by the most rudimentary analysis, as τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχοντα *bona quae circa res bellicas*⁶. But more ignorance whether of the meaning of words or of the construction—and it would seem as if, in II. 12. 8, he made Ὀλυμπίασιν an accusative after τοῦ νικῆσαντος *qui vicit Olimpiasem*⁷; at any rate he gives *super tecta* for

¹ Comp. *nn.* on III. 8. 1 (542); III. 13. 13 (601); VI (IV). 15. 4 (1350); see also III. 2 §§ 1—3.

[Here Prof. Susemihl's own *Introduction* ends. The following section is mainly an attempt to present succinctly some results of his critical labours; but for its form, and for occasional divergences of opinion, he is not responsible. Tr.

² pp. 1, 2.

³ Berlin, 1881. 8.

⁴ Susemihl however in the large critical edition (1872) p. XXXIII f. had already pointed out inaccuracies and inconsisten-

cies in William's translation and the need of caution in inferences from it to the original. See also the edition of 1879, e.g. I p. 204 n. 1, 210 n. 2.

⁵ Yet it is an exaggeration when Roger Bacon writes "ut nolum est omnibus Patetis literis nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca de quo patetum, et ideo omnia translatet falsa et corruptis scientiam Latineum." Cp. Jourdain *Recherches* p. 67.

⁶ Busse *op. cit.* p. 36 f. Space permits only a few typical instances to be selected from his stock.

⁷ p. 9. The best ms. gives *Olimpiasem*.

ἀνὰ δώματα in v (viii). 3. 9¹—does less to obscure the readings of his original than a fatal inconsistency and fluctuation in the choice of renderings. The prepositions are changed or confused on almost every page. So likewise the particles: γὰρ autem in ἔστι γὰρ II. 9. 18, ἵσως γὰρ IV (vii) 17. 13, δὲ γὰρ v (viii). 1. 2²; γὰρ igitur, III. 7. 5; δὲ enim I. 2 1; οὖν enim I. 8. 6³, etc.: not to speak of the stock renderings καὶ δὲ et...etiam, καὶ τοι et quidem. Sometimes he omits particles (μέν, γάρ, δέ, οὖν); sometimes, e.g. II. 5. 9 δικαίως et iuste, he inserts them. They are most frequently inserted to avoid asyndeton, as in II. 3. 7 φράτορα φυλέτην *fratriuicem* aut *contribulem*, etc.⁴ He is careless of the order of words; thus II. 4. 6 καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἕνα et *ambos fieri unum ex duobus existentibus*, IV (vii). 3. 8 κυρίως καὶ et *dominos* (i. e. καὶ κυρίους)⁵ His carelessness leads him repeatedly to translate the adjectives ἀριστοκρατικῇ, ὀλιγαρχικῇ by the nouns *aristocratia*, *oligarchia*⁶.

This being the ordinary style of his translation, when he comes to passages where his Greek original was defective, it is only occasionally that he transmits the defect faithfully: as in VIII (v) 6. 3 ἐν θω (for ἔνθα) in *tho*, which he took for a proper name; III. 11. 3 κρήνης (for κρήνουσι, so M^a) *Kries*; II. 9 30 φιλέτω (so M^a) *amicabilia*; v (viii) 1 § 4 M^a αὐ⁷ *ipsorum* (he has read the compendium αὐτῶν); 6 § 9 M^a ὁ αὐτός (for αὐλός) *id ipsum*⁷. More frequently he tries to get some sort of sense by putting in a word or phrase suggested by the context, or by a parallel passage in the *Politics*. Take for instance VIII (v). 1. 3: P¹ gives ἀνίσους ἔ. τι ὄντας, with space for one letter; M^a has slurred over this defect of the archetype by reading ἔτι; not so William; from the immediately preceding ἐκ τοῦ ἴσουσιν ὄντας he derives *inaequales* in quocunque *existentes*. Similarly with *natura* for δύναμις in IV (vii). 11. 4 (from the adjoining φύσιν), *alia quidem esse eadem* for τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι VI (iv). 4. 25 (from the following τὰλλα μὲν εἶναι τὰντά): see also III. 16 § 5 *universale* borrowed from c. 15 § 4 τὸ καθόλου, IV (vii). 1 § 4 *quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant*, IV (vii). 11 § 1 *si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem* borrowed from 5 § 3 τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρη ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν, etc.⁸ Thus the defects and false readings of his original, which must have resembled M^a though not so corrupt, are made worse by alterations and superficial remedies. In IV (vii). 14. 22 I had the same hiatus as M^a has now, through the homoeoteleuton σπουδάζειν, σχολάζειν: William does what he can

¹ p. 12.² p. 30.³ pp. 14, 27.⁴ p. 11.⁵ pp. 29, 30.⁶ p. 9.at v (viii). 5. 17, where ἀκ... is all that stands in M^a of ἀκροώμενοι.⁸ Buse pp. 15—20.⁷ pp. 9, 12, 23. Compare the lacuna

to conceal this by translating *ἔνεκεν τᾶξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης gratia ordinis et pacis*, as if he had read *τάξεως*. In vi (iv). 4. 11 M^a gives τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ instead of τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾗ; so too Γ, for William renders *<minus> quam* to make sense. Similarly v (viii). 6. 11 M^a has ἦποντο for ἦποντο; William *sequebantur*; which must be his attempt 'to make sense out of ἦποντο'.

Another source of divergence between the codices and William's Latin must also be kept in view, viz. the freedom with which he sometimes translates. Thus in ii. 9 20 *δημαγωγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἠναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς regere populum se ipsos* (he read αὐτούς) *coegerant reges*, he may perhaps have simply exchanged the passive construction for the active. This is a not uncommon resource with him: see vii (vi). 7 § 5 *προσκεῖσθαι arponere*, 8 § 1 *δεσφῆσθαι dividere* etc.; and for the converse ii. 7 § 6 *δειξῇ ostendatur*, 8 § 5 *γράφειν scribatur*, viii (v). 8. 9 *παρελθῆναι comprehendantur*, etc.¹ Though he hardly ever appears to omit words from Γ, it can be shown that he sometimes adds: e.g. i. 5. 8 *ἐπερ τοῖς εἰρημένους si quidem et dictis <creditur>*, ii. 9. 3 *κεκτημένους περὶ οἴκου* (so M^a for *περιοίκους possidentibus <prædicta> circa domus*, etc.² Yet additions may be due to glosses, like *videro fugientem proelio*, (?) ἀπάνευθε μάχης νοήσω in the margin of P¹, etc.⁴ Lastly, how much caution is needed in handling this translation may be judged from a few characteristic blunders taken almost at random: i. 9. 1 οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης *neque longe <posita>*; ii. 8. 13 οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιοῦν κτλ. *non bene autem neque de iudicio habes lex iudificare dignificans*, though here one might suppose he had ὁ κρίνειν ἀξίων before him⁵: ii. 11 § 14 *ἐκαστον ἀποτελείται τῶν αὐτῶν unum quodque perficitur ab eisdem*⁶. c. 11 § 15 τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰετὶ τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις *inditando semper aliquam partem emittentes super urbes*, suggested perhaps by *ποιούσιν εὐτόρους* in vii (vi). 5. 9⁷: iii. 3 § 2 *ἐπερ οὖν δημοκρατοῦνται si quidem igitur in democratiā versae fuerant quaedam*: 13 § 2 οἴκοι *habetur*. iv (vii). 16. 14 πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπεῖαν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμὴν *ad deorum reverentiam hiis, quae sortitae sunt eum quis de generatione honorem* (as if τὰς εἰληχότας were read)⁸.

From this examination of the old translation Busse concludes that it is a less trustworthy representative of the better recension (Π¹ i. e. Γ P¹ M) than P¹, the codex of Demetrios Chalkondylas. Its lost original was slightly better than the very corrupt Ambrosian manuscript

¹ pp. 21—23: Γ may have had *ἐλ-
ποντο*, but this is less probable.

² pp. 24—26.

³ p. 32.

⁴ p. 34.

⁵ p. 30.

⁶ pp. 43, 20, 47.

⁷ pp. 24, 43.

⁸ p. 41.

M^a, but closely resembled it; the common archetype of the two being itself very corrupt, with numerous omissions through homoeoteleuta and one or two glosses inserted in the text¹. And it was from this Latin translation and not from another manuscript, he thinks, that the scribe of P^a derived those readings wherein he departs from the second or worse family².

These conclusions however are by no means warranted³. The ignorance and uncritical spirit of William of Moerbeke renders it all the more certain that in the majority of the right readings which are due solely to his translation he must have followed a codex considerably better (as it was also older) than the archetype of P¹ or of M^a. When all deductions have been made for variants arising from conjectures and mistranslations, the old translation presents the correct reading 18 times unsupported: 7 times in conjunction with P^a only: once in conjunction with P^a only: 3 times with P¹ (or its corrections) only; once with Arctinus only: 5 times in conjunction with more than one of the inferior manuscripts⁴. To these may be added some 12 other passages where the evidence, though good, is less convincing⁵. Whereas the correct reading is due to P¹ alone 11 times, to P¹ in conjunction with inferior authorities (Ar., P^a margin, P^a) 5 times: and several of these are such changes as Demetrios or Arctinus could

¹ pp. 45—47

² In proof of this Busse quotes (p. 48)

from v (VIII) 8. 2—a passage where the second family P^a exhibits an hiatus—

P ¹ M	William	P ^a (margin)
παράδοσιν	subintians	ὑπεισδύουσα
παρὰνομιᾶ	praevaricatio	παράβασις
τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα	parvae expensae	αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι
δαίρει	consumunt	δαπανῶν.

There is nothing new in this observation. Compare Sussehl's large critical edition (1872) p. XIII: "mirum autem est in eis verbis, quae in vulgatae recensionis codicibus ommissa hic liber (P^a) cum paucis aliis et vetusta translatione servavit, cum aliis illis interdum accuratius cum hac assentire aut alias eiusdem sensus voces quam illos hic illic offeire, ut propensius facile fiat ad credendum hos in eo locos non ex codice Graeco antiquiore, sed ex ipsa translatione Latina esse haustos."

³ With what follows compare Sussehl *Politica tertium editio* (1882) Preface pp. VIII—XVIII.


⁴ P¹ alone gives 1258 b 40 Χρηστὴν 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ, 1260 b 41 αἱ δὲ τῆς, 1260 b a δ' ἡδὴ, 1271 a 20 πᾶν, 1276 a 33 εἶδος ἐν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστον, 1285 a 7 ἀποκρίνται, 1332 a 42 ἐνία δέ, 1336 a 34

σπουδασομένων, 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 ευστάσεις, b 38 πλήθει, 1330 b 9 τὴν Ταραντίων ἀρχὴν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 δολιτικῆν, 1303 a 24 ἐγγύς ἐν (οἱ ἐγγύς), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων: P^a 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 10 δῆλον ἐστι δέ, 1321 b 29 τὰ omitted, 1322 b 36 προσευθύναι (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ omitted: P^a 1259 b 28 δέ; P¹ 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτὸ: P^a (corrector) 1278 b 22 παρ': P^a 1289 b 38 πολλοί; P^a 1336 a 5 δέ: P¹ 1303 b 31 τὰ: P¹ Aldine P^a (corrector) 1332 a 33 τῶ: P¹ A. 1^a (corr. 3) 1335 a 26 σώματος: P^a 1254 a 10 ἀπὸ πᾶς (ἀπὸ πᾶς θλῶς M^a P¹, θλῶς cet.).

⁵ Of the disputed cases 1260 b 20 οἰκονόμοι, 1262 b 32 τοὺς φύλακας, 1274 b 20 (ἀποστίνειν or ἀποστίνων), 1280 a 29 ταλάντων may be mentioned.

easily make for themselves¹. In 4, or perhaps 5, places P^a has alone preserved the right reading: it is difficult to find a single passage where it is due to M^a or to P^a alone². From P^a and from Aretinus unsupported a greater number of such cases is derived; but the uncertainty, whether we are dealing with a genuine reading of a manuscript or merely with conjecture, proportionately increases. The latter is more probable not only for P^a, but for the few occasional good readings of the worst manuscripts³.

Further it must be noticed that while M^a Γ are often found alone supporting a variant against P¹, M^a P¹ are less frequently (the number of such cases being about $\frac{2}{3}$) alone in agreement against Γ, and it is very seldom indeed that P¹ Γ alone support any reading against M^a. What is the right inference to draw from this state of things? Evidently that Γ and M^a go back to one common archetype, and P¹ to another (from which also must be derived the traces of the better recension in P⁴ P^a): only the immediate ancestor of M^a had been corrected by the latter, while this was not the case with Γ or the authorities from which it is derived⁴. The genuine readings of the family Π¹ will be found to have been preserved sometimes in the one archetype (of M^a Γ), sometimes in the other (of P¹ and of the corrections in P³ P^a): and the relationship between the members of the family may be represented by the following tree.



¹ P¹ alone 1259 a 13 *ἐλαιουργείων*, the right order of 1278 a 36 l. (corr.¹), b 4 *κάκωνος* corr.¹ (P *κάκωνος*), 1286 b 17 *μετέβαλον* (perhaps Γ also), 1287 b 38 *βασιλικόν*, 1328 a 5 *ἀπάγγελται*, 1335 b 20 *γενόμενους*, 1338 b 4 *πρότερον* (corr.¹), 1340 b 30 *παιδίων*, 1299 b 24 *ἐτέρων*, 1314 a 35 *τὸ ποιῶν* (?). P¹ Ar. 1263 b 4 *τὸ*, 1280 b 19 *εἶσαν*; P¹ (corr.) Ar. 1255 a 37 *ἐκγονον*, 1299 a 14 *πολιτείας*; P¹ P^a (manus.) P¹ (later hand) 1284 a 37 *κολούειν*. Of these *ἐλαιουργείων*, *πρότερον*, *παιδίων*, *τὸ ποιῶν*,

εἶσαν, *ἐκγονον* are of slight weight.

² P¹ 1253 a 25 *καὶ omitted after φύσει*, 1270 b 38 *εἶποι*, 1325 a 29 *αὐτὸ τὸ* (corr.¹), 1339 a 14 *εἶπεν*. perhaps 1338 b 33 *ἀπαιδαγωγήτους*.

³ 1267 b 33 *τὰ L^a, U^b* (corr.); 1274 b 20 *τὶ πταίσωσι L^a*; 1275 b 39 *τοῦτο L^a* Aldine and M^a (1st hand); 1331 a 24 *θεοῖς P^a Ar.*, 1295 a 28 *τὴ L^a C^a Al.*, 1317 a 12 *τίς R^b Ar.*, 1302 b 39 *τὸ πρὸς R^b*.

⁴ For proof of this see (beside the criti-

Few of the readings common to M^a P^1 or of those common to Γ M^a have much to recommend them. Yet this is far from proving P^1 to be our best authority. Against such a view may be urged (1) the number of mistakes with which, no less than Γ or M^a , it abounds: (2) the futile attempts at correction which it sometimes exhibits, e.g. III. 13.15 ταύτας γὰρ δεῖ δαίκεν for αἷται γὰρ δεῖ δοκοῦσι δαίκεν (δοκοῦσι having been omitted in the archetype of Π^1): (3) the fact that, as just shown, Γ , solely or with inferior manuscripts, furnishes the true reading at least 34 (perhaps 46) times; whereas P^1 , alone or with inferior manuscripts, does the same only 16 times. These considerations are not to be set aside by an isolated passage like III. 9. 8, where P^1 διακόπουσι is a trifle nearer right than M^a διακονοῦσι Will. *ministrant*¹.

All existing manuscripts of the *Politics*, when compared even with those of the *Ethics*, are late and bad. Still there are degrees of badness: and if to follow Γ M^a , other things being equal, in preference to P^1 sometimes leads an editor away from the true reading of Π^1 , he would yet oftener go astray if he followed P^1 against Γ M^a . The relationship between the two families is itself obscure. In some respects Π^a is the better of the two, particularly where it preserves words omitted in Π^1 : in such cases it is seldom Π^a that has a gloss inserted, nearly always it is Π^1 that is mutilated². Yet as a general rule Π^1 should be followed in preference to Π^a .

Coming now to Busse's view about P^a , we must admit that this manuscript presents most remarkable variants. Take v (VIII). 2 § 5 ff. (1337 b 17 ff.).

	P^1 M^a	Willam	P^a
	πρὸς ἀκριβείαν	ad perfectionem	πρὸς τὸ τέλειον
	ερμηνείας	dictis	ῥηθείσας
§ 6	ἐνεκεν	gratia	χάριν (Bekk.)
	τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ	ipsius quidem enim	αὐτου μὲν γὰρ (Bekk.)
	φίλων	amicorum	τῶν φίλων
c. 3 § 1	τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἥδη	de musica autem	περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 3	τέλος	finaliter	τελευταίον
	ὅτι δεῖ ποιῶντας	quod facientes oportet	τί ποιῶντας δεῖ (Bekk.) ³

In some of these instances the discrepancy has nothing to do with

cal notes) Susemihl's Third edition (1882) Preface pp. x, xi, where also the diagram is given, p. xvi.

¹ Quoted by Busse p. 45.

² The manuscripts of the *Nicomachean Ethics* show an equally perplexing discrepancy between $K^a M^b$ and $L^b O^b$ in

some parts of the treatise, $K^b O^b$ and $L^b M^b$ in others.

³ Other instances of close agreement with the old translation, in 1327 a 34, 1329 a 17, 18, 1334 a 37, 1336 a 34, b 18, 1340 a 10, 1307 b 32 l. Susemihl *op. c.* VIII.

the old translation: and this is still more plain from the following variants of P⁴: 1330 a 32 *χρη* for *δε* c. c.¹, 1333 b 2 *δὲ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα* for *καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δὲ* (Π¹ omit *δὲ*); 1335 b 23 *παιδοποιίας* for *τεκνοποιίας*; 1336 b 5 *γὰρ τοῦ* for *τοῦ γὰρ*, 1339 a 16' *χάριν* for *ἐνεκα*, 1340 a 8 *δῆλον* for *φανερὸν*; 9 *ἄλλων* for *ἐτέρων*; 1342 a 6 *ἀπάσαις* for *πάσαις*; 1309 a 18 *οὐ* for *μή*. But at the same time this corrupt carelessly written book has some readings agreeing with P¹ and M² against the old translation, and others which no Latin version would ever have suggested. Thus 1338 b 27 *λειπομένοις* M² P⁴ *deficientes* William, 1318 b 31 *τιμημάτων τὰς μελλοῦς ἀπὸ* omitted by M² P⁴ translated by Will.; 1326 b 4 *μὲν τοῖς* M² P^{1,5} Ald., *τοῖς μὲν* Π²; 1332 b 1 *μεταβαλλειν* M² P^{1,5} *μεταβαλεῖν* Π²; 1334 b 2 *τε* untranslated by Will., *τὰ* P^{1,5}, 1335 a 16 *τὸ* c. c. *τοὺς* M² P⁴; 1337 a 18 *βέλτιον* M² P⁴ Ar., *βέλτιστον* c. c. *optimus* Will.; 1319 b 24 *καὶ τὰ* P^{1,5} and in the margin of P⁴ *κατὰ* c. c. *ἐν* Will.; 27 *αἱ πρότεροι* Π¹ P² and the corrector of P⁴, *αἱ πρότερον* Π²; 1322 a 22 *τοῖς ἐρημένοις* M² and P^{1,5} (1st hand), *τῆς ἐρημένης* c. c. *dicto* Will., 1306 a 22 *ἐγχειρίσωμεν* ceteri, *ἐγχειρήσωσιν* M², *ἐγχειρήσουσιν* P⁴ *manus iniecerint* Will.; 1313 b 2 *φρόνημά τε* P^{1,5} R^b, *φρονήματα τε* c. c. *sapientiae* Will.; 1316 a 32 *τῶν* c. c. *τοῦ* P^{1,5} Ar., in P¹ M² a hiatus. Take even the suspected passage 1334 a 28, 29 *δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας* c. c., *indigent iustitia et multa temperantia qui optime videntur agere et omnibus beatis frui* Will. Any one conjecturing the text from the Latin version would surely have written *ἀπολαύειν*, but P⁴ has *δεόνται.....οἱ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες.... ἀπολαύοντες*. Or again, 1311 b 7 *διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχῶναι* (*αἰσχῶναι* M² P¹ *αἰσχύνεσθαι* Π²), *propterea quod aliqui monachatum in corpore verecundiam fecerunt* would have suggested *αἰσχῶναι*, not *αἰσχύνειν* which is what we find in P⁴. So again had the scribe wished to emend the corrupt *ὀπλίτην* of 1321 a 12, William's *armatunam* would have suggested *ὀπλιτικὴν* or *ὀπλίτιν*, not *ὀπλιτικὸν* which is the reading of P⁴. Far more probable is it that here traces of the archetype still remain. Similarly in 1320 b 3 the right reading *ἀφιεμένους* seems to have come down in P⁴ as well as in P¹: it is at least unlikely that William's *respuentes* suggested it. Even in viii (v) 8. 2, the passage which Bussio thinks conclusive, but for the reminiscence of a phrase in Plato it is by no means clear that *παραδυομένη* should supersede *ὑπεισδύουσα*².

¹ Consensus codicum.

² Bekker, who took P² of the second or worse family as the foundation of his text, often adopted readings from P⁴: in

some cases even, e.g. 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16 f., 34 f., where M² P¹ have a better reading. See p. 76.

Dislocations and double recensions.

The text of the *Politics*, when put into the more coherent shape which to the Geiman editor most nearly reproduces Aristotle's intention¹, is seen to depart from the order of the manuscripts not merely in the two great instances of the arrangement of the books², but also in a large number of other cases. It will be useful here to review, at greater length than can be done in the critical footnotes, the difficulties for which transposition seems to be suggested as a natural remedy, especially as the fullest account of these suggestions has often to be sought in monographs or magazine articles not always readily accessible.

(1) Bk. I. II §§ 5, 6. Montecatino, p. 422 of his Commentary on Bk. I., was the first to enquire what is the connexion between § 6, *εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης, βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβώνται μάλιστα, δουλικώταται δ' ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλεῖσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς*, and the context. Piccart, p. 140, proposed to remove it to follow τῷ σώματι μόνῃ χρησίμων (l. 27). As Schneider saw, this will not do; for the third or mixed sort of χρηματιστικῇ could not be excluded from the ἐργασίαι of § 6. Now the last words of § 5, immediately before *εἰσὶ δὲ τεχνικώταται κτλ*, are, *περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογέσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν*. This reads like the final remark of Aristotle on the separate branches of χρηματιστικῇ, considered not in regard to theory but to practice (τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν, § 1): no new remarks upon them ought to be added. If so, § 6, which consists of such remarks, would be in place if it preceded *περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ κτλ*: or, which is the same thing, if the sentence *περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ...τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν* be transposed to follow ἀρετῆς. The argument too runs on better to the next sentence *ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα κτλ*, § 7. "I have here said what was necessary in a general way on each of these various branches; to go accurately into details would no doubt be useful for the various pursuits themselves, but it would be a tedious subject to dwell upon. The reader is referred for particulars to the separate works which have been written upon them."

¹ As may be done by passing over the parts printed in Clarendon type and reading the duplicates of the same passages in their transposed place, where they stand in ordinary type between thick brackets

thus < >.

² See above p. 16 n. 4.

³ Sussemlil *Quaestiones Criticae* I p. 9 (Greifswald 1867. 4).

(2) Bk. I. 13 § 8. q. v. "It is strange," says M. Thurot¹, "that after having spoken of the deliberative part of the soul, Aristotle does not say one word of the *ἀπὸ τῶν διανοητικῶν* which properly belong to it, while speaking three times, ll. 15, 17, 20, of *ἡθικῇ ἀρετῇ* in the same sense. Further, it is singular that in order to prove that he who commands ought to have *ἡθικῇ ἀρετῇ* in perfection, he says that the work belongs to him who directs it and that reason (*λόγος*) is a directing faculty: this reflexion evidently applies to the *ἀρετῇ διανοητικῇ* of τὸ *λόγον ἔχον*, elsewhere called *φρόνησις*, III. 4. 17, and not to the *ἡθικῇ ἀρετῇ* of the *ἀλογον*." He proposes therefore to transpose ll. 14—17, *ὁμοίως τοίνυν.. ἔργον* to follow *ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς*: to omit *ἡθικῇ* in line 20, and change *ἡθικῇ* to *διανοητικῇ* in l. 17. (The transposition becomes less needed and less satisfactory if *ἡθικῇ* be retained.) Now there is no doubt that, on the stricter Aristotelian theory, *φρόνησις* inseparably involves *ἡθικῇ ἀρετῇ*, *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13 §§ 2, 3, 6 (cp. *id.* 12 § 6, *ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἀποτελείται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν*); so l. 20 *ἡθικῇ* may stand. The dianoeitic virtue, in its perfection, seems to reside solely in the master who commands. Cp. § 7, just above the present passage, *ὁ δοῦλος ὅλος οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν*, and *Pol.* III. 4. §§ 17, 18, *ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἀρχόντος ἴδιος ἀρετῇ μόνῃ τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔουκεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῇ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής* with the notes.

(3) II. 4. 4, *τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον... μὴ νεωτερίζειν*. "It is singular that Aristotle supposes here what he has not yet proved and is going to prove later on, namely, that communism relaxes the bond of family affections. Again in c. 5 § 24, 1261 b 1, he supposes without saying "so, that community of wives and children will make the labourers more obedient" (Thurot)². He therefore suggests that II 4. 4 should follow *κοινωνίαν* in II 5. 24. A better place would seem to be in 4 § 9, 1262 b 24, after Aristotle has proved that *ὑδαρὴς φιλία* must result from the Platonic institutions in the absence of the ordinary motives to mutual kindness. The argument of §§ 5—9 goes to show *συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τὸνναντίον ὧν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰετὸς γίνεσθαι*; the application to the agricultural class would come in appositely to point thus reversal of the effect intended¹.

(4) II. 6 § 3 *σὺν μὴν. καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινα δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων*. Aristotle would hardly consider a discussion *περὶ παιδείας* to be extraneous to the main political subject of the *Republic*. Moreover

¹ *Études sur Aristote* 18, 19. Comp. also Susenmihl *Quaest. Cris.* VI. 9—11.

² *Op. cit.* 26, 27.

³ Susenmihl *Quaest. Cris.* I p. 13.

in line 37 he exchanges the construction with *περὶ* for a new one *οἶεται δὲν...πεπλήρωκε*. The clause *καὶ περὶ παιδείας...φυλάκων* should come amongst the subjects (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάντων*) on which Socrates in the *Republic* has touched, and therefore in § 1 after *κτήσεως* 1364 b 30¹.

It is possible, however, while admitting that the transposition would give a better position to these words, to defend their present place. Aristotle is evidently criticizing in an unsympathetic spirit. He has reduced the points touched upon to a minimum (*περὶ ὀλίγων πάντων*). Afterwards, when he complains of the extraneous topics which take up the bulk of the treatise (criticism on poetry and art, psychology, metaphysics, ethics), he has grudgingly to allow that some of these long digressions do serve the purpose (or at least are introduced under the colour) of elaborating the training of the guardians.

(5) II. 7 § 1, αἱ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν. Giphanius (Van Giffen)² comparing c. 12 § 1, ἐνιοὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐκονώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ἀντιφωνοῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον... ἐνιοὶ δὲ νομοθέται γηγόνασιν...πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, proposed to omit *φιλοσόφων καὶ*. Spengel³ simply transposed these words before *ἰδιωτῶν*.

(6) II. 7 §§ 10—13 = §§ 18—20.

The third objection to Phaleas' scheme, §§ 8—13, emphasizes the necessity for equality of education as well as of possessions. Like the preceding criticisms, §§ 5—7, it deals with the internal arrangements of the state. In §§ 14—17 there is a transition to its external relations, which Phaleas ought not to have overlooked, as he did. It is not likely then that in §§ 18—20 (with which we must take § 21) Aristotle would return to internal matters and repeat his previous objection in other words. Yet this is what he has done if the common order be retained. Let the two passages be read side by side, and it will be seen that there is no new thought in the latter, but only a repetition of the former in different language.

ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον
διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά τῆς κτήσεως,
ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τού-
ναντιον δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ
πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνισον,

ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων
τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς
πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν
ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ χαρίζεντες

¹ Compare Victorius *Comm.* p. 106 (ed. of 1576); adiungit autem in extremo disputasse eum illic Socratem de disciplina quam putaret convenire custodibus illius rei publicae: hoc enim coniungi debet cum his quae nunc repetit facienti.

bus ad maiestatem eorum librorum indicandam, non cum inferioribus ut quidam falso putant.

² In his commentary p. 210.

³ *Arist. Studies* III, p. 14 (66).

οὐ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν,
ἐὰν ἴσται· ὅθεν καὶ

ἐν δὲ ἰς τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἰσθλός),
οὐ μόνον θ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγ-
καῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὣν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει
τὴν ἰσότητά τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ
λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ βιγούν ἢ πεινῆν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ
ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχω-
σιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ
τὴν ταύτης λατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν,
οὐ τοῖνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς
ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν
τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα-
χεία καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη·
τρίτον δ', εἰ τινες δύναιντο δι' αὐτῶν
χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ
φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀν-
θρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικουσί γε
τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ'
οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν
οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ
μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτην
ἀλλὰ τύραννον)· ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικ-
ρὰς ἀδικίας βιοθητικὸς μόνον ὁ τρό-
πος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. γ §§ 10
—13.

It seems advisable therefore to remove §§ 18—21 to precede § 14
ἐτ, to treat as parallel versions §§ 10—13, §§ 18—20 cited above, and
to take § 21 as coming directly after them but before § 14¹.

(7) II. 11 § 12. In § 9 Aristotle says that eligibility to office on
the ground of wealth and on the ground of merit are traits of oligarchy
and aristocracy respectively: hence the Carthaginian constitution, where
wealth and ability combined are qualifications for the highest offices,
must be a third and distinct scheme. This, he adds, § 10, is a fault in
the legislator, who ought to have made provision that ability should not
be associated with poverty even in citizens in a private station: ὁρᾷν
ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον

ἀγανακτοῖεν [ἄν] ὡς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες
ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις
ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἐτι δ'
ἢ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον,
καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διωβολία
μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἡδὴ τοῦτ' ἢ πάτριον,
αὐεὶ δέονται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς
ἄπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἄπειρος γὰρ ἢ
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς
τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν.
τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ
τὰς οὐσίας ὁμαλίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν
ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρα-
σκευάζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεον-
εκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ
δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἡττους
τε ὦσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶνται. γ §§ 18—
20.

¹ Susemthl in *Fahrh. für Philol.* xcvi. 1866. p. 330.

ἀρχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴ ἰδιωτεύοντες. Now here, as far as the sense goes, the clause in § 12 belongs: βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς. "If he was "forced to neglect the last-mentioned task, at least he might have made "provision for poor men in office." Then would follow quite naturally the criticism of § 10: "at all events he should not have allowed these "high offices to be virtually put up for sale¹."

(8) III. 7 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ πλείους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα. Spengel² first called attention to the difficulty of συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως, when as Aristotle goes on to explain (ἤδη χαλεπὸν) it is hard for a large number of citizens to attain a high standard of excellence. Thurot³ supposed a lacuna to precede συμβαίνει, containing a reason for the name Πολιτεία, something like this: <διὰ τὸ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἀρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἀπλῶς ἀρίστους>. The parallel passage in III. 17. 4 πολιτικὸν πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικόν may have suggested to Zeller the insertion of πολεμικόν before πλῆθος in § 3. In any case he is right so far as this, that the remark to which συμβαίνει εὐλόγως refers must emphasize the warlike character of Πολιτεία⁴. Schmidt lastly found such a remark, and the lost subject of the verb συμβαίνει, in the last clause of § 4, καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα, which he would transpose to come after πολιτεία.

(9) III. 11 § 20 ἀλλὰ γὰρ...§ 21 λείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. Schneider bracketed the clause ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους as superfluous and disturbing to the context. If retained in the present order there appears to be a double recension ἀλλὰ γὰρ...ἀδίκους = πλὴν τοῦτο...νόμους⁵. But it seems better, with Congreve, to reverse the order of the two sentences.

(10) III 13 § 6 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν...ἐξ αὐτῶν. Thurot⁶ sums up his elaborate examination of the context as follows. Aristotle has proposed, § 5, to investigate who ought to have power in a state where all kinds of superiority are represented—wealth, nobility, virtue, numbers. The discussion continues as follows: (i) If the virtuous are few in number we must enquire whether there are enough of them to govern the state

¹ Sussemihl *Jahrb. f. Ph.* xcvi. 1866.

P 333.

² *Ueber die Politik* p. 23 n. 24.

³ *Études sur Aristote* p. 42, 43.

⁴ Sussemihl *Philol.* xxix. 1870. 106

n. 16, *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 15, IV. p. 12.

⁵ Sussemihl *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 16.

⁶ *Études sur Aristote* 47—51.

or to constitute a state by themselves, § 6. (ii) No superiority gives exclusive right to power, §§ 7—10. (iii) The best laws are adapted to the interest of the whole state and the body of citizens, §§ 11, 12. (iv) Individuals, one or more, of pre-eminent virtue cannot be reduced to a level of equality, §§ 13, 14 (then follows a digression on ostracism). Now (i) has no direct bearing on the question proposed: the right of virtuous men to command must be proved before any enquiry as to what ought to be done when the virtuous are few in number: (ii) is the negative solution and (iii) has the germs of a positive solution, which we may suppose more fully developed in a part now lost. A discussion of a particular case, analogous to that in (i), is presented in (iv). The conclusion is that the proper place for (i) will be after (iii), *i.e.* somewhere between ἀρετήν (§ 12, end) and εἰ δέ τις ἔστιν, the beginning of § 13. For §§ 7—12 are certainly just as much in place immediately after the question proposed in § 5, which they answer from the negative side. And although in itself § 6 might very well follow § 5, it must excite considerable suspicion to find that the important question stated in § 6 is never fully answered at all and not even noticed until § 13¹.

(11) III. 13. 22. The sentence ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο...τοῦτο δρῶσιν, if genuine, interrupts the thread of the remarks begun in § 20 and continued to διορθοῦν in § 23, to the effect that the problem, what to do with unduly eminent citizens, is one which is equally urgent in all constitutions. The words cited ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο . τοῦτο δρῶσιν, however, do not bear upon the general problem, but on the particular case of monarchs. Hence, as Thurot² saw, they would be more in place in § 23 after διορθοῦν, at the end of the general reflexions. Bernays³ however found them a place at the end of § 20 above, after ἔχει τρόπον.

(12) III. cc. 15, 16. On the question of absolute sovereignty, πότερόν ποτε ἓνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, a succession of ἀρετίας and a general investigation are promised in 15 § 3. What follows in the order of the manuscripts may be briefly summarized as follows⁴. (α) Is the rule of the best man more advantageous than the rule of the best laws? §§ 3—6. (β) Assuming that in certain directions the laws are insufficient, should the decision rest with the one best man or with a number of the more competent citizens, in the extreme case the whole body of a qualified community? §§ 7—10. Then comes a historical or antiquarian appendix to this ἀρετία, contained in §§ 11, 12. (γ) How are the standing difficulties of hereditary succession, §§ 13, 14,

¹ Susemihl in *Philol.* XXIX. 1870 pp.

² In his *Translation* p. 211.

113—4

³ *Études sur Aristote* 51—53.

⁴ For a fuller account see the *Analyt.* 215 p. 112 f.

and (δ) a body-guard, §§ 14, 15, to be dealt with? Aristotle appends to this last enquiry a sort of digression, § 16, showing what would be the decision in the case of the constitutional monarch. But, as he explains, resuming his argument with c. 16, it is not the constitutional monarch, but the absolute sovereign about whom the question is now being raised (§§ 1, 2, down to the words *κατὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς*). Here it seems absolutely necessary to assume a lacuna. For what immediately follows, § 2 *δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν...* § 4 *πάντων*, relates to a different *ἀπορία* altogether: (ε) Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly where the citizens are all on the same footing (*ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλις*)? Should not power rather pass from hand to hand (*ἀνὰ μέρος*)?

Here the limit of *ἀπορία* distinctly discernible is reached: in the remainder of c. 16, §§ 4—13, *ἀλλὰ μὴν...ὁμοίως*, no new question is started, but remarks are jotted down which bear more or less directly on those formulated in the preceding chapter. Thus all from § 4 *ἀλλὰ μὴν* as far as *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in § 9 must belong to the first *ἀπορία* (α): Is the rule of the best man to be preferred to that of the laws? Not that it could anywhere find a place as a whole in 15 §§ 3—6; but the earlier part (α) *ἀλλὰ μὴν*. § 5 *τῶν κειμένων* could suitably be transferred to the end of 15 § 5 to follow *κάλλιον* and precede *ὅτι μὲν τοῖνον*; the remainder (β) 16 § 5 *ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον...* § 9 *κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* might be inserted a little higher up in 15 § 5 between *πᾶσαν* and *ἀλλ' ἴσως*. Again, the next piece of c. 16, (γ) §§ 9, 10 from *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾶδιον* as far as *συμφερόμενες*, clearly has for its subject that comparison of the one best man with a number of qualified citizens which is introduced in (β): and this might go in 15 § 10 after *ὁ εἰς* and before *εἰ δὴ*. To this same *ἀπορία* further belongs the remainder of c. 16, from § 10 *εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν* to the end *δεῖν ὁμοίως*; when placed side by side with c. 15 §§ 7—10 *καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς*, it is seen to be another recension of that passage.

καὶ γὰρ νῦν συνιόντες δικάζουσι καὶ βουλευόμενοι καὶ κρίνουσιν, αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. καθ' ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὁστισοῦν ἴσως χείρων· ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἔστισις συμφορητὸς καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὁστισοῦν.

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνουν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἀριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξει καὶ κρίνειεν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον

ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιοῦτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρίσιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἅμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἢ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δι' ἡμῶν τοῦτο βέβαιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἶεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορώτερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πάντες; ἢ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀστασίαστος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθέτον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ κακῆινος ὁ εἰς. 15 §§ 7—10.

τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον. περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται νομοθεῖσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. οὐ τοῖνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρίνοντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἀποπον τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὁμᾶσι καὶ δυοῖν ἀκοαῖς κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυοὶ πρὸς καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοῦς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχου ποιοῦσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν εἰ δὲ φίλοι κακῆινος κοίτης ἀρχῆς, ὁ γὰρ φίλος ἴσως καὶ ὁμοῖος, ὥστ' εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίως. 16 §§ 10—13.

Such would be the best restoration of the primitive order of these two chapters, if the order of thought and the connexion were solely to be followed. Yet undoubtedly the less complicated and artificial assumption is that of two independent versions combined by an over-careful or unintelligent compiler. Such a view has been acutely advocated by Mr J. Cook Wilson¹. "It may be that the two chapters belong "almost wholly to two parallel versions and that instead of being "combined they should be still further resolved." Thus

- (i) 15 §§ 2, 3 τὸ μὲν οὖν...ἐνούσας = 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ...ἐλαττον.
- (ii) 15 §§ 3—6 ἀρχῇ πάντας corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 3—9 τὸν ἄρα νόμον...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος + §§ 10, 11 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ...περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
- (iii) 15 §§ 7—10 καὶ γὰρ...ὁ εἰς corresponds in subject to 16 §§ 11—13 ἀλλ' ὅτι...δεῖν ὁμοίως and to §§ 9, 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν

¹ *Journal of Philology* x. 1881. pp. 82, 83.

οὐδὲ ῥάδιον... συμφράδμονες. "Of these passages the third [16 §§ 9, 10] disturbs the context and looks like a parallel version of the second."

To this arrangement of the contents of the two chapters it may be objected¹ (1) that the second version is so fragmentary as to present no statement of the problems under discussion and no intimation when we pass from one of them to the other. (2) The arrangement destroys what appears to be one connected sentence beginning 15 § 16 τάχα μὲν οὖν and continued in 16 § 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως. The sense runs on without a break from 15 § 14 ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν to 16 § 2 ὁ βασιλεύς. (3) The resolution into parallel versions is not complete; it must be supplemented by transposition: for it has to be admitted that 16 §§ 4, 5 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα... τῶν κειμένων "interrupts the argument of the context: "it belongs to the same part of the subject as [§§ 10, 11] 1287 b 16—23 "and may be read after τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν 1287 b 23" (in § 11).

Spengel² proposed a simpler remedy for the confusion of cc. 15, 16: viz. to transpose 16 §§ 4—9 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε...κατὰ τὸ ἔθος to follow ἄλλιον, at the end of 15 § 5. The passage following κατὰ τὸ ἔθος in 16 § 9 also begins with ἀλλὰ μὴν, and there is an actual case, viz. the ms. A^c, where the recurrence of a word (συλλογισμός in *Rhet.* I. 2 1357 a 17 and b 6) led to the omission of the intervening passage and its insertion in the margin. The inadequateness of this solution of the difficulty need hardly be demonstrated. For not only (1) does Spengel propose to insert οὐ after ζητεῖν in 16 § 11, but (2) when he has transposed 16 §§ 4—9 to follow 15 § 5, he is obliged to explain that what we then get is a sort of dialogue between the supporters of personal rule and of the laws³.

(13) IV (VII) 1 §§ 11, 12 = c. 2 §§ 1, 2

ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμόνα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς πράττειν τὴν μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσαν· οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς

πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν

¹ Cp. Susemihl *Aristotelis Politica* *tertiump* ed. p. XXI.

² *Arist. Stud.* III. 26 (78), f.

³ ἀλλ' ὥστε ἂν φαίη τις ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦτου βουλευσάμεθα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καλλίων. The reply is: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διαρίσειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπος

ἂν δύνασθαι γνωρίσειν. Objection: ἀλλ' ἐπειγὼς παύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίσταται τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διακεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπαπορροβούσθαι διδωσιν, ὅτι ἀπὸ βόθῃ πειρωμένοις ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. Final reply and decision: ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κτλ.

οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-
νήσεως· ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιο-
σύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει
δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὡν μετασχὼν
ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαι-
ος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σώφρων. c. 1
§§ 11, 12.

πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθενται ἐφ' ἑνός,
οὔτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐν ᾗ
πλουσία, μακαρίζουσιν. ὅσοι τε τὸν
τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τιμῶσιν,
οὔτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἄρ-
χουσιν εὐδαιμονοεστάτην εἶναι φαῖνεν
ἀν. εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν
ἀποδέχεται, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονοεστέ-
ραν φήσῃ τὴν σπουδαιοτέραν. c. 2
§§ 1, 2.

Here the language is by no means similar and the thought that virtue in the state is the same as virtue in the individual seems introduced in different connexion in the two passages. Nevertheless they cannot both stand. The latter opens the discussion afresh without any allusion to the previous chapter, as Spengel observed¹. If it is to be fitted into this part of the work, it must be intended to supersede some part of c. 1. Susemihl is probably right in holding this part to be §§ 11, 12².

(14) IV (VII). 4 §§ 8, 9. Giphanius (Van Giffen)³ calls attention to the difficulty of connecting the last words of § 8, ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσθε γίνεσθαι, with those immediately preceding. Schneider proposed to transpose the whole period to the end of the chapter to follow εὐσύνουτος in this way § 9 ὁ λεχθεὶς ὁρος would refer to the number of the citizens. If the words ἐπεὶ γίνεσθαι are in their right place and are to be taken with § 8, the preceding sentence θείας γὰρ... τὸ πᾶν must be parenthetical. They cannot go with § 9 as the passage stands. Koiacs omitted διό. it is a smaller change, with Bockei⁴, to transpose ἐπεὶ γίνεσθαι to follow ἀναγκαῖον in § 9.

(15) IV (VII). 8. 2 οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρα πλήθος εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. Bojesen⁵ saw that these words should follow directly upon § 1 ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν which they illustrate. They are not suitable to be instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς ἄλλης κοινωνίας, as on the ordinary arrangement they might be taken to be.

(16) IV (VII). 8 §§ 3, 4 ὅταν δ' ᾖ κτήσεώς ἐστιν. The proposal to make this passage follow πολιτείας at the end of § 5 serves to bring the mention of κοινωνία in § 4 nearer to the κοινωνοῖς of § 2⁶.

¹ *Ueber die Politik*, pp. 45, 48.

² *Zeits. f. Philol.* xcix. 1866 p. 602.
See also Bockei *De gubnandam Pol. Ar. locis* (Greifswald, 1867) p. 61., Spengel *Ant. Stud.* iii. 30 (82).

³ *Comment.* pp. 921, 2.

⁴ *op. c.* 13, 14.

⁵ *Lidtnug* (Copenhagen 1845) pp. 24—26.

⁶ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 15.

(17) IV (VII) CC. 13—15. Wilson¹ regards c. 13 as a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "In each the same question is proposed, what is 'happiness or the chief good? (compare 1332 a 7 and 1333 a 15, 16); 'and the discussion of it is followed in each by a transition, in almost 'the same terms, to the subject of education (cp. 13 §§ 10—13, with '15 §§ 6, 7 *ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡχθαι*).'" These transitional passages stand as follows:

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. (§ 11) τὰ τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶτον ὅλον ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶν, εἴτα καὶ ποιῶν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθῃ μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. (§ 12) τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶν μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον.

ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις. πολλὰ γὰρ πορὰ τοὺς ἐθισμοὺς καὶ τὴν φύσιν πράττουσι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

(§ 13) τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐχειράτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μαθήνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 13 §§ 10—13.

... <τὴν ἀρετὴν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον, τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ ποίους μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρητὴν τὴν φύσιν, διώρισταί πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρησάι πρότερον παιδευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν.

ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπόθεσεως καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὁμοίως ἡχθαι. 15 §§ 6, 7.

There is certainly a striking parallelism here: compare especially 13 § 13 with τούτων δὲ ποίους... ἔθεσιν in the right hand column; but it is partly covered by the reference back *τυγχάνομεν δὲ διηρημένοι πρότερον*, which Wilson is obliged to suppose inserted or to be, possibly, a reference

¹ *Journal of Phil.* x. pp. 84, 85.

to the *Ethica*. That there is an advance in the treatment of cc. 14, 15 will become apparent on a close comparison with c. 13: see the *Analysis* (p. 116). Similarly in III. c. 9 there is an elaboration of the earlier sketch in III. c. 6; in I. cc. 5—7 the conclusions anticipated in I. c. 4 are but amplified and supported¹.

In 13 § 12 the fact that man often obeys reason in opposition to his habits and nature is a strange reason why habits and nature should be in harmony with reason². Hence Bocker⁴ proposed to transpose *ὥστε . ἀλλήλους* to follow *βέλτιον* at the end of § 11. In this place it emphasizes the agreement necessary between the habits and the natural capacity of our citizens. But Wilson points out that the parallel clause in c. 15 refers to *λόγος* and *ἔθνη*; hence he defends the order of the manuscripts. The meaning then would be: "reason ought to work for "the end which the legislator has in view in harmony with nature and "habit; for men may be induced by reason to do what they would "never do by nature or by habit."

(18) 14 (VII). 16 §§ 4, 5 *σχέδον δὲ πάντα...τούτους*. This solution of the whole question discussed in this chapter should surely follow the difficulties enumerated, and not interrupt the enumeration, as it does at present. It is proposed to remove it to follow § 8 *πληθύνει ἔτι <ἢ> μικρόν*. If this be done, (1) § 6 *ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων κτλ* will directly explain § 4 *ἔτι δ' ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι... βούλησιν*; (2) the transposed passage will have an excellent continuation in § 9, which fixes the ages for marriage at 18 and 37 (?) respectively⁵.

(19) 14 (VII). 17 § 6 *τὰς δὲ διατάσεις...διατεινομένοις*. These remarks must apply to the very earliest infancy. If so they ought to come after § 3 *ἄσκησιν*; for in § 4 Aristotle goes on to discuss *τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν*. The transposition suggested is supported by the fact that then *ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ* will follow directly upon § 5, to which in any case it must be referred⁶.

(20) 14 (VII). 17 § 12 *νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ .ἀναγκαῖον*. These remarks are clearly intended to put a close to the whole discussion of §§ 8—14. If so, they should come at the end, *i. e.* after *δυσμένειαν* (τὸ δυσγένειαν) in § 14⁷.

(21) 14 (VIII). 4 § 7. The clause *δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων κρίναι, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν* ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι,

¹ Comp. Sussemlahl *Arist. Politica tertium* ed. pp. XXI, XXII.

² Cp. Sussemlahl in *Philol.* xxv. 1867.

pp. 403.

³ *op. c.* 15.

⁴ Sussemlahl *Quaest. Crit.* VII. p. 15.

⁵ Sussemlahl in *Philologus* xxv. 1867.

pp. 408—9.

⁶ Sussemlahl *l. c.*

πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον must refer to the Lacedaemonians and their recent rivals the Thebans. They would stand better directly after the criticism on the Lacedaemonians in § 4; the intermediate remarks, §§ 5, 6, being of a general character and a deduction from this particular case¹. Moreover δὲ should then be changed to δὴ.

(22) V (VIII). V § 17 ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν οὐτῶν. As they stand, these words, introduced by ἔτι, should give a *second* reason ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἥθη διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς, the first being the 'enthusiasm' inspired by the melodies of Olympus. But the reason alleged is surely only a generalization of the first: 'enthusiastic' strains inspire 'enthusiasm': and, further, all men become attuned to the mood of musical imitations by listening to them. Now a little further down, § 18, we are told that "rhythms and melodies afford the best imitations, "short of the reality, of emotions, virtues, and moral qualities generally: which is plain from their effects. For as we listen to music the "soul undergoes a change." But why should this change of mood in the soul prove music to be the best means of faithfully portraying morality and emotion? Transfer to this place the words from § 17, and the reason is plain: "because all men are attuned to the mood of the musical imitations to which they listen, even if there be no words, but mere rhythm and melody," *i.e.* a purely instrumental performance².

(23) V (VIII). V § 25 καὶ τις ἔοικε συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς * * εἶναι (διδὼ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχουσιν ἀρμονίαν). Böcker³ recommends that this, the only clause not at present included in the huge period stretching from § 17 to the end of c. 5, should be transposed to a place before the apodosis, *i.e.* after § 23 and before ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων § 24.

(24) VI (IV). cc. 3, 4 §§ 1—19. There are good grounds⁴ for believing that this portion of Bk. VI (IV) is not genuine. From the parallelism of 4 § 7, ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτείαί πλείους καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτία, εἴρηται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί, λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον, to 4 § 20 (the first words after the suspected section) ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολιτείαί πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον, the inference was drawn that there were two interpolations. That the second is not a continuation of the first, but rather a parallel version unskillfully added by the compiler⁵, seems probable from the

¹ Sussehl *id.* p. 411, Q. C. IV. 20, also Böcker independently *op. c.* p. 18.

² Sussehl *Philologus* XXV. 1867. 411—413, Q. C. IV. 20, Spengel *Arist. Stud.* 44. 45.

³ *op. c.* p. 18.

⁴ Sussehl in *Rhein. Mus.* XXI. 1866. 554—560.

⁵ See Cook Wilson in *Journal of Philol.* x. 80, 81.

fact that the promise made in 4 § 7 διότι δὲ πλείους κτλ, is never redeemed: instead of this the main subject of c. 3 is treated over again in 4 §§ 7—19. We will here cite only the more exact correspondences adduced by Wilson in support of this view.

τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας
αἵτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ μέρος πλείω
πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμόν. 3 § 1.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκῶν συγκε-
μνάς ὁρῶμεν πάσας τὰς πόλεις,
ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου τοῦ πλήθους
τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ
τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ
μὲν ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δ' ἀοπλον. καὶ
τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὁρῶμεν
ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ
βάνανσον. 3 §§ 1, 2.

ἐτι πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον δια-
φοραῖς ἔστιν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ
κατ' ἄρετήν. * * καὶ εἰ τι δι' το-
ούτων ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι
μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν·
ἐκεῖ γὰρ διείλομεν ἐκ πόσεων μερῶν
ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις. 3 § 4.

φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀνα-
καῖον εἶναι πολιτείας, εἶδει διαφε-
ρούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ' εἶδει
διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. 3 § 5.

ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσ-
αύτας ὅσαι περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς
ὑπεροχὰς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς
τῶν μορίων. 3 § 6.

ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ οἷχ' ἐν μέρος
ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν. 4 § 7.
καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἐνός ἀλλ'
ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μορίων, ὥστερ
εἴρηται πολλάκις. 4 § 9.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφήν
πλήθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί,
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναν-
σον, κτλ

τρίτον δὲ <τὸ> ἀγοραῖον, κτλ
τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον
δὲ γένος τὸ προπολεμῆσον, ὃ τούτων.
οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν ὑπάρ-
χειν κτλ 4 §§ 9, 10.

ὥστε κτλ. φανερόν ἐστι τό γε
ὀπλιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ τῆς
πόλεως μέρος. * * ἔβρομον δὲ τὸ
ταῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὅπερ καλοῦ-
μεν εὐπόρους. ὄγδοον δὲ τὸ δῆμουρ-
γικὸν κτλ

.. ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας
εἶναί τινας ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν.
4 §§ 15—17.

ὥστερ οὖν εἰ ζῶον προσηρούμεθα
λαβεῖν εἶδη, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν ἀπο-
διωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν
ζῶον κτλ

εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτα εἶναι δεῖ μόνον, τούτων
δ' εἶναι διαφοραῖς... ὅ τῆς συζεύξεως
τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσει
πλείω γένη ζῶων κτλ... ὥστ' ὅταν
ληφθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχό-
μενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν εἶδη
ζῶων, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἶδη τοῦ ζῶου ὅσαι
περ αἱ συζεύξεις τῶν ἀναγκαῖων μορίων
εἰσίν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν
εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν. 4 §§ 8, 9.

μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 3 § 6.

ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὰ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείας δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. 4 §§ 18, 19.

Whereas in 3 § 4 the one version refers to Bk. IV (VII), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν (whence it may be inferred that its author had the original order of the books before him), "the second version inserts, "instead of the reference, a long passage similar to that part of Bk. "IV (VII) which the first version refers to."

To sum up, there does appear to be sufficient evidence of a parallel version: it must be remarked, however, (1) that the second version, as it now stands, plainly refers to the former 4 § 7 ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην: therefore this at least must be due to an editor who wished to make the two continuous. (2) There seems to be nothing in c. 3 to correspond with the simile of an animal in 4 §§ 7, 8; for the sense and bearing of 3 §§ 5, 6, suggested by Wilson, appear very different.

(25) VI (IV). 6 §§ 2, 3. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ θεωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ εἶναι σχολάζειν ἀδύνατον ἢ προσόδων οὐσῶν.

The clause διὸ... μετέχειν is omitted by the manuscripts of the second recension. Either it is an interpolation or, if genuine, out of place; for there is nothing preceding διὸ of which it could be the effect. Thurot² would find a place for it after προσόδων οὐσῶν, but he has to admit that εἶναι σχολάζειν is forced and unusual; it is εἶναι μετέχειν wherever this subject comes up, and the second claim forms no real antithesis to the first. Rassow³ gives a more satisfactory contrast by inserting δημοκρατικὸν after εἶναι: "on general grounds to exclude from citizenship "those who have the requisite amount of property would be an "oligarchical measure, to admit them democratical." After this rule

¹ "The words may perhaps refer to Bk. IV (VII)" (Wilson). But he does not further explain.

² *Etudes sur Aristote* 60, 6

³ *Bemerkungen* pp. 13, 14.

has been laid down the clause διὸ...μετέχειν comes in with excellent sense as stating the practical result. It will be necessary to insert δ' after σχολάζειν.

(26) VI (IV). c. 12¹. The subject of this chapter is the third of the investigations enunciated in c. 2 §§ 4—6, *ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίςιν αἰρετή*: what form of government is most adapted to a state under given circumstances. After the general conditions, that it must be that supported by τὸ κρῖντον whether their preponderance comes from τὸ ποιὸν or τὸ ποσόν, Aristotle points out (1) when a democracy is desirable in the words of § 3, *ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει .τούτων*; (2) when an oligarchy would suit better in the remainder of § 3, *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν ἐπὶ πόρων... πλῆθους*; while (3) the circumstances favourable to a Polity (in the technical sense) are pointed out in §§ 4, 5, *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων. ὁ μέσος*. The similarity of their form proves that these three sentences ought to be taken closely together: (2) and (3) are however separated by the words *δεῖ δ' αὖτε τὸν νομοθέτην. τοῖς νόμοις ταύτοις*, the former part of § 4. Not only so, but this sentence has nothing to do with the special conditions of an oligarchy: *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* must refer to Polity in the technical sense; accordingly the sentence belongs to the second investigation of c. 2, *τίς κοινοτάτη κτλ.* Moreover from 12 § 6, *ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον* right on to the end of c. 13, *τὸ ἀρχεσθαι*, Aristotle never recurs to the enquiry *τίς τίςιν αἰρετή*. He appears to go off on the subject of the stability of Politics (in the technical sense), ending with a brief historical digression, 13 §§ 6—12².

The conclusion to which these facts point is as follows: The enquiry *τίς τίςιν αἰρετή* is broken off abruptly at ὁ μέσος in 12 § 5; if it was ever complete—cp. VII (VI) 1. 5, *καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίςιν, εἰρηται πρότερον*—the rest of it has been lost. The beginning of 12 § 4, *δεῖ δ' αὖτε .τούτους*, together with 12 § 6 and the whole of c. 13, belong to the previous enquiry. Bucheler with great probability would insert 12 § 4, *δεῖ...τούτους* + 12 § 6, c. 13 §§ 1—6, *ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον...ἐτέρων μόνον* in the account of the constitution of Polity given in c. 9 § 6, between *ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς μίξεως οὗτος* and *τοῦ δ' εὖ μεμῖχθαι*, where certainly the subject-matter is strikingly similar. For the remainder of c. 13, §§ 7—12, *δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν...ἀρχεσθαι*, he finds a fitting place at the end of c. 9 after *ἄλλως*.

(27) VIII (V) 1 § 8. There are two ways in which revolutions arise, διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ..ἐκείνων, ὅτε δὲ ..

¹ See Susemihl in *Rhein. Mus.* xxi. 564 ff.; also Bocker *op. cit.* § 11, pp. 24—32.

² The reader may satisfy himself of this by careful examination of the passage: cp. *Analysis* p. 121 f.

μοναρχίαν. But in § 9 another way is seemingly brought in ἐτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον κτλ, and in § 10 another ἐτι πρὸς τὸ μέρος τι κτλ. Further, these two latter cases properly belong to the first alternative, when the revolutionary party wish for a change in the government; they are both equally opposed to the other ὅτι δὲ κτλ, where the object is not to overthrow the form of government, but to crush the present holder of power. If then Aristotle wrote in the proper logical order, the place for the second leading alternative ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ. ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν is in § 11 between πολιτεία and πανταχοῦ¹.

Wilson² discovers a parallel version of 1 §§ 2—7, δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον... στάσεων εἶναι, in 1 §§ 11—16 πανταχοῦ γὰρ... τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. The most striking correspondences which he adduces are:

δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλὰι γεγένηνται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τοῦτον δ' ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι οὐκ ὄντας οἷεσθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ εὐεθέροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι νομίζουσιν), ὁλιγαρχία δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσου ἐν τι ὄντας ὅλως εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' εὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). §§ 2, 3.

ὁμολογούντες δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἱ μὲν ὅτι, εἰὰν κατὰ τὴν ἴσιν ὄσιν, ἴσοι ὅλως εἶναι νομίζουσιν,

οἱ δ' ὅτι, εἰὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀνίσιν, πάντων ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. §§ 13, 14.

Further "the main thought of these two parallel passages is repeated "in a shorter form" in 2 §§ 2, 3: "there is here then perhaps another "re-writing, seemingly by a later hand, of the introduction to the book "and with this third beginning seems to cohere the rest of cc. 2, 3." Wilson sees in each of these a probable reference to Bk. III; at 1 § 2, § 13, 2 § 2. It must be observed however (1) that the main difficulty of c 1 lies in §§ 8—11, and is not removed by these suggestions: (2) there is a real advance in c. 2 as compared, for instance, with 1 §§ 11—16: and yet (as Wilson sees) if 1 §§ 11—16 is another recension of 1 §§ 2—7, 2 §§ 2, 3 has quite as much right to be so considered. (3) It is possible that 3 § 14, στασιάζουσι δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις... ἴσοι ὄντες,

¹ Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* v. p. 10.

² *Journal of Philology* x. 84.

should precede 1 § 11, πανταχοῦ γὰρ κτλ. At all events that passage is out of place where it stands in c. 3¹.

(28) VIII (v). c. 4. In this chapter §§ 1—7, γίνονται μὲν...ἐπηρεασθεῖς, have for their subject the cases where στάσις has arisen from dissensions amongst the leading men. The subject of §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ . πρὸς πολλούς, is wholly different. Aristotle returns to the case which he calls in c. 3 § 6 δι' αὐξήσιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, when any party in the state has become over-powerful. This αὐξήσις may be κατὰ τὸ ποσόν or κατὰ τὸ ποιόν; but all the examples in 3 §§ 7, 8 illustrate the former kind. It seems best then to transpose 4 §§ 8—12, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ . πρὸς πολλούς (which contain examples of the latter kind) to follow δυναστείας at the end of 3 § 8².

(29) VIII (v). 6 §§ 10—13, ὁμοιοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία . ἡ Ἰφιάδου. In its present place this passage interrupts the orderly enumeration of the causes which tend to overthrow oligarchy owing to internal dissensions: (1) 6 §§ 2—5 continual decrease of the privileged body, (2) §§ 5—7 rise of demagogues amongst them, (3) §§ 8, 9 extravagance and reckless living, (4) §§ 14, 15 insults offered κατὰ γάμους ἢ δίκας, (5) § 16 refusal on the part of some oligarchs to go the full length in oppression of the Demos. In §§ 10, 11, coming between (3) and (4), the conditions of permanence in an oligarchy are touched upon; a better place for them is after § 16, while §§ 12, 13 are probably interpolated³.

A few remarks may be useful on the suggestions here passed under review. Though necessarily an unsatisfactory remedy⁴, transposition has been used with great effect in some authors (e.g. Lucilius) and has always been a recognised expedient. But it has been most successful when applied to verse and to dislocations arising mechanically through the displacement of leaves or by carelessness of transcribers. Now only a small part (if any) of those here assumed can have had such an origin. The most reasonable account of the majority presupposes an editor dealing unskillfully with Aristotle's materials⁵. In proportion as this is

¹ Susemihl *Politica tert. ed.* p. xxix; Bocker *op. cit.* 37.

² Bocker *op. cit.* 40, 41.

³ Susemihl *Quaest. Crat.* v. 12, 13.

⁴ "Before we can prove that a transposition is correct, we must have shewn not only that the passage *cannot* be placed in its old position, but that it *must* be placed in its new." Postgate *Notes* p. 24.

⁵ "Hoc est utrimillimum: ipsum Aristotelem omnes has particulas, quas in altera Politicorum recensione siue uberius tractate siue continenti exposi-

tionis ordinem inserere sibi proposuerunt, in margine hic illic adnotasse; posteros autem, qui ediderunt librum, cum noscerent, quid notis illis voluissent scripserint, neptissime confusas in hunc, quem hodie tenent, locum contulisse, quem fortasse iuncta mutilatum lacunosumque deprehenderant." Bocker *op. cit.* 32, 33. There was no place for footnotes in an ancient book: but some instances in the above list—e.g. (3) (11) (15) (21) (23) (27) (29)—have quite the look of marginal notes. Compare the remark of Weidion *Translations* p. 100 n. 2.

admitted the certainty that a given transposition restores the original form, due to its being logically required, diminishes: and room must always be allowed for the misgiving "ne hoc modo ipsum potius Aristotelem corrigamus quam editores eius antiquos: certe cui ab eo ipso in libris celerime scriptis, nequaquam diligenter ubique elaboratis, incohatius potius quam perfectis optimam semper disponendi rationem esse inuentam non sane scio cur credam¹."

These observations are all the more necessary as the most recent edition of any part of the *Politics*² carries still further the disintegration of the text, transposing and rejecting supposed interpolations in a part of the treatise hitherto believed not to need these remedies³. The most important change introduced is to make Bk. I. cc. 8—11, *περὶ χρηματιστικῆς*, precede the discussion *περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου*, thus inserting them in I. c. 3 § 3 between *χρηματιστικῆς* and *πρώτον δέ*. That the topics of Bk. I. would be thus better arranged may be admitted: but the probability (not to say the certainty) that Aristotle even intended ultimately so to arrange them will require cogent proof, especially if it can be shown that with the present order the transition from topic to topic is natural, the development logical, the indications of a disposition of the subject-matter borne out in the sequel. Briefly to sum up, Schmidt presents Bk. I. in the following order: c. 1, c. 2 §§ 1—6 *παῖδας*: then comes § 8 presented as two parallel versions:

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείωνων κοινῶν κοινωνία
τέλειος πόλις ἦδη. γινομένη μὲν οὖν
τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν
<ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν>. [ἡ δὲ φύσις
τέλος ἐστὶ] οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι
τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην
φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου,
ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. διὸ
πάντα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ
πρώται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη
ἐκείνων. 2 § 8, 1252 b 28—34

<ἡ δὲ> πάσης ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς
αὐταρκείας, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 1252 b 28.

<μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ> αἰτία⁴. τὸ
<γὰρ> οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλ-
τιστον. ἡ δ' αὐταρκεία [καὶ] τέλος,
<ὥστε> καὶ βέλτιστον. 2 § 8,
1252 b 34 1253 a 1.

Then follows 2 § 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον.. τῶν θεῶν. Then another double recension consisting mainly of 2 §§ 13, 14:

¹ Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. p. xxvi. Cp. also p. xiii.

² *Aristotelis Politicorum liber primus* ex recensione M. Schmidt (Jena 1882. 4to). The arrangement adopted is justified in an article in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxxv. 1882. 801—824. Compare with

what follows Susemihl *Politica tertium* ed. (Teubner) pp. xxiv—xxvi.

³ Even Krohn *Zur Kritik* 33—35 regards the first book as Aristotle's. He nowhere states how far it had been manipulated by the οἰκίων συναγωγή.

⁴ αἰτί <α> for ἔτι.

καὶ πρότερον διὰ τῇ φύσει ἢ πόλει
ἢ οἰκίᾳ καὶ ἑκαστος ἡμῶν ἔστιν.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι τοῦ μέρους ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ
τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται [ποῦς οὐδὲ χεῖρ] εἰ
μὴ ὁμωμένως [ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγοι τὴν
λιθὴν. διαφθαρέῃσα γὰρ <οὐκ> ἔσται
τοιαύτη.] πάντα γὰρ τῷ ἔργῳ ὀρίσται
καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα
ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ'
ὁμῶνυμα. 2 §§ 12, 13: 1253 a 19
—25.

[ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ πόλις καὶ φύσις καὶ πρότε-
ρον ἢ ἑκαστος δῆλον.] εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρ-
κης ἑκαστος χωρισθείς, ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον.
ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μὴδὲν
δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος
πᾶσι, [ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.] 2 § 14:
1253 a 25—29.

ἃ τε περ ἄλγε' ὦν ὥσπερ ἐν πεπτοῖς.
2 § 10'. 1253 a 6, 7.

What is left of c. 2 follows in the usual order, 2 c. §§ 9, 10 ἐκ τούτων
...ἐπιθυμητής, §§ 10—12 διότι...πόλις, §§ 15, 16 φύσις... κρίσις: also
c. 3 §§ 1—3 as far as χρηματιστικῆς. Then cc. 8—11 in the following
order: 8 §§ 1—13 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν (the preceding sentence of
8 § 1 ὅλος ἦν is enclosed in brackets) οἰκίας: 10 §§ 1—3 δῆλον...
ζῴων: 8 §§ 14, 15; 9 § 1 καὶ εἰκεν...γίνεται μᾶλλον: 9 §§ 12, 13 καὶ αὐτῇ...
χρημάτων κτήσις. 9 §§ 2—12 λάβωμεν...ὁ κατὰ φύσιν 9 §§ 14—18 τῆς
δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ<σης> χρηματιστικῆς...ἄρον: 10 §§ 1, 5, c. 11; c. 12 § 1
as far as γαμική. The rest of c. 3 follows, 2 c. §§ 3, 4 πρῶτον [δὲ] περὶ
δεσπότου. βίαιον γάρ. cc. 4—6 as usual; c. 7 §§ 2—5 ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπό-
της...θηρευτική, after which ἢ δεῖ χρῆσθαι...τὸν πόλεμον [καὶ πρῶτον]
should be inserted from c. 8 § 12: then 7 §§ 1, 2 φανερόν δὲ...ἴσων ἀρχή:
lastly cc. 12, 13 from καὶ γὰρ γυναικός (in 12 § 1) to the end. [ΓΡ]

¹ The parallel versions here given hardly deserve that name if compared with those pointed out by Spengel, Susemihl, Wilson. It is essential that the same thought, or something very similar, should be found repeated with a mere variation of language. Schmidt employs the two columns to separate genuine Aristotelian fragments from the additions of editors. In the right hand column above, the conception of αὐτάρκεια is found three times, and the passages where

it occurs are judged by him to be additions to the original Aristotle (φρ. c. 804) because, if the end of the clause is ἐθ' ἑφ', it cannot be αὐτάρκεια. This then, he argues, is an instance of two independent definitions which have been blended into one. Similarly with other cases where, according to his view, the present text, or, as Kohn calls it, 'oui old recension', has been formed by the comprehension of heterogeneous materials.]

ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICS.

INTRODUCTION. B. I. cc. 1, 2.

I. As the end and aim of every society is a good, the end and aim of the state, the highest society under which all the rest are included, is the highest good : 1 § 1.

II. The assertion (in the *Politics* of Plato) that the difference between the family and the state is merely quantitative, not qualitative, and hence that there is no essential difference between a father, a master, a king, and a republican statesman, 1 § 2, disproved by an analytical enquiry into the origin of the family, the village-community, and the state : 1 § 3, 2 § 1.

(a) The family is formed by nature out of the two smallest natural unions, of husband and wife, and of master and slave, solely for the support and propagation of life : 2 §§ 2—5.

(b) In the same natural manner out of the household or family grows the village-community, the first in the ascending scale of societies formed for purposes wider than the satisfaction of mere every-day wants. Out of the village arises the state, in which the primitive form of government was accordingly monarchy : 2 §§ 5—7.

(c) The state itself then, the most complete society, springing up, like the rest, to provide the bare means of living, continues to exist for the full development and perfecting and independence of life. It is, in a higher sense of the term, most truly a natural growth ; and man is a being by nature ordained for civil society, 2 §§ 8, 9, far beyond all other animals, because he alone possesses speech and the perception of good and evil, of right and wrong : 2 §§ 10—12.

(d) Moreover the state is in the order of nature prior to the family and to the individual. 2 §§ 13, 14.

(e) Only the actual establishment of the state raises man to what he really is and endows him with those higher gifts of virtue, in the absence of which he is no better—far worse indeed—than any of the brutes : 2 §§ 15, 16.

PART I: OF THE FAMILY: B. I. cc. 3—13.

A. Of the Family in general. There being three fundamental constituents of the family, the subject is divided into a consideration of the several relations (1) of master and slave, (2) of husband and wife (the conjugal relation), (3) of father and child (the parental relation). To which must be added a consideration of wealth and its acquisition (*χορημαστική*); the relation of this subject to that of the family (*οικονομική*)¹ is a disputed point needing investigation: 3 §§ 1—3.

B. Special Exposition: c. 3 § 3—c. 13 § 6.

I. Of the relation of master and slave, or of Slavery: 3 § 3—7 § 5

(a) Transition to this subject, 3 § 3. Statement of the two main points in the inquiry, 3 § 4.

(b) These two points discussed at length: cc. 4—6, c. 7 §§ 1—3.

(a) The nature and justification of Slavery cc. 4—6.

(i) The nature and character of the slave: he is an animate chattel, c. 4.

(ii) How far Slavery is in accord with the law of nature. cc. 5, 6.

(a) There are as a fact men whom nature intended to be the slaves of the rest, c. 5

(b) But for that very reason slavery imposed simply by the laws of war upon men who are not of this sort is contrary to nature, c. 6

(β) The view quoted in the *Introduction* from Plato's *Politicus* that rule over freemen and over slaves, whether in the family or in the state, is not essentially different and that it rests upon a science, is now more completely stated and disproved on the ground of the results just obtained, 7 §§ 1, 2.

There are however sciences treating of the functions of master and slave. Wherein such science consists: 7 §§ 3, 4.

II. Of Property and its acquisition: cc. 8—11.

(*περί τῶν κτήσεως καὶ χορημαστικῆς* of the acquisition or management of property, the art of wealth.)

¹ [No uniform rendering of these two words has been attempted, and the term 'economic science', used a little lower down as a virtual reproduction of one of them, is without authority in this sense.

The more common equivalents are, for *χορημαστική* 'finance', 'money-making art', for *οικονομική* 'household management', 'domestic economy'. TA.]

(a) Theoretical discussion. The relation of the art of wealth (*χρηματιστική*) to a theory of the family or economic science (*οικονομική*): cc. 8—10.

(α) The different cases possible: 8 §§ 1, 2

(β) Proof that the first is inadmissible. acquisition of property does not coincide with the whole field of economic science: 8 § 2 (*ὅτι μὲν οὖν*).

(γ) To decide whether the former is at any rate a branch of the latter (or even an auxiliary science), it is necessary, 8 § 3, to distinguish

(i) direct acquisition through production by means of cattle-breeding, hunting, plundering, fishing, agriculture, and fruit-growing: a species of acquisition belonging as such to economic science and forming a part of it, or an auxiliary science: 8 §§ 3—15,

and (ii) indirect acquisition by exchange, c. 9:

either (a) simple barter, not in itself unnatural provided it does not go beyond actual needs, 9 §§ 1—6,

or (b) exchange through the medium of money, an artificial, though necessary, development of barter to facilitate intercourse. So long as it remains true to this object and no more than a means to the easier satisfaction of actual needs it does not become unnatural or foreign to economic science, as it does when trade is carried on as a distinct profession, money is made an independent end, and exchange supply a means to unlimited accumulation of money and capital. 9 §§ 7—18.

(δ) It is now possible to decide finally between the various alternatives remaining, so far as the *natural* species of acquisition is concerned. This is in one respect an actual branch of Economic, in another respect, and more truly, only an auxiliary to it: 10 §§ 1—3

(ε) The most unnatural species of exchange is trading with money in the strict sense, the lending out of money on interest, which directly makes money out of money: 10 §§ 4, 5.

(b) The art of acquiring wealth in its practical application. c. 11.

(α) Classification of the different branches of this art: 11 §§ 1—4

(i) Production proper: cattle-rearing, agriculture, fruit-growing; culture of bees, fish, birds: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Acquisition by means of exchange: 11 § 3.

(a) trade. whether (1) maritime, (2) inland, or (3) retail trade;

(β) the lending of money on interest;

(c) hired labour (1) of artisans, (2) of day labourers.

(iii) Branches of a mixed nature: forestry, mining, 11 § 4.

(β) General remark on the different character of these various branches as judged by an ideal standard, 11 § 6.

(γ) For particular information as to the practical exercise of these various branches of acquisition reference is made to special works upon these subjects and to

the stories current in various quarters of the means by which individuals have been enriched : 11 §§ 7—13.

III. The management of the household, as it affects the members, especially in the marital and parental relations ; also in the relation of master and slave : cc. 12, 13.

(a) Different nature of the rule exercised over the wife and over the children : c. 12.

(b) The management of a household extends to inanimate property but especially and primarily aims at promoting virtue and excellence in the members of the family, preeminently in those who are free : 13 § 1.

(c) Proof that even a slave is capable of a certain mental and moral excellence and that he requires it : that the virtue of man, woman, child, slave, is different in kind and degree, 13 §§ 2—12, since

(a) although the parts of the soul are the same, they exist differently in man, woman, child, and slave, 13 §§ 5—9 :

(β) a more detailed investigation shows that by common consent certain qualities would not be virtues in a man which are so in a woman, a child, or a slave : 13 §§ 10, 11.

(γ) The virtue and excellence of a boy and a slave belong to them not in themselves, but in relation to another : 13 § 11 (*τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ*).

(d) A more precise statement wherein the excellence of a slave consists. It is the master's business to train him to it. The right mode of treating slaves : 13 §§ 12—14.

(e) The right course of training for women and boys is a subject that goes beyond the limits of the family and more properly belongs to the theory of the best polity. 13 §§ 15, 16.

PART II: OF THE POLITY OR CONSTITUTION. B. II.—VIII.

A. CRITICAL PART.

Examination of the schemes of an ideal best polity put forward in the theories of preceding philosophers, together with those most commendable amongst the constitutions actually established. It is shown that none of them really answers to the best polity: B. II.

I. The object and principles of this review: c. I §§ 1, 2.

II. CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL POLITIES: I § 3—8 § 25.

a. PLATO'S IDEAL STATE IN THE *Republic*: I § 3—5 § 28.

(α) The end which Plato assumes for the state, its utmost possible unity, really involves, in the form in which he assumes it, the abrogation of the state, and is thus incapable of realization: c. 2.

(β) But even granting that this is the true end and practicable it would not be secured by the means which Plato proposes; viz. the enforcement, upon the two upper classes, of community of wives and children and community of property: 3 § 1—5 § 13.

(i) Arguments against community of wives and children: co. 3, 4.

(1) Plato thinks it a proof of perfect unity that all should apply to the same objects the terms 'mine', 'another's'. But there is an ambiguity in the word "all". Plato's view would not be correct if "all" meant "all collectively", but only if "all" meant "each individual":—a meaning here impossible: 3 §§ 1—3. This argument applies also to community of property.

(2) Men care far less about the things which they share in common than about what is their own. Hence the community of children will result in the total neglect of them by all alike. Their real or nominal parents will, one and all, feel but slight interest in what becomes of them. So that a specific real relationship, however distant, would be of far more service to them than this general indeterminate paternity: 3 §§ 4—7.

(3) Many parents however would inevitably recognise their own children: 3 §§ 8, 9.

(4) As a rule violence and outrage are avoided with especial care in the case of near relations, but when it is not known who these are this heedfulness disappears: 4 § 1.

(5) It is strange that in spite of the community of children Plato does not altogether prohibit unnatural love but only its worst excesses; nor even that because he is scandalized at its impropriety between the nearest blood-relations: 4 §§ 2-6.

(6) The end Plato has in view is the greatest possible unity and harmony amongst the ruling class of citizens; all are to feel themselves members of a single family. But the result would be just the opposite, since when thus generalized all specific affection for kinsfolk would be abrogated and replaced by a feeble attachment in the last degree 'watery' and attenuated: 4 §§ 5-9. < For Plato's purpose, then, these institutions would have been better adapted for the third class of the population, than for the first two as he proposes, in order to make its members disunited and more obedient: 4 § 4. >

(7) Plato's regulation for removing children, under certain circumstances, from the two upper classes into the third, and conversely, would be attended by great difficulties. and as such children are not to be informed that they were born in a different class, the mischiefs pointed out under (4) and (5) would be more likely to occur in that case. 4 § 9 (ἀλλὰ μὲν..), § 10.

(ii) Arguments against community of property. 5 §§ 1-13

(1) The different forms of communism possible, 5 §§ 1, 2

(2) Community of property is no doubt more conceivable where, as in the Platonic state the cultivators are not the owners of the soil 5 § 3. But still in all that relates to social intercourse, to *meum* and *thuum*, communism is shown by experience to produce much dissension, 5 § 4. Far preferable therefore would be that state of things where property in general remains in private ownership, but the laws have inspired the citizens with so much public spirit, that they are willing to give up to their fellow-citizens much of their private possessions for common use: 5 §§ 5-8

(3) Communism destroys the high enjoyment afforded by private property, which is in itself fully justified and in many respects morally noble. 5 §§ 8, 9.

(4) With community of wives, children, and property there could be no such virtues as chastity (*σωφροσύνη*), in respect of one's neighbour's wife, or liberality. 5 § 10.

(5) Lawsuits about disputed property, cases arising from perjury, &c are not due, as Plato maintains, to the absence of communism, but to the prevalence of moral corruption. 5 §§ 11, 12.

(6) In general Plato's procedure is unfair; he has before him only the evils of which we should be rid by communism. the advantages we should lose he overlooks: 5 § 13.

(7) Further objections to the Platonic institutions generally: 5 §§ 14-28.

(i) Their defects are ultimately due to the defectiveness of the end which they subserve, as pointed out above under (a). But so far as political unity within due limits must be the object of political institutions it is surprising that, considering the great importance which Plato attaches to the right education, he should not seek to attain this unity amongst his citizens by education, the introduction of common messes, &c instead of the means which he employs: 5 §§ 14, 15.

(ii) If the Platonic institutions were really serviceable, they would have been carried into effect before now. 5 § 16.

(iii) But the experiment would prove beyond all doubt that the practical application of them could not be carried further than is at present actually the case in some states: 5 § 17.

(iv) Besides, the regulations laid down by Plato are extremely imperfect. They only apply to the two upper classes of citizens, and equal difficulties present themselves whether they are extended to the third class or not. In the former case the true foundation of the Platonic state would be annulled; in the latter the state would be divided into two hostile camps in direct contradiction of the unity intended, as the advantages which Plato claimed for his state (see 5 § 11 above) would for the most part be rendered illusory. 5 §§ 18—24.

(v) The analogy of animals, who have no domestic life, does not prove that women can share the occupations of men: 5 § 24 (*ἀντικον δὲ καὶ*).

(vi) To keep the same rules always in office is a dangerous measure, but consistency on Plato's part requires it: 5 §§ 25, 26.

(vii) Plato himself admits that his regulations do not secure the complete happiness of the upper classes. If so, then further this is true of the whole state: 5 §§ 27, 28.

b. The ideal polity of Plato's Laws: c. 6.

(a) Comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws*, the relation between the schemes of polity laid down in these two works: 6 §§ 1—5.

(β) Criticism of the state in the *Laws*: 6 §§ 6—22.

(i) It would require far too large a territory: 6 §§ 6, 7.

(ii) It is not enough that a code of laws should take account of the land and the people; the neighbouring people have also to be regarded: 6 §§ 7, 8.

(iii) Again, the principles regulating the limit to be set on possession need to be expressed more clearly and fully. 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) There is an inconsistency in demanding equality of landed estate without at the same time fixing a definite unalterable number of citizens: 6 §§ 10—13.

(v) We are not told how the ruling citizens are to receive an education distinguishing them from the rest, nor in what this education should consist: 6 § 14.

(vi) It is inconsistent to make landed estate inalienable and at the same time allow moveable property within certain limits to change hands: 6 § 15.

(vii) The division of each citizen's real estate into two separate establishments is awkward: 6 § 15 (*καὶ τῇ τῶν οἰκονόμων...*).

(viii) The constitution proposed in the *Laws* is a combination of Oligarchy and Democracy, i.e. a Polity (*πολιτεία*) technically so called. But

(1) this sort of mixed constitution, though perhaps the best on the average, is by no means the next best after the absolutely perfect scheme. 6 §§ 16, 17.

(2) Plato himself calls it a blending of Democracy and Tyranny, which is self-contradictory and, as a matter of fact, incorrect: 6 § 18.

(3) The oligarchical element is far too predominant in this constitution of Plato's: 6 §§ 19—21.

(ix) The mode in which the magistrates are elected is politically unsafe: 6 § 22.

c. Phaleas' scheme of polity: c. 7.

(a) Brief account of this scheme: 7 §§ 1—4.

(β) Criticism: 7 §§ 5—23.

(i) The objection brought against Plato, 6 § 10, holds also against Phaleas: if there is to be a maximum fixed for property, then the number of children must also be limited: 7 § 5.

(ii) Although a certain equality of possessions is no doubt of importance for the state, it is much more important that the estates should on the average be neither too large nor too small: 7 §§ 6, 7.

(iii) Far more important, again, is equality in respect of a good education, which trains the intellect properly and duly moderates the desires: 7 §§ 8, 9, §§ 10—13 = 7 §§ 18—20.

(iv) Moreover Phaleas has never sufficiently defined equality of possessions, as he makes no allusion to moveable property: 7 § 21.

(v) In his regulation of property he ought to have taken some account of the external concerns and relations of the state, but he has left them altogether unnoticed: 7 §§ 14—17.

(vi) Phaleas prohibits all handicrafts to his citizens; but the measures adopted by him to render this possible are not suited to his object: 7 §§ 22, 23.

d. Hippodamos' scheme of polity: c. 8.

[(α) Introductory remarks on Hippodamos himself: 8 § 1.]

(β) Account of his model constitution: 8 §§ 2—7.

(i) Number of the citizens, 8 § 2.

(ii) Division into citizens, farmers, soldiers, 8 § 2.

(iii) Division of the land; a part to belong to the temples, a part to the state, a part to private individuals, 8 § 3.

(iv) Legal regulations: 8 §§ 4, 5.

(1) The administration of justice to be confined to three objects, § 4

(2) Right of appeal, § 4.

(3) Alterations in the mode in which jurymen record their verdicts, § 5.

(v) Honorary distinctions for those who are the authors of useful reforms in the existing laws and institutions: 8 § 6.

(vi) Maintenance, at the cost of the state, of the orphans whose fathers have fallen in war: 8 § 6.

(vii) Election of magistrates: 8 § 7.

(γ) Criticism: 8 §§ 7—25.

(i) That all three classes should have an equal share in all the privileges of citizenship is impossible: 8 § 7 (*ἀποφύγει δ' αὖ* . . .)—§ 10.

(ii) It does not appear what is the end to be answered by such a farmer class owning the private lands: if it is also to cultivate the state lands its very existence is contrary to the object in view yet one is at a loss to know who else could do this: 8 § 10 (*ἔτι οἱ γεωργοί*).

(iii) Nor is the proposal as to the mode in which the jury-men should vote, § 5, any better: 8 §§ 13—15.

(iv) The proposal to reward reforms in legislation, § 6, is open to the objection that while on the one hand the unchangeableness of the existing laws is dangerous, 8 §§ 16—22, on the other there is pressing need that any change in them should be attended by conditions every whit as stringent: 8 §§ 23—25.

III. CRITICISM OF THE BEST AMONGST ACTUALLY EXISTING POLITICS: c.c. 9—12.

(a) The Spartan polity: c. 9.

(a) General pefatory remark upon the twofold standard to be set up in criticising a polity: 9 § 1.

(β) The defects of the Spartan polity: 9 §§ 2—36.

(i) Social defects: 9 §§ 2—19.

(1) Under a good constitution judged by the first standard there will be provision that the citizens are released from all manual labour, and hence that the soil is cultivated by others than the citizens. But the position of the Spartan peasantry, the Helots, is radically wrong: 9 §§ 2—4.

(2) The license of the women, and their virtual supremacy at Sparta, are mistakes judged by either standard: 9 §§ 5—13.

(3) The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure, the absence of any limit to the amount of dower, the unrestricted right of the father (or of the successor to his rights) to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes;—all this combined has brought two-fifths of the Spartan land into female hands and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions with a frightful diminution in the number of men capable of bearing arms. In these circumstances the very law which was designed to increase as much as possible the body of Spartan citizens serves only to swell the ranks of paupers: 9 §§ 14—19.

(ii) Political defects: 9 §§ 19—36.

(1) In the Ephoralty, 9 §§ 19—24:

(2) in the Council of Elders, 9 §§ 25—28:

(3) in the Kingly office, 9 §§ 29, 30.

(4) Bad management of the public messes at Sparta: 9 §§ 31, 32.

(5) The Admirals (*ναυάρχαι*), 9 § 33.

(6) All the institutions tend solely to military excellence, 9 § 34, which is, after all, but a means to an end and not an end in itself, 9 § 35.

(7) Defects in the financial administration, 9 § 36.

(β) Criticism of the Cretan polity: c. 10.

(α) How the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan polities may be historically explained 10 §§ 1, 2. [Digression on the geographical position of Crete and its political relations under Minos: 10 §§ 3, 4.]

(β) Comparison of the Cretan and Spartan polities 10 §§ 5—16.

(i) The resemblances, 10 §§ 5—7.

(ii) The differences between the two. 10 §§ 7—14.

(1) How far the public messes are better regulated in Crete than at Sparta. Some other social rules peculiar to the Cretans: 10 §§ 7—9.

(2) How far again the magistracy of the *ἀδμοι* is worse managed even than the ephoralty. 10 §§ 9—14.

(iii) Nothing but its favourable geographical position has saved Crete more than once from the outbreak of mischiefs similar to those at Sparta: 10 §§ 15, 16.

(γ) Criticism of the Carthaginian polity: c. 11.

(α) General introductory remarks on the excellence of this polity, its resemblance to the Cretan, and more especially to the Spartan polity 11 §§ 1, 2.

(β) Comparison of Carthage and Sparta in respect of the institutions at Carthage which correspond to the public mess, the ephoralty, the kingship, and the senate: 11 §§ 3, 4.

(γ) To what extent

(i) the democratical element 11 §§ 5, 6,

(ii) the oligarchical element,

is more strongly represented at Carthage than in Crete or at Sparta

(1) in the Boards of Five, 11 § 7,

(2) in the exaggerated respect paid to wealth in the appointment to the highest offices, and in the fact that they can be bought—a practice mischievous to a true aristocracy: 11 §§ 8—10, § 12, §§ 10—12

(δ) One defect very usual at Carthage is that the same individual simultaneously fills a number of offices. 11 §§ 13, 14.

(ε) From many of the evils resulting from the defects of their polity the Carthaginians are preserved solely by external means, placed at their disposal by the insecure favour of fortune: 11 §§ 15, 16.

(δ) Criticism of the Solonian constitution: 12 §§ 2—6.

(α) Transition to this criticism, 12 § 1.

(β) There are no good grounds

(i) either for the praise bestowed by its friends: 12 §§ 2, 3,

(ii) or for the censure bestowed by its opponents: 12 §§ 3—6, upon Solon's constitution,

[IV. APPENDIX.

On the most prominent legislators, whether they aimed at founding new polities or not 12 §§ 6—14.

(a) Zaleukos, with remarks upon a supposed school of legislators, Onomakritos, Thales, Lycimachus, Zaleukos, Chaiondas. 12 §§ 6, 7.

(b) Philonaoos, 12 § 8,

(c) Chaiondas, 12 §§ 8—10,

(d) Phaleas, 12 § 11,

(e) Plato, 12 § 12,

(f) Draco, 12 § 13,

(g) Pittacus, 12 § 13,

(h) Andromachos, 12 § 14.]

B. POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: B. III.—VIII.

I FUNDAMENTAL GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

B. III. cc. 1—13.

First group: the most general conceptions: III. 1 § 1—6 § 2.

a. The essential nature of a polity or constitution, of a state, of a citizen: cc. 1, 2.

(a) The enquiry into the nature of a constitution raises the question 'What is a state?' and thus introduces the further question 'What is a citizen?': 1 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Citizenship is defined by participation in the government of the state, there being two forms of this government, the one exercised by the general deliberative and judicial bodies, that is, the popular assembly and the jurymen (*δικασταί*), the other by the particular magistrates. Different polities have different regulations as to the government, and so too as to the right of participation in it. Citizenship not necessarily dependent on descent from citizens. 1 § 2—2 § 5.

β. The true nature of the state is so largely bound up with its constitution that a change in the latter is sufficient to destroy the identity of the state, c. 3.

γ. Is the excellence (*ἀρετή*) of the citizen the same as the excellence of the man? 4 § 1—6 § 2.

(a) Not unconditionally the same, since

(i) the former varies with the particular polity, while the latter is always one and the same: 4 §§ 1—3.

(ii) It is true that in the highest sense the excellence of the citizen means the excellence of a citizen of the best polity. Yet even in the best polity the citizens are not all equally good men, although they may be equally excellent in their several functions: 4 §§ 4, 5.

[(iii) The state consists of very dissimilar elements, which differ in their degrees of excellence: 4 § 6.]

(b) Government in the state must fall to the men who are intellectually and morally the most capable. Hence the excellence of the citizen who rules, *i.e.* his excellence as a ruler, must coincide with his excellence as a man: 4 §§ 7—9.

(c) But no one can properly command in the state unless he has first learnt properly to obey; this then is a further qualification included under the excellence of the ruler, that is, by (b), under the excellence of the good man. It follows that the excellence of the citizen and the excellence of the man are in their inmost nature really identical and only apparently distinct (and the best polity that in which they are coextensive). The moral excellences (*ἀρεταί*) displayed in ruling and obeying, though specifically distinct, are yet generically the same. Only the intellectual or *dianoetic* excellence is generically different in the ruler, where it is higher practical insight and prudence, from what it is in the subject, where it is merely right apprehension of the command: 4 §§ 10—18.

(d) In agreement with these results the best polity refuses to allow its citizens to engage in agriculture or trade, to be artisans or labourers. Men who are thus occupied must have a status assigned them distinct from that of the citizens. In all the other polities, true civic excellence, identical with the excellence of the good man, can neither wholly nor approximately be attributed to any of the citizens except those who are in a position to abstain from such occupations: 5 § 1—6 § 2.

Second group of principles. Development of the chief species of particular constitutions, with their order of merit. 6 § 2—13 § 25.

a. Determination of all the possible leading types of polities: 6 § 2—7 § 5.

(a) A polity or constitution is nothing but a form of government, and the separate polities are especially distinguished by the different supreme authorities in whose name government is administered. This being so, the difference in polities is mainly based upon the observance of the end of the state, and upon the different possible modes of ruling men, whether in the interest of the governed, or in the selfish interest of the governors. Thus the important distinction is that between normal polities—in which the government is for the good of the governed and so for the true end of the state, the common weal; that is, the general happiness and the perfecting of life—and perverted forms c. 6 §§ 2—11.

(b) The next subdivision is into three normal constitutions—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity—and three corresponding perversions—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy, according as the supreme power is vested in one man, in several, or a large number: c. 7.

β. Closer investigation into the nature of these constitutions and their relative values: cc. 8—13.

(a) Democracy more precisely defined as selfish government by the poor, Oligarchy as selfish government by the rich, the rule of the majority or the minority being but a subordinate characteristic, the absence of which, even when amounting to a reversal of the numerical proportions, would not affect the essential nature of the case: c. 8.

(b) Which of the normal constitutions is the most normal and the best, and what is their order of merit: cc. 9—13.

(a) The right (*δικαιον*) recognised by the principles of Democracy and of Oligarchy respectively, and its divergence in each case from the absolute right which is based on excellence (*τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον, τὸ κατ' ἀρετήν*) c. 9.

(β) Who ought to be sovereign, judged by the standard of this absolute right, and how far his powers should extend. cc. 10, 11

(i) Objections to the exclusive sovereignty of every class or person: c. 10.

Not simply of (1) a tyrant, § 1 or (2) the great masses of the poor, §§ 1, 2 or (3) the rich, § 3; but also (4) the respectable classes (*οἱ ἐννεαῖς*), § 4, or (5) the one best citizen (*εἰς ὁ σπουδαιότατος*), § 5.

If however (6) the law is held to be the true sovereign, precisely the same questions recur in another form, § 5.

(ii) The true normal state of things: the whole body of citizens relatively so virtuous that the merit of the great majority of them taken collectively will exceed that of the specially gifted minority. In that case

(1) sovereignty should be vested in this whole body of citizens, §§ 1—5: but

(2) its exercise restricted to legislative and judicial powers, more particularly the election and control of the responsible magistrates, to whom the

citizens should entrust the details of state business: 11 §§ 6—9.

(iii) First objection to this arrangement, 11 §§ 10—12, and reply to the objection, 11 §§ 13, 14.

(iv) Second objection, 11 §§ 15, 16: how disposed of, §§ 16, 17.

(v) Under this arrangement the law must undoubtedly be the truly supreme sovereign: the unrestricted plenary powers of the human sovereign being exercised only in the province of the particular and individual which law by its very nature cannot define. The more precise character of the laws must in each case be determined by the constitution: 11 §§ 19—21.

(7) True constitutional principles more precisely elaborated: cc. 12, 13¹.

(i) A claim to political privilege not conferred by all personal advantages, but only by those which are necessarily connected with the essential nature of a state, viz. free birth, wealth, and more especially merit (*ἀρετή* = capacity and virtue): to which may be added nobility, as being a higher degree of free birth and a combination of excellence with affluence: c. 12. Politics where the case is otherwise, are no normal forms but mere perversions, 13 § 1.

Fuller statement of the claims justified, 13 §§ 2—5.

(ii) None of the advantages mentioned can lay exclusive claim to justification even from the one-sided oligarchical or democratical point of view, much less from that of the true aristocracy, as even in respect of merit it is always a question whether the excellence of the pre-eminently good men is or is not outweighed by the aggregate endowments of the great majority: 13 §§ 7—10.

(iii) If it be so outweighed there is a solution of the difficult question, whether the laws should be made for the advantage of the majority or of the better men: 13 §§ 11, 12.

(iv) This case also provides for

(1) the normal and best polity proper, True Aristocracy:

(2) a Polity, where distinctions of property are also regarded, will be the utmost attainable in other cases.—*This whole discussion, (1) and (2), or something similar, is lost.*

(3) In general, the superior merit of a body of men within the state can only establish its right when this body is large enough numerically to form a state of itself, or at all events to appoint the magistrates, 13 § 6. When it is a single citizen, or a few, whose preeminent endowments outweigh those of all the rest collectively, perverted forms of government resort to ostracism and other violent measures to remove such men and get rid of them, but in the best constitution nothing remains except to give them unlimited authority unfettered even by law. In such a case the best constitution would take the form of Absolute Monarchy: 13 §§ 13—25.

¹ [Benays supposed cc. 12, 13 to be another version of cc. 9—11: see *Introd.* p. 42.]

II. THE SEPARATE POLITIES OR CONSTITUTIONS:

B. III. c. 14—VIII (V).

A. Monarchy and the best constitution in the strict sense, Pure Aristocracy: III. c. 14—V (VIII).

MONARCHY: III. cc. 14—18.

(a) The questions which come under consideration in the examination of Monarchy: 14 §§ 1, 2 (*διαφορές*).

(b) The different varieties of monarchy or kingship: 14 § 2 (*ῥαδιον...*)—§ 15.

(a) The office of the Spartan kings, §§ 2—5.

(β) Despotism amongst non-Hellenic races; §§ 6, 7.

(γ) *Διουμνητεία* or elective tyranny; §§ 8—10.

(δ) The Hellenic kingship of the heroic age, §§ 11—13.
Recapitulation of these four varieties, § 14.

(e) True absolute monarchy, with full powers, § 15

(c) Why it is only absolute monarchy that requires fuller consideration in this place. 15 §§ 1—3.

(d) Objections to its utility. 15 §§ 3—16.

(a) In general it is better to be governed by the best laws than by the best man. 15 § 3—§ 5 (*πᾶσαν*): 16 § 5 (*ὁ μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(β) It may be granted that there certainly is one province, that of particular fact, for which the decision of the laws is insufficient; yet it is always a question whether it is better that in this province the one best man or the whole body of capable citizens should have the decision in its own hands.

15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως.. κάλλιον*): 16 § 4 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα*)—§ 5: 15 § 6:

15 §§ 7—10, 16 § 9 (*ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ*)—§ 10=16 § 10 (*εἰσι δέ*)—§ 13.

15 § 10 (*εἰ δὲ*)—§ 13 (*δημοκρατίαν*).

(i) Many questions are more correctly decided by the great majority than by an individual. 15 § 5 (*ἀλλ' ἴσως*)—§ 7, and many eyes see more than two: 16 § 10 (*εἰσι δέ*)—§ 12.

(ii) A large majority of men of comparative excellence cannot be so easily led astray by personal feelings, 15 §§ 8—10.

(iii) As it is the custom for monarchs to associate their friends with them in power, they themselves *pro facto* allow the claim of those who are equal and alike to an equal share in the government; 16 §§ 12, 13.

(iv) Even a monarch cannot be sole ruler; a number of officials is always required. If so, it is better from the first not to have a monarchy but to appoint this number of ruling officials by the constitution: 16 § 10.

(v) If the absolute rule of a single ruler can only be justified on the ground of merit, several capable men have in general more capacity than one: 16 § 11.

(vi) Historical appendix on the development of the remaining constitutions out of monarchy: 15 §§ 11—13 (*δημοκρατίας*).

(γ) What opinion should be held of hereditary succession to the throne? 15 §§ 13, 14.

(δ) And of the armed force or body-guard to be assigned to a king? 15 § 14 (*ἔχει δὲ δρόπας*)—16 § 2 (*βασιλεύς*).

(i) This question can easily be settled in a monarchy limited by law: 15 §§ 14—16.

(ii) Here, however, we are discussing absolute, not limited, monarchy: 16 §§ 1, 2.

(e) The unrestrained rule of one man over all the rest for his whole lifetime appears unnatural when these others are more or less his equals: whereas the only normal course appears to be to divide the government amongst several men under the restrictions imposed by the laws: 16 § 2 (*δοκεῖ δὲ τίσις*)—§ 4.

(e) How far these doubts and objections are well grounded: c. 17.

(a) Monarchy not in itself unnatural any more than the rule of a master over slaves (*δεδωρεῖα*) or a normal republican government (*πολιτεία*); under changed conditions each of them becomes appropriate: 17 § 1.

(β) In fact, however, as an actual form of government in the developed state, kingly rule is only conceivable as an absolute monarchy under the most capable citizen; yet not actually suitable and natural save in a single exceptional case, namely, in the state of things explained above (c. 13 §§ 13—15): 17 § 2.

(γ) [Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity severally adapted to citizens of different kinds: 17 §§ 3, 4.] It is only in the single case above-mentioned that Absolute Monarchy should supersede Aristocracy: 17 §§ 5—8.

(f) Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the stricter sense: c. 18.

PURE ARISTOCRACY: THE TRUE NORMAL FORM OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION: B. IV (VII), V (VIII).

Preliminary Questions: IV (VII) cc. 1—3.

(a) The best form of polity is that which is auxiliary to the best and most desirable life. A definition of the latter is thus required and first obtained: 1 §§ 1—10. This best life or happiness is shown to be the same for the individual and for the state: 1 §§ 11, 12=2 §§ 1, 2.

Summary of the results of this investigation: 1 §§ 13, 14.

[(β) A second preliminary question. Even if happiness is made to depend pre-eminently upon virtue and excellence, we may yet be in doubt whether excellence in peace or in war is the main thing for the state, whether the active life of the practical statesman or the contemplative life of the scientific enquirer is the happier for the individual: 2 § 3—3 § 10.

(i) Excellence of the internal administration is the main thing for the state: military excellence is only needed for self-defence and for acquiring as slaves those for whom nature intended this lot. The state should not make conquest and subjugation its aim and end: 2 §§ 8—18.

(u) For the individual it is not the tyrant's life but active employment in the service of a free and capable state that is alone a great or noble thing. Yet the scientific life is no less an active life, and is besides an activity of a higher order than the other: c. 3.]

OUTLINE OF THE ABSOLUTELY BEST CONSTITUTION:

B. IV (VII) c. 4—V (VIII) c. 7.

(a) The External Conditions: IV (VII) cc. 4—12.

(i) The natural conditions; the land and the people: cc. 4—7.

(A) Prefatory remarks: 4 §§ 1—3.

(B) Of the proper number of citizens and inhabitants: 4 §§ 4—14.

(C) Of the character and extent of the territory and of its geographical form: 5 §§ 1—3.

(D) The position of the city, 5 § 3 ($\tau\eta\varsigma \delta\epsilon \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\omega\varsigma$...)—6 § 8,

(a) on the land side: 5 §§ 3, 4,

(b) towards the sea; 6 §§ 1—5.

Of the regulation of the naval force: 6 §§ 6—8.

(E) The best natural endowment and disposition for the citizens: c. 7.

(ii) The social or socio-political conditions: cc. 8—12.

(A) Exclusion of the citizens from work for a livelihood, and of all who work for a livelihood from citizenship: c. 8—10 § 8.

(B) Distinction between the classes which are actual organic members of the state, and such as are merely indispensable conditions for the existence of the former: 8 §§ 1, 2; §§ 4, 5; §§ 3, 4.

(b) Enumeration of the classes indispensable to the state, 8 §§ 6—9.

(c) It is a feature of the best polity that only the classes which are from the nature of the case members of the state, viz. fighting men and administrators (including those who administer justice), with the addition of the priests, who form a third, peculiar element, are in fact recognised as its members, or have the citizenship. These functions are exercised by them alone, the first in their youth, the second in their mature age, and the third when they are old men. All other classes—farmers, artisans, tradesmen, etc.—are excluded from citizenship. Hence every such employ-

ment, even agriculture, is prohibited to the citizens, yet so that the soil belongs to them, although it is cultivated by serfs or dependents (*δοῦλοι ἢ περὶοικοί*) of non-Hellenic descent: c. 9.

[(*d*) Such regulations are no mere innovation; they are of old standing in Egypt and Crete, as also are public messes in Italy and Crete: 10 §§ 1—9.]

(*a*) The proper scheme for dividing the land: the right qualifications and position of those who cultivate it: 10 § 9 (*περὶ δὲ...*)—§ 14.

(*a*) General leading principles: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(1) No community of property, only a certain common use granted out of friendship, § 9;

(2) No citizen to be in want, § 9;

(3) The common messes to be provided at the public expense, § 10.

(4) So also the worship of the gods, § 10.

(*b*) The territory is accordingly divided into public land and private land, and each of these again into two parts: 10 §§ 11, 12.

(*c*) The cultivators of the soil should be either (1) serfs of different races and of docile temper (*μηδ' θυμωεῖσθεις*), those on the state domain to belong to the state, those on private estates to the private owners: or failing this, (2) dependent subjects (*περὶοικοί*) of similar temper and of non-Hellenic descent: 10 §§ 13, 14.

(*c*) Regulations for the building of the city and the hamlets and villages. cc. 11, 12.

(*a*) The city: 11 § 1—12 § 7.

(1) Its site, on the slope of a hill, if possible, facing the east or else the south: 11 §§ 1, 2.

(2) Provision for a perennial supply of sufficient wholesome water, 11 §§ 3—5.

(3) Of fortified positions inside the city: 11 § 5.

(4) Plan for laying out the streets: 11 §§ 6, 7.

(5) The walls, 11 §§ 8—12. Plan of sites in the walls where the guards may hold their mess, 12 § 1.

(6) The Upper Market-place, a public square for freemen (*ἀγορὰ δλευθέρων*) with the principal temples and the gymnasia for the older men, 12 §§ 2—5. The Market-place for trade and in it the law courts and official buildings: 12 §§ 6, 7.

(*b*) Public buildings in the country: 12 § 8.

(*β*) A detailed sketch of the internal working of the Best Polity: IV (VII) c. 13—V (VIII) c. 7 (*incomplete*).

(i) General introductory remarks: IV (VII) c. 13.

(A) A right knowledge of the end of the best polity is as necessary as of the means which actually conduce to it: 13 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Its end is the happiness or well-being of all the citizens, which mainly consists in their highest excellence, though this is impossible apart from favourable external conditions, under which alone such excellence can be fully realized: 13 §§ 3, 4. These favourable conditions assumed to be at the legislator's disposal include, besides those already discussed, a happy natural capacity on the part of the citizens (*φύσις*), whilst the concern and principal task of the legislator is to see how this capacity can be improved into actual excellence by habituation and instruction: 13 §§ 5—13.

(ii) **The Education of the citizens; IV (VII) c. 14—V (VIII) c. 7** (*left incomplete*).

Its unity: IV (VII): 14 §§ 1—8.

Its aim and end: 14 § 9—15 § 6.

The means to be employed: IV (VII) § 6—end of V (VIII).

(A) Should the education of the rulers and of the ruled be different or the same, on the principles of the best constitution?

Different, in so far as the two are here different persons: the same, in so far again as they are the same persons but at different ages, and as in a government exercised for the common good of the ruled it is not possible to govern well unless one has learnt to obey well: 14 §§ 1—8.

(B) At what should the education of the citizens aim? What is the distinctive end and object of a virtuous life? 14 § 9—15 § 6.

(i) The virtues of the non-rational part of the soul (the moral virtues) are inferior to those of the rational part (the mental excellences or intellectual virtues) and have their end in the latter just as work has its end in leisure, war in peace: 14 §§ 9—14.

(2) Hence appears the defectiveness of constitutions like the Spartan, which, conversely, make war and conquest the object of the state, and strive solely to educate the citizens to be good soldiers, and nothing more, instead of treating military excellence as only a means to an end: 14 §§ 15, 16. Besides

(i) such principles have already been refuted by experience, namely by the sudden and lamentable collapse of the Spartan state and its power: 14 § 17.

(ii) Such principles aiming at the subjugation of other states imply the perverse opinion that it is nobler to rule over slaves than over freemen: 14 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) They are also dangerous in their influence on the behaviour of the citizens towards their own state: 14 § 19 (*ἐντρί*)—§ 21 (*ἀποθροῦσιν*).

(iv) What are the ends for which alone war must be waged and citizens become good soldiers: 14 § 21 (*τῇν re...δουλεύειν*).

(v) Another appeal to experience; states which have not learned to excel in the arts of peace must necessarily fall as soon as they have acquired their empire: 14 § 22.

(3) The virtues of peace and of leisure must rather have the preeminence; all the others ought however to be practised, since without the means the end cannot be attained and many indispensable virtues are easier to practise in war than in peace. For undisturbed peace easily leads us to rank external goods above virtue. But on the other hand this same mistake is the foundation for a onesided military tendency as, for instance, amongst the Spartans; even capacity in war, which is all they strive to attain, is only a means to an end, to the complete acquisition of external goods: 15 §§ 1—6.

(c) The right educational means: 15 § 6 (<σφι>...)—end of B. v (VIII).

(a) Preliminary remarks on the right course of education in general and the order of succession of educational agencies. Bodily development must precede that of the mind; in the latter, again, the training of the irrational soul by habituation must precede that of the rational soul through instruction: yet in such a way that the former always regards the latter as its aim and end: 15 §§ 6—10.

(b) Means to be employed before birth; the care requisite for the procreation of children of mental and bodily vigour and of good capacity: c. 16.

(1) The proper age for marriage: 16 §§ 1—10.

(i) The leading principles which determine it: 16 §§ 2—4, §§ 6—8.

(a) The difference of age between the parents to be such that their powers of procreation do not cease disproportionately, § 2.

(β) The difference in age between parents and children not to be too great or too small, § 3.

(γ) The educational requirement above mentioned, that the children to be brought up must be physically strong, § 4 (βούλησιν). Whereas the offspring of marriages between those who are too young is usually stunted, § 6.

(δ) Further, young mothers invariably suffer greatly in childbirth, § 7: and

(e) cohabitation begun at too early an age is prejudicial to female morality: also

(f) it stunts the growth of the husbands, § 8.

(ii) All these considerations may be satisfied by observing the limits of age within which married people are capable of having children, 16 §§ 4, 5, and thus we arrive at the proper determination, viz. 37(?) for men and 18 for women: 16 §§ 9, 10.

(2) The season of the year and appropriate weather for entrance upon marriage and its duties: 16 §§ 10, 11.

(3) The right bodily condition for the parents: 16 §§ 12, 13.

(4) Provision for the proper treatment of women with child: 16 § 14.

(5) Exposure of deformed infants · procurement of abortion to be sanctioned, in order that the prescribed number of children may not be exceeded: 16 § 15.

(6) Further a limit of age should be set beyond which parents are not to have children: this limit prescribed. Procurement of abortion when conception takes place beyond this age: 16 §§ 16, 17.

(7) Penalty for adultery: 16 § 17 (*δωρε.*)—§ 18.

(c) Means to be employed directly after birth, 17 §§ 1—14.

(1) In infancy, §§ 1—3, § 6, § 4.

(2) In the subsequent period to the fifth year, § 4 (*τῆν δ' ἐχόμενῃν...*)—§ 7. With a preliminary discussion of the question how far all coarseness and indecency is to be proscribed, and on the other hand how far male adults should be allowed to be spectators at comedies and the like: § 7—§ 14, § 13, § 14, § 12.

(3) Education from the fifth year on to the seventh: § 14 (*διεξελθόντων...αὐτοῦς*).

(d) The course of Public Education proper from the age of seven to that of twenty-one: 17 §§ 15, 16, v (VIII).

(1) **General introductory remarks.** Two grades of age distinguished. Statement of the three questions to be discussed in regard to this course of education proper: 17 (VII). 17, §§ 15, 16.

(2) It is more than necessary, it is most essential for the best polity, that a definite regulation of this educational course should be prescribed by law: v (VIII). 1 §§ 1, 2.

(3) It is not to be a domestic private education: it must be a universal and public course: 1 §§ 3, 4.

(4) **The right educational course:** v (VIII). cc. 1—7.

(i) Fundamental considerations: 2 § 1—3 § 12.

(a) Difference of views both as to the subjects of instruction, and as to the end and aim of the training: where there is agreement as to the subjects there are divergent views as to their practical application and mode of treatment, due to the difference of opinion as to their end: 2 §§ 1, 2.

(β) The pupils must indeed be taught what is indispensable for external life, yet here the right limits should be observed. The educational means usually employed should not be used (as, music alone excepted, they all may) with the idea of their conferring a purely practical external utility. They ought rather to be regarded as simply the conditions to the attainment of a higher end: 2 §§ 3—6.

(γ) The list of these subjects of ordinary education: reading, writing and arithmetic, gymnastic exercises, drawing, music: 3 § 1.

(δ) The ultimate end of education is the right occupation of the highest and truest leisure, which is not merely an interlude to work, but in itself the highest goal of life. Amusement and pastime serve as recreation to fill the less exalted leisure; but for the higher leisure the mind requires a different kind of activity, bringing with it the enjoyment of the highest intellectual gratification. Preliminary proof that amongst the ordinary subjects taught, music even in the judgment of our ancestors tends to this end, 3 § 2—§ 11 (*δῆλον*); and that the other subjects should be so used as not to lead away from it, but, indirectly at least, to conduce to it: 3 § 11 (*ἐνι* 22)—§ 12.

(ii) Athletic exercises (*γυμναστική*): cc. 3 § 13—4 § 9.

(α) As was stated above, IV (VII). 15 §§ 6—10, education must begin with bodily exercises: 3 § 13.

(β) But two errors should be avoided; the one, of training up the boys like athletes, as is commonly done; the other, the Spartan practice of brutalizing them by excessive exertions: 4 §§ 1—7.

(γ) We must therefore begin with easier exercises for the first period, and wait until they have attained puberty, and have been taught the other subjects of instruction for three years, before we commence the more exhausting gymnastic training: 4 § 7 (*δὲ μὲν οὖν*)—§ 9.

(iii) Music: cc. 5—7.

(α) Statement of the question: Should music serve for pastime recreation and relaxation, or for moral training, or lastly as a purely æsthetic and theoretic enjoyment, thereby ministering to the highest intellectual gratification? 5 § 1—§ 4 (*εἰρημύων*).

(β) The first and third of these ends are to all appearance foreign to the education of youth, though something may be said in favour of taking notice of them too in connexion with it. But it is still a question whether for any of these three objects it is necessary to learn to be a practical musician oneself: 5 § 4 (*δὲ μὲν οὖν*)—§ 8.

(γ) Answer to the first question: Music can and should subserve each of those three aims, not only the highest intellectual gratification, but also mere recreation, since it is a thoroughly innocent enjoyment; and considering the frequent need for recreation in life thus alone would suffice to justify its admission to a place in the instruction of youth. This consideration is not then to be wholly disallowed, as we supposed above (§ 4): yet it is only subordinate, 5 §§ 9—15; and the main point is that music is, thirdly, an excellent means for the moral training of the young: 5 §§ 16—25.

(δ) From this follows the answer to the second question:

(i) that in general the young should in fact be taught to become practical musicians: 6 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) and yet the adult citizens of the best state have in general to refrain from practising music themselves: §§ 3, 4.

(iii) Further this musical instruction should be regulated, §§ 5, 6, as follows:

(α) With regard to the degree of proficiency to be attained, the pupils should not be trained up to be professional virtuosi, but only receive the needful training of their characters and their tastes: 6 § 6 (*φανερόν*).—§ 8.

(β) For this reason all musical instruments, like the flute, which are only in use with professional performers, should be excluded from the instruction of the young: 6 §§ 9—16.

(c) Lastly, as to the various modes (*ᾠδαί*) and rhythms :

(1) for musical performances by professional musicians all modes are permissible, since all serve to promote the homeopathic purification of the emotions which procures the educated the highest intellectual gratification and the multitude recreation and amusement. Hence for the sake of the public at large who are not citizens—the farmers, artisans, labourers—at such performances even the modes and pieces which gratify their low taste must be admitted. But for the moral training of the young only those which best represent, and for that reason best train, character, the Dorian mode especially. The Phrygian mode should not be allowed : 7 §§ 3—12. [Perhaps however the Lydian mode may be tolerated, since we are not excluded from paying some regard to the amusement of a maturer age, and even adult citizens are on certain occasions allowed to sing : also the modes which are appropriate to the compass of the voice in mature life may be allowed as well as those specially adapted to the young : 7 §§ 13—15.]

(2) *The elucidation of the further question stated in 7 § 2, whether the rhythm or the melody and tune is of chief importance for the instruction of the young, is altogether wanting.*

B. THE REMAINING CONSTITUTIONS : B. VI (IV), VII (VI), VIII (V).

Introductory remarks : B. VI (IV) cc. 1, 2.

i. Why it belongs to political philosophy to consider not merely the absolutely best constitution, but also the best on the average, the best in any given case, and even the best possible organization of any actually existing polity : 1 §§ 1—7.

ii. This implies an exact acquaintance with all possible forms of government, and therefore with all the possible varieties of Democracy, Oligarchy, etc., which up till now have been left out of sight : 1 § 8.

iii. The theory of legislation moreover is based upon this exact acquaintance with constitutions : 1 §§ 9—11.

iv. The department of constitutional theory which remains for treatment defined : 2 § 1. Order of merit of the degenerate forms of government : 2 §§ 2, 3. The arrangement to be followed in the succeeding exposition : 2 §§ 4—6.

The actual details of the theory of the established constitutions : VI (IV). c. 3—VIII (V).

i Enumeration of all possible constitutions : VI (IV) cc. 3—10.

[(1) The difference between polities depends on the extent to which different classes take part in the government, c. 3.

(ii) How Democracy and Oligarchy ought rightly to be defined: 4 §§ 1—6.

(iii) The explanation of the fact that Oligarchy and Democracy come to be regarded as almost the only constitutions. Why there are more than these two and their sub-species. The classes of people necessary in the state: 4 §§ 7—19.]

(iv) The different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: 4 § 20—6 § 11.

(a) The basis of the general difference between them, 4 §§ 20, 21 (...*διαφορὰ*).

(b) Enumeration of the four kinds of Democracy from the best, which resembles Polity, down to the worst or unrestrained Democracy, which resembles Tyranny: 4 § 22 (*δημοκρατία*)—§ 31.

(c) Enumeration of the four kinds of Oligarchy in corresponding manner, from the most moderate to that which resembles Tyranny, viz. arbitrary dynastic government (*ὀλιγαρχία*): 5 §§ 1, 2.

(d) In spite of a constitution externally oligarchical a state may nevertheless bear a democratic character, and conversely: 5 §§ 3, 4.

(e) Reasons assigned why there can only be these four species (α) of Democracy, 6 §§ 1—6, (β) of Oligarchy, 6 §§ 7—11.

(v) The different species of Mixed Aristocracy and the forms of Polity. c. 7—9 § 5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Of Aristocracy and Polity in general: 7 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Mixed Aristocracy: 7 §§ 4, 5.

(c) Of Polity: c. 8, 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(a) Justification of the arrangement by which Polity is reserved for treatment to this point and Tyranny comes last of all: 8 §§ 1, 2.

(β) A further and more exact distinction between Polity and the Mixed Aristocracies. Refutation of the view that those species and varieties of Polity which incline more to Oligarchy than to Democracy should be included under Mixed Aristocracies, 8 §§ 3—9.

(γ) Genes and organization of Polity: 9 §§ 1—5, 12 § 4, 12 § 6—13 § 6, 9 §§ 6—10, 13 §§ 7—11.

(i) The three different ways of fusing Democracy and Oligarchy in Polity, 9 §§ 1—5. (ii) The middle class as the proper support of Polity, 12 § 4.

(iii) On the degree of success in the fusion depends the durability of the Polity. When therefore Polities or Mixed Aristocracies are established, it is a grave mistake if out of favour to the rich the claims of the poor are only satisfied in appearance, the concession made to them being in reality annulled and rendered void by all kinds of

illusory devices. Enumeration of such illusory measures and of the similar counter-measures adopted in democracies with the opposite intent: 12 § 6—13 § 6.

(iv) The criterion of a successful fusion in Polity, also in Mixed Aristocracy, 9 §§ 6—10.

(v) The amount at which the property qualification for the franchise should be fixed, 13 §§ 7—9 (*πολεμεῖν*).

(vi) Peculiar constitution of certain individual Polities, 13 § 9.

(vii) Historical remarks: 13 §§ 10, 11.

(vi) The different species of Tyranny, c. 10.

ii The best constitution on the average (*ἀρίστη τὰς πλείσταις πόλεσι*): c. 11.

(i) This is, in the main, Polity, as the rule of the well-to-do middle class: 11 §§ 1, 2.

For (a) as in the life of the individual moral virtue and excellence consist in the right mean between two opposite extremes of error, so the life of the state prospers best when the well-to-do middle class has the preponderance, whereas the extremes of wealth and poverty are two main sources of the two opposite kinds of crime and wrong-doing: 11 §§ 3—5.

(b) Excessive wealth leads to despotic ambition, extreme poverty to servile submission: 11 §§ 6—8 (*πόλεως*).

(c) The middle class has the most assured existence; the more strongly it is represented in the state, the more the state is secured from insurrection and internal troubles and from the danger of degenerating into one of the three worst perversions or degenerate types of polity, extreme Democracy, extreme Oligarchy, or Tyranny: 11 § 8 (*καὶ εὐφύονται*)—§ 13. This accounts for the fact that Democracies are ordinarily more stable than Oligarchies, because in the former the middle class is usually more numerous and influential than in the latter, 11 § 14.

(d) The best legislators have come from the middle class, 11 § 15.

(ii) All this explains why Polity, although the constitution best adapted for most states, is yet of rare occurrence: 11 §§ 16—19.

(a) It frequently happens that the middle class in a state is not very numerous, 11 § 16.

(b) In the frequent party conflicts between rich and poor it is invariably the practice for the victorious side to seize the government for itself, and not to come to terms with the defeated side, 11 § 17.

(c) Of the two states that were in succession supreme in Greece, the one, Athens, introduced democracies and the other, Sparta, oligarchies, each in her own interest: 11 §§ 18, 19.

(iii) The nearer any one of the remaining constitutions stands to that which is the best on the average, the better it is: the further it is removed therefrom, the worse it is: 11 §§ 20, 21.

iii What kind of polity is relatively the best for different kinds of people (*τίς πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία ποίους συμφέρει*): 12 §§ 1—3, § 4 (*δπου...*)—§ 5.

(1) General positions laid down, 12 §§ 1, 2.

(ii) Their application (a) to Democracy and its different species, 12 § 3, (b) to Oligarchy and its different species, 12 § 3 (*δπου...*), (c) to Polity, 12 § 4 (*δπου δέ...*)—§ 5, (d) to so-called or Mixed Aristocracy (*this is wanting*).

Recapitulation of all the previous discussion, 13 § 12.

iv The theory of the best possible organization of the different Democracies and Oligarchies, or of that which most corresponds to the spirit and intent of each of them respectively: VI (IV). 14—VII (VI).

(1) General fundamental positions as to the ordering and organization of all possible polities: VI (IV). CC. 14—16.

(a) Distinction of the Deliberative, Executive, and Judicial authorities in the state: 14 §§ 1, 2.

(b) Organization of the Consultative or Deliberative body in accordance with the various polities: 14 §§ 3—15.

(a) The department of the Consultative or Deliberative authority, and the three possibilities that either the whole body of citizens, or particular magistrates, have to decide upon all that belongs to this department, or again that it is divided between the one and the other: 14 § 3.

(β) These three possible cases, the different forms under which they may appear in practical application, and the sphere of action (whether larger or smaller) assigned to the different deciding factors, how distributed amongst different polities: 14 §§ 4—10;

(i) amongst the different species of Democracy, 14 § 4—§ 7 (*πρώτες*);

(ii) those of Oligarchy, 14 § 7 (*τὸ δέ τινα...*)—§ 9;

(iii) Mixed Aristocracy, 14 § 10;

(iv) Polity inclining to Aristocracy, and Polity proper, 14 § 10.

(γ) Measures by which at all events to secure that the decrees passed and the verdicts of the courts shall be good and salutary for the state, (i) in the most extreme Democracy, where all is decided by decrees of the people, through the adoption of certain oligarchical elements or of institutions related to Polity, while the democratical principle is still retained; and (ii) in an Oligarchy, through the adoption of certain democratical institutions or of others peculiar to Polity, or else by a procedure the reverse of that usual in Polities: 14 §§ 11—16.

(c) Organization of the Executive power, or the magistracies: c. 15.

(a) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 15 §§ 1, 2.

(β) What kind of officials are to be regarded as really magistrates, i.e. as ministers or authorities of the state: 15 § 2 (*ἄστυ δέ.*)—§ 4.

- (γ) What officials are required for every state, great or small, 15 §§ 5—8.
- (δ) The distinction between different magistracies according as the nature of the department they administer involves its extension over the whole state or its division according to definite localities, 15 § 9 (*τὸν αὐτόν*), and further according as the same department controls all the persons affected by it, or different classes are assigned to different magistracies, 15 § 9 (*καὶ πόρερον*)
- (ε) The difference between magistracies in the various constitutions: 15 §§ 10—13.
- (i) Certain offices are the same under different forms of the state, only the mode of appointment to them being different, 15 § 10.
- (ii) Others are generically the same under different forms but specifically different: i.e. different as to the extent of their powers, § 10.
- (iii) Others again are peculiar to given forms of the state, §§ 11—13.
- (f) The different modes of appointing to magistracies and their distribution amongst the forms of government, 15 §§ 14—21.
- (i) Each of the three questions to be considered, viz. who have the right to elect, who are eligible, and what is the mode of election, admits of three possibilities: combine each possibility under the first of these heads with each possibility under the second and third severally, and we obtain as the total number of conceivable cases nine for each of the three, i.e. 27 in all: 15 §§ 14—18.
- (ii) These modes classified under (A) Democracy § 19, (B) Polity, not only Polity proper, but also the variety which has an aristocratical, and that which has an oligarchical character, §§ 19, 20, (C) Oligarchy §§ 20, 21 and (D) Mixed Aristocracy § 21.
- (η) The duties of its department must determine what mode of appointment is advantageous for each office, 15 § 22.
- (d) Organization of the judicial authority; c. 16.
- (α) Statement of the questions to be answered in regard to this subject, 16 § 1.
- (β) The different kinds of courts, 16 §§ 2—5.
- (γ) The possible differences between them as to who are eligible as jurors (*ἀνδρες*); how they are to be appointed; whether they are to exercise all possible judicial functions or only to serve in certain courts, 16 §§ 6, 7.
- (δ) Classification of them under the different forms of the state, Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Polity, 16 § 8.
- (ι) Organization of the different species of Democracy and Oligarchy: VII (VI) cc. 1—7.
- (α) The discussion of this subject announced: the questions which remain as to the organization of other constitutions, and as to the blending of different forms when one power in the state is regulated in accordance with one form, and another in accordance with another form: 1 §§ 1—4.

(b) The species of Democracy: 1 § 5—c. 5.

(e) Species are distinguished according to the various occupations of the different democratic populations, and the degree to which they have severally adopted democratic institutions: 1 §§ 5—10.

(β) The principles of Democracy enumerated: 2 §§ 1—4.

(γ) All the democratic institutions developed from them: 2 §§ 5—8.

[(δ) Objections to absolute Democracy and recommendation of a peculiar form of compromise between the claims of Democracy and those of Oligarchy: 2 § 9—3 § 6.]

(ε) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Democracy, 4 §§ 1—14:

(i) of the two intermediate species, 4 § 15; and

(v) of the extreme Democracy, 4 § 15 (τῆν τε τελευταίαν...)—5 § 11.

(i) The institutions which promote the growth of this form: 4 §§ 15—20.

(ii) The measures which tend to neutralize its dangerous effects, and even impart to it, so far as is possible, a tolerable and durable character: c. 5.

(A) Preliminary remark on the urgent need for such measures: 5 §§ 1, 2.

(B) Particular instances of measures of the kind, 5 §§ 3—11:

(a) a diminution in the number of political trials, 5 §§ 3, 4:

(1) by not distributing the fines amongst the people, (a) by imposing severe penalties upon false accusation:

(β) the practice of summoning few popular assemblies and allowing the courts to sit as seldom as possible in the poorer states, 5 §§ 5, 6; and in the richer states of bestowing large sums at rare intervals upon the poor, and freeing the richer citizens from useless burdens: 5 §§ 7—9.

(c) Measures taken at Carthage and Tarentum; 5 §§ 9—11.

(c) The species of Oligarchy: cc. 6, 7.

(a) Organization of the best and most moderate species of Oligarchy: 6 §§ 1, 2;

(β) of the several intermediate species, 6 § 3; and

(γ) of the most extreme Oligarchy or Dynastic government, 6 §§ 3, 4.

(δ) Measures more directly affecting oligarchies at large, 6 § 5—7 § 7.

(i) The principal safeguard of Oligarchy, 6 § 5.

(ii) Arrangement as regards the military force and service in the army, 7 §§ 1—3.

(iii) Individual members of the popular party may be won over to the oligarchical government, 7 § 4.

(iv) To the highest posts in the government should be attached costly burdens to be defrayed for the commonwealth, 7 §§ 5—7.

(III) The theory of the organization of public offices: a fuller account in detail, c. 8 (*incomplete*).

(a) The questions to be discussed, 8 §§ 1, 2.

(b) The officials necessary in every state, 8 §§ 3-11.

Superintendents (a) of the markets (*ἀγορανόμοι*), § 3, (β) of the streets, public buildings, harbours; the city police (*δοτυνόμοι*) §§ 4, 5. (γ) Police officers in the country (*ἀγρόνομοι*, *ὄλιμοι*); (δ) financial officers (*ἀποδέκται*, *ταμίαι*), § 6. (ε) Keepers of archives and registers (*μνήμονες*, *ἐπιστάται*), § 7. (ς) Officers for penal administration, executioners and the like, §§ 8-13. (η) Military officers (*στρατηγοί*, *πολέμαρχοι*, *ναύαρχοι*, κτλ), §§ 13-15. (θ) Board of control, for scrutiny of the accounts of retiring officials (*εὐθύνοι*, *λογισταί*, *ἐξετασταί*), § 16. (ι) Legislative committee, to summon and direct the popular assembly, and to bring matters before it (*πρόβουλοι*, *βουλῆ*), § 17. (κ) Officers to superintend public worship (*ιερεῖς* κτλ), §§ 18-20. (λ) Recapitulation, § 21.

(c) Magistrates peculiar to certain given constitutions, 8 § 22.

The theoretical treatment of the cases where different forms of polity are combined in one and the same state, is wanting.

V The causes of decay in the various forms of the state and the corresponding safeguards: B. VIII (V).

I Preliminary Observations: I §§ 1-8, §§ 9-11, § 12:

3 § 14: I §§ 11-16.

(a) Statement of the whole question: I § 1.

(b) The general cause of all internal political disturbances consists in dissension as to the extent to which political equality should be carried: the rich and the nobles claim special privileges over the poor, the latter on the ground of their free birth claim equality with the rich: I §§ 2-7.

(c) Two species of revolution, I §§ 8-11:

(a) Overthrow of the constitution, §§ 8-11: whether

(i) subversion of the entire polity, § 8; or simply

(ii) accentuation or relaxation of the same form of government, § 9; or

(iii) abolition of single parts of the constitution, § 10.

(β) Change merely in the holders of power, § 8.

(d) Special application of the remarks in I §§ 2-7 to Democracy and Oligarchy. Two kinds of equality distinguished: it is necessary to pay attention to both kinds: 3 § 14, I § 11 (*πρωταρχοί*...)-§ 15.

(e) Why Democracy is in general more enduring than Oligarchy, I § 16.

II The causes of decay inherent in all polities in common : cc. 2—4.

(a) The three points for general consideration in this inquiry : the tendencies, the objects in view, and the external occasions which lead to political revolutions, 2 § 1.

(b) The tendencies and claims which lead to intestine disturbances and to revolutions have been already characterized (1 §§ 2—7). How far they are justified, or not, 2 §§ 2, 3.

(c) The objects sought to be attained in rebellions and insurrections : 2 § 3 (*πῶς ... πόλεσιν*).

(d) The definite occasions of revolution : 2 § 4—3 § 8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(a) General enumeration : 2 §§ 4—6.

(β) Consideration of them in detail : 3 §§ 1—8, 4 §§ 8—12, 3 § 9—4 § 7.

(i) Insolence in the rulers, 3 § 1.

(ii) Their greed for aggrandisement, 3 § 1.

(iii) Efforts of the subject body to attain higher political honours, 3 § 2.

(iv) Preponderating influence of individuals, 3 § 3.

(v) Fear of punishment or of injustice, 3 § 4.

(vi) Contempt for the governing class on account of their weakness, 3 § 5.

(vii) Disproportionate growth of separate elements in the polity or classes of the population, 3 §§ 6—8 ; 4 §§ 8—10 : and conversely

(viii) The establishment of an equivalence in point of numbers between opposing elements in the state.

(ix) Appropriation of offices by electoral intrigues (*διὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς*), 3 § 9.

(x) Neglect of the dangers threatening the constitution from individuals, 3 § 9.

(xi) Gradual introduction of slight changes unobserved, 3 § 10.

(xii) Any sort of difference between the inhabitants, 3 §§ 11—13, §§ 15—16.

As (A) difference in race, particularly when alien settlers have been admitted, §§ 11—13 :

(b) difference in sentiment, and especially in political sympathies, between the dwellers in different localities of one and the same state, due to a difference of character in the localities, §§ 15, 16.

(xiii) Private feuds between leading, influential citizens, 4 §§ 1—7.

(e) The means usually employed to effect revolutions, 4 §§ 12, 13 :

(a) force, (β) stratagem, (γ) stratagem succeeded by force.

III The causes of decay and the corresponding safeguards in the particular forms of government: cc. 5—12.

(a) Positive or dogmatic exposition: c. 5—c. 12 § 6.

(a) Republics, cc. 5—9.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY, cc. 5—7.

(A) In democracies, c. 5.

(a) Change to Oligarchy due to the continual persecutions of the rich by the demagogues, 5 §§ 1—5.

(b) Change to Tyranny, the demagogues usurping absolute power. Why this only happened in former times, why it is no longer usual for tyrannies to arise, 5 §§ 6—10, namely, because

(1) formerly demagogues were also generals, 5 §§ 6, 7.

(2) formerly certain officers had too large powers assigned them, 5 § 8 (*ἐν τῷ πολεμικῷ ἀρχαίᾳ*)¹.

(3) The states were as yet small, and the people in former times busy with their occupations in the country, so that it was easier for military chiefs to seize absolute power, 5 §§ 8, 9.

(c) Change from the most moderate to the most extreme form of democracy, due to the demagogic intrigues of candidates for office, 5 §§ 10, 11.

(2) In oligarchies, c. 6.

(a) Downfall of oligarchies through ill-treatment of the people, 6 § 1.

(b) Downfall through dissensions between the rich oligarchs themselves, 6 §§ 2—9, §§ 14—16, § 10.

(1) If the actual members of the oligarchical government are reduced to a mere handful, so that even persons belonging to the ruling families are excluded from it by law, 6 §§ 2—5¹.

(2) If the oligarchs themselves from mutual jealousy adopt demagogic intrigues, 6 § 5 (*καὶ οὐκ ἀλλήλους*)—§ 7:

(i) one member of the government, or a minority, intriguing to gain over the rest to his support, 6 § 6:

(ii) a part of the oligarchs (or all of them) intriguing with the people, 6 §§ 6, 7:

(a) where the people has the right of electing to the public offices, § 6, or if

(β) the law courts are constituted out of the people, § 7, or

(γ) in case some of the oligarchs are aiming at concentrating the power of the state in yet fewer hands, § 7.

¹ Perhaps (2) should properly follow (3).
² If § 5, and ἐν τῷ πολεμικῷ... ἀρχαίᾳ, be genuine we must add: "In the same way a small number of oligarchs, in spite of good government, can procure the downfall of the oligarchy at the hands of the people."

(ih) If individual oligarchs who have squandered their property attempt to make a revolution or to enrich themselves from the public means, thus embroiling themselves with the government, or raising a popular insurrection, 6 §§ 8, 9.

(iv) If members of the oligarchy are involved in private enmity owing to marriage relations or lawsuits, 6 §§ 14, 15.

(v) An oligarchy may be subverted by its own members on account of the too despotical character of the government, 6 § 16.

Concluding remark: an oligarchy united in itself is not easily overthrown from without, 6 § 10.

(c) Fall of the old oligarchy by the formation of a new one within it, 6 § 11¹.

[(d) Overthrow of oligarchies by the generals of mercenary troops enrolled for war; or in time of peace by the generals called in because of the mutual distrust of the oligarchs; or by a commander appointed on the same grounds to mediate between them, 6 §§ 12, 13]

(e) Change from Oligarchy to Polity and from Polity to moderate Democracy due to a depreciation of money, whereby the property qualification required by law for the franchise ceases to be adequate, 6 §§ 16, 17.

(f) Change from one kind of Oligarchy to another: 6 § 18.

(c) **In Mixed Aristocracies and Politics** c. 7 §§ 1—13.

(a) Fall of aristocracies and revolutions in consequence of the number of those who take part in the government becoming too small, 7 §§ 1—4:

(1) especially when the large body excluded consider themselves equal in merit, 7 §§ 1, 2;

or (2) if able and distinguished men are ill-treated by men not superior to them in desert although occupying higher offices in the state, 7 §§ 2, 3,

or (3) are excluded from the government in spite of their merits, 7 § 3;

or (4) if some of the citizens are too poor and others too rich, 7 § 3.

or (5) an individual is so powerful that he is likely to attain supreme power, 7 § 4.

(b) The principal danger for Aristocracies of this type and for Politics consists in the fact that the oligarchical element in them has not quite successfully blended with the democratical element, but the one of these preponderates over the other, 7 §§ 5, 6. [Consequently a revolution to this preponderating side may easily take place, that is, to complete Oligarchy or Democracy. Sometimes however there is a movement in the opposite direction: 7 §§ 7—10.]

(c) Aristocracies of this type are subject, above all other forms of government, to dissolution brought on by unperceived gradual changes, 7 §§ 11—13.

(d) **Concluding remark on the changes in republics taken in common.**

Sometimes they are of internal origin, sometimes they are brought about by powerful foreign states, 7 § 14.

¹ Perhaps §§ 10, 11 should also be enclosed in the square brackets.

(ii) THE SAFEGUARDS: CC. 8, 9.

(A) Preliminary remark.

The safeguards are implied in the statement of the causes of destruction. 8 § 1.

(a) Enumeration of the safeguards: 8 § 2—9 § 22.

(a) In Politics and Mixed Aristocracies especial care must be taken that slight changes and deviations from the existing laws do not gradually creep in unobserved: 8 §§ 2, 3.

(b) In the same governments precautions must be taken against those illusory measures discussed in VI (IV), 12 § 6—13 § 6: 8 § 4.

(c) In Aristocracies and Oligarchies the government must not only treat the governed well, but must also treat its own members on a footing of democratic equality, 8 § 5: hence many democratic measures are often quite in place even under these constitutions, 8 §§ 6, 7.

(d) The citizens must be kept in constant vigilance over their constitution, 8 § 8.

(e) All disputes between the principal men must as far as possible be avoided and prevented; and, so far as this fails, care must be taken that no others but the original parties to the quarrel are involved in it, 8 § 9.

(f) In Politics and Oligarchies a fresh valuation of property must be taken frequently in order that the property qualification for the franchise, if it is to retain its relative importance, may undergo the necessary revision at the proper time, 8 §§ 10, 11.

(g) No citizen to be disproportionately elevated. In particular, provision should be made by legislation to prevent the rise of unduly powerful individuals. If this does not succeed, they should be removed from the state by ostracism: 8 § 12.

(h) There should be a special board of magistrates to have supervision over the private lives of the citizens and see that they are in accord with the existing form of government, 8 § 13.

(i) Care must be taken that one part of the citizens does not prosper at the expense of the rest, 8 §§ 14—21; and hence

(1) that magisterial offices never fall exclusively into the hands of one of the two opposed classes of the population, 8 § 14.

(2) that the antagonism between rich and poor is adjusted or else that the middle class increases, 8 § 14.

(3) especially that the public offices do not afford any opportunity for enriching oneself from the public property, 8 §§ 15—19.

(4) In democracies the property of the rich must be spared, 8 § 20;

(5) in oligarchies posts with emolument attached to them must be assigned to the poorer citizens, and the insolence of a rich man towards a poor man must be punished more severely than if it were towards another rich man, 8 § 20.

(6) Further in oligarchies the accumulation of landed property in the same hands must be restrained within limits fixed by law, 8 § 20.

(7) Care must be taken in an oligarchy that the decisive authority rests in the hands of the rich, and in a democracy that it rests with the poor: but in other respects equal, nay even higher, privileges must be conceded in the former case to the poor, and in the latter case to the rich, 8 § 21.

(k) It must always be kept in view that attachment to the established form of government, special knowledge of the subject, and lastly virtue and integrity are requisite for the highest official positions: the second qualification indeed in certain offices in a higher degree than the third, in others again the third qualification in a higher degree than the second: c. 9 §§ 1—4.

(l) In a word, every measure that helps the healthy working of a constitution tends also to preserve it, 9 § 5.

(m) The citizens who desire the continuance of the form of government must be the numerical majority, 9 § 5.

(n) Even in the worse forms of Democracy and Oligarchy the mean must be preserved: it is the exaggeration of democratic and oligarchic measures which infallibly leads to the downfall of Democracy and Oligarchy respectively: 9 § 6—§ 11 (*δῆμος*).

(o) But the principal thing is to educate the young in the spirit of the established form of government: 9 § 11 (*μυστερον δε*)—§ 16.

(β) Monarchies: c. 10—c. 12 § 6.

(i) THE CAUSES OF DECAY: c. 10.

(A) Discussion of certain fundamental points: 10 §§ 1—13 (*δραπέδν*).

(a) The government of a king is closely related to Aristocracy, but Tyranny (*τυραννίς*) combines the evils of the most extreme Democracy and of the most extreme Oligarchy: 10 § 1, 2.

(b) The opposite nature of kingly rule and tyranny is at once shown in their divergent and opposite origin: 10 §§ 3—8.

(c) A more precise statement of the antithesis between them: 10 §§ 9, 10.

(d) The points which Tyranny has in common with Oligarchy on the one hand and with Democracy on the other: 10 § 11—§ 13 (*δραπέδν*).

(B) Causes of the overthrow of monarchies and of monarchs in general:
10 §§ 18—28.

(a) General statement

(1) of the motives for conspiracies and attacks upon a sole ruler, 10 §§ 13, 14, and (2) of the objects sought thereby, 10 § 14.

(3) Some of these attacks are directed against the person of the usurper; in others the assailant desires to seize the throne for himself, or to effect a revolution in the government: 10 § 15.

(b) These points of view presented in detail, 10 §§ 15—28.

(1) Attacks in consequence of injuries received, 10 §§ 15—20;

(2) from fear of punishment, 10 § 20;

- (3) from contempt for the rule, 10 §§ 22—25,
- (4) from greed of gain (*lavishly wanting*), 10 § 25;
- (5) from ambition, 10 §§ 26—28.

(c) Special causes of the downfall of (a) tyrants and tyrannies, (b) of kings and kingships. 10 §§ 29—38

(a) Tyrants and tyrannies. 10 §§ 29—34.

(1) A tyranny is destroyed from without by more powerful foreign states not tyrannies whether (i) under a royal or aristocratical, or (ii) under a democratical government, 10 §§ 29, 30.

(2) It is ruined from within by the members of the ruling family quarreling amongst themselves, 10 § 31.

(3) Most tyrants make themselves despised and this most frequently brings about their fall, 10 §§ 32, 33.

(4) Again, every tyrant is necessarily hated; hatred and righteous indignation against him often accomplish his overthrow, 10 §§ 33, 34.

(5) The same causes which threaten Extreme Democracy and Extreme Oligarchy are also dangerous to Tyranny: 10 § 35.

(b) The government of a king (as distinct from a tyrant) is mostly destroyed from within.

Either (1) feuds break out between members of the royal family, 10 § 36: or

(2) the kings overstep the legitimate limits of their authority and aim at making themselves tyrants, 10 § 38.

(3) Under an hereditary monarchy it is often impossible to prevent the succession to the throne of princes who render themselves contemptible, 10 § 38,

or (4) to exclude others who behave with insolence and violence, forgetting that they are not tyrants but kings, 10 § 38.

(5) Why it is that even in recent times tyrannies have sprung up, but no new monarchies arise, 10 § 37.

(11) THE SAFEGUARDS: C. 11, C. 12 §§ 1—6

(A) The office of king is best preserved by the gradual diminution of its absolute authority in keeping with the spirit of the times, 11 §§ 1—3.

(B) The tyrant can only secure his throne, 11 §§ 4—34,

(a) by employing the most extreme measures of force and corruption, 11 §§ 4—16:

(1) by getting rid of all the principal men, entirely forbidding the common pursuit of culture, and putting down all messes and clubs, 11 §§ 4, 5;

(2) by compelling all the citizens to live in public, 11 § 6,

and (3) by imitating all the other regulations of Persian and other oriental despotisms, 11 § 6;

(4) by sending secret spies and detectives amongst the citizens, 11 § 7;

(5) by setting all classes of the population against one another, 11 § 8;

- (6) draining the means of all his subjects, 11 §§ 9, 10,
- and (7) perpetually creating wars, 11 § 10,
- (8) by suspecting his own friends most of all, 11 § 10,
- (9) by allowing families to be governed by women and by giving slaves license to indulge all their caprices, just as in the most extreme democracy, 11 §§ 11, 12;
- (10) by permitting no dignified or free-minded character to remain near him, 11 § 13;
- (11) by being more intimate with strangers than with his own townsmen, 11 § 14.
- (12) The three leading points of view in this policy, 11 §§ 15, 16.

On (8) by demagogic devices joined with activity in war, when the tyrant poses as the friend of the people and makes his usurped power approximate to that of a king, 11 §§ 17—34.

(1) Careful management of the state funds; avoidance of lavish grants to mistresses, foreigners, or artists; a statement of accounts presented, no treasures accumulated for himself, 11 §§ 19—21.

(2) He should endeavour to create the impression that all taxes paid and services rendered are not for him but for the state, 11 § 21.

(3) He must inspire reverence by a dignified bearing and by capacity in war, instead of inspiring fear by severity and rough treatment, 11 § 22.

(4) He should not merely himself avoid crimes and offences against his subjects, but he should not allow them to be committed by any of his family or court, especially those who are of the female sex, 11 §§ 22, 23.

(5) He should be moderate in his indulgences, or at least should conceal his excesses from the world, 11 §§ 23, 24.

(6) In his care for the adornment of the capital he must not seem to have any ulterior object, 11 § 24.

(7) He should create the impression that though he is free from childish superstition yet he is very specially concerned to honour the gods, 11 § 25.

(8) He must award, to those who show themselves deserving, higher honours and distinctions than they could hope for in a free state, and he must always bestow distinctions and rewards himself, but have punishments inflicted and executed by others, 11 § 26.

(9) On the other hand, like monarchs generally, he should especially avoid raising individuals to greatness, least of all a man of bold and enterprising character, 11 § 27.

(10) Of all deeds of violence, personal insults or ill treatment, and seduction accomplished by force are the most dangerous. If he cannot altogether avoid them, he should give to the former the colour of paternal chastisement, and seek to succeed in his intrigues by dint of impassioned persuasion alone, 11 §§ 28, 29.

(11) He should especially be on his guard against people who imagine that they, or some one whom they love, have been so deeply wronged by him that they are ready to hazard their lives in opposing him, 11 § 30.

(12) While he should seek to please rich and poor alike, he should yet prefer to rest his rule upon the poor where they are the stronger, but where the rich have the upper hand, upon the rich, 11 §§ 31, 32.

(13) The leading points in this whole policy, and the great advantages which attend on it, 11 §§ 33, 34.

[(c) Oligarchy and Tyranny the least enduring forms of government. Historical survey of the tyrannies which lasted the longest, with the reasons why this was the case: 12 §§ 1—6.]

(b) Criticism of Plato's doctrine

of the successive changes from one form of the state to the other: 12 §§ 7—18.

(a) His theory of the transition from the best form of polity to the remaining forms: 12 §§ 7—10.

(i) It takes the right point of view for the cause of the decline in the best form, but the explanation given of the appearance of this cause is

(A) not peculiar to the best form of the state, but applies to all human affairs in common, 12 § 8, and

(B) supposing the best form of government to have been introduced into different states at different times before the period which Plato assumes for the universal decline, it is scarcely conceivable that, on the approach of this period, it would be subverted at one and the same time in them all, 12 §§ 9, 10.

(ii) No reason can be given why the best form of state should invariably pass over into that which stands next to it, 12 § 10.

(β) The case stands no better with his account of the transitions from the remaining forms of the state, to one another or to the best form: 12 § 10 (ὁ δ' αὖτός)—§ 18.

(i) Plato adheres to the same principle that every form of polity is changed into the form nearest to it, whereas the change to the opposite form is quite as frequent or even more so, 12 §§ 10, 11.

(ii) As to the second point, Plato has said nothing definitely about the change to the best form of the state; but if the omission is to be supplied in accordance with his exposition there is nothing for it but to assume that the sole transition *from* Tyranny or *into* the best state is the change when the former passes into the latter: which would be incorrect, 12 §§ 11, 12.

(iii) Further, in regard to the first point, the change from Oligarchy to Tyranny does take place, 12 § 13.

(iv) Nor is the reason assigned by Plato for the change from Mixed Aristocracy to Oligarchy the true one. For

(1) the true motive is different;

(2) what Plato takes to be the true ground for the transition to Oligarchy is not present in many oligarchies; and

(3) where it is found in Mixed Aristocracies experience shows that no such transition takes place, 12 § 14.

(v) As regards the transition from Oligarchy,

(a) that the state is divided into two states, one of the rich, the other of the poor, is not more true of Oligarchy than of the Mixed Aristocracy at Sparta or of other forms of government: 12 § 15.

(b) The change from Oligarchy to Democracy is really due to several causes, but Plato (1) only cites one of them, which does not hold except under strict limitations, 12 § 17, while (2) this cause is not altogether necessary to a revolution from Oligarchy to Democracy, provided there are other causes: 12 § 16, § 18.

(vi) Again, the transition from Democracy to Tyranny is not adequately explained, 12 § 18. (*This is almost entirely wanting.*)

(vii) Plato speaks throughout as if there were only one species of Democracy and of Oligarchy, 12 § 18.

PART III. *The third main division of the work, treating of Legislation, is entirely wanting.*

Symbols and Abbreviations.

- Γ = codex Graecus deperditus ex quo originem deduxit
 vetusta translatio latina Guillelmi de Moerbeke.
 M^b = cod. Mediolanensis Ambrosianus B. 105 old. sup.
 P^1 = cod. Parisinus 2023.
 $P^1(\text{corr.}^1)$ = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
 p^1 = correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.
 Π^1 = the agreement of $\Gamma M^b P^1$ in a reading, presumably that of their archetype.

 P^2 = cod. Parisinus Consolinianus 161.
 $P^2(\text{corr.}^1)$ = correctiones eiusdem cum codicis textu coloris.
 $P^2(\text{corr.}^2)$ = correctiones nigrores.
 $P^2(\text{corr.}^3)$ = correctiones pallidiores et luteolae.
 p^2 = correctiones rubrae.

 P^3 = cod. Parisinus 2026
 P^4 = cod. Parisinus 2025.
 P^5 = cod. Parisinus 1858.
 P^6 = cod. Parisinus 1857.
 Q = cod. Maecianus Venetus 200.
 M^b = cod. Maecianus Venetus 213.
 Q^b = cod. Laurentianus 81, 5.
 R^b = cod. Laurentianus 81, 6.

 S^b = cod. Laurentianus 81, 21.
 T^b = cod. Uibinas 46.
 U^b = cod. Maecianus Ven. append. IV, 3.
 V^b = cod. Vaticano-Palatinus 160.
 W^b = cod. Regensius 125.
 C^c = cod. Camerarii deperditus.
 $Ar.$ = cod. Aetini deperditus.
 $Ald.$ = editio princeps Aldina.

 Π^2 = the agreement of Ald. and all existing MSS *except* $M^2 P^1 P^6$ in a reading
 Π^2 = " " " " " *except* $M^2 P^1 P^2 P^3 P^6$ in a reading.
 Π = codex archetypus deperditus superstitum librorum et Aldinae.

 Bas.¹ = Basel ed. of 1531. Bas.² = Basel ed. of 1539. Bas.³ = Basel ed. of 1550.
 Bk.¹ = the Berlin Aristotle in quarto edited by Imm. Bekker in 1831.
 Bk.² = the *Politis* republished in octavo (3rd edition in 1855; 4th, unaltered, in 1878).
 Susem.¹ = Susemihl's critical edition, 1872. Susem.² = his edition of 1879.
 Susem.³ = his ed. in *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, 1882. Susem.⁴ = the present work.

Note that $P^{4-6}(\text{corr.})$ = the corrector of P^4 and the corrector of P^5 ; *but*
 P^2 and $P^4(\text{corr.})$ = the first hand of P^2 and the corrector of P^4 .
 [$\delta\rho\chi\omega$] Bernays = Bernays proposes to omit $\delta\rho\chi\omega$ from the text.
 < $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\kappa\omega\nu\mu\kappa\tilde{\omega}$ > Rasso = Rasso proposes to insert $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\kappa\omega\nu\mu\kappa\tilde{\omega}$ in the text.
 ? Susem. = Susemihl conjectures; *but*
 $\Gamma(?)$ = Γ may have had the reading in question.
 $\epsilon\tau\omega\omega *$ denotes a lacuna; that after $\epsilon\tau\omega\omega$ some word, or words, has been lost.

The passages conjectured to be out of place in our authorities are, as a rule, printed twice over. where they occur in the MSS. in thick Clarendon type; again, in ordinary type, but between angular brackets < >, in the place to which the editor would transpose them.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΑ

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α.

Bekker 410
p 1252 a

Schneider
c 1 § 1

1 Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ
πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν (τοῦ γὰρ
εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆ-
λον ὅς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ
5 καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἢ πασῶν κυριωτάτῃ καὶ πάσας

1252 a 1 [ἐπειδὴ...7 πολιτικῇ] Schmidt || 5 καὶ before τοῦ is omitted by Π¹R^bA¹. ||
κυριωτάτῃ before πασῶν M^aP¹

Introduction, cc. 1, 2: περὶ οἰκονο-
μίας, cc 3—13 (the latter a necessary
preliminary to the rest of the work, πᾶσα
γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις ἐξ οἰκῶν). The pre-
vailing tone is dialectical, and the con-
tents of Bk. I. are nearly exhausted by a
list of the problems (ἐπὶτοίαι) slated for
discussion; (1) the difference between a
city-state and a family, between πολιτι-
κὸς and οἰκονομικὸς, (2) the elements of
the state, πόλις ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται, c. 2,
(3) the natural basis of slavery, ὅτι εἰσι
φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν δεινότεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι,
cc 4—6, (4) the relation of χρηματιστικῇ
to ὁικονομικῇ, πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικῇ ἢ
αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ κτλ, cc. 8—11, (5) the
capacity of the slave and the citizen for
moral virtue, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις δού-
λου παρὰ τὰς ὁργανικὰς, 13 § 2 ff. See fur-
ther the *Analysis* and *Introd.* pp. 23—31.

c. 1 *The city is the highest form of
association, having the highest good for
its end.* § 1. *The city not an enlarged
family, but an essentially distinct organiza-
tion, as is evident when it is analysed into
its simplest elements:* §§ 2, 3.

§ 1 i πόλιν] A 'city,' but at the same
time a sovereign 'state.' κοινωνία—which
includes any form of communication or
social intercourse, κ ἀλλοτρίαι, commercial
transactions, exchange *Nic. Eth.* v. 5.
9; ταύτην τὴν κ.—τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμίαν,
the marriage union *Pol.* IV(VII). 16. 3—
denotes chiefly in this treatise (1) the
voluntary combination, association, or co-
operation of free men with each other in

objects in which they have common inter-
ests (τόπου, ζωῆς, so ἀλλαγῇ καὶ συμμα-
χίας κοινωνεῖν), οἱ, as it is sometimes put,
formed with a view to certain common
advantages (χρήσεως μὴ ἐφήμερον ἕνεκεν
τῆς μεταδόσεως, συμμαχίας, καλῶν πράξεων
χάριν). Hence by a natural transition,
concretely (2) the associated body, the
members who compose the union; so
that ἡ πολιτικὴ κ., 'civil society' = the
community, τὸ κοινὸν (e.g. II. 3. 1 com-
pared with II. 2. 2, IV(VII). 14. 1). See
further on I. 2 § 12, 8 § 13, III. 9. 12.

3 δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ] seeming good,
which may not really be the agent's
true interest, although he thinks so, cp.
IV(VII) 13. 2. (See this case fully elu-
cidated *Nic. Eth.* III. 4 §§ 1—4, § 17, § 20,
the solution being οὐ σπουδαῖος ἕκαστα κρῖ-
νει ὁρθῶς καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τῶν ἡθῶν αὐτῶν
φαίνεται.) Both δοκεῖν and φαίνεσθαι are
often opposed to εἶναι as semblance to
reality, but while δοκεῖν = φαίνεται to be
thought, φαίνεσθαι = εἶναι to appear, of
an object present to sense; hence τὸ δο-
κοῦν = subjective opinion, τὰ φαινόμενα =
objective facts. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v.

4 πᾶσαι μὲν...μάλιστα δὲ] The clause
with δὲ gives the true apodosis to ἐπειδὴ:
'while all aim at some good (κατὰ μέρος
τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται), the highest and
most comprehensive aims especially at the
highest good.'

5 κυριωτάτου] Cp. III. 12. 1 and note
SUSEM. (1)

Aristotle's proof, if we assume ἡ πολι-

περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη πόλις (I) καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.

§ 2 ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἰονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν [εἶναι] τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ
10 καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλείωνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλείωνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικόν, ὥς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικράν πόλιν καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικόν, ὅταν
15 δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικόν ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ).

9 εἶναι omitted by II¹ (added after τὸν by a later hand in M¹) || 14 ἐφεστήκη M¹ (1st hand), ἐφέστηκε M² (collector), ἐφεστήκει P^{4,5} Q² R³ S³ T¹ U¹ V¹ W¹ L¹ Aldine || 15 τοὺς is omitted by II¹ Bk. || 16 [ἄρχων] καὶ ἀρχόμενος § Beinays (cp. III. 17. 7) needlessly

τική to be the 'ait' concerned with ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολ., is given *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 §§ 5—7, cp. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως... κἀλλιον καὶ θεότερον ἔστιν καὶ πόλεως, sc. τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀγαθόν: which is more precisely described in the case of the 'city' as justice and the interest of the community, τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον.

ἡ πασῶν. πᾶσας περιέχουσα] See n. on II. 2 § 7, where is explained, from *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9 §§ 4—6, how this supreme society embraces all the inferior as 'parts' (μέρη) of itself.

§ 2 8 ὅσοι μὲν κτλ] *Plato Politicus* 258 E ff.; cp. c. 3 § 4, 7 §§ 1, 2 nn. Socrates too expresses himself to this effect in *Xenoph. Memorab.* III. 4 § 6 f. § 12 ἢ γὰρ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν. SUSSEK. (2) πολιτικόν] A practical statesman, a magistrate in a free city, self-governed according to Greek ideas; so 8 § 15, II § 13, II 7. 1 πολιτικοί) (φιλόσοφοι καὶ ἰδιῶται, cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9. 18) (σοφισταί. Occasionally much more than this, for Aristotle requires that ὁ ὧς ἀληθὲς π. should know psychology, *N. E.* I. 13 §§ 2—7, legislation, and other sciences: hence joined with νομοθέτης, a theoretical statesman, student of politics: IV(VII). 4. 3, VI(IV). 1 § 3, VIII(V). 9. 9.

9 πλήθει κτλ] They assume that a king differs from e.g. a householder only in having more numerous, not more heterogeneous, dependents. πλήθος=numbers: 8 § 15, *Rhet.* I. 4. 10 (τὸ

πλήθος τῆς φυλακῆς=the strength of the defensive force), cp. *Metaph.* I. 9. 24 ἀριθμὸς=τὸ πολλὸ καὶ ὀλίγον.

10 εἶδει] οἱ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, 'specifically,' 'in kind', εἶδει διαφέρειν=to be essentially different, because division into species takes account only of essential qualities.

11 ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων] Schneider supplies ἄρχη here, and καλοῦσι before δεσπότην, but νομίζουσι (εἶναι) would do just as well in the latter case, and in line 14, while εἴητε ἄρχη or ἐφεστήκη must be understood to follow ὅταν δὲ in line 15.

12 ὥς οὐδὲν κτλ] Whereas the state is composed ἐξ εἰδῶν διαφερόντων, II. 2. 3, where see n. SUSSEK. (2 b)

Plato Polit. 259 B μεγάλην σχῆμα οἰκίαν εἰς μικράς αὐτὴν πόλεις διχοτομῶν τὴν πρὸς ἄρχην διόριστον; NE. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν. ΞΕ. οἰκοῦν, ὁ νυνδὲ δισκοποῦμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα. ταύτην δὲ εἴτε βασιλικὴν εἴτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὀνομάζει, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

13 καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν] sc. οὐκ εἶδει νομίζουσι διαφέρειν.

15 τῆς τοιαύτης] i. e. τῆς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ, not τῆς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, the legal science of government (*Rassow Bemerkungen* p. 3). SUSSEK. (3)

Cp. n. on τοιαύτην c. 8 § 7. The one man supreme over the state is called a king, the ruler who follows out the principles of the same kingly science (when in office), but takes his turn (κατὰ μέρος) at governing and being governed, is a republican magistrate.

§ 3 δὴλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὕψη-
 γημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-
 του μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλα-
 χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται
 σκοποῦντες ὀφύμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέ-
 ρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ
 ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων.

2 εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φνόμενα βλέπειεν (Bk. i
 25 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτοις, κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω
 § 2 θεωρήσειεν, ἀνάγκη δὲ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ 4

§ 3 17 τὸ λεγόμενον] sc. 9 ὅτι οὐ
 καλῶς λέγουσιν, all between being rati-
 onal. When such side-notes are im-
 bedded in the text the construction of the
 main sentence is often difficult to follow:
 e.g. 2 § 2, § 9, 4 §§ 1, 2, 5 §§ 4—6, perhaps
 13 §§ 6—8. II 10. 7—9: IV(VII). 3 § 1,
 13 §§ 2—4, 16 §§ 2—4. V(VIII) 5 §§ 2—
 4, §§ 18—24, perhaps 6 § 15—7 § 1,
 7 §§ 6—8. In III. 9 §§ 6—8, VI(IV)
 4 §§ 8, 9 and perhaps in III 12 §§ 1, 2
 the interruption of the original construc-
 tion almost amounts to anacoluthia. See
 Bonitz *Aristotelische Studien* II. III.

κατὰ τὴν ὕψημένην μέθοδον] in ac-
 cordance with the method of inquiry
 which has previously been 'started' or
 'traced out' or 'followed,' and so the
 usual method of inquiry (Bonitz). *De*
Gener. Anim. III. 9. 1, 758 a 28 ff.: τὸν
 ὕψημένον τρόπον *Pol.* I. 8. 1, *Nic. Eth.*
 II. 7. 9 The participle is passive, as is
 ὕψηγεται (ὕψηγται Bk.) *Pol.* I. 13. 6.
 See 3 § 1, 8 § 1 n. (66), III. 1. 2 with n.
 (434) (Schneider). SUSEM. (4)

18 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ] "As in other
 subjects a compound has to be resolved
 into its ultimate elements, these being
 the smallest parts of the whole, so here
 by inquiring of what elements a city,"
 which is a compound III. 1. 2, "is com-
 posed, we shall better discover the differ-
 ence between the four types above-men-
 tioned (πολιτικὸς, βασιλικός, etc.) and
 whether systematic knowledge can be
 attained about them severally." Although
 he did not apply the mathematical method
 of pure deduction to biological or political
 sciences Aristotle derived both the pro-
 cesses of Analysis and Synthesis and the
 terms (ἀναλεῖν, σύνθετον διαιρεῖν) from
 geometry: see the instructive passages
Nic. Eth. III. 3 §§ 11, 12 ἵππων καὶ
 ἀναλεῖν τὸν εἰρημὸν τρόπον ὥσπερ δι-
 γράμματα (a geometrical problem), *Metaφ.*

VIII (Θ). 9. 4 1051 a 21—29 εὐρίσκειται
 δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργεῖα, διαρροῦντες
 γὰρ εὐρίσκουσιν.

21 τούτων and 23 τῶν ῥηθέντων
 should be taken as above and not referred
 to ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται (πόλιν) as the grammat-
 ical antecedent.

c. 2 *Origin of the city from the*
family through the village-community.
 §§ 1—8. *The city a natural institution*
 §§ 8—12, *prior in the intention of nature*
to the family and individual §§ 13, 14,
and of incalculable utility §§ 15, 16.

We have here the Patriarchal Theory,
 as it is called by Su H. Maine, applied
 to the origin of society. The family living
 under the headship of the father is taken
 as the ultimate social unit. Until quite
 recently this was the accepted view. see
Maine Ancient Law c. 5 esp. 122—135,
Early History of Institutions c. 3, *Early*
Law and Custom cc. 7, 8. There are
 certain difficulties of this derivation of
 the state which Aristotle avoids 'by mak-
 ing the combination of families of different
 stocks (γένη) depend on contiguity of
 residence and on convenience.' See J. F.
 McLennan's criticisms *Studies in Ancient*
History, esp. 213—227, 235—309.

On the origin of civil society there is
 something in Plato *Rep.* II 369 B ff., *Laws*
 III. 676—682, Polybios VI. cc. 4—7, Cicero
De Rep. I. 25, 26 §§ 39—42 (with Lac-
 tantius *Instit.* VI. 10), *De Off.* I. 17 §§ 53,
 54, *De Ann.* III. §§ 62—67. A. C. Brad-
 ley *Hellenica* 190—212 gives the best
 commentary on cc. 1, 2; Oncken *Staats-*
lehre II. 3—27 is also helpful.

§ 1 24 τὸ πράγματα φνόμενα]
 "things in their growth or origin"
 (Shilleto); Plato *Rep.* 369 A, *Laws* 757 C.

§ 2 26 συνδυάζεσθαι] *Nic. Eth.* VIII.
 12. 7 ἀνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν
 μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν.

ἀλλήλων μὴ δυνάμενους εἶναι, οἷον θήλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς (I)
 γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι,
 30 οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ καὶ
 ἀρχόμενον φύσει διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ
 διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην [φύσει], τὸ δὲ
 δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον φύσει καὶ
 § 3 δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλω ταῦτ' ἀμφέρεται). φύσει μὲν
 35 b οὖν διώρισταί τὸ θήλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις
 ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πε-

28 γενήσεως Stobaeus (p. 324) Suscm.¹ § 32 διανοία <τὰ θέοντα> ? Suscm. ||
 δεσπότην [φύσει] Thurot || 33 ταῦτα αἰεὶ τῷ σώματι II² Bk. || φύσει καὶ ΑΙ., καὶ
 φύσει Γ II Bk., ἀρχόμενον, [καὶ] φύσει Benhay
 1252 b 2 αὶ is omitted by II² Bk.

27 οἷον] "namely," introducing the two relationships (each of which needs a long parenthetical explanation) into which the family can be analysed, § 5.

28 καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ] Cp Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II i 511, who quotes *De Anima* II. 4. 2, 415 a 26 φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῴων ὅσα τέλεια τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῶον μὲν ζῶον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ δει καὶ τοῦ βελον μετέωρον ἢ δύνανται. Individuals perish but the species, the kind, is immortal. So first Plato *Sympos.* 206 E, 207 C—208 B SUSCM (5)

οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως] not by design, or of deliberate purpose, ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγον καὶ διανοίας. instinctively.

30 ἄρχον κατὰ] "governor and governed by nature" clearly="master and slave" not as I § 2 'political ruler and subject'

31 On Aristotle's conception of φύσις in general Zeller *Ph. der Gr.* II i 384—389, 422—427; Grant *Ethics* I. 279—285. Various senses of the term *Μεταφρ.* VI. C. 4.

διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν] "for preservation": i.e. to secure the means of subsistence. How far this is true of the 'slave by birth' on Aristotle's view is explained § 6—10, as Fulleborn has correctly observed: in the case of the master it should be remembered that without slaves in his household he can procure at best but a poor and uncertain subsistence. see § 5 n (15), 4 §§ 1—4. SUSCM. (6)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ] Cp. § 5 §§ 8—10, 11 § 6 n. (103). SUSCM. (6 b)

33 ταῦτα=δ τὸ ἄρχον προορᾷ.

§ 3 34 διὸ δεσπότη κατὰ] 'It is not simply, as Fulleborn (II. 75) supposes, that both master and slave are alike interested in the establishment of this relationship Aristotle really means that the master's interest is advantageous for the slave, and conversely'. Cp. § 10 n. (57). Only the advantage to the slave comes indirectly, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, III. 6. 6 n. (L. Schiller). SUSCM. (7) Cp. § 2.

1252 b 1 οὐδὲν γὰρ κατὰ] "For nature never fashions thingsiggardly, for various and dissimilar purposes, as Delphic cutlers do their knife" (Shilleto)

2 τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν] "According to Hesychios, i.e., the Delphian knife had the upper part only of iron, λαμβάνουσα ἐμπροσθεν μέρος σιδηρόν; the handle, perhaps also the back, was of wood. Gotting *De m. D. quae est apud Aristotelem* (Jenae 1856. 4) maintains it was a knife and spoon combined, for sacrificial purposes" (Schnitzel). Hence Gotting proposes *μύστρον* for *μέρος* in Hesychios, as above. Oncken, II 25—27, dismisses the obscure words of Hesychios in favour of Oresme's explanation: "suppose a piece of iron with a thick end and a pointed end, with the back left rough and the other side sharpened to a blade. Then you have a knife for cutting, you can file with the rough back, and by turning it round use the thick end for a hammer. Such a rough sort of tool would certainly be cheap enough." Cp. *ὀβελισκολόχνη* VI(IV). 15. 8 n SUSCM. (8) *Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα ἐπὶ τῶν φιλοκερδῶν* Makarios ap. Walzium *Arsen.* 179: with which agrees the explanation

νυχρός, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελεῖτο κάλλιστα (I)
 4 τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοὺς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐν δουλεύου)
 § 4 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει

§ 5 τὰ after καὶ is omitted by Π³ Bk.

in *arrend.* *πρὸς*. I. 94 (tom I. p. 393 of the *Corpus Papyrologiograph.*, Gotting 1830) Δελφικὴ μάχαιρα: ἐπὶ τῶν φιλολερῶν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς λαμβάνειν προαιρουμένων, παρόσον οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸ μὲν τι τῶν ἐρεῶν ἐλάμβανον, τὸ δέ τι ὑπὲρ τῆς μάχαιρας (7 for the use of the knife) ἐπράττοντο Athenaeus IV. 74 p. 173: 'Αχαιοὶ δ' ὁ Ἑρετριεὺς ἐν Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ σατυρικῷ καρυκοποιὸν καλεῖ τοὺς Δελφοὺς διὰ τούτων· Καρυκοποιὸν προσβλέπων ββελόττομαι· παρόσον τὰ ἐρεῖα περιέμνοντες δῆλον ὡς ἐμαγείρευον αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκαρκενον. εἰς ταῦτα δὲ ἀποβλέπων καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ἐφ' ἧς Ἄλλ' ὦ Δελφῶν πλειοστάς διονύϊον | Φοῖβε μάχαιρας | καὶ προβιβάσων τοὺς σὺν προβάλοις It was from Thomas Aquinas *ad locum* that Olesme derived the explanation cited above. See Von Heiting *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 447. M¹ W. Ridgeway thinks the name given to "a large kind of knife, which could be used for either fighting or carving, from the sacrificial knife having been used as a weapon to slay Pythius, Pindar *Nem.* VII. 42."

§ ἐν πρὸς ἐν] There are of course exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself allows *De Part. Anim.* IV. 6. 13, 683 a 22 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνδέχεται χρῆσθαι διὸν ἐπὶ δὲ ἔργα καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐδὲν ἢ φύσις εἴπωσι ποιεῖν ὥσπερ ἡ χυλαινική πρὸς ἐντέλειαν ὀβελισκολόχον ἀλλ' ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται, λαταχρῆται τῷ οὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα. SUSEM. (8) See *De Anima* II. 8, 10, 420 b 16. We shall find the rule applied to political offices II. 11. 13, VI(IV). 15 6.

4 μὴ πολλοὺς ἔργοις κατὰ] "if restricted in use to a single function" Fullborn asserts that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, even supposing there is no exception to the rule (see preceding note). But surely the propagation and the preservation of the species are two different ends. At the same time Aristotle should have emphasized the fact that woman is not nearly so far below man as the natural slave (see § 2) is below his master. SUSEM. (10)

§ 4 5 ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις κατὰ] 'Whereas in Greece wife and slave are distinct, in *barbaria* they are not, because all—men and women—are slaves' (Jackson) In Thrace e.g. the women did farm-work *μηδὲν διαφερόντως τῶν*

δοῦλων Plato *Laus* 805 E. Fulleborn (II. 84) objects that this is an unsatisfactory reason to assign for the servitude of women outside Greece, since where all of both sexes are slaves, we should rather infer that they are all equal. (In this last sense indeed Congreve seriously takes the words, supplying τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τῶν sc. τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τοῖς ἄρσενι καὶ τοῖς θείοντα.)

"Fulleborn's objections arise from his having been misled by the omission mentioned above, in II. (10), and so having misunderstood the real sense of the passage. Aristotle's meaning is this: because the barbarian nations are slaves by nature, the men are not capable of respecting the freedom of the female sex in the women, and of according to them the position which by nature belongs to the woman in relation to the man; but treat them as slaves. And hence necessarily arises the perversion of nature, that in the marriage relation you have one slave ruling despotically over another. To the same cause, the servile character of these nations, or at least of the Asiatics (I. 6. 8 n.), Aristotle attributes the fact that they themselves are ruled by their kings as slaves, or in other words that the form under which the state exists amongst them is despotism, III. 14 6 n., which in reality cannot be considered to constitute a state at all, a state consisting of free citizens but not of slaves, 7 § 1, III. 9 § 6, 12 § 8; cp. VI(IV). 4 § 11, a passage which is probably not genuine. Such a despotism is only an anomalously expanded family' ('non civitas erit sed magna familia,' Grotius *De iure belli ac pacis* III. 8. 2) It is a species of that which Aristotle denotes by *ἔθνος*, i.e. a mere aggregate of men of the same race, a tribe population or nationality, as contrasted with πόλις, a city-state: § 6; II. 1 § 3; III. 3 § 5, 13 § 19, 14 § 15; IV(VII). 4 § 11; VIII(V) 10 § 8 with *nn.*; *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 8, 1094 b 10; *Rhet.* I. 5. 5 1360 b 31; cp. Scholsser I. 278. [Cp. *ἔθνος* = federation in Polybios and Diodorus, esp. of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues: δὲ *ἰθρικὸς χρεῖας* 'for federal purposes' Diod. XVII. 13.] See further *n.* (13): 5 § 8, 6 § 8 4—6 with *nn.* (47), (54), (56). 7 § 5, 8 § 12; IV(VII). 2 § 15, 14 § 21 with *nn.*" SUSEM. (11)

6 τάξιν. αἷτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεταί (I)
 ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δοῦλον. διὸ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί

βαρβάρων δ' Ἑλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός,

§ 5 ὡς ταῦτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν 6
 10 δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας

οἶκον μὲν πρόωιστα γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα

ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἔστιν.

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κοινωνία κατὰ
 φύσιν οἰκός ἐστιν, οὗς ὁ μὲν Χαρώνδας καλεῖ ὁμοσιτίπους, Ἐπι-
 15 μενίδης δὲ ὁ Κρής ὁμοκάπους· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλεόνων οἰκῶν κοινωνία γ

9 ὅν before ταῦτὸ I, omitted by M^a P¹ || 12 ἐστίν. ** Sussem¹ wrongly, see Dittenbeiger *Gott. gel. Anz.* 1874 p. 1372 ff. || 15 ὁμοκάπους II^a P⁴ L^a Sussem.¹ and M^a (coll.), perhaps rightly, but see Dittenbeiger p. 1357 ff. and Commentary n. (17): ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήπους Ridgeway (also Shilleto in unpublished *Adversaria*: 'si Epimenides ἐρίει ποιεῖ utebatur, certe ὁμοκάπους. Nisi forte ὁμοκάπους = ὁμοκήπους')

8 Euripides *Iphigenia in Aulis* 1400 Nauck. The words following are ἄλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους, μήτε, Ἑλλήνων τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλευθέρους. SUSSEM. (12)

9 ὡς ταῦτὸ κατὰ] In this Aristotle only expresses the view which had gradually become universal among the Greeks, and was not combated until a late period and then by but few: § 4 n. (31) This view is explained by the justifiable consciousness they had of their mental superiority; it was especially fostered by the Persian war, and found external confirmation in the fact that the vast majority of Greek slaves were of barbarian origin, while in itself again it tended to hinder the enslavement of Greeks (L. Schiller). See also n. (47) on I. 5 § 10 That slaves are non-Hellones is assumed quite as an understood thing in Xenoph. *Memor.* II. 7. 6, Demosth. XXI (c. *Mid.*). 48. See however n. (64) on I. 7 § 5. SUSSEM. (12)

§ 5 10 πρόωτῃ] predicatively, "from these two relationships,"—man and wife, master and slave,—arises primarily the family." For the sense, *πρόωτον καὶ ἀναγκαϊότερον οἰκία πόλεως Nic. Eth.* VIII. 12. 7. The three stages, *οἰκία κόμη πόλις*, are given by Plato *Laws* I. 626 c ff. Ἡσίοδος *Works and Days* 405. Clearly Aristotle did not know of the spurious line 406 in our texts, *κηνην δ' οὐ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βοῦν ἐποιον*. SUSSEM. (14)

12 ὁ γὰρ βοῦς κατὰ] "the ox supplies the place of a servant." Cp. § 8 9

n. (46). If with both these passages we compare 4 §§ 1—4, it is evident that Vairo's division *De re rustica* I. 17, which Grotius mentions *op. c. I. 5*, 3, is quite in the sense and spirit of Aristotle: *ali in ties paties (sc. dividunt) instrumenti genus vocale et semivocale et mutum. vocale in quo sunt servi; semivocale in quo sunt boves; mutum, in quo sunt plaustra.* (L. Schiller.) SUSSEM. (16)

12 ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ] μὲν οὖν, not δέ, repeating after the quotation from Hesiod the clause 9 ἐκ μὲν οὖν κατὰ. Take κατὰ φύσιν with *συνεστηκυῖα*: "thus then the society which in the order of nature has arisen to meet every-day needs is the household: shares in one meal-jar as Chaeondas calls them, joint-holders of a piece of land in the phrase of Epimenides the Cretan. The union of a number of families first formed with a view to needs beyond those which are of daily recurrence is the village." Elsewhere in Aristotle *ἐφήμερος* = lasting for a day; so Bernays here, "for intercourse of less transitory duration."

14 Χαρώνδας] II. 12 § 7, § 11 n. (416); VI (IV). II § 15, 13 § 2 n. *Polm Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum* (Leipzig 1870) I. p. 153 ff., 401. SUSSEM. (18)

Ἐπιμενίδης] See Excursus I at the end of this book, p. 204. SUSSEM. (17)

15 ὁμοκάπους] The reading is doubtful (1) The MSS. of the better family give ὁμοκάπους. (2) If Aristotle is quoting from a collection of oracles (*Χρησμοί*)

§ 6 πρώτη χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου κώμη. μάλιστα δ' εἴκοι (I.
17 κατὰ φύσιν ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι, οὗς καλοῦσιν τινες

16 εἴκοι after 17 κατὰ φύσιν P¹ P² Bk. || 17 ἀπ' [οἰκία] Heitland, but see the Comm.

ascribed to Epimenides, then, as these would be written in hexameters, the text requires a word capable of standing in an hexameter verse and *δομάκτους*, which satisfies this condition, appears to possess a decided advantage. For *δομάκτους* of the inferior MSS. is usually taken to be a compound with *ἀσπη* a *trough*, *crib*; hence *any feeding-place*; and if this etymology be correct nothing but arbitrary lengthening of the first syllable *in anisi* could adapt the word to an hexameter verse. (3) Gotting, again, thinks that Epimenides could not possibly have called the *familia* of the Cietans 'mess-mates,' because the *συνεστρία* were established amongst them. But, even assuming that Epimenides actually wrote the line in question, there was, as Dittenberger remarks, no absolute necessity that he should confine himself in this oracle to the circumstances of Crete, especially as his influence was actively felt far beyond the island.

In favour of *δομάκτους* Dittenberger urges that 'it is like Aristotle to support the results of his own inquiries by a subsequent appeal to the language of common life, to proverbs, passages in the poets, or specially significant sayings and expressions of prose writers. In this place Charondas and Epimenides are evidently quoted for this same purpose, in connexion with the definition of the family as a society existing for the whole of daily life. Consequently it is the satisfaction of daily recurring needs which brings individuals together in a household. The expression of Charondas (and that of Epimenides also, if we read *δομάκτους*) fits in perfectly with this, by making common participation in food, which is the most important daily need, characteristic of the household. But *δομάκτους* = smoke-fellows could only be taken as alluding to the common sacrificial fire, which would not suit the present context, although it is true that from the point of view of the Greek the family was a society for worship.' Yet *δομάκτους* should be understood of sharers in the smoke of the common hearth, just as we might speak of 'hearths' meaning

homes or families*; thus the same idea of a common participation in food would be denoted but in a different form.

All these difficulties Ridgeway (Camb. Philological Soc. *Transactions* Feb. 23, 1882) seeks to avoid by retaining the reading *δομάκτους* (with α), Doric for *δομάκτους* (*κῆπος*) = with a common plot of ground SUSEM. (17)

"The Cietan poet used a Doric form, for the retention of the dialectic form in Aristotle cp. *Θάλας* I. II. 12. *κῆπος* is the common plot of ground that furnishes the common food supply (*συστή*). cp. II. 5. 2 (*γῆπεδον* and *καρπός*). The scale of social development here indicated seems to be (1) original *οἰκία*, (2) *οἶκος* = joint family of Hindus or Slavonic house-community, where the proceeds of the undivided property (*κῆπος*) must be brought into a common chest or purse: vide Sir H. Maine "Early Law 237—255; after that, (3) the *οἶκος* breaks up into separate *οἰκίαι* forming the *κώμη* (= the Russian village community): all are sprung or believe themselves to be sprung from a common ancestor (*δομογένητες*)" (Ridgeway). For the undivided family property comp. E. de Laveleye *La propriété primitive* cc. 13—15 (Engl. tr. pp. 175—214), Hearn *Aryan Household* 176—191, and the criticism by D. McLennan *Patrician and Theory* c. 8; also Caillmer *Droit de succession* p. 34 ff., Jannet *Les institutions sociales et le droit civil à Sparte* (Paris 1880) p. 88.

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κτλ.] Instances of services needed from time to time for which members of a village community unite (as distinct from the daily wants which originate the family) are, to repel a common enemy or to execute a great work of common utility (Rilleborn II. 95, 96). Add the exchange of commodities, which is unnecessary in the household: § 5 with *note*. SUSEM. (18)

16 πρώτη = simplicissima, quae tamquam pars inest aliis (Bonitz).

§ 6 17 ἡ κώμη ἀποικία οἰκίας] i. e. all the rest of the village except the original

* So Grote, "each society having its separate meal-bin and fireplace." Cp. Gaelic *tendloch* and *coediche*, J. F. McLennan p. 123.

- ὁμογάλακτας [παῖδός τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας]. διδὲ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον (1) ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ ἔθνη· ἐκ βασιλευμένων 10 γάρ [συνῆλθον]· πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου,

18 ** παῖδός Schmidt, [παῖδός... παῖδας] Susem. || 20 συνῆλθον wanting in Π¹ (added by p¹ in the margin) || πᾶσα γὰρ πᾶσα δ' Schmidt in a former conjecture, transposing 18 διδὲ.20 συνῆλθον to follow 24 ψᾶον (now withdrawn)

household may be most naturally regarded as a colony or offshoot of the original household. SUSEM. (18b)

18 ὁμογάλακτας] According to Philochorus *Ῥηγ.* 91—92 and *Ῥηγ.* 139 in Παιονικόν and Suidas (i. σν. γεννήται, ὁμογάλακτες, ὄρυγες) the members of each of the 360 ancient Attic γένη who were afterwards called γεννήται = kin, clansmen, were originally called ὁμογάλακτες = foster-brothers, fellow-nurslings (J. G. Schneider *Addenda* II. 471). Pollux VI. 37, VIII. 9 οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ γένους ἐκαλοῦντο γεννήται καὶ ὁμογάλακτες, γένει μὲν οὐ προσήκοντες, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συνόδου οὕτω προσαναγορευόμενοι. SUSEM. (19)

Thus only is the γένος hinted at here. "The identity of the κῆρυξ and the γένος is apparently indicated III. 9 §§ 12, 14 where we have the πόλις defined as (α) ἡ τοῦ ἐβ' ἔθνη κοινονία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, and (β) ἡ γενῶν καὶ κοινῶν κοινονία" (Heitland *Notes* 8). Even then no place in the development is found for φρατρίαι, φύλαί, or Aristotle's 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals' *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9, 5; cp. *Pol.* III. 9, 13 (Oncken). Apparently they are held to be of later origin than the state. Nor is there any explicit reference to συνοικισμός, although, as Stein suggests, Aristotle has doubtless been influenced by the history of Attica.

As to the meaning of ὁμογάλακτες, Aristotle unquestionably understood it to imply common ancestry in our sense, even if παῖδός τε καὶ παίδων παῖδας be rejected as a gloss. And this may well have been the sense in which it was anciently applied to the clansmen (γεννήται). For descent had long been reckoned through males in Athens,—indeed *Dikaiarchos* (*Fr.* 9 Muller) appears to denote by πάτρα what is usually called the γένος: and even where individuals not connected by blood had entered a clan they may have come to believe the contrary. (See Maine *Early Law* p. 272 ff.)

H.

Or the word may have first meant 'those of kin by descent through females only.' On the evidence of Spartan and Athenian customs, and from indications in Homer and the legends, it has been with good reason inferred that this system of kinship once prevailed in Greece, McLennan *op. c.* 225—309; cp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* c. 8 esp. 230—234. "If ὁμογάλακτες = members of a γένος, the name itself demonstrates that this membership in the γένος depended on their having had the same mother's milk" (Ridgeway). If so, may we similarly interpret ὁμοσίπνοι and ὁμοκάπνοι as survivals from a time when eating from the same meal-jar or sharing the same smoke, and not inheritance of the same father's blood, constituted in a savage society the earliest idea of kinship? See *Enc.* I to B. II.

Another meaning proposed is, 'those who offer the same milk', from a comparison of Sanskrit sapinda, samānodaka = those who offer the same cake, the same water. i. e. 'near kin', 'distant kin' respectively (Heinrich *op. c.* 171); but for this there is no evidence.

διδὲ = hence: viz. because the 'city' arose through the village from the family. Thus Plato argues *Λaws* III 680 D ff. ἐν οἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἀρχεὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι... βασιλεῖαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευμέναν.

19 αἱ πόλεις = Hellenic city-states, τὰ ἔθνη = non-Hellenic races or populations. As in IV(VII). 2, 10 ἐν δ' ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν. οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσιν καὶ Θράξιν καὶ Κελτοῖς, Aristotle uses ἔθνη on the grounds assigned in II (11) as equivalent to non-Hellenes, precisely as the word is used in the New Testament for Gentiles (Jews and Christians τὸ πρῶτον) Other reasons assigned III. 14 § 12, 15 § 11 nm. (657—9), VII(V). 10 § 3 (1649). SUSEM. (19 b) Also, as Postgate suggests, VI(IV). 13 § 11. On the advantages of monarchy in a primitive society, see Bagehot *Politics and*

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§ 7 ὥστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν δὲ λέγειν ὅτι
 "Ὀμηρος, θεμιότεν δὲ ἕκαστος

παῖδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾗσκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς
 25 δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ μὲν
 ἔτι καὶ νῦν οὐ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη
 ἑαυτοὺς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 8 ἡ δ' ἐκ πλείονων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλιν ἦδη, πάσης
 ἔχουσα πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινωμένη μὲν
 30 οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εἶ ζῆν. διὸ πάντα πόλιν φύσει

21 αἱ is omitted by M¹ P¹, whether rightly, is very doubtful || 24 σποράδες γὰρ
 καὶ οὕτω <ἀρχαῖονες> Schmidt edits, σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὕτοι [τὸ ἀρχαῖον] and
 26 ὥσπερ γὰρ Schmidt formerly (now withdrawn) || 28 ἡ δὲ M¹ P¹ 2.4.6. C¹ Q¹ M¹
 Q¹ R¹ S¹ T¹ V¹ W¹ Aldine Bk., ἡ δὲ Ὑ¹ L¹ || ἡ δ' 1253 a 1 βέλτιστον transposed
 by Schmidt to follow 18 παῖδας. See his arrangement and alterations *Introd.* p. 96 ||
 29 γινωμένη Schneidei || 30 οὖν is wanting in M¹ P¹, but cp IV (VII). 10 § 1, 1329 b 3

21 ὥστε καὶ αἱ δα. 'Wherefore like-
 wise the colonies' [i.e. the villages] 'be-
 cause of their kinship' so, βασιλεύονται.
 So § 11 ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (Shilleto).

§ 7 22 The quotation from Homer
Odyss. IX 114 f. SUSK. (30) Cited *N. E.*
 x. 9. 13. Plato has it *Laos* 680 n. Cp.
Maine Ancient Law pp. 4—6, 125.

24 τὸ ἀρχαῖον With the adverbial
 use comp. Xen. *Hellen.* v. 2 γ καὶ ὥσπερ
 τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύσει.

24 ff. "A reminiscence of the famous
 saying of Xenophanes given by Clem.
Alex. VII p. 711 B: "Ἕλληνες δὲ ὥσπερ
 ἀνθρωπομόρφους οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρωποταβεῖς
 τοὺς θεοὺς ὑποτίθενται καὶ καθάπερ τὰς
 μορφὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίαι ἑαυτοῖς ἕκαστοι δια-
 ζωγραφοῦσιν" (Ridgeway).

See still stronger statements about the
 popular religion in *Metaph.* XII(A). 8 §§
 19—21, 1074 b 3 ff.

§ 8 28 γ' δ' ἐκ πλείονων κατὰ Cp. II.
 2 §§ with notes and references, also n. on
 III. 2 §§ 3, 4; 9 § 10 (554). SUSK. (30 b)

"The union of several village-com-
 munities forms, when complete, an actual
 city, attaining, so to speak, the limit of
 perfect self-sufficiency: at the outset
 a union for a bare livelihood, it exists to
 promote a higher life." See Grote *History*
 II. 341—344 on city-state (villages: on
 this deduction of the state generally A. C.
 Bradley *Hellenica* 197—199, who observes
 194 n. that "freedom", though not in a
 mere negative sense, best answers to αὐ-
 τάρκεια: a life which leaves no want of

man's nature, external or spiritual, un-
 satisfied. In *N. E.* I. 7. 7 τὸ ἀτάρκεια = δ
 μοναόμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μη-
 δεὸς ἐνδεῖ, the sole condition of a life
 that is desirable and lacks nothing. Cp
N. E. x. 6. 2 οὐδενὸς ἐνδεῖ. ἀλλ' αὐτάρκεια.

29 ff. Compare c. 4 § 1; II. 2 § 8; III.
 1 § 12, 6 §§ 3, 4 ff., 9 §§ 5, 6, 11—14, esp.
 ἡ γένωμ καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ἴσως τέλειος
 καὶ αὐτάρκεια <χάρων>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν, ὡς
 φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶν. τὸν
 καλὸν ἄρα πρᾶξων [χάρων] θετόν ἐστι τὴν
 πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν;
 fut thei III. 12 § 9, 13 § 1, 18 § 1; IV(VII).
 4 §§ 11—14, 5 § 1, 8 § 4, §§ 8, 9, 9 §§ 1, 2;
 VI(IV). 4 §§ 9—11; VII(VI). 8 § 3. These
 passages would prove (even if it were not
 self-evident) that the perfected and beauti-
 fied life, made complete self-sufficing and
 satisfying, is one with the life of happi-
 ness or well-being (εὐδαιμόνεια): cp. n.
 (284) on II. 9 § 5. SUSK. (31)

The implication of εἶ ζῆν and αὐτάρ-
 κεια which disposes of Schmidt's atthesis
 of the clauses where the latter conception
 comes in (*Jahrb.* f. Phil. CXXV. 1882.
 804, cp. *Introd.* 97 n.) may also be studied
 in *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 §§ 6—8. In *De anima*
 II. 8. 10, 420 b 19—22, τὸ εἶ is op-
 posed to ἀναγκαῖον, τοῦ ἀνάγκης
 in *De part. animal.* III. 7. 18, 670 b 23.

30 διὸ κατὰ Two proofs that the 'city'
 is natural (1) It is the outcome and
 realization, the final cause, of the previous
 societies: they are natural, so also is the
 'city'. (2) It alone is fully self-sufficing,

ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνοῦναι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων, (1)
 ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἶον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως
 τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ
 § 9 ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας. ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτι-
 1253 a στον· ἢ δ' ἀντάρκεια [καὶ] τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων οὖν φα-
 νερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἢ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολι-
 τικὸν ἔχον ἐστί, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαυλός

32 ἢ δὲ...ἐστίν Schmidt || 33 εἶναι after ἐκάστου M^o P¹

1253 a 1 καὶ before τέλος omitted by Π² Bk Bernays || καὶ before βέλτιστον omitted by
 Bernays, ἀντάρκεια * Bucheler; but see Comm. || καὶ before βέλτιστον omitted by
 W^b Ald. || ἢ.....βέλτιστον omitted by Q M^o T^o || * ἐκ Schmidt, quoting 1278 b
 19—28 || 2 [ἔτι.....πόλις ἐστί] and ὅτι φύσει πολιτικὸν ἔχον ἀνθρώπος ἐστί Schmidt
 || 3 ἐστί M^o, omitted by P¹ Π² Bk. perhaps rightly || ὁ omitted by Π² Bk. || φαν-
 λότερος? Oncken wrongly || ἦτοι κρείττων ἢ ἀνθ. ἢ φαυλός ἐσται ἀνθ. Schmidt

but to be self-sufficing is end and highest good (and end = fully developed nature).

Against whom, we may ask, is this directed? No doubt there were Sophists who criticized political institutions, of whom Hippias and Thrasymachus may serve as opposite types. But perhaps Antisthenes was the first deliberately to oppose the outcome of civilization and to advocate a return to a ruder and simpler life: Zeller *Socrates and Socrates* p. 322—5. The anti-social theories of Plato's Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Thrasymachus and the speakers in *Republic* B, II, are not directly subversive of the state: like Hobbism, they are conservative in their aim.

32 ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος? *Physics* II. 1. 8 193 a 30 f. φύσις in first sense = ὅλη mere potency, in second sense = ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτως καὶ φύσις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν: II. 2 § 8, 194 a 28 f. ἢ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα· ὡς γὰρ συνεχεῖς τῆς κινήσεως οὕσης ἐστί τι ἐσχάτον, τοῦτο τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα... βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἐσχάτον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον. *De anima* III. 12. 3. 434 a 32 f. (Eaton). "Is it the bud, or the blossom, or the ripe fruit that is natural to a tree? All three: only it is unnatural and contrary to the design of the tree that the bud should wither before coming into bloom and bearing fruit" (Fullbrook). SUSSEX. (22)

§ 9 34 f. ἐν βέλτιστον The whole connexion requires that this should be a second proof (or at least an amplification of the first proof) ὅτι πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστί. And so in fact it is, only it must

be supplemented from what precedes. It runs thus: 'the final cause, that is, the end, of a thing is best. Now self-sufficiency is the end and the best' (thus including under one both the subject and the predicate of the former premises). With this must be mentally supplied from the foregoing, 'the end discloses the true nature of the thing', and 'political society alone' (i.e. no society short of the state) 'affords to its members true self-sufficiency'. Then the conclusion follows that the state is by nature. Similar abbreviations of the steps in an argument are found elsewhere in Aristotle, so concise sometimes as to be almost unintelligible: e.g. *Metaph.* XII (A), I § 2, § 5, 1069 a 24, b 5 (Freudenthal), SUSSEX. (23)

1253 a 1 'From this then it appears that the city is part of the order of nature and man a social being'. *N.E.* IX. 9. 3: no one would choose the possession of every good to be by himself, πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. See also *id.* I. 7. 6. "The dogma τῶν φύσει ἢ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ἔχον, as interpreted by Aristotle, implies (1) that social organization is not a violation of nature, (2) that the πόλις differs from the οἰκία in something more than size, (3) that existing institutions are capable of improvement, (4) that there is a form or type or end towards which they may be improved. It is plain that the exposition of this dogma appropriately holds a prominent place in the introduction to a work which has for its main purpose the development of a scheme of the normal πόλις" (Jackson).

3 ὁ ἀπολις κτλ. "He who is cut

ἐστὶν ἡ κρείττων ἡ ἀνθρωπος (ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὕψ' Ὀμήρου λαιδορηθεὶς (I)

5

ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμωτος ἀνέστωρ

- § 10 ἅμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής), ἅτε περ
 ἄλκις ὢν ὥσπερ ἐν πεττοῖς. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ζῷον ὁ ἀν- 10
 θρωπος πάσης μελίτης καὶ παντὸς ἀγέλαίου ζῷου μᾶλλον,
 9 δῆλον. οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ λόγον
 § 11 δὲ μόνον ἀνθρώπος ἔχει τῶν ζῶων ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ

6 [γάρ] Schmidt || [καὶ] Spengel partly recognising the fault in the ordinary construction: that ὥσπερ...ἐπιθυμητής is parenthetical was first shown by Jackson (*Journal of Philology* VII, 1877, p. 236 ff.); see Comm. || ἅτε περ omitted by L¹, erased in U¹ || ἅτε περ...7 πεττοῖς transposed to follow 29 θεός Schmidt || 7 ἄλκις ὢν omitted by U¹ W¹ L¹; with vacant space left, by P²-Q¹ M¹ Ald. and 1st hand of P² Q¹ S¹ T¹ V¹; ἄλκις ...πεττοῖς omitted by Ar., ὢν by R¹ and P⁴ (1st hand); ἄλκις ὢν was inserted by P² (con. 3), ἄλκις by a later hand in Q¹ S¹ and by a later hand in the margin of T¹, ἀνευ ζῴου τυγχάνων V¹ (a later hand), ἀνευ ζῴων τυγχάνων C⁴ also, ἀνευ ζῴου Bas.² || πεττοῖς M¹, πετεινοῖς Γ and p¹ in the margin, γρ. πετεινοῖς P⁴ (corrector) in the margin, and a later hand in the margin of S¹ || ζῷον ἀφεί ὁ ἀνθρώπος Π¹ Bk.

off from civil society by nature, and not by chance, is either low in the scale of humanity, or above it—(as is also he whom Homer reproachfully described as 'clanless lawless heartless'; for he", not the ἀπολις, but ὁ ὕψ' Ὀμήρου λαιδορηθεὶς, "is at once naturally unsocial and pugnacious)—being in fact solitary, like the blot at backgammon" (Jackson).

§ 10 γ ἀλκις From an epigram of Agathias (*Antkol. Pal.* ix. 482, esp. 20—28) Götting *De loco quodam Aris.* (Jena 1858) showed that ἄλκις nearly resembles the 'blot' of our backgammon—an exposed piece as contrasted with pieces guarded or supported, i.e. standing close together*. Bernays in his translation and Mahaffy (*Academy* Jan. 8, 1876) take ἄλκις to mean a 'rover', i.e. a piece with special powers of aggression; but this is inconsistent with Agathias' epigram. Moreover they mistake the sense of the quotation from *Iliad* ix. 63, 64, where ἐκείνος ὃς πολέμου κρατεῖ ἐπιθυμίου δρυόεντος is the subject of which ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμωτος ἀνέστωρ are predicates. What Homer really says is, as Spengel rightly saw

(*Arist. Studien* III 5), that the lover of domestic strife is clanless lawless heartless; not, that the outlaw or broken man or 'rover' is pugnacious and aggressive. The right sense can be secured by a mere change of punctuation. The parenthetical sentence refers by way of illustration to Homer's πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής ἐπιδημίου who is a φύσει τοιοῦτος, i.e. an ἀπολις φύσει, in whom to the unsocial character is superadded an inclination to war. Aristotle does not say that the ἀπολις is always or commonly aggressive, thus there is no reason for regarding aggression as a characteristic of the ἄλκις (Jackson). SUMM. (24) (25)

διότι here, like ὅτι, "that."

διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν] *De hist. anim.* i.

1. 12: πολιτικά δ' ἐστὶ ζῷα ὧν ἐν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πᾶσι τὸ ἔργον, ὥστε οὐ πάντα ποιεῖ ἀγέλαα. Not all gregarious animals form a community, but those which, like bees, wasps, ants, canes, and lastly man, are engaged upon some common work (Eaton). SUMM. (25 b)

9 For parallel passages consult Zeller *ib.* 422-428, 488-497.

§ 11 On the physiological distinction between φωνή mere voice, articulate speech, and λόγος rational language, see *De hist. anim.* iv. 9. 536 a 20, b 8 ff., *Probl.* x. 39, 895 a 7 ff., *Post.* 20 § 2, 1456 b 22 ff. στοιχεῖον=φωνή διαιρετός, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἧς πέφυκε συνεπὴ

* Whether πόλις was a name for this game or not, the πύμωλλαι πόλις of Plato *Rep.* iv. 422 E (cp. the scholion) makes it likely that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις; if an isolated piece was called ἀπολις, Aristotle's allusion would be specially appropriate. Oncken, ii. 27 f., has misunderstood Agathias' epigram and Götting's divination no less than the present passage (Jackson).

- ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ- (I)
χει ζῳίαις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ
ἔχειν αἰσθῆσιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν
14 ἄλλῃῳις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
§ 12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοῦτο γὰρ 11
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθῆσιν
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.
19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν
§ 13 ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀνα- (φ. 4)
ρουμενόν γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται πούς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμο-

11 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος (ἡδέως P⁶ U^b and 1st hand L^a) II^a Bk. || ἐστὶ σημεῖον... 13 ἡδέος. These words are wanting in Q Q^b R^b (where † stands in the margin) S^b T^b and V^b (1st hand; added by a later hand) || 12 ἐλήλυθεν W^b Ald. Bk. προήλθεν P⁴ 6. M^b U^b L^a || τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθῆσιν ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ P⁴ 2. M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 14 δηλοῦν διελείν? Oncken, wrongly || 18 τούτων τῶν τοιαύτων Schmidt || 19 καὶ πρότερον .29 θεός transposed to follow 1252 b 27 θεῶν Schmidt. See his arrangement *Introd.* p. 97 || δὲ Schneider, δὴ I II Bk.

γίνεσθαι φωνή, καὶ γὰρ τῶν θηρίων εἰς αἰσθητοὺς φωναί. SUSSEM. (26)

15 τὸ δίκαιον governed by δηλοῦν: 'and therefore also (for the purpose of signifying) justice.'

§ 12 16 πρὸς = when compared with. ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ αἰσθῆσιν] moral perception, *N. Eth.* II. 9. 8; IV. 5 13, ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις: not to mention passages in Bk. VI; as I I § 4 τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰσθῆσιν, αὐτῇ δ' ἐστὶ νοός.

18 ἡ δὲ τούτων κ.] An objective genitive with κοινωνία as in III. 9. 12 κ. τόπου, 'fellowship in goodness and justice'. The 'city' is regarded as a moral or spiritual society, church and state in one.

19 καὶ πρότερον δὲ τῇ φύσει.] It is not in order of time γενέσκει (in which sense *N. Eth.* VIII. 12, 7, quoted on § 5 above, asserts the direct contrary), but in order of thought and of real existence φύσει, κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ εἶδει, τῇ οὐσίᾳ, that the state is prior to the family and to the individual. On this distinction see esp. *Metaph.* I. 8 §§ 3—7 989 a 15 ff.: IX (Θ). 8 1050 a 3 ff. ἡ ἐνέργεια πρότερα τῆς δυνάμεως (the realized and actual precedes the possible) κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ χρόνον. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε, πρότερον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα ὡς ἀνὴρ παῖδες τὸ μὲν γὰρ ᾗδῃ ἔχει τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δ' οὐ· *Phys.* VIII. 7. 12, 261 a 14 what is in process of de-

velopment appears imperfect, ὅπως δὲ φαίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ἀτέλῃ καὶ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἴδν, ὥστε τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον εἶναι. See below III. I. 9, normal constitutions are prior to the divergent, imperfect types SUSSEM. (27) Other passages in *Grani Ethics* I. 239.

§ 13 20 ἀναρουμενόν κτλ.] "for if the whole body" except the foot or hand "is destroyed, there will be neither foot nor hand, except in an equivocal sense such as that in which we call the hand of a statue a hand; because a hand in such circumstances" i.e. after the destruction of the rest of the body, "will be spoilt for use," cp. 5 § 5 ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις, "and all things are defined by their function and faculty, so that things which are incapable of exercising their functions and faculties (μηκέτι τοιαῦτα = μηκέτι ἐνεργεῖν καὶ δυνατά)" must not be said to be the things in question, but to be equivocally called by their names" (Jackson). Cp. *Manu* II. 157: 'as an elephant of wood, as an antelope of leather, so is a Brahmin unread in the Vedas. These three bear the name' (Postgate).

If the text is correct, the above explanation, in which Hayduck and Jackson independently agree, must be

* "Such as they were before, when they formed part of the whole and fulfilled their functions" (Cope) See the quotations n (28).

νύμωσ, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην· διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται (I)
 τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὄρισται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε
 24 μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώ-
 § 14 συμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει [καὶ] πρότερον ἢ ἕκα-
 στος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἕκαστος χωρισθεὶς, ὁμοίως
 τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος
 κοινωνεῖν ἢ μὴδὲν δεόμενος δι' αὐτάρκειαν οὐδὲν μέρος
 29 πρόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός.
 § 15 φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὄρμη ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνί-
 αν· ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συστήσας μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος. ὥσπερ γὰρ

22 λέγει Bk.² and Susem.¹ following P² and perhaps Γ || ἀλλὰ φθαρεῖσα Bender, apparently with the following construction: λιθίνην, ἀλλὰ (φθαρεῖσα γὰρ) ἔσται τοιαύτη πάντα: hardly right || <οὐκ> ἔσται Rud. Scholl (*Comm. de legg.* XII. *intd.* Bonn 1865, p. 43) which is not improbable. unless we are to blacket the words διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη. But see Comm. and *Quaest. Cr.* III. 3 ff., IV. 3 ff || 23 <ἢ> τοιαύτη? Jackson || δὲ γὰρ Γ apparently, adopted by Bender—rightly, if we accept his conjecture or reject διαφθ. κτλ || 25 καὶ omitted before φύσει in II² and Paris. 963 || καὶ omitted before πρότερον by P² Ar. || προτέρα Γ P² Q M² T³ U³ V³ L², πρότερα P⁴, προτέρω Q³ R³ S³ || 28 μὴδὲν II² Bk. μὴδενὸς Γ Ar. || οὐδὲν II² Bk. οὐδὲ M² P¹ || 31 πρῶτον P⁴ Q M² Q³ R³ S³ T³ U³ V³ L²

accepted: διαφθαρεῖσα must be, as Hayduck thinks, equivalent to τοῦ ἔργου ἐσθημένη καὶ τῇ δυνάμει: "In such a case the hand and the foot are really deprived of their force. But the essential nature of an object consists in its function; so that where it no longer possesses the appropriate quality it can no longer be said to be the same, but only to bear the same name". But the parallel passages *De gener. anim.* I. 19. 7 726 b 22 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ οὐδ' ἄλλο τῶν μερῶν οὐδὲν ἔχει ψυχῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δυνάμεις ἔστι χεὶρ οὐδὲ μέρος οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώμωμον: II. I. 42, 734 b 24 ff. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι πρῶτον μὴ ἔχει ψυχῆς, οὐδὲ σάρξ, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα ὁμώμωμος λεχθήσεται τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρῶτον μὴ δὲ σάρξ, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγγίγγοι λίθους ἢ ἔλιθια; *De anim.* II. 1. 9 412 b 18 ff. ὅπως ἢ ἀποικοδομοῦντες οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφθαλμός, πλὴν ὁμώμωμος, καθάπερ ὁ λίθους καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος: *Μέτ.* IV. 12, 3, 390 a 20 ff. πάντα δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερμύνη τῷ ἔργῳ· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενα ποιεῖν τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον ἀγαθῶς ἐστὶν ἕκαστα, οἷον ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰ ὁρᾷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενον ὁμώμωμος, οἷον ὁ περὶ οὗτος ἢ ὁ λίθους lead to the conclusion that διαφθαρεῖσα is *sub-ject and τοιαύτη is predicate*. If so, and if τοιαύτη = a true hand, the sense requires the insertion of the negative, although

we should then expect ἀλλὰ πάντα rather than πάντα δὲ: "for a hand thus rendered useless <no longer> has the qualities of a hand, whereas the definition of every object is contained in its function." ὁμώμωμος] Cp. III. I. 7 21. (428 b). SUSEM (28)

§ 14 26 χωρισθεὶς cut off from society, living in isolation, μωνὴν γὰρ χαλεπὸς ὁ βίος. Comp the discussion in *N. Eth.* IX. c. 9 showing that friends are indispensable to Wellbeing: δεήσει τῷ εὐδαίμονι πολλοὺς φίλους σπουδαίον· ἡ ταύτη ἐνδεής ἔσται, i.e. not αὐτάρκης.

ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔξει κτλ] 'will be related to the state as any other part to the whole of which it is a part': i.e., § 13, will be relative and subordinate to it, will be *δωτερον* not *πρότερον*.

29 ἢ θηρίον ἢ θεός] So § 9 ἦτοι φαῦλος ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἀνθρωπος. *N. Eth.* V. 9. 17 with Jackson's note, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή (τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν) οἷον ὥστε τοῖς θεοῖς, τοῖς δ' οὐδὲν μέρος ἀφελί-μον, τοῖς ἀνάντις κακοῖς, so that the sphere of particulars justice is restricted to human society: *ib.* VII. I. 2 ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρίου ἔστιν κακία οὐδ' ἀρετή, οὕτως οὐδὲ θεῶ.

§ 15 31 ὁ δὲ πρῶτος κτλ] Cp. *Introd.* 24, and notes on II. 9 § 8 (288), § 12 (296), § 14 (300). SUSEM. (28 b)

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτλ] "Both the grammar and the sense of *τελευθὲν* and *χωρισθὲν*

καὶ τελεωθέν βέλτιστον τῶν ζῴων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ (1)
 § 16 χωρισθὲν νόμον καὶ δίκης χεীরιστον πάντων. χαλεπωτάτη γὰρ
 ἀδικία ἔχουσα ὕπλα· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονή-
 35 σει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τὰναντία ἔστι χρῆσθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀν-
 οσιώτατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἀνευ ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια
 καὶ ἐδωδὴν χεীরιστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη
 πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν [ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις].
 3 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν ἐξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνέστηκεν, II

1253 b

32 [τελεωθέν] and 33 [χωρισθὲν νόμον καὶ δίκην] Jackson || τελεωθεὶς and 33 χω-
 ρισθεὶς Spengel || ὁ wanting in II³ Bk., but inserted in the margin of P⁴ || 35
 ἀρετῇ? due to 36 ἀρετῆς, having displaced a word like τέχνη Freudenthal (cp
 Met. I. 1. 6 p. 980 b 27 f.) or καρτερία Susem.; not ἔρωτι Lindau, ἀρετῇ Hampke,
 ποτ' ὀργῇ Schmidt; hardly κρδεί Schnitzer. [φρονήσεις καὶ ἀρετῇ] Conling Madvig,
 [καὶ ἀρετῇ] Schneider, <ἐπὶ> φρονήσεις καὶ ἀρετῇ Welldon, * * φρονήσεις Thuiot,
 φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετῇ Reiske (this makes bad worse, Montecatino protested against it),
 χρήσεις κατ' ἀρετῇ Oncken. See Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* II. 5 f., IV. 5 f. || 38 [ἡ
 κρίσις] Hampke, [δίκη] Spengel || δίκη] δικαιοσύνη Reiske Thurot

νόμον καὶ δίκην appear strange, and 26
 χωρισθεὶς is used in a different connexion"
 (Jackson). Spengel (and lately Rulgemay)
 would make the participles masculine.
 But the concord is not too harsh; 'at
 foisasse, at saepius, liberioe construc-
 tione utitur Aristoteles' (Susem.). For
 the thought, Plato *Λοιπὸν* 765 E, πάντος γὰρ
 δὴ φύσις ἡ πρώτη βλάστη καλῶς ὁρμηθεῖσα
 πρὸς ἀρετῇ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως κυριωτάτη
 τέλος ἐπιτείνει τὸ πρόσφορον καὶ ἀνθρώ-
 πων. ἄνθρωπος δὲ, ὡς φάμεν, ἡμερον . μὴ
 ἰκανῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλῶς τραφεὶ ἀγριώτατον
 ὁπότε φύει γῆ.

§ 16 34 ὁ δὲ κατὰ 'Man is born with
 weapons to be used by (i.e. to subserve)
 wisdom and virtue; weapons which are,
 however, especially liable to abuse' (Mon-
 tecatino): φρονήσεις the dative of reference
 (Jackson). Most editors make it causal
 or instrumental. "But (1) what can
 'weapons for practical wisdom and virtue'
 mean? Hardly weapons for the exercise,
 but rather such as serve for the *attain-
 ment*, of these qualities. Yet ἀδικία
 ἔχουσα ὅπλα shows that the former use
 meant. (2) It is essential to the thought
 that we should learn whence man, of all
 creatures, gets these dangerous double-
 edged weapons, so eminently adapted for
 purposes mutually opposed (τὰναντία), for
 good and for evil. Whereas that they
 are for good needs not be stated. Ari-
 stotle's teleological standpoint implies it."
 SUSEM. Cp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 13 (Spengel).

37 ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν κατὰ]

III. 10 2 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλει φθαριόν.
 SUSEM. (28 0)

Jackson keeping the last clause ἡ δὲ
 δίκη κατὰ (which he holds to be a paren-
 thetical explanation of δίκη in ἡ γὰρ δίκη
 κατὰ, rightly placed last in a Greek sen-
 tence) would translate: "now justice be-
 longs to a state", i.e. can be found only
 in a πόλις, "δίκη or the administration of
 law—which is the determination of what
 is just—being a regulation of the political
 community." Cp. *Nic. Eth.* V. 6. 4 ἡ
 γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδικίου
 cf. with Jackson's notes.

c. 3 *Economics has three parts treating
 of the relationships which make up the
 household, (1) δεσποτική (2) γαμική
 (3) πατρική: §§ 1, 2. The relation of (4)
 χρηματιστική to economic is obscure:*
 § 3 *Upon δεσποτική, which we take
 first, there are widely divergent views § 4.*

Roughly speaking the rest of the book
 treats of (1) δεσποτική in cc. 4—7, (4)
 χρηματιστική in cc. 8—11, (2) and (3) in
 cc. 12, 13.

c. 4 *The household needs implements
 which may be animate or inanimate—
 such an implement is called a chattel
 (κτῆμα), and is πρακτικόν, for use
 not for production: §§ 1—4. The thrall
 (κτῆμα ἐμψυχόν) defined §§ 5, 6.*

c. 5 *But are there any persons answer-
 ing to this definition, φύσει δοῦλοι? § 1
 As it is advantageous to both and to each,
 and therefore just and natural that body
 should be subject to soul, opposite to reason,*

ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγ- (II)
 κεῖται πόλις ἐξ οἰκῶν. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν πάλιν ἡ οἰκία
 συνέστηκεν· οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
 5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἕκαστον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ
 καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλος καὶ πόσις
 καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατήρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν τούτων σκε-
 2 πτέον ἂν εἴη τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δεῖ εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ
 δεσποτική καὶ γαμική (ἀνάνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὶς καὶ ἀν-
 10 δρὸς σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον πατρική (καὶ γὰρ αὕτη οὐκ
 ἀνόμασται ἰδίῳ ὀνόματι). ἔστωσαν δὲ αὗται τρεῖς ὡς εἴπο-
 3 μεν. ἔστι δὲ τι [μέρος] ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία,

1253 b 2 ἀνάγκη P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald., while Q^b R^b (which has however † in the margin) S^b T^b and V^b (1st hand) omit ἀναγκαῖον. 4 συνέστηκεν (a later hand has inserted the words in the margin of V^b) || περὶ οἰκονομίας (οἰκίας Bk. 2 following the mss. used by Accoromboni and Sepulveda) εἰπεῖν πρότερον P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk. in place of πρῶτον.....εἰπεῖν || σύγκειται after 3 οἰκῶν P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 3 οἰκονομίας οἰκίας Γ P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b L^a Bk. Beinays || πάλιν ἡ οἰκία Γ apparently, πάλιν οἰκία P^{4.6}. C⁴ and a later hand in V^b, ἡ οἰκία πάλιν M^a P¹, αὐτὴς οἰκία P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 4 συνέστηκεν] συνίσταται P^{4.6}. Q M^b U^b W^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 5 πρῶτον] <κα> πρῶτος Benda || 7 τούτων σκεπτόμεν αἰεία 8 ἂν Π^a Bk. || 9 αἰ is wanting before γαμική in M^a M^b || 10 πατρική Αι. apparently (cp. c. 12 § 1), τεκνοποικητή Bk. following Γ and the mss. (W^b Ald. omit ἀνάνυμον.....τεκνοποικητή), τεκνοποικητή Dindorf (Steph. Thes.): πατρική was abbreviated πρική; this became ποιική or ποιητική, and was then wrongly emended || 11 δὴ Susem.², δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. || 12 δ' ἐτι or δὲ τι <ἐτι> Susem., δὲ <δ'> τι: i. e. δὲ <τέταρτον> τι (after first suggesting δ' ἐτι <τέταρτον> τι) Schmidt, probably right || [μέρος] Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II i 693 n. 4, ed. 3)

§§ 5, 6, boasts to man, female to male, § 7, so it is better (i. e. § 11 advantageous and just) that a man whose function is bodily service, who is a mere adjunct of another, should be subject to his superior in excellence of soul, §§ 8, 9. Nature designs to mark this distinction upon the bodies of the two, but does not always succeed. §§ 10, 11.

On the question of slavery cc. 3—7, consult *Introd.* pp. 24—26, the excellent dissertation of L. Schüller *Die Lehre der A. i. v. der Sklaverei* (Erlangen 1847. 4), Hildenbrand *op. c.* 395—406, Oncken II. 29—74, Becker and Heilmann *Charities* III. 1—12, Eng. tr. 356—373. SUSEM.

c. 3 § 1 1253 b 3 οἰκονομίας δὲ κατ' In his lax manner Aristotle means "the parts of Economic" or household-management "correspond to those of which the household consists". This at least gives better sense than to read οἰκίας: see 12 § 1,

The οἰκίας μέρη, as enumerated just afterwards, are the three 'pairs' of relationships συνζεύξεις (oi, 2 § 5, κοινωνίαι).

4 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλ. κατ' by the method noticed I § 3 n., 8 § 1 n., III. I. 2 n. (434) SUSEM. (29)

5 πρῶτα.] The ἀνόνθη of I § 3.

§ 2 9 γαμική = 'conjugal', πατρική = 'paternal' relationship: senses obviously more precise than the ordinary use of the terms warranted. Thus ἡ γαμική διὰ τὴν τὴν marriage union, IV (VII). 16 § 1 = simply cohabitation. Schneider thinks ἀνδρική, Gottling ποικητική (sic) would better express the former relation from the side of the stronger analogously to δεσποτική, or Latin *maritalis*. Strictly πατρική = hereditary, as e. g. in III. 14 6: but in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8, VII. 10. 4 it is used, as here, for 'paternal'.

τοὺς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἔχει, θεωρητέον. (II)
λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς. (p. 5)

- 15 πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπωμεν, ἵνα τὰ τε
πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν ἴδωμεν, καὶ εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι
περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβάνο-
8 4 μένων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, 8
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βα-
10 σιλικὴ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ
δεσπότην. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλευθέρων,
φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βλαῖον γάρ.
4 ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ [καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ]

15 [δὲ] Schmidt, who transposes πρῶτον [δὲ].....1256 a 1 τρώων (cc. 3 § 3—7 § 5) to follow 1259 a 39 γαμική (c. 12 § 1): see *Introd.* p. 97 || 17 δυνάμεθα M^s P¹ C⁴, δυναίμεθα Γ (?) Susem.¹⁻⁴; poterimus William || 23 ἐπὶ οὖν εἴπομεν οὖν <δτι> Schmidt || [καί... 24 οἰκονομία] Susem. On 23—33 cp. Susem. *Qu. Cr.* II. 7 ff.

§ 3 13 τοὺς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος] 8 § 1, 9 §§ 12—18, 11 § 13. SUSEM. (29 b)

15 ἵνα κτλ.] 'first in order to observe what has a direct bearing upon practical use, and secondly for our theory, to ascertain any facts which may enable us to improve upon the views at present held'

§ 4 20 καθάπερ εἴπομεν κτλ.] 1 § 2 f. cp. 7 § 1 m. SUSEM. (80)

τοὺς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν] Comp. below 6 § 1 foll. with m. The only representative of this view of whom we have certain knowledge was the rhetorician Alkidamas of Elaia, a disciple of Gorgias (see III. 2, 2 n), who gave expression to it in his 'Messenian' speech delivered on behalf of Messene after its restoration by Epaminondas, in order to overcome the obstinate refusal of the Spartans to recognize the new state: ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεοὺς, οὐδένα δούλον ἢ φύσει πεποίηκεν, Aristot. *Rhet.* I. 13. 3, with scholiast. Compare Spengel (II. 179) [and Cope] on that passage; and esp. Vahlen *Der Rhetor Alkidamas* (Vienna 1864. 8). 14 ff. Possibly (see 7 § 3 n) Aristotle was acquainted with the lines of the comic poet Philémon (*Fragmenta*, inc. xxiv Meineke, cp. Meineke's ed. p. 410) καὶ δούλος ἐστὶ, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δούλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ· ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεβουλώσατο. SUSEM. (31)

Zeller *Socrates* p. 322 n. 3 is inclined to attribute this view to the Cynics.

21 νόμῳ...φύσει.] On this famous antithesis of the 'conventional' and the 'natural' see *Soph. Elench.* 12 § 6 173 a 7 ff.,

Grant *Ethics* I. 149—151, and esp. Sidgwick *Journal of Philosophy* V. 73—77.

22 διόπερ κτλ.] Wherefore slavery (τὸ δεσπότην) is unjust also, as resting on mere force (Wysel).

c. 4 § 1 23 ἡ κτητικὴ=the theory of the acquisition of property. Götting and Bernays in a more general sense, 'the theory of property'; and certainly with this rendering the words in brackets would fit better into the context. But in what follows κτητικὴ everywhere denotes the same thing as χρηματιστικὴ in the wider sense, the 'science' or 'art' of acquiring wealth, first introduced 3 § 3, see 8 § 1 n. Property, as being indispensable for living, belongs to the household; hence by analogy it follows that every chattel is an instrument for the household's use, and that the slave is an animate instrument of this kind. But from the fact that the theory of acquisition or even the theory of property is a part of the science of household management, no such conclusion follows, even when taken in connexion with the first premiss, which is sufficient of itself to prove it in the manner indicated above. Besides, the words bracketed anticipate the decision which at 3 § 3 is distinctly postponed to c. 8, and the way in which the question is raised 8 § 1 presupposes that no such decision by anticipation has yet been given. The statement made here does not agree with the results of cc. 8—11; for not the whole theory of property and its acquisition,

μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας] (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον (II)
 25 καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν· ὥσπερ δὴ ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις
 ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει
 § 2 ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν
 δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἀψυχα τὰ δὲ ἐμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερ-
 νήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶαξ ἀψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ
 30 ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ <τῷ
 οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτήμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτήσις

25 καὶ εὖ ζῆν wanting in ΓΜ^a and Π¹ (first hand, added in the margin) || δὴ
 Susem., δὲ Π¹ P²⁻³ C⁴ M⁶, δὲ ἐν Q² R³ S³ T³ V³ Bk.; wanting in P⁴⁻⁶ U³ W³ L⁴ Ald.
 Hence [δὲ] Susem.¹⁻² || 26 πολλοὶ Κοῖνας and perhaps Γ || 27 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ
 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν P²⁻³⁻⁶ Q M⁶ Q² R³ S³ T³ U³ W³ L⁴ Ald. Bk., with a later hand in C⁴
 and the 1st hand in V³ (the dative in V³ by a later hand); [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ]
 and 30 οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> Rasso Susem. Thuiot once proposed to omit
 30 οὕτω καὶ and transpose 27 οὕτω καὶ.....30 ἐστίν to follow 31 ἐστὶ || 31 [ἡ...
 ...32 ἐστὶ, καὶ] Schmidt

but only as much of it as relates to the
 'natural' part concerns *οἰκονομική*, and
 that only indirectly. My defence of the
 words, *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 510, is exposed
 to objections not then foreseen: it would
 seem that this is an un-Aristotelian in-
 terpolation. SUSEM. (32)

24 ἀνευ γὰρ κτλ] Cp 2 § 8 n. (21).
 Mele life, bare existence, ζῆν, is of course
 the immediate end of the household and
 of household management; good life or
 well-being, εὖ ζῆν, is the end which the
 state has in view but indirectly the state
 and its end is the end of the household
 2 §§ 2—9. Consequently we find that side
 of *οἰκονομία*, which is directed towards
 securing the fitness of those belonging to
 the household, and so towards the per-
 fecting of life, ranked above the use
 and preservation of property, or the side
 which is directed to mere living, 13 § 1 n.
 SUSEM. (33)

25 ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις = the arts
 which form distinct professions: 'as the
 craftsmen of a particular trade-guild must
 be provided with suitable tools &c.' Ber-
 nays. In any case the phrase means 'the
 arts' properly so called; immediately be-
 low they are termed productive or creative
 (ποίησις, ποιητικὰ ὄργανα § 4 with n) as
 contrasted with the merely practical ac-
 tivities to which Economic and the art of
 life belong. According to Aristotle these
 productive arts are to be subdivided into
 (1) the useful, and (2) the imitative or
 'fine arts'.

In the sphere of practice
 the end lies in the activities them-
 selves, ἐνέργειαι: in the sphere of the

arts, in certain definite special products,
 ἔργα, distinct from the activities which
 produce them. *Nic. Eth.* i. 1. 2, 1094 a
 3 f., διαφορά δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελευτῶν
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ'
 αὐτὰς ἔργα τελέα. I. 1. 5 1094 a 16 διαφέρει
 δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τελέα
 τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθά-
 περ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσιν ἐπιστημῶν. II. 4. 3
 1105 a 26, VI. 2. 5 1139 b 2, II. 5. 3
 1140 b 3, 6. In conformity with this dis-
 tinction Schlosser prefers to explain
 ὀρισμέναις τ. as arts restricted to de-
 finite distinctive ends. But can this be
 expressed by the one word ὀρισμέναις?
 Fulleborn waves between this explana-
 tion and his own, which makes ὀρ. τέχ =
 definite special arts (the one all-em-
 bracing art of life. But conduct or the
 art of life—even if we include in it the
 perfecting of life—embraces at the most
 only the practical activities; and from
 what has been said it follows that the
 technical or productive activities, ποιήσεις,
 would be excluded from it. Cp. also IV
 (VII). 3. 3 n. SUSEM. (34)

§ 2 30 ἐν ὀργάνου εἶδει is classed
 with, ranked under the head of, im-
 plements: cp. τὰς ἐν ὕλῃ εἶδει ἀρχὰς
Meta. I. 3. 3 983 b 7, the material soil of
 causes; ἐν μορίου εἶδει *De Caelo* I. 1. 7
 269 a 5. The same idiom frequently
 where εἶδος and the genitive are almost a
 paraphrase for the thing in question: νό-
 μων ἔχει πολλὸν εἶδος ἡ πολιτεία *Pol.* III.
 15. 2, cp. VI (IV). 6. 9 ἀλυσσάριος εἶδος.

31 τὸ κτήμα ὄργανον κτλ] "the
 chattel is an instrument to aid him in

πλήθος ὀργάνων ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτήμα τι ἐμφυλον. καὶ (II)
 § 3 ὥσπερ ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς [ὁ] ὑπηρέτης. εἰ γὰρ ἡδύ-
 νατο ἕκαστον τῶν ὀργάνων καλευσθῆναι ἢ προαισθανόμενον ἄπο-
 35 τελεῖν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαίδαλου φασὶν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ
 'Ηφαίστου τρίποδας, οὓς φησιν ὁ ποιητῆς αὐτομάτους θεῖον
 [ὑπο]δύεσθαι ἀγῶνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκέρκιζον αὐτάι καὶ τὰ
 πλήκτρα ἐκισθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
 § 4 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπότηταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα
 1254 a ὀργανα ποιητικὰ ὀργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικόν· ἄπο

32 [καὶ] before ὁ δοῦλος so that the apodosis begins here Thucot || 33 ὁ wanting in M^a, erased in P⁴ || 34 προαισθόμενον Koras || 35 αὐτοῦ II || 37 δύεσθαι P¹ II² Bk. || οὕτως <el> Susem.² following William's translation *sic sit, οὕτως καὶ* Schmidt || αὐταὶ only I' and a later hand in C⁴: the rest have αὐται.

1254 a 1 [τὰ μὲν... ὁ μόνον] Schmidt

living." But it is not true conversely that every instrument of use for living is a piece of property or chattel. The analogy of the distinctive crafts is against this; for the helmsman's assistant is not his property, and the difference between the ends for which instruments are used in the two cases does not supply any reason for this distinction. See further I. 2 § 5 n., 6 § 10 n. SUSEM. (88)

33 ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων] an implement superior to other implements, see 7 § 3 and *De part. animal.* IV. 10 21 687 a 21 ἔστι γὰρ (sc. ἡ χεῖρ) ὥσπερ ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this relation δούλος = ἐμφύλον ὀργανον, ὀργανον = ἐμφύλος δούλος Eaton cites *N. Etic.* VII. 11. 6

§ 35 Δαίδαλου] Not a real historical personage, but only the legendary personification of the first prominent advance in Greek architecture and more especially in sculpture. Before him the human figure had been represented with the feet together, the arms joined to the body and the eyes shut. He first made the eyes look as if open, detached the arms from the sides, and showed the feet stepping apart (scholiast on Plato *Meno* 97 D, Suidas s. v. Δαίδαλου τοῦμυα). When contrasted with the archaic style his figures came to be praised for their illusive lifelikeness, and this, or rather his choice of attitudes of motion and action for his figures, is all that is meant by the story to which Aristotle here alludes, viz. that his figures moved as if alive and had to be chained to prevent their running away (Plato *l. c.*). See Bruns *History of the Greek Artists* I. 14—23. SUSEM. (88)

36 ὁ ποιητῆς] Homer *Iliad* XVIII. 376 ὅφρα ὁ αὐτομάτοι θεῖον δουρὶ ἀγῶνα. SUSEM. (86 b) There is a similar ingenious fancy in Lytton's *Coming Race*.

§ 4 1254 a 2 ποιητικὰ = for production (of fresh utilities embodied in material objects), πρακτικόν = for action = merely for use, i.e. as we see from 8 § 2 the consumption or utilization of commodities. In Political Economy consumption is either *productive* or *unproductive*, and the definition of wealth will vary according as we consider it from the producers' or the consumers' point of view: Mill I. c. 3, Sidgwick *Principles* I. c. 3 § 7.

On the distinction here made between *ποίησις* and *πράξις* cp. *mn.* (34, 40) and Zeller *op. c.* II. 11 164, 177 ff., 580, 586, 652 ff. Consult also the special treatises Ed. Muller *History of the Theory of Art in Greece* II. 28 ff., 374 ff., Teichmüller *Forschungen (Aristotelischen Researches)* II. 12—62, Reinkens *Aristotle on Art* I—12, 169—179, Susemihl in the *Fakob. f. Philol.* CV 1879, 319 f., Rich. Schultz *De poetices Aristotelis principis* (Berlin 1874, 8), Walter *Theory of Practical Reason in Gk. Philosophy* (Jena 1874, 8) p. 80 ff., 245 f., 276 ff., 296 ff., 504 ff.

Oncken very justly remarks, *op. c.* II. 39 f., that even from Aristotle's own point of view we must be surprised at a conception of slave-labour so one-sided that even its capacity for production (i.e. of fresh objects of utility) is denied. "Thus could not be maintained in view of the fact that in the art and industry of Hellas the whole of the unskilled labour engaged upon the

μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἑτερόν τι γίνεταί παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν (II) αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἢ χρῆσις μό-
 5 νον. ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πράξις, ἡ
 καὶ δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν
 8 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πράξις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστίν·
 διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν.

τὸ δὲ κτῆμα λέγεται ὡς περ καὶ τὸ μόνιον. τό τε γὰρ μόν-
 10 ριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόνιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὁ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δοῦλου
 δεσπότης μόνον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον
 δεσπότης τοῦ δοῦλου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως ἐκείνου.

τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δοῦλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων ἡ
 15 διήλυν (ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἀλλ' ἄλλου ἀνθρώπος ὢν, οὗτος
 φύσει δοῦλος ἐστίν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστίν ἀνθρώπος, ὅς ἐν κτῆμα ἦ [δοῦ-

5 δ' wanting in M^a and perhaps also in Γ, hence [δ'] Susem.¹ || 6 καὶ δέονται Π¹ P²⁻⁴. C¹ V¹ Ar. Ald., δέονται δ' Γ⁴⁻⁶ Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^a Bk. || 10 ἀπλῶς Γ¹ and P² (but ἐρήνεα [sic] ἐστὶ τοῦ θλως mg.² P², i.e. a marginal note in dark yellow ink), ἀπλῶς θλως M^a P¹, θλως all other sources Bk. Susem.¹⁻⁴. || The clause 15 ὁ δ' ἐστίν is noticed by Alexander of Aphrodisias on the *Metaphys.* p. 15, 6 ed. Bonitz || 15 ὢν Π¹ Paris. 963 Alex. (apparently) and P⁴ (corrector in margin), δὲ P²⁻⁶. Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b W^b L^a Ar. Ald. Bk. and the 1st hand in Γ⁴ C²: no doubt also in P² (an erasure here), γρ. δὲ P¹ in margin, ἐστίν a later hand in C⁴: || 16 ἄλλ' οὐδ' P²⁻⁶. W^b L^a Ald., ἀλλ' οὐδὲν M^a || ἡ Γ¹ M^a || δοῦλος ἐστίν οἱ δοῦλος ἡ Γ¹ apparently, δοῦλος ὢν M^a C⁴ and P²⁻⁴⁻⁶. Q M^b (1st hand), ἀνθρώπος ὢν δοῦλος ὢν P⁴, ἀνθρω-

production of fresh utilities was performed exclusively by slaves, and thus the slave in the great workshops and manufactories was not merely an aid to the use or enjoyment of the goods of life but indirectly a producer of new commodities, at least in the sense in which this is true of the weaver's shuttle.¹¹ SUSEM. (37)

§ 5 ο κτῆμα ..μόριον] Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* v. 6, 8, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ὅς ἐν ἡ πηλικὸν καὶ χρωσθῆ, ὡς περ μέρος αὐτοῦ; a chattel and a child, until he reaches a certain age and becomes independent, are as it were parts of oneself.

10 ἀπλῶς ἄλλου] "belongs absolutely to another". To express relation to and dependence upon something else we find (1) the genitive with εἶναι, as here and *Pl. Rep.* iv. 433 β τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι του, or (2) εἶναι with the genitive, as in *Metaph.* i. 2. 19 quoted in n. on 14, or (3) πρὸς with the accusative, as in the technical term for the category πρὸς τι, and *Rhet.* i. 9. 27 ἐλευθέρον τὸ μὴ πρὸς

ἄλλου [ἦν.

12 ὁ δὲ ..θλως ἐκείνου] *Eth.* *End.* vii. 9. 2 1241 b 19 οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐστίν (i.e. δεσπότης καὶ δοῦλος), ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός. τοῦ δεσπότης ὁ δοῦλος ὡς περ μόνιον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαιρετόν, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ὡς περ δοῦλος ἀψύχον.

§ 8 14 δύναμις] essential quality, attribute: a sense the word acquires because 'the real nature of a thing is denoted by that which it τέφκε τοιόν καὶ πάσχειν'. Bonitz *Ind.* A¹. s. v. Cp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 2. 6 ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἑτερον ἔχοντι τὴν δύναμιν, *Pol.* iv (vii). 1. 12 τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ μορφήν, also iv (vii). 4. 10; *Plato Parm.* 134 D τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἢ ἔχει, *Rep.* ix. 588 b τὸ τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἢν ἐκτέρον ἔχει δύναμιν.

15 ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ κτλ.] Conversely in *Metaph.* i. 2. 19 98a b 25 we have a definition of the free man ἀνθρώπος, φανέν, ἐλευθέρος ὁ αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄλλου (L. Schiller). SUSEM. (38)

5 λος ἐστίν], κτήμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν· πότερον (II)
 8 ὅ ἐστι τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δικάϊον τινι
 δουλεύειν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ
 10 ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρήσαι καὶ
 12 ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
 οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ.
 καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι
 τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχειν. καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ
 15 ἀρχομένων ἐστίν (καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων ἢ ἀρχῇ) τῇ τῶν βελτιόνων
 18 ἀρχομένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον
 ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιόνων βέλτιον ἔργον· ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖ
 τὸ δ' ἀρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον· ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλειόνων

πος ὦν p¹ P² Q¹ R¹ S¹ T¹ U¹ V¹ W¹ L¹ A¹. Ald. Bk. and, with γρ. before these words, c¹ 11.¹ in the margin of P², a correction in red ink on the margin of Q, and M¹ (corr. in margin); [ἀνθρώπου ὦν] Koraes. Dittographia, whichever of the two—δοῦλος ἐστίν or ἀνθρώπου ὦν—gave rise to all the other readings || 23 καὶ εὐθὺς ... 24 ἀρχεῖν Susem.¹ transposed to immediately precede 28 ὅσα, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1375 f. who has now been followed in punctuation. Cp. Comm. || 24 [καὶ εἶδη ... 28 ἔργον] Schmidt who thinks the proper context is before φανερόν 1259 b 18, and if so conjectures ἐπεὶ δὲ εἶδη || 25 [ἢ] ἀρχῇ Koraes || 26 ἀνθρώπων ἢ θηρίων Schmidt || 27 ἐπὶ Bk.² instead of ἀπὸ

17 χωριστόν] Hereby opposed to μέριον which when separated can do no work, as we saw, 2 § 13 (Shilleto).

Thus the definition of ὁ φύσει δοῦλος is ὄργανον ἐμφύον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν, δλος ἄλλου ὄν, and this exactly corresponds to the limited meaning of κτήμα 'chattel', 'thrall', as for instance in *N. E.* v. 6. 8 quoted above.

c. 5. To whom then does this definition apply? Are there any φύσει δοῦλοι, for whom a slave's estate is greater good and just?

§ 1 20 τῷ λόγῳ ... ἐκ τῶν γνωμένων] Aristotle emphasized the distinction between the abstract and concrete treatment of a subject. The former is λογικῶς or διαλεκτικῶς ἡγεῖν as opposed (a) to διαλεκτικῶς οἱ ἐκ τῶν καμένων, (b) to φυσικῶς ἡγεῖν or ἐπισκοπεῖν; Waitz *Organon* II. 354, Zeller *Phil.* II ii 171 n. 2. Eaton rightly compares IV (VII). 1. 6.

§ 2 22 τῶν συμφερόντων] Under the limitation laid down III. 6. 6, see n. (7).

24 εἶδη πολλά] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5; Plato *Leis.* III. 690 A The variety implies a gradation.

25 καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων κατὰ] This passage is referred to IV (VII). 3. 2, see the note cp. IV (VII). 14 19 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς

ἀρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχῇ καλλίων καὶ μάλλον μετ' ἀρετῆς. SUSEM. (88 b) .

Cp. also VIII (V). 11. 34.

§ 3 26 τὸ γὰρ ἀποτ. κατὰ] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* II. 6. 4 πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ τε εἶ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν (Eaton).

28 τούτων ἔργον] The function proper to them, the work which they exclusively perform in their relation of government and governed, lies in the mere exercise of command and tender of obedience. See Plato *Rep.* I. 353 A: τοῦτο ἐκάστου ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μόνον τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται.

ὅσα γὰρ] This argument only applies to the general proposition καὶ εἶδη πολλά καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστὶ, not to the particular explanation attached to it καὶ αἰεὶ βελτίων... ἔργον. SUSEM. (89)

The sentence is parenthetical as in I. 1. 3, where see note. "For whenever several parts, whether continuous or discrete, combine to form a single composite whole, in all such cases may be discerned a principal or ruling part and one subordinate which is ruled. This follows from the whole order of nature (ἐκ καὶ αἰεὶ καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, 2 § 2) and is seen to hold good of living things."

συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται ἐν τι κοινόν, εἴτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἴτε ἐκ (1
 30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἅπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχό-
 34 μενον, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς
 ἐμφύχοις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἔστι τις
 ἀρχή, ὅλον ἁρμονίας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐξωτερικωτέ-
 35 ρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως· τὸ δὲ ζῶον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς 11
 καὶ σώματος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχό-
 36 μενον — δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μάλλον
 τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-
 τιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀν-
 θρωπον θεωρεῖτον, ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο δῆλον· τῶν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν ἡ

31 [καὶ τοῦτ'.. 32 ἐμφύχοις] Schmidt || 33 <ἐν> ἁρμονία? Sussem || 35 ἀρχό-
 μενον—(to make a break in the construction) Bonitz § 39 μοχθηρῶν ἡ μοχθηρῶς] *pas-*
tilentium et prave William; apparently Γ had φαίλως which Buchelei approves,

§ 4 31 ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως] The
 conclusion is based upon the whole order
 of nature: it is a universal natural law,
 not a special law applying to living orga-
 nisms (Benays). SUSSEM. (38 o) It
 is not probable that ἐκ with genitive= a
 partitive genitive (Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 235 b
 11), for the only support for such a use is
 the spurious treatise *Περὶ φύτων*, 836 a
 39, τὸ φύτον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν στερεομένων
 ψυχῆς, and 828 b 27. It would be an
 improvement, but hardly correct, to
 render 'taking the whole of nature this
 is preeminently true of living things'.

32 τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι κατὰ] αἰεὶ τὸ
 χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιωτέου ὅστιν ἔνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο
 φανερόν ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην
 καὶ τοῖς αἰσθ. φύσιν IV (VII). 14. 10.

33 ἀρχή, ὅλον ἁρμονίας] "Even in
 things without life there is a species of
 dominance, in music for instance": each
 musical 'mode' being ruled by its key-
 note, ἡ μέση (originally the note
 struck by the middle string of the hepta-
 chord"). Compare *Probl.* XIX. § 33 920 a
 21 ἡ γὰρ μέση καὶ ἡγεμών: § 36
 920 b 9 τὸ ἡγεμόσθαι ἐστὶν ἀπάσης sc. ταῖς
 χορδαῖς, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς τὴν μέσην.
 § 44 922 a 23 ἐπειδὴ τῶν μεταξὺ τῶν
 ἁπλῶν τὸ μέσον μόνον ἀρχή τις ἐστὶν
 .. 27 φάσκειν ὧν ἡ μέση καλουμένη μόνη
 ἀρχή ἐστὶν ὑστέρον τετραχόρδου. On the
 technical sense of ἁρμονία= *ethos* *dia-*
pasῶν see Exc. III. on Bk. V (VIII).
 Another political simile from the 'modes'
Eth. End. VII. 9. 4: ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἁρμονιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πολιταίαις, *unas-*

much as some are *orthoi*, others *parekbat-*
es. Giphanius and others wrongly take
ἁρμονίας as qualifying ἀρχή=dominance
 in the sense, that is, of a blending or sub-
 ordination of parts. Cp. *De Anima* 1.
 4. 1 τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρῖσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναν-
 τίων εἶναι. This would be the sense of
συμφωνία, rather than of *ἁρμονία*, in music.
Probl. XIX. 38 921 a 2.

ἐξωτερικώτερας ἐστὶ σκέψεως] "would
 perhaps involve a discussion somewhat
 outside the subject". Obviously the
 simple meaning here as in *ἐξ. πράξεις* IV
 (VII). 3. 8: not to be pressed (as by
 Thuiot *Etudes* 219 f., Ueberweg *Hist. of*
Phil. Eng. tr. I 143) to signify 'those
 parts of Aristotle's strictly scientific works
 which are "dialectical" i.e. controver-
 sial, rather than "apodeictical" i.e.
 purely scientific.'

34 τὸ δὲ ζῶον κατὰ] The enumeration
 is interrupted at ἀρχόμενον by the qualify-
 ing phrase in parenthesis *δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν...*
ἔχειν in such a way that even the first
 member (ζῶον) is only quoted by its first
 division into soul and body, while the
 second subdivision into rational and
 irrational parts of the soul is not added
 until the enumeration is resumed, § 6.
 We should expect *ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων*, *πρῶτον*
 to correspond with *πρῶτον*, in place of them
 we find *πάλιν* and *ἐπὶ* δεῖ in § 7. SUSSEM.
 (39 b)

§ 5 This does not help us to determine
 what is κατὰ φύσιν. But Aristotle's
 meaning is the same as in 2 § 8 ὅσον γὰρ
 ἑκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως τελειώσεως
 ταύτην φανερὴν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου. Cp.
N. Eth. IX 9. 8, *Cic. Tusc.* 1 § 32 (Eaton).

* The term 'dominant' for the fifth above the
 key-note in a modern scale is quite different.

(II)
 1254 b μοχθηρώς ἐχόντων δόξειεν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα (a. 7)
 § 6 τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἔχειν. ἔστι 11
 δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζῳῇ θεωρήσαι καὶ δε-
 σποτικῇν ἄρχην καὶ πολιτικῇν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-
 5 ματος ἄρχει δεσποτικῇν ἄρχην, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὀρέξεως πο-
 λιτικῇν καὶ βασιλικῇν· ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-
 σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-
 χῆς καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ
 9 λόγον ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἴσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν.

eiasing φαύλως καὶ just afterwards; μοχθηρώς, due to a mistaken correction written over μοχθηρῶν, may have displaced φαύλως, as Schmidt once suggested. now he suspects μοχθηρῶς ἢ: [ἡ μοχθηρώς ἐχόντων] Studemund

1254 b 2 καὶ παρὰ φύσιν wanting in M^a and P¹ (1st hand), but added in the margin by P¹ || P²⁻³ have περὶ παρὰ || 6 [καὶ βασιλικῇν] Oncken, perhaps rightly

§ 6 1254 b 3 f. This analogy is carried out in *Nic. Eth.* v. 11 § 9, 1. 13 § 18, III. 3 § 18, 12 § 6. Cp. also Plato *Phaedo* 80 A ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὡς ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν; *Phaedrus* 237 f., not to mention *Rep.* ix. 589 E, 590 C, D (Eaton). Several characteristic phrases here come from Plato. For similar analogies turning on various forms of ἄρχη see *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 8 f., 11 § 9 with Jackson's notes; VIII. 10 §§ 4, 5, 11 §§ 1—6.

8 τῷ παθητικῷ. Λόγον ἔχοντος) Cp. IV (VII). 15. 9 with n. (935). More precisely Aristotle distinguishes in the human soul (1) the rational part or thinking soul, νοῦς, (2) the sentient appetitive soul, cp. IV (VII). 7 § 2. (786), and (3) the nutritive or vegetative soul. The lower animals have the two latter merely, plants have only the third: see Zeller *op.* c. II n. 497 f., 509 f., 566 ff. The nutritive soul is of no importance for the present inquiry, compare *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 §§ 11—14; here it is left entirely out of the question as in c. 13 § 6, IV (VII). 14 § 9 f., 15 §§ 9, 10, where see the notes, cp. also III. 4 § 6 n. (472). He further divides the rational soul into two parts: 1 cognitive reason (ἐπιστημονικόν), i. reflective or opinion reason (λογιστικόν, θεωρητικόν). The latter includes that part of the speculative reason which attains to a mere idea or opinion (ὑπόληψις = unverified belief, assumption, δόξα) but


falls short of true knowledge, and more especially the practical reason with its peculiar faculty of taking counsel or deliberating with itself (βουλευτικόν, see 13 § 7 n.), or in other words the faculty of reflexion from which Aristotle has borrowed the name (λογιστικόν) for all this part of the reason. It was explained in n. (34) on I. 4. 1 that the practical reason is again divided into (1) διάνοια πρακτικῇ, practical reason in the strict sense, and (2) constructive, i.e. technical, reason, δ. ποιητικῇ, which when developed becomes τέχνη, artistic skill*: see *Nic. Eth.* VI. 1 § 5 f.; 2 § 3, 3 § 5; 4 § 3, 5 § 8, 12 § 2; *Metaph.* VI. 1. 5 1025 b 25 f. Compare Walter and Zeller as above quoted, and in modification of their views Sussemlil *Studies in the Nic. Eth.* in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879. 737 ff.

If we combine with the above the results stated in the note on I. 13. 6 we obtain the following scheme of the rational soul according to Aristotle:

* In the *Politics* however τέχνη generally denotes (2) Art as opposed to Nature, (3) the total activity in any department whatsoever of technical skill or the construction of new products, — the exercise of crafts and industries of all kinds, including occasionally even *practical* aptitudes such as Household Management (οἰκονομικῇ). This is the sense in 4. 5 1 above, where the former or 'arts proper' are accordingly distinguished from practical aptitudes by the addition of εἰρησμέναι, cp. n. (34). It is only in 12 § 6 that τεχνικὴ τέχνη = occupation where artistic skill is most required: see n. (100)

- § 7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὡσαύτως· τὰ 13
 11 μὲν γὰρ ἡμερα τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τοῦτοις δὲ
 πᾶσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου· τυγχάνει γὰρ σω-
 κτηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν
 κρείττον τὸ δὲ χείρον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον.
 15 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώ-
 § 8 πων. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεσθᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχῇ σώματος 18
 καὶ ἀνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων

13 ἐστὶ Δτ. (?) *est agitur*, Sussem.² (a misprint) || 14 Π³ Bk omit καὶ || 16 διε-
 σθᾶσι τοσοῦτον Μ¹, διεσθᾶσι τοιοῦτον Ρ¹ || ψυχῇ σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θήριον? Thuiot,
 more correctly; but perhaps an improvement upon Aristotle himself || 17 δὲ
 wanting in Μ¹ Ρ¹ α Q^b Τ³ Δτ. Ald. and Ρ² (1st hand, supplied by con.²)



Now in the *Politics* we have to deal throughout with the supremacy of practical reason (in the strict sense of the term) over the second part of the soul, the *λογιστικόν* or *ορεκτικόν* (cp. *De Anima* III. 7. 2 οὗχ ἔτιον τὸ ορεκτικόν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὐτ' ἀλλήλων οὐτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο) in regard to its appetitive or emotional, and not to its sentient or perceptive side. Obedience to this supremacy constitutes moral or ethical virtue, virtue of character, *ἠθικός*. Cp. I. 13. 6 n., *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 12 f., 13 § 10 f., VI. 12 § 6. SUSSEM. (40)

§ 7 10 πάλιν... 13 ἐπὶ 84] See on § 4 a 34 above. ὡσαύτως] Here again, in man's relation to the animals we see the same thing· clearly, from what follows, the difference between ruled and ruler and the advantage derived by the one from the rule of the other. SUSSEM. (41, 42)

Cp. 2 § 2 διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν (Congreve).

11 τὰ ἡμέρα τῶν ἀγρίων] Plato *Politicus* 264 A, διήγοιο τὸ τῶν τῷ τιθασθῆ καὶ ἀγρίῳ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τιθασθεύονται φύσιν ἡμέρα προσείρηται, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχοντα ἀγρία. A division which Aristotle censures as unscientific *De part. animal.* I. 3. 13 643 b 3, πάντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὅσα ἡμέρα, καὶ ἀγρία τυγχάνει ὅσα.

13 τὸ ἄρρεν κατὰ Cp. 12 § 1 n. (108, 109), 13 § 9 ff. (117, 120). SUSSEM. (42 b)

14 κρείττον... χείρον] Elsewhere τὸ θῆλυ is declared to be ὡς περ ἄρρεν πενηρμένον, or *ἀναπηρία*. This is Plato's doctrine of the natural inferiority of the sex. *Rep.* V. 455 E ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀσθενέστερον γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς, *Laws* VI. 781 B ὁσῶν δὲ ἡ θήλεια ἡμῶν φύσις ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν χείρων τῇ τῶν ἀρρένων, *Τιμαίους* 42 A, D: τὸ κρείττον τοιοῦτον εἶη γένος... ἀνὴρ, 90 E f.

15 ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθ. sc. in relation to one another.

§ 8 16 ὅσοι 17 θηρίου] Cp. III. 11. 5 καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἐνιοὶ τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν; How is the existence of such men possible, on Aristotle's own psychology? There is a difference of kind between man and the brutes, the latter not having a rational part of the soul (see n. on § 6 above); but between the most perfect and the least perfect of men there is at most but a difference of degree, even when in the latter this rational part is reduced to the minimum immediately described, n. (45). We must understand Aristotle to follow the general current of Greek ideas and the usage of language when "he regards bestial limitation to sensual enjoyments, callousness to insult, indifference to knowledge, coarseness and vulgarity in act or speech in general as a servile, degraded disposition *ἀνδραποδωδία*" (Schiller, who quotes Orelli *Arist.*

ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν (II) 19 βέλτιστον), οὔτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν ἐστιν 9 ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἔπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοισι. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἀλλὰ

18 ἐστιν M^a, ἐστ' P^a 2-4 Q M^b T^b Ald. Bk., ἐσται S^b || 20 ἥπερ Bucheler for ἔπερ, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1366 f. || ἐστιν ἄρα? Susem.; since no δε corresponds to the preceding μὲν αὖν and μὲν Thurot suspects some deeper corruption, a lacuna, it may be, before ἐστι γὰρ || 21 ὁ δυνάμενος. 22 καὶ suspected by Schmidt || 23 λόγου Π^a Aⁱ. Bk. Schneider Spengel, perhaps rightly || [αἰσθανόμενα] Bender [ἄλλα] Spengel αἰσθάνονται? Schneider

tolele Pedagogik 60). The passages to consult are II. 4 § 11, IV (VII). 17 § 7, § 9; also V (VIII). 6 § 2, IV (VII). 15 § 5 with the notes; *Nic. Eth.* I. 5 § 3. III. 10 § 2, I. 1 § 3; IV. 5 § 6; and the further references under ἀνθρωπολόγος Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 54 b 30 f. SUSEM. (43)

19 οἷς βέλτιστον κατὰ Plato *Rep.* IX. 590 D ὅς ἀμενον δὲ παντὶ ὑπὸ θεῶν καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεσθαι μέγιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου. a passage which contains something more than the germ of Aristotle's whole doctrine of natural slavery

20 τοῖς ἀρημένοισι τῷ σώματι, τῷ παθητικῷ μορῶν, τῷ θηρίῳ, τῷ θήλει (Congreve)

§ 9 21 διὸ καὶ ἄλλων ἐστίν] Aⁱ a general rule slavery is due to a natural inferiority. But this must not be pressed too far from c. 6 an unjust slavery is possible, cum hi sunt alterius qui sui possunt esse, Cic. *De Rep.* III. § 37 (Congreve). SUSEM. (44)

22 ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν] In c. 13 § 14 the capacity to admit reason or understand its commands (αἰσθάνεσθαι) is ascribed to these natural slaves in a higher degree than to children (see note), for children, while their reason is still undeveloped, attend too much to the mere suggestions of the instincts and passions of sense; *Nic. Eth.* I. 2. 6, III. 12. 6. Moreover Aristotle is here assenting more than his own psychology justifies: for what he here leaves to the slave's practical reason is more correctly attributed to the irrational soul, that is, to speak accurately (see n. on § 6), the appetitive soul, in IV (VII). 14 § 9, cp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 15 f.; namely, the capacity of allowing itself to be guided by

practical reason. As the power to reflect is to Aristotle amongst the most essential peculiarities of the practical reason—see n. (40) on § 6—this cannot with any consistency be wholly denied to the slave as it is here and c. 13 § 7 (where see note) if it be once granted that the slave's soul has a rational part under which is included the possession of practical reason. At the most there can be merely an approximation to the state here described. See further on c. 13 § 12.

Δόγος, which here = *λογισμός*, is the *λογιστικὴν* of 13 § 7 (see n.); more precisely, ἀρετὴς λόγος in the *Ethics*, right or sound understanding as the law and criterion of human action in the sphere of practice and morals. Preeminent skill in the exercise of this λόγος is φρόνησις = insight, prudence; see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 63a f., Walter *op. c.* 353—503. Aristotle is consistent when he allows φρόνησις to none but the φύσει θεωρητικῆς. I. 13. 8 n. (115), III. 4. 17 n. (497). But if the φύσει δοῦλοι were wholly devoid of practical reason of his own he would, by Aristotle's own definition, cease to be a human being and to possess even the scanty remains of capacity for human and moral virtue which is left him according to c. 13 §§ 1—14: cp. *Poetics* c. 15 § 1 with my note (29 b). He would then be reduced to the level of the brute, in himself unable to resist the promptings of sensual desires. See n. p. 211. SUSEM. (45)

23 Λόγῳ αἰσθ. On αἰσθάνεσθαι, αἰσθάνεσθαι see n. (370) upon III. 11. 9. SUSEM. (45 b) If λόγος is the right leading, then the copula is omitted as if αἰσθανόμενα were an adjective: "the other animals (are) not attentive to reason, but obey their passions."

παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρεῖα δὲ παραλλάττει μικρόν
 25 ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεταί παρ
 ἀμφοῖν, παρὰ τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ζώων
 § 10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα
 ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ
 πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς
 30 τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν
 βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεταί διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν
 χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοῦ-
 ναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς
 ψυχὰς ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διά-
 35 φοροὶ τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-
 λειπομένους πάντες φαίεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.
 § 11 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολλὴ δικαιοτέρον ἐπὶ
 τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν
 τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

28 ποιεῖ 13^a. QM^b S^b T^b A. Ald. and 1st hand of P² (emended by corr.²) || μέν
 <ταπεινά καί>, or something similar, Schmidt with great probability; ὁρθά
 nach Reiske || 31 καὶ wanting in L^a. [οὗτος 32 εἰρηνικὴν] Schneider and Schmidt,
 perhaps not unreasonably || 33 ἐλευθέρων ἐτέρων or a little before <τῶν δούλων>
 τοὺς μὲν Heitland wrongly Aristotle's meaning would have been clearer if he had
 added μόνον after σώματα or after ψυχὰς || 36 Oncken thinks the conclusion omitted
 after δουλεύειν; but it came first. βούλεται μὲν οὖν ... τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς

24 f. καὶ ἡ χρεῖα δὲ παραλλάττει κτλ.]
 "Moreover the service afforded by the
 slave is not very far removed from that of
 domesticated animals; viz. bodily aid (note
 the dative) towards the necessities of
 life." Comp. Plato *Polit.* 289 B slaves
 and domesticated animals as species of
 the same genus *περὶ ζῴων κτήσιν τῶν*
ἡμέρων πλὴν δούλων, also c. 2 § 5 above n.
 (15); and 6 § 10 n. (57). SUSK. (48)
 § 10 27 βούλεται] Nature designs, but
 is sometimes thwarted. See 6 § 8 n. (56).
 32 χρεῖαν] "including services in
 war as well as in peace."

34 ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε κτλ.] Cp. IV (VII)
 14. 2 Congreve and Eaton compare
 Herod. v. 47. This remark has a truly
 Hellenic ring. To the Greek, mental
 worth is necessarily and naturally pre-
 sented in a harmonious external form;
 and in the very beauty of the face, of
 which he was thoroughly conscious, Ari-
 stotle finds direct proof of its superiority
 to the barbarians. What a complete jus-
 tification this for the slavery of the black

and coloured races! Zeller *op.* i. II 11
 691 n. (2). See on I. 2 § 4 n. (13).

Lang however from another point of
 view justly remarks *op. c.* *Esays* 60.
 "we must remember no one would have
 been more bitter than Aristotle against
 the negro-slavery on plantations of mo-
 dern days. To turn the servants of the
 noble life into tools of limitless money-
 making would have been, in his view,
 unnatural. We must remember also, that
 he would have held up the promise and
 reward of freedom, to stimulate his slaves
 to virtuous lives, and, with freedom in
 prospect, and friendship in the men, me,
 with every lovely life of divine service
 performed for their sake, there may have
 been wiser lives than those of the Greek
 slaves." SUSK. (47)

§ 11 38 οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν κτλ.]
 Eaton compares *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 16 ἀλλ'
 ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερό-
 μενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν.
 Should we not rather think of Plat.
Phaed. 250 D E, Xen. *Memo.* III 10. 3?

* ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν εἰσι φύσει τινὲς οὐ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οὐ δὲ δοῦ- (II)
λοι, φανερόν, οἷς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον
6 ἐστίν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγου- 18
σιν ὁρθῶς, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν
5 καὶ ὁ δούλος. ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δούλος καὶ
δουλεύων· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστίν, ἐν ᾗ τὰ κατὰ
2 πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασί. τοῦτο δὲ
τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὥσπερ ῥήτορα γρά-

1255 a 1 ὅτι. b 8 δύνανται is cited by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil. c. 6, p. 332 B sq.
5 καὶ before κατὰ omitted in Π³ M³ A¹. Ald. Plut. and in P⁴ (1st hand—added by a
later hand) || 6 ἐν ᾗ Bas.², ἐφ' ᾗ omitting the following φασί Bernays; Hampke
punctuates δουλεύων (δ. . . τις ἐστίν), ἐν ᾗ κτλ, cp. *Heim* XIX. 577 n.

c. 6 *There is then one species of slavery, which is natural. But there is another species, conventional slavery.* § 1. *The justice of the convention which allows prisoners taken in war to be sold for slaves is unconditionally challenged by some (A) and defended by others (B).* § 2. *The reason why there are these conflicting views, and why nevertheless they have a common ground, is the implication of virtue and superior force.* The issue turns on what constitutes right and justice: § 3. *Weakness of the one view (A), which implies a denial of the right of superior virtue to rule.* § 4. *Others (C), again, argue that all slavery, so far as it is so, is just: but the war might be unjust, and they would refuse to apply their principle consistently to captive Greeks.* § 5. *This refusal leads them back to the conception of nobility.* § 7. *Men are marked off for true freedom and true nobility by virtue (ἀρετή):* § 8. *Recapitulation.* §§ 9, 10.

See EXCURSUS II.; Hampke in *Philologus* XLIV. 1866. 172—175, who compares IV(VII). 2 §§ 12—18; in *The Transactions of Camb. Philol. Soc.* II. 1883 Jackson pp. 111—116, Postgate pp. 17—123, Ridgeway pp. 128—130; and St. muhl in *Hermes* XIX. 1884. 576—588. The chapter reminds us of *N. Eth.* I. cc. 8—12, in so far as Aristotle is testing his theoretical conclusions by a comparison with various received opinions.

§ 1 1255 a 1 ff “It is thus plain that in certain cases there are natural freemen and natural slaves, for the latter of whom the estate of slavery is both advantageous and just. And yet it is easy to see that those who maintain the opposite” viz. of

the doctrine of natural slavery (against Ridgeway 129 ff) “do, to a certain extent, argue correctly. For the terms slavery and slave are used in two senses. <Besides the natural> there is also the conventional slave and conventional slavery; this convention being a species of agreement whereby the conquered in war are declared the property of their conquerors.”

6 ὁ γὰρ νόμος... 7 φασί Xenophon *Cyr.* VII. 5 73 νόμος γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις διδύς ἐστίν, ὅταν πολεροῦντων πόλις ἄλφ, τῶν ἐδόντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα (Congreve). It is well known that customs and usages purely conventional and resting on mere tradition were called νόμοι by the Greeks and considered more sacred and venerable than the written laws; III. 16 § 9 ἐτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριώτερον τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων εἰ κατὰ τὰ ἐθῆ εἰσιν, and VII (VI). 5 § 2. Yet these “unwritten laws” are regarded as if each of them could be derived from a definite law-giver: see on II. 9 §§ 12, 14 SUSEM (48).

Cp. *Grote Plato* I. 249 f., 252 n. § 2 7 “This conventional right is by many juriconsults arraigned, like a demagogue, of unconstitutionality.” Yet “slavery among the ancients was at first an unmingled blessing—an important conquest of the spirit of humanity. When men were altogether barbarous they killed their prisoners.” Lecky *Hist. of Rationalism* II. 254.

8 γράφονται παρανόμων] ‘This indictment was laid against any private citizen who had proposed or carried an *unconstitutional* law or popular decree, i. e. one which contravened laws or decrees in force at the time and not previously

φονται παρανόμων, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου (I
 10 καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἔσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόμενον
 καὶ βιασθῆναι. καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτως δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκείνους, καὶ
 13 τῶν σοφῶν. αἴτιον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ ὃ 17
 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινα ἀρετὴ τυγ-

11 ἐκείνους [καὶ] Κορναί, wrongly

repealed. Proceedings had to be commenced within a year from the day when the proposal was made or adopted; otherwise the proposer escaped a personal prosecution. The illegality might consist in the substance of the proposal, in its form, or in both at once. A decree (*ψήφισμα*) would be formally unconstitutional if brought before the popular assembly without consent of the *βουλὴ* previously obtained, although there might be no decree proposed by the *βουλὴ* on the same subject which it could contravene? (Meier and Schomann *Altlicher Praxis* 283 f.). The comparison here relates to illegality in substance, for the sense is that the convention or positive law in question violates natural law. SUSEM. (49)

9 δὲ δεινὸν κτλ.] "on the ground that it is monstrous if mere ability to subdue by force, and superiority in might alone, shall give ownership and rule over that which it subdues." The representatives of this view are no doubt the same as those who declare all slavery to be contrary to nature: see § 4, τοῖς μὲν εὐνοία δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι and § 3 1, τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν, where see note. SUSEM. (49 b) Note the genitive after ἀρχόμενον, "subject of the coerced".

11 "This then is then view: others again take the former view" (*ἐκείνους*): namely, that prescribed by the convention or positive law mentioned in § 1. δοκεῖ ἐκείνους repeats the *φασί* of line 7. For convenience we may denote by (A) the opponents (τοῖς μὲν), and by (B) the defenders of conventional slavery (τοῖς δὲ); the view of the latter is shared, though on other grounds, by a third party (C) the *τινὲς* of line 22.

§ 3 12 "The reason of the conflict" between (A) and (B) "and what" at the same time "makes the (two opposed) views overlap." The general sense, as explained p. 206, is that (i) the views of (A) and (B) stand sharply opposed (cp. 19 διαστάντων χωρὶς), and yet (ii) they have a common point of contact, the two distinct facts (i) and (ii) being due to one and the same cause, the implication of virtue and force.

Beinays differently, see p. 209. SUSEM. (51)

13 λόγους, often taken as=arguments, or again as=propositions, should be explained more widely as "the propositions [conventional slavery is just, is unjust] together with the arguments supporting them and the conclusions adopted in consequence of them," thus nearly=views or reasonings (Postgate *op. c.* 121, 123 n.), 'platforms' (Heitland), theories

ἐπαλλάττειν, as in I. 9. 15, VI (IV). 10. 2, VII (VI). 1. 3; see Heitland's examination of these passages *Notes* 11-13, and the passages collected by Jackson *op. c.* 114 n. Bonitz *Index* s.v. compares ἐπαμφοτερίζειν and explains that from the sense of "to alternate" it comes to be applied *ad ea quae inter duo genera ita sunt interposita ut cum utroque cohaerant*. "Said of two different, or even opposite, things or views which yet have something in common and again approximate or meet or even cross or run into each other or are in inseparable connexion" (Susem.) Oncken took it of 'arguments crossed or traversed by counter arguments' Heitland and Jackson of 'propositions overlapping': but the former thinks these are the sub-contraries (a) some slavery is just, (b) some slavery is unjust. The latter holds that it is the *λόγοι* of (A) and (B)—all slavery is unjust, all slavery is just—which 'overlap': because the "slavery which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just." (See by all means the context of this remark, Ex. II. p. 208.)

τρόπον τινα κτλ.] "in a sense virtue, provided it finds proper appliances, is in fact best able to subdue by force, and the conquering side always has advantage in good of some sort." These two clauses are not opposed (against Jackson 114 f., Postgate 122), they merely put the same thing in a different form. There is always a presumption that *βία* carries with it *ἀρετή*: this is the common ground where the two contending parties meet, and here Aristotle also agrees with them. But from this they draw opposite inferences as to the nature of τὸ δίκαιον, as to when it is just to use force.

χάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ (II)
 15 ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός, ὥστε δοκεῖν
 μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μό-
 § 4 νον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοια
 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν
 κρείττονα ἄρχειν)· ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό- 18
 20 γων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἕτεροι λόγοι, ὥς

17 *eunomia* Lamblin, wrongly: <μετ'> *eunoias*? Schneider

14 *χορηγία* = means, resources: ἡ ἐκ-
 τὸς χ. favourable external circumstances,
 external goods *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 § 4; so of
 the individual *Pol.* IV (VII), 13 § 3. In a
 wider sense, anything with which the state
 requires to be furnished, even population,
 territory IV (VII), 4 § 2, § 4.

13—16 *ἐν ὑπεροχῇ* Fullborn remarks
 with truth that the qualifications neces-
 sary here (amounting in all to *ceteris*
paribus) really make the whole theory
 futile, because 'other things' in this
 connexion are so seldom 'equal'. Bodily
 qualities, superior numbers and wea-
 pons, all sorts of external circumstances
 often largely contribute to victory. Con-
 quest is no valid proof of the higher
 excellence of the conqueror: besides, the
 one kind of mental capacity which has
 contributed to his victory is no guarantee
 that he also possesses the other which
 qualifies him for wise government, above
 all for the exercise of despotic rule over a
 conquered foe. Nevertheless Aristotle
 would be borne out by a belief in the
 moral government of the world*. in the
 main, success attends upon the most
 capable nations. *SUSEM.* (80)

15 ὥστε δοκεῖν κτλ. "hence it seems
 that force to coerce is never independent
 of virtue, but that the dispute turns on
 the nature of right and justice."

§ 4 17 f. ("For this reason some take
 the mutual goodwill" of governors and
 governed "to constitute right, others stand
 on the naked right of the stronger to
 rule.") The parenthesis is due to Ridg-
 way, Heitland saw that 'this remark
 breaks the course of the argument' (p.
 14). The grounds for the view of (B),
 which had not been stated above §§ 1, 2,
 are now given by *διὰ τοῦτο*.

τοῖς μὲν] Clearly again the unqualified
 opponents of slavery. *SUSEM.* (80 b)

Jackson, 115 n., first proved that one
 meaning of *εὐνοια* is 'loyalty: the will-

* [And no less by the scientific doctrine of
 the survival of the fittest.]

ing obedience which an inferior renders
 to a kind and considerate superior'. To
 take it solely to mean 'the goodwill of
 governors to governed' seriously invali-
 dates the protest of the anti-slavery party
παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ δεσπόζειν; masters
 might always urge the plea that they held
 their slaves from disinterested motives.
 Giphanius notes well: *benevolentia et*
bona existimatio magistratus et dominos
peperit. Cp. VII (VI), 5 § 4, § 10; VIII (V),
 11 § 11: ἀγαθαῖον εὐνοῖαν εἶναι ταῖς τυ-
 ραννίδι sc. τοῖς δουλοῖς καὶ τὰς γυναῖκάς.

18 τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν] Cp.
Thuc. v. 105, 2, Plato *Gorgias* 483 c f.

19 *ἐπεὶ* answers the sentence 15 ὥστε
 δοκεῖν "If however these two views stand
 opposed and apart, the former has neither
 force nor plausibility, (implying as it does)
 that the superior in virtue has no right to
 rule and be master." *χωρὶς* is used pre-
 dicatively, *διαστάντων* is the opposite of
ἐπαλλάττειν: if the point of contact be-
 tween the two views be lost, if they
 stand opposed without any community.
 For the sense of *separation* the passage
 quoted by Jackson (see p. 208) *De*
long et brev. vitae, 464 b 26, is most
 instructive: *πότερον ταῦτά μακροβία καὶ*
τὴν φύσιν ἐγγειὰ τῶν φύσει συνεστάντων,
ἢ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ
νυσσίδες, ἢ κατ' ἐπίαν μὲν νύσσος ἐπαλ-
λάττει τὰ νυσσὶν τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς
βραχύβιοις, κατ' ἐπίαν δ' οὐδὲν κοῦδὲν
νυσσίδες εἶναι μακροβίους ὄντας. Others
 (Schneider, Jackson, Postgate, Ridgeway)
 take *διαστάντων* = *se per se ponantur*, 'if
 disentangled,' each taken separately.

20 ἕτεροι λόγοι = one of the two sets
 of arguments advanced, that of (A).
 Postgate (*op. c.* 123) thinks *ἕτεροι λόγοι*
 would be clearer. Schneider took it =
neutra ratio: to which Hampke rejoined
 that this sense requires *οὐδὲτεροι*. Jackson
 however still maintains that it is a true
 plural 'as in 13 τοῖς λόγοις', but then
 we should have *ἀμφότεροι*: his novel
 and ingenious interpretation, *op. c.* 115 f,

§ 5 οὐ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. ὅλως (II)
 δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δίκαιον τινός (ὁ γὰρ νόμος
 δίκαιόν τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασιν δίκαιαν,
 ἕμα δὲ οὐ φασιν. τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι-
 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδα-
 μῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς (p 2)
 εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐάν
 § 6 συμβῇ πραθῆναι ληφθέντας. διόπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βοῦλονται
 λέγειν δούλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ἔταν τοῦτο λέ-
 30 γωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ζητοῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον ὅπερ ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς εἴπομεν ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς φάναι τοὺς μὲν
 § 7 πανταχοῦ δούλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 19

24 ἕμα] ὅλως Π¹ P² M¹ T² L¹ (γρ. ἕμα p¹ in the margin), ἀπλῶς apparently Ar. ||
 27 καὶ ἐκ δούλων transposed to follow 1255 b 2 ἀγαθόν Schmidt || 28 αὐτοὺς Monte-
 catino and perhaps P¹. Over this word p² has the gloss τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ κρατηθέντας
 which M¹ has in the text after ληφθέντας || 32 πανταχοῦ] ἐξ ἀρχῆς Π¹, γρ. ἀπαν-
 ταχοῦ p¹ in the margin

departs widely from that here given. Hampke also takes 19 τούτων τῶν λόγων as a singular of one view and hence infers that ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου denotes one view also: M. Croiset, 'les opinions de nos adversaires'

§ 5 οὐ δὲ, epexegetic of λόγοι, 'the view namely that'. But Jackson following Heinsius makes it depend on πιθανόν: "plausibility to shew that it is not the right of superiority in virtue to rule". Why does Aristotle expose the weakness of (A)? He admits εὐνοία as the principle regulating the relations of citizens in the normal πολιτεία, but as between master and slave it is not to supersede the right of virtue to rule.

§ 5 21 Take ὅλως with ἀντεχόμενοι.

"Others again simply holding fast to something just and right as they suppose (for whatever is legal is just) admit the justice of slavery in accordance with the laws of war, but in the same breath withdraw the admission. For not only may the war have had an unjust origin, but further no one would call him, who is undeserving of slave's estate, a slave. Else it will follow that men who are held to be of the noblest birth are slaves or come of servile ancestry, if they" [or then ancestors] "happen to have been taken prisoners and sold" — as Plato was by Dionysius. The view of (c), 22 τινες, is substantially the common opinion in Greece, with its latent incon-

sistencies. ὅλως was taken by Hampke = 'embracing both the former views'. Ridgeway (op. c. 130) objects that 'if Aristotle was enunciating another theory here, he would have used ἐπὶ δὲ'. It will be found upon comparison of *De Anima* I. 588 10, 11 410 b 2 and *Metaph.* II. 3 88 14, 15 357 b 10, 12, that ὅλως and ἐπὶ δὲ are used in parallel clauses to introduce *distinct* objections, the order of the clauses being indifferent.

§ 6 28 διόπερ καὶ] "Hence they refuse to call their own countrymen slaves, and only apply the term to barbarians". αὐτοὺς used absolutely for αὐτοῖς < τοῖς Ἕλλησιν > which comes to the same thing as 33 αὐτοῖς. Eaton compares the noble conduct of Callicratidas, Xen. Hell. I. 6, 14.

30 οὐδὲν ἄλλο καὶ] In making this qualification they are really on their way to the principle of natural slavery laid down by us at the first: they are compelled to admit that in certain cases there is a distinction between two classes, the one who are everywhere, the others who are nowhere, slaves. Having thus reduced the intermediate view of (c) to its right sense Aristotle has no need to refute at length the extreme views of (A) and (B).

§ 7 32 πανταχοῦ] Nic. Eth. v. 7, 1, 1134 b 19, τὸ μὲν φύσει <δίκαιον> ἀκρίστον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν (Con-
 greve), τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ] Cr. III. 13 2 ἢ εὐ-
 γένεια παρ' ἐκάστοις οἰκοῖσι τίμιοι. SUM. (82)

περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ' αὐτοῖς εὐγε- (II)
νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἰκοι μό-
35 νον, ὡς ὅν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενὲς καὶ ἐλεύθερον τὸ δ'
οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἑλένη φησὶ

θείων δ' ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν ἔκγονον βίωμάτων
τίς ἂν προσειπεῖν ἀξιώσειεν λάτρην,

§ 8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδενὶ ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-
40 ρίζουσιν τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς
35 β δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐκ

33 αὐτοῖς II¹ P⁴ Plut., αὐτοῖς P³ S³ T^b and 1st hand of I² (emended by cori.²) ||
παρ' αὐτοῖς I¹ M² Plut. and perhaps P¹ || 35 καὶ omitted in P² Q M² S³ T^b Ald. and
P⁴ (1st hand), Ar. leaves καὶ ἐλεύθερον untranslated || 36 καὶ before ἡ is omitted by
Bk. || ἐλελόγηται τοῖς Ἑλένη I¹ M² || 37 ἔκγονον Δι., ἐκγονον P¹, ἐκγόνου I¹ M²
P³ 4-6. Ald. Plut. ἐκ γόνου P³ Q M², ἐκγονοι S³ T^b || 38 ἀξιώσειεν M² P¹ 2-4. Ald.
Plut. and P³ (a later hand) || 39 οὐδενὶ II² Ar. Plut. Bk., οὐδέν II¹

35 ὡς ὅν τι "which implies the exist-
ence of an absolute, as well as a relative,
nobility and freedom".

36 On the tragic poet Theodectes of
Phaselis, a contemporary and friend of
Aristotle who is rather fond of quoting
from him, see Sussehl's note (103) on
Poetics II § 1, Bernhardt *Griech. Literatur-*
gesch. II b p. 64 f., Welcker *Die*
griech. Trag. III. 1069 ff [also Cope
Journal of Cl. and Sacred Philol. III.
160 f., *Int. to Rhetoric* 53 f., note on
Rhet. II 23. 3]. These lines are frag. 3 in
Nauck's *Trag. Graec. frag.* SUSSEHL (58)
§ 8 39 ὅταν δὲ] From VI(IV). 8. 9,
VIII(V). I. 7 (cp. III. 13. 3, *Rhet.* I. 8. 5)
we learn that true nobility is a combina-
tion of wealth with high excellence here-
ditary in a family, ἀρετῇ καὶ πλοῦτος
ἀρχαῖος.

How far this third or
intermediate view of slavery and the
limits within which it is justified as
natural agrees with that of Aristotle
himself, is more clearly seen from the
discussion in IV (VII). 7 §§ 1—3, where
see *sup.* (780, 781). The question there
is, to what are we to ascribe the higher
endowments and 'virtue' which distin-
guish the Greeks from other races and
make the latter their born slaves? Only
Aristotle there more precisely restricts
this relation to the Asiatic portion of the
non-Hellenic nations, as indeed he does
before III. 14. 6, δουλικώτεροι τὰ θῆη οἱ
μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν

Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑυρώπην. The other
references are I. 2 § 4, 5 § 8 f., 6 § 4, 7
§ 3 f., 8 § 12: IV (VII). 2 §§ 15, 16, 9
§ 18, 14 § 21 with the notes.

In his whole doctrine Aristotle follows,
in the main, the indications of his master.
Plato in like manner condemns the en-
slavement of Hellenes by Hellenes; *Rep.*
V 469 n f., 471 A f. Ideas which Plato
only suggested, *Rep.* VIII. 549 A, IX.
590 C, *Politics* 309 A, Aristotle works
out systematically: see on I. 5 § 9 n.
(46) and the next note: *Introd.* p. 24 f.;
Zeller *op. c.* II i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato*
p. 458 f.] SUSSEHL (54)

1255 b i ἀξιοῦσι κετλ] So above § 10
βούλευται. πολιτικὸν βίον Cp. III. 13 § 3
n, *Rhet.* I. 9 § 33, Theognis 535 f. οἱ ποτε
δουλεῖται κεφαλῇ ἰδέειν πέφυκεν | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
σκολιῇ, καυχέται λοῖζόν ἔχει. | ὅτε γὰρ ἐκ
σκέλλης βόβα φέρεται οὐδ' ὑκύνθος | ὅτε
ποτ' ἐκ βούλης τέκνον ἐλευθέριον (Ca-
mearius). also Plato *Cratylus* 394 D
(Schiller). Oncken remarks: "what
Aristotle requires however is the visible
and palpable mark of innate slavery is
not the deformity which Theognis has
in view, but a greater endowment of
rough muscular force. He overlooks the
fact that the domestic service of the slave
hardly demands more strength than the
military service of the freeman, who
needs a good deal besides mere erect
stature". SUSSEHL (56)

θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίον, οὕτω καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθόν. ἡ δὲ φύ- (II)
 σις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ δύναται.
 § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, καὶ 80
 οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλευθέρου, δηλον,
 καὶ ὅτι ἔν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν συμφέρεται τῷ μὲν τὸ
 δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν
 ἀρχεσθαι τὸ δ' ἀρχειν, ἣν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἀρχειν, ὥστε
 § 10 καὶ δεσπόζειν, τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἐστὶν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ
 10 γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρεται τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ σώματι καὶ
 ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οἷον ἔμφυχόν τι
 τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος διὸ καὶ συμφέρον 81
 ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δοῦλῳ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς

1255 b a γενέσθαι M^a P¹⁻⁴ Q T^b || ἀγαθόν, <καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων δούλον> Schmidt, cp. a 27 || 3 τοῦτο αἰεὶ ποιεῖν M^a P¹ || πολλάκις μέντοι οὐ Α. πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι Γ II Plut. Bk. which, though unsatisfactory, might perhaps be defended: see Dittenberger *Op. l.* p. 1371 f. || 5 The text can hardly be sound: <εἰσι καὶ> οὐκ Camot, Bk.⁴, perhaps the best suggestion; οὐκ ? Susem.³, οὐκ <ἀναμφισβήτητος> οἱ οὐκ <ἀπανταχοῦ>? Schmidt formerly: <ὅτι> Bojesen; οὐκ is omitted by W^b Ald. Lambin Götting, εἰ for 4 καὶ and <ἡ οὐ> before δῆλον Lambin, οὐκ for 4 οὖν Götting, οἱ μὲν <εἰ μὴ> Thurot || ὁ μὲν φύσει φέρεται <τινὲς> οἱ μὲν and 6 <δῆλον δὲ> καὶ ὅτι Schmidt now edits || φέρεται wanting in M^a and P¹ (1st hand, added in the margin by P¹) || 7 τὸ is omitted before δεσπόζειν by Π³ || τὸν μὲν and 8 τὸν δ' Α. Nickes, who would prefer 6 τοῖς μὲν... 7 τοῖς δὲ. τοὺς μὲν 8 τοὺς δ' || 8 In M^a P¹ Α. ἀρχειν and ἀρχεσθαι are transposed || 12 τοῦ σώματος in some older mss. probably came after μέρος where it is repeated by Γ M^a and P¹ (1st hand)

2 ἡ δὲ φύσις κτλ.] So above § 10 συμβαίνει ἐλευθέρων, Füllehorn remarks with truth that this admission quite invalidates all practical application of Aristotle's theory. It is even possible for a Greek to be a natural slave, for a barbarian, though an Asiatic (see on I. 2. 4 and above n. 54), to be a natural free-man: e. g. Hermenes, Aristotle's friend and the uncle of his wife, who had actually been a slave: see on II. 7. 17. Hence the non-Hellene may even prove to be the natural master of the Hellene SUSEM. (56)

§ 9 5 οὐκ εἰσὶν] Fortunately we can check the text (see *Crit. Notes*) by the directly opposed statement with which c. 6 opens, by § 6, § 10, and the next words, line 6, ἐν τισι κτλ. "in certain cases there is a clearly marked distinction of this sort, where namely. . ."

9 τὸ δὲ κακῶς] sc. ἀρχειν.

§ 10 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ κτλ.] See I § 3 π. (7).

11 δὲ δὲ δοῦλος . . . κεχωρισμένον δὲ

μέρος] This is said of property (κτῆμα) generally and of the child *Nic. Eth. v. 6. 8* quoted on 4 § 5 above. SUSEM. (57) See however Jackson's note *ad loc.*

12 διὰ 12 πρὸς ἀλλήλους] In *Nic. Eth. viii. 11* §§ 6, 7, 1161 a 32 ff., it is said that there can be no friendship between master and slave *good slave*: ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινὸν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία: οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον. The relation is like that of a craftsman to his tools, of soul to body, of master to slave. ἀφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρημάτων (cp. τὸ αὐτὸ συμφέρεται of the text), φιλία δ' οὐκ ἐστίν... δ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμφυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἀνυχοῦς δοῦλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος, οὐκ ἐστὶν φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ἢ δ' ἀνθρώπων: δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς πάντα τὸν διωκόμενον κοινωνήσαι νόμον καὶ σωθῆναι, καὶ φιλία δὲ, καὶ ὅσον ἀνθρώπων. Zeller II n 692 f., following Ritter, rightly calls this an inconsistency which does the philosopher honour. The author of the

φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένους, τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, (II)
 7 ἄλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τὸνναντιον)· φανερόν δὲ
 16 καὶ ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολι-
 τική, οὐδὲ πᾶσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὥσπερ τινὲς φα- (p 10)
 σίν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἡ δὲ δούλων ἐστίν, καὶ
 19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομική μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖται γὰρ πᾶς οἶκος),
 2 ἡ δὲ πολιτική ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή. ὁ μὲν οὖν δεσπότης
 22 τῆς οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι,

14 τούτων] τοιούτοις Susem.¹⁴, τοιούτοις <εἶναι> ? Susem., τοιούτοις <καὶ>
 Schmidt at one time: τούτων was suspected by Schneider and Koraes, οὕτως ἡξιω-
 μένοις Κοῖαες || ἡξιωμένους transposed to follow 15 νόμον Schmidt || 15 φανερόν
 ..20 ἀρχή transposed to follow 1256 a 1 τρόπον Schmidt || 16 καὶ before ἐκ τούτων
 would perhaps come better after those words

Eudemian Ethics, VII. 9. 2 1241 b 17 ff.,
 withdraws the concession: since there is
 the same relation between soul and body,
 craftsman and tools, master and slave, in
 these cases there is no association (κοινωνία)
 possible οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
 μὲν ἐν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνός (the two members of
 such a relation are not independent). οὐδὲ
 διαμερὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρω, ἀλλὰ ἀμφο-
 τέρων τὸ ἐνός οὐ ἐνεκά ἐστιν (the good of
 the one is not separable from the good of
 the other, the good of both is the good
 of that one of the two for whose sake the
 other exists). τὸ τε γὰρ σῶμά ἐστιν
 ὄργανον σώματος, καὶ τοῦ δεσπότης ὁ δού-
 λος ὥσπερ μέριον καὶ ὄργανον ἀφαι-
 ρετόν. That even a slave is a man is
 emphasized in another fragment of Philo-
 mon, besides the one quoted on 3 § 4,
 viz. Ἡξεικόμενος 28: πᾶν δούλος ἢ τις,
 οὐδὲν ἦντον, δέσποτα, ἢ ἄνθρωπος οὗτός
 ἐστιν, ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἦ. Cp. Becker *Char-
 akters* III. 12 (ed. 2), Eng. tr. p. 357. Con-
 sult further *Pol.* IV (VII), 8 §§ 1—4 n.
 (801); I. 2. 3 n. (7); III. 6. 6. SUSEM.
 (87 b) Comp. F. A. Paley's *Emipides*,
Pref. to vol. I. pp. xiii f. with ref. there
 given, esp. *Hel* γ28, *Melampus* fr. 506
 (515), *Phrixus* fr. 823 (828): also Oncken
 II. 33 ff.

c. 7 Δεσποτεία then, or rule over
 slaves, is not the same as statecraft: § 1.
 Nor does the relation of δεσπότης depend
 upon science: § 2. In what sense there
 may be a science of the duties (1) of slaves
 (2) of slaveowners (the latter quite distinct
 from ἡ κτηνική, sc. δούλων): §§ 3—5.

§ 1 17 τινὲς] Plato. See on 1 § 1
 n. (2). SUSEM. (88)

¹ It is plain that here and 1 § 1 Aristotle
 is thinking of Plat. *Polst.* 258 a 33. esp.
 259 B. It is however a mistake to attri-

bute the doctrine, without qualification,
 to Plato, who at 268 D introduces a long
 and elaborate myth with the express
 intention of warning us, that though the
 shepherd-king of the theocratic period
 exercised all regulative functions indis-
 criminately, this state of things ended
 with the Saturnian age. See by all means
 274 E seq. From this point to the end of
 the dialogue the Eleate is mainly en-
 gaged in discriminating the πολιτικός
 from a host of rivals. Clearly the doc-
 trine in question is at variance with the
 whole tenor of the *Republic*. May we
 not attribute it, on the strength of Xenoph.
Memorab. III. 4 § 12, *Oecon.* 13 § 5, to
 Socrates? (Jackson).

19 ἡ μὲν οἰκονομική.. 20 ἀρχή] Com-
 pare IV (VII), 8 § 4 (ἐξ ὁμοίων), VI (IV).
 11 § 8 (ἐξ ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων), also II. 2 § 6,
 III 16 § 2, 17 § 1 and n. (133) on II. 2 § 4.
 On the other hand see III. 4 § 5 with n.
 (471). SUSEM. (68 b)

20 A similar distinction between ἡ τῶν
 ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἀρχή and ἡ δεσποτική
 is seen in *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, § 8, where
 Jackson refers to *Pol.* IV (VII), 14 §§ 6, 7,
 § 19. See his notes.

§ 2 21 οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην]
 As is asserted in the passage of the *Politi-
 cius*; cp. c. 1 § 2 n. (2), 3 § 4. ἀλλὰ
 τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι] But does this latter
 at once exclude the former? As was
 shown in n. (54) on c. 6 § 8, Plato is
 very far from denying the one because he
 asserts the other. He too, like Aristotle,
 regards the more capable as the natural
 ruler, but for that very reason assigns the
 perfect art of ruling, of whatever kind, to
 those alone who in the strict sense have
 knowledge, i.e. to the philosophers: for,
 on the Socratic principle that all virtue or

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλεύθερος· ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν (II)
εἴη καὶ δεσποτική καὶ δουλική, δουλική μὲν ὅταν περὶ ὃ ἐν
24 Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευσεν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάναντες τὸν μισθὸν
§ 3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παῖδας), εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ
ἐπὶ πλείον τούτων μάθησις, ὅλον ὀφιοποιητική καὶ τὰλλα τὰ
τοιαῦτα γένηται τῆς διακονίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἕτερα ἐτέρων τὰ μὲν
ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τὰ δ' ἀναγκαϊότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν
29 δοῦλος πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

§ 4 αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦται πᾶσαι δουλικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι εἰσὶ· δεσπο- 23
τική δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστική δούλων. ὁ γὰρ δεσπό-
της οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτῆσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι
δούλοις. ἔστι δ' αὖτις ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ
34 σεμνόν· ἂν γὰρ τὸν δούλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνον δεῖ
§ 5 ταῦτα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ ὅσοις ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοὺς
κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν, αὐτοὶ

23 ἐν ταῖς M¹ P¹ Susem.¹—wrongly, see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1362, ἐν [ταῖς]
Susem.² § 24 ἐπαίδευσεν II³ Bk. || 26 τοῦτων II² Bk. || ὀφιοποιική I² B¹ Q S² T² B¹ Ald. Bk. ὀφιοποιική P⁴, ὀφιοποιικὴ A¹. || 27 ἕτερα] ἔργα Q S² T² B¹ Ald
and 1st hand in P⁴ (γρ. ἕτερα in the margin of P⁴, the right reading is inserted in P³
by a later hand, but subsequently erased)

excellence (*dōrēh*) arises from knowledge, philosophers have in his eyes the highest excellence in every respect Aristotle has not taken pains enough over his refutation here. In the *Etikē* he is more accurate, beginning with a successful attack upon the Socratic principle which Plato accepted, see Zeller *op. c.* II ii 627 f. SUSEM. (59, 60)

κατὰ=in virtue of, as in καθά. The term 'master' is not applied to any one because of his knowledge, but from his being of a given character.

§ 3 27 τὰ μὲν ἐντιμότερα κτλ.] The latter are the conditions for bare existence, the former for the ennobling refinement and perfecting of existence. SUSEM. (61)

29 A verse of the *Pankratistai*, a comedy by Aristotle's younger contemporary Philémon, frag. 2. (J. G. Schneider). But if one master thus differs from another, it is implied that in the activities of freemen there is a similar difference; that thus all human occupations exhibit an ascending scale from the lowest and most mechanical work up to the highest and most intellectual, which Aristotle calls (*δαιμονίῳ*) employment of leisure, as distinct from work or occupa-

tion (Ludw. Schneider). See IV (VII). c. 8 f.; c. 14 § 12 ff. SUSEM. (88)

§ 4 32 οὐκ ἐν τῷ κτῆσθαι] Below c. 8 § 2 τίς γὰρ ἐστὶν χρῆσις τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκ.; III. 4. 11 τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα <ἀρχὴν δεσποτικὴν>, δ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἀρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μάλλον. SUSEM. (63)

33 οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα] IV (VII). 3. 2 οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δούλω, ἢ δούλω, χρῆσθαι σεμνόν, VI (IV). 15. 3 αἱ δ' ὑπερηφανίαι <τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν> καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ, ἀν' εὐνοῶσι, τὰ τούτοις δούλων. But see I. 13. 14 and II. (123). SUSEM. (64)

§ 5 36 The overseer, *ἐπίτροπος*, the house-steward, *oikylas*, was himself a slave: Pseud.-Arist. *Oecon.* 1.5 § 1 1344 a 26, 6 § 5 1345 a 8 ff., Xen. *Oecon.* 12. 2, Aristoph. *Knights* 947 f.; Becker *Charities* III. 23 (ed. 2), Eng. ti. p. 363. Yet no doubt Greeks by birth were readily taken for this office, as well as for that of παιδαγωγός. SUSEM. (64)

Translate: hence all who have the means of escaping personal discomfort employ an overseer to take this charge and themselves the while engage in public affairs or in study.

δὲ πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ κτητική ἐτέρα ἀμ- (II)
φοτέρων τούτων, οἷον [ἡ] δικάλα πολεμική τις οὐσα [ἡ θηρευ-
τική].

8 περὶ μὲν οὖν δούλου καὶ δεσπότου τούτων διαρίσθω τὸν III
1255 a τρόπον· ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεω-

38 [ἡ] Susem., ἡ Schmitzer wrongly: ?[δικαλα] or ?[τις οὐσα] Susem. || [ἡ θηρευ-
τική] Susem.², [ἡ] Jackson || Conring and Spengel suspect the whole sentence 37
ἡ δὲ κτητικῇ . 38 θηρευτικῇ, Schmidt all from 37 ἡ δὲ κτητικῇ... 1255 a 3 μέρος τι ἦν

37 ἡ 84 κτλ.] With κτητικῇ supply
δούλων. But it may be inferred from c.
8 § 12, δὲ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικῇ πως
ῥοται (ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς), ἡ δὲ
χρησθαὶ πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θήλουσιν, that
under the one genus 'offensive war' Ari-
stotle includes two species: (1) the chase,
a war against wild animals, (2) war con-
ducted for the capture of slaves.

πολεμική

πρὸς τὰ θηρία
(θηρευτικῇ) πρὸς τοὺς φύσει δούλους
(θηρευτικῇ)

If this be so, he knows nothing of an
art of 'man-hunting' and the words at
the end, 38 ἡ θηρευτικῇ, must be an in-
terpolation. Cp. further 1. 2 § 4 n (11), 6
§ 8 n. (54, 56), IV (VII). 2 § 15 οὐ
δὲ πάντων περὶσσεύειν δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ
τῶν δεσποσύνων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ
θῶνι ἢ οὐσίᾳ ἀνθρώπων· ἀλλὰ τὸ
πρὸς τοῦτο θηρεύειν π. (727, 728): IV
(VII). 14 § 21, where one object of military
training is τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δου-
λεύειν. SUSEM. (85)

This view, that θηρευτικῇ is a species
of πολεμική, Jackson cannot accept. On
the contrary, from 8 § 12 (just quoted) he
infers that to Aristotle (as to Plato *Soph.*
222 B, *Laws* 823 B) πολεμική is a species
of θηρευτικῇ: see his note on that passage.
He translates here, "the art of acquiring
slaves, that is, the just art of acquiring
slaves, is distinct from both of these,"
from δουλικῇ καὶ δεσποτικῇ, "being a
species of the art of war or the art of
hunting."

cc. 8—11 περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ
χρηματιστικῆς.

c. 8 *In what relation does χρημα-
τιστικὴ stand to Economics? Is it (1) the
same science, or (2) a branch of it, or (3)
a subsidiary science? Is it not the same,
for it serves a different purpose, accumula-
tion: § 8 1, 2. Whether it is a branch or
not is disputed, and must be decided for*

*each of the various species of χρηματιστικὴ
separately' § 3.*

*Review of the various natural modes of
subsistence' § 4—12.*

*The natural art of production (κτητική),
which has for its object the accumulation
of natural wealth within due limits, is a
branch of Economics. § 13—15.*

For this section of the work consult
Ludw. Schneider *Die staatswirtschaft-
lichen Lehren usw.* (The theories of Po-
litical Economy in the *Politics*), pt. 1
Deutsch-Krone, 1868, pt. II Neu-Rup-
pin, 1873. Glaser *De Aristotelis doc-
trina de divitiis* (Königsberg 1856. 4)
with Bendixen's review in *Philologus*
xvi. 498 f. Hampke *Bemerkungen* (Re-
marks on Pol. 1.) Lyck, 1863; Schmitzer
Zu Aristoteles Politik in *Bor* 1. 1864.
499—516. Susemihl on *Pol.* i. cc. 8—11
in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 1865. 504—517:
Buchensschutz *Zu Aristoteles Politik* i. cc.
8—11 in *Jahrb. für Philol.* xcvi. 1867.
477—482, 713—6. SUSEM. (88)

There can be little doubt that Ari-
stotle wrote with especial reference to
Plato. *Rep.* II. 370 B—372 A, *Laws* xi.
918 A—920 C (cp. VIII. 831 E, 849 D),
Soph. 219 A f., 222 B f., 223 C, D, *Politics*
287 C—290 A, etc.

§ 1 1255 a 1 χρηματιστικῇ is applied
(1) to the whole art of acquisition, being
thus completely identical with κτητική.
In this sense the term was introduced at
3 § 3 (cp. 4 § 1 n) and this holds through-
out c. 8, and in 9 § 4. In a narrower
sense it is used (2) for the acquisition by
exchange, μεταβλητικῇ, of the kind of
wealth which in Aristotle's view is un-
natural, i.e. not for use, but to exchange
again at a profit. In this sense χρημα-
τιστικῇ 'money-making, profit-making'
= κατηλυκῇ 'trade.' So from c. 9 § 1
onwards. Again in 9 § 12, 10 § 2 it is
used (3) for that part of the art of ac-
quisition which, as opposed to (2), is
directed solely to natural wealth and is
intimately connected with Economics.
Plainly (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστικῇ,

ρήσομεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὁ δοῦ- (III)
 λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν
 ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικῇ ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἔστιν
 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικῇ, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικῇ, πότερον ὥς ἢ
 κεραιδοποιητικῇ τῇ ὑφαντικῇ ἢ ὥς ἢ χαλκουρικῇ τῇ ἀν-
 δριαντοποιίᾳ (οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως ὑπηρετοῦσαν, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν δρ-
 22 γανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ὕλην· λέγων δὲ ὕλην τὸ ὑποκει-
 μενον, ἐξ οὗ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἶον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια
 10 ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκόν). (p 11)

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ,
 δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρῆσασθαι· τίς
 γὰρ ἔσται ἢ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονο-
 14 μικήν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἔστι τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμ-

1256 a 5 [5] ὑπηρετικόν, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικόν Benda, certainly not right. That M^a omits ἢ is quite unimportant || 6 κεραιδοποιητῇ P^a 4 Q S^b T^b Ald. Bk and a later hand in P^a, κεραιδοποιή P^a (1st hand) || 9 ἔριον P^a P^a Sussem¹ b || 10 χαλκός P^a P^a Sussem¹ 12, χαλκ' M^a || 11 τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ Sylburg (οἰκονομικῇ) (ἢ οἰκονομικῇ corr. of P^a and Bk.) τῇ χρηματιστικῇ || 13 παρὰ περὶ M^a P^a S^b T^b

(2) = ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαῖα of c. 9 § 18, and (1) the widest range of the term includes both, the getting of goods as well as the getting of gain. SUSSEM. (69)

2 κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον] "in accordance with the procedure adopted," namely, that from part to whole. See 1 § 3 n. (4); 3 § 1 n. (29); III. 1 § 2 n. (434). SUSSEM. (66)

ἐπεὶ περ . ἦν] "since the slave is, as we saw, included under the head of property," being defined as κτήμα, a chattel.

5 καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετ. κτλ.] The more precise way in which this third possibility is expressed leads us to anticipate a decision in its favour (Hampke). However when the decision comes to be made, 10 §§ 1—3, it only has a preference given it; it is not exclusively adopted, as Hampke thinks. That the question, in which of the two senses χρημ. is auxiliary to Economic, is never taken up is most surprising. We can only conjecture the answer from passing hints: see on 10 § 2. SUSSEM. (67)

7 ἢ μὲν δργανα... ἢ 84 τὴν ὕλην] The one provides tools to work with, the other raw material to work up (Oncken). SUSSEM. (67 b)

This distinction comes from Plato Πολιτικῶν 287 c, ὅπου αἱ <τέχναι> παρέχοντο δργανα περὶ τὴν ὑφαντικὴν... ἐτίθεμεν ὡς συναρίτους: 288 D, εὖ τὸ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖσι

σώματα παρέχον ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς δημιουργοῦντο ὅπου αἱ τῶν τεχνῶν γνῶσις (Jackson). So too the conception of ὑπηρετικαὶ τέχναι comes from the Πολιτικῶν 281 E: ὅσα μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ μὴ δημιουργοῦσι, ταῖς δὲ δημιουργοῦσας δργανα παρασκευάζουσιν. ταύτας μὲν ἐναρίτους <τέχναι>. The Eleate quotes τὰς μὲν περὶ τὰ ἀνδράκτοι καὶ κερκίδας as the first examples of ἐναρίται τέχαι (Eaton).

§ 2 8 ὕλην τὸ ὑποκείμενον κτλ.] Plato denotes this by τὸ πρωτογενὲς ἀνθρώπου κτήμα Πολιτικῶν 288 E: but ὕλη occurs in Phil. 54 c φημι δὲ γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνθρωπον πρῶτον δργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ὕλην παρατίθεσθαι πᾶσι.

12 τίς γὰρ κτλ.] See n. (63) on c. 7 § 4. SUSSEM. (68) What is to be used to use the household goods if it be not Economic (παρὰ = except)?

14 Two alternatives are given in § 1, ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικῇ, and it is not easy to see what has become of the latter in the statement ἔστιν οὐκ ὀλίγον μέρος αὐτῆς ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος and in § 3, 17 ἢ γεωργικῇ πότερον μέρος τι ἢ ἕτερον γένος. For reasons given in Excursus III on Bk. I. p. 209 g. v., both alternatives of § 1 should be supposed included under μέρος, that is being so loosely used as to include even an auxiliary science. SUSSEM. (69)

- § 3 φισβήτησιν, εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρησάι πόθεν χρή- (III)
ματα καὶ κτήσεις ἔσται. ἡ δὲ κτήσεις πολλὰ περιέειλε μέρη καὶ ὁ
πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰ-
κονομικῆς ἢ ἑτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τρο-
19 φὴν ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ κτήσεις].
- § 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ 3
τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶν οὐ γὰρ οἶον τε ζῆν ἀνευ
τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασιν δια-
§ 5 φέροντας τῶν ζώων. τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγέλαα τὰ δὲ σπο-

15 εἰ γὰρ] *εἴπερ* Montecatino needlessly, since Vahlen (*Poetic* p. 128 f. ed. 3) has shown that *εἰ γὰρ* can be used in the same sense. Even then Vahlen's comma after 16 ἔσται must be a full stop. But perhaps *διαμφισβήτησιν, εἰ γὰρ κτήσεις ἔσται*, ** with the punctuation of previous edd., is right || 16 ἔσται, ἡ δὲ κτήσεις Bernays || 17 ** ὥστε Conring Sussem.¹ 'The lacuna began with *ὥς* or *ὥστερ*,' Hampke Schnitzer. Other proposals fruitless: see my large critical edition, *ad loc.* and Addenda || *οικονομικῆς* Gaive, *χρηματιστικῆς* Γ Π Ar Bk. || 19 [καὶ κτήσεις]? Sussem.: καὶ κτήσιν? Stahr || 22 πεποιήκασιν after *διαφέροντας* M^a P¹ || 23 τε omitted by M^a P⁴

§ 3 15 Vahlen (see critical notes) takes *εἰ γὰρ* to mean "if namely" as in Alkidamas *De soph.* I. 1, 12 ἄρ' οὐκ εὐθὺς ἡμᾶς ἄλλην τινα ποιεῖσθαι μελέτην λόγων; εἰ γὰρ οἱ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐξεργασμένοι. ἀπιστίας καὶ φθόρου. τὰς τῶν ἀκούοντων γνώμας ἐμπιπλάδι, and Axiis *Rhet.* III. 17. 11 εἰ γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς λέγων Πηλεὺς ἔταυει, εἴτα Διόκλεις, εἴτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν, (ἢ (ms ἦ) τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἡ τοιοῦτε ἔσθιν) Elsewhere γὰρ appears redundant, or rather, no apodosis is expressed to the sentence introduced by it: *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 8, 6 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν: *ἔως γὰρ* (so long namely as) ἂν περιζῶσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ἀφελείας ἀλλήλους: so *ἐπει γὰρ Rhet.* II. 25. 10, ἡ γὰρ *Pol.* VI (IV). 8 6, *ὅτε μὲν γὰρ* VIII (V). 1 8. "See however Spengel *Arist.* *Poet.* n. Vahlen's newest *Beurteilung* p. 13 ff." (Sussemihl).

16 The elements of wealth enumerated in *Rhet.* I. 5 § 7 (and *Pol.* II. 7 § 21) are γῆ, χωρίων κτήσεις, ἐτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσεις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραποδῶν. also νομίσματος πλῆθος which, according to c. 9 below, is not true wealth.

17 πρῶτον] There is no word like *δεύτερον* which expressly corresponds to this, cp. *Poet.* 13 § 2. What, we may ask, answers to it in substance? Either (i) the expression is again inexact, and ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια must be extended to the industries concerned with all the other necessities of life—shelter

clothing tools, all things in general which Aristotle calls 'instruments for life and wellbeing,' including slaves—if directly produced or acquired by plunder without resort to exchange. If so, Exchange is the *δεύτερον*. This view is supported by the actual use of *τροφὴ* in a wider sense than food, for sustenance generally, "subsistence," § 8, 10 § 1, 3. (In these passages acquisition by exchange must be understood as well as that branch of *χρηματιστικῆς* which, because directed to procuring the requisite subsistence, really belongs to economic science: but this does not affect the present question.)

Oι, (ii) if all that is meant is direct production and appropriation of food, in the strict sense of the term, then we must look for "secondly" in the remarks on the procurement of clothing and tools from the proceeds of the chase or from animals under domestication, § 11, and on the capture of slaves, § 12. In any case, whatever the grounds for supposing the text defective (see on § 12 n. 74), this is not one. SUSSEM. (70)

πότερον is dependent, like *πόθεν* line 15, upon *ἔστι τοῦ χρ. θεωρησάι*.

§§ 4, 5 That the way in which animals support themselves determines then mode of life is more fully stated *Eth. animal.* I. 1. 23, 487 b 33 ff., VIII. 1. 11, 589 a 4 ff.; and the proof is given in detail *ib.* VIII. cc 2—11 Under *καρποφάγα* are included animals who feed on berries,

ραδικά ἐστιν, ὑποτέρως συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφήν αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ (III)
 25 τὰ μὲν ζροφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι,
 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς βρατώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ φύσιν τοῦς
 βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐκάστω ἡδὺ κατὰ φύ-
 σιν ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἑτέροις, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζροφάγων καὶ τῶν
 30 καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἀλλήλα διεστάσι· ὁμοίως δὲ
 30 καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. πολλὴ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι.
 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀργότατοι νομάδες εἰσὶν (ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέ-
 ρων τροφή ζῶων ἄνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν ἀναγκαίου
 δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήνεσι διὰ τὰς νομάς καὶ
 34 αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν
 37 γεωργοῦντες)· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἕτεροι ἐτέ-
 ρας, οἷον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλείας, ὅσοι λί-

25 τὰ δὲ παμφάγα omitted by the 1st hand in P¹ (supplied by P² in the margin), τὰ δὲ 17y M^a || 26 καὶ κατὰ Bernays, perhaps rightly || 30 πολλὴ πολλοὶ P⁴ S^b T^b Ald. and probably also Q, *multis* (?) William || 31 οὖν γὰρ Γ' apparently || 33 μεταβάλλειν after τοῖς κτήνεσι M^a P¹ || 36 ἀλείας Ald. ἀλίας M^a P¹ 2 3 4

roots, fruit and vegetables, so that the term is wider than *πομφάγα* = herbivorous. In *Hist. animal.* *σαρκοφάγος* 'carnivorous' is chiefly used. *ζροφάγος* hardly ever.

§ 5 26 *βρατώνας* facilities: "to enable them to get at their food and capture it." By *τούτων* understand *ζῷα* primarily, though *καρπὸς* would be included. Bernays reads *κατὰ* for *καὶ*: "to give them facilities for the capture of their food."

§§ 6-8 Smith *Wealth of nations* Introd. Chap. I, Mill *Pol. Econ.* I. pp. 11 ff. rightly place lowest in the scale the savages who depend upon casual hunting or fishing, although in such a life fits of prolonged and strenuous exertion alternate with periods of indolence. In Homer the cannibal Cyclopes are a pastoral people. As Aristotle thought that all domesticated animals had once been wild, *Hist. anim.* I. 1. 29 488 a 30 ff, he must have overlooked the labour of taming them; cp. *n.* above on § 7.

31 The Scythians, or such North African tribes as Herodotus describes, IV. 186, would represent these *νομάδες*. They are wholly distinct from the non-migratory *νομάς* of Hellenic democracies, VII (VI). 4. 11.

32 "The cattle being forced to shift their quarters for pasturage the owners must also go about with them, as farmers to whom live-stock serves instead of land."

§ 7 36 *ληστείας* It is highly characteristic of the Greek philosopher that while he is indignant against trade and particularly against lending money on interest, 9 § 9 ff., 10 §§ 4, 5, he includes piracy as one species of the chase amongst the direct natural modes of acquisition or production, and therefore as appropriate to a householder. He was led to this by the observation that not only do certain uncivilized tribes live by plunder, and combine with a nomad life a life of brigandage, but also amongst the most ancient Greeks, as Thuc. I. 5 piecemeal informs us, piracy was rather honourable than disgraceful *οὐκ ἔχοντες πω ἀλαχόνην νότον τοῦ ἔργου φέροντος δι τὴ καὶ δόξης μάλλον*, cp. Hom. *Od.* III. 73, IX. 252; and even later it was usual amongst the Locrians and other Hellenic peoples (Thuc. I. 5, II. 32, IV. 9. 2). Here he has forgotten his own principle, that the true nature of a thing must not be sought in its beginnings, but in its perfect development, § 8. A strong national prejudice is apparent in all this, but it is well known that the earlier centuries of the Christian era had the same aversion to lending on interest (see *Introd.* 30), while many barbarities were allowed without scruple, as for instance the right to plunder wrecks, which Schlosser (I. 47 n.) adduces as a parallel. See *Introd.* 27 f. SUSSEX. (71)

μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμούς η̃ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι- (III)
 κούσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὰ δὲ πλείστον
 39 γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῆ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ-
 § 8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτό-ε
 φυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγῆς καὶ κα-
 1256 b πηλέας κομίζονται τὴν τροφήν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη- (α. 11)
 στρικὸς ἀλιευτικὸς θηρευτικὸς. οἱ δὲ καὶ μινυύντες ἐκ τού-
 των ἡδέως ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον, ἢ
 τυγχάνει ἐλλείπων πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἷον οἱ μὲν
 5 νομαδικὸν ἕμα καὶ ληστρικόν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικὸν καὶ θηρευ-
 § 9 τικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους· ὥς ἂν ἡ χρεῖα
 συναναγκάξῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη ε
 κτήσις ὅπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως δεδομένη πᾶσιν,
 9 ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτως καὶ τελειω-
 § 10 θείσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ-
 τίκεται τῶν ζώων τοσαύτην τροφήν ὥς ἱκανὴν εἶναι μέχρις
 οὗ ἂν δύνῃται αὐτὸ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἷον ὅσα
 σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ φῶτοκεῖ· ὅσα δὲ ζῶτοκεῖ, τοῖς γεννωμένοις

41 [ἐργασίαν ..b 1 τὴν] Schmidt

1256 b 1 πορίζονται II² Bk. perhaps rightly || γεωργικὸς is wanting in Γ M², and perhaps Spengel is right in transposing it to follow θηρευτικὸς || 3 τὸν ἐνδεέστερον βίον Beinaes, τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον Γ II Bk ; τὸ ἐνδεὲς τοῦ βίου Bks², τὸ ἐνδεὲς κατὰ τὸν βίον Reiske (better) || [τ] .4 εἶναι] Schmidt || 8 δεδομένη II² Bk. || 13 γενο- μένοις II² Bk.¹

37 τοιαύτην] 'such as before de- scribed' i.e. 'suitable for fishing'. The same use of the pronoun in I. 1. 2, and in II. 4. 4 δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους (i.e. 'less friend- ly') εἶναι. See Cope on *Rhet.* i. 5. 6.

36—38 With this classification of the different modes of the chase cp. Plato *Laws* vii. 823 B ; πολλὰ μὲν ἢ τῶν ἐνὸ- δρων (sc. θήραι), πολλὰ δὲ ἢ τῶν πετη- νῶν, πᾶμπολυ δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ θηρέματα, οὐ μόνον θηρίων καὶ κλω- πέται καὶ ληστῶν .θήραι See also n. on 7 § 5.

30 ἡμέρων] cultivated.
 § 8 40 ὅσοι γε αὐτόφυτον] "derive their employment from natural growth." Nature is used now for what is primitive)(the latest development.

41 καπηλεία=retail trade; ἐμπορία= wholesale trade, commerce. The former is used as a contemptuous term, "huckster- ing", Plato *Laws* viii. 849 D, xi. 918 D, *Soph.* 223 D.

1256 b 1 τὴν τροφήν=subsistence,

support: see n. (70) on § 3. SUSEM. (72) 2 οἱ δὲ κτλ] "Others select out of these some which they combine in order to pass an agreeable existence, supplying by an addition the deficiency in independence of a more meagre mode of life" (Cope).

§ 9 7 συναναγκάξῃ=constrain: σύν intensive as in συμπεληροῦν.

§ 10 12 ὅσα σκωληκοτοκεῖ ἢ φῶτο- κεῖ] Aristotle erroneously believed that insects lay no eggs, but produce worms or maggots which are then transformed through several metamorphoses into the perfect insect: see Anbert and Wimmer *Introd.* to the *De generatione animal.* p. 14, Meyer *Thierkunde des Ar.* p. 201 f. What he says of the difference between worm and egg serves in particular to explain this passage. Thus *De gener. anim.* ii. 1 §§ 8—12, 732 a 25 ff.: one species of animals, the viviparous, bring forth young like themselves fully developed; others bear offspring not yet organized or of perfect form, and of these the vertebrates

- 14 ἔχει τροφήν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά- (III)
 § 11 λακτος φύσιν. ὥστε ὁμοίως δηλον, ὅτι καὶ [γενομένους] οἰη-
 τέον τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζώων ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
 καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ
 19 τὰ γε πλείεστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοθηθείας ἐνεκεν, ἵνα
 § 12 καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ὄργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ
 φύσις μηδὲν μῆτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.
 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἔσται (ἡ γὰρ θη- 8

15 [γενομένους] Gottling, τελειωθείσιν Ar. Sussem.¹⁻² γενομένοις Γ¹Μ²Π³ Bk., γενομένοις Π¹ (1st hand), ἄλλως γενομένοις Π¹ (corr.¹ in the margin), γενομένοις (=the facts) Zell (in his ed. of the *Ethics* II. p. 405 f.), [καὶ γενομένους] Bernays, [δηλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένους] Bender || 18 Before πάντα in Π¹ is another τὰ ἄλλα (τὰλλα Π¹), a repetition of the preceding: παν (εἰ) Π⁴ (1st hand), τὰ πάντα Π⁴ (corrector) || 20 γίνηται Μ¹Π¹ || γόνυ Conington Sussem.², which suits the sense but is against Aristotle's usage, γὰρ? Sussem., οὖν Γ¹Π¹ Ar. Bk. Bernays || 23 [δὲ... 24 αὐτῆς] and 23 κτητικὴ φύσει πολεμικὴ also 24 [ἡ δὲ... 26 πόλεμον καὶ πρῶτον] Schmid², who transposes the latter to follow 1255 b 39 θηρευτικῇ. See *Qu. Cr.* III. 5 ff.

(τὰ ἐναιμα) lay eggs, while the invertebrates (τὰ ἄναιμα) breed worms. The difference between egg and worm is this: if the young animal is developed from a part and the rest serves as nourishment for it, it is an egg; but if the whole of the young animal proceeds from the whole of what is produced, it is a worm. Also *Hist. anim.* I. 5. 3 489 b 6 ff.: a perfect germ (ἄναιμα) is called an egg when one part of it serves for the formation and another for the nourishment of the young animal developed out of it, a worm when the whole animal is developed out of the whole of the germ by its organization and growth: cp. *ib.* V. 19. 2 550 b 28 ff. ἐκ δὲ τῶν σκυλῶν οὐκ ἐκ μέρους τινὸς γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ζώων, ἀλλ' ὅταν αἰσθάνεται καὶ διαπυρρῶμενον γίνεται τὸ ζῷον, and *De gener. anim.* III. 2. 4 752 a 27 f. οὐχ ὥστε οἱ σκύλῳκες αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν (sc. τὰ ζῷα) λαμβάνει τὴν αἰσθῆσιν. It follows from these explanations that what Aristotle asserts in the present passage of worms is in reality only true of eggs. All that the former receive from the parent worm is that capacity for perfect self-development which is wanting in the egg. Cp. also 10 § 3 κ. (96). SUSSEM. (78)

14 τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν = the natural substance called milk. So τοῦ ἀέρος, τοῦ θερμοῦ φύσις = air, heat respec-

tively: see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 838 a 8 ff. with the examples 837 b 42 ff.

§ 11 15 γενομένους] "after they are born." The crude teleology of §§ 11, 12 is common to all the Sociatics and was probably derived from Socrates himself: *Xen. Mem.* I. 4. 5 ff.

§ 12 23 διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ κτλ.] This does not directly follow from the foregoing. Some intermediate thought has to be supplied: < it must further be assumed that amongst men themselves the less perfect are formed for the service of the more perfect >. Cp. also *ib.* (70) on § 3. SUSSEM. (74)

"These are at least four ways of taking this passage. (1) Vettori Giphanius Schneider Bojesen make αὐτῆς and ἡ both refer to πολεμική. (2) Lambin, Schutizer, Stahl refer αὐτῆς to πολεμική, ἡ to θηρευτική. This is plainly absurd: for if θ.ρευτική can be used against men as well as wild animals it is no longer μέρος πολεμικής, but at least as extensive as πολεμική. (3) Garve, followed by Hampke p. 16, refers αὐτῆς to κτητική, and ἡ to θηρευτική. These are three objections to this: (a) It proves too much; for if we deduce the right to make war from the right to hunt, why should not captives be eaten?—a notion which Aristotle (7) IV (VII). 2. 15 expressly repudiates with abhorrence. (β) Wars of


- ρευτική μέρος αὐτῆς), ἣ δὲ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ (III)
 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς
 φύσει δίκαιον ὄντα τοῦτον τὸν πόλεμον.
 18 ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς
 μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὥπως ὑπάρχει,

26 ὄντα αὖτε τοῦτον Π²Bk. On τοῦτον p² gives the gloss τὸν θηρευτικόν, this θηρευτικόν has crept into the text in Γ' M' after τοῦτον τὸν || πρῶτον is added after πάλαιον by M² P¹ and P² (corr.), καὶ πρῶτον by Γ': but, as Schmidt observes, this πρῶτον has arisen from ἀ=ἐν || 27 κτητικῆς after κατὰ φύσιν M² P¹ || τῆς οἰκονομικῆς τοῦ οἰκονομοῦ Thurot, [μέρος] Schneider Hampke Thurot; but see Comm. || 28 [ἐστίν ὑπάρχει] Schmidt || δ' ὅ Thurot (*Revue critique*, 1869, p. 84 f.), δ' δ' Schmitzer, ἢ Lambin Reiske, δ<τ> Zwinger, <λαβ>δ Beinaes: in *Revue critique*, 1872, p. 57 f. Thurot considers the sense given by the last three suggestions necessary; δ Ransow, who transposing δ. ὑπάρχειν to follow οἰκίας and reading οὐ for 29 ὦν has the following order ἐστίν· οὐ ἐστι θησαυρισμός.. ἢ οἰκίας δ' δεῖ ἦτοι.. ὅπως ὑπάρχει

defence or to regain liberty can hardly be called hunting: the notion of hostility is the wider. (γ) The clause ὡς φύσει δίκαιον assigns a separate justification for the kind of war in question, which is not therefore deduced from the chase. It depends upon the view of slavery laid down in cc. 5, 6. (4) Sepulveda renders, *quo fit ut opes bello etiam parvande ratio a natura quodammodo proficiatur*, making πολεμική an epithet of κτητική and μέρος αὐτῆς=μέρος πολεμικῆς κτητικῆς; he also refers ἣ to θηρευτική. But though this gives excellent sense it involves transposing φύσει after ἀλητική: and there is hardly good evidence of two adjectives in -ική so combined, the one as attribute the other as substantive." SUSEM. *Quaest. Crit.* III. p. 6 f. Then translate: "hence the natural art of war will belong in a sense to the art of acquisition (for the chase is only one branch of it)" viz. of natural warfare, and θηρευτική, § 7, is ἀνθρώποις ἐργασία. "It" i.e. war "has to be employed not only against wild animals but also against all such men as, though naturally slaves, refuse submission, this species of war having a natural justification."

The view given above as (3)—αὐτῆς=κτητικῆς, ἣ=θηρευτικῇ—is supported by Jackson, who would extend the parenthesis to πόλεμον. He translates: 'natural warfare will in a sense be a branch of acquisition: for (1) the chase is a mode of acquisition, and (2) can be applied either against wild animals (in which case it is θηρευτική proper) or against natural slaves, who refuse to obey, that being a

branch of war which has a natural justification.' He adds: "The διαίρεσις then is



From 7 § 5 it would appear that πολεμική is still further divided. So Plato, *Soph.* 223 c, includes ἡσυχική, ἀνδραγωγιστική, and τυραννική under the general head of πολεμική, which is one of the two branches of ἡμεροδομική."

25 ὡς φύσει δίκαιον] Consult the reff. given n. (6) on 7 § 5. SUSEM (76)

§ 13 27 ἐν μὲν οὖν καὶ] See Exc. III. on B. I p. 210. SUSEM. (76. b)

28 With the changes proposed by Madvig and Ransow (see critical notes) translate: "one species of acquisition then is a branch of economic science, that branch namely whose task it is to collect a store of objects necessary for life and useful for civil or domestic society, objects which ought therefore to be at hand for the householder or to be provided to his hand by his science (Economic)" Others (Lambin, Zwinger, Bernays, Thurot) either change δ, or else extract from it the sense of 'since', 'in so far as', taking ὧν ἐστι θησ. χρημάτων=the means to a store of commodities (or possessions, κτήματων): a rendering not very clear, see § 14. SUSEM. Jackson, for the most part agreeing with Beinaes, interprets ὧν ἐστι θησ. χρημάτων 'things capable of being stored' (here perhaps anticipated by Gottling τὰτα τὰ χρήματα ὧν ἐστι θησ.); he

ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ (III)
 § 14 χρῆσιμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ οἶκεν ὃ γ' ἀλη-
 31 θινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἀπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σό-
 λων φησὶ ποιήσας

(p. 13)

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται.

§ 15 κείται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπει-
 36 ρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλούτος
 ὄργανον πλήθους ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

ὅτι μὲν τὸν μὲν ἔστι τις κτητική κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκο-
 νόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, δῆλον·

9 ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ 10

29 ὧν ἐστὶ] ὃ ἐνεσσι Madvig (this I think needed whether we emend with
 Lambin, Zwinger, Beinays or transpose with Rassoov): μέρος ἐστίν· ὃ ἐνεσσι θησαυ-
 ρισμὸς ... οἰκίας, δὲ δει ὑπάρχει Susem.² provisionally || ὧν] ὧν Schmidt || κτημά-
 των Beinays (perhaps rightly) for χρημάτων || 31 ἀγαθῶν P²⁻³ Q S¹ T¹ Ar. and P¹
 (1st hand), ἀγαθῶν P¹ (corrector¹) || 35 κείται omitted by M², λείπει γὰρ om. by P¹
 (1st hand—supplied by P¹ in the margin) || 37 οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν Γ, οἰκο-
 νομικῶν [καὶ πολιτικῶν] Schultz, but see Comm. || 38 [ἐνι. 39 ἐφ' ἧλων] Schmidt ||
 39 καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς Schutz also proposes to bracket, but see Comm.

translates "in so far as Economic must
 either find ready to hand, or itself provide
 that there may be found ready to hand,
 necessities of life and utilities which are
 capable of being stored for the common
 use of state or family."

30 True wealth is for use: ὧν δὲ τὸ
 πλοῦτος ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μάλλον ἢ ἐν
 τῷ ἐκτελεῖσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ τῶν
 τοιοῦτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος Rhet. 1. 5. 7.

§ 16 32 αὐτάρκεια = the amount of such
 property absolutely necessary to secure
 independence of all external aid.

οὐκ ἀπειρὸς] See 9 §§ 13, 14. The
 notion of a limit to true wealth recurs in
 Epicurus *ἀνάκτ.* Diog. Laet. x. 144: ὃ
 τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ἀριστος καὶ ἀπό-
 ριστος ἐστὶ, ὃ δὲ τῶν κερῶν δοῦναι εἰς ἀνεύ-
 ρον ἡμῖν ἐστι. The earlier political econo-
 mists believed in a possible "glut of
 capital": Mill P. E. i. 5 § 3.

Σόλων] *Ἠθ.* 13, 71 Bergk. SUSEM.
 (76)

§ 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ κτλ.] Cp. iv (vii).
 i § 5 n. (695), i § 7 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτός
 ἔχει πέρας, ὥσπερ ὄργανον τι, πᾶρ γὰρ τὸ
 χρησόμενον ἐν τι, ὧν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἡ βλάβη
 τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἢ μὴδὲν ὀφελος εἶναι αὐτῶν
 τοῖς ἔχουσιν. SUSEM. (76 b)

37 ὄργανον πλήθους κτλ.] in other

words, means and appliances for life, and
 for the life of wellbeing and perfection
 as the end of the household and of the
 state. But cp. Exc. III. SUSEM. (77)

The definition of wealth as "instru-
 ments" (given also 4 § 2) is commended
 by J. S. Mill *Political Economy* i. 10 as
 adding distinctness and reality to the
 common view. His definitions are "any
 product both useful and susceptible of
 accumulation"—with which comp. 1256 b
 29—and "all useful or agreeable things
 which possess exchange value." Mill too
 restricts the term to material wealth.

38 τοῖς οἰκονομικοῖς κτλ.] See again
 Exc. III. p. 211 n. (2). SUSEM. 77 (b)

c 9. The other species of κτητική, viz.
 χρηματιστική, the art of money-making,
 § 1. Origin of exchange in the infancy
 of society, §§ 2-6. Origin and use of
 money: §§ 7-11. Distinction between
 natural κτητική and this χρηματιστική:
 §§ 12-15. Cause of the confusion between
 them: §§ 16-18.

§ 1. 40 ἣν μάλιστα κτλ.] "which is
 especially called money-making," χρημα-
 τιστική (2) of 8 § 1 n. "and fairly so
 called; to which is due the opinion that
 wealth and property have no limit." But
 9 § 4 the first sense seems to recur.

41 δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικὴν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ (III)
 257 α πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν
 αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειννῆσιν
 ἔστι δ' οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ'
 4 ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας
 § 2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεταί μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 11
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρήσις
 ἐστίν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ'
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος,
 9 οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-
 § 3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-
 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς
 χρητῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
 χρησίν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
 § 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ
 15 μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ
 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλεῖω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν

41 οὕτω Bas.³ in the margin

1257 a 1 [τῇ 5 μᾶλλον] Schmidt || 3 ἐκείνης] κεμένη Γ (?—*proila* William)
 Suscm.^{1,2} || 6 κτήματος Γ M^a and P¹ in the margin || 7 καθ' αὐτό] after ὁμοίως
 Koraes || 9 ὑπόδεσις M^a P¹ || 12 [τῷ ὑπόδημα] Koraes, Scaliger proposed to trans-
 pose these words to follow χρῆσιν, which also occurred to Koraes, but see Comm.
 n. (78)

§ 2 1257 a 6 ἐκάστου γὰρ κτλ]
 "Compare *End. Eth.* III. 4, 1231 b 38,
 where we find the same classification of
 χρήσεις, though the use in exchange is

reckoned a species not of ἡ καθ' αὐτό
 χρήσις, but of ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The two
 classifications are as follows:—

Politics
 καθ' αὐτὸ οἰκεία
 καθ' αὐτὸ οὐκ οἰκεία
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός

ὑπόδεσις
μεταβλητικὴ
ὡς ἂν εἴ τις
σταθμῷ χρῆσταιτο
τῷ ὑποδήματι

End. Eth.
 καθ' αὐτό
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός
 κατὰ συμβεβηκός"

(Jackson).

9 ὑπόδεσις = wearing, ἡ μεταβλητικὴ =
 the use in exchange. The shoe when
 used as an article of exchange preserves
 its proper nature, it is still to be worn by
 somebody; although as it is not made to
 exchange this use is οὐκ οἰκεία.

§ 3 το καὶ γὰρ. 12 ὑπόδημα] This
 is true. The question is always how
 much money or food the shoe as such,
 and not the leather used in making it, is
 worth: the labour has to be paid for as

well as the materials (Gotting) Cp n.
 on § 8 (83) and *Introd.* 28 SUSCM. (78)
 12 ἢ ὑπόδημα] as a shoe.

§ 4 14 ἔστι γὰρ . πάντων] sc. χρῆ-
 σις. "All things have a use in exchange."
 We now speak of the two *values* of a
 thing, value in use and value in exchange.

15 ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον] (τὸ δὲ
 ὑστερον, derived in the first instance from
 a natural origin [whatever it may after-
 wards become].

ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς ¹²
 χρηματιστικῆς ἢ καπηλικῆς ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
 § 5 καὶ οὖν ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ
 20 κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἔργον
 αὐτῆς. ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκονομῶν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
 πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων + *· ὃν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον <ἦν>
 24 ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἔτι πολλὰ ποιεῖ [καὶ] τῶν (p. 14)
 § 6 βαρβαρικῶν ἐθνῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ
 χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλέον δ' οὐδὲν,
 οἷον οἷον πρὸς σίτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη- 13

17 [ἢ λαί.. 19 ἀλλαγὴν] Schmidt || φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] τις φύσει χρημα-
 τιστικῇ Schmidt || 18 χρηματιστικῆς] μεταβλητικῆς Beinays || 20 [τοῦτο. οἰκία]
 Schmidt || ἐστὶν] ἢν Schmidt || 22 τῶν omitted in Π² and Α₁, it is supplied
 by p¹ in the margin || 23 καὶ was left out by Camot, [καὶ] Koras, <ἐτέρων
 <ἰδέοντο> Schneider, ἐτέρων <ἡτόρουν> Schmidt, ἰστέροντο Koras, <ἐτεροι> ἐτέρων
 Bernays (on which see Comm.). Fülleborn saw that something was lost: ἐτέρων
 <ἐτεροι ἡτόρουν>? Sussem. Welldon changes ἐτέρων into ἰδέοντο || Koras added
 ἦν || 24 λαί is wanting in Γ, [λαί] Sussem., καὶ <νόν> Schmidt and Beinays (per-
 haps rightly); Russo transposes καὶ to precede πολλὰ—not badly || 25 ff Michael
 of Ephesus in his comm. on Arist. Ethic. f. 70^a refers to this passage

17 ἢ καὶ δῆλον. καπηλικῇ] Barter
 is sufficient for natural wants, as he goes
 on to show. Money is an artificial means
 of facilitating this, not of natural origin
 but only due to custom and convention,
 see §§ 8—11 *ms* (82, 83), though when
 applied within due limits it is not con-
 trary to nature. The whole explanation
 would have been clearer, Fülleborn rightly
 observes, had Aristotle definitely stated
 what he means by 'trade' (καπηλική=
 huckstering, retail trade), viz that it is a
 buying and exchanging "not for one's
 own wants, but in order to sell again".
 As it is, this is left to be inferred from
 the context. SUSSEM. (79)

18 ὅσον γὰρ καὶ] "For the necessity
 of exchange is confined, as we saw, to
 the satisfaction of the exchangers' own
 wants." Cp. τοσαύτης=only so much 13
 § 12.

§ 5 21 ἄλλ' ἤδη] but not until the
 society extended. Since trade is intro-
 duced at a later stage it is not 'natural'.
 Possibly directed against Plato's primi-
 tive state, the ἀθηναί, ἡγήσι, ὅν πᾶσι,
 Rep. II. 371 A—D: ἀγορά δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ
 πόσιμα ξυμβολὰν τῇ ἀλλαγῇ ἐνεκα γυνή-

σεται.

22 οἱ δὲ κεχωρ. καὶ] Beinays thought
 the addition of a word for "lacked" un-
 necessary, 'because this idea is implied in
 κεχωρισμένοι'. If so, as κεχωρ. <ἐτεροι>
 ἐτέρων=separated (or divided) one from
 this thing, another from that, so κεχωρ.
 πολλῶν should mean 'separated from
 many things'. But as Beinays gives
 'division of possessions', i.e. separate
 property was introduced for many things'
 he must intend κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν
 to stand for 'living in divided possession of',
 or *in respect of*, 'many things': a sense
 hardly possible in any case and quite in-
 conceivable if the participle has a different
 construction with ἐτέρων. SUSSEM.

Postgate would give in πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων
 by ἐκονομῶν, supposing πολλῶν to be op-
 posed to πάντων (as πλείστον is, II. 5. 27),
 and understanding ἐτέρων of the primary
 division of the joint-household into two
 "again when the original household split
 into two, each half continued to hold in
 common a large part of the stock, viz. all
 that the other half left it".

23 κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις] Comp 2 § 5 n.
 (18). SUSSEM. (80)

29 τικῇ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἶδος οὐδέν (III)
 § 7 (εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνταρκείας ἦν)· ἐκ
 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετο ἡ κείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ
 γενομένης τῆς βοθηθείας τῷ εἰσαγάσθαι ὧν ἔνδεεις καὶ ἐκ-
 πέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομισματος ἐπο-
 § 8 ρίσθη χρήσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ φύσιν
 35 ἀναγκαίων· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιοῦτόν τι συνθέντο
 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ὃ τῶν χρησίμων
 αὐτὸ ὅν εἶχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἶον

33 γενομένης Koras, γενομένης II Bk. || ἐνδεεῖς] ἐνδεῖς Bernays || 37 Κοίνας
 conjectured <οὐκ> ὅν, but see Int. p. 28 ff and Comm. II. (87) || ζῆν] <μετα-
 κομί> ζῆν Reiske, certainly right as to the sense, <βαστά> ζῆν Bernays (less good)

§ 7 31 κατὰ λόγον, as one might have
 inferred. Lindau 'by agreement'. But
 can the words bear this meaning? The
 proof which follows seems to show that
 this phrase expresses subjectively the same
 thing as 33 ἐξ ἀνάγκης in objective fashion.
 SUSK. (81) Similarly IV (VII). 16. 10
 Bonitz commenting on 989 a 30. "quod
 rationibus ad rem pertinentibus accom-
 modatum est et consentaneum"

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ] "when the supply
 extended to foreign countries."

§ 8 34 οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον κτλ.]
 Yet money is not by nature, but has its
 origin in mere convention! Here again
 Aristotle falls into the contradiction
 noticed in II. (71), seeking the true nature
 of man in violation of his own principle,
before instead of *in* the normal develop-
 ment of civilization. Hence he ignores
 the fact which on other occasions (*Poet.*
 4, §§ 1—6) by no means escapes him,
 that there is no unconditional antithesis
 between nature and art, nature and con-
 vention, nature and civilization: that
 innumerable arts institutions and con-
 ventions take their origin from man's inmost
 nature in the course of its development.
 It is precisely so with the state, and as
 with the state so with money. That in
 history too the law of a rational necessity
 controls chance is a thought not suffi-
 ciently acknowledged in his works: see
Poet. 9 §§ 2, 10, with my notes, and
 Reinkens *op. cit.* 289 ff, who somewhat ex-
 aggerates. Cp also below on II. 9 § 12 n.
 (296), § 30 n. (339), III 3. 9 n. (466).
 SUSK. (82)

35 διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς κτλ.] On
 the origin of money compare *Nic. Eth.*
 V. 8 §§ 10—16 (1133 a 19 ff): of which
 the substance is as follows,

All things which are to be exchanged
 must be somehow commensurable: and
 for this purpose money has been intro-
 duced, which serves as a sort of medium,
 for it measures all things, e.g. how many
 pairs of shoes are equivalent to a given
 house. The standard or common mea-
 sure is in reality demand; but demand
 is conventionally represented by money
 which gets its name (*νόμισμα* = currency)
 because it is not by nature but by conven-
 tion (*νόμος*), so that it is in our power to
 change and demote it (i.e. render it
 no longer current). If we do not require
 a thing now, money is still the guarantee
 of a future exchange, to take place if we
 require the thing at some other time.
 And although the value of money itself
 occasionally changes, yet it tends to be
 more constant than that of any other
 thing. All other commodities should
 therefore have a price set on them, that
 so exchange may always be possible.
 SUSK. (83)

36 ὃ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὅν] Schneider
 thinks this is not implied by the nature of
 money, since certain tribes use cowries as
 a medium of exchange, and the Ethi-
 opians stones with marks engraved upon
 them (*λίθοις ἐγγεγραμμένοις* Ps-Plato
Eryx. 100 n) We admit the truth of
 this, yet only a metallic currency can
 fulfil the proper end of money, and from
 the nature of the case the really civilized
 races have always availed themselves of it.
 Aristotle however has failed to recognise
 this sufficiently: see § 11 n. (87) and *Is-
 tova.* 29. SUSK. (84)

37 χρεῖαν recalls *χρησίμων*: a com-
 modity useful in itself which adapted its
 use handily to the purposes of daily life.

σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ- (II)
 τον ἀπλῶς ὀρίσθην μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλόντων, ἕν' ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως
 § 9 αὐτούς· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτῆρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημεῖον. πορι- 15
 1257 b σθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς
 θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
 μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας
 4 ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον
 § 10 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ
 νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρησάι πόθεν
 ἔσται πλῆθος [χρημάτων]· ποιητικὴ γὰρ [εἶναι] τοῦ πλούτου
 καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλὰκις τιθέασι νο- 10
 9 μίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν
 § 11 καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ
 νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-

38 αὖν εἰ Μ^o Π^o Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 ἐπιβαλόντων Μ^o Π^o Bk.

1257 b 3 οὖν omitted by P^a-s. Q S^o T^b Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand) || γινόμενον
 ? Susem. || 7 [χρημάτων] Giphanius || ποιητικὴν [γὰρ] Schmidt, who transposes
 ποιητικὴν . . . 8 χρημάτων to follow 10 καπηλικὴν || γὰρ δ' Beinays, inserting γὰρ after
 the next following καὶ, thus: χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ δ' εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου· καὶ <γὰρ>
 χρημάτων· καὶ γὰρ κτλ. If so, 9 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ must also be omitted || εἶναι
 omitted by Π¹ || τοῦ omitted by M^o, bracketed by Korais; ὅπως? Susem. || 8 Giphanius
 proposed to omit γὰρ; Schmidt transposes it to follow 9 διὰ || πολλὰκις after τιθέασι
 M^o P¹ || 9 διὰ τὸ διδ? Susem. || 10 Thurot proposes to omit καὶ before τὴν, καὶ
 <εἶναι>? Susem.; Schutz rejects καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (αὐτὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ) ||
 11 νόμῳ Lambin, perhaps rightly; yet see Comm. n. (86)

38 σίδηρος] "Byzantium is an instance of the use of iron money; cp. Plato Comicus *Peis.* 3 χαλεπῶς ἂν οὐκ ἴσασιν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ ὅπου σιδερέαια τοῖς νομίμασιν ἢ χρῶνται. These coins were commonly called σιδερέαια, cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 149. εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον] Aristotle has in mind some such coinage as the Electrum money used at Cyzicus" (Ridgeway). Electrum was the material of the earliest known coins of Lydia, before the time of Croesus, and of the Ionian cities; see Gardner *Types of Gk Coins* p. 4 ff., *Head Coinage of Lydia* p. 11
 τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κτλ.] This is the old-fashioned bar-money, like the iron money at Sparta. Pseudo-Plato *I. c.* ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ σιδηρὰ σταθμὰ νομίζουσι. Cp. Xen. *De Rep. Laccd.* 7. 5; Plutarch *Lyc.* 17 (ἀβέλαια, spits), *Lyc.* 9; Polybius vi. 43; and II Stein *On the Spartan iron money* in *Fabri b. f. Philol.* LXXIX 1864.

332 ff. SUSEM. (85)

§ 9 1257 b 1 Take ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκ. ἀλλαγῆς with πορισθέντος rather than with ἐγένετο, "as soon as a currency was provided in consequence of the necessary exchange, there arose the other branch of the art of wealth, I mean retail-trade: at first no doubt in a rude form, but afterwards improved by experience as to the quarters from which, and the way in which, exchange of commodities" not μεταβαλλόμενον < τὸ νόμισμα >, "will produce the largest profit".

§ 10 8 καὶ γὰρ . . . το καπηλικήν] This is the error best known as the Mercantile System: the confusion of money with wealth exposed by Adam Smith *Wealth of Nations* B. iv. Cp. Mill *Pol. Econ.* pp. 1-4. Even in *Rhet.* I. 5 γ νομίσματος πλῆθος 14 only one of many 'elements' of wealth

§ 11 11 νόμος παντάπασιν] An allu-

θεμένον τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς (III)
οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ, καὶ νομίματος πλουτῶν πολλὰ-
κας ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον
15 εἶναι πλουτῶν οὐ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολείπεται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν (v. 15)
Μίδαν ἐκείνον μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς
§ 12 πάντων αὐτῷ γνωσμένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ 17
ζητοῦσιν ἑτερόν τι τὸν πλουτῶν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὁρθῶς
ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἑτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλούτος ὁ
20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομική, ἡ δὲ καπηλική,
ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ χρημάτων με-
ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ
§ 13 νόμισμα στοιχείον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἐστίν. καὶ ἄπει-
ρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλούτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς.

12 οὐδὲ Bk., οὔτε II. || 20 αὐτῷ] ἡ? Schmidt || [καὶ αὕτη... 24 χρηματιστικῆς]
Schmidt, who transposes καὶ αὕτη 30 κτῆσις to follow 1257 a 5 μάλλον || ἡ after
μὲν corr.² of I² || 21 ἡ P⁴⁻⁶ Q (?) I² Ald., ἡ S⁴, ἡ Rassow || Bernays omits χρη-
μάτων after αὐτῷ || 24 δὲ Giphanius || οὗτος omitted by II²

slon to the derivation of νόμισμα = money, currency, from νόμος = convention, *conventional custom*: see n. (83). It may be for the same reason that money is more pointedly said to be νόμος rather than νόμιμ, 'conventional', as we should expect. The same allusion in Pseudo-Plato *Εργασίαι* I. c. 5, n. (85) (Schneider). SUSEM. (86) δτι παρατιθέμενον κτλ.] Although Aristotle himself, § 12, adopts the opinion that this form of wealth is οὐδὲν φέσκει, yet here the view is carried much farther than he goes in § 8, see n. (84). He must hold that money, when no longer current, loses its value as money, retaining only its value in exchange as this or that metal: its only use now is as metal, not as coin. SUSEM. (87)

With this comp. *N. E.* v. 5 § 11, ἐφ' ἧμιν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ τοῖσιν ἀχρηστον, § 14 πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ νόμισμα) τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ γὰρ δεῖ ἵσταν θύναται· ὁμοῦ δὲ βοῦδεται μὲνεν μάλλον

14 καίτοι κτλ.] "And yet it is strange that there should be wealth of a kind that with abundance of it a man will nevertheless perish of hunger, as the legend runs about Midas of yore, when in fulfilment of his insatiate prayer everything that was served up to him turned into gold."

16 Μίδαν] This mythical king of Phrygia is said to have captured Silenos and restored him to Dionysos, who in

return for the kind treatment of the prisoner allowed him to wish for whatever he liked. The fatal boon was subsequently withdrawn by the god at Midas' request, see Ovid *Metamorph.* XI. 90—145. Aristotle must have had a version of the story in which, instead of this happening, Midas died from hunger and thirst. Would the Midas of the legend have fared any better in the end, if all his food had been converted into drink, or all his drink into food? In the one case he would have been starved to death, in the other killed by thirst. SUSEM. (88)

§ 12 17 διὰ [ζητοῦσιν κτλ.] A possible reference to previous writers, see *Introd.* 20 n. (1). SUSEM. (88 b)

19 ἑτέρα ἡ χρ.] Getting of goods for use, χρηματιστικὴ (3) of § 8 § 1 n.

21 διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς] "by exchange of commodities. And this species, i. e. ἡ καπηλική, is thought to deal with money, for currency constitutes and limits exchange;" i. e. trading begins and ends with money. στοιχείον, main constituent, seems to mean indispensable agent in exchange. Elsewhere called guarantee, τῆς μελλούσης ἀλλαγῆς ὅλον ἐγγυητήν, *N. E.* § 14; and ὑπόδηγμα τῆς χρείας, representative of demand id. § 11.

§ 13 23 καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ] "In the words of the line from Solon, 8 § 14" (Bernays). SUSEM. (89)

25 ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἱατρικὴ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστι καὶ (III)
ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ
ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπει-
ρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς
29 χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
§ 14 πλούτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς [οὐ χρη- 18
ματιστικῆς] ἐστὶ πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον.
διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλούτου πέρας,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὁρᾷμεν συμβαῖνον τὸνναντίον· πάντες
34 γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον αὐξουσιν οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.
§ 15 αἰτίων δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν. ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις

25 As Eucken remarks, we should have expected εἰσι; but this change would be very bold (see 36 and 1258 a 1) || 30 τῆς δ'...31 ἔργον suspected as an interpolation Schmidt || οὐ χρηματιστικῆς P⁹ (coll. ?), Reiske first omitted these two words (but after 31 οἰκονομικῆς he inserts δ καὶ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, in which case Schneider and Guittl recommend ταὐτὸ instead of τοῦτο); [οὐ] Bojesen Thurot Schultz, ad Bernays, σθ<σθ> Schmidt. The case is still undecided || 31 οὐ γὰρἔργον once transposed by Schmidt to follow 32 πέρας This however really involves other and perhaps more serious difficulties || 32 μὲν <φύσει> ? Sussem. || διὰ <τὶ δὲ> τῇ μὲν * * φαίνεται Schmidt || 33 ὁρᾷμεν Sylburg, ὁρᾷ P II Ar. || 34 νόμισμα, αἰτίων * * διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν Schmidt

25 τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν depends on εἰς ἀπειρον: medicine is without end *in respect of* health; medicine recognises no limits within which its production of health is confined

27 τὸ πρὸς τὸ τέλος = means to the end.

28 πέρας, πάσαις "For all arts are limited by their ends." True in cases where, after a certain limit has been passed, the number and amount of the means applied do not contribute anything to the attainment of the end, may even hinder it. But does it also hold for the all-embracing end of human life, the happiness and perfection not of individuals but of whole nations and finally of the human race? Aristotle did not think of that: and no wonder, when we consider it is only the discovery of modern Political Economy, that capital is simply accumulated labour: that the means to continued progress in national civilization are guaranteed solely by the transmission and growth of the national wealth from generation to generation, which money first made possible. We ought rather, with Stahl and others (*Introd.* p. 28), to recognise Aristotle's penetrating insight, the ripeness and maturity of many of his conclusions in this

9th chapter, "the unpretending germ from which two thousand years afterwards grew the science of society". Cp. further IV (VII). I § 5 n. (695), n. (700). SUSSEM (90).

§ 14 30 If οὐ be changed or omitted, take τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as an adjective: so perhaps l. 39 below, and undoubtedly § 18, 1258 a 17: "but to that branch" of accumulation "which concerns the householder there is a limit". See however n. on 8 § 12, p. 177.

31 τοῦτο = to attain this limit, χρήματα ποιεῖν as Schneider says, τῇ μὲν "in one sense", viz. when regarded as an instrument. Lambin Schutz Bernays take it as "to the one branch", viz. that which concerns the householder.

34 εἰς ἀπειρον] Cp. [Xen.] *De Vectigal.* 4 § 6, 7. ἀργύριον δὲ οὐδεὶς πω οὕτω πολλὸν ἐκτήσατο ὥστε μὴ ἐπὶ προσέειδαι.

οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι = those who are engaged in traffic.

35 τὸ σύνεγγυς, the close relationship between the two branches of χρηματιστικῆς is the cause of this mistake.

§ 15 ἐπαλλάττει.] See on I. 6. 3. "The practical application of the two kinds of χρηματιστικῆς overlaps, though being concerned with the same article.

τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσα ἐκατέρας τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς (III)
 ἐστὶ κτήσεως χρήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταυτόν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν
 ἑτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τισι τοῦτ' εἶναι
 39 τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἢ σφῆζειν οἰόμενοι
 § 16 δεῖν ἢ αὐξεῖν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἀπειρον. αἰτίων 19
 δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
 1258 a μὴ τὸ εὖ ζῆν· εἰς ἀπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὕσης,
 καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὅσοι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ
 ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς
 ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρ-
 5 χειν, πᾶσα ἡ διατριβὴ περὶ τὸν χρηματισμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ (p 15)

36 ἐκατέρας Ar. and the mss. used by Sepulveda, ἐκατέρα Γ II Bk. ἐκατέρα Schneider, ἐκατέρᾳ and then τῇ χρηματιστικῇ Beinays, perhaps rightly || 37 κτήσεως χρήσις Gottling (after Schneider, or rather Fulleborn, had proposed to omit the whole clause 36 τῆς γὰρ.. 37 χρήσις), χρήσεως ἁπλῆς Γ II Ar. Bk. || 39 οἰονομίας p 46. Q S^b T^b

1258 a 1 οὕσης Sylburg (but see on 1257 b 25) || 2 ὅσοι.....3 ἐπιβάλλονται noticed by Eustath. on the *Iliad* p. 625, 36 || 4 ὑπάρχον Korais (perhaps rightly)

Here two χρήσις ἐπαλλάττουσι because they have the same object in common". (Postgate).

37 τῆς μὲν κτλ.] 'The one application has a different end' (viz. enjoyment, use) 'the other aims at mere accumulation'

39 διατελοῦσιν κτλ.] "persist through life in the opinion that they ought at least to hoard their stock of money if not to go on adding to it indefinitely": νομίσ. οὐσίαν=their substance or capital in money, Bonitz s. v. Better thus taken than as a paraphrase of νόμισμα, for which idiom see Waitz *Org.* i. 283 and cp. ἡ τοῦ δυνάμεως οὐσία 693 b 6.

§ 16 This gives the reason why men fall into the error just noticed, the external cause, the trap into which they fall, having been stated in § 14. ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως=τοῦ διατελεῖν ἢ σφῆζειν κτλ. (Postgate).

40 αἰτίων δὲ κτλ.] 'Perhaps the thought becomes clearer' says Fulleborn 'when expressed as follows. men have a universal desire for long life, and without setting a definite aim before them,' without making clear to themselves wherein the value and happiness of life really consist, 'they work on incessantly to procure themselves the means of living through this indefinite series of years. Now if they would consider how to provide for present enjoyment' and for the ennobling

of life, 'their desire for gain would be rendered more definite and limited'. SUSEM. (91)

1258 a 2 ὅσοι δὲ κτλ.] "those who set their hearts upon a life of happiness look for it in sensual enjoyments" whereas, on Aristotle's own theory, the true embellishment and perfecting of life, i. e. happiness, consists in the utmost possible cultivation of mental and moral excellence, of which the highest and noblest enjoyments are but a necessary consequence, a moderate share of external goods and bodily pleasures being required not as constituent element but merely as indispensable condition all beyond this hinders rather than promotes true Wellbeing See Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II ii 609: cp. IV (vii), i §§ 7, 8. SUSEM. (92)

3 ἐπιβάλλονται] 'throw themselves upon' (cp. Hom. *Il.* vi. 68, ἐνάρων ἐπιβάλλομενος) 'desire' in the same metaphorical sense as ἀρέσασθαι, ἀντρίσθαι. But otherwise II. i. 1 'to adopt'. For the intransitive use of the active see i. 13 §§ 8, 13. In *Nic. Eth.* I. 5 §§ 1, 2 ὁ ἀπολαυστικός βίος is the life of sensual enjoyment. As Plato explains *Rep.* ix. 580 E f., money is the means to this life, so that φιλοκερδές, φιλοχρήματος are convertible terms with τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν: hence ὁ χρηματιστικὸς ἀνὴρ comes to be compared with ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλόσοφος.

§ 17 ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ' ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν ὑπερ- (II)
 βολῇ γὰρ οὐσῆς τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς
 ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικὴν ζητοῦσιν· κἀν μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστι-
 κῆς δυνάμεως πορίζειν, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρώμενται,
 10 ἐκάστην χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. ἀνδρίας 20
 γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς
 § 18 καὶ λατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγίειαν. οἱ δὲ
 πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὥς τοῦτο τέλος ἐν, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸ τέλος ἅπαντα δέον ἁπαντᾶν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τίς,
 16 καὶ δι' αἰτίας τῶν ἐν χρεὶ ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται, καὶ περὶ
 τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἑτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικὴ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν
 ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, οὐχ ὥσπερ αὐτὴ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα
 10 ὅρον· δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ εἰ

12 ὑγίαν M¹ P¹ || 15 [τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας] Schmidt || μὴ is transposed by
 Hampke and Rassow to precede 17 ἀναγκαίας—but wrongly || 16 [καὶ περὶ 19
 ὅρον] Schmidt || 17 <καὶ> κατὰ φύσιν Thumot || 18 ᾗ Schneider (perhaps
 rightly, unless we prefer to omit ἡ.... τροφήν) || ἀτῆ Welldon || 19 Bender
 considers the whole of c. 10 δῆλον... b 8 ἐστὶν to be spurious; but see Comm. n. (95)
 || Schmidt transposes 19 δῆλον... 38 ἴψων to follow 125b b 30 οἰείας

§ 17 8 κἀν μὴ κτλ] "And if they
 cannot procure this" (ἀπολαυστικὴ ὑπερ-
 βολή) "by mere accumulation they at-
 tempt it by some other supposed cause,
 perverting each of their faculties to at-
 tain it."

§ 18 13 πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματισ-]
 Compare Plato *Rep.* I 342 D: (the true
 λατρεία τοῦ χρηματισμοῦ, and 346 C, D: ἡ
 μισθωτικὴ accompanies the other arts to
 provide remuneration.

14 ἀπαντᾶν = meet in, conspire, tend
 to; *referre ad*.

19 ὅρον = standard, limit. Properly
 'boundary', 'definition', like ὁρισμός.

§§ 16—18 In the several points Aristotile is quite right, but in reality all this
 makes against him. For it shows that
 the fault lies with the men and not with
 the 'arts'. If men misuse not medicine
 merely, but moral virtues like courage, as
 a means to their own avarice and craving
 for pleasure; if they can follow agriculture,
 cattle-rearing, etc. in the same
 spirit; why are commerce trade and
 banking to be unceremoniously rejected
 merely because they can serve such men
 as a still readier and more successful
 means to the satisfaction of their desires?
 Why should it be culpable in any one to

carry on such pursuits merely to gain a
 living by them? (Glaser). It is true
 that if there were no stock exchange
 there could be no speculation in stocks,
 and then no one would be tempted to
 such excessive indulgence in it as is cer-
 tainly liable at times to endanger the
 morality of whole nations [as e.g. at the
 time of the South Sea Bubble]. But
 without the shadow no light; civilization
 is impossible without luxury. 'In spite
 of many great evils which money has
 brought into the world it is to this inven-
 tion alone that we owe the fact that nine-
 tenths of mankind are now no longer
 forced to serve that fortunate minority,
 the owners of real property. Think of the
 time when money was still scarce in
 Europe; the land then belonged almost
 exclusively to the clergy and the nobility.
 Money alone introduced a new
 species of commodity of inexhaustible
 ownership, which stands open to all to
 acquire' (Schlosser). "Aristotle forgets,
 too, that, even before money was in-
 vented, people might find no limit to
 wealth-seeking. The *ῥῆς δαίμονος* of
 Odysseus, *Od.* xiv. 96, went beyond the
 limit of his consumption, and its aim was,
 not nurture, but power, as he could make

20 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ οὐ, <ἀλλὰ * * * > (III)
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν (ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ
ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτικὴ, ἀλλὰ λαβούσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήται
αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφήν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ

20 [καὶ πολιτικοῦ] Schmidt || οὐ, <ἀλλὰ ἐτέρου. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ
ἀναγκαῖα χρήματα ποιεῖν> or something similar? Sussem. (see Comm.), οὐ * *
Schmidt. Conring and Schneider suspected some loss || 21 τοῦτο] ταῦτα (a
conjecture retracted by Schneider) Schmidt Bender; if taken here, it must be
repeated in 35, and so Bender || 23 <εἰς> τροφήν? Schneider, τρέφον Oncken, but
wrongly

grants to his *comitatus* out of his herds and flocks" (Lang). And is not the total result attained in itself truly surprising, namely, that the landowner who sells just enough produce to defray all his other household requirements is the sole household holder (*οικονόμος*); whereas the merchant, the tradesman and the banker are not? Not unnaturally Plato and Aristotle looked only at the dark side of trade. Like true Greeks (*Introd.* pp. 22, 29 f.) their standpoint was still that of the fortunate minority supported by the remaining nine-tenths who serve: as is seen in their approval of slavery and their scheme of a body of citizens living a life of free leisure, without work, finding exclusive unpaid occupation in science, æsthetic enjoyment, and civil administration. Physical labour in Greece was for the most part converted by slavery into slave-labour. Thus all respect for it was lost: "when agriculture, trade, and work in factories or on board ships, were given up to serfs and slaves, the contempt for these occupations was made permanent, just because men saw them carried on by such people, as conversely they had originally been given up to serfs and slaves because they were thought unworthy for free citizens to follow" (Schiller). Even Plato and Aristotle thoroughly despised physical labour as something servile and, in the bad sense of the word, mechanical (*βαναυικὸν*), as intellectually and morally degrading: see c. 11 § 6 with the passages quoted in n. (102). Consequently, trade and commerce, even the pursuit of agriculture proper—see IV (VII) 9 §§ 3, 7; 10 §§ 9—14, Exc. III on Bk. I, and Plato *Laws* VII. 806 D E—all paid labour, see n. (102), appeared to them more or less unworthy of true freemen. It is a further consequence that, though Aristotle forcibly rejects the extreme de-

velopments of Plato's social and political theories, yet after all he is taking the same line with more prudence and reserve. See *Introd.* p. 21 nn. (1) and (3), p. 33 n. (7). SUSSEM. (92)

c. 10 *Decision of the question raised in c. 8 § 1: §§ 1—3. Unsurprisingly the most unnatural for us of gain, §§ 4, 5.*

§ 1 19 δῆλον δὲ καὶ || "But it will now be easy to decide the further question started at the outset, namely, whether the art of wealth is the concern of the household and statesman or not, but"

"Then comes a lacuna which may tentatively be filled as follows: "but, <so far as in general needed for the management of a household, is the concern of a subordinate science. Plainly the latter is the case, and the former only so far as the head of the house has to see that the art of acquiring wealth is practised, without exercising it himself; for it is his function, as we said, to use and not to acquire. Furthermore it is an auxiliary science for procuring instruments for living and not the mere materials: these> must be given already." But the briefer and somewhat different restoration given in the critical notes is also admissible: "but <of some one else. For it is not his business to procure all that is necessary for living:> nay these must be definite materials found him beforehand." SUSSEM. (94)

23 οὕτω καὶ τροφήν καὶ || "so nature must provide land or sea or something else as means of support." Lamban and Gottling make γῆν ἢ θάλατταν cpeuegetic of τὴν φύσιν and Jackson shows that this is not impossible by citing Plato *Laws* 891 C, τὴν φύσιν ἐνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτὰ, sc. πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. But the above rendering best agrees with 8 §§ 9, 12, 10 § 3.

24 θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι), ἐκ δὲ τούτων, ὡς δεῖ ταῦτα διαθεῖ- (III)
 25 ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἔρια
 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γινῶναι δὲ τὸ ποῖον
 χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ
 26 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, διὰ τί ἢ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς
 27 οἰκονομίας, ἢ δ' ἰατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δεῖ ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς
 28 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν ὥσπερ ζῆν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχοντος καὶ περὶ
 ὑγείας ἰδεῖν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ
 τῶν χρημάτων ἔστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ
 τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, δεῖ
 35 φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. φύσεως γὰρ ἔστιν ἔργον τροφὴν τῷ

24 ταῦτα] αὐτὴν Glaser (wrongly), πάντα? Oncken, τᾶλλα Bender (both better, but hardly correct) || 25 οὐ] οὐδὲ? Schmidt || 29 δεῖ after ὑγιαίνειν M^a P¹, δεῖν P⁴ || 32 ὑγείας Ald. ὑγείας M^a P¹⁻²⁻³⁻⁴ || τοῦ ἱατροῦ] τῆς ἱατρικῆς P^a Q L^a and P⁴ (1st hand—γρ. τοῦ ἱατροῦ in the margin), while in S^b T^b V^b ἀλλὰ . . . οὐ ἴσ' omitted || ἰδεῖν <ἔστιν> and 33 οἰκονόμου <ἔστιν> Welldon || 33 τῶν omitted by P^{a-6} Q L^a || χρημάτων] χρηματιστικῆς P⁴ and γρ. P¹ (in the margin), χρηματιστικοῦ P⁶ L^a, χρηματιστικῶ Q || 34 Ἀφ' ἑκτῆς P¹⁻⁶ C^a Q L^a Ar. (probably also M^b U^b) insert κέρδον || 35 ταῦτα Bender for τοῦτο, cp. n. on I. 21

24 ἐκ δὲ τούτων] afterwards, *postea* (Bonitz); answering τοῦτο πάλιν. "And then it is the householder's duty to dispose of these materials to the best advantage (ὡς δεῖ)."

§ 2 25 οὐ γὰρ κατὰ] From this illustration it would be inferred that the domestic branch of *χρηματιστικὴ* is related to *οἰκονομική* as shuttle-making to weaving, and not as the production of wool to weaving. Thus the question proposed § 1 and not expressly taken up afterwards would have to be decided as follows: the domestic branch of *χρηματιστικὴ* provides the household with the useful raw materials for use, by artificial appropriation of nature's stores, so far as nature herself, whose especial function this is, has made no direct provision. On the other hand the sum total of the necessities of life are certainly called elsewhere, § 15, 4 §§ 1-4, the *instruments* (*ὄργανα*) for living or managing a household. As however this is not a mode of production but a practical, utilizing activity of consumers (*ὁ δὲ βίον πρᾶξι, οὐ ποιήσει*), the two answers to a certain degree coincide: so far, the question which remains unanswered need not have been proposed. But there is a difference, again, between earning a livelihood directly and indirectly

procuring the appliances and tools required for it. The latter is undoubtedly the business of domestic *χρηματιστικὴ*, and therefore it stands to Economic in the relation of a subsidiary art that provides, not simply materials, but also instruments. Not only is c. 10 required as an indispensable conclusion to the entire discussion begun at c. 8, but even beyond that there is much that we look for in vain in it; whether Aristotle himself left it thus incomplete, or, as is not quite impossible though undemonstrable, we have here the inadequate execution of another hand substituted for a discussion that has been lost or was never really written. In the latter case there must have been a lacuna here. SUSSEX. (95)

28 ἀπορήσειεν ἂν] *χρηματιστικὴ* (3) is just as much, or as little, a part of Politics or Economic as Medicine is, and no more. For health is just as necessary to the state as property, and yet the duty of providing health is not considered to belong to Politics or Economic.

§ 3 34 μάλιστα] if possible, this must be found by nature, i.e. without the trouble of acquiring it.

35 φύσεως γὰρ κατὰ] It was explained in n (73) on § 11 that on Aristotle's own theory it is impossible to see how far

γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γάρ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται, τροφή τὸ (III)
§ 2 λεινόμενον ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν ἡ χρηματιστική (ω 1) πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.

διπλῆς δ' οὕσης αὐτῆς, ὅσπερ εἰπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλι- 23
40 κῆς τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίως καὶ ἐπαινου-
1258 b μένης, τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ
φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὀβολο-
στατική διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν
§ 5 καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ᾧ περ ἐπορισάμεθα. μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν,
5 δὲ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἴληφεν·

38 <ψ> ἀπὸ Schneidm. || 39 [καπηλικῆς . 40 μὲν] Schmidt

1258 b 1 μεταβλητικῆς II³ Bk. and γρ p¹ (in margin); [μεταβολικῆς] now, perhaps rightly, μεταβλητικῆς <καλ> formerly, Schmidt || 3 ἐπ' Jackson, ὡτ' Bk.², ἀπ' ceteri || τῇ omitted by M¹, [τῇ] Jackson (unnecessary) || ἀτῆσιν, <ἐπὶ τόκῳ χρομίζουσ> now, <ἐπὶ τ. χρομίζον αὐτῷ> formerly, Schmidt || 4 ᾧ περ ἐπορισάμεθα] ὅπερ ἐπορισθῇ II³ Bk., ᾧ περ ἐπορισθῇ Schmidt || 5 αὐτὸ] αὐτὸν I¹ A.

this is intended to apply to the animals which according to him are produced from worms SUSEM. (96)

36 παντὶ γὰρ κτλ.] "for every animal has for its sustenance the remainder of the matter out of which it grows." Hence the animal and vegetable world is nature's reserve for the support of man.

§ 4 1258 b 1 τῆς δὲ μεταβολικῆς ψεγομένης] Attested in equally general terms by Plato *Λύσις* xi 918 D: compare Andoc. i. 137, Diog. Laert. i. 104. An Athenian would find capital for mercantile concerns, but he considered it on the whole disreputable to engage in them personally (Becker *Char.* II. 134 ed. 2, Eng. Tr. p. 281) SUSEM. (97)

2 ἀπ' ἀλλήλων] If *neuter*, the profit made from mutual exchange. But more likely *masculine*, derived from men defrauding and overreaching one another; the root, probably, of Aristotle's objection to trade altogether.

μισθῆται] Demosth. xxxvii *Adv. Panteleim.* § 52: μισθοῦ, φησὶν, Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς δανείζοντας. SUSEM. (97 b)

ἡ ὀβολοστατική] = obol weighing, petty usury; *Lyneas adv. Theomn.* i § 18 p. 117 explaining the law τὸ ἀργύριον στάσιμον εἶναι ἐφ' ὅπου αὐτὸν βούληται δανείζων says τὸ στάσιμον τοῦτο ἐστὶν οὐ ζυγὰ ἴσταναι ἀλλὰ τόκον πρᾶττεσθαι ὅπου αὐτὸν βούληται. Cp. also Aristoph. *Clouds* 1146, Antiphr. *Neot.* frag. i, Meineke 92 in Athen. i. 108 E (Cope). The insecurity of the principal lent was the main

cause of a high rate of interest. Thus upon bottomry the average rate charged was 20 per cent., which would go to cover insurance, [Xen.] *De Vectig.* III. 9. On house-rents the return was only 8½ per cent. Partly, too, the absence of a paper medium of the nature of bills of exchange, drafts, or bank notes, contributed to the same result. Duchsenschütz *Basis und Ergänz.* pp. 98, 106 ff.

3 διὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κτλ.] "According to the texts both of Bekker and Susemihl ὀβολοστατική is hated because it draws a profit from coin instead of from commodities exchanged by means of coin. But the explanatory sentence—μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, ὁ δὲ τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον—seems to show that ὀβολοστατική is hated because it seeks to accumulate coin instead of using it in the furtherance of exchange. In order to reconcile the explanatory sentence and the sentence explained, read in the latter ἐπ' instead of ἀπ' or ὡτ', omit τῇ with M¹, and restore Bekker's περ. In this way we obtain an appropriate sense: 'ὀβολοστατική is hated because it is directed to the acquisition of coin, instead of to the end with a view to which coin was invented: for it was to further exchange that coin was introduced, while interest multiplies coin itself'" (Jackson)

§ 5 5 τόκος] "Perhaps from Plato *Rep.* VII. 555 E, οἱ δὲ διὰ χρηματιστὰς ἐγκόψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες τοῦτους ὁρᾶν, τῶν λαπῶν τὸν δὲ ὑπερκοινὰ ἐνέμντες ἀργύριον

ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτὰ ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ (III) τέκος γίνεταί νόμισμα ἐκ νομίσματος. ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὗτος τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν.

- 11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανῶς, τὰ IV
10 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν
μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλευθέρον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.
ἔστι δὲ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα
ἐμπειρον εἶναι, ποῖα λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον
14 ἵππων κτήσις ποῖα τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
§ 2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε
τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποῖα ἐν πόλεσι τόποις·

γ ἐκ is omitted by II³ Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps rightly. it is added by P⁴ (connector) || 10 δεῖ γὰρ I A¹, perhaps rightly || 11 ἐλευθέριον? Jackson || 12 δεῖ δὲ L^{ambin}, perhaps rightly || τῆς omitted by II³ Bk. || κτήματα] κτήνη Bernays

τιρώσκαυτες καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνοις τόκουσι
πολλαπλασίονι λουζόμενοι πολλὸν τὸν κη-
φῆνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Still
earlier in Aristotle. *Theophr.* 84b, ἀξία
γούν ἐι τόκου, τεκοῦσα τοῦτον τόκον" (Ridgway). Cp. also Plato *Rep.* vi.
507 A, *Politic.* 276 A.

With 3-8 84d τό κτλ comp. Plato *Laus*
v. 743 C, viii. 842 B. Every one will agree
with Fulleborn that this proof is sophis-
tical. But Stahr rightly observes, 'it
was not until capital itself attained its
complete development, that is, only in
recent times, that the justification and
reasonable necessity of interest became
clear. The history of capital recounts
the gigantic efforts that had to be made,
the difficulties that had to be surmounted,
in order to its formation. From the point
of view of universal history the high rate
of interest in ancient times has perhaps
been a favourable means to that end, yet
its immediate effect, in conjunction with
a cruel law of debtor and creditor, was
to excite repulsion in men with moral
natures and thus led them decisively to
condemn interest altogether, as Plato
did.'

All this tends to give Aristotle's whole
theory of exchange the following shape:
'he first includes under the term Ex-
change (ἀλλαγή) all buying and selling
barter. Next he subdivides this genus
into two species, the one good and praise-
worthy, the other not so. The former
belongs to Economic. It exchanges the
surplus stock of the household for com-
modities which the household needs; or if

this surplus stock be sold for money it is
with no intention of making a profit, but
only to purchase other necessities with
the proceeds. The other species is dis-
tinguished by the intention of making a
profit, and this exchange with a view to
gain is *χρηματιστική* in the narrower sense
of trading proper. It is again subdivided
into two branches: the one includes all
traffic in commodities whether in ex-
change for other commodities or for
money, the other is traffic in money
alone by lending it on interest. Aristotle
regards this, last as wholly detestable 'the
former as less bad, but still bad enough'
(Schlosser). *SUSEM.* (98)

c. 11 *Production viewed on the prac-
tical side.* Cp. *Analys.* p. 100.

§1 10 χρῆσιν=practical application,
as in § 15.

πάντα δὲ κτλ] The theory has its
limitations solely in the nature of the
case generally; but in practice the nature
of the particular locality where we live,
and therefore the climate, the character
of the soil, &c., determine whether we are
chiefly confined to agriculture or to cattle-
rearing, to mining or commerce by sea,
whether there can be preserves of fish
and fishing or not, which sorts of grain or
of cattle must be procured, and so on
(Schütz). *SUSEM.* (99)

11 For ἐλευθέρον] (ἀναγκαίαν, strictly
limited, cp. *Metaph.* i 2 § 11 982 b 27:
αὐτῇ (First Philosophy) μόνῃ ἐλευθέριον
τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, and § 14 982 a 10, ἀναγ-
καίωτεται μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῇ.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθηνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, (IV)
 καὶ ταύτης ἤδη ψιλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελι-
 19 τουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλωτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἀφ'
 § 3 ὅσων ἔστι τυγχάνειν βοήθειας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη- 2
 21 ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
 μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
 φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἕτερα ἑτέρων τῶ
 τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλείω πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-
 § 4 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμός, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία (ταύ-
 26 τῆς δ' ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων
 καὶ τῶ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμων)· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρημα-
 τιστικῆς μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
 κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς

26 τεχνῶν] τεχνῶν Vermehren, perhaps rightly || 27 τρίτον] τέταρτον Π⁴ and
 P⁴ (corrector), ἄλλως τρίτον p¹ in the margin || 29 ὅσα] ὅσα Beinays

§ 2 17 εὐθηνεῖ=thrive, have abundant offspring. see Veiwall *Trans. of Camb. Phil. Soc.* 11. p. 165

18 ἤδη and here (when we come to this) we find two kinds: agriculture proper and fruit-growing. The technical terms perhaps of Apollodorus, § 7.

The cultivation of the olive and in particular of the vine would be included under ἡ πεφυτευμένη; see Steitz *Hesiod's Works and Days* (Leipzig 1871) p. 27 f. SUSEM. (100)

§ 3 23 φορτηγία=inland trade. SUSEM. This is the view of the commentators generally, but Cope disputes it. He remarks: "φορτηγός and its derivatives φορτηγεῖν, φορτηγικός, φορταγωγός, φορταγωγεῖν, seem to be always applied to commerce carried on by sea, whether ναῦς or πλοῖα be expressed or not (the sense of 'porter' given in the lex., seems not necessary in any of the passages, cp. Theogn. *Frag.* 679, Aesch. *Frag. Phryg.* 242). For this reason, and because commerce by land at Athens and in Greece generally was so utterly insignificant in comparison that it might well be passed over without notice, I rather think that ἄρις means by ναυκληρία building and letting out ships for traffic, and by φορτηγία commerce proper, the transport of goods on board of them, perhaps including also land transport. On this view Xenophon's distinction *De Rep. Lacæd.* 7 ὁ μὲν γεωργεῖ, ὁ δὲ ναυκληρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἐμπορεύεται, would correspond to Ar-

istotle's *heic*."

παράστασις virtually=καπηλειή, stantia mercatura, hominum nimium in foro consuetudinem.

24 ἀσφαλέστερα] For definition of ἀσφάλεια in this connexion, see *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 τὸ ἐν ταῖς καὶ οὕτω λεκτέσθαι ὥστ' ἐφ' αὐτῇ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν [Jackson].

ἐπιλαμπία=profit additional to the principal (τὰρχαῖον); see on § 11.

25 μισθαρνία κατὰ] Cp. § 6 below. In any case the division is incomplete. The occupations distinguished in § 6 as τεχνικώτατα, which are not unskilled manual labour nor service for wages, are here omitted: see *nu.* (102, 103). Moreover in V (VIII). 2. 5, where μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι are said to be degrading and βάνανσοι, the term has quite a different meaning, see *u* (981) SUSEM. (101)

§ 4 26 By ἀτέχνου καὶ τῶ σώματι μόνον χρησίου Cope understands the ὄητες in a general division of the population; farm labourers, porters, etc.

29 ὅσα κατὰ is in loose apposition to εἶδος χρημ., "all the wealth or property derived from land and such of its useful products as are employed by the proprietor himself," like the *καρπὸς* of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία. Even if Bernays' ὅσα is right, we cannot accept his punctuation (a colon after 28 πρώτης, no parenthesis, but a single sentence from ἔχει to 31 μεταβλητικῆς) or his translation of ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς; 'deducted to the land'. SUSEM.

30 καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δέ, (IV
 § 5 οἷον ὕλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ
 ἤδη περιεῖλφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλ-
 λευομένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἰρηται 3
 καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν
 § 6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ
 36 τεχνικώταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,
 βαναυσόταται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,
 δουλικώταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείσται χρήσεις, ἀγεννέ-

31 ὕλοτομία] cf. *λατομία* Thomas Aquinas and Susem.¹, but wrongly || 33 περὶ ..
 35 ἐνδιατρίβειν Susem. transposes to follow 39 ἀρετῆς, see *Introd.* p. 78 || δὲ Susem.,
 δὲ II Bk., omitted by Ar. || 35 εἰσὶ 39 ἀρετῆς was first seen by Montecatino to
 be out of place, it was erroneously transposed by Piccart to precede 27 τρίτον δὲ ||
 36 P⁴. Q Ald. S² T⁶ Bk. insert ᾗ before τύχης || 38 ἀγενεστάται M² P¹⁴. Q Ald.,
 perhaps rightly

30 ἀκάρπων] Compare *Rhet.* I. 5, 7: ἀόρπιμα δὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἱ πρόσθετοι [Jackson].

31 ὕλοτομία, the growing and cutting down of timber as distinct from the fruit-trees of ἡ πεφυτευμένη γεωργία.

§ 5 32 γένη, εἶδη interchanged. cp. § 3 2 ἕτερον εἶδος with § 3 2 ἕτερον γένος.

§ 6 36 ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης] "where chance has least play". where nearly everything turns upon acquaintance with the facts, technical knowledge and skill; where the skilled craftsman's hand is guided by intellectual training, which is the all-important element. Cp. Walter *op. c.* 505 f. Clearly Aristotle means what we call the fine arts and all the higher technical pursuits, including the sciences themselves and rhetoric, if followed or taught professionally for pay. In particular the art of the sophists, for which see n. (552) on III. 9. 8, also v(VIII). 2. 5 with n. (981). Susem. (102)

Compare Polos, ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τέχνην, *Μεταφ.* I. 1. 8, 981 a 4 (Jackson).

37 βαναυσόταται κτλ.] This and many other passages—c. 13 § 13, III 4 § 12, 5 § 4, § 6; IV(VII) 9 § 3, 14 § 7; v(VIII). 2 § 5, § 6, 4 § 6, 6 §§ 3—6, § 16, 7 § 7; VII(VI). 4 §§ 11, 12 with notes; Plato *Lysis* v. 741 B, 743 D E, cp. VIII. 831 C f., 846 D f.; Xenoph. *Oec.* 4 § 2 f., cp. 6 § 6, 10 § 10—show clearly how closely related were the conceptions of the servile (cp. n. 43) and the mechanical both to Aristotle and to the Greeks at large

(see further Herod. II. 167). 'Seville' occupations like that of the hired labourer, § 4, form according to this description the proper antithesis to those which are 'artistic' (n. 102); mechanical trades are intermediate, yet even the artisan, to say nothing of the labourer, is only a superior kind of slave. Aristotle has really before him the "sedentary" crafts, τέχναι ἐδραῖαι *End. Eth.* I. 4 2, 1250 a 30, which are not conducive to bodily health or a noble carriage, v(VIII). 2. 4 n. (980). Similarly we read in Plato *Rep.* VI. 495 D that manual labour disfigures the body and maims the soul, Xen. *2. c.* says that it hurts men's bodies by keeping them in a sitting posture (καθίστασθαι) cooped up indoors (σκιεραφεύεσθαι), or in other cases standing all day long over the furnace, and Pseudo-Plato *Elast.* 137 B that it makes them go about with stooping shoulders and backs bent *κατὰ τὸν ἄνδρα* (the references from Eaton). This is totally unlike the way in which Socrates thinks and judges: 'he speaks as the son of a poor craftsman, Plato Xenophon and Aristotle like men of rank and property', Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II 1142 (Eng. in *Socrates and Socrates* p. 170 n. 1). Compare Xen. *Men.* III. c. 10. With the definition of seville employments compare c. 2 § 2 n. (6b) and c. 5 § 7 ff. Susem. (103)

For λωβῶνται see v(VIII). 4. 1: the workmen themselves 'spoil' or 'deprave' their bodies; i.e. render them feeble and unfit to do service for the state in war.

- 39 *σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς.* (IV)
 33 <περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται
 34 <καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς
 § 7 <τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις
 40 γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαραγίδῃ τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ
 1259a Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψιλῆς καὶ
 πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταῦτα μὲν
 ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖτω ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα
 + σποράδην, δι' ὧν ἐπιτετυχήκασιν ἔνιοι χρηματιζόμενοι,
 § 8 δεῖ συλλέγειν. πάντα γὰρ ὠφέλιμα ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τοῖς τιμῶσι
 τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλαω τοῦ Μιλησίου·
 τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημά τι χρηματιστικόν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνός
 μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
 § 9 ὅν. ὀνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελούς
 10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης, κατανοήσαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν
 φορὰν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἔτι χειμῶνος ὄντος
 εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι τῶν
 ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου
 μισθωσάμενον ἅπ' οὐδενὸς ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς
 15 ἦκε, πολλῶν ζητουμένων ἕμα καὶ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκμισθοῦντα

40 *χάρητι* (*χάρητι* M^o) δὴ II Ar. Bk. Bernays

1259 a 6 *οἷον.....* 18 *σπουδαῖον* seems to have been used by Hieronymos of Rhodes as quoted by Diog. Laert. I. 26 || 13 *ἐλαιουργίῳ* P¹ and Hieron. *ἐλαιουργῶν* Γ Susem.^{1,2}, *ἐλαιούργων* P⁴, *ἐλαιουργῶν* M^o Q (?) S^b T^p, *ἐλαιουργῶν* P²⁻³ Ald. Bk. Bernays, *ἐλαιουργῶν* L^o

39 *ὅπου .. ἀρετῆς*] "where excellence" of any kind, and so, where bodily excellence "is least needed." No doubt lending money on interest is particularly meant, 10 § 4. Such business he includes under the servile occupations. SUSEM. (104)

§ 7 40 *περὶ τούτων*] With the transposition this aptly refers to 34 τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, exact particulars in detail.

1259 a 1 Ἀπολλοδώρῳ τῷ Λημνίῳ] Also mentioned by Vallo R. R. I. 1. 8, and several times in Pliny's *Natural History*. SUSEM. (106)

3 *ὅτῳ ἐπιμελές* = whoever is interested in the subject. We are referred to written works in *Rhet.* I. 4. 13, 1360 a 30.

§ 8 6 τὸ Θάλαω] *Nic. Eth.* vi 7. 5 1141 b 3 ff. On Thales see Zeller I. 168 ff. [Eng. tr. *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 211 ff.]

SUSEM. (105 b)

8 *διὰ τὴν σοφίαν*] Aristoph. *Clouds* 180, *Birds* 1009.

καθόλου τι] The device (*κατανόημα*) is of general application, depending (as explained in § 12) on the possession of a monopoly. See Boeckh p. 52 f. Eng. tr.

§ 9 12 *ἀρραβῶνας διαδοῦναι κτλ*] "paid deposits in advance to engage the various oil-presses" *ἀρρ.* = earnest money, as guarantee for the execution of the contract· διαδ because the sums were distributed, paid to various owners. Quite apart from the external authority for ἐλαιουργίῳ (Hieronymos), it seems more business-like to engage the oil-mills, six months beforehand, than the workmen.

13 *ὀλίγου μισθοῦ*] "taking them at a low rental, because there was no one to outbid him": ἐπιβάλλειν = add, make a higher bid, run up the price.

- δὴν τρόπον ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξαν, (IV, ὅτι ῥάδιόν ἐστι πλουτεῖν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ' § 10 οὐ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ περὶ ὃ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπιδείξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ 10 εἵπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικόν, ἑάν τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνια (V τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορώσῃ χρημάτων· μονο- § 11 πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὠνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δέ τις τεθέντος ἡ παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπρίλατο πάντα τὸν σίδηρον ἐκ 15 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐπιπορίων οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πενήτηντα ταλάντοις § 12 ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἔτι 30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο ταῦτόν ἐστιν (ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἐτέχνασαν γενέσθαι § 13 μονοπωλίαν)· χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς. ὥσπερ οἰκία, μᾶλλον δέ, διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολι- 35 τέονται τῶν πολитеυομένων ταῦτα μόνον. § 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἂν μὲν δευ- V σποτικῇ, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἂν δὲ πατρικῇ, τρίτον δὲ

16 συλλέξαντος P⁴ Ald., συλλέξαντες S^b T^b || 25 ἐμπορίων I² A², πόρων M^a || 28 τοῦτο S^b Bk. || δ omitted by M^a P¹ || 30 αὐτοῦ II Bk. || 31 ὄραμα (106 b) Camerarius, θεώρημα ? Komes || Ὁλὴ καὶ τούτῳ Susem. I² A², *Thals et hinc* William, perhaps rightly || 37 μέρος omitted by II² (added by a later hand in S^b) || 38 [περὶ ...πρότερον] Schmidt

§ 10 21 ἔνια] Selymbria, Byzantium, and Lampsakos are instances given by P^a. Aristotle *Oeconom.* II. 18 1348 b 33, 4 § 4 1346 b 25, 8 1347 a 32.

§ 11 27 ἐπὶ τοῖς πενήτηντα] "on" or "in addition to his capital of fifty talents he received a hundred more"; he made a profit of 100 talents on his original fifty. The preposition has the same force in *τοῖς ἐπιτρίτοις* *Rhet.* III. 10. 7, and the analogous fractions.

§ 12 28 Undoubtedly Dionysios the elder who is mentioned III. 15. 16 n. SUSEM. (106)

31 ὄραμα] 'discovery': cp *Dem. adv. Mid.* § 60 533, 25, οὐδὲς πάποτε τοῦτ' εἶπε τὸ πλεονέκτημα 'had an eye to this

advantage' (Postgate). Also Plato *Phaedr.* 267 A εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα.

§ 13 35 διόπερ κατ'] See Exc. III. and *Introd.* p. 31 n. (1). SUSEM (106 b) Possibly an allusion to Eubulos.

c. 12 *The remaining branches of Economics: the relations of the head of the household (1) to his wife, (2) to his children.*

§ 1 37 ἐπὶ...ἦν] c. 3 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (107) Comp. *Nic. Eth.* v. 6. 9 διὸ μᾶλλον πρὸς γυναῖκά ἐστι δίκαιον ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ κτήματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον with Jackson's note, "in *Pol.* III. 6 § 7 however οἰκονομική as an epithet of δική is used to include all three relations" Justice between man and wife is really ἀνδρῶν, § 2.

γαμική, * * καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχειν καὶ τέκνων, ὥς ἐλευθέ- (V)
 40 ρων μὲν ἰμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ
 49 b γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τὸ τε γὰρ
 ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μὴ πού συνέ-
 στηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεω-
 § 2 τέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς 2
 5 πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἴσου
 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως
 δέ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχῃ τὸ δὲ ἀρχῇται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι
 καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις εἶπε

39 γαμική * * καὶ γὰρ Contring, Bernays by altering ἄρχειν into ἀρκεῖν, Ar. by translating ἄρχει, ignore the lacuna: ἔστιν ἄρχειν, a Paris ms. 2042. See the Comm.

1259 b 2 πού πως II¹ (emended by p¹)

39 γαμική**] There is here a considerable lacuna. For the sense some such restoration as the following may be proposed. "Economic science has, we saw, three branches, treating of (α) the relation of master and slave which has been discussed above, (β) the paternal and (γ) the conjugal relation. <Further we saw that in general a slave is only a piece of property, persons as well as things being included under that head, and it is not the acquisition but the use and maintenance of property which is properly a part of economic science. This science may therefore be divided into (1) the guidance and rule of the *persons* of the household, (2) the right use of the *property*. The former includes the treatment of the conjugal and paternal relations: the relation of master and slave would come partly under the one, partly under the other. The householder has to care for the improvement and excellence of all that belongs to the household, and hence for the improvement and excellence of the property, but property is only a means to the end which the household seeks to attain, and the living chattel is more important than lifeless objects. It is therefore the householder's main task to direct aright the free members of the house." > In c. 12 the differences in this rule as exercised over the different free members of the family are parenthetically specialized, but in c. 13 the leading thought itself is resumed and explained. Cp. Tharot *Études* p. 14 f., Sussehl in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. pp. 212—215 (where however some mistakes need

correction), Buchsenschutz *op. c.* 716. SUSSEHL (107 b)

1259 b 1 πολιτικῶς] like a magistrate in a republic, or, more precisely, an aristocracy, *Nic. Eth.* viii. 10 § 5, II § 4. Cp. Zeller II ii 619 n. (1). SUSSEHL (108).

§ 2 4 ἐν μὲν οὖν κατὰ] Here follows a discussion, as to (1) how far the rule of the husband over the wife may fitly be compared with republican government, despite certain differences between them; (2) how far the rule of a father over his children may be compared with monarchical government. Cp. further I. 5 § 7 n. (43 b) and 13 § 9 n. (117). SUSSEHL (109).

"In most cases where citizens rule over citizens rulers and subjects change places, for they (τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον nom. to βούλεται and to ζητεῖ) tend to be on an equality in nature and to differ not at all": τὴν φύσιν an adverbial accus. as II. 2. 6 τὴν φύσιν ἴσου, IV(VII). 1. 10 ποῖός τις τὴν φύσιν, cp. 15 below φύσιν διαφέρειν. Yet some have taken τὴν φύσιν, as subject of εἶναι, to mean the spirit of republican citizenship, or the 'natures' of the citizens.

8 σχήμασι, outward signs, insignia: λόγοις, titles.

ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασις κατὰ] Herodotus tells this story, II. 172. Amasis, who had deposed his predecessor Apries (Hophia), was at first despised by the Egyptians on account of his low birth. Whereupon he had a statue of gold made out of a foot-bath, in which he and his guests had been accustomed to wash their feet. When this statue was set up the Egyptians paid it due reverence, and

§ 8 τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον· τὸ δ' ἄρρεν αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ (V)
 10 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική·
 τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρε-
 σβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς εἰδος ἀρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς Ὁμη-
 ρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν

πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε

(p. 20)

15 τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα δια-
 φέρει μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν· ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ
 πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεότερον καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.
 13 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἢ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 3
 περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνψύχων κτήσιν, καὶ
 20 περὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τούτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὃν καλοῦμεν
 πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων.
 § 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις, πότερον ἔστιν
 ἀρετῇ τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμι-
 ωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ
 25 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ
 § 3 τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας (ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε
 γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων
 ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον)· σχεδὸν δὲ 4

15 After ἀνδρῶν p³ adds as a gloss δηλονότι πατέρα εἰπὼν, and this πατέρα εἰπὼν has crept into the text of Γ¹ M¹ || 17 τὸ] τὸν Γ¹ S^b Ar. before νεότερον || 18 * * φανερόν [τοίνυν] ? Schmidt; see on 125; a 24 || 26 εἴτε] εἴτε P¹ S^b T^b, εἴτε P³ S^a Ald. || 28 δέ] δὴ M¹ P¹⁻²⁻⁴ Q S^b T^b Ald. and P² (cori.?)

Amasis, calling them together, explained to what vile uses the object of their present adoration had once been put. Similarly he had risen from the common people to the throne, and as king he demanded their respect. SUSSEX. (110)

§ 2 9 del (κατὰ μέρος 1 § 2. The husband holds, as it were, permanent office.

11 κατὰ φ.] by right of affection.

12 ὅπερ ἐστὶ κτλ.]—and this gives a form of monarchy, viz. hereditary monarchy, III. 1. 6. Bernays takes εἶδος as 'essential nature', but compare Nic. Eth. VIII. 10. 4, ἡ μὲν γὰρ πατρὶς πρὸς υἱὸς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα.

16 τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν] So too in Γ¹indai's words, ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐν θεῶν γένος, ἐκ μίας δὲ πνέουσα μητέρα ἀμφοτέροις *Nem.* 6, 1, men are of one race with the gods, earth being the common mother of both. The same is implied by Hesiod's verse οἳ ἀμύθη γένεσσι θεοὶ θνητοὶ τ' ἀν-

θρώποι *Works and Days* 108 (J. G. Schneider) See Steitz *op. c.* 50 f. SUSSEX. (110 b)

c. 13 Various degrees of excellence requisite in the different members of the household: §§ 1—11. The promotion of this excellence in slaves, §§ 12—14; in women and children, §§ 15, 16.

Cp. *Analys.* p. 101, *Introd* p. 31

§ 1 18 'τοίνυν traducendo ad novam cogitationem inservit' Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* quoting *Physics* I. 2 §§ 7, 8 185 b 3. 9 Perhaps it only assumes a thought previously expressed, 'then', 'accordingly'—see n. (107 b). Bernays gives 'It is clear beforehand then.' SUSSEX.

20 Here πλοῦτος = ἀρετῇ κτήσεως, but in 8 § 15 it is πλοῦτος ὀργάνων

21 μᾶλλον ἢ δούλων] Cp. n. (33) on 4 § 1 καὶ [ἦν καὶ εὐ [ἦν. SUSSEX. (111)

§ 2 25 τῶν ἄλλων ἔξεων so τῆς = τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, *Rhet.* 1, 6. 9 with Cope's n.

ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, (V)
 30 πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα σόφρονα
 εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστι καὶ ἀκό-
 § 4 λαστος καὶ σόφρων, ἢ οὐ; [καὶ] καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκε-
 πτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτῇ
 ἀρετῇ ἢ ἑτέρᾳ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-
 35 καγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἀρχειν δεοί ἢν τὸν δὲ ἀρχεσθαι
 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷον τε διαφέ-
 ρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ
 § 5 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν). εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, ε
 θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἀρχων μὴ ἔσται σόφρων καὶ δι-
 40 καιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθί-
 1260 α σται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει
 τῶν προσήκοντων. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν
 ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
 § 6 φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων. καὶ τοῦτο εὐθὺς ὑφ' ἡγεῖται πε-
 5 ρὶ τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐν ταύτῃ γάρ ἐστι φύσει τὸ μὲν ἀρχον τὸ δ'
 ἀρχόμενον, ὃν ἑτέραν φάμεν εἶναι ἀρετὴν, οἷον τοῦ λόγον (v. 22)
 ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ο

30 σόφρονα αἰτεῖ 31 εἶναι Π³ Bk || 31 καὶ before ἀκόλαστος omitted by Π³ || 32
 καὶ before καθόλου omitted by Γ M^a || 37 διαφέρει τῷ Δ1.

1260 α 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ omitted by Π Δ1. Bk. || ὑφ' ἡγεῖται Π² Bk. and P¹ in the
 margin, ὑφ' ἡγεῖται <τὰ> Schutz; yet ὑφ' ἡγεῖται can also be used passively || 6 μὲν
 εἶναι φάμεν M^a P¹, μὲν φάμεν εἶναι P⁴ (corrector)

§ 3 31 παῖς, .σόφρων] Compare Nic.
 EtA. III. 12. 5 1119 a 33: we apply the
 term ἀκόλασία to the faults of children
 so far as they bear a certain resemblance
 to the vice of intemperance (ἀκόλασία).
 SUSK. (111 b)

§ 4 37 εἶδει διαφέρει] see on I 2.

§ 5 1260 α 3 ὥσπερ καὶ ἀρχομένων
 sc. διαφορὰ εἶναι, as explained § 2 ff.

§ 6 4 ὑφ' ἡγεῖται] "this is indicated
 (or, given in outline) in the case of the
 soul." The participle ὑφ' ἡγεῖται (I § 3)
 "seems evidence that the verb is used pas-
 sively (Bonitz Ind. Ar.); but Schutz'
 suggestion <τὰ> gives the middle a fair
 sense: "to this result the relations which
 exist in the soul at once lead us." SUSK.

6 ὃν ἑτέραν γ' ἀλόγου] "and we say
 that a different kind of excellence belongs
 to the one and to the other of these, I
 mean to the rational and irrational parts
 of the soul." Namely intellectual or
 dianoetic virtue (ἀρετὴ διανοητική) to the

rational soul: moral virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ,
 excellence of character) courage, temper-
 ance, etc. to the irrational appetitive
 soul, Zeller II ii 624—658. The dianoetic
 virtues are discussed in B. VI of the
 Nic. EtA. and the latest detailed investi-
 gation of this subject, Walzer op. c. 283—
 537, gives the following results

Each of the three kinds of reason,
 theoretic, creative, and practical in the
 narrower sense (see n. 40), has its parti-
 cular dianoetic virtue, or it may be, vir-
 tues. Practical wisdom or insight (φρό-
 νησις), if not the only virtue, is at all
 events the most indispensable and im-
 portant virtue of the practical reason
 (Walter p. 356 ff.), see on § 9 n. (45);
 III. 4 §§ 7, 8 nn. (474—6), §§ 16, 17 nn.
 To theoretic reason belongs (i) νοῦς in
 the narrower sense, intelligence, com-
 prehending in itself the two extremes
 of all indemonstrable knowledge, which
 must be assumed for every syllogism and

7 ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὥστ' <ἐπει> φύσει πλείω τὰ [ἄρχοντα (V)
καί] ἀρχόμενα (ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλευθέρων τοῦ δούλου
10 ἀρχεῖ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θήλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδός), καὶ πᾶσιν

8 ὥστ' <ἐπει> Bernays, while Susem.^{1-2,3} had simply ὥστε || πλείω τὰ Ramus, τὰ πλείω Γ II Bk. || [ἄρχοντα καὶ] Susem.⁴, especially as otherwise the insertion of ἐπει, l. 8, is untenable || 10 ὡς πατήρ ? Koiaes

for scientific demonstration; at the lower end of the scale the immediate judgment of perception, and at the other end, by means of induction, the principles and axioms on which all demonstration, definition, and division rest: (ii) ἐπιστήμη, demonstrated science with the exception of metaphysics; and

(iii) σοφία, wisdom, the highest or metaphysical knowledge which consists of elements of both kinds, demonstrated truths and truths immediately known. It is of slight importance whether Zeller and Walter are right, that Aristotle regarded all three as dianoetic 'virtues', or whether, as Döring tries to prove against Walter in *Kunstliche der Arist. (Aristotle's Theory of Art)* p. 62 f., only the third, σοφία, was really so considered by him. In the creative reason, lastly, τέχνη, artistic skill, is not itself a dianoetic excellence, though it can lead to one, *Nic. Eth.* vi. 5, 7, 1140 b 21 f.¹

For the 'excellences of character' cp. 5 § 6 n. (20) in regard to temperance in particular II. 6 § 9 n. (206 b), 5 § 10 n. (162), 7 § 12, III. 4 § 16 n. (491), IV (VII). 1 § 4 n. (693). SUSEM. (113) 7 τοῖσιν] See on § 1. 'But' or 'clear' it is clear' (Bonit.).

§ 7 8 ff. "Since then there are by nature various sorts of things, subjected to rule (the rule of a free man over a slave being different from that of a husband over a wife, and again from that of an adult over a child), and all have the elements of the soul present in them, only in different degrees (the slave in general being destitute of the deliberative faculty, which in the woman has not sufficient authority and in the boy is as yet undeveloped);

¹ Whether this is really Aristotle's theory or not, Döring does not venture to decide. I see no ground for doubt. But perhaps Aristotle wished to restrict this dianoetic excellence to the higher group of arts, the imitative arts, see n. (34). If this be so Walter's conception of them, p. 172, is unaffected by Döring's objection, p. 65 n. In *Nic. Eth.* I. 12, 20, οὐκ ἔστιν, apprehension, see *Phil.* II. 4 § 16, 17 n. (491 8), 17 (17) 4, 14 n. (1186) is adduced as a dianoetic virtue along with σοφία and φρόνησις. It would take too long to explain how this is to be understood.

for this reason the ruler requires the intellectual virtue in perfection (for the work belongs simply to the master-workman, and hence this is reason), while each of the others needs only his fitting share thereof. And so, too, must it be with the moral virtues: we must suppose all to need a share of them, though not equally, but only in so far as each requires for his work."

Bernays defending the order of the mss. translates from 14 ὁμοίως as follows: "A similar gradation must likewise be assumed for the moral virtues: all must possess them, though not equally, but only in such measure as is necessary for their respective duties. The ruler must have moral virtue in its perfection;—for every work depends in all its parts on the supreme master, and reason" i.e. that which makes the ruler a ruler "is supreme master"; if then the work is to be successful, the ruler must satisfy the demands of reason on all sides, and must therefore possess complete moral virtue. "Those again who obey need severally so much virtue as is proportional to their share of the total work." This however does not meet Thuiot's objections, *Études* 16 ff. "The transposition is indispensable. From the proposition 'reason is the master-workman' it first follows that the ruler must possess the highest intellectual virtue, and only secondarily that he must have the highest moral virtue. Aristotle has been speaking (a 2—7) of a virtue of the rational, and of a virtue of the irrational, part of the soul, and he admits (a 10—14) that both these parts are possessed by slaves, women, and children. Before going on to inquire how they all share in the moral virtue of the irrational part he must have noticed the manner in which they share in the intellectual virtue of the rational part. Indeed the words which Bernays inserts 'the demands of reason on all sides' imply the dianoetic virtue." Cp. *Hermes* XIX, pp. 588—592, *Quaest. Crit.* VI. p. 9 f. SUSEM. 9 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον] See 12 § 1, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῇ ἀρχῇ. SUSEM. (113)

ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει δια- (V)
 φερόντως (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν,
 τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν,
 § 8 ἀλλ' ἀτελές)· ὁμοίως τοῖνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς γ
 15 ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'
 16 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον·
 διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελῶν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν
 ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ
 19 λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
 14 αὐτοῖς. <ὁμοίως τοῖνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς
 15 ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς· ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ'
 16 οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον.>
 17 ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἡ> ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρη- 8
 21 μένων ἀπάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός,
 οὐδ' ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ φέτο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ'

14 ὁμοίως ... 16 ἔργον Thurot Susem. transpose to follow 20 αὐτοῖς: see *Introd.*
 p. 79 || Beinays transposes ἀναγκαῖον, Welldon ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν to follow 16 ἀλλ' ὅσον,
 and both punctuate 15 ἀρετάς ὑποληπτέον δὲ μὲν, rejecting Thuiot's proposed transpo-
 sition. See Comm. || 15 Ἀφτεῖ ὑποληπτέον corr.² of P² inserts γὰρ, Ar. δὲ (so also
 Koniaes in his commentary) || 16 αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ Γ II || 17 διανοητικὴν Thurot,
 ἡθικὴ Γ II A1. Bk. Beinays || 20 <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἡ> ἡθικὴ Susem.⁴ ἰδία ἡ? Susem.
 caules, είεία οι είεία ἡ Schmidt, [ἡθικὴ] Thuiot || 21 ἀπάντων Π⁴ P⁴, πάντων P²⁻⁴.
 Q S^b T³ Ald. Bk. || 22 ὁ Σωκράτης P⁴, which Wilson (perhaps rightly) approves

13 ὁ μὲν γὰρ.. βουλευτικόν] Just the
 same thing is said in other words § 9
 n. (45). See also n. (115). SUSEM. (114)

13 ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον] Cp n. (117).
 This can establish a difference of degree
 only, not a difference of kind, between
 the virtue of a man and of a woman.
 See III 4. 17 n. (495). SUSEM. (114 b)

§ 8 17 τὴν <διανο>ητικὴν ἀρετὴν]
 It is self-evident that only the 'dispositive
 virtue of practical life, φρόνησις or prac-
 tical wisdom, is here treated: see n.
 (46) (112); IV(VII). I. 4 (693). Where
 it is a question of executing another's
 command, as it is always and uncondi-
 tionally with the slave, there this virtue
 belongs only to him who gives the com-
 mand, he who obeys having merely 'right
 opinion' about it. All the difference now
 is, whether he can attain this right ap-
 prehension more or less easily, thoroughly
 or carelessly: III 4. 18 n. (498). Com-
 pare also n. on III. 4 § 16 (493), § 17
 (497), §§ 7, 8 (474—6). But so far as a
 natural slave, who is denied every ca-
 pacity for deliberation, can be said to

have ever so small a share of approximate
 intellectual virtue in the department of
 practice, such virtue consists merely in
 the fact that one slave understands his
 master's commands and knows how to
 execute them better, more quickly, and
 more aptly than another. SUSEM. (118)

19 ἕκαστον] sc. ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν δ. ἀρ.
 ἐπιβάλλει 'so far as is incumbent on
 them.' Impersonal; cp. *De long. vitæ*
 I. § 4, 464 b 33, λεκτέον ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
 τῇ φυσικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ: Herod. II. 180 τοῦ
 Δελφούς δὲ ἐπιβάλλει παρασχεῖν.

16 ὅσον ἐκάστω] sc. ἐπιβάλλει.
 § 9 20 <ἐκάστου ἰδία ἡ> ἀρετὴ κτλ.]
 "that the moral virtue of each of the
 above classes is peculiar to itself." Ber-
 nays translates as if he had before him
 the words inserted.

22 Σωκράτης] The historical Socrates
 unquestionably did so, *Xen. Symp.* 2. 9;
 cp. Zeller *op. c.* II i 221 [Eng. tr. *Soc-
 rates and Socratics* p. 145 n. 1]. But
 here no doubt Aristotle has in view the
 Platonic Socrates; amongst other pas-
 sages in *Meno* 71 D f., to which he alludes

ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ (V)
 § 10 περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μάλλον ἐπι-
 25 σκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι
 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἡ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἡ τι τῶν τοιού-
 των· πολλὴ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρε-
 § 11 τὰς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διὸ δεῖ, ὥσπερ ὁ
 ποιητὴς εἶρηκε περὶ γυναικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων·
 30 γυναικὶ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴ φέρει,
 ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δὲ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι

24 καὶ, which A1. leaves untranslated, Lambin omitted || 26 ἡ τὸ Π¹ P⁴-L¹ W^b Ald., καὶ τὸ Q Ar., τὸ P²-S³ T^b || τοιούτων ἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων M^a P¹ || 31 δ before καὶ omitted by Π¹

more distinctly § 10 n. (118). Like Socrates in Xenophon *L. c.*, Plato (*Rep.* v. 452 E f.) holds that, apart from begetting and bearing children, the difference between the sexes is a difference of degrees: upon this is based his demand that women should share in the education of men, in war and public business, also (although this is expressly stated only in the *Laos*) in the public menses. see II. § 1 n. (153), 6 § 5 n. (196), 7 § 1 n. (231 b). Further, community of wives in the two upper classes of his ideal-state (III. 1 § 3 E., 7 § 1) is clearly connected with this; compare n. (142) on II. 2 § 9, Zeller *op. c.* II 1 775 [Engl. II. *Plato* p. 481], Susseml *l'at. Phil.* II. 168—170. Aristotle on the contrary records the results of careful scientific observations on the difference in temperament between the two sexes in *Hist. Anim.* IX. 1 § 5, §§ 7, 8 608 a 21 ff.: τὰ θήλεα μαλαώτερα καὶ λαονργότερα καὶ ἥτιον ἀπλὰ καὶ προπετιότερα καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφὴν φροντισιωτέρα... ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ δούλου καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ψευδέστερον, εὐπαταγέστερον δὲ καὶ μηνησιώτερον, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀγροισιώτερον κτλ. Cp. *De gener. anim.* IV. 6. 10 f., 775 a 12, and Zeller II ii 688 with n. (3). SUSSEM. (118)

23 ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ κτλ.] Cp. III. 4 § 3 n. (470), § 16 n. (491), § 17 n. (495); also I. 5 § 7 n. (42 b), II §§ 1, 2 n. See on the other side n. (120) on I. 13 § 11. SUSSEM. (117)

§ 10 24 κατὰ μέρος] 'in detail'.

25 The same protest in *Nic. Eth.* II. 7 § 1, cp. 2 §§ 3, 4.

26 τὸ εὖ ἔχειν] Plato *Rep.* IV. 444 E ὑπερὰ τὴν καὶ εὐεχίαν ψυχῆς; *Gorg.* 506 D

τῶς τεταγμένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκδοσιν.

27 οἱ ἔφαρ. κτλ.] As Gorgias does in Plato's *Menon* 71 B E, where the Platonic Socrates attacks the doctrine. Aristotle 14 here defending Gorgias against that polemic and expresses his agreement with him in the main. Schlosser well observes that the defence certainly misses the mark, as Plato in the *Menon* insists with perfect right that the generic notion of virtue ought first to be defined, and in the *Ethica* Aristotle starts from that. On Gorgias see n. (448) to III. 2. 2. SUSSEM. (118)

§ 11 28 ὁ ποιητής] Sophocles *Ajax* 293. See further n. (117). SUSSEM. (119)

31 ἐπεὶ δὲ κτλ.] "Since the child has not yet fully developed, his excellence is not to be referred simply and solely to himself, but to perfect development and the standard of his education."

The slave's moral excellence is restricted to that which fits him to be well employed by his master, the child's to that which fits him to be well trained by his father. In the child only the germ of human virtue is present (*Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, III. 12. 5 ff.); on this see I (viii), 12. 5 n. (875) but in the adult slave, so far as he possesses the indispensable minimum of such a virtue at all, it is at least actually developed. Children and slaves have only to obey; the wife must indeed obey her husband, but then she has along with him to command the remaining members of the family. This implies that her virtue is not merely *υπηρετικὴ*, as Aristotle inaccurately puts it § 9. Further with §§ 8—12 compare *Poetics* 15 § 3 and note (191 b) in Susseml's edition. SUSSEM. (120)

τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς (V)
 § 12 τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δοῦλον πρὸς δεσπότην.
 ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον,
 35 ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρῶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως 10
 μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων, ἀπο-
 ρήσειε δ' ἂν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθές, ἀρα καὶ τοὺς (p 21)
 τεχνίτας δεῖσει ἔχειν ἀρετὴν· πολλὰκις γὰρ δι' ἀκολασίαν
 § 13 ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλείστον; ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 40 δοῦλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρώτερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι-
 βάλλας ἀρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας· ὁ γὰρ βάναντος τε-

32 αὐτὸν Γ (*ad se ipsum* William) || 33 τὸ τέλος τὸν τελειον P^{4.6}. W^b L^a Ar. Ald. Bk. || 36 ἐλλείπει P³ (but ἐλλείψῃ corr.) Gotll. Bk.² Susem.^{1,2,3} perhaps rightly || [ἀπορήσειε... b a τεχνιτῶν] Schmidt || 37 ἀρα Γ Π³ (yet Q perhaps has ἀρα) || 39 ἡ <οδ. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ> διαφέρει <ν> Schmidt. || τούτων Π² (emended apparently by p¹) || 40 Whether Ar. read αὐτῶ in his ms. after τοσοῦτον as I once assumed from his translation, is more than doubtful: τοσοῦτον <αὐτῶ>? Schneider || ἐπιβάλλας ἐπιβαλεῖν Schmidt || 41 <δουλικῆς> or <ὀπηρετικῆς> before ἀρετῆς? Susem. (see Comm.); yet in 38 ἀρετῇ alone expresses this || περ omitted by Γ M^a; hence [περ] Susem.¹

§ 12 35 ἀρετῆς.... 36 ἔργων] But how on Aristotle's own psychology and theory of virtue is even this minimum of moral virtue, which is the condition of his serviteness, possible in the slave, if he shows no trace of deliberation or purposed action of his own? See *Nic. Eth.* III cc. 2, 3, *Walter op. c.* p. 169 ff., 212 ff., *Zeller op. c.* II ii 590 n. (3). Yet all goodness or badness of character and conduct is derived from the quality of the *προαίρεσις*, i.e. from the bent of the will in intention and purpose. *Poet.* 6 §§ 5, 6, 17, 15 § 1, n. (884) on *Pol.* IV (vii). 13 § 9. Plato speaks far more humanely on this subject *Λατ.* VI. 776 D, where he admits that ere now many a one has found in his slaves men on all points of more approved virtue than his brothers or sons. But in this he contradicts the fundamental assumptions which he makes in common with Aristotle; cp *Zeller II* i 755 f. [Eng. tr. *Plato* p. 459]. Aristotle himself grants that even slaves may have a noble character, *Poet.* 15 § 1, καὶ γὰρ ζωὴ ἐστὶ χρηστὴ καὶ δοῦλος, καίτοι γε ὥς τῶν τῶν τὸ μὲν χεῖρον τὸ δὲ ὡς φαῖλον ἐστίν. If he is more consistent elsewhere, his consistency only involves the whole theory in self-contradiction in another way, and discloses all the more its untenableness on internal grounds: see § 8 n. (43),

§ 9 n. (45); also p. 211. SUSEM. (121)

39 ἡ introduces Aristotle's own view: "or shall we rather say..." more freely; "surely here is a very great difference."

§ 18 40 κοινωνὸς ζωῆς] whereas the citizens are *κοινωνοὶ βίου*; *Nic. Eth.* V. 6. 4, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν: the slave is excluded from βίος, i.e. X. 6. 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.

δ δὲ πορρώτερον] 'further removed', 'less dependent' on his master.

τοσοῦτον ἐπιβάλλας ἀρετῆς] sc. αὐτῶ: just so much of virtue as of slavery falls to his share. The verb intransitive but personal. *Comp.* III. 6. 3, καὶ ὅσον ἐπιβάλλας μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ἴσου καλῶς: IV (vii). 1. 10, ἐκάστῳ τῇ εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβάλλας τοσοῦτον ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς: *Herod.* IV. 115, VII 23, *Dem. De Cor.* § 254, p. 312, 2.

"This special virtue, i.e. excellence of function, of the free workman differs from the true virtue of man in being something inferior and approximating to that of the slave: see n. (103) on II § 6 with the references, esp. III. 4. 12 n. (486)." SUSEM. (122)

Mi T. L. Heath objects to this, that if τοσοῦτον is the subject of ἐπιβάλλας, the change of subject from δ δὲ is surely very harsh. "Indeed, *καὶ τοσοῦτον*, is it not inconceivably harsh? I think the sentence would go much better, if we could

- 1260 b χρίτης ἀφωρισμένην τινα ἔχει δουλείαν, καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος (V)
τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ' οὐδείς, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.
§ 14 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ 11
δούλῳ τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ' οὐ <τὸν> τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν
5 ἔργων [δεσποτικῇ]. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δούλους
ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον· νουθε-
τηγέον γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.
§ 15 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· περὶ
δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ

1260 b 4 <τὸν> Schneider following A1.; τὸν for τὴν Scaliger Reiske || 5 [δε-
σποτικῇ] Giphanius (cp. the Comm.); Koras conjectures ἐπιστήμη, Bender δουλικῇ;
δεσποτικῇ, transposed to follow ἐπιτάξει, Schmidt

make δ δε the subject of ἐπιβάλλει. I should translate 'the artisan is further removed and entrenches on virtue only to the same degree as he entrenches on slavery.' Cf. for the supposed use of ἐπιβάλλει *De casib.* I. § 10, 272 a 25 δεῶν γὰρ ἡ ἐτέρα [γραμματῇ] ἐπιβάλλει τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, καὶ ἡ ἐτέρα ἐκείνης τοσούτον, where ἐπιβάλλειν contrasts with ἀπολλέσθαι. Is there any reason why ἐπιβάλλει should not = ἐπαλλάττει? In point of fact this is perhaps the right construction. That we require αὐτῷ with the other, was pointed out by M. Schmidt and by me in my first edition (1872). At the same time is not ἀρετῆς by itself also strange? (See *Critical Notes*.) If something like δούλου or τῆς τοιαύτης has been lost, αὐτῷ may well have been lost with it. We certainly should expect 'he shares in *virtue* in so far as his condition approximates to a slave's.' SUSSEX.

1260 b 1 ἀφωρ. τινα ἔχει δουλείαν = is under a definite, limited form of slavery. Comp. *Rhet.* I. 1 § 1, 1354 a 3, with Cope's note. also ὁρισμέναι above 4 § 1, n. (34). Some interpret wrongly, 'detached from the master.' That the slaves should be ranked as a natural class and the artisans (who had largely sprung from them, III. 5. 3) as an artificial class, is significant of the Greek contempt for labour. See n. (93).

§ 14 <τὸν> τὴν διδασκ. ἔχοντα] 'the person who instructs him in routine duties.' This is the possessor of, or proficient in, the δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη which is more fully described above 7 § 2, where it is distinguished from δεσποτικῇ. The discussion on the 'virtue' of the slave results in a more precise determination of δεσποτικῇ and its elevation by an exten-

sion of its functions. The master may entrust his steward with the employment and direction of the slaves in his service, as Aristotle ironically remarks, 7 § 5. but he must himself develop in them the minimum of virtue which they require for this. Cp. n. (64) on 7 § 5. In line 5 δεσποτικῇ must be wrong; δουλικῇ is what we require, and Bender would accordingly insert it in the text. But neither δουλικῇ nor δεσποτικῇ is free from grammatical objections, I prefer therefore to bracket the word. SUSSEX. (123)

Here δεσποτικῇ or δεσποτικῇ is the art of making good servants. The household like the state exercises a moral superintendence over its members, 13 § 1, and its head is responsible for their moral improvement.

5 οἱ λόγων . ὁ μόνον] "Those who permit no conversation with slaves, and hold that we should merely give them orders." Plato *Laus* 177 E, τὴν δὲ οἰκτρον πρόσρησιν χρή σκεδόν ἐπιταξὶ πᾶσαν γίνεσθαι. Elsewhere Plato strongly recommends a humane treatment of slaves: see n. (121) on § 12. SUSSEX. (124)

Plato's view is still from time to time approved, as notably by George Eliot.

6 νουθετηγέον] Plato εἰς, κολάειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλου δεῖ καὶ μὴ νουθετοῦντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρόπτεσθαι ποιεῖν.

7 μᾶλλον] Because the slave, albeit unable to deliberate rationally himself, yet, as an adult, understands better than the child the rational admonitions conveyed to him by others (Fülleborn II. 184). Compare n. (120) on § 11 above, and n. (45) on 5 § 9. SUSSEX. (125)

§ 15 δ διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον] Compare the close of c. 7.

- 10 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλίας, (V)
 τί τὸ καλῶς καὶ μὴ καλῶς ἐστί, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εὖ διώ-
 κειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ [τάς] πολιτείας ἀναγ-
 καῖον ἐπελθεῖν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα 17
 δ' οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν
 15 ἀρετὴν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παιδεύειν
 καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἴπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαῖαν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίους
 § 16 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν
 γὰρ γυναῖκες ἥμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων
 20 οἰκονόμοι γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων
 διώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς τέλος
 ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι λέγωμεν,
 καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφνημαζέων περὶ τῆς
 ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

12 Nickes omits τὰς, following Ar. || 13 διελθεῖν Schmidt || 17 καὶ is omitted by P¹, [καὶ] Susem.^{1,2} || 20 οἰκονόμοι Γ, οἱ κοινῶν Π Bk, qui gubernant (οἰακο- νόμοι?) Ar. || [ἐτεῖ .21 λεκτέον] and 12 [λέγωμεν καὶ] Schmidt || 24 πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης Π² Bk.

11 τί τὸ καλῶς sc. ὁμιλεῖν (Congreve). πῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ <ὁμιλεῖν> διώκειν, how the right intercourse ought to be followed: cp τὸ δὲ κακῶς <ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν> ἀσυμφόρον ἐστὶν ἀμφῶν, 6 § 10.

12 ἐν τοῖς .πολιτείας] This discussion means the scheme of the best state more especially, as is shown by the reason subjoined. But so far as that has come down to us in B iv(vii) and v(viii), this point was never reached, nor the question of the proper training and education of the women. Cp. *Introduct.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM (186)

15 ἀναγκαῖον] Probably because the family will then be treated as a part of the state, and will be better understood in relation to the whole. Comp. n. (33).

πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κτλ.] Cp. v(viii). i. i, viii(v). 9 i i ff., and Nic. Eth. v. 2. 12, τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν κοινῶν ὅσα νομοθετῶνται περὶ παιδείας τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν κτλ, with Jackson's notes. The all important term *politeia* will be fully explained in B. III (i § 1, c. 3, 6 § 1 &c). It will

be found to be a much wider term than 'constitution' or 'form of government' (τάξις τῶν ἀρχῶν), as indeed the English word 'polity' is still. See vi(iv) 11. 3, βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, and n. (466) on III. 3. 9.

16 διαφέρει πρὸς=is an important means towards the excellence of the city: literally "makes a difference with regard to." So iv(vii). 14. 7, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν διαφέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις.

§ 16 18 αἱ μὲν ἐλευθέρων] Cp. II. 9 §§ 5, 6 n. (285), Plato *Laos* vi 781 n, οὐ γὰρ ἥμισυ μόνον ἐστὶν, ὡς δόξειεν ἄν, τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. SUSEM (187)

20 οἰκονόμοι, administrators, τῆς πολιτείας suits Aristotle's views elsewhere at least as well as οἱ κοινῶν: see III. 4 §§ 14, 15; iv(vii). 14 §§ 4—6.

21 ἀφέντες κτλ.] "let us dismiss the present discussion as complete, and carry on our subject from a fresh starting-point. And first let us review those theorists who have put forward a scheme for the best form of polity." With τοὺς νῦν λόγους cp. τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, III. 6. 3.

EXCURSUS I.

EPIMENIDES I. 2 § 5.

THE most detailed account we have of Epimenides is in Diog. Laert. I 109—115 (cp. Suidas *s. v.*), whilst of modern writers Heinrich *Epimenides of Crete* (Leipzig 1801. 8), Höck *Kreta* III. 246 ff., and C. Schultess *De Epimenide Crete* (Bonn 1877. 8) give the fullest particulars. He was probably of Phaistos in Crete, but lived principally at Knosos and was held in unbounded esteem as an expiatory priest, a prophet, and a worker of magical cures. At the same time, it would appear, he was shrewd in practical statesmanship, so that some reckoned him among the seven wise men. His whole history is mythical. He is said to have reached the age of 154 or 157, or in the Cretans' version of the story, of 299 years, and further to have passed 57 years of his early life asleep in a cave. The story of his having effected the purification of Athens about 596 B.C. has been shown to be unhistorical by Niese *Contributions to the history of Solon and of his time* pp. 12—14 (in *Historische Untersuchungen Arnold Schäfer gewidmet*, Bonn 1882). Whether he owes his place among the seven sages solely to this work attributed to him as Solon's coadjutor, which is Niese's opinion, is not so certain. For to all appearance it is on better authority, at the least, that he is said to have played an important part in Sparta about 580 B.C., where he seems to have pronounced the oracles whereby the transference of the election of ephors from the kings to the popular assembly¹ received the requisite religious sanction². In connexion with this he introduced there the worship of the Cretan moon-goddess Pasiphaë and her oracular dreams: in their ancient official building the ephors had a memorial to him (Paus. III. 11. 11) and even preserved the hide, or animal's skin inscribed with oracles which he was alleged to have written. See Ulrichs *On the Rhetra of Lycurgus in the Rhean. Mus.* VI. 1848. 217—230, Duncker *History of Antiquity* VI. p. 352 ff. ed. 5 (1882), Schäfer *De ephoris Laedaemonis* pp. 14—21 (Leipzig and Giefswald, 1863. 4); also Gilbert *Studien (Studies in the history of ancient Sparta)* p. 185, Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* p. 31 f. (Gottingen 1872. 8). There is a curious story which makes him come to Athens only ten years before the Persian wars, and there prophesy these wars, Plato *Laws* I 642 D. The works attributed to him in Diog. Laert. I. 111—two epics, *Κοιμήσεων καὶ Κορυθαίρων*

¹ If indeed, considering the strange method by which the ephors were selected (see *u.* on II. q. 22), they can be said to have been elected by the popular assembly at all.

² Triebes (*Forschungen* Berlin 1871. 8) *Researches into the history of the Spartan constitution*, p. 130 ff., has indeed endeavoured to prove that the new position of the ephors did not begin until a consider-

ably later period. Of course the ephors did not attain their new position at a single blow, as it were, by the mere fact that their election was taken out of the hands of the kings. On the contrary it must evidently have taken long and arduous struggles to change the disproportionate superiority of the kingly power into corresponding inferiority.

γένεσις καὶ Θεογονία, and Ἄργουσι ναυπηγία τε καὶ Ἰάσονος εἰς Κόλχους ἀπόπλους, with prose works *περὶ θυσιῶν* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ πολιτείας*—never had any existence. they are a mere invention of the romancer Lobon of Argos in his work *περὶ ποιητῶν*, as Hillel has shown in the *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII. 1878. 525 ff. Other works really appeared under the name of Epimenides, of which some were forgeries attributed to him, others the writings of a later Epimenides. The Fathers mention a work *On Oracles*, *περὶ χρησμῶν*, which can hardly be a prose writing by him, but rather a collection of his oracles; if it is here that the hexameter *Κρήτες δὲ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί* occurs, which the writer of the *Epistle to Titus*, I. 13, attributes to one of the Cretan prophets, *ἕως αὐτῶν προφήτης*, without mentioning his name. Theodoret indeed ascribes the verse to Callimachus, but in his hymn to Zeus (l. 8) only the first words are found: hence Epiphanius (*c. haer.* I. 14) and Hieronymus (T. VII A. p. 707 Vall.) remark that Callimachus on the contrary first took them from Epimenides. cp. Lübeck *Hieronymus* p. 12 f. However that may be, the word quoted by Aristotle most probably occurred in a hexameter, very likely in a collection of oracles which Aristotle had before him, of which Epimenides was the reputed author. Moreover, in *Rhet.* III. 17. 10, 1418 a 23 f., Aristotle says that Epimenides did not divine the future, but only interpreted the obscurities of the past, *περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμμανεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγόντων μὲν, ἀδήλων δέ;* and this could hardly be affirmed except upon the evidence of such a collection. What connexion there was between this published collection of his oracles and the one which was jealously guarded at Sparta, it is impossible to say. SUSEM. (17)

EXCURSUS II.

ON I. 6 §§ 1—8, 1255 a 5—b 3.

THE recent contributions of Jackson Postgate and Ridgeway to the explanation of this passage, referred to in *u.* (51) on 6 § 1, have not superseded the more successful results attained by Hampke in the *Philologus* XXIV. 1866. 172 ff. Jackson however has the credit of clearing up the sense of *εὐνοία*, and Ridgeway by restoring the right punctuation has helped to correct Hampke's interpretation and to remove apparent difficulties. He saw that in § 4 the words 17 *διὰ γὰρ...19 ἄρχειν* form a parenthesis, and hence that the *ἐπεὶ* following refers not to this parenthesis but to the sentence which precedes it.

Aristotle admits that not every form of actual slavery is natural; a distinction must be drawn between a slave who is so by nature and a slave according to convention and law. The two may, but need not necessarily, coincide. There are natural bondsmen who are not as a matter of fact enslaved, and people who are not nature's slaves are actually in servitude: the former though not in slave's estate deserve to be so; while the latter, although held in bondage, are undeserving of it. The (unwritten) law in question consists in the universal agreement that prisoners captured

in war are the slaves of their conquerors (*ἐν ᾧ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασίν*). This brings Aristotle to the two extreme and opposite views between which his own holds the mean, the views of the unconditional opponents (A) and of the unconditional defenders (B) of each and every form of slavery. He first speaks of the former, remarking that they impeach the legality of the convention or positive law in question, inasmuch as the better man may become the slave of the stronger or more powerful, whereas in a rational state of society virtue is the sole title to rule¹. This then is their view (11 οὕτως). the others (B), on the contrary, take the former view, *ἐκείνως*, that namely prescribed by the foregoing positive law. The two views stand sharply opposed (19 *δίστανται χωρὶς*) and in conflict (*ἀμφισβήτησις*), yet they have a common point of contact (*ἐπαλλάττουσι*), both facts being due to one and the same cause. Aristotle might have prevented all misapprehension of these words if he had written *ποιεῖ δὲ* in line 13. This common cause of both facts is, namely, that virtue (*ἀρετή*) is that which primarily gives force and might, and that without some sort of excellence the exercise of force is impossible (*ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν αὖ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός*); only, of course, virtue still requires the indispensable condition of favourable external circumstances (*χορηγία*). This then is the common point in the two contending views, the point where Aristotle agrees with both, that in the first place only virtue deserves to rule, and in the second place the requisite force to rule essentially depends upon virtue (*ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνεν ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*). But from this common point the conflict between the two theories breaks out on the question, wherein right and justice consists (*ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν*). Just for this reason (*διὰ τοῦτο*) the opponents of all slavery make the essence of right to consist in the mutual good-will of rulers and ruled: *i.e.* in the fact that the ruler, on his part, does not govern in his own selfish interests, but for the welfare of his subjects; and in the willing obedience, on their part, of the ruled. In other words they transfer to the relations between master and servant the principle which Aristotle himself recognizes as the true one in the state, where he uses it to distinguish "normal politics" from "degenerate forms" (*παρεκβάσεις*). In this Aristotle discovers their mistake: they assume that the truly virtuous man cannot desire to exercise any other kind of lordship,—that it would be a misuse of his force, were he to do so: that he would thereby cease to be a truly virtuous man. So conversely, from the pro-

¹ [Dr Jackson having kindly read this excursus as it was passing through the press remarks upon this last sentence, that in his opinion this is precisely what these people do not appreciate and what Aristotle wishes to impress upon them, viz. that virtue is the sole title to rule. He objects (1) that the words *ἐν τρόπῳ τινὰ ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός* are not to be taken as implying that the two parties have formulated their views in this way, but as Aristotle's explanation

of their common statement *μὴ ἄνεν ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*. Further (2) he regards the two propositions contained in *ἐν τρόπῳ τινὰ ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινός* as the *cause* but not the *matter* of the partial agreement between (A) and (B): and he demurs (3) to the statement that the two views simultaneously *δίστανται* and *ἐπαλλάττουσι*, (4) to the sense given to *ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου*, and (5) to the vagueness in which the whole passage is left, especially in the part about *τὸ δίκαιον*.]

position 'virtue gives force' the defenders of all slavery argue that 'might is right'—forgetting that it is not virtue alone that gives force, but that it must have favourable external circumstances; when this is not the case the better man may easily succumb to the inferior. Aristotle might well assume this to be actually the reasoning employed by (B), for no other is logically conceivable. In regard to (A), the philosopher is not so certain whether they do thus far agree with (B) and with himself; whether they all really assume that, as a rule, virtue leads to victory. As therefore the sole right of virtue to rule became doubtful, he feels obliged to give an explicit justification of his course in attributing to them the argument above. This is because, if the point of contact between the two views is lost, and both stand opposed without any community, the views of (A), *ἄτεροι λόγοι*, contain nothing tenable or convincing, since they would yield this result that those who stand higher in mental and moral capacity do not deserve to be rulers and masters (*ἐπεὶ διαστάτων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὥς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν*). Postgate correctly remarks that it would have been clearer if Aristotle had written *ἄτερος λόγος* for *ἄτεροι λόγοι*.

Aristotle next passes to the view of a third party (C), agreeing in the practical result with that of (B), though not in the reason assigned, as its defenders simply (*ὅλως* to be taken with *ἀντεχόμενοι*) adhere to the principle "what is legal is right"; while even this result is restricted, because the principle is not allowed to apply to the case of non-Hellenes conquering Hellenes, but only to that of Hellenes conquering non-Hellenes or to the relations of the non-Hellenes to one another. The view of (C) is thus essentially nothing else than the popular opinion current in Greece, involved in this inner contradiction; and Aristotle shows that, in the main, his own coincides with it, since it maintains what is true in the popular opinion at the same time that it gets rid of its inconsistencies. For on Aristotle's theory also Greeks are, in the main, the natural rulers, barbarians the natural slaves, though this is a rule which certainly admits of many exceptions (see *Introd.* p. 25). SUSEMIHL.

[Some salient features of Dr Jackson's interpretation may here be appended in his own words. He distinguishes three theories in 1255 a 7—26 viz. i. that of (A) who argues that all slavery is unjust and unnatural, because violence is wrong; ii. that of (B) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because might is right; iii. that of (C) who argues that all slavery is just and natural, because what is legal is just¹: while Aristotle declares that in practice *some* slavery is just, *some* slavery unjust. "In 1255 a 12—21" he continues "Aristotle seeks to show that the positions of (A) and (B) are open to attack precisely in so far as they differ from his own.

"Now the *λόγοι* of (A) and (B)

- i. All slavery is unjust
- ii. All slavery is just

¹ [Dr Jackson's notation X, Y, Z is here altered to (A), (B), and (C), for the sake of uniformity.]

ἐπαλλάττουσιν : i.e. slaveries which (A) pronounces unjust, (B) pronounces just. How is it, then, that these λόγοι ἐπαλλάττουσιν? What is the reason of the controversy between (A) and (B)?

The reason is, Aristotle tells us, that, as δρετή with proper appliances is able to exert force or violence, while force or violence implies ἀγαθόν of some sort or other, (A) and (B) agree in assuming that where there is βία, there there is δρετή, and consequently suppose that they differ fundamentally in their notions of δίκαιον. That is to say, on the assumption that βία is always accompanied by δρετή, (A), who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is detestable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, condemns all relations between inferior and superior which are not based upon 'loyalty', i.e. the willing obedience which an inferior renders to a kind and considerate superior; while (B) who conceives that in the cases which he has examined βία is respectable, and does not see anything to distinguish these cases from other cases, takes as his principle 'might is right'.

When however the two theories are withdrawn within their proper limits, so that they διεστῶσι χωρὶς and no longer ἐπαλλάττουσι, the theory which (A) advances against (B) and the theory which (B) advances against (A), ἄτεροι λόγοι, have neither force nor plausibility as against the modified doctrine ὡς δαί τὸ βέλτιον κατ' δρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν¹.

He adds in a note: "In other words, so long as (A) maintains that All slavery is unjust, and (B) that All slavery is just, (B) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has something ἰσχυρόν and πιθανόν to urge against (B). But when (A) and (B) respectively fall back from their advanced and untenable positions to the position of Aristotle, (B) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (A), (A) has no longer anything ἰσχυρόν or πιθανόν to urge against (B). It will be seen that I take τοῖς λόγοις and τῶν λόγων to be 'the theories of (A) and (B)', ἄτεροι λόγοι to be 'the theory adverse to (A's) theory and the theory adverse to (B's) theory', i.e. 'the theories of (B) and (A)'." He agrees with Heitland (*Notes* p. 11) that ἐπαλλάττειν means primarily to 'overlap', whether by superposition or by juxtaposition, and continues: "But when may propositions be said to 'overlap'? At first sight two cases suggest themselves: (1) *All X is Y* might be said to overlap *Some X is Y*, and (2) *Some X is Y* and *Some X is not Y* might be said to overlap one another, provided that these subcontraries are incompatible. It appears however that ἐπαλλάττειν marks not so much the transgression of a limit, as the invasion of a region beyond, and consequently that *All X is Y* could not be said to ἐπαλλάττειν *Some X is Y*. For this reason, as well as because ἐπαλλάττειν understood in the former of the two senses indicated above, would not find a proper antithesis

¹ Apart altogether from my doubts whether the words, of § 4 (especially ἐπεὶ, ἄτεροι, ὡς οὐ δαί as constructed with πιθανόν) can grammatically bear the meaning which Dr Jackson here assigns to them, I fail to see what imaginable

interest the unconditional supporters of slavery, (B), have to contest the right of τὸ βέλτιον κατ' δρετὴν to rule at all, or why they should seek to advance anything possessing force and plausibility against 'the modified doctrine.' SUSSEX.

in διαστάντων χωρίς, I take ἐπαλλάττειν here in the latter of these senses, the whole field of slavery being a debatable ground which from opposite quarters (A) and (B) have overrun. With the phrase διαστάντων χωρίς, which represents the relative position of (A) and (B) when they have withdrawn to their own sides of the field, compare the kindred use of κεχώρισται in $\mu\kappa$ 1, 464 b 27. Thus while I agree with Heitland that 'overlap' is the best English equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν, I demur to his unqualified statement that the latter word expresses the relation in which subcontinentaries stand to one another.⁷

Beinays' rendering of 6 §§ 3—5, 1255 a 12—24, mentioned in *n.* (51), is as follows (the words in italics being supplied by him to explain the connexion of thought)

"The reason for the difference of opinions, and the common ground taken by the divergent views, is that to a certain extent intrinsic merit, when it attains external means, becomes also most competent to do violence, and every superior force depends upon the excess of some good quality or other, so that violence seems not to be devoid of all noble elements and the difference of opinion therefore concerns the question of justice only. For the one side discovers justice in benevolent treatment, *which precludes slavery*; the others even hold it to be just that the stronger should rule. Whereas if the views stood harshly opposed to each other, *so that merely external or brutal violence according to the one, and intrinsic merit according to the other, justified the claim to rule*, then the view which impugns the right of the man, who is the better by his intrinsic merit, to be ruler and lord would be unable to adduce anything cogent or even plausible on its own behalf. Others however fasten wholly on an assumed empirical justice, such as the law, and declare slavery brought about by war to be just *merely because the laws sanction it*; yet in the same breath they are forced to admit that it is unjust."

EXCURSUS III.

THE RELATION OF χρηματιστική TO οικονομική: I. 8. 2.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οικονομικῇ ἢ χρηματιστικῇ, θῆλον... πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν. The most obvious course is to understand ἕτερον εἶδος as only another expression for a mere auxiliary science (ὑπηρετική), or at least as including the relation of an auxiliary science under the case that the two are wholly distinct. In this sense all the commentators take it; both (1) those who think with Hampke—see *n.* (67) on I. 8. 1—that Aristotle simply wished to set up as an auxiliary science just so much of χρηματιστική as stands in a natural relation to οικονομική, and consequently in c. 8 § 13 would set matters right by omitting μέρος, so that the direct branch of χρηματιστική is not there said to 'be a part of', but only 'to belong to', οικονομική, as that with which it is concerned:—and (2) those who with Buchsenschütz rely on the received text

of 8 § 13 and maintain Aristotle's decision to be this: that the direct branch of *χρηματιστική* is really a part of *οικονομική*, but that the 'natural' part of indirect *χρηματιστική*, the theory of exchange, is, on the contrary, merely an auxiliary science. Now there is no passage in which Aristotle makes even the slightest allusion to such a difference in the relation of the two to *οικονομική*. But he states explicitly that not until c. 10 does he proceed to give a definite answer to the question proposed in c. 8 § 1, viz. how that branch of *χρηματιστική*, with which the householder is concerned, is related to *οικονομική*; the answer being that it is in one respect a part of *οικονομική*, in another respect an auxiliary science, 10 §§ 1—3. The matter cannot therefore have been previously decided. And yet he had just said that *οικονομική* has to do with the use or consumption of commodities, *χρηματιστική* with their production, and that hence the two are heterogeneous, because consumption and production are not the same thing. Now, as Schutz remarks, this necessarily implies that for the same reason even the branch of *χρηματιστική* most closely allied to *οικονομική* cannot be a part of it except in a restricted and relative sense¹. This again is decisively confirmed by Aristotle's requirement, IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 18; 10 §§ 9—14, that while none but landowners are to be citizens and none but citizens landowners, they shall not themselves carry on agriculture or cultivate their own estates, since in this way even agriculture really ceases, strictly speaking, to be a distinctive part of household management or domestic economy. Yet on another side the connexion still remains so close that Aristotle can distinguish between the functions of husband and wife in housekeeping by saying III. 4. 17 n. (496), that the one has to acquire, the other to keep; in other words that the external management of the property is more appropriate to the husband, the internal management to the wife. From all this it follows that *ἕτερον εἶδος* denotes something which is not connected with *οικονομική* either as a part of it, or simply as an auxiliary to it: the more subtle distinction between branch and subsidiary science is, for the present, to remain undecided; and *μέρος* is used in a vaguer sense, even covering the case of an auxiliary science, this being also true of 10 § 1, so that there is certainly no need to expunge the word there. Such instances of inexactness and careless expression frequently obscure Aristotle's meaning; but in this part of the work they are unusually numerous. Thus *χρηματιστική* has three meanings, (1) = *κτητική*, in the widest sense; 3 § 3 and c. 8. and, in a narrower sense, (2) = *μεταβλητική* or *καπηλική*, ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία of 9 § 18 (so from c. 9 § 1 onwards); and again (3) = ἡ ἀναγκαία, ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, 9 § 12, c. 10 (cp. n. on 8 § 1). Several times only accurate observation of the context can determine which of the three senses the word has. Similarly *μεταβλητική* or *μεταβολική* as a general term for exchange includes under it both the natural and unnatural species of indirect acquisition, both that which comes under *οικονομική* and

¹ If Buchsenschutz had definitely put the question to himself, whether acquiring can be a branch of using and consuming he would no doubt have answered

in the negative. To acquire and to spend, or consume, are really opposed; which is what Aristotle says briefly, but to my thinking quite clearly.

that which is alien to it : but sometimes it is found in the narrower acceptation of retail trade proper, *καπηλική*, as in 9 § 12, 10 § 4, 11 § 3. Teichmüller has some good remarks on the want of a strict terminology in Aristotle *Arist. Forschungen* II. 4 ff.

Besides, to ask whether *χρηματιστική* is a part of *οικονομική*, is, as Oncken has pointed out¹, a perverse way of raising the question. For *χρηματιστική*, conversely, has a wider field than *οικονομική* : even the finances of the state and the labour of the whole society of the citizens are intimately concerned in it, and the earnings which supply the wants of single households form only an important part of this sum total of the national income. Aristotle finds himself accordingly compelled to speak of a *χρηματιστική* (8 §§ 13—15 ; 11 § 13) which is not simply for the householder and the family circle, but for statesmen and the commonwealth. At the same time he is so inconsistent as to designate the accumulation of a stock of commodities or possessions which shall be useful for civil society, whether it be by direct production or by plunder, a branch or a concern of *οικονομική*². Cp the notes on 8 §§ 13—15, and on 11 § 13. SUSEM (60)

NOTE ON I. 13 § 12: REASON AND VIRTUE IN THE SLAVE.

The difficulty pointed out in notes (45) and (121) on 5 § 9 and 13 § 12, may perhaps be removed as follows. If the slave by nature is to be altogether without that lower part of reason, which Aristotle here calls *τὸ βουλευτικόν*, he would be without reason altogether ; for still less can he be said to have the higher part, *τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν*, scientific thought. But then he would quite cease to be a human being. The expression *ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν*, 13 § 7, should therefore be taken as hyperbolic and interpreted in the light of that other, and itself hyperbolic, statement *κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσούτου ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι* ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν 5 § 9 : reason is present in the slave only, so to speak, as a *δύναμις*, not as a *ἔξω* ; and Aristotle avails himself of the

¹ *Staatslehre* II. 81. "It is just like putting the question : Is the universal the same as the particular, or a part of it, or a distinct species ? For that *χρηματιστική* has the wider generality and that *οικονομική* is the particular, is evident. We should have expected to hear, what *χρηματιστική* is in itself, what comes under it, and then the relation of *οικονομική* to it would have followed of itself and have been arrived at very simply. Whereas by adopting the opposite" (?) "procedure, we can only with difficulty surmise that *χρηματιστική* is undoubtedly an independent branch of science, treating quite generally of the means to acquire property and increase wealth ; that *οικονομική* teaches us to apply to the maintenance

of the household the means, which the other science indicates." It must be observed in reply to this, (a) that only the smaller and less essential branch of *οικονομική* in Aristotle's sense has this function, 13 § 1, (δ) that as it has to do with consumption, while *χρηματιστική* is concerned with acquisition, even this branch of *οικονομική* is not related to *χρηματιστική* simply as particular to universal.

² Schultz alone saw this difficulty and vainly tried to get over it by the omission of *καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς*, 8 § 15. He failed to see that it was also necessary to reject *πόλεως ἡ* in 8 § 13 *ἐνὶ πόλει*, that these words indeed must be the first to go.

hyperbole μὴ εἶναι to denote that only the indispensable, or roughly speaking insignificant, minimum of rational deliberation, and therefore of reason generally, is found in such men. It is precisely similar with c. 6 of the *Poetics*, where first of all § 9, 1450 a 7, characters (ἥθη) are said to form a part of every tragedy, and then a little farther on § 14, a 23, we read ἀνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἀνευ δὲ ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἂν. αἱ γὰρ τῶν νέων τῶν πλείστων ἀήθεις τραγῳδίαί εἰσιν καὶ ὅλως ποιηταὶ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι. Comp. *Hermes* XIX 1884, p. 592. SUSEM. Plato too, *Rep.* IV. 441 A, says λογισμοῦ δ' ἐνίοι μὲν ἔμπονε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀφέ ποτε. Taken strictly this would deny to children and many adults the possession, as well as the use, of reason.

NOTE ON I. 2 § 13: 1253 a 20—24.

ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ, εἰ μὴ ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθίνην διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἔσται τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ (? γὰρ) τῷ ἔργῳ ὤριστα καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὥστε μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα. The words of H. (28) p. 150 "if τοιαύτη = a true hand" will admit of further elucidation. Scholl, who maintains this to be the meaning of τοιαύτη, 'talis qualis esse debet vera manus' (Susem. *Quaest. Crit.* IV p. 5), cites as analogous the use of τοιοῦτος in *De part. animal.* I. I §§ 25, 26, 640 b 33; καίτοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφὴν, ἀλλ' ὁμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. ἔτι δ' ἀδύνατον εἶναι χεῖρα <τὴν> ὁπωσούν διακειμένην, οἷον χαλκὴν ἢ ξυλίνην, πλὴν ὁμωνύμως, ὥσπερ τὸν γεγραμμένον λατράν. οὐ γὰρ θνητὸς ποιεῖν τὸ ἐαυτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αὐλοὶ λίθινοι τὸ ἐαυτῶν ἔργον, οὐδ' ὁ γεγραμμένος λατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ τεθνηκότος μορίων οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐστί, λέγω δ' οἷον ὀφθαλμός, χεῖρ (where Scholl has himself added τὴν). The citation is the more apposite because Scholl takes διαφθαρεῖσα χεῖρ to mean precisely τοῦ τεθνηκότος χεῖρ, 'manus corporis extincti, ἀναιρουμένου τοῦ ὅλου, quae propter hanc solam causam simul corrupta est appellanda.'

There is however another suggestion. Even granting that, as Scholl contends, διαφθαρεῖσα is subject and τοιαύτη predicate, and that διαφθαρεῖσα means 'a dead man's hand,' may not τοιαύτη mean simply 'homonymous,' a hand in much the same sense as a hand of stone? Thus explained ἔσται τοιαύτη is parallel to οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλ' ὁμώνυμα, there is no need to insert οὐκ, and πάντα γὰρ (which the best MSS. of the old translation attest) is a distinct improvement upon πάντα δὲ. So in effect Vettoii p. 14 (ed. of 1576): "posset enim, inquit, aliquis manum vocare e lapide formata, quae tamen manus non esse perspicitur. neque enim fungitur munere manus. manus vero hominis mortui talis profecto est."

B.

1060 b 27 ἐπεὶ [δὲ] προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς (I)
πολιτικῆς, τίς κρατίστη πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἔῃν ὅτι μά-
λιστα κατ' εὐχὴν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολι- (P
30 τείας, αἷς τε χρώνται τινες τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομισθαι
λεγομένων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρη-
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τό τ' ὁρθῶς ἔχον ὀφθῇ

1260 b 27 δὲ omitted by II¹ A¹, and γὰρ would make a better transition. See *Introd.* p. 14, n. 3 || 28 τίς II¹ and P⁴ (corr. in the margin over an *εἰσαίτω*), § II³ Bk. P⁴ (1st hand) || 31 κἄν P³ II³ Bk. (perhaps rightly) || τυγχάνουσιν P³ (1st hand) and perhaps I, τυγχάνουσιν M³ P¹⁻² 4 C⁴ Q⁵ T⁵ U⁵ Ald. Bk.⁴ and a later hand in P³ || ἐρημέναι Schneider, but see Dittenbeiger *op. c.* p. 1368 f. || 32 τ' omitted by M³ P¹

Book II is the critical portion of the work, just as an examination of preceding theories serves for an introduction to other Aristotelian treatises, *Metaphysics Physics Psychology* &c. Here cc 1-8 deal with Political Thinkers, cc 9-12 with Existing Constitutions. See *Introd.* p. 32.

c 1 Our object is to discover the best scheme of political society. We must therefore examine in detail the best existing forms of government and the theories of our predecessors. § 1.

First of all, should the community which in some measure is implied in every city (§ 2) extend to wives and children and to property, as in Plato's *Republic*? § 3.

§ 1 1260 b 27 προαιρούμεθα.] This is evidence (as against Gottling *Preface* p. xvii, and others) that Aristotle intended to construct an ideal state: see Spengel *Ueber die Politik* p. 11, and compare IV (VII). 13, 4.

κοινωνίας τῆς πολ.] This takes us back to I. 1 § 1. The imperfect 'associations' whose relation to civil society, § πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, was the preliminary problem, have been dealt with in B. I.

29 κατ' εὐχὴν] For this expression see 6 § 7 n. (202); IV (VII). 4 §§ 2, 5 § 3,

10 § 13, 11 § 1, 12 § 9, 13 § 9, VI (IV). 11 § 1 with notes SUSEM. (128)

In Plato *εὐχαῖς ὁμοία* = a chimerical scheme, e.g. *Rep.* 456 C, οὐκ ἔρα ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαῖς ὁμοία ἐνομασθεύμεν, 499 C, δικαίως δὲ καταγγελλόμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὁμοία λέγοντες, and in 540 D μὴ εὐχαῖς εἰρηκέναι is explained by ἄλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατόν δὲ πῃ. Thus *εὐχὴ* = an ideal, something visionary, impracticable, as in Demosth. c. *Timocr.* 722, 19, εἰ γὰρ αὖ καλῶς μὲν ἔχει, μὴ δυνατόν δὲ τι φράζειν, εὐχῆς οὐ νόμου διαπράττειν δὲ ἔργον. Similarly *optare* in Latin. By ἔῃν μάλιστα κατ' εὐχὴν Aristotle implies that no restrictions are placed on the realization of the scheme by circumstances.

30 τινες τῶν πόλεων.] See IV (VII). 14, 15 n. SUSEM. (128 b)

εὐνομισθαι λεγομένων] e.g. by the historical Sociates Xen. *Mem.* III 5, 15, IV. 4, 15. Plato *Crito* 52 E, Ps-Plato *Afinos* 320 B. Add *Nic. Eth.* I. 13, 3.

32 ἵνα κτλ.] in order to note what they have of right and useful, and to show that it is from no love of ingenious speculation at all hazards (as the search for some new form of polity, distinct from these, might seem to imply) but from the

καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτὰς ἕτερον μὴ (I)
δοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην
δοκῶμεν ἐπιβάλλεσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.
§ 2 ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης α
τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἥτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς
πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενός
40 κοινωνεῖν φανερόν ὡς ἀδύνατον (ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τις
ἐστὶ, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς
1261 a ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως).
§ 3 ἀλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνήσαι, πάντων βέλτιον
κοινωνεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκίσσεσθαι πόλιν καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν
μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ
5 γυναικῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις,
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης

33 τί P¹, omitted by Γ M^a, hence [τι] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐπιβα-
λέσθαι Π² Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 40 πολιτεία II, πόλις Susem.^{1,2} Al. (?) and Γ (?),
civitas William || 41 τοῦ τόπου after κοινωνῶν M^a P¹ || εἰς ὁ τῆς Γ, ἰσότης II
Ar. ||

1261 a 2 ἀλλὰ b 15 αἰρετώτερον. Eubulos, in Angelo Mai's *Script. vet. nov. coll.*
Ist II. p. 671 sqq., attempts to refute this passage || ὅσων M^a C^a Q^b T^b ||
πάντων omitted by Γ, [πάντων] Susem.¹ but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1363 f. || 6
πλάτωνος πολιτεία M^a P¹, πολιτεία τοῦ πλάτωνος Q^b U^b W^b L^a Ald.

defectiveness of all schemes hitherto
framed that we have undertaken this in-
vestigation.

34 σοφίζεσθαι=affect wisdom, show
one's cleverness, whence σοφιστής. Else-
where in the treatise simply 'to devine,'
§ 19, vi(1v). 13 I, vii(vi). 14 19.

36 ἐπιβάλλεσθαι Shilleto compares
Thuc. vi. 40, Plato *Soph.* 264 v, *Tim.*
43 c, *Leges* X. 892 D, for this sense 'to
take up.'

§ 2 37 ἢ περ πέφυκεν] The natural
beginning, seeing that every state is a
form of association, κοινωνία, I. I. 1
(Eaton). SUSEM. (198)

38 ἥτοι πάντας πάντων καὶ] The
same alternatives are given IV(vii). 8 § 8
—9 § 2.

41 τοῦ τόπου] The converse is not
universally true. Mere contiguity of resi-
dence is not enough to constitute citizen-
ship: III. I § 3, 9 § 9. Note here the idea
of *territory* in the germ.

§ 3 1261 a 3 οἰκίσσεσθαι] Eaton
proposes a reflexive sense, "direct itself

might," comparing Thuc. vi. 18 τὴν πόλιν
τρέφεσθαι αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν and other
instances.

6 ἐκεῖ] *Rep* IV 423 E f. v 449 C—
466 D. This passage and v(viii). 7. 9
justify the inference that ὁ Σωκράτης with
the article v(viii). 7. 9, means thought-
out ὁ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ, Socrates, the
character in the Platonic dialogue, in
keeping with Aristotle's cautious manner
of referring controversially to contem-
porary thought. Not directly named, as a
rule, Plato looks under Socrates (cp. *ph.*
116, 199), as under τινός, τις τῶν πρῶτερον,
and the like. See Campbell's apt remarks
on similar reticence in Plato, *Introd.* to
Theaetetus p. xxvii, ed. 2.

cc 1—5 An Examination of Plato's
Republic.

c. 2 Communism would not secure
Plato's end, which is the utmost possible
unity. Excessive unification subverts the
city, reducing it to a family or an indi-
vidual. §§ 1, 2. The elements of the
city are dissimilar, and thus it is differen-

φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς κτήσεις. τοῦτο δὲ πρότερον ὥς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον;

2 ἔχει δὲ δυσχερεῖας ἄλλας τε πολλὰς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς 3 11 γυναῖκας κοινὰς, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νονομοθετησθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς, τὸ τέλος ὃ φησι τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὥς μὲν

10 ἔχει. 1260 a 27 διαφορὰν noticed by Mich. of Ephesus op. o. f 183^b || δὲ Γ P¹ II², perhaps rightly || 11 κοινὰς <καὶ τέκνα> Spengel || 13 ἐτι δὲ πρὸς, τὸ Bannys, cp. τοσοῦτον γὰρ καὶ ἐτι πρὸς, *De Soph. Eleuch* 4 § 7, 166 a 34 f.: ἐτι δὲ [πρὸς] τὸ Susem.¹²⁻³, tracing it to a variant πρὸς δὲ τούτοις of ἐτι δὲ: yet the punctuation πρὸς τὸ τέλος with Thurot's construction ("as regards the end," making ὥς μὲν εἰρηται νῦν subject to δόξαντες) is not impossible: πρὸς τὸ τέλος φησι Busse

tiated from an offensive and defensive alliance (συμμαχία) and a race or tribe (ἔθνος): § 3. It is this which makes reciprocity the political safeguard, § 4, allowing the citizens to become alternately rulers and subjects, although a permanent governing body would be better, §§ 5, 6, allowing also a change of functions among the officials, § 7. Further, the greater independence (ἀντάρκεια) secured in the city essentially depends upon a degree of unity lower than that of the family, § 8

See Grote's *Plato* c 35, III. pp 160—242, Oncken 1. 171—193 and various monographs quoted in the *Introd.* p. 32 n. 4, p. 33 n. 7. The main defects of this criticism are at once apparent, Zeller, *Platonic Studies* p 203, 290, has rightly traced them to an excessive striving after logical clearness; a tendency to reduce the Platonic utterances to a number of precise dogmatic propositions and to test the independent validity of each empirically, without regard to its inner connexion with the whole system of idealism. Hence it comes about that the spirit of the Platonic teaching is hardly ever adequately appreciated, while now and then there is a captious, almost pedantic, disposition to get at external results and to fasten on details with but little insight into their true relative importance. "Several objections urged by him turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and if judged by Plato from his own point of view would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections" (Grote). This is the sober fact, and serves to account for the piquant charges of injustice, sophistry, and mala

fides sometimes brought against Aristotle.

§ 1 10 πάντων and 11 κοινὰς are unintentional misrepresentations of the kind just criticized. The 'marriage laws' in question affect only Plato's Guardians, and do not establish community of wives at all, in the strictly literal and unfavourable sense of the term (which would be a gross libel, we are told, on the philosopher who made marriage, so to speak, a 'sacrament'). Indeed they 'seem to aim at an impossible strictness,' hardly less exacting than vows of celibacy (Zeller *Plato* p. 489 Eng. t.). And this must have been Aristotle's judgment: he never attacks them on the score of license, but only on grounds of public expediency. Moreover the aim of these laws and the arguments by which they are defended are such as to lay them open to the inexact and invidious appellation even at the hands of impartial modern critics. See e.g. Dr Jowett's remarks *Plato* III. p. 160 ff.

11 δι' ἣν αἰτίαν = αἰτία δι' ἣν "that which he assigns as the reason why such legislation is necessary does not appear to result from his proposals", συμβαίνειν following as if τοῦτο δι' ὃ had preceded. In 4 § 5 is a similar attraction. The 'reason' in question is the fundamental assumption of the Platonic state that the utmost possible unity is desirable: communism, within certain limits, is a means to this unity.

13 Thurot would translate: "further in view of the end which he says ought to be set before the city his present statement (of his scheme) is impracticable." But it is simpler to take τέλος as subject; πρὸς may be adverbial (see *Crit. Notes*): "the

εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διάρριστα. (I)
§ 2 λέγω δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἄριστον ὃν ὅτι μάλιστα
16 πᾶσαν· λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης.

καίτοι φανερόν ἐστιν ὡς προϊούσα καὶ γνωμὴν μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις ἔσται· πλήθος γάρ τι τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γνωμὴν τε μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως ἀνθρώπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίμεν (v)
20 ἄν, καὶ τὸν ἕνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὥστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἴη τοῦτο
§ 3 δρᾶν, οὐ ποιητέον· ἀναιρήσει γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλείονων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἶδει διαφερόντων. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων. ἕτερον γὰρ συμ-

14 εἴρηται] διήρηται Zwinger || δεῖ omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, inserted by cor. 1) || διελεῖν M^a P² 3 C⁴ Q^b T², εἰπὲν? Susem. || 15 ὃν omitted by Π³ Bk. and the 1st hand of P⁴ (inserted between the lines and by a later hand in the margin) || 16 πᾶσαν before 15 ὡς ἄριστον Π² Bk. (in P⁴ corrected by a later hand in the margin) || 18 οὐδὲ] οὐ M^a P¹ || ἡ omitted by M^a P¹; hence [ἡ] Susem.^{1,2} || 21 ἕνα <μᾶλλον ἕνα>? Riese, needlessly || καὶ after εἰ omitted by Γ M^a, [καὶ] Susem.¹; notwithstanding Dittenberger's protest, *op. c.* p. 1361, καὶ is not indispensable, see III. 16 § 9, 1287 b 6 || 22 δ' ἐκ Π², ἐκ omitted by Π¹, δὲ [ἐκ] Susem.^{1,2}, perhaps rightly || 23 εἶδει] εἶδους C⁴ Q^b T², εἰδελους P² U², in P⁴ the word stands over an erasure

end as there stated by Plato is impossible (to attain). For νῦν—in the case supposed, see 3 § 2, 8 § 10: νῦν δ' (on the scheme of Hippodamou) ἵδαν ἔχουσιν.

14 διελεῖν=analyse, define (by analysis), more nearly determine: III 13 § 6, 14 § 2, *De gen. et corr.* I. 1. 1 τὰς τε αἰτίας διαιρετέον.

§ 2 16 λαμβάνει γὰρ καὶ] *Rep.* IV 422 D 4, 423 D 1; V 449 B 1, 462. The three general positions which Aristotle takes up against Plato in §§ 1, 2 are treated in reverse order in the sequel. The third, "the end is impracticable" in c. 2; then the second, "the means are unobtainable" in cc. 3, 4, 5 §§ 1–13: lastly, "the many other difficulties" in c. 5 §§ 14–28 (Thom.). *Comp. Analysis* pp. 102, 103. SUSEM (130).

17 μὴ μᾶλλον] too much of a unity.
18 πλήθος γὰρ τι] See 5 § 15, III. 1 § 2, § 12.

22 οὐ ποιητέον.. πόλιν] With these words the polemic against Plato is resumed exactly where it had started at the commencement of the work, I. 1 2 cp. *note* (2 b) and *Intro.* p. 23, *i.e.* with the specific difference between a state and a family; and this point of view is retained in §§ 7, 8, 3 § 4–4 § 10, 5 §§ 14–24.

The discussions in this book supply the further relation that the maintenance of the state itself is conditioned by the maintenance of the family SUSEM. (131)

§ 3 The state is an organized unity. The plurality of parts which it contains are specifically distinct and properly subordinated. This however is one distinctive thought of the *Republic*, the ground of Plato's analogy between the state and the individual.

24 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ὁμοίων] Apparently contradicted by III 8 § 4, 16 § 2, VI (IV). II § 8; but there equality of rights is intended by ὁμοίων (Eaton). The present statement is repeated III. 4. 5 where uniformity of moral excellence is disclaimed: here the sense is similarity of functions (Postgate), as is illustrated by *N. Eth.* V 5 9, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο λατρῶν γίνεται κοινωνία, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὁμοῦ ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἑνῶν· ἀλλὰ τοῦτους δεῖ ἰσαριθμεῖν. It is the basis of the arrangements proposed *Pol.* IV (VII) cc. 8, 9. See on I. 7 § 1 n. (58 b).

συνμαχία] A confederation is a different thing from a state see III. 3 § 5, 9 §§ 7, 10. It is not an organism but an aggregate of homogeneous members. The

25 *μαχία καὶ πόλις*· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, κἂν ᾗ (I.)
τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἶδει (βοηθείας γὰρ χάριν ἢ συμμαχία πέφυ-
κεν), ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σταθμὸς πλεῖον ἐλκύσει (διοίσει δὲ τῷ
τοιούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνη, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὧσι κεχωρι-
29 σμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες)· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν
§ 4 γενέσθαι, εἶδει διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς

26 τῷ (τῷ P⁴) αὐτῷ P¹C⁴Q³T³U³ || 27 ἐλκόντῃ Π³Bk., ἐλκόντῃ M³ || διοίσει...
'Arkades transposed by Sussem.¹ to come before ἀλλὰ πρότερον 1261 a 2, but wrongly ||
28 καὶ πόλις πόλις καὶ ? Sussem || 29 ἀλλ' πάλαι Schneider, [ἀλλ'] Schlosser Gaive
|| 'Arkades' * * Conington, ὅταν <νῦν> Riese; but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1376 ff. and
the Comm. below || 30 γίνεσθαι ? Sussem. || εἶδει <δεῖ> διαφέρειν Bucheler (pro-
bably right), εἶδει διαφέρειν M³

separate autonomous states, the Lacedaemonians and then allies, for example, are homogeneous.

25 τὸ μὲν answered by 29 ἐξ ὧν δὲ The one (the alliance for war) will be of advantage from its mere size however much alike in kind, just as (it will be of advantage) if a weight shall pull more (than another); i.e. like a heavier weight which turns the scale. The more members the stronger the alliance.

27 διοίσει κατὰ] "Upon something similar", the character of the constituents, whether *heterogeneous* (so as to allow of reciprocity) or *homogeneous*, "will depend the difference also between a city and a race, provided the race does not live with its population separated over a number of villages, but like the Arcadians." Not observing the parenthesis and taking *ὅταν μὴ ὧσι κεχωρ* as epexegetical of τῷ τοιούτῳ the editors have refused this remark to the process of *συνουισμός*, the change from village life by which a Greek *ἔθνος* was consolidated into one city. But (1) the Arcadians must surely be cited as an example of a race and not (as they would be upon that view) of a city; (2) this is not a distinction between *ἔθνος* and *πόλις* universally, but between one *ἔθνος* and another. (3) We should then expect *μηκέτι*, or *οἷον <νῦν>* or something equivalent: and the exact force of the future and of τῷ τοιούτῳ (not τοῦτῳ) would be missed. (4) In that case Arcadians means simply Megalopolitans, whereas Tegeatans, Mantineans and others might equally claim to belong to the Arcadian league (τὸ Ἀρκάδιον). Hence Dittenberger, in *Gott. gel. Anzeiger* 1874 p. 1381, rejects the supposed reference to *συνουισμός* and takes *ὅταν μὴ κατὰ* as a

limiting clause, which excludes from the comparison the cases where the people live *κατὰ κόμας* and opposes to the city-state only such 'races' as the Arcadians.

29 Ἀρκάδες] Who are meant? The interpretation of the passage turns upon this. When Plato, *Symposium* 193 A, writes *διωκίσθημεν ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων* the words spaced show that the Mantineans are meant. Demosthenes *Or. XVI* uses Ἀρκάδες nine times and *Μεγαλοπολίται* seven times of the same people whose city was entitled in full *ἡ μεγάλη πόλις τῶν Ἀρκάδων*. There everything is clear from the interchange of *τοίμας*. But if the words "when they live like the Arcadians" indicate an *ἔθνος* so well known as to spare Aristotle further explanation the instance chosen ought, as Dittenberger urges, to be before all things perspicuous. Understand then neither the Mantineans with Schneider, nor the Megalopolitans with Cameiarius, nor with Giphanius the Maenalians and Parrhasians in the southwest before the founding of Megalopolis; none of these exclusively, but the entire population of Arcadia, as the word naturally means. See *Note on Arcadia* at the end of B. II.

"Further compare I 2 § 4 n. (11), § 6 (19). III. 13. 19 (657), IV(VII). 4. II (760)." SUSSEM. (182)

ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ] Whereas (in the case of the city-state) the elements which must coalesce into one are (? must be, see *Crit. Notes*) specifically distinct. So that it would not make a single city, III. 3 § 6, 9 § 9, to join by an external tie two such similar units as the civic body of Corinth and that of Megara: the conditions for reciprocity would be wanting.

§ 4 30 τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός] Not 'equal retribution' but the propor-

31 σφύζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἶρηται πρότερον· (I)

tional adjustment of claims, i.e. reciprocity of services and functions.

"As 'reciprocal proportion' regulates the exchange of different wares in *Nic. Eth.* v 5, so here it regulates the relations between the magistrate for the time being and the ordinary citizen, who renders, the one service, the other τιμή καὶ γέρας *Nic. Eth.* v 6 § 7, 1134 b 7. On the application of the principle of ἀντιστοιχίας κατ' ἀναλογίαν, 'reciprocal proportion', to commerce, friendship, and exchange generally, see my edition of the Fifth Book of the *Ethics* p. 88 ff. In *Nic. Eth.* v 5 § 6, 1132 b 32 it is ἀντιστοιχίας κατ' ἀναλογίαν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰσότητα, i.e. 'reciprocal proportion' as opposed to the 'retaliation' of the Pythagoreans, which is said to hold the πόλις together. The inconsistency is however only apparent. Here, where it is not necessary to emphasize the distinction between ἀντιστοιχίας κατ' ἀναλογίαν, i.e. κατ' ἰσότητα λόγῳ, and ἀντιστοιχίας κατ' ἰσότητα, i.e. κατ' ἰσότητα ἀπλῶς, τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιστοιχίας is the equivalent of ἀντιστοιχίας κατ' ἀναλογίαν in the other passage. By a similar inexactitude in *Nic. Eth.* ix 1 § 1, 1163 b 33 geometrical proportion takes the place of reciprocal proportion as the rule of exchange. Just so, although τὸ ἀπλὸς δίκαιον is τὸ κατ' εἶαν viii (v) 1, 1301 b 37, at vii (vi) 2 § 2, 1317 b 3 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικόν is said to consist in τὸ ἴσον εἶναι κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' εἶαν, τὸ κατ' εἶαν in the former passage including, and in the latter excluding, τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἴσον. See my notes on *Nic. Eth.* v 3 § 7." JACKSON.

From the apparent inconsistency Grant inferred, *Ethics* i. p. 52 f., that the remarks on Retaliation in the *Ethics* are a development and improvement of those in the *Politics*. The common source may be Plato's Διὸς κλέψαι, the true πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, cf. *Lysis* vi 757 B; C: τῷ μὲν γὰρ μέιστος πλησίον τῷ δ' ἐλάττωσι συμμέτροντα νέμει, μέτριά διδοῖσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἐκαστῶν, καὶ διὰ καὶ τιμὰς μέιστοι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν αἰετ' μέιστοις κτλ.

31 ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* v. 5. 6, where from the nature of the case and the explanations given τὸ ἀντιστοιχίας is not to be understood negatively of retaliation for evil suffered, but positively as a recompense for good received. (As there explained the one, retaliation, repays like with like; the other makes requital by the corresponding term in reciprocal pro-

portion: for in reference to his demand the builder is to shoes as the shoemaker to the house.) More precisely thus: of the different members of a community A transfers to B the goods which he (A) has and B has not, receiving in return that which he lacks himself and B has: thus, a shoemaker exchanges shoes with a baker for bread. Hence we read in § 9 of the same chapter that an association (κοινωνία) of two similar members, as two physicians, is impossible. It can only be formed by a physician and a farmer, or generally by members dissimilar and unequal, between whom equality or proportion is thus said to be produced.

Now the dissimilar members in the state are rulers and subjects. The former afford the latter a wise and intelligent guidance in return for which they receive respect (*N. E.* viii. 14. 3, 1163 b 6), willing obedience, and skilful execution of their commands. and the subjects, in return for this obedience, receive from their rulers the wise government before mentioned. On this depends the continuance and well being of the state. Compare further i. 2. 16, iii 10. 2, with notes (28 c, 562).

But as the greatest possible equality amongst the citizens is the aim of Aristotle's best polity no less than of Plato's—i. 7. 1 n. (58 b), iv (vii). 8. 4 (797), vi (iv). 11. 8 (1293); iii. 16. 2 (672), 17 § 2, i § 10 (440, 441), 13 § 9 (595), § 12 (597-9)—a seeming inconsistency arises; compare also iii. 4. 5 n. (471). The fuller explanation which follows in the text is intended to remove this inconsistency by showing that even in the ideal state there is the same difference between rulers and subjects and the same adjustment of the difference, and to what extent this holds. Thus §§ 4-7 διότι τὸ ἴσον...ἀρχαί are a digression, but one indispensable to Aristotle's argument, which, putting this aside, runs as follows: the state has more need than the family of a plurality, or more precisely of a plurality of dissimilar members, § 2. Remove the dissimilarity and you destroy the state which is still more evident if independence (αὐτάρκεια) be also taken into account, § 8.

Cambrinus, and long before him Eubulos, blame Aristotle unfairly for not seeing that Plato's unity of the state meant only the utmost possible unity concord and unanimity among the citizens. From

ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καὶ ἴσοις ἀνάγκη τοῦτ' εἶναι· ἕμα (γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ
 § 5 κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον. καὶ συμβαίνει δὴ τὸν
 35 τρόπον τοῦτον ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ μετέβαλλον
 οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ αἰεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ σκυτοτόμοι
 § 6 καὶ τέκτονες ἦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ * * βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ ο
 τὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ βέλ-
 τιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνατόν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατόν διὰ τὸ τὴν

32 ἀμα] διὰ P¹ in the margin || 33 γὰρ δὲ Γ Μ * || 34 ἢ καὶ Ατ. (probably right) || 35 μετέβαλον Μ* P¹ Susem.^{1,2} || 36 αἰεὶ after οἱ αὐτοὶ P^{2,4} C¹ Q^b T^b U^b Ald Bk. and a later hand in P³ (omitted by the 1st hand in P⁴) || 37 ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ Beinaes, who by omitting with Koraes τὸ which follows skillfully removes all traces of the lacuna after δὲ discovered by Conington and Schneider (viz. αἰεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὕτως ἔχειν· καὶ περὶ τὴν κ. τὴν πολιτικὴν δῆλον) <οὕχ> οὕτως Schlosser—equally wrong: cp. the Comm. <βέλτιον ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ταῦτόν ἐργον αἰεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ πέφυκε δὴ> βέλτιον οἱ something similar Thuriot

3 § 3; 4 § 5 ff., § 4; 5 § 11, §§ 14, 15, §§ 19, 20 it is clear that Aristotle was well aware of this fact. Nevertheless it may easily be seen that this does not affect the soundness of his reasoning which, as even the language shows, is directed more especially against *Κερυδαίον* V 462, where Plato is showing how the abolition of family life would be the means of making all the citizens of his ideal state feel as the members of a single family (cp. II 140) or even of a single man (καὶ ἦτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνός ἀνθρώπου ἔχει, αὕτη γὰρ πόλις ἀριστα διοικεῖται). Is this not, as Aristotle rightly puts it, to prescribe for the state the end of representing so far as possible an individual man? "Aristotle's argument is that unity when applied to the state is an analogical term, and that Plato's use of it subverts the very ground of the analogy" (Eaton) Comp. also Oncken I. 173 f. SUSEM. (138)

32 τοῦτο=τὸ ἀντιπεπονημένον. There must needs be reciprocity even amongst free and equal citizens, as in the ideal state

ἀμα γὰρ... 39 δυνατόν] All cannot rule at once the only possible alternatives are (a) a perpetual ruling body, αἰεὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη (cp. I. 13 § 4) τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν; (b) alternation or rotation of functions, μετεβάλλειν, ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεισθαι κατὰ μέρος (cp. I. 1 § 2, III. 6 § 9). Comp. IV(VII). 14 §§ 1, 2 where this argument recurs,

§ 5 35 ὥστε apparently redundant

after συμβαίνει, as in VI(IV). 5. 3 συμβέ-
 θηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν εἶναι, and so
De Sensu 2 § 5, 437 b 8 οὐ συμβαίνει ὥστε
 δοκεῖν. Similarly with other verbs: *Pol.*
 VIII(V) 9 § 8 ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν ἱκανούς,
Physics VIII. 6. 2, 258 b 17 ἔστιν δ' ἐνδε-
 χόμενον ὥστ' εἶναι ποτε

§ 6 37 ἐπεὶ δὲ * *] The difficulty is that, if no lacuna be assumed, οὕτως properly refers to μὴ αἰεὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ, and this is against the sense. To take οὕτως=ὡς νῦν οὕτως (see c. I § 3), with Lambin, *ita ut sunt*, is as forced as to insert οὐχ with Schlosser.

"The sense is satisfied if we supply something like this: But <as in fact the work of a carpenter is always done by a carpenter and never by a shoemaker, and from the nature of the case each work is more successful when executed by the same persons, who make this their sole business, and as therefore> it is better it should be so with political society" (Thuriot). SUSEM. (134)

39 ἐν οἷς δὲ κτλ.] "But where it is not possible, because all are naturally equal," τὴν φῶσιν adverbial accus. with ἴσους; comp. II on I. 12 § 2 "and at the same time therefore it is but fair, whether a good or a bad thing for ruling," as opposed to obeying, "that all should take a turn at it—this retirement from rotation of the equal citizens from office imitates an original dissimilarity." φαῖλον=an unsatisfactory arrangement, c. 7 § 6, the thought being perhaps different from Plato's in *Rep.* I. 345 D ff., whether office

56 b φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας, ἕμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν (I)
 εἶτε φαῦλον τῷ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, τοῦτο δὲ
 μιμνῆται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν τὸ ἀνομοίους εἶναι
 57 ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσιν οἱ δ' ἄρχονται [κατὰ μέρος]
 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων
 ἕτεροι ἐτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερόν τοιούτων ἐκ τούτων ὡς γ'
 οὐ πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσιν οἱ τινες,
 καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς
 9 πόλεις ἀναιρεῖ καίτοι τό γε ἐκάστου ἀγαθὸν σφίξει ἕκαστον.

1261 b 1 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ' II A1. Bk., δὲ Bae³ || 2 τῷ Susem., cp. Pl. *Prot.*
 334 A—C, *Enthyd* 295 D, τὸ Γ' II Ar. Bk., <πρὸς> τὸ Thmot || τοῦτο] ἐν τούτοις
 II² Ar. Bk. (Montecatino), γρ. ἐν τούτοις p¹ in the margin || τοῦτο δὲ] οὕτω δὴ
 Welldon || δὲ μιμνῆται] δὲ μιμνῆσθαι II² Ar. Bk. γρ δὲ μιμνῆσθαι p¹ in the margin,
 δὲ μιμνῆσθαι Montecatino || 3 τὸ ἐν] τῷ ἐν Heinsius Susem.², a correction more
 plausible than sound, τὸ to be taken with τοῦτο || οἰκεῖν P² T^b and C⁴ (1st hand),
 οἰκεῖν C⁴ (corrector), ἡλεῖν a later hand in P¹ (the 1st hand having left a lacuna) ||
 τὸ ἀνομοίους Susem., τὸ δ' (τὸδ' Γ') ὡς ὁμοίους Γ' M² Susem.¹ in the text and P¹
 (1st hand), ὁμοίους P², ὁμοίους II² C⁴ Bk., γρ. ὁμοίους p¹ in the margin, τὸ ὁμο-
 μοίους Schmidt (possibly right; I should adopt it if the word occurred elsewhere in
 Aristotle) || εἶναι Γ' M² and P¹ (1st hand), τοῖς P² 344 Q^b T^b Ald Bk and γρ. mg. p¹,
 τῇς C⁴ U^b || 4 κατὰ μέρος omitted by II², παρὰ μέρος Vettori Bk || 5 καὶ omitted
 by C⁴ A^b Bk. || 7 οὕτω II² Bk. || οὕτως after εἶναι M² P¹

is or is not a source of individual advantage τοῦτο τὸ εἶκειν=this yielding of the returning magistrates to their successors, at the expiration of their term of office, μιμνῆται is the counterpart or reflexion of original heterogeneity, produces much the same effect as if rulers and subjects had always been distinct bodies of citizens.

1261 b 1 ἕμα δὴ καὶ δίκαιον κτλ.] Compare III 16 §§ 2—4 with n. (672), IV(VII). 3 §§ 5, 6 n. (740); further n. (58 b) on I. 7. 1, n. (133) and (797) on IV(VII). 8. 4. SUSEM. (184 b)

2 τοῦτο δὲ] This δὲ with the demonstrative resumes the δὲ with the relative 39 ἐν οἷς δὲ. so IV(VII). 9 § 5, f δὲ . ταῦτα δὲ. The two recensions of the text here widely diverge; see the *Critical Notes*. Bekker's text is nearly that of P¹: ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμνῆσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἶκειν ὁμοίους τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Thurot *Etudes* pp. 22—24 has shown the usual mode of interpreting this text to be unsatisfactory. The infinitive may indeed be governed by βέλτιον, and εἶσαι (or ἀρξαι) may be understood with τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς but whether τὸ...εἶκειν be taken as subject or object of μιμνῆσθαι the result

is equally futile. If *object*, the sentence means 'where men are naturally equal, there it is better to imitate—what happens in a state of natural equality'. If *subject*, there is nothing to express what, as a matter of fact, is 'imitated' by the rotation of office-holders, viz. natural inequality.

§ 7 5 ὥσπερ ἂν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι] as if, with taking up or laying down office, they assumed a new personality: γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος in *Nic. Eth.* IX 4. 4.

ἀρχόντων] gen abs. "while (the governors) govern, different officers interchange different offices in the like fashion," i.e. in rotation τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον = 3 ἐν μέρει

7 τινες] That is, Plato: see esp. *Rep.* V 462 B. Cp. n. (133) SUSEM. (185) Also 464 B ἐγγιστόν γε πόλει αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσαμεν ἀγαθόν

8 καὶ (φανερόν) οὐ...is the construction.

9 καίτοι σφίξει ἕκαστον] οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ. "Cp. III. 10. 2 οὐχ ἡ γ' ἀρετὴ φθείρει τὸ ἔχον αὐτῆν with n. (561 b)." SUSEM (135 b)

"What is this 'unity' which seems to Plato so beneficial, to Aristotle so

- § 8 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον φανερόν ὅτι τὸ λῶν ἐνοῦν ζῆ- (I)
 11 τῶν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄμεινον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστε-
 ρον ἑνός, πόλις δ' οἰκίας, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἤδη τότ' εἶναι πόλις, (v.
 ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους·
 15 τοῦ μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἥττον ἐν
 15 τοῦ μᾶλλον αἰρετώτερον.

mischievous? It is not (1) 'unanimity', i.e. community of political principles and aims, the *ὁμόνοια* of *Nic. Eth.* IX. 6, 1167 a 22, as appears from c 9 § 22, 1270 b 21 &c. Nor is it (2) 'uniformity', i.e. the suppression of individuality, so that all the citizens are of one type: for the discrimination of functions, carrying with it diversity of character, is, under the name of justice, the very foundation of the Platonic *πόλις*. Hence it is not (3) 'organization', as organization implies discrimination of functions combined with unanimity in the sense here given to the word. Rather it is (4) 'centralization' Plato is anxious that his citizens should be bound together by a common interest in the *πόλις*, and, with a view to this, proposes to eliminate all those inferior *κοινωνίαι* which induce subordinate affections and create separate interests, thus, he conceives, weakening the supreme tie of patriotism. On the other hand Aristotle regards the subordinate affections which are induced in the inferior *κοινωνίαι*—for example, *οἰκία*, *σύνπλοια*, *συστρατιώται*, *φυλῆται*, *δημόται*, *θιασώται*, *ἐρασισταί* *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9 § 4 f, 1160 a 9, q. v.—as valuable in themselves, and therefore does not desire that they should be merged in patriotism. Further he maintains that the elimination of the inferior *κοινωνίαι*, which *μορῶς ἐλκεσι τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας* *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 9, 1160 a 9, will not cause the subordinate affections to be merged in patriotism, i.e. to be transferred, unimpaired in force, from the inferior *κοινωνίαι* to the supreme *κοινωνία*. He thinks, in fact, that the *πόλις* is properly a complex organization containing lesser organizations within it, rather than a large family or a colossal man. It will be observed (1) that Aristotle's criticisms arise directly from the theory of the *πόλις* which he has developed in the first book, and (2) that they indicate the same appreciation of *φιλία* in all its forms, which has led him to devote to it two out of the ten books of the *Nic. Eth.* JACKSON.

§ 8 το ἑνόν is infinitive, 'the endea-

your to intensify the unity of the state is not so desirable.'

12 βούλεται=tends, means; the meaning of a state is then first realised or fulfilled when .

14 ἔπερ οὖν κτλ] Cp. I. i. 8 m. (10 b, 21); III. i § 12 πόλιν τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζῆης, π. (447), 9 § 14 n. (560), IV (VII). 4 § 11 (759), 5 § 1 τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδενὸς αὐταρκές (764), 8 § 8 ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθος ἐστὶν οὗ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζῆν αὐταρκές π. (804). SUSEM. (186)

Add IV (VII). 4. 14 δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς οὐ τὸς ἐστὶ πῶλεως ὅρος ὁριστος, ἡ μέγιστη τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζῆης εὐσύννοτος

cc. 3, 4 Objections to communism, chiefly to the abolition of separate families. *Even supposing Plato's end, i.e. the most perfect civic unity, to be desirable, his communistic scheme is not the best means to secure it.* A series of detached remarks, so closely allied in some cases that it would not have been difficult to bring them together under one and the same head. See fuller details *Analysis* pp. 102, 103; and compare throughout *Pl. Rep.* v.

The Platonic scheme, as Grote (III. 207) reminds us, is only partial communism. Modern communistic theories contemplate individual producers handing over the produce of their labour to be distributed among themselves by official authority. But the producing and labouring classes in the *Republic* are not communists at all: they are private proprietors with separate families, taxed only with the maintenance of a body of public functionaries, the guardians. Hence the arguments advanced by Aristotle, however just in themselves, have little direct application to the scheme which he is ostensibly criticising, they belong to a far wider enterprise on which he has embarked, an advocacy of the principle of individualism against socialism in general, beginning (I § 2) with the inquiry into the limits of community and subsidiary .

3 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ τοῦτο ἄριστόν ἐστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά-
 λιστ' εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται
 κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἅμα λέγωσι τὸ ἐμόν καὶ τὸ
 μὴ ἐμόν· τοῦτο γὰρ οἶεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ τὴν
 § 2 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττόν. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 21 ὡς ἕκαστος, τάχ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον δ' βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω-
 κράτης (ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ-
 ναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου
 δὴ τῶν συμβαινόντων ὡσαύτως)· νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως φήσουσιν
 25 οἱ κοιναῖς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναῖξιν καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν-
 τες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν
 § 3 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος δ' αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν παρα-
 λογισμός τις ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερόν (τὸ γὰρ πάν-
 τες καὶ ἀμφοτέρα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττόν καὶ

19 δ omitted by M^s P¹, [d] Susem.¹, but see Dittenbergei *op. c. p.* 1359 || 25 τοῖς omitted by M^s P¹ (? rightly) || 27 πάντες omitted by Γ M^s || 28 τίς omitted by M^s P¹ || 29 διττόν καὶ <ἀμφίβαλον> οἱ else 30 τοῖς <κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν> λόγους Thurot; an ingenious suggestion, but not (as I once thought) necessary

to his own constructive theory in B. III.

Again, while the peculiar marriage system of the *Republic* would unquestionably result in the abolition of the ordinary separate family, Aristotle is unable, perhaps from a defect of imagination, fully to realize the new state of things, which Plato intended to create. He persists in attaching the old meanings to words (§§ 5—8, 4 §§ 6—9), whereas it is Plato's avowed aim by an extension of the affections into an intimate and equal sympathy with a whole class (*εἰρηστέα καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνη*) to supersede former family relationships and extinguish private interests.

§ 1 16 τοῦτο = τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα κτλ. Even granting the utmost unity in the (civic) association to be the best, such unity does not appear to be made out by the scheme that all shall simultaneously apply the terms *mine* and *not-mine*.

18 κατὰ τὸν λόγον] with ἀποδείκνυσθαι, established by the proposal that all shall agree in their use of *mine* and *not-mine*: ἐὰν πάντες...μὴ ἐμόν is explanatory of λόγον. For κατὰ = by, cp. *Μεταφ.* B. 8 § 14, κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι. 1050 b 3.

19 ὁ Σωκράτης] In Plato's *Republic* v. 462 c. ἐν ᾧ τινι δὴ πόλει πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταῦτα τοῦτο λέγουσι τὸ ἐμόν καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν, αὕτη ἀριστα διοικεῖται. SUSEM. (187)

§ 2 20 'All' has two senses, (1) each individual, *πρὸς τε καθ' ἑαυτὸν*; (2) the whole body collectively. If 'all' is taken in the former sense, this is perhaps more what *Σοκράτης* means ("proposes to do").

24 συμβαινόντων] "circumstances", the joys and sorrows of life *Rep.* 462 e. νῦν δ' οὐχ οὕτως] But then it is not in this sense that communists will apply the term 'all'. The whole body collectively, not the individuals exclusively, will have the right to say "mine" in this sense.

26 πάντες] (ὡς ἕκαστος) Another instance in III. 11. 2. Also VI (iv). 4. 26 where the distinction is skillfully worked in: *μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γινεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες*.

§ 3 28 τὸ γὰρ πάντες κτλ.] The terms "all" and "both" and "odd" and "even" by reason of their ambiguity tend to make arguments fallacious even in dialectical discussions (and much more so when handled by sophists for purposes of deception).

29 καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια] See § 27 τοῦτο (i.e. τὸ ἄρτιον) ἐνδέχεται τῷ δὲ ὑπάρχοντι τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, *De Soph.* *El.* 4 § 7, 166 a 33; παρὰ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ὅτι τὰ πένν' ἐστὶ δύο καὶ τρία, καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια, 'to (fallacious) division is due the instance, that five is two

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικούς ποιεῖ συλλογισμούς· διό ἐστι τὸ πάν- (1)
 τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥδι μὲν καλόν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατόν, ὥδι
 § 4 δὲ οὐδὲν ὁμοιοσητικόν· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἑτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ
 λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλείστων 10
 κοινόν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν
 35 ἦττον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει· πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς
 ἑτέρου φροντίζοντος ὀλιγοροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-
 τικαῖς διακούλαις οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίοτε χεῖρον ὑπηρε-

30 *ἐστιν* P²⁻³ Q^b T^b || 34 φροντισοῦσι ? Susem. || 35 ἦττον ἢ (*less than*) T. L. Heath || ὅσον] ὅσων P⁴ T^b U^b || 36 φροντισάμενοι ? Susem.

and (is) three, odd and even' (Eaton).
 SUSEM. (138)

Walford and Postgate would take *περιττὰ* καὶ *ἀρτια* to be predicates of *πάντες* and *ἀμφότερα*. But five in the passage quoted above is at once an example of *ἀμφότερα*, 2+3, and of *περιττὰ*. Ἄς *ἀμφότερα*=sum of two things, so *περιττὰ*=an odd sum total, *ἀρτια*=an even sum total. In all three cases the fallacy is not really due to ambiguity in the terms themselves, as Aristotle admits *De Soph.* *El.* 20 § 2, 177 b 7, οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαίρεσιν, unless the confusion of two things as distinct as *ὅρος* and *ὅρος* be said to be due to ambiguity.

30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις] in disputations, in dialectic. SUSEM.

ἐριστικούς] Because they may be construed both collectively and distributively (Schneider), in Aristotle's phrase they admit of *σύνθεσις* and *διαίρεσις*, illicit combination and disjunction. See *De Soph.* *El.* 4 § 6 166 a 22, 6 § 3 168 a 26, 20 § 1 177 a 33, 30 § 7 181 b 20. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀμφὺ καὶ τὸ ἅπαντα πλείω σημαίνει, the words 'both' and 'all' have several meanings (Eaton). Further compare VIII(V). 8. 3; παραλογίζονται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· ἐπὶ ἑκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα (illicit σύνθεσις) SUSEM. (139)

31 ὥδι μὲν] as ὡς ἑκαστος; ὥδι δε=collectively

32 οὐδὲν ὁμοιοσητικόν] Since democrats may quarrel, although πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἑκαστος δὲ they are supreme in the state. The individuals whose unity is Plato's main object can call nothing their own; it is only the body politic as a whole, after all, that can say "mine."

§ 4 Then comes a sensible practical suggestion Comp. Jowett, *Introd.* to Plato's *Republic* p. 166 f., who refers to the statistics of mortality in founding

hospitals.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κτλ.] 'In the next place, the scheme in question has another disadvantage. The property shared by the greatest number meets with the least attention. For men care most about their private matters and less for the public concerns.' The zeal and attention of individual owners are checked and chilled by division of ownership. So with the sons who are a 'common possession' of the Guardians.

35 ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει] 'or (only at most) in proportion to their stake in them.' Since the whole clause answers to *μάλιστα* and ἦττον, the verb would seem to be impersonal: 'as much as it falls to each man's share' to care. For the impersonal use, see I. 13 § 8. For the meaning, Herod. VII. 23 μῆριον ὅσον αὐτοῖσι ἐπέβαλλε· hence Herod. IV. 115 ἀπολαχόντες τῶν χρημάτων τὸ ἐπιβάλλον=their due share. Cameiriatus cites Ptolemy as using the word to express 'proportional parts' in astronomical calculations. The same thought recurs 1262 a 3 in the words ὁπόσους τυγχάνει τὴν ἀριθμὸν ὧν. If the society consists of a thousand members, the interest of each is represented by the fraction τῶν. But such is the tendency of human nature that the interest felt and care bestowed will be even less than this.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις κτλ.] 'Each is more likely to neglect them, amongst other reasons, because there is some one else to look after them; just as with the attendance of servants it sometimes happens that the work is not so well done by many as by few.'

§ 5 According to Plato's regulations, *Rep.* V 457 c—464 b, all the children of the Guardians, the two upper classes who are full citizens of his ideal state, are to be taken from their mothers directly after

§ 5 τοῖσι τῶν εὐατόνων. γίνονται δ' ἑκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν¹¹
 υἱοί, καὶ οὗτοι οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχὼν
 1262 a ὁμοίως ἐστὶν υἱός· ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγαρχήσουσιν, ἐπεὶ οὕτως
 ἕκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εἰ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς,
 ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δέοντος, τοῦ-

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ Bucheler, ὅτι ? Sussem, ἔτι Γ II A1. Blk. Bonitz seeks to prove that this alone is right (*Erismes* vii. p. 102 ff.), and in the Addenda to my critical edition, p. 119, I somewhat hastily acceded. If ἔτι be accepted there must be a full stop before it || 2 λέγει Γ (?) A1 (?) Sussem^{1,2} || 3 τῶν ἀριθμῶν P³ and the 1st hand in P¹ 2 Q^b (emended by a later hand in Q^b), τῶν ἀριθμῶν T^b || ὧν omitted by IP Ar. || τοῦ δέοντος II Ar. and also probably Γ, *hinc* *filius* William || In the whole passage 1—14 Schmidt proposes extensive changes thus: ὀλιγαρχήσουσιν, κρείττον ἀρα ἴδιον ἀνεψὶον εἶναι (transposed from 13) ἐνδὲς τὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον προσγορεύοντος, <ἢ> διαχιλίων ἢ καὶ μυρίων τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον υἱόν, ἔτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον <υἱόν> λεγέοντες ὡς αὐτὸν ἑκαστον τῶν χιλίων [ἢ] ὅσων ἢ πόλιν ἐστίν, οὕτως ἕκαστος ἐμὸς ὅτι λέγει <ὡς αὐτὸν> τὸν εἰ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἢ κακῶς ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὧν, καὶ τοῦτο διατάξω [εἰ μὴ] ἐμὸν τὸν τοῦ δέοντος· ἀδελφον α 7λ

birth. The sickly and deformed are to be exposed, as well as the offspring of incapable parents and of unions formed in violation of the laws and magisterial authority (provided recourse has not been had to abortion in this latter case). The remainder are committed to public nurseries or crèches, in order that the real parents and children may be kept in ignorance of each other and that no favouritism may be shown. According to definite gradations of age all the Guardians alike are to treat one another and feel love for one another as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. See *n.* (133). SUSSEM (140)

38 χίλιοι] Not a fixed number, but merely suggested as a convenient round number by *Rep.* iv 423 A. 'Now each of Plato's citizens has a thousand sons, not in the sense that each of them is his son exclusively, but (in the sense) that any of them is just as much a son of any other of the elder citizens. And the consequence will be that all these fathers alike will be indifferent to him.'

39 οὐχ ὡς ἑκάστου] Not as being children of his individually; but to any of the children (of a given year) any of the fathers (of that year) stands in a paternal relation.

1262 a 1 ἐπεὶ οὕτως κτλ.] Almost word for word from *Rep.* v 463 E, πασῶν ἀρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφωνήσουσιν ἐνδὲς τινος ἢ εἰ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος, ὁ

νυνδὴ ἐλγόμεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εἰ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς: i.e. when any individual member fares well or ill, they will all with one accord use the expression 'it is well with mine' or 'it is ill with mine.' Hence translate. "As [or if ἔτι be retained, 'Further] each of the elder citizens, when he uses the term 'my son' to express his sympathy in the joy or sorrow of a younger comrade, uses it only in the sense of the fractional part which he himself forms of the whole body of citizens. That is, he says 'my son' or 'so and so's'; and this 'so and so's' applies equally to each of the thousand citizens or whatever the number of which the state consists." To take ἐμὸς = my son (not my brother or my father) is justified by what is in the preceding line, 6 τέκνον, 14 υἱόν (cp 4 § 7). In spite of the χίλιοι υἱοί (b 38) it is the elder generation, the 'fathers', that are meant by τῶν χιλίων ἢ ὅσων κτλ. In fact the hypothetical round numbers (see § 6 διαχιλίων καὶ μυρίων) serve merely to present the case definitely and vividly. To οὕτως corresponds ὁπόστος ὧν, as τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ δέοντος, mine or A's or B's, and so on through all the thousand. When a 'father' uses the term 'my son' in Calipolis he will be aware that he shares the relation with a number of other 'fathers'.

2 ἐμὸς] Editors compare Soph. *Antig.* 565; ἀλλ' ἢδε μέντοι μὴ λέγε.

3 οἷον = I mean.

τον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν χιλίων, ἡ ὅσων ἡ (I)
 5 πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο διαστάζουν· ἀδελφον γὰρ ὃ συνέβη γενέ- (p. 26)
 § 6 σθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω 12
 κρεῖττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἕκαστον, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύου-
 τας δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὥς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 § 7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὃ μὲν γὰρ οὖν αὐτοῦ ὃ δὲ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ

7 [ἕκαστον...8 μυρίων] Schmidt (transposed as above) || μὲν ὄνομα Bonitz, perhaps rightly; yet the instances in which μὲν in Aristotle stands without any δὲ following have not yet been sufficiently explained μηδὲν with a comma after (instead of before) τὸ αὐτὸ Beinays || προσαγορεύοντα Beinays, perhaps rightly; yet the plural may be intentional although the participle goes with ἕκαστον || 8 καὶ | ἡ Susem.¹ aut William || 9 [τὸ ἐμὸν] Schmidt || οὖν αὐτοῦ M¹ P²⁻⁴ Ald. and apparently P¹ || ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ Γ and apparently P¹, ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ M¹ P² 3¹ Ald., ἀδελφὸν [αὐτοῦ] Schmidt

5 καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ 'And even this he says dubiously, for it is never certain who of the citizens actually had a son or whose son, if born, was reared.' At first sight this seems to make against Aristotle; for if less than the thousand had sons, the fractional interest of each elder citizen, or 'father,' in the younger generation is increased. But then his chance of being childless is proportionately increased.

§ 6 "And yet is it better in this fashion for each of the 2,000 or 10,000 elder citizens to use the term 'mine' (of any one), all calling him by the same name" viz. son 'or as it is used under the present system' with the addition of different names, as nephew, cousin, &c?

7 ἕκαστον 8 μυρίων] Of course only those citizens are meant whose age entitles them to call a boy 'son' and not 'brother' or 'grandson'. Hei.e. τὸ αὐτό=son. SUSEM. (141) With αὐτό μὲν κατὰ may be mentally supplied *ὀλιγομύριον* δὲ πάντων (Thucot).

8 δισχιλίων] Is this genitive after ἕκαστον, as above? Is it not more forcible if taken after τὸ αὐτό=the same relation? Each calls him 'mine', (which will result in) the whole body (*plural*) calling one person the same relation of some 2,000 people (T. L. Heath).

A different construction of § 6 is proposed by Bonitz; viz. to take ἕκαστον as the object, instead of the subject, of λέγειν, and to make δισχιλίων the genitive after τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα, which is a correction for μὲν:—"is it better in this sense to call each (of the younger generation) 'mine', using the same name [i.e. son] for 2,000 or 10,000?" In the same essay

(*Hermes* VII pp. 102—8) Bonitz defends the MS. reading *ἐν* (a 1) on the ground that a new objection, No. 3, is there introduced. The last, No. 2 (§ 4 *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ὀλιγομύριοις*) dwelt on the depreciation which the term 'my father' suffers. "The multitude of fathers, whom each of the younger men has, is prejudicial and fatal to the loving attention which a son otherwise receives from a father." In the passage which follows (1 *ἐν οὖν* .. 14 *πᾶσι*) "the fact is viewed from the opposite side. The name 'my son' loses all value, as each one who uses it shares the problematic relationship with an indefinitely large number." With all deference to authority so weighty, it may be doubted if the two sides are opposed: at all events in a 13 (*κρεῖττον γὰρ κατὰ*) the point of view is the advantage of the younger generation no less than in a 1 (*ὀλιγομύριοις*). Comp. Susemihl *Quaest. Crit.* VI p. 16 ff.

§ 7 9 8 μὲν γὰρ κατὰ] "For one and the same person is called by one man his own son; by another his own brother, or cousin; (by another) according to some other kinship either by blood relationship or by some connexion and affinity to himself in the first instance or else to his kin; and furthermore by another his clansman, his tribesman. For it is better to be actually an own cousin than in Plato's sense a son." There is at present a kind of community in relationship; only it does not extend so far and is compatible with dissimilar individual interests.

"For *φράτρας, φυλῆται* consult the following references: 5 § 17 n. (169), 11 § 3 with Exc. IV; 111 2 § 3 (451), 9 § 13

10 προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτόν, ὃ δ' ἀνεψιόν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλην τινα (I)
 συγγένειαν, ἢ πρὸς αἵματος ἢ κατ' οἰκειότητα καὶ κηδεῖαν
 αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἕτερος φράτορα,
 φυλῆτην. κρεῖττον γὰρ ἴδιον ἀνεψιὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-
 8 τον υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μή τις 13
 15 ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφούς τε καὶ παῖδας καὶ πατέρας
 καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, αἱ γίνονται τοῖς
 τέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ
 9 ἀλλήλων τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν
 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων· εἶναι γὰρ τισι
 20 τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναικας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα
 τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ
 γυναικες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, οἷον ἵπποι καὶ βόες, αἱ
 σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὅμοια ἀποδιδόναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦ-
 4 σιν, ὥσπερ ἢ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθεῖσα Δικαία ἵππος. ἔτι δὲ 14
 25 καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ βῆδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς
 ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἷον αἰκίας καὶ φόνους
 [ἄκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἄκουσίους καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· ὧν

12 αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Bk., αὐτοῦ—αὐτοῦ Γ II || 4] εἴτα? Susem. || ἕτερος Lindau, ἕτερον Γ II Δr. Bk., ἕτεροι Bernays, εἰαῖρον Spengel || 13 <ῆ> φυλῆτην Bas.³ Bk., aut contribulenti William || εἰαῖρον <ῆ> φράτορα <ῆ> φυλῆτην Schmidt || 27 [ἄκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] Blander, ἄκουσίους [τοὺς δὲ ἄκουσίους] Congreve; τοὺς δὲ ἄκουσίους omitted by P², which proves nothing against their genuineness, still should not the brackets include all four words? See Comm. || Lambin omitted καὶ μάχας

(558); vii(iv). 14 § 4 (1321 b), 15 § 17 (1367); vii(vi) 4 § 19 (1427), 5 § 9 (1437); viii(v) 1 § 10 (1499), 4 § 10 (1526), 5 § 11 (1561), 8 § 19 (1626)."
 SUSEM. (142)

§ 8 Yet after all parents would suspect relationship from the likeness of their own children. Comp Jowett on the *Republic* p. 165 ff.

17 λαμβάνειν τὰς πίστεας] derive their convictions, so in iv(vii). 1 6.

§ 9 19 τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους] Books of travel round the world, as in *Rhet.* 1. 4, 13 (where see Cope's exhaustive note), *Meteor.* 1. 13, 13, II. 5. 14. Such books were also called *περίγλοι* and *περιγήσεις*.

Usually *πραγματεύεσθαι* takes *περὶ*; but once, *Rhet.* 1. 2. 5, it has *πρὸς*. In *Pol.* iv(vii). 14. 8 we have τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευέσθαι, *ὅπως*.

20 τισι τῶν ἄνω Λιβύων] See Exc. 1. to B. II p. 326 ff., as regards the evidence for these customs. Comp. also 1. 2. 4 ff

(11) and n. (116). SUSEM. (142)

24 ὥσπερ. ἵππος] The same remark in *Hist. Anim.* vii. 6 8, 586 a 12 (Schneider). Further compare *De Gener. Anim.* iv. 3. 1, 767 b 5: ὁ μὴ ἐοικὼς τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἤδη τρόπον τινα τέρας ἐστίν· παρεβέβηκε γὰρ ἢ φύσις ἐν τούτοις ἐκ τοῦ γένουι τρόπον τινα (Eaton). SUSEM. (142)

Δικαία here probably means "docile": Xenophon *Cyneg.* 7 § 4, *Memorab.* iv. 4. 5: φασὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῶν τῷ βουλομένῳ δικαίως ποιήσασθαι πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι τῶν διδασκόντων (Jackson).

c. 4 § 1 25 τὰς τοιαύτας] the following.

27 [ἄκουσίους τοὺς δὲ] ἄκουσίους] Can it be said that a divine law forbids involuntary homicide in the case of father, mother, &c, but permits it in other cases? On the contrary, responsibility ceases for involuntary acts; nothing but negligence is then punishable; nor can we talk of such acts being allowed. But

οὐδὲν ὅσιόν ἐστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς (I)
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπωθεν.
30 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνωσούντων ἢ γνω-
ρίζοντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
§ 2 νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν. ἄτοπον δὲ 18
καὶ τὸ κοινούς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱούς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-
λεῖν τῶν ἐρώντων, τὸ δ' ἐρᾶν μὴ καλῶσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρή-

29 ἀπωθεν M¹ P¹·L¹ Ald. || 30 ἀλλὰ] & Π¹ (γρ. ἀλλὰ corr.¹ in the margin of P¹) || 31 μὴ <οὐ>δεμίαν Jackson, <μὴ> μηδεμίαν Schneider, μηδεμίαν Π² Ar. Dk. Susem.^{1,2,3}, μηδὲμίαν Π¹ || 33 ποιήσαντας Γ Ar. and M² (1st hand)

intentional homicide is forbidden by the law of God and of nature in the case of the nearest blood relations, while under certain circumstances it is allowed in the case of strangers. So too outrage, blows, abuse are all intentional acts. On these grounds the words bracketed must be regarded as an interpolation (Bender). SUSEM. (144)

28 ὃν οὐδὲν ὅσιον] To this Plato might certainly reply, that where relationship is abolished, crimes (even if they are still committed) cannot be aggravated by the fact of being crimes against relations (Oncken) SUSEM. (145)

32 λύσεις = expiations. Editois compare *Réf.* II 364 E. ὡς ἄρα λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων διὰ θινῶν καὶ παιδῶν (ἡδονῶν) εἰσι μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι εἰσι δὲ καὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀς δὴ τελευτᾶς καλοῦσιν: *Eur. Or.* 510 φόνων φόνων λύσαι, 597 μίσμα λύσαι. Such purifications for homicide were unknown in the Homeric age. Grote, *Hist.* I 34, compares Thuc. I. 126—128 for their great importance.

τῶν δὲ κατὰ] "All the editois assume that the words τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν, whether with or without Schneider's addition, stand for τῶν δὲ μὴ γνωρίζοντων ἐνδέχεται μηδεμίαν γίνεσθαι λύσειν, as if Aristotle wished to say 'it is possible that no expiation should be made'. He ought however to say 'it is not possible that any expiation should be made'. Hence I conjecture τῶν δὲ μὴ, <οὐ>δεμίαν." JACKSON

§§ 2, 3 ἄτοπον δὲ κατὰ] *Réf.* III. 403 A, B: οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστὸν μανικὸν οὐδὲ ξυγγενεῖς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὁρθῷ ἔρωτι. οὐ προσοιστὸν ἄρα αὐτῇ ἢ ἡδονῇ (sc. ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια) οὐδὲ κοινωνησάντων αὐτῆς ἐραστῇ τε καὶ παιδικῶς ὁρθῶς ἐρώσει τε καὶ ἐρωμένους. οὕτω δὲ, ὡς οὐκ, νομοθετήσας ἐν τῇ οὐκ ἐκείνῃ πόλει φιλεῖν μὲν καὶ ξυνεῖναι καὶ ἀπτεσθαι ὥσπερ

υἱὸς παιδῶν ἐραστῇ, τῶν καλῶν χάριν ἐὰν πελθῇ. εἰ δὲ μή, φύγων ἀμουσίας καὶ ἀπειροκαλίας ὑφέξοντα. With this compare V 468 C, where the gallant soldier is rewarded with the right to kiss his comrades upon the expedition, καὶ μηδὲν ἐξεῖναι ἀπαρηθῆναι ὅν ἂν βοῶληται φιλεῖν, ἵνα καὶ, ἐάν τις τοῦ τύχῃ ἐρών ἢ ἀρρενοῖ ἢ θηλείας, προθυμώτερος ἢ πρὸς τὸ τάρμυστα φέρειν. See also Zeller's *Plato* p. 455 f. SUSEM. (146)

34 τὸ δ' ἱρᾶν μὴ καλῶσαι κατὰ] This objection might apparently be met, like the last, *u* (145), by some sort of defence. It would however be open to reply on behalf of Aristotle that if the relation of Guardians to one another is seriously to be taken as that of parents and children, brothers and sisters, it is unseemly at any rate to make such strong concessions to sensual passion—whatever may have been Aristotle's own opinion on the direction it took in Greece (see on 10 § 9). Besides, the Platonic institutions take precautions against the "marriage" of those who are actually parents and children,—a fact overlooked by Oncken, who (i. 181) attributes to Aristotle an objection which he neither did nor could bring against Plato on that score—but none at all against the "marriage" of actual brothers and sisters. comp. *Réf.* V 461 E, ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀδελφὰς ὁμοῖα ὁ νόμος συναικῶν, Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 171. As Aristotle does not take especial exception to this it must be assumed that he did not feel his Greek sentiments excessively outraged, any more than Plato, by incest under this form. It is also significant that he has no word of blame for the deception whereby the rulers in the ideal state are directed to ensure that as many as possible of the ablest guardians of both sexes procreate children, and as few as possible of those who are inferior, *Réf.*

- 35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἀς πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν (I) ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν
 § 3 μόνον. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνουσίαν ἀφελεῖν δι' ἄλλην (p. μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λῶν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γινομένης· ὅτι δ' ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἢ υἱός, οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,
 § 4 μὴδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν. : εἵκοι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς
 41 εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς πα-
 1262 b 28 ας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ὥττον γὰρ ἔσται φίλα κοινῶν ὄντων
 τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-
 χομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νικητέρειν. ὅλως δὲ 10
 § 5 συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούναντίον διὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον νόμον ὃν προσ-
 5 ἦκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ δι' ἣν
 αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέ-
 § 6 κνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. : φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἴομεθα μέγιστον
 εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν ἦκιστα στασιδ-
 ζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἐπαινεῖ μάλιστα· ὁ Σω-

35 εἶναι omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹) || 40 εἵκοι .b 3 νεωτε-
 ρίῳ Thurot transposes this passage to follow 1264 a 40 κοινῶν, Susem. to follow
 1262 b 24 πολυτελειόμενοι, *Introd.* 79 || δὲ Γ' Π Dk., δὴ Susem.; the alteration stands
 or falls with the transposition

1263 b 4 συμβαίνει P¹ T^b U^b and Q^b (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || 6 οὐ-
 τως omitted by M^a P¹ || 7 τε omitted by M^a P¹, *quidem* William, but nothing can
 be inferred from this with regard to Γ

V 457 C—461 E. See Zeller's *Plato* p.
 455, 477—8. Susemuhl *Plat. Phil.* II 170.
 SUSEM (1887)

χρήσεις=enfearments.
 35 ἀς πατρὶ. ἀπρεπέστατον] But
 the words ἀπρεπέστατον, *Rep.* III. 403 B, do
 not bear this implication. Plato permits
 to the ὁρθὸς ἔρως only such familiarities
 as would be unimpeachable as between
 father and son.

36 καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον (ἀπρεπέστατον
 ἔστω) according to Greek ideas. Such
 power lay in a 'little word' to extinguish
 the fiercest passions, *Laos* VIII 838 B.

§ 3 37 δι' ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν μηδε-
 μίαν] True there is no other reason
 assigned, but there may well be irony
 under the terms ἀμυνσία and ἀπενοκαλία
 (see the quotation n. 146): especially
 when viewed in connexion with the noble
 conception of Socrates' moral character
 and the language of gallantry at the same
 time put into his lip, by Plato. See *Ap-
 pendix* I to Dr. Thompson's *Phaedrus*,
esp. pp. 153, 161 ff. The attempt to trans-

figure and etherealize gross passion was
 pitched in too exalted a strain of romanticism.
 Plato himself renounced it after-
 wards. III. matter-of-fact disciple simply
 ignores it.

§ 4 is out of place here; perhaps it is a
 later marginal note by the author.

§ 5 1262 b 3 ὅλως δὲ] Comp. I. 6.
 5 n. "Such a law must bring about the
 very opposite to that which ought to be
 the result of well-framed laws and to
 that which was Socrates' own reason (c. 2,
 § 1) for thinking that the institutions re-
 garding women and children ought to be
 thus ordered."

This criticism seems unfair. "Such
 private friendships and affections as
 Aristotle is thinking of do not, according
 to Plato, promote concord in the state
 generally, but rather divert men's atten-
 tion from the whole community into
 private channels, and by creating private
 interests tend to selfishness and disunion.
 So the Spartan love of domesticity is
 censured; *Rep.* VIII 548 A, B.

- 10 κράτης, ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεῖνος εἶναι φησι τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, (1
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἴσμεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀρι-
στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμούν-
των συμφύηαι καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δύο ὄντων [ἀμφοτέρους] ἕνα·
§ 7 ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφθάρθαι ἢ τὸν ἕνα, ἐν 11
15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδαρῇ γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἥκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἢ υἱὸν
§ 8 πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὺ εἰς πολλὸν
ὑδωρ μυχθὲν ἀναλίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει
καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομά-

13 συμφύηαι P²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. (perhaps more correct), συμφύηαι P¹ (1st hand), συμφυήαι P⁴ (corr.) || [ἀμφοτέρους] Congreve || 14 εἰ τὸν ἕνα Congrev., εἰ τὸν ἕνα <συμβαίνει> ? Susem., εἰ τὸν ἕνα Tyrrell || 19 καὶ] κατὰ Lambin, καὶ <περὶ> Koraes in his Commentary; καὶ <κατὰ> Bernays and independently, but hesitatingly, Vahlen (*Ztschr. f. d. ostr. Gymn.* xxiii 1872. p. 539), but Bernays makes ἀναγκαῖον ὄν (omitting the comma before διαφροντίζειν) depend on συμβαίνει, while Vahlen takes this as an absolute accusative. This slight alteration is certainly preferable to that proposed for διαφροντίζειν (see below), but, as Vahlen rightly judges, not absolutely necessary either ἀναλίσθητον εἶναι can be supplied with Vahlen, or the acc. τὴν οἰκειότητα καὶ taken as the object of διαφροντίζειν, with Congreve and Susem¹; then ἀναγκαῖον ὄν is to be construed, as Bernays does, omitting the comma; in the former case it is an absolute accusative. Bendei (partly anticipated by Spengel) suspects ἀναγκαῖον ὄν || τὴν πρὸς] εἶναι πρὸς Spengel

§ 8 10 φιλίας] Cp. vi(IV). 11. 7. ἢ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλική. SUSEM.

11 ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις] Plato *Symposium* 192 c 29 comp. 191 A. Hug in p. x of his edition of that dialogue considers ἐρωτικοὶ λόγοι to be another title for the *Symposium*; but this could only be allowed if the text read "Plato in the discourses on love" whereas it is "Aristophanes, in the discourses on love," and there is nothing to hinder our supplying "contained in Plato's Symposium." Moreover Plato's own theory of love in its fulness and integrity is there given to Socrates alone, who expressly combats the suggestion made by Aristophanes that it is "seeking the other half of ourselves" 205 D, cp 212 C. Yet no doubt, in so far as Aristotle here makes use of the thought expressed by Plato's Aristophanes, Plato agrees with the latter. This much is clear, that Aristotle intends to designate Plato as the author of the *Symposium*. SUSEM. (148)

12 ὡς τῶν ἐρώντων καὶ] The genitive absolute after λέγοντα instead of ὄνι or accusative and infinitive.

§ 7 14 ἐνταῦθα καὶ] "In this case either both will be spoiled or at least the one absorbed in the other."

15 ὑδαρῇ] water, i.e. diluted (unmixed, κρατος. Aesch. *Agam.* 770 ὑδαρὲς σάλυν φιλότητι, *Poetics* 27 § 13, 1462 b 7 ὑδαρῇ μῦθον, a tame spun-out plot.

16 ἥκιστα λέγειν=least likely to apply the term 'mine'. § 5. Owing to a feeble esprit de corps they would take little pains to assert the relationship. "Plato if called upon for an answer to this reasoning would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the 'diluted friendship' pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections between individuals he wishes to discourage; the unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out." (Grote III. 220 π.)

§ 8 18 οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τὴν οἰκειότητα] 'So too is it in the end with the mutual affection implied in these names': συμβαίνει sc. ἀναλίσθητον εἶναι,

10 των τούτων, διαφροντίζειν ἥκιστα ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (I)
 τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ ἢ υἱὸν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς
 § 9 ἀδελφούς ἀλλήλων. δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τὸ τε ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν ὧν
 14 οὐδέτερον οἶόν τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. <ἔοικε
 a 41 <δὴ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυ-
 b 1 <ναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἢ τοῖς φύλαξιν· ἦττον γὰρ ἔσται φίλα
 2 <κοινῶν ὄντων τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι
 3 <τοὺς ἀρχομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν.> ἀλλὰ 18
) 15 μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γενόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ

20 τούτων δι' ἃ φροντίζειν ἀπὸ [δὲν] Spengel: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι>, διαφροντίζειν Camericius: τούτων <διαφορηθῆναι οἱ διαφθαρῆναι, ὡς> διαφροντίζειν? Schneider: τούτων δια <φρεῖν>, φροντίζειν Madvig: τούτων, <ὡς> διαφροντίζειν Koiaes in the text, but the absolute accus. is also possible without ὡς || ἀναγκαῖον ὃν ἀναγκάζειν Bender (no comma before διαφροντίζειν) || 21 υἱοῦ υἱὸν P²³ Q¹ T¹ Ald. Bk. || ὡς after 23 ἀδελφούς Ridgeway || 25 γενόμενα Sussem., γινόμενα II Bekk., γεννώμενα? Götting

The special affections would be lost in the general sense of comradeship. This seems simplest, though it is also possible to govern *οὐκείνη* by *διαφροντίζειν*; so that either *ἢ πατέρα* 17a is the subject of *διαφροντίζειν*, as Congreve and Sussemühl think, or as Ridgeway *Transactions* II. 132 proposes *ἢ πατέρα* 17a is to be regarded as eponymic of the wider term *οὐκείνη*. He translates: 'so the result is that in such a constitution as Plato's, least of all is it necessary to have regard for the mutual family feelings implied in these names' (of father and son).

21 *πατέρα ὡς υἱοῦ καὶ* [that one citizen should care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another.] Ridgeway aptly compares VII(V). II. 21 *ταμίαν ὡς κοινῶν* 17b *μὴ ὡς ἰδίων*, *Μεταφρ.* M. 5 § 6, 1079 b 34 *τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν*, species in relation to a genus. For other views of the construction see *Critical Notes*.

§ 9 23 *τὸ ἀγαπητόν* has been taken to mean (1) only, rare, unique, = *μόνον* (Eaton, quoting *Odyss.* II. 365 *μόνος ἐὼν ἀγαπητός*); and (2) much desired, dearly prized, precious. SUSSEM.

See Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 7. 41: καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητόν (μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν ἐστι), καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων, where it must have the second meaning, as *unicuius* in Catullus 64. 215.

§ 4 1262 a 40 *γεωργοῖς* Here as often the farmers stand for the entire third class of citizens in Plato's ideal

state, τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν πλῆθος of 5 § 18, all who are neither *δοκῶντες* nor *ἐπίκουροι*; properly including (§ 9) *τεχνίται* and all who are engaged in trade as well as in agriculture. See § 20, where all are enumerated. The strength of this class evinces Aristotle's fears: see § 8 19, 20, 22.

41 *χρήσιμον* Comp. VIII(V). II. 15 (Enlon). This section is the only new application of the argument in the whole passage which follows § 3. For the rest, §§ 5—9 are essentially a repetition, with certain distinctive and appropriate nuances, of the objections contained in 3 §§ 4—7; yet they are not constructed like another version simply to supersede them. Neither passage gives the slightest cause for suspicion of its genuineness. We must be content to set down to the occasional negligences of Aristotle's style this reiteration of a previous line of argument without any indication that it has occurred before: Comp. n. (164) on 5 § 14. SUSSEM. (149)

1262 b 2 *τοιούτους=ἦττον φιλικούς*: cp. I. 8 § 7 n. Plato would altogether disclaim such a policy; see *Rep.* 416-7, 463 B. See n. on 5 § 20, 1264 a 27.

§ 9 25 *περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν* In Plato's ideal state, as children of the Guardians grow up they are to be removed into the third class of citizens if they appear to degenerate. Conversely the rulers are to observe carefully any exceptional children of this third class,

α6 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τού- (I)
των εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν, τίνα ἔσται τρόπον'
καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας (P.
§ 10 τίσι τίνας διδῶσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλοι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον
30 ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαίνειν, ὅλον αἰκίας ἔρωτας φόβους
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ
μητέρας οἳ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δοθέντες τοὺς φύλα-
κας καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας,
ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.
5 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναικάς
36 κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· ἐχόμενον II
δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τίνα
τρόπον δεῖ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιτεῦσθαι

28 <γὰρ> γινώσκειν Bernays, perhaps rightly || 31 προσαγορεύουσιν
Koraeas || 32 τοὺς φύλακας before α' τε II³ Bk.; omitted by M¹ P¹ || 33 φύλαξι
II¹, φύλαξιν εἰς P¹ II³ A. Bk.

who as they grow up may display higher mental and moral qualities, in order that they may be received amongst the children of the Guardians and educated along with them for duties like theirs. See *Republic* III 415 B, IV 423 C. SUSEM. (180)

27 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν] Schlosser remarks that this requires a more detailed proof. SUSEM. (181)

These does seem some variance between the rule laid down above, *Rep.* 423 C, *Τίμῃ* 19 A (τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἄλλην λάθρα διαδοτέον πόλιν, ἐπαυξανόμενον δὲ σκοποῦντας δὲ τοὺς ἀξίους πόλιν ἀνάγειν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀναξίους εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπαυγάντων χώραν μεταλλάττειν), and that other regulation about exposure *Rep.* V 460 C (τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐάν τι τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύβουσιν).

28 καὶ γινώσκειν κτλ] But what harm could this knowledge do in the case of the children of Guardians who were degraded? As to the children of the third class adopted as Guardians, nothing could prevent the whole body of Guardians from knowing in the end that they were of different blood. But if we assume that all the other institutions of this ideal state are practicable, these adopted children would suffer no neglect, from any one or in anything, on that account. SUSEM. (182)

Aristotle implies that jealousy and dis-

union would follow the recognition of the facts.

29 τίσι τίνας διδῶσιν] This clause depends on γινώσκειν.

§ 10 πάλοι=above, §§ 1—3. So in III. 14. 14 τὸν πῶλοι λόγον, VII (V) 11. 24. Obviously Aristotle thinks with Horatius (as we should) from these crimes against blood relations; but there is no evidence that it is on the ground which Grote ascribes to him, "that serious mischief would fall upon the community if family quarrels or homicide remained without religious expiation."

34 ὥστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι] "so as to be on their guard," as they might be if they used these terms of relationship.

c. 5 *Objections to community of property.* §§ 1—13. See *Analysis* p. 103.

§ 1 37 τίνα τρόπον δεῖ κτλ] This issue is not decided in what follows, for the conclusion adopted in §§ 5—8 excludes the first and third of these alternatives in their application to all the land, but does not necessarily exclude the second. Later on however, IV (VII). 10. 10 π. (834), we perceive that even the second suggestion does not by any means correspond with Aristotle's view, which is more like the third, provided it be restricted to a part of the territory, whereas Plato had extended it to the whole. In Plato's Calipolis the Guardians are forbidden the possession of gold and silver and of money altogether, and so far they

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν (II)
 82 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις καὶ χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ
 41 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω
 632 δὲ [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] πότερον κἂν ἢ ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς, καθ'
 ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, πᾶσι τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλ-
 τιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις * *, ὅλον τὰ μὲν γήπεδα χωρὶς, τοὺς δὲ

39 ἢ μὴ κοινὴν after εἶναι M^s P¹. In Γ δὲ was perhaps repeated before εἶναι ||
 [πότερον—40 κτήσιν] ? Schmidt and then a colon after νενομοθετημένων

1263 a 1 [τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν] Susem. || 2 πᾶσι Γ Susem.^{1,2} Fieudenthal (per-
 haps rightly), πᾶσιν M^s || πᾶσι <τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ> τὰς or πᾶσι <τὰς
 χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ> τὰς Syngel, * * τὰς Susem.^{1,2} || τε] γε Korae Oncken
 Bernays which gives no sense || χρήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον ἢ τὰς κτήσεις Korae
 Oncken || 3 καὶ ἢ Schloesser Korae, Oncken, κατὰ Bernays || χρήσεις <ἢ μόνας
 τὰς κτήσεις ἢ τὰς χρήσεις> Fieudenthal, χρήσεις <ἢ τὰς κτήσεις μόνων ἢ
 τὰς χρήσεις> Bursse, χρήσεις <ἢ> Heinicus Ilampke

have no property of their own. Nevertheless the connexion of Platonic thought leaves no doubt that the entire body of Guardians is the sole proprietor of the soil, and that thus they hold landed property in common. The farmers of the third class are consequently tenants who pay a rent in kind for the farms they cultivate, this rent being a definite amount of the produce supplied to the Guardians, who have the other indispensable necessities of life provided for them by other members of the third class in lieu of a tax levied for protection. Lastly, the common dwellings and common meals of the guardians make community of property and community of life amongst them an actual accomplished fact. See *Rep.* III 416 c, IV 419, V 464 c, and comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 481 Eng. tr. The extension of these common dwellings and common meals to women is not expressly mentioned by Plato, but it is implied in his complete equalization of male and female Guardians.—cp. *n* (196) and *i*. 13. 9 *n*. (116). Thus, as Oncken I 183 justly observes, "Plato has simply abolished the possession of capital by a theoretical fiat, while Aristotle B. I c. 8 has done his best to banish it to the remotest regions of economic life. Only landed property with the income derived from it is of any account in their philosophical deliberations." There is this difference between them that Aristotle beholds community of property to be possible apart from community of families; whereas the fact is that there cannot be a true marriage in our sense of the term

without settled and independent house-keeping of one's own. Here he is not so consistent as Plato, which is easily explained however by the fact that his whole economic theory rests upon the basis of slavery in the genuine fashion of antiquity, of Greek antiquity especially. And one consequence of this is that, as Oncken again justly observes, his conception of property does not involve that of personal labour. On this point see *Introduct.* p. 27. SUSEM. (1263)

39 πολιτείαν] Cognate accus. after πολιτεύεσθαι. The phrase recurs VI(IV) I 4. We find καθ' ἃς πολιτεύονται, II. 7 I, the accusative in I. II. 13 ταῦτα πολιτεύονται, and in τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς II 7. 14, is not quite similar.

82 40 χωρὶς σκέψαιτο ἀπὸ] separately from=independently of. Comp. Plato *Phaedo* 98 c διαφυλάττει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, "to separate them." This is the sense of ἀπὸ in ἀπόφασις, negative predication, διηρημένου τοῦ ὄντος as Aristotle puts it. Compare πόρου ἀπ' ἑμῶν *Problems* XVIII. 10, 917 b 14, and *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8 I οὐδὲν ἀπ' ἐαυτοῦ πρότερον, nothing away from, i.e. unlike, himself.

1263 a 1 ἐκεῖνα χωρὶς=the families are separate.

2 κτήσεις](χρήσεις; ownership, fee-simple)(usufruct, income returned.

3 ὅλον introduces the application of the three modes of communism to land and its produce. "I mean, (1) when the estates are held separately but the crops are brought into a common stock for consumption, or (2) when the land is held in common and cultivated by the state as

καρπούς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἔνια ποιεῖ (1
 5 τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἣ τούναντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινὴν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ-
 γεῖν κοινῇ, τοὺς δὲ καρπούς διαιρεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας χρή-
 8 3 βαρβάρων), ἣ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρπούς κοινούς. ἐτέ- 2
 ρων μὲν οὖν ὄντων τῶν γεωργούντων ἄλλος ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ
 10 ῥάων, αὐτῶν δ' αὐτοῖς διαπονούτων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις
 πλείους ἂν παρέχοι δυσκολίας. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσι

8 κοινούς] χωρὶς Hampke

public property, but the produce divided for private uses, or (3) when both lands and crops are held in common." Of modern theories, (3) alone answers to what Mill *Pol. Ec.* II. c. 1 calls thoroughgoing Communism: (2) to the milder forms proposed by St Simon and Fourier. γῆπεδα, plots of ground, farmsteads, like οἰκπεδον, emphasizing the site of the property.

4 81a] Editors refer to Lacedaemon (§ 7) and Tacetum VII(VI). 5 10 But these instances seem hardly sufficient to establish the first form of communism: and 109, see n. (11), would suggest here also non-Hellenic tribes, to whose customs Aristotle paid considerable attention to judge from the fragments of his Νόμμοι οἱ Νόμμοι βαρβαρῶν; cp IV(VII) 2. 11 That work being lost, the most apposite references are from Diodorus v. 44, of the Vaccæans, a Celtiberian tribe. v. 9, of the exiled Cnidian and Rhodian who colonized the Aeolian isles (Lipari). v. 41, of Panchaia, which Strabo thinks a fiction. Neuchus in Strabo xv. 1. 66 testifies to the custom amongst certain tribes of India. Further, the prevalence formerly of this system of land-tenure would serve to explain συσθετία.

7 11a] On this second system, if the soil is to remain common property there must be a periodic partition, such as is in force even now in Russia, in some Swiss cantons (e.g. Glarus) and amongst the village communities (dessas) of Java. This was the characteristic feature of the German mark, first known by Caesar's account of the Suevi (*Bell. Gall.* VI. 29). Strabo VIII. 6. 7 affirms it of the Dalmatians, and the Greek settlers on the Aeolian islands finally adopted this plan, Diod. v. 9. In fact, "there appears to be no country inhabited by an Aryan race in which traces do not remain of the

ancient periodical redistribution," which preceded and at length ended in perpetuity of occupation: Maine *Village Communities* p. 81. To collect these traces is the object of M. de Laveleye's *Primitive Property*: see pp. 109, 145 ff. (of the English trans. by Marriott). It was a modification of this second system which appears to have prevailed among the Village Indians of North America at the time of its discovery. "They still held lands in common: the lands of each Aztec "group" could not be alienated. They constructed joint-tenement houses and lived in large households composed of a number of related families, sometimes fifty or a hundred families together: and there are grounds for believing that they practised common living in the household: i.e. something analogous to συσθετία; L. H. Morgan *Anc. Society* pp. 187, 200 ff., 535—538.

§ 8 8 81a] a distinct body. αὐτῶν=the citizens themselves; αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαπονούτων=when they are αὐτουργοί, Thucyd. I. 126.

"This remark is quite true in itself, but it makes for Plato rather than against him. His guardians are a distinct body from the γεωργοί and are thus in the position described as most favourable to communism" (Oncken). SUSEM. (154)

10 τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις is nomin., the subject of ἀν παρέχοι and not the object of διαπονούτων.

11. "For where all have not equal shares in enjoyment any more than in work, indeed have very unequal shares, dissatisfaction must needs be felt with those who have much enjoyment and little labour, by those who get less and have more work to do" This is the standing difficulty of communistic schemes, see Mill *Pol. Econ.* II. 1 § 3.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἴσων ἀλλ' ἀνίσων ἀναγκαῖον (II)
 ἐγκλήματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνον-
 14 τας] πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονούντας τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνουσι,
 § 4 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὧς δὲ τὸ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν- 3
 θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.
 δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
 πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-
 κρούοντες ἀλλήλους. ἔτι δὲ τῶν θεραπόντων τούτοις μάλιστα (P. 4)
 10 προσκρούομεν οἷς πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας
 § 5 τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας
 τε καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερεῖας· ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον 4
 ἔχει [καὶ] ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μι-
 κρόν ἂν διενέγκαι. ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθόν.
 25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτή-

12 ἀλλ' ἀνίσων omitted by I²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b A¹. Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand; added in the margin) || 13 [ἢ λαμβάνοντας] Congreve, μὲν ἢ λαμβάνοντας omitted by U^b Ald. || 18 διαφέρονται Κοινὰς || προσκρούουσι for προσκρούοντες Congreve || 20 χρώμεθα P¹ || 22 νῦν after τρόπον ἔχει M¹ P¹ || 23 καὶ after ἔχει omitted by P¹ || ἔθεσι P¹ Ar. Bk.

§ 4 15 κοινωνεῖν governs τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων; "to share in all relations of human life, especially such as affect property."

17 συναποδήμων] *N. Eih.* VIII. 9 §§ 4, 5; συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμ-φέροντι, καὶ παρίδμενοι τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον.

18 διαφερόμενοι ..προσκρούοντες] Participial construction with ellipse of copula, as perhaps in I. 5. 9 αἰσθανόμενα.

τῶν ἐν ποσὶ things near at hand, immediately before us; Hesod. III. 79: ἔπεινον τῶν μάγων πάντα τὰ ἐν ποσὶ γινόμενα.

προσκρούοντες] Comp. *N. Eih.* IX. 4 § 1, τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκρουόμενοι = friends who have broken with each other.

20 τὰς 8. τὰς ἐγκυκλίους] for the daily round of services. Cp. I. 9. 9 (Eaton), also II. 9. 9 n. 291. *SUSEM.* (186)

§ 5 22 ἄλλας τοιαύτας] Aristotle never urges (1) that communism will diminish the efficiency of labour, nor (2) that it will relax the checks on an increase of population. The Hellenic idea of the omnipotence of the state precluded these objections. The conclusion at which he arrives is endorsed in the remarks of Mill *Pol. Ec.* ib. p. 128: "We must compare communism at its best with the régime of individual property, not as it is, but as it

might be made. The principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any country."

ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κτλ.] ὃν τρόπον νῦν ἔχει with the epexegetic ἐπικοσμηθὲν κτλ. is the subject of διενέγκαι: "the order of things at present existing if improved by good manners and the enactment of wise laws would be far superior" ἔθεσι, somewhat wider than morality, see § 15; ways, habits, instincts.

"This is in reality not so much proved as stated; still it is not laid down simply on the strength of § 4. Oncken I. 184 goes decidedly too far in saying the attacks on community of property lack all precision and point, and that the doctrine is not refuted on its own merits like the community of families. He fails to notice what is pointed out by Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 289 that the words of § 6—"all will thrive better under a system of private property because then each one labours assiduously for his own advantage"—apply to property exactly the same argument which was used with most effect to refute on its own grounds community of wives and children and was for that reason twice advanced, 3 §§ 4—7, 4 §§ 4—8 n. (149)." *SUSEM.* (186)

σεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰς, ὅλως (I. § 6 δ' ἰδίας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μάλλον δὲ ἐπιδώσουσιν ὡς πρὸς ἴδιον ἐκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντες· δι' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρή- 30 σθαι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνταῖς πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον, ὡς οὐκ ἔν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις § 7 τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν· ἰδίαν γὰρ ἕκαστος τὴν κτήσιν ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρήται 35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίους, ἔτι δ' ἵπποις καὶ κυσίν, κἀν

28 μάλλον τε? Susem. || 29 ἐκάστον προσεδρεύοντος P¹ P² Bk (perhaps rightly) || 33 γίνουτ' ? Susem. || 35 ὡς κοινοῖς Susem.^{1,2}, *tanquam* Willam || 36 ὡς ἐτίπαν? Susem. ὡς εἰς πᾶσαν? Schmidt, ὡς [εἰπεῖν] Giphanius, ὡς περ? Koiaes || ἂν (?) Γ

26 For ὅλως=in general, almost like ἀπλῶς, comp. III. 9. 4, VII(V) 1 § 3, 1 § 13 where it is opposed to κατὰ τι as here to πᾶς.

§ 6 27 The division of attention will remove mutual dissatisfaction. the article implies 'those grounds of complaint specified above.' Each will set about his own task, e.g. the cultivation of land.

29 δὲ ἀρετὴν κτλ] Public virtue will ensure that, as the proverb has it, *in all that relates to use* friends go shares in properly.

"Comp. IV(VII). 10. 9 with *u.* (831). Giphanius observes that this favourite maxim of the Pythagoreans is purposely introduced here because Plato (*Rep.* IV 424 A) applied it to the absolute community of property. It is not Aristotle, however, but Plato who misconstrues it: in fact after the latter had misinterpreted it, the former restores it to its original sense. See Zeller's *Pre-Socratics* I. p. 345 *n.* 2, Eng. tr." SUSEM. (188 b)

31 ἐν ἐνταῖς πόλεσιν] See the commendation passed on the Tarentines, VII(V). 5. 10. SUSEM. (187) ὑπογεγραμμένον] prescribed, laid down as a rule to follow. Often in Plato. Eaton refers to *Laus* V 734 E, νόμους πολλὰς ὑπογράφειν, *Protag.* 326 D ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράφασα, add *Rep.* 424 A, 449 C.

32 ὡς=implying that.

33 τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ] either is or might become.

§ 7 34 τοῖς δὲ χρήται κοινοῖς] Here even Aristotle's political theory has a certain dash of socialism; only in

the main he stops short of the actual facts as presented in Sparta particularly, whereas Plato set out from these Spartan institutions, but only to go far beyond them. It is also justly observed by Oncken I. 183, that in general wherever, as was the case in Greece, the freemen are principally supported by the labour of strangers who are not free, there the ruling caste as a whole stands in a certain communistic relation as opposed to the servile caste. Compare further *u.* (166). SUSEM. (188)

35 οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κτλ] Xenophon *De Rep. Lac.* 6 §§ 3, 4 relates in the main the same facts, first, as to slaves and helots; and as to horses, with the more precise limitation that a sick man or any one requiring a carriage or desirous of travelling rapidly to a given place will, if he sees a horse anywhere, take it and after using it return it faithfully unhurt. As to dogs, he still more definitely restricts this usage to the chase. Those who require the dogs invite their owner to go hunting; while he, if he has not the time, readily sends them off with the pack. There is no such information in Xenophon about produce growing in the fields: what he does say is that after a meal in the country people left the remainder of the food they had prepared in store-chambers, others, detained while hunting and in need of food, might, if they had no provisions with them, break the seals of these store-chambers and take what they required, leaving the rest behind and replacing the seal. SUSEM. (189)

§ 8 δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδῶν, <τοῖς> ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερόν (Π) τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου
 40 τοῦτ' ἔργον ἴδιον ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὕσων ὁ διαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἴδιον τί. μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς
 12, 13 αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φίλῳ ἕκαστος, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῦτο φυσικόν.
 § 9 τὸ δὲ φίλῳ εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ
 καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
 5 ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ξένοις ἢ ἐταίροις ἡδίστον· ὃ γίνεται τῆς
 3 10 κτήσεως ἰδίας οὔσης. ταῦτά τε δὴ [οὐ] συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν τ' ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα δυοῖν ἀρετῶν φανερώς, σωφροσύνης μὲν [τὸ] περὶ τὰς γυναικας

37 ἐφοδῶν] *non vaticis* Wilham || <τοῖς> or <πᾶσι τοῖς> before κατὰ Sappire, before ἐν Susem., <τοῖς> ἐν had also occurred to Vahlen, *Ztsch. f. d. ostr. G.* XXV 1874. p. 487, [ἐν] τοῖς ἀγροῖς Oncken, [ἐν] ταῖς ἀγροῖς Benays, <ταμείοις> ἐν οἱ <ταμείοις> ἐν v. Leutsch, ἐν ταῖς ἀγροῖς Busse and Ridgeway independently || χώραν] θῆσαν Buchelei, perhaps rightly

1263 b 1 αὐτὸς omitted by Π¹ || 3 τὸ omitted by Q^b T^b U^b and P² (1st hand, added by corr.²) || 4 καὶ τὸ P¹ Ar., καὶ τὸν Γ Μ¹ Γ² 4-4 Q^b T^b U^b, τὸν Ald. || φιλοχρήματον <καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον> ? Koras, accepted by Benays || 5 ἕκαστος P² 4 Q^b T^b U^b Ald. and L² (1st hand; emended by corr.¹) || 6 ἐτέροις Π¹ Susem.^{1,2} || 7 οὐ after δὴ omitted by Π¹ || 9 τὸ after μὲν omitted by Π¹, τῷ Benays

§ 8 39 τοιοῦτοι sc. οἱ τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. Above δὲ ἀρετῶν.

νομοθέτου [ἔργον] Undoubtedly Aristotle hopes for results of human legislation which now we only expect from the training of the conscience by morality and religion; see on 9 § 12 n. (296). Heine agrees with Plato; not however, like him, from any denial or underestimate of the rights or power of individuality (Oncken). See notes (161) and (162). SUSEM. (160)

40 ἔτι δὲ κατὰ] "Again, even to the pleasure we feel, the difference that it makes to call a thing our own is unspeakably great." An expression like ἀναιροῦσιν ὅσον, *nimum quantum*.

41 μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην] By μὴ οὐ μήποτε with the indicative, no uncertainty is intended; ibi quoque adhibita reperitur, ubi res affirmatur non negatur. "It may well be that our love for ourselves is not without a purpose."

§ 9 1263 b 2 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8. 1, 1168 a 28,

Rhet. I 11. 26, 1371 b 18; also Plato *Laus* V 731 D (Eaton). Congruent quotes *Nic. Eth.* IX 4 1, where even friendship and benevolence are reduced to forms of self-love, τὰ φιλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους. *δοκεῖν ἐλ τῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐληλυθέναι.* SUSEM. (161)

3 καθάπερ κατὰ] "just as the love of money means to love it more than is right": Pl. *Rep* I 347 B τὸ φιλόχρημον εἶναι ἀνείδος λέγεται (Vetton). Comp. also *Nic. Eth.* IV. 4. 4, φέρομεν τὸ φιλότιμον ἐπαυνοῦντες μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, ψέγοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ

§ 10 7 συμβαίνει] of awkward consequences involved in a theory. *συμβαίνει* dicitur ubi factus ex aliqua hypothesis conclusionibus ipsa hypothesis refutatur (Bonitz).

8 ἀναιροῦσιν ἔργα] "destroy the functions."

9 σωφροσύνης] Even Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II 11 p. 697, n. 7, thinks this an unfair objection, because in Plato's commonwealth a guardian is bound to continence

- 10 (ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίας οὐσης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο-
σύνην), ἐλευθερίοτος δὲ [τὸ] περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται
φανερὸς ἐλευθέριος ὢν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον οὐδε-
μὴν· ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθε-
11 ριότητος ἔργον ἐστίν). εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύ-
15 τη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλόανθρωπος ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν·
ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἔσε-
σθαι φίλιαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν πᾶσι πρὸς ἅπαντας, ἄλ-
λως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορή τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων
ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ κοι-
20 νῆν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυριῶν κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων
22 κολακείας. ὃν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνησίαν ἀλλὰ

11 ἐλευθεριότητα P¹, ἐλευθεριότητα M^a || τὸ after δὲ omitted by II¹, τῷ Beanares
|| 13 τῇ after γὰρ W^b Ald. Bk and perhaps Q^b || 15 ἂν after εἶναι δόξειεν M^a P¹ ||
17 τινὰ (τὴν M^a) before φίλιαν M^a P¹

in respect of all women to whom he is not married by the authorities, the Platonic 'community of wives' being the very reverse of free indulgence of the appetites. Quite true, but then neither is this the point of Aristotle's objection. What he urges is that voluntary self-restraint, which is nowhere possible save where monogamy is established, and in Plato's state is out of the question, alone deserves the name of continence, *σωφροσύνη*. We must admit with Oncken that he is right in this, and that §§ 9, 10 make an especially agreeable impression, as a defence of the individual's moral freedom. Further, see n. (206 b). SUSSEX. (182)

10 [ἔργον καλὸν] Strictly, a goodly deed, fair to contemplate; then a 'moral action' (since the motive makes the act virtuous; it must be done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα), with that peculiar implication of 'nobleness' which runs through the *Nic. Ethics*.

12 πρᾶξιν ἐλευθέριον] for which private property, e.g. money, is required. Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 8 4 τῷ μὲν ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια; id. § 7. Can we ascribe acts of liberality to the gods? τίμι δὲ δώσουσιν; ἀποπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

13 ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει. 14 ἔργον ἐστίν] for the use of one's possessions is the field for the exercise of liberality. Cicero's *ius uti tutis*, *Acad. post.* i. 38 is analogous to ἔργον in this sense.

§ 11 17 φίλιαν τινὰ θαυμαστήν] Comp. Dante *Purgatorio* xv. 55—57, che per quanto si dice più il nostro, | tanto possiede più di ben ciascuno, | e più di caritate arde in quel chioistro; 73—75, e quanta gente più lassù s' intende, | più v'è da bene amare, e più vi s'ama, | e come specchio, l'uno all' altro rende

ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορή τις] Here he evidently has in mind Plato's expressions, *Republic* iv 425 c τί δέ, τὰ ἀγορεύει συμβολαίων τε περί κατ' ἀγορῶν ἑκαστοὶ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβιβάλλουσιν. τούτων τοι μῆτρον τι νομοθετεῖν; 464 d δίκας τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰχέσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ μὴδὲν ἴδιον ἐκτεῖσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα; Although not precisely the same evils are enumerated there and here, nor expressly derived from the institution of private property, yet in fact Aristotle's words quite accord with the view of the *Republic*. Comp. §§ 20, 21 with n. (174, 175). SUSSEX. (182)

Add *Rep.* 465 c: τὰ γὰρ μὴν συμκρότατα τῶν κακῶν ὄκνω καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων μὲνοι ἂν εἶεν, κολακείας τε πλουσίων [πλην-
τες] ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀληθόνας θύας ἐν...
χρηματισμοῖς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετῶν ἀνωγαλίων
λοχουσι, τὰ μὲν θανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαγορῶ-
μενοι. Eaton quotes *Aristoph. Eccl.* 657 sq.

§ 12 22 ὃν οὐδὲν γίνεται] This is begging the question, though it may fairly be surmised that communism would not cure all these evils.

- διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι- (Π
 νωνοῦντας πολλῶν διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὀρώμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρὶς
 25 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὀλίγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι-
 νωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη-
 § 13 μένους ἰδίᾳ τὰς κτήσεις. ἔτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν
 ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων
 ἀγαθῶν· φαίνεται δ' εἶναι ἀπάναντος ὁ βίος.
 30 αἴτιον δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν
 § 14 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ οὖσαν ὀρθήν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πῶς μίαν
 καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντη. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς
 οὐκ ἔσται προΐουσα πόλις, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἔσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ' οὐσα
 τοῦ μὴ πόλις εἶναι χεῖρων πόλις, ὥσπερ καὶ εἴ τις τὴν
 35 συμφωνίαν ποιήσκειν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν.

25 τοὺς τῶν P¹ Q¹ U^b Ald. || 32 πᾶντος P¹ P² Bk. || ἔσται M^a and P¹ (1st hand) || 33 Walford (as cited by Eaton) transposes πόλις to follow ἔσται μὲν || 34 ἔσται was added after εἶναι by Vettori Bk. Susem¹ 2, *crit* William

23 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κατλ.] "Since we see just those people who are joint owners and who share property quarrelling far more than those who have their estates separate." Are these the *συναπόμενοι* of § 4? Or is the reference to commercial partnerships?

25 ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κατλ.] The cases of quarrels seem to arise out of partnerships are few, it is true; but then we compare them with the large number of those who have separate possessions.

§ 13 29 ἀπάναντος] Compare Grote III. pp. 217—222. "This supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance. Plato's project contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated: the reasons offered to prove it impossible are principally founded upon the very sentiment adverted to. The truly forcible objection is the sentiment itself." Plato impugns it and declares it to be inapplicable to his guardians: amongst whom as he conceives, a totally different sentiment of obligation would grow up. Similarly "if Sparta had never been actually established and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable."

30 παρακρούσεως] "fallacy" as in *De Soph.* *EL* 17 § 3, 175 b 1, Demosth. c. *Timocr.* § 194, 750 27 φανακισμοῦ καὶ παρακρούσεως ἐνεκα

31 τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κατλ.] the incorrectness of his first principle: see a § 2. Comp. Grote III. p. 215 f. 217 n., who from Aristotle's own admissions V (VIII). 1. 4, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως· μέριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and 1. 4. 5 τὸ τε γὰρ μέριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μέριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄλλου, argues that "the bond principle is common to him with Plato," though "each has his own way of applying it."

General Objections to the scheme of Plato's Republic: §§ 14—28.

§ 14 Here too it would have been as well to state that these remarks are nothing new, but only a repetition of c. 2, although as new points arise out of them (see *Ana-lysis* p. 104) there is much greater justification than there was in the case of c. 3 §§ 4—7 and c. 4 §§ 4—8: cp. n. (149). SUSEM. (164)

33 προσῶσα] advancing (to a certain degree of unity), "if its unity be carried far"; explained by *γινωσκόμεν μίαν μᾶλλον* in a § 2.

34 ὥσπερ καὶ κατλ.] "as if one were to turn the concord of parts into unison, or the rhythm into a single step." See *Probl.* XIX. 38 § 3, 921 a 2, συμφωνία κρᾶσις ἐστὶ λόγων ἔχοντων ἑναυτίων πρὸς ἀληθεῖα.

35 συμφωνία = consonance of the voices singing one part with the instruments playing another: cp. *Probl.* XIX. 39,

§ 18 ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλήθος ὄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παι-^(II)
 δειαν κοινήν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδεύειν
 εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἔσεσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου-
 δαίαν, ἀτοποῦν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ὀλεσθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
 40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὥσπερ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
 νομοθέτης ἐκόνωσεν. δεῖ δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι χρὴ (p. 31.

1264 a 1
§ 18

προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς
 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν, εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν
 εὔρηται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δ' οὐ χρώνται

39 <δεῖν> διορθοῦν Spengel || 40 ἔθεσι P¹

1264 a 1 ἐκόνωσε P²⁻³⁻⁴ and P¹ (corr.), ἐκωνώγησε M² and P¹ (1st hand) || μὴ
 II¹ || Bk.² omits αὐτὸ || 2 ἔθεσιν Ar., ἔθνεσιν Beinays (hardly right)

Chappell *History of Music* pp. 11 f., 16. Whereas in *δραφονία* one or more sets of voices or instruments gave the same notes. Similarly *ῥυθμός*, ἡ τῆς *μετρήσεως* τάξις (Pl. *Lysis* II 665 A), is the orderly succession of steps in dancing or notes of music of certain definite lengths. The unit or element of which long successions of 'times' are composed is *βάσις*, 'step' in dancing, 'foot' in metrie. This is clear from *Μεταφρ.* XIV (N) 1. 10, 1087 b 33, τὸ δ' ἐν ὅτι μέτρον σημαίνει, φανερόν· καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἐστὶ τὴν ἑτερον ὑποκείμενον, ὅταν ἐν ἀρμονίᾳ δίσσις (in music a quarter-tone, the smallest interval), ἐν δὲ μεγέθει δάκτυλος ἡ ποὺς ἢ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ ῥυθμοῖς βάσις ἢ συλλαβή. Instead of the regular orderly sequence of *βάσεις*, steps in dancing or feet in recitation, of various lengths, there will be only a single monotonous step or a single beat. § 18 36 πρότερον] §§ 5—8. SUSKEM.

(166)

37 κοινήν ποιεῖν] widen it so that all shall share in it.

τόν γε μέλλοντα παιδεύειν κατὰ Comp. 7 § 8 n. (238), and below §§ 18, 19. SUSKEM. (166 b)

39 τοῖς τοιοῦτοις=such direct, compulsory measures, as Plato proposes.

40 ἔθεσι, φιλοσοφίᾳ, νόμοις] Comp. *φύσις*, *ἔθος*, *λόγος* of IV(VII). 13. 11 n. (887). SUSKEM. (166)

φιλοσοφίᾳ] in the wider sense, 'culture' as in 7 § 12. So *Rhet.* II 23. 11 of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, perhaps a quotation from Alkidamas. An approximation to Isocrates' use of the word for 'literary training.'

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις] Aristotle's fond-

ness for social institutions of the Cretan and Spartan type—see § 7, n. (158)—is here seen in a new direction, of which we shall hear more in c. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 §§ 7, 8, IV(VII). 10 §§ 9, 10 and *notes*. Compare further *notes* 168, 193, 208—11, 234, 236 b. SUSKEM. (166)

§ 18 1264 a 3 οὐκ ἂν ἔλαθεν] An appeal to the evidence of history. It is like Aristotle to seek for the doctrines he approves some basis in tradition, authority, popular or wide-spread beliefs. "An institution which has flourished in many different ages and races must presumably fulfil some want and correspond to some deeply-seated instinct." Grote rejoins that the same objection (like the objection of impossibility) would apply to the novelties in his own ideal state. But Aristotle might fairly have argued that the long time which has elapsed without a communistic state makes it the less likely that one ever will be established, as no originating cause seems forthcoming adequate to start it.

4 οὐ συνήκται] have not been systematized. A 'synthesis' is wanting.

τοῖς δ' οὐ χρώνται] Much that is known is not introduced because it is regarded as impracticable. Assuming that the earth, and doubtless the race of men upon it (8 § 21 n.), has always existed and always will exist Aristotle shares the conviction of Plato and most other Greek thinkers that there has not been one single historical development of humanity, but it has begun and been carried on, in a manner similar if not quite the same, for innumerable times over and over again. Hence to a greater or less

- § 17 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερόν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔρ-
 6 γοῖς ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ
 δυνησεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιῆσαι τὴν πό-
 λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίδας καὶ φυλάδας.
 ἵσπερ οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβήσεται νομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωρ-
 10 γεῖν τοὺς φυλάκας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
 § 18 χειροῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας τίς
 ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὐτ' εἴρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε βῆδινον

γ αὐτῶν Ald., αὐτῶν Thom., αὐτοῖς Bocker, αὐ Bernays, ἅτα Jackson, αὐτίκα
 Welldon || 8 φατρίας M¹ P^{2,4} Q^b T^b Ald. Sussem ^{2,3}, φατρίας P¹ || 9 οὐδὲν after
 ἄλλο M¹ P¹ || 10 καὶ νῦν] τῶν τριῶν Trieber

extent everything has existed before, and there is nothing new under the sun: all discoveries have been already made and then lost again, so that they need to be rediscovered. See Zeller II p. 792. Comp. Sussemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* vol. ciii. 1871, p. 135 ff.: IV (vii). 10 §§ 7, 8 n. (824). Plato however would have had all the more right to reply to this objection that he himself has but made such a rediscovery: that, as Oncken observes, he has only followed Aristotle's advice and collected institutions hitherto widely scattered: that his innovation consists solely in this combination of old material, as all the elements of his ideal state were to be found previously isolated, some in Sparta and Crete, others amongst the Pythagoreans, and others again in Sociates. Comp. Zeller's *Plato* p. 483 f. SUSSEM. (187)

This view found a strong expression from K. F. Heumann *The historical elements of Plato's ideal of a state*, in *Gesam. Abhandl.* VII. 140, "Plato has drawn every single feature in his picture of the state from the actual political life of Greece: he has but applied the abstractions of science to produce a formal and harmonious combination." It is at least obvious that the Spartan ἀγωγή is, in a manner, the true starting-point of Plato, as of Xenophon and Aristotle (Grote III. 209—211); but some caution should be exercised in the choice of precedents. Thus L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 417 conjectures that the system of relationship propounded in *Rep.* v 461 D, Tim. 18 C, D was derived from "traditions not known to us": and Curtius (*History of Greece* I p. 181 Eng. trans.) that the three orders of society *Rep.* IV were adopted from Crete (see n. 818):—two features of the scheme which bear in

a high degree the stamp of originality.

§ 17 5 τοῖς ἔργοις] "actually in process of formation." The plural is used as well as the singular ἔργῳ with or without the article, in prose or poetry.

8 εἰς συσσίτια] See n. (166). That Plato too intended this, was shown in n. (153) on § 1. From the expression here and in § 15 we might be led to believe that this was not the case. Comp § 19 n. (170), § 24 n. (179), § 27 n. (184): 6 § 3 n. (187), § 5 n. (195) SUSSEM (188) φρατρίδας] The form φάτρα (as in Aeschines II § 147), not φάτρα, is supported by the *Copius Inscr. Att.* II. No. 599, l. 1 with Kohler's remark, *Philippi Contributions to a history of the Athenian citizenship* (Beiträge u. s. w. Berlin 1870) p. 177 and 55, 56, *Burmans Three Studies in Attic Law* in *Jahrb. f. Phil. Suppl.* IX p. 615. At the same time φρ is often written in the cursive MSS. with a small hook to φ, so that φ and φρ can hardly be distinguished with certainty from one another. In such a case therefore it may be advisable to depart from the one safe principle of following the oldest manuscript authority and to retain the only rational form φρ even against the codices. Comp § 6 n. (141). SUSSEM. (189)

10 καὶ νῦν] Here again, as so often in these chapters and elsewhere, νῦν does not mean 'at the present time' but 'actually', and ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν is but a limiting expression for ποιοῦσιν.

§ 18 11 ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὅλης πολιτείας καὶ] "has never explained what is the nature of the entire polity which (these) members of the community share. Yet the bulk of the state is made up in effect by the bulk of citizens other than the guardians." For οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται, see § 20, and n. on 4 § 4.

εἰπεῖν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τό γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ- (II)
λων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότε-
15 ρον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ [καὶ]
καθ' ἑκαστον ἰδίας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἰδίους
§ 19 ἢ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν-
των, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φυλάκων; ἢ τί πλείον
τοὺς ὑπομένονσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; ἢ τί παθόντες ὑπομενοῦσι
20 τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐὰν μὴ τι σοφίζωνται τοιοῦτον οἷον Κρήτες;
ἐκείνοι γὰρ τὰλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις ἐφείτετες μόνον ἀφ-
§ 20 ῥήκασιν τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων κτήσιν. εἰ δέ, κα-

15 *καὶ* after *ἢ* untranslated by William and Ai. || 16 *καὶ* after *δὲ* omitted by
Π¹ || 19 *ἀρχονσι* or something similar, in the place of *ὑπομένουσι*, Lambin
and Thuiot; Bernays omits 18 *ἢ τί πλείων.. ἀρχὴν* with Ai. and transposes
αὐτῶν to follow 20 *ἀρχὴν* || *μαθόντες* Γ¹ Π³ Bekk. Bernays, and *παθόντες* I⁴ (corr.)
|| *ὑπομενοῦσι* Ar., *ὑπομένουσι* Γ II || 21 ταῦτα Γ, πάντα Ai. (?), Koraces || *ἐφείτετες*
Q^b T^b U^b and P⁴ (1st hand) || *ἀπειρήκασιν* I²⁻³ Q^b T^b U^b Ald. Bk. and apparently
P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps rightly

§ 19 17 *εἰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ* Aristotle might well have spared himself the consideration of this possibility. It is strange that he has not learnt from Plato whether this third order of citizen, 15 to have community of families and of property; whether, in other words, just those characteristics which, like their education, are distinctive of the two upper classes in the ideal state, are to be extended to the third, or not. It is not easy to imagine a stronger case of inability to transport oneself to an opponent's sphere of thought. In fact he cannot be acquitted of very culpable carelessness in the use of the word he is criticizing. As regards community of property at any rate, Plato has most expressly said *Rep.* III 417 A, IV 419 that nothing of the kind is to exist amongst citizens of the third class, leaving room for no doubt whatever as to his real opinion. Nor is Aristotle even consistent. For in 4 § 4 above he has, with better reason, raised an objection which is only intelligible if these institutions are not supposed existing in the third class of citizens. Comp. § 24 n. (179); also n. (168) and the references there given. SUSSEX. (170)

18 *ἢ τί πλείων καὶ* See *Critical Notes*. The sense we require is not, "what compensation will those receive who submit to their rule?" (which is repeated in the next sentence), but "what

advantage will the rulers have over their subjects?" The older commentators endeavoured to extract this by taking τοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχήν = τοῖς ὑπομένουσιν ἀρχεῖν, "those who undertake to govern." But this is against the sense of ὑπομενοῦσι in the next clause: "or what inducement will (the rest of the citizens) have to submit to them?"

20 *σοφίζονται* = devise or contrive (Eaton).

οἷον Κρήτες] See on 9 § 3 n. (281) and Exc III. This statement is confirmed by the *skolion* of the Cretan poet Hybrias there quoted. See also IV (VII). 10 1 n. (820). SUSSEX. (171)

21 τοῖς δούλοις ἐφείτετες] "while allowing their serfs the same rights with themselves in other things, have deprived them" (*ἀπειρήκασιν* would be 'have prohibited'). As we now know, *olētes* was the proper term for these serfs, but they are called *δοῦλοι passim* in the inscription of Gouty.

"The arguments in §§ 20—24 (*εἰ δέ, καθάπερ.. γεωργῶν γυναῖκες*) are in the main quite correct, but apply just as much to Aristotle's ideal state as to Plato's (Oncken). Yet see n. (177)" SUSSEX. (172)

Comp. Grote III. pp 213—215, who lays stress on the spiritual pride, and contempt for the *θῆμος*, certain to be nurtured in the breasts of the guardians.

θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ (II)
 τοιαῦτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μὲν γὰρ πό-
 25 λει δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεραντίας
 ἀλλήλαις. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἶον φρουρούς, τοὺς δὲ
 § 21 γεωργούς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή- 18
 ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
 φησὶ κακά, πάνθ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-
 30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεήσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
 οἶον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
 § 22 τούτων, ἀποδιδόνς μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φύλαξιν. ἔτι δὲ
 κυρίου ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργούς ἀποφορὰν φέρον- (p. 32)

24 Congreve brackets μὲν

§ 20 23 ἐκείνοις=τοῖς ἄλλοις πολί-
 ταις, the citizens of the third class. τὰ
 τοιαῦτα,] family life and separate pos-
 sessions.

24 τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας]
 What will be the means of uniting them?
 How will they associate as fellow-citizens
 with the two upper classes, who have
 such dissimilar institutions?

ἐν μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] This is the very re-
 proach which Plato levels at the existing
 politics: ἐκείνη αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πᾶσι
 πόλεις, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι...δύο μὲν γὰρ κἄν
 οἷον ἢ πολεμικῇ ἀλλήλοισι, ἢ μὲν πενήτων,
 ἢ δὲ πλουσίων *Rep.* IV 422 E; and VIII
 551 D (Eaton). SUSEM. (173)

26 οἶον φρουρούς] *Rep.* III 415 D, E;
 IV 419 ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς, φατὴ ἢ, ὥστερ' ἐπί-
 κοινοὶ μισθοῖσι ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται λα-
 θήσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ φρουροῦντες.
 SUSEM. (174)

27 πολέτας is predicative: "his citi-
 zens are the farmers and the citizens, &c."
 As Grote justly remarks, this is a larger
 and more generous conception of the
 purpose of political institutions than any
 we find elsewhere in Greece, even in
 Aristotle, who sets aside the rest of the
 people as not members of the common-
 wealth, IV (VII). 9. 3. Plato not only
 treats them as integral parts of the state,
 but in a sense makes them the ultimate
 object of his solicitude. It is for them
 that he sacrifices the private pleasure of
 the guardians, and compels his philo-
 sophic rulers to descend into the cave.
 Both rulers and guardians are truly public
 servants, whose duty it is to protect and
 benefit their fellows, *Rep.* 463 B.

§ 21 29 φησὶ] *Rep.* V 464 D: τί δέ,
 δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλή-
 λους οὐκ εἰρήσεται ἐξ αὐτῶν; Cp. n.

(163). SUSEM. (175)

καὶ τούτοις] just as much to the citi-
 zens of Callipolis (i.e. ὅθεν δὴ ὑπάρξει τοῖς
 τοῖς δαστασίδοις οὐσι); for by I. 27 the
 farmers, citizens &c. who make up the
 third class, are citizens.

λέγει ὁ Σωκρ.] *Rep.* IV 425 C, D: ἢ
 καὶ τὰ παράπαν ἀγορανομικὰ πάντα ἢ
 ἀστυνομικὰ ἢ ἀλλομενικὰ ἢ ὅσα ἄλλα
 ταῦτα, τοῦτων τορμήσμεν τι νομοθετεῖν;
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Cp. n. (163). SUSEM. (176)

31 ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορ.] Comp.
 IV (VII). 12. 7 n. (865). SUSEM. (176 b)

"Laws concerning city-police and
 market-police." Dionysius says of the
 Roman aediles (VI. 90) σχεδὸν ἐοικασί
 πως κατὰ τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς παρ' Ἑλλήνων
 ἀγορανόμοις.

32 Take μόνον with τοῖς φύλαξιν. This
 objection proceeds from an acute appre-
 hension that in outward aspect the ideal
 state would not greatly differ from an
 ordinary Greek city, in spite of its stand-
 ing army, half Amazons, and its govern-
 ment of experienced military officers
 distinguished as savants, who (like the
 Jesuits in Paraguay or the English in
 India) are at another stage of develop-
 ment, and belong intellectually and mor-
 ally to a wholly different world from
 the mass of the population.

§ 23 33 κυρίους . φέροντας] How
 precisely the connexion is to be under-
 stood was explained in n. (153) on § 1.
 Practically the result is much as Aristotle
 represents it, and this is certainly man-
 aged differently in his own pattern state.
 SUSEM. (177)

Pl. *Rep.* V 464 C:
 παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῇ λαμβάνοντας,
 μισθὸν τῆς φύλαξης, κοινῇ πάντας ἀναλίσ-
 κειν, IV 416 D, E. τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσων
 δέονται ἄνθρωποι ἀθλητῶν πολέμου σφόδρῶς

τας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονη- (II
 35 μάτων πλήρεις ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἰλωτέας τε καὶ πενηστέας
 § 23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ' ὁμοίως εἴτε 14
 μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἢ
 τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἔστι δ'. οὔτε
 39 εὐρεῖν ῥάδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρειν μικρόν, τὸ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι
 § 24 τούτους πρὸς τὸ σφῆξεσθαι τὴν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ
 1264 b μὴν εἴ γε τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας ποιήσει κοινωνὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις
 ἰδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες
 αὐτῶν; κἂν εἰ κοινὰ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖ-
 κες * *. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πα- 15
 § 25 ραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰς γυναῖκας τοῖς
 ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ
 τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης· ἀεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς

35 *πενήστας* P² T^b || 36 [αἱ δουλείαι] οἱ αἱ <τοιούτους> δουλείαι Susem.,
 καὶ περιουσίας Schneider, μωίας or <κοινὰς> δουλείαι Schmidl || 37 διώρισται
 <καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν> αἱ? Susem. || 39 ποίους τινὰς P² J⁴ Q^b Bk. || *εἶτα* <δεῖ>
 Scaliger <δεῖ> *εἶνα* Spengel

1264 b 3 *κἂν...γυναῖκες*. These words in Π¹ come before 2 ὥσπερ (P¹ connected
 this in the margin): Sylburg and Bk. bracket them; Schneider and Koiaes transpose
 them to precede 2 τίς οἰκονομήσει, Koiaes reading *εἰ τε* for *εἴ γε*. Thurot first
 discovered the lacuna

τε καὶ ἀνδρείοι, ταξαμένοι παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων
 πολιτῶν δέχεσθαι μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς το-
 σούτων ὅσον μῆτε περιεῖναι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸν
 ἐνιαυτὸν μῆτε ἐνδεῖν.

ἀποφορὰν] a tent in kind.

34 χαλεποὺς κτλ.] troublesome and
 full of arrogance.

35 τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις. πενηστέας] See
 9 § 2 n. (180). SUSEM. (178)

36 δουλείαι] Ridgeway *Transactions*
 p. 132 thinks the word means "the self
 populations of states like Argos and Crete,
 called Γυνήσιοι at Argos, and Ἀφαιμῶνται
 in Crete," quoting Thuc. v. 23 where the
 word is used of the Helots, ἣν δὲ ἡ δου-
 λεῖα ἐπανιστήται. So also by Plato, *Λόγος*
 776 D of the Mariandyni.

§ 23 εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖα κτλ.] We are re-
 called to § 18; the question, *περὶ ᾧ*
οὐδὲν διώρισται, is the tenure of property
 amongst the ordinary citizens. "Whether
 it is equally necessary here" <as in the
 case of the Guardians, to have commu-
 nism > "or not, has certainly not
 been determined, as matters stand." ταῦτα
 = κοινὰ πάντα of line 17 above.

37 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων] "Nor
 about the following points: what consti-

tution and education and code of laws
 are in force in the case of the citizens
 at large"

40 sc. διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ σφῆξεσθαι.
 The construction as in 1260 b 16 n.

§ 24 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ.] But supposing
 he intends to leave their property in in-
 dividual ownership, and yet to introduce
 community of wives, where are the wo-
 men to be found to superintend house-
 hold matters as the men manage the
 work in the fields?

"What was said in n. (170) applies
 again to this argument in the mutilated
 state of the text." SUSEM. (178)

1264 b 4 ἐκ τῶν θηρίων] *Rep.* v
 451 D. SUSEM. (180)

ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, εἶτ.] should
 show by a comparison from the lower
 animals that. . . In *Rhet.* II. 20 § 2, § 5
παραβολή = simile.

§ 25 7 ἀεὶ γὰρ κτλ.] In the Plato-
 nic state the government is not actually
 in the hands of the same individuals in
 perpetuity. None except members of the
 highest order, the philosophers, are eli-
 gible as rulers, but they enter the ruling
 body by rotation. SUSEM. (181)

αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἴτιον γίνεταί καὶ παρὰ (II)
 τοῖς μηδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἤπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ-
 § 26 μοσιδέσι καὶ πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ
 11 ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις
 ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυ-
 σός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γνωμέ-
 νοις μίξαι χρυσόν, τοῖς δ' ἄργυρον, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σιδήρον
 § 27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσιν ἔσσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἔτι δὲ καὶ 18
 16 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν
 εὐδαίμονα ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ

9 ἢ πουθεν δὴ P^{3.4} Q¹ T¹ U¹ Ald. and P² (cor. 7), ἢ πουθεν δὴ P² (1st hand), ἢ πουθεν δὴ P⁴, ἤπουθεν δὴ I¹, ἐπουθεν δὴ Γ Μ', ἢ ποῦ γε δὴ Vettori Bk. 1, ἢ που δὴ θεν ? Götting, ἢ δὴ πουθεν γε Spengel || 13 δὲ] γὰρ ? Suscm. || εὐθὺς II¹ Bk. & P¹ (1st hand)

9 ἀξίωμα=dignity, valuation. There is no such distinction in Aristotle (as there is in Thucydides) between your own estimate, ἀξίωσις, and that of others, ἀξίωμα.

10 θυμοσιδέσι. ἀνδράσι] The members of the second order of citizens, Guardians, in the narrower and inexact sense (φύλακες=ἐπίκουροι) from whom the first class (ἀρχοντες) are drafted off. For after they have attained the age of twenty, only the better qualified amongst them proceed to the higher education in mathematics; and out of these again at thirty only the very ablest receive instruction five years longer in philosophy (ἀκαδημαίῳ). Then after fifteen years more devoted to practical life, after serving in higher command, they are at length received into the highest order, the rulers proper. see *Rep.* VII 536 D ff., comp. *n.* (970) on IV(vii). 17. 15 and Zeller's *Plato* p. 480 *n.* (69). In the Aristotelian model-state, however, all citizens in later life may attain to a share in the government and administration; provided, that is, their fellow-citizens elect them to the particular offices of state for which they are eligible. See on III. 1 § 10 *n.* (440), 4 § 5 (471), 13 § 12 (599), IV(vii). 9 § 9 (817), 13 § 9 (885) and *Exc.* 1 to B. IV(viii). As Eaton remarks, θυμοσιδέσι = 'men of spirit' is Plato's own term (*Rep.* II 375 B, 376 C) for his caste of warriors. comp. III. 16 § 1 *n.* (641), IV(vii). 7 § 5 (786), § 7 (790), 10 § 13 (839), 15 § 9 (935). SUSCM. (182)

§ 26 ὅτι δὲ ἀναγκ. κτλ.] "Aristotle apparently does not observe that Plato's myth does not answer its purpose, as it

does not recognize the promotion of ἐπίκουροι to be φύλακες." JACKSON.

13 φησὶ δὲ] *Rep.* III 415 A. SUSCM. (183)

εὐθὺς γιν.] directly they are born, at the moment of birth: εὐθὺς of time is not good Greek.

§§ 27, 28 This relates to one of the most brilliant and striking episodes of the *Republic*; the objection of Adeimantus at the opening of B. IV that Socrates has insufficiently provided for the happiness of his guardians: 419—421 C.

15 ἔτι δὲ .17 νομοθέτην] Here Aristotle is guilty of a further piece of carelessness. Plato certainly says, 420 B, οὐ μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἐν τῇ ἡμῶν πόλει ἔσται διαφερόντως εὐδαίμων, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐνὶ μέλλουσιν ὅλη ἡ πόλις. but Aristotle has not attended to another passage V 465 D—466 B, where this thread is taken up (μνηνεύσαι οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐκ οἷδ' ἔστι λόγος ἡμῶν ἐπέκληξεν, ἐνὶ τοῖς φύλακας οὐκ εὐδαίμονας ποιοῦμεν) and to the later discussion IX 680—692 B, whence it appears that the former statement is only provisionally made. Plato's ultimate decision is the very opposite that his polity is the sole means whereby the Guardians are added to perfect happiness (465 D ἴθυσον τοῦ μακαριωτάτου βίου, ἐν ᾧ Ὀλυμπιονίκαι ἴσονται, μακαριώτερον). Thus this objection breaks down entirely. We have had instances of similar negligence already in § 17 *n.* (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179) : and there is another in 6 § 5 (195). Moreover in IV(vii). 9 § 7 Aristotle himself says εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος

εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ [μὴ] πάντων μερῶν ἢ (II)
 τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαι-
 20 μονεῖν ὥνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ ὅλῳ
 ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύ-
 § 28 νατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαιμονες, τίνες ἔτε-
 ροί; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἷ γε τεχνῆται καὶ τὸ πλεῖθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων.
 6 ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρηκεν, ταύτας III
 25 τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐτέρας· σχε-
 δὸν δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ὕστε-
 ρον γραφέντας, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπι-
 σκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ
 30 καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, <καὶ
 40 <περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων,> καὶ
 § 2 31 τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν (διαίρεται δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ

18 μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων μερῶν Bojesen || εἰ μὴ Vettori, but then εἰ μὴ πάντων should be transposed to come after 19 τινῶν || [μὴ] πάντων Lindau Zeller (*Phil. d. Gr.* II 11 698 n. 2)—the easiest alteration. Bussie transposes the second μὴ to piece off τινῶν || ἢ τινῶν omitted by Bojesen || 20 ὥνπερ M¹ P¹ (1st hand—emended by P¹), and P² (coll.¹), ὥνπερ the remaining authorities, including T, rendered *quoniam et* by William || 26 τὰ is omitted by P² Bk || 30 καὶ 14 inverted after τῶν by II² || After κτήσεως Susem. inserts the clause καὶ περὶ φυλάκων from 1264 b 40, 1265 a 1; *Introd.* p. 79 f. || the last καὶ κατὰ ? Schmidt, accepting the transposition || 31 δέ] γὰρ II² Ar. Bk.

τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας: where see *note*. SUSEM. (184)

18 ἢ τινῶν κτλ] "or unless at least certain definite parts," viz. the most important, "attain happiness." SUSEM. (188)

19 οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ] "For happiness is not a thing of the same sort with evenness, which may be an attribute of the sum (of two numbers) where it is not an attribute of either of the numbers themselves." The sum of two odd numbers, 3 + 5, is even.

c. 6 Comparison of the Republic and the Laws. §§ 1—5. Examination of the polity proposed in the Laws: §§ 6—22.

See *Analysis* p. 104, *Introd.* p. 33 with *notes*; Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 203—207, and pp. 1—14 generally; Oncken 1. 194—209; Van der Rest pp. 181—344.

§ 1 27 ἐνταῦθα] In the Laws. Evidently Aristotle assumes the work to

be genuine. According to Diog. Laer. III. 37 it was published by Philip of Opus after Plato's death.

28 περὶ ὧν κτλ] "has precisely determined very few things." In this comparison of the *Republic* with the *Laws* Aristotle's tendency to look for definite results (noticed above, c. 2) is especially prominent. He is in no way concerned to exhaust the differences between the two polities; indeed the whole discussion started with the dogmatic inquiry, "what are the limits of community in civil life?" 1 § 2.

But one cannot help seeing that the deepest ground of this difference, the altered philosophical standpoint and the change in the conception of the state, has escaped him. had he clearly recognised this, he would not have expressed himself as he has in § 5 (Zeller). See however § 4 (T. L. Heath).

31 τὴν τάξιν] Understand διώριξε, though the change of construction is unusual.

32 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ (III)
 33 προπολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ
 § 3 κύριον τῆς πόλεως), περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν,
 35 πότερον οὐδεμὶς ἢ μετέχουσί τινος ἀρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ἅπλα
 δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ τούτους καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μὴ, περὶ τού-
 των οὐδὲν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναικας
 οἶται δεῖν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχου τῆς αὐτῆς
 τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκε

39 λόγους after πεπλήρωκε Susem.¹⁻² following William's translation: it is omitted by M¹ P¹ Benda

§ 2 32 For the repetition of *eis* compare IV (VII). 14 § 12, and possibly 12 § 6.

33 προπολεμοῦν] Plato's word *Reph.* IV 423 A.

τρίτον δ' ἐκ τούτων] Comp. n. 182 SUSEM. (188). Supply *ἐστὶ*. "The deliberative and supreme (executive) body of the state (is) a third order formed out of *these latter*." He quite correctly takes the *ἀρχαί* to be a committee chosen out of the *ἐπικούροι*: specially trained military officers, of mature experience and of great eminence in science, are from time to time coopted into the governing order. In the individual soul the gulf is fixed between the λογιστικὸν and the other two parts which make up τὸ διλογον· but in the state the wide distinction is between ἀρχοντες and ἐπικούροι together, i.e. φύλακες in the vaguer sense, on the one hand, and οἱ ἄλλοι πολῖται on the other.

§ 2 34 περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν κατὰ] Here Aristotle contradicts himself again: see on 5 § 17 n. (168), § 19 (170), § 24 (179), 6 § 5 (195). For at 5 § 25 above he recognised quite rightly that even the members of the second order are to have no real share in the administration: whereas now he expresses doubt whether some part in it may not fall to the third order, and whether they too are not to go out on military service! If there is one thing which Plato has made clear it undoubtedly is his principle of the division of labour. This, which he puts into the foreground, prohibits the shoemaker from ever attempting to be at the same time a tradesman or a carpenter or a farmer: ἀπορριπτὸν it prohibits the artisan or farmer from serving likewise as soldier; and either of them, or even the soldier, from ruling. See Zeller *Plato* p. 470 f. SUSEM. (187)

37 οὐδὲν διώρικεν] Yet see *Reph.* v 468 A.

ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν κατὰ] Consult the note following. SUSEM. (188)

38 συμπολεμεῖν] *Reph.* v 451 E, 457 A, 466 E, 471 D.

39 τοῖς ἔξωθεν κατὰ] But in the *Repub.* Plato treats of the community of children and wives v 457 B—466 D, of the regulation of property relations III 415 D—417 B, of education II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 535 A, x 595 A—608 B, of the division into the three orders of citizens, II 367 E—376 B, III 412 C—IV 445 E, v 466 D—VI 502 C, VII 535 A—541 B (comp. II 376 E—III 412 B, VI 502 C—VII 541 B), of the women's share in the duties of the guardians v 449 A—457 B, so that this whole work is literally filled with what Aristotle has here cited; only the first two books lay the foundation for it and the eighth and ninth enlarge upon the other forms of government. Thus independently of the discussions on the immortality of the soul x 608 C—621 D nothing is left which could come under the head of these discussions which lie outside the subject. The treatment of the above questions is no doubt crossed over and over again by dissertations on metaphysics, the theory of cognition, psychology, and ethics. This is what Aristotle really means, and he might from his standpoint consider them as not properly belonging to the subject. But that is no correct standard of judgment. What should have compelled Plato to write a purely political work in the *Republic*? Why might it not have been his intention to present a work in which the specially political discussion was only an organic member of a more comprehensive whole? SUSEM. (188)

"In answering the question What is

40 τὸν λόγον· καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεῖ γίνεσθαι (III)
 1265 a τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι 2
 § 4 τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν. καὶ
 ταύτην βουλευόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι κατὰ μι-

40 τὸν λόγον untranslated by William, Ar., [τὸν λόγον] Sussem.^{1,2} but Γ is uncertain and it is better to follow II², as I now think, or else with M^o P¹ to omit λόγους

the subject of a given Platonic dialogue? it is convenient to distinguish the subject of the *conversation* from the subject or subjects of the *work*. Thus in the case of the *Republic*, though the thesis *ὡς ἀμεινον διακοσμήσθαι δίκην* is the subject of the conversation between Socrates and his friends, it may fairly be said that the work is concerned with the *καλλίστη*, the theory of ideas, and some minor matters. It is however the thesis *ὡς ἀμεινον διακοσμήσθαι δίκην* which gives unity to the composition. Hence, although one of the incidental discussions may have, in consequence of its originality, both for the reader and for Plato himself (περὶ πολιτείας ἢ τὸ κεφάλαιον *Timaeus* 17 C), a special interest, it is unreasonable to regard what is alien to it as in any way irrelevant. In fact Aristotle's remark is no more than the expression of his characteristic dislike of Plato's indirect method of approaching the doctrines which he wishes to enforce." JACKSON.

§ 4 1265 a 1 τῶν δὲ νόμων κτλ.] This is quite incorrect: in the *Laws* about equal parts are taken up with constitutional theory and with legislation, and the constitution in the narrower sense is treated much more fully than in the *Republic* (Suckow *Form der plat. Schriften* 132 f.). Aristotle (ii 406 on III. 3. 9) agrees with Plato in including under the constitution, in the wider sense, the regulation of education. From his point of view therefore the whole of the *Laws* from the middle of B. v to the end of B. viii with a large part of B. xii may be said to be περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, while books ix, x, xi and the rest of B. xii are a code of laws, νόμοι. SUSSEM. (190)

Oncken (i. 194—199) appeals to this passage in support of his view that the first four books of the *Laws*, and part of the fifth, are a later spurious introduction (τὸ πρόσμικτον τῶν νόμων, 734 x) with which Aristotle was wholly unacquainted.

2 καὶ ταύτην βουλ. κτλ.] "and while endeavouring to make it more universally applicable to the existing states he gradu-

ally works it round to the other polity once more." *κοινοτέρα* = common to many states, an average polity. Cp § 16 and vi(1v). 2 4

"When he wrote the *Republic* Plato looked upon the pattern constitution there described as by no means impracticable. He declares that its immediate introduction might be secured without difficulty under a definite condition, which though not indeed easy, nor of frequent occurrence, was yet by no means impossible. v 471 C f., 473 C, vi 497 A f., 499 B—501 C. In the *Republic* moreover he knows nothing of any pattern state of the second rank, holding an intermediate position between the first and the existing constitutions. But in the *Laws* he has changed his view on this point. The form of the state described in the *Republic* (though he still holds it to be the best) is an impracticable ideal: v 739 A f., vii 807 B, ix 853 C, cp. 874 E f., iii 691 C f., 692 D f., iv 713 C f. For that reason he now replaces it by a second best scheme of constitution which approximates much more nearly to the actual constitutions, not without expressing the apprehension that if the attempt were made to call this into life much in it would have to be abandoned, so that the actual result would be only a pattern state of the third order: v 739 A—E, 745 E f., cp. vii 805 B. Here too the possibility of thus realizing it, though only to a limited extent, is made dependent on a condition, very similar though not entirely the same as the condition which is indispensable for the realization of the state planned in the *Republic*, namely, that it should be undertaken by an absolute prince (νότατος) with an inclination for philosophy, young, of good disposition and as yet uncorrupted, in conjunction with a philosophic lawgiver: iv 709 E f., v 735 D. Cp Zeller *Plat. Stud.* 16 ff., *Plato* (Eng. tr.) p. 483, 522 f., 531, 538 f., 546; Suckow, *op. c.* 133; Sussemh. *Plat. Phil.* ii. 619, German trans. of the *Laws* 976 ff. Aristotle seems to have rightly apprehended this relation between the two: at all

§ 5 κρὸν περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν. ἔξω γὰρ (III)
 5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα
 ταῦτ' ἀποδίδωσιν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ
 παιδεύειν τὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπε-

1265 a 4 εἰς] πρὸς II^o Bk. || 6 διδωσιν P⁴ U^o Ald.

event, he gives no expression here to the opinion which is supported by many moderns, most recently by Oncken *op. c.* 1. 201, that the state of the *Laws* is only meant to be a transitional form to mediate and prepare the future introduction of the true ideal state,—an opinion which is seen from the foregoing to be utterly untenable. On the contrary his words plainly amount to this; that Plato intended in the state of the *Laws* to frame something intermediate to that of the *Republic* and the existing states, but in reality he has unconsciously followed the *Republic* so much more closely than the existing states, that all essential features of the former are still retained." SUMER. (191)

§ 5 + ἔξω γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κατ[
 But summing—what is not indeed the case (see next note)—that this really were the only difference between the two schemes, is it not after all one so essential that any further discussion of a really essential identity between them is thereby precluded? And so far as this might yet be possible, does not Aristotle's ideal state come pretty nearly as close to that of the *Republic* as does that of the *Laws*? At any rate, of the three points which Aristotle lays stress upon as justifying his criticism, he too expressly approves of the two latter ones: c. 7 § 8 *n.* (238); 9 § 2 (279), § 31 (341); 10 § 8 f. (365), 11 § 10 (393). IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 8; 10 § 9 (831), § 10 (834), *Introd.* p. 22 *n.* (3). His own ideal of public education also, so far as he has developed it, coincides in very important particulars with the directions in the *Laws*: see on IV (VII). 17 § 1 *n.* (950), § 15 (970). V (VIII). 4 §§ 7—9, *nu.* True, Plato's divergence comes out in that dialogue also when he insists on the education of women in common with men, on their taking part in military service and in the common messes, thus rendering true domestic life impossible; nor perhaps is Aristotle willing to follow him in assigning by law a definite limit to personal property: see § 15 *n.* (313), 7 § 4 *n.* (233). But he, too, demands, exactly like Plato in the *Laws*, that the land in the possession of private persons should be divided into equal inalienable

indivisible lots twice as numerous as the families of citizens (IV (VII). 10 §§ 9—11, see also *nu.* on 11 § 5 1, 6 § 15) and that for this purpose the number of citizens be maintained perpetually the same, §§ 10—13, 7 § 5 *nu.* He is only more decided and consistent than Plato in not shrinking in the least from the horrible expedient of abortion, as a means of securing this (*Introd.* 34, 56, IV (VII). 16 § 15 f. *nu.*); while Plato, who had made the same regulation under certain circumstances in the *Republic* (see on 11 § 5, 6 *n.* 140), had in the *Laws* abandoned it, and had left the number of children to be produced unrestricted, in the hope of adjusting the matter in a wiser way. *n.* (208) on 6 § 10. In this respect then Aristotle's ideal state stands even nearer than that of the *Laws* to the state depicted in the *Republic*, and makes a more severe and destructive attack upon married life. Lastly he too requires written enactments fixing the age at which marriage is advisable and compulsory (IV (VII). 16 §§ 1—10, *nu.* 937, 940); in fine, whereas his view of marriage is wholly different from Plato's, and ethically regarded a mean view (Exc. 1 to B. II p. 327), it is actually realized in only a very mutilated fashion. Thus in criticizing Plato he has at the same time unintentionally passed judgment upon himself SUMER. (192)

7 παιδεύειν τὴν αὐτὴν] This is only relatively true. The all-essential feature in the state of the *Republic* is the rule of the philosophers, see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* II 1 761 f. (Eng. tr. *Plato* 466, 467 ff.), and in the *Laws* this is dropped. Aristotle overlooks this fact. Further, in the earlier scheme those engaged in trade and agriculture are at any rate free members of the state. In the scheme of the *Laws*, the former are aliens not settled permanently in the country, while the latter are slaves *Laws* V 741 ε ff.; VII 806 d ff.; VIII 842 c f., 846 d, 850 d; XI 915 ε ff., 919 d ff., 921 c, XII 952 d ff. Thus the third class of citizens is done away with. The second class is all that is left and the training prescribed for it is the same only so far as it extends; that

χομένους ζῆν, καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ (III)
 φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων
 10 τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακισχιλίων.

§ 6 τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους §
 λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ [τὸ] ζητητικόν, κα-
 λῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένου πληθὺς

9 καὶ before γυναικῶν omitted by Γ (?) and by P¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹) ||
 12 τὸ before ζητητικὸν omitted by M¹ P¹

is, not beyond the elementary principles of mathematics *Latius* VII. However a certain survival of the philosophic rulers of the *Republic* is still retained by the formation of a higher council of state, the so-called 'nocturnal assembly.' It is to consist of the most educated and capable men in the community over fifty years of age; moreover certain of the most distinguished magistrates belong to it in virtue of their office, while younger qualified citizens, if at least thirty years old, may be admitted as extraordinary members by cooptation, and are then instructed by the council in its own sciences, philosophy, higher mathematics, including astronomy and theory of music. But this higher college is destitute of political power and is restricted to its moral influence simply; it endeavours thereby to guide public opinion in such a manner that the elections to public offices may fall, wherever possible, upon its ordinary and extraordinary members. See *Laws* I 632 c, XII 951 d ff., 961 a ff. Cp. n. (970) on IV(VII). 17 § 15. SUSEM. (198)
 καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων κτλ.] *Laws* V 741 E, VII 806 D—807 D, VIII 843 D, 846 D, XI 519 d f. SUSEM. (194)

ἀναγκαῖον=necessary for support, cp. III. 5. 3, IV(VII). 10. 7 where the antithesis is 10 τὰ εἰς εὐχρησμον καὶ περισσύν.

8 καὶ περὶ συσσιτίων ὡσαύτως] Here Aristotle is perfectly aware of the fact which he appeared to have forgotten before, 5 § 17 n. (168), § 24 n. (179), that even in the ideal state of the *Republic* Plato had required there should be common messes for the guardians. SUSEM. (198)

πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ κτλ.] As a matter of fact messes common to the women are assumed by Plato in the state of the *Republic*, as was stated in n. (153) on 5 § 1, but in the changed sphere of the state in the *Laws* he finds himself obliged expressly to lay down this requirement and assign reasons for it, as he intends to

maintain it in the later scheme: VI 780 D ff., VII 806 E, cp. VIII 842 B, 847 E. Further compare I. 13 § 9 n. (116), II. 7 § 1 n. (231 b). SUSEM. (196)

9 χιλίων] *Republic*. IV 423 A, where however this number is given as only the minimum, ὡς ἀληθῶς μέγιστη καὶ ἐν μόνον ἡ χιλίων τῶν προσολεμούντων. SUSEM. (197) Yet Grote (*Plato* III. p. 206 n. b) observes, that the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence that this was intended by Plato. Comp. *Politics* 291 E for the possible number of the rulers.

10 πεντακισχιλίων] More precisely 5040; *Laws* V 737 E, 740 C f., 745 B ff. etc. SUSEM. (198)

§ 6 11 τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ.] "Now all the discourses of Socrates display genius acuteness, originality, earnestness." περιττὸν, out of the common, extraordinary. cp. *Metaφ.* I. 2 13: κομψόν, ingenious, subtle, as VI(IV). 4. 11 κομψῶς τοῦτο οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἰρηται. Both better taken of the *thought* than with some editors of the style. (Thus Gottling *Commentariolus de Ar. Pol.* II 3 gives for κομψόν 'compta pulchritudo,' grace or finish.)

τοῦ Σωκράτους] Aristotle then erroneously takes the Athenian stranger in the *Laws* to be Socrates, although the time of the conversation falls long after his death. The *ἔξωτος* should rather be considered as personifying enlightened Athens. See Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II 667 ff., Trans. of the *Laws* p. 998 f. SUSEM. (199) Yet all the same this stranger, 739 C—E, apparently assumes responsibility for the proposals of "Socrates" in the *Republic*.

12 καλῶς δὲ πάντα] sc. εἶχεν, for everything to be right "but to be right on all points may well be a hard task." χαλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ. Bernays however renders χαλεπὸν=too much to ask.

13 τὸ νῦν εἶρ. πληθὺς] The construction changes; he begins as if δεῖσθαι were to follow.

δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεήσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις Βαβυλωνίας (III)
 15 ἢ τίνος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλήθος, ἐξ ἧς ἀργοὶ πεντακι-
 σχίλιοι θρέψονται, καὶ παρὰ τούτους γυναικῶν καὶ θεραπῶν-
 17 τῶν ἕτερος ὄχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι (p. 34)
 κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ τὸν
 νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τίθεναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τε
 20 τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ-
 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιώντας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν

14 δεήσει τοῖς τοιοῦτοις after 15 ἀπεράντου Γ, perhaps rightly || 16 παρὰ Γ P¹, περὶ M¹ P² Bk. and P¹ (1st hand) || τούτοις Welldon || 18 μηδὲν] μὴ M¹ P¹, omitted by Q² || 19 τε omitted by P¹, τε τὴν by M¹ || 21 πρῶτον μὲν added before εἰ by P¹ and in the margin of P⁴, adopted by Susem.¹²: a doubtful case, the words would then bear the sense of *μάλιστα μὲν*. Schmidt inserts them after προσθεῖναι (μὲν answered by δέ 28)

14 Βαβυλωνίας] Cp. III. 3, 5 n. (462).
 SUBFM. (200)

15 ἀπερ. τὸ πλήθος] unlimited in size.

17 ἔξ ἧς κτλ] But how does this calculation agree with that made about Sparta in 9 §§ 16, 17? Compare III. (306), (311). Even granting that the present is the more correct statement, how much smaller must we imagine the number of citizens to be in Aristotle's own ideal state according to the data given IV(VII). 4 §§ 5—14⁵ (Schlosser). Suppose these data reduce the number by one half, one half the same objection would still apply to Aristotle. On the other hand it is interesting to observe how near his penetrating intellect comes to a discovery of the fact, that the idleness which belonged as a right to a privileged minority of freeborn landholders was really the fundamental evil of the Hellenic state. Confined however to the circle of opinions current in his own age and nation, the philosopher turns back when on the very threshold of the truth: and follows Plato in adopting this fundamental evil as an inalienable primary good for his own model state. SUSEM. (201)

§ 7 17 δεῖ μὲν οὖν..μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον] "We should frame our scheme on the most favourable supposition, yet not so as to be impracticable." Cp *Laws* v 742 E · τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατόν οὐτ' ἂν βούλοιντο [μεταφύκειν], sc. ὁ διακομῶν.

ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχὴν] A reference to the expression used by Plato *Laws* IV 709 D εἰκασθαι δύναιτο . καὶ νομοθέτης, *Rénoué*. VII 540 D μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμῶς

εὐχὰς εἰρηθεῖναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, διωτὰ δὲ πρῶ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ εἰρηται; cp. VI 503 A—C εἰματα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε. On his part however Aristotle also appropriates the expression: see the references in n. (128) on I § 1, esp. διὰ δὲ πολλὰ προὔποντε θέσθαι καθάπερ εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον IV(VII). 4 § 2 n. (750). SUSEM. (202)

18 λέγεται δ' ὡς δεῖ κτλ] This is not expressly to be found anywhere in the *Laws*, but Aristotle had a perfect right to infer it from IV 704—709 and v 747 D. SUSEM. (203)

20 ἔτι δὲ καλῶς κτλ] But this even Plato himself has by no means overlooked, see *Laws* v 737 C ὅγκος δὲ πλεόνους ἱκανὸς οὐκ ὀλίγος ὀρθῶς γίγνεται· ἂν λεγέσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰς τῶν πλεονισχωμένων πόλεις (Schlosser). Aristotle brings the same objection against Phaleas, 7 § 14 ff. (Eaton). Compare n. (210) on 6 § 13. SUSEM. (204)

Cp. IV(VII). 2. 18 τῆς νομοθετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, εἰναι τινες ὑπάρχουσιν γειτνιώντες, ποῖα πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἀσκητόν.

21 εἰ δεῖ κτλ] See *Jahrb. f. Phil.* XCIII. 1866 p 329. The sense is clear from the parenthesis: "If the state is to be independent and secure against aggression." Editors who retained the ms. πολιτικῶν extorted much the same sense out of it, explaining it to mean simply a "national" life, the life of a polis; or a "social" life, a life of activity, πρακτικῶν. Thus Victorius: a moribus aliarum civitatum non penitus abhorrebat quae fines etiam imperii profertur conantur. Shilleto

βίον πολεμικόν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοι- (III)
 οὔτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις ἀ χρῆσιμα κατὰ τὴν
 § 8 οἰκείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω τόπους). εἰ δέ
 25 τις μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἴδιον μήτε τὸν
 κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἦττον δεῖ φοβεροὺς εἶναι τοῖς
 πολέμοις, μὴ μόνον ἐλθούσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ
 ἀπ[ε]λθ[ο]ύσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὀρᾶν δεῖ, μὴ ποτε
 βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μάλλον. τοσαύτην γὰρ
 30 εἶναι φησι δεῖν ὥστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴπεν
 § 9 ὥστε ζῆν εὖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον, ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ σω-
 φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν). ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ

22 πολεμικόν Muret, πολιτικόν Γ Π Ατ. Bk. ὁπλιτικόν Montecatino, <ἡγεμονικόν
 καὶ μὴ μόνον> πολιτικόν Thuiot || πολιτικόν μὴ μονωστικόν Γ, πολιτικόν μὴ μονωτι-
 κόν Γ⁴, πολιτικόν μὴ μονώτερον Μ², πολιτικόν μὴ μονωστικόν Ρ⁴ (in the margin):—all
 glosses || 23 ὅπλοις ὁρίοις Oncken, νομίμοις? Susem. || 25 <καὶ> μὴ Schmidt ||
 28 ἀποδοῦν Bender || 30 εἰ omitted by Π². Were this right εἴπεν would have to
 be altered, with Bas.⁸, to εἴπεται || 31 ἐπειδὴ Susem ἐπεὶ δ' Γ Π Ατ. Bk. Susem.¹⁻²

wrote "perhaps explained by Pl. *Polag.*
 322 B πολιτικὴν τέχνην ἥς μέρος πολεμική,
 absolutely political and having therewith
 as one ingredient πολέμημα." The expres-
 sion recurs in IV(vii). 2 § 3, §§ 5, 6 (a prob-
 ably spurious chapter) and 6 § 7, where see
Critical notes.

23 ἀ χρῆσιμα κτλ.] Cp. VII(vi). c. 7
 §§ 1—3 (Eaton) SUSEM. (206)

§ 8 24 εἰ δὲ τις μὴ τοιοῦτον κτλ.]
 "But if any one refuse to approve of a
 life such as this" i.e. warlike "for the
 state at large any more than for the indi-
 vidual." Whether war is the end of the
 state is a question debated in IV(vii). 14
 § 13 f, 15 §§ 1—6. Plato in the *Lysis*
 I 628 c, VII 803, VIII 829 A, holds that it
 is not.

28 τὸ πλῆθος really belongs to the
 dependent clause. "Whether perhaps it
 might not be better to define otherwise,
 by a clearer definition, the amount of
 property which one man may hold." It is
 characteristic of the writer to require
 analysis and precise definition, τὸ σαφές,
 τὸ διωρισμένον.

29 τοσαύτην γὰρ εἶναι φησι.] *Lysis*
 V 737 D γῆς μὲν ὅποση πόσιος σώφρονος
 ὄντας καθ' ἑτέραν πλείονος δ' οὐδὲν προσ-
 δεῖ. With what follows compare γ § 7 n
 (237 b). SUSEM. (206)

31 καθόλου μάλλον] "For this (term)
 is too vague (cp. *μία μάλλον*, 2 § 2) since
 men may live frugally and at the same
 time wretchedly": literally, in hardships

and distress.

§ 9 σωφρόνως here and IV(vii). 5 § 1,
 and σωφροσύνη III. 4 § 16 can only
 mean 'parsimoniously', 'parsimony'. But
 in II. 5 § 10 n (162), γ § 12 n (242),
 I. 13 § 2 f., § 6 (112), IV(vii). 1 § 4 (691),
 3 § 3, 15 §§ 2—4, 16 § 8 the meaning is
 temperance or self-restraint in reference
 to eating and drinking and the appetite of
 sex: and it is from this side that the virtue
 is depicted in *Nic. Eth.* III. cc. 10, 11 (1117
 b 23 ff.). There however Aristotle himself
 explains how extravagance leads to pro-
 fligacy and to excesses in this direction,
 and that *σωφροσύνη*, properly a spendthrift,
 comes to mean a profligate; *id.* IV. 1 § 3,
 1119 b 30, § 35, 1121 b 17. In *Nic. Eth.* IV.
 3 § 4, 1123 b 5, 4 § 4, 1125 b 13 *σωφρων*
 has yet another meaning: viz. modest.
 Lastly, Van der Rest observes that the
 next objection brought against Plato
 affects only a certain inexactitude of ex-
 pression and not the thought, which is no
 other than that followed by Aristotle, of
 a right mean between excessive wealth
 and excessive poverty: see esp. *Lysis* V
 741 E: χρηματισμὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνστάει ἐν τῇ
 τοιαύτῃ λατασταυῇ. and next note. SUSEM.
 (206 b)

32 ὅρος] A better definition would be,
 to live frugally and liberally. "Comp.
 IV(vii). 5. 1 n. *λευστέριος ἅμα καὶ σω-
 φρόνως*; II γ. 7 n. *τοὺ μέσου στοιχαστέον*,
 VI(IV) 11 4 *τῶν εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτήσις ἢ
 μέση βελτίστη πάντων*." SUSEM. (207)

σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως (χωρὶς γὰρ ἑκατέρω τῷ μὲν τὸ (III)
 τρυφᾶν ἀκολουθήσει, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἐπιπόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ'
 35 εἰσὶν [ἔξεις] ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρῆσιν αὐταί, οἷον
 οὐσίᾳ πρῶτος [μὲν] ἢ ἀνδρείως χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν, σωφρόνως δὲ
 καὶ ἐλευθερίως ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἔξεις ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 § 10 περὶ αὐτὴν ταύτας. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα τὸ
 περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφεί-
 40 ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἰόριστον ὡς ἱκανῶς ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην
 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὁσωνοῦν γεννωμένων,
 1265 b
 § 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δεῖ δὲ
 τοῦτ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] τότε καὶ νῦν.
 νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπορεῖ διὰ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς
 ὁποσονοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ ἀδιαιρέτων οὐσῶν ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα-
 5 ράξοντας μὴδὲν ἔχειν, ἐάν τε ἐλάττους ὦσι τὸ πλῆθος ἐάν τε

33 ἑκατέρω Koraev, ἑκάτερον Γ II Ar. Bk. || τῷ τὸ II² Ai. Bk. || τὸ τῷ II²
 Ar. Bk. and M^a (1st hand) || 34 τῷ τὸ II² Ai. Bk. || τὸ τῷ P²⁻³ Q^b Ar. Ald. Bk.
 || ἐπιπόνως] *labonious teneon*. William, no doubt an addition of his own: hence *ξῆν*
Su-tem,¹⁻² erroneously || 35 [ἔξεις] *Su-tem*. || ἀρεταί] *alperai* written by an un-
 known hand in the margin of the Munich copy of the Aldine, first found in Vettori
 and wrongly defended by Bekker, Madvig, Bernays: omitted by Schneidein as a gloss
 upon ἔξεις || χρῆσιν] *ξεν* II¹ Apparently William translated from the following
 order: αὐταὶ αἱ ἔξεις εἰσὶν ἀρεταὶ περὶ τὴν ξῆν τῆς οὐσίας, Ar. from the following:
 αὐταὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ εἰσὶν ἔξεις περὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τῆς οὐσίας || 36 μὲν is omitted by Γ II² Bk.
 || 37 ἔξεις *Su-tem*², χρήσεις Γ II Ar. Bk., *alperseis* Madvig: Bernays conjectures *περὶ*
 τὰς ἀτάσεις ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὰς εἶναι ταύτας, not happily || εἶναι after 38 αὐτὴν II² Bk.
 || 40 ὁμομαλισθησομένην Madvig for *ἂν ὁμαλισθησομένην*

1265 b 2 [περὶ τὰς πόλεις] Bendei who also conjectures τοῦτο δὲ οὐχ οἷον τε for δεῖ
 δὲ τοῦτ' οὐχ || 4 παράξοντας Γ M^a and P¹ (1st hand), and the scribe restored this after
 P¹ had emended it to παράξοντας

33 χωρὶς] if the two be separated.

34 τὸ ἐπιπόνως (ξῆν)

35 ἀρεταὶ αὐταί] These are the only
 virtues that have to do with the use of
 property. οἷον = I mean.

§ 10 38 ἰσάζοντα] *Lauw* v 740 B—
 741 A. *SUSEM*. (307 b)

"It is strange that while equalizing their
 properties he should not regulate the num-
 bers of his citizens."

39 ἀλλ' ἀφείναι κτλ.] This too is
 very inexactly expressed. All that Plato
 in the *Lauw* intends, indeed all that he is
 able to effect, is to keep the number of
 citizens unalterably the same. i.e. exactly
 5040 elder men, as many younger men,
 with twice that number of women. All
 beyond that number must, as he expressly
 prescribes, go abroad, to found colonies.

One son and one daughter, then, is the
 normal family: only when there is child-
 lessness or death does it become neces-
 sary that there should be other children
 in order to marry heirs or heiresses, and
 to be adopted by the childless (*Schlosser*).
 As it stands at present, the polemic does
 not touch Plato. If Aristotle held the
 means proposed by Plato to avoid an
 excess of the prescribed number to be
 impracticable or impossible to realize he
 should have proved his point, as he easily
 might have done. *SUSEM* (208)

§ 11 1265 b 2 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀκριβῶς =
 ἀκριβέστερον "whereas that requires to
 be fixed with a great deal more nicety in
 the supposed case than at present." Cp.
 7 § 18 οὐκ ὡς ν

4 παράξοντας] the emigrants, like παρή-

- § 12 πλείους. μάλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὀρίσθαι τῆς οὐσίας ἢ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννᾶν τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἂν (p. συμβαίῃ τελευτᾶν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
- § 13 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς
- 11 ἄλλαις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἴτιον γίνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις, ἣ δὲ πενία στάσις ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φεῖδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους φήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
- 15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ἀνίσους εἶχον τοὺς κλήρους πάντες κατὰ μέ-
- § 14 γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τοῦναντίον ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων πῶς ἂν οἰόμεθα βέλτιον ἔχειν, λεκτέον ὕστερον· ἐλλέλειπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἄρχον-

11 ἄλλαις Γ Μ², πλείους Γ³ Π² Ar. Bk. (πλ οἷαι an elisione I⁴) || 12 [Φεῖδων . 17 ὕστερον] Schmidt || 14 καὶ κατὰ Bernays || 15 τοὺς κλήρους before ἀνίσους Π³ Bk., before εἶχον Μ² P¹ || πᾶν Bk.² || 17 ὅν after βέλτιον Π² Bk.

οροι ἔκτοι, supernumeraries outside the tines, the elder brother being the yoke-horse, ὅστις ἔκτος.

§ 12 6 Take μάλλον with τῆς οὐσίας. 7 ὥστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς] Statistics will have to be collected to determine on the average how many children die before reaching maturity and how many marriages are without issue. "Thus," says Schlosser, "the idea of political arithmetic is no novelty." Aristotle is a precursor of Malthus (Eaton). Comp. also Rxc II to B. II. SUSEM. (209)

Grote III. 228—231. Plato and Aristotle saw clearly the law of population, but did not recognise the common element in the positive and prudential checks sufficiently to coordinate them, as Malthus did.

8 These "accidents of life" are before Plato, Laws v 740 C—E, cp. Grote III. p. 229 n. (g) Perhaps what Aristotle deprecates is the 'laissez faire', ἀφείσθαι, to leave it to the citizens at their own discretion.

§ 13 10 τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι κτλ.] Aristotle (?) repeats this 7 § 5. SUSEM. (209 b)

12 ἣ δὲ πενία κτλ.] See Laws v 744 D, also the account of the transition from oligarchy to democracy Rep. VIII 555 D—557 A.

Φεῖδων ὁ Κορίνθιος] Nothing is known of any such ancient lawyer of Corinth. He is supposed to be different from the better known Phaedon of Aigos, about whom see VIII (v) 10. 6. Yet he is called,

a Corinthian by the scholiast on Pindar *Olym.* XIII. 20, τούτῳ δὲ φησιν, ἐπεὶ Φεῖδων τις ἀνὴρ Κορίνθιος εὖρε μέτρα καὶ στάθμια. This is one of the various difficulties in this chapter mentioned *Introd.* p. 33 n. 4, 14 (4). There is always the heroic remedy; see *Critical Notes* and M. Schmidt in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXV. 1882. p. 822.

16 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ.] A decidedly unfounded assertion, as was explained in the note on § 10. Aristotle (?) repeats this objection against Phalaes, 7 § 5: comp. n. (204) on § 7. SUSEM. (210)

§ 14 17 ὕστερον] IV (VII). 10 § 11 f. and esp 16 § 15 f. n. (946). From the latter passage it is seen of what means he is thinking. To prevent any increase in the fixed number of the citizens Aristotle sanctions the procuring of abortion. Cp. *Introd.* p. 56 and n. (192) on § 5. SUSEM. (211)

18 ἐλλέλειπται κτλ.] Laws v 734 E. the warp is necessarily stronger and firmer than the woof, ὅθεν δὴ τοῖς μεγάλαις ἀρχαῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ἀρξάντας δεῖ διακρίνεσθαι τὰν τρώων ταύτην καὶ τοὺς σμικροὺς παιδείᾳ βασιανισθέντας ἐκαστοτε κατὰ λόγον. As a matter of fact this objection of Aristotle's is altogether unfair. In the Laws Plato has done exactly that which Aristotle here requires. he has prescribed for all the citizens of his model state the same course of training, on the ground of which he expects them to discover for themselves which among them

τας πῶς ἔσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων. φησὶ γὰρ (III)
 20 δέιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑτέρου τὸ στημόνιον ἐρίου γίνεταί τῃς κρόκης,
 15 οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἔχειν δέιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἐφίησι γίνεσθαι μελζονα μέχρι πεντα-
 πλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῇς γῆς μέχρι τινός;
 καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὐ
 25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστω ἐνεῖμε

19 ὅπως Π² Dk. || 20 δέιν] δι' Κοινας; Conring would omit δέιν here or in 21. Bergk, while defending δέιν, suggested <οὐ>δέν <ἄλλο ἤ> Finf. Abhand. p. 65 n. 2 (Leipzig 1883) || 21 δέι Π¹ || [ἐπεὶ . . . 26 οἰκέω] Schmidt, perhaps rightly, cp. 111. (213) (214) (215) || 25 συμφέρει M^a P¹ L¹ Ald. and P^a 3 (1st hand), συμφέρη Γ¹ P⁴ Q^b T^b U^b Dk. and P² (corr.¹) and a later hand in P³

me better fitted for the warp and which for the woof, and to vote accordingly at the election of magistrates. What other means has Aristotle at his command for his own ideal state? Besides it must not be forgotten that by the institution of the Nocturnal Assembly (as explained in n. 193 on § 5) Plato aimed at making especial provision for a staff (personnel) more highly qualified to administer the government and to hold offices of state. The assertion then that this simile is all that we learn from him as to the character of those qualified for the government is a mistake due to a too hasty perusal of the dialogue in question. There might certainly have been good reason for a doubt whether the institution was practicable; but here no such doubt is expressed. SUSLM. (212)

It is the professed object of the *Ερμηνεία* to expound the course of study for the Nocturnal Assembly which is to aim at controlling the election of magistrates. But nothing can be inferred from Aristotle's silence respecting it: Zeller *Plato* p. 616 n. (59) Eng. tr.

20 στημόνιον...κρόκης] Zeller *Platonic Studies* p. 107 took these terms in the *Laws* to refer to the appointment of magistracies and of the laws for them. But in Pl. *Politicus* 283 B, 309 B, the brave and energetic natures are the warp and the gentler and weaker natures the woof.

21 δέιν] Taking up the preceding δέιν of line 20

§ 18 It would certainly relieve the chapter to reject this section, as M. Schmidt proposes

22 μέχρι πενταπλασίας] Here and 7 § 4 Aristotle (?) has mistaken Plato's meaning, as if he had permitted the accumulation of moveable property to the amount

of four times the value of the real estate belonging to the family. As a matter of fact in *Laws* V 744 π (cf. VI 775 ε ff) he only allows the increase of the total property to this fourfold value; consequently only the acquisition of three times as much personal property. The occurrence of the mistake at least favours the assumption that both passages are by the same author. SUSLM. (218)

23 διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐπὶ τῇς γῆς κατὰ] This objection is simply incomprehensible. There is not the least provision for an increase of landed property in Aristotle's own ideal state. see IV (VII). 10 § 9 ff. SUSLM. (214)

25 δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα] One home-
 stead near the city and the centre of the territory and one placed on its borders, the latter to be occupied and managed by the married son and heir to the farm: *Laws* V 745 ε, VI 775 ε ff., cp. VIII 848. Aristotle (?) here blames this arrangement, but in his own pattern state he has adopted something very similar IV (VII). 10 § 11. We might assume that when he wrote Bk. IV (VII), he had changed his mind and then forgotten to expunge from his criticism of Plato the passage before us as no longer in point. Here however M. Schmidt's suggestion of interpolation is quite as obvious, although it may be met by an inquiry whether a later editor would not have carefully avoided introducing this inconsistency. SUSLM. (215)

But is the inconsistency proved? "Plato would assign to each man two οἰκίσεις *Laws* 745 ε, or, as Aristotle puts it, οἰκόπεδα, οἰκίας Aristotle recommends two κλήροι, not two οἰκίσεις or regular establishments" (Jackson). To this I reply that Plato too repeatedly uses the expres-

- § 16 διελών χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἡ δὲ σύνταξις ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μήτε δημοκρατία μήτε ὀλιγαρχία, μέση δὲ τούτων, ἣν καλοῦσι πολιτεῖαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, καλῶς εἴρηκεν ἴσως· εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτεῖαν, οὐ καλῶς. τάχα γὰρ τὴν τῶν Λακωνῶν τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ κἂν § 17 ἄλλην τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἔτιοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεῖ 10

27 βούλεται after μὲν M¹ P¹ || 29 [εἰ μὲν .1266 a 6 δημοκρατία] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. *u.* (223) || 30 πολιτεῖαν P¹ Bk. and P² 1, (1st hand) γρ. πολιτειῶν P² (corr.¹ in the margin), in *L¹* πολιτεῖαν was written over it by a later hand, but again erased || 32 τις after ἂν P² Bk.

sion ἀλλήροι. Even supposing that, in contradistinction to him, Aristotle really intended to provide only one of the two estates with a dwelling-house, how can he have believed that to farm two estates in separate localities would thus be made easier than if they had dwellings upon them? Is it not clear that the opposite will hold good? Nay more, what idea are we to form of two such detached properties, one near the town and one in the country, unless there are farm-buildings and a house upon the latter? If this be so, the above supposition is *à priori* impossible. Even Plato does not arrange that the country house shall be a regular establishment in the sense of being *always* inhabited, but the son who inherits succeeds to it as soon as he is grown up and married, and so sets up the second establishment there (*Laws* VI 775 E f). In Aristotle's best state such an appropriation of the second dwelling-house is certainly excluded, because there, when the heir marries, he succeeds his superannuated father as citizen and consequently as proprietor of both the family properties (see *note* and *Excursus* on IV[VII]. 16 § 10, 1335 a 32—35): but that is the sole point in which Aristotle diverges from Plato in this matter. To what purpose he would destine this second house can only be conjectured: it may be to lodge the superannuated father, perhaps with the lands belonging to it as a sort of retiring pension. In any case the inconsistency, as Aristotle's text has come down to us, is unquestionable. SUBEM.

26 διελών χωρίς=distinct, separate homesteads.

§ 16 σύνταξις] The entire arrangement of the constitution tends neither to

oligarchy nor to democracy but to something intermediate known as Polity. Plato's citizens are the heavy-armed men: *Laws* VI 753 B, πάντες μὲν κοινωμένων τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων αἰρέσεως, ὅπόσοι περ ἂν ἔπλα ἱππία δ' ἢ πεζία τιθῶνται καὶ πόλεμον λεκόντων ἦκωσι. This is the criterion of a 'Polity'.

28 πολιτεῖαν] Compare III. 7 § 4 with the notes and references there given. SUBEM. (216)

29 ὡς κοινοτάτην κατὰ] "as the most universally adapted for cities at large" VI (IV). c. 11 with *u.* (1282) on § 1. SUBEM. (217)

31 πρώτην=highest, normal. So δ' πρῶτος συλλογισμός. Comp. I 2. 5.

32 Plato's arrangement *Rcp.* B VIII implies this.

33 ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν] i.e. a constitution which, like the Spartan, has the character of an Aristocracy to a greater extent than Polity. The term may be thus explained: true Aristocracy coincides with Aristotle's best constitution; but in a transferred and secondary sense this name is earned by such constitutions as combine aristocratical with oligarchical and democratical elements, like Carthage, or only with democratical elements, like Sparta; this is stated VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, cp. VI(IV). 9 § 6 ff., 2 § 1 *u.* (1133), § 4 *u.* (1141), 10 § 1, 11 § 2. Further consult *Excursus* 1 on Bk III and the notes to III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601), § 24 (614); 14 § 15 (633), 17 § 3 (677), § 5 (678). VI(IV). 2 § 2 (1136—7). Of course such mixed constitutional forms are nearer to the true Aristocracy than is Polity, which is a blending of Oligarchy and Democracy: VI(IV). cc. 8, 9. See on this the notes to

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμ- (III)
 35 γμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν (εἶναι
 γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-
 κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
 δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
 40 ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα- (p. 36)
 τεῖσθαι δὲ κατὰ τε τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν
 1206 a
 § 18 καθ' ἡμέραν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἴρηται τούτοις ὡς δεόν συγκ 11

34 πολιτειῶν] πολιτῶν ΓΤ³ || 35 τὴν omitted by ΓΜ² || τῶν omitted by P¹
 || 39 τῶν omitted by Μ² P¹, [τῶν] Sussem.^{1,2} || 40 ἐφορίαν Π³ and P³ (1st hand,
 emended by a later hand)

III. 7 § 4 (536, 538); VI(IV). 2 § 4 (1141),
 7 § 4 (1237). SUSSEM. (218)

§ 17 33 ἄνιοι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Cp. IV(VII). 14 § 16 n. (911), VI(IV). 1 § 6 n. (1123). Thus we learn that two schools of political theorists, to one of which Ephorus perhaps belonged¹, dissented from the writer's opinion and agreed in regarding monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy as elements of the Spartan constitution; while the second school (40 of 82) added tyranny as a fourth element. It is strange that in this passage Aristotle (?) takes up no definite position in relation to the two views and does not oppose to them his own. Presumably he judged it sufficient, in order not to enter on a longer digression, to have denominated this constitution a mixed aristocracy. From the explanations which he has devoted specially to it we learn that he looked upon the council of Elders as the aristocratical, the Ephors as the democratic element in it, 9 §§ 19—28, but at the same time also as in a certain sense related to τυραννίς: see on 9 § 20. He finds another democratic element, though such in intention only, in the common measures, 9 § 32. He regards the Spartan kingship as far too limited to give the constitution any particular colouring: III. 14 §§ 3, 4; 15 §§ 1, 2; 16 § 1. It is still more strange then that Aristotle (?) only mentions here the views of those other theorists on this subject, passing over in total silence that expressed by Plato himself in the *Lysis* IV 712 c ff. (cp. III 693 A f., 693 ε), a view which stands much nearer to his own, representing the Spartan constitution as

mainly a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, but with the addition of the royal office and an element akin in one view to τυραννίς, in another to democracy, viz. the Ephors. Plato himself tells us, *Lysis* XII 963 ε, that he was not the first to pronounce a mixed constitution the most excellent in practice οἱ δὲ σοφώτατοι, οἱ εἰσεται, πρὸς ταῦτα τε (liberty and dominion over others) καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ξυμπαντα [βλέποντες νομοθετοῦνται], εἰς ἐν δὲ οὐδὲν διαφερόντως τετιμημένον ἔχοντες φράζω, εἰς δὲ τὰλλα αὐτοῖς δὲ βλέπειν; presumably his predecessors were to some extent the same who are here noticed. Compare further Excursus 1 to Bk. III. SUSSEM. (219)

Isocrates Lacedaemonios, *μάλιστα δημοκρατουμένους τυγχάνειν δικαίου* *Areopag.* § 61 (Spengel).

§ 18 1266 a 1 ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις κτλ] *Lysis* III 693 D f. εἰσι πολιτειῶν οὐκ ἡττοῦται δύο τινές· καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὁρῶν, τὴν δ' αὖ δημοκρατίαν; Peisia is the extreme case of the one, Athens of the other: δὲ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγλαῶν μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφὸν τούτων· 701 ε; VI 756 ε μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἢ δὲ αἱ μετέπειν τὴν πολιτείαν; cp. IV 712 D f. However what Plato really says in these passages is somewhat different, viz. that a good constitution must hold the mean between democracy and *monarchy*. Moreover he expressly guards against being supposed to derive anything in his mixed form of the state from τυραννίς, IV 712 C: τίνα δὴ ποτε πολιτείαν ἔχομεν ἐν νῶ τῇ πόλει προστάττειν; . . . οὐκ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ ἀριστοκρατίαν ἢ βασιλευσίαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τυραννίδα γέ που λέγοις ἂν; and in the *Republic* he has already himself

¹ See on this *Introduct.* p. 35 n. 3 and Sussemih's critical edition p. 1211.

κείσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας¹ καὶ τυραννίδος, ἃς ἡ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θεῖη πολιτείας ἢ χειρότεας 4 πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μινύντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ

1266 a 3 χειρότεαι P² and P³ (1st hand, emended by a later hand) || πᾶσι T || 4 [ἡ 5 βέλτιον] Riese, see Comm.

pronounced democracy and τυραννίς to be the two worst governments, the latter as the extreme of despotic rule, the former as the extreme of liberty. Aristotle however everywhere else calls *Oligarchy* and τυραννίς the two worst forms of government, see on VI (IV). II § 21 n. (1305): so that here he contradicts himself. According to the statement in the *Laws* it is no doubt true that every unlimited, i.e. pure and unmixed, monarchy coincides with τυραννίς: III 691 D—701 E, IV 710 E, 712 C ff.; kingship or limited monarchy and limited democracy are intermediate or mixed forms. Hence it would certainly be no incorrect expression of Plato's thought in the *Laws*, that the right constitution should hold a mean between democracy and τυραννίς. But from this it does not in the least follow that it must be compounded of the two: for it would also be a mean between them if it were compounded of forms which approximate partly to the one partly to the other, in order thus to blend freedom with order or authority. 'In the passages in question Plato is speaking of monarchy and democracy as principles of all government, not of certain constitutions, since he finds the principle of authority more clearly stamped on the one, that of liberty on the other' (Henkel). Consequently, to make the state in the *Laws* a combination of oligarchical with democratical elements is not inconsistent with his requirement. Besides, it is also incorrect to call these the only constituents of the mixed form and so to make the constitution simply a Polity (πολιτεία): for it deserves to be called a mixed aristocracy with far greater right than the Spartan constitution: see on § 5 (193), § 14 (212), § 21 (229); Susemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. 624—631; Translation of the *Laws* p. 980; also Zeller *Plato* p. 535 f. Eng. tr. Nor is this state of the *Laws* without a certain monarchical head; for in so far as it too is preeminently an educating institution, such a post is filled by the highest official who presides over education. However Henkel (*Studien* 65) is quite right in inferring from all the foregoing

that the monarchical element of the state is rather to be looked for in the magistrates collectively, in virtue of the extended powers assigned to them. But this by no means excludes the substantial correctness of Oncken's remark (*op. c. l.* 209): "taken literally monarchy and democracy are incapable of reconciliation: for where one rules, all cannot rule, and conversely. But if a reconciliation or blending of the two is thought of as possible at all, it can only be understood in this way, that the numbers are set aside as unessential and the mode of government emphasized as the essential feature. In that case, however, the nomenclature is quite suitable to the case before us." The highest magistracy, apart from the council, in Plato's state of the *Laws*, the 36, 01 (including the officer who presides over education) the 37 νομοφύλακες, have an approximately monarchical authority in consequence of the large powers entrusted to them*, in the sense in which Aristotle himself (?) admits that the double kingship of the Spartans is called monarchy, § 17, and the board of ephors a τυραννίς, though there were five of them; and further, designates the people in the most extreme democracy as a many-headed monarch. Taken literally, the union of oligarchy and democracy, as Aristotle finds it in the πολυτεία, is just as impossible as that of monarchy and democracy. SUSEMIL, (220)

4 βέλτιον οὖν κτλ.] That is, in the particular case here given (cp. II. 223) they are more in the right. They either leave out tyranny, the worst form of government, altogether and combine other elements with democracy; or at any rate add two other elements, oligarchy and monarchy, one of which at least, viz. monarchy, is distinctly better. The two schools of political theorists and eulogists of the Laconian constitution noticed in § 17, are doubtless intended. If it were true (1266 a 1, 2) that the best polity according to Plato is one com-

* Only Oncken's assertion, that Plato intended the council to be irresponsible, is a decided mistake, and all the inferences which he has attached to the assertion fall to the ground.

- 5 πλείονων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων]. ἔπειτα οὐδ' ἔχουσα (III)
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-
τικὰ· μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
§ 19 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπρω-
10 τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζει εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας
ἢ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφείσθαι, τοῦτο δ'
ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἶναι

pounded of democracy and tyranny, then the general statement in a 4 might justly be made for any three, or more, forms would make a better mixture than *these* two. SUSKEM. (221)

ἢ γὰρ ἐκ πλείονων κτλ.] 'This statement made thus universally is not in keeping with the philosopher's thought. He does not blame Plato for not combining elements enough, but because he would construct a polity out of the two corrupt elements' (Kiese). On Aristotle's own principles a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, must be better than one of oligarchy, democracy, and tyrannys. As was shown in the last note, the preceding sentence, rightly understood, is a simple deduction from what has been laid down above, and needs no additional reason, least of all one which erroneously extends it beyond the limits of this right interpretation and lays it down as universally true. The chapter contains difficulties enough, but this is beyond the limits of all that we dare attribute to Aristotle himself: surely this illogical generalization is interpolated. We shall however be obliged to go some way further than this, I think. For even one who, like myself, either rejects or mistrusts Schmidt's other atheteses in this chapter will nevertheless be unable to deny that the entire passages §§ 16—18, 1265 b 20 *et* μὲν, 1266 n 6 δημοκρατικά, and § 22, 1266 a 23 *ὡς*...25 σκέψαι, do most violently interrupt the connexion and leave the impression that they are non-Aristotelian. This suspicion is strengthened by the strange statements noticed in *nn.* (219, 220). SUSKEM. (222)

5 ἔχουσα sc. ἢ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις πολιτεία μοναρχικὸν οὐδέν. See *n.* (220).

7 ἐγκλίνειν = to betray a tendency towards, as in VIII (V). γ. 7.

§ 19 8 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοῖς] "For selection by lot from a body elected previously by vote belongs

to both" i.e. the lot to democracy, the voting to oligarchy [or aristocracy] This took place in the election of the council, of the magistrates charged with the police of the city (ἀγορανόμοι καὶ δασυνόμεοι), and of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίας ἀποθεταί): Laws VI 756 B—E, 763 D f., 765 B—D. SUSKEM. (223)

See R. Dareste *Le système électoral des Lois de Platon in Annales de l'Association pour l'En. des études grecques*. XVII. 1883. pp. 68—74.

9 τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κτλ.] Laws VI 764 A: *ἢ τοὺς δ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ἐλλογον δ' βουλόμενος, ἐπάναγκες δ' ἔστω τῷ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων τιμημάτων, δέκα δραχμαῖς ἡμιουμένων, ἢ μὴ παρὸν ἐξετάσθαι τοῖς ἐυλόγοις, τρίτῃ δὲ τιμῇ καὶ τετάρτῃ μὴ ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλὰ ἀρήμιος ἀφείσθαι*. SUSKEM. (224)

10 φέρειν is *suffragium ferre*, to vote; with acc., to vote for certain candidates for office.

καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας] As a matter of fact this regulation only applies to the election of the superintendents of the games (ἀγωνίας ἀποθεταί) Laws VI 765 C, and of the council VI 756 B—E. but Aristotle does not come to speak of this latter election until § 20 SUSKEM. (225)

11 τοὺς δ' ἀφείσθαι.] Not however at the election of ἀγορανόμοι καὶ δασυνόμεοι, Laws 764 A: *χειροτονεῖτω δὲ πάντες πᾶντα δὲ μὴ θέλων, ἢν εἰσαγγελθῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχοντας, ἡμιουσῶν*. SUSKEM. (226)

τοῦτο δ'] This δὲ is resumptive of δὲ in line 9. Cp τοῦτο δὲ μὲνεται, a § 6.

12 καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους κτλ.] Of these two statements the latter, viz. that the highest officers of state are to be elected from the highest classes of the census, is quite incorrect. Even for the Guardians of the Laws (νομοφύλακες) no such regulation is found: Laws VI 753 B, 766 A f., nor for the supreme board of control (εὐθνοί) XII 945 E ff. nor again for the military officers (στρατηγοί, ἑταίραρχοι, φύλαρχοι, ταξίαρχοι) 755 H ff. And as

13 τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημά- (III
20 των. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν. αἰροῦν- 13

regards the former statement, instead of arrangements to secure the election of a majority of the officials from the richest citizens, the truth is that only in the case of a *minority*, namely the *ἀσυνήμοι*, is it provided that they shall be of the highest class on the register, while the superintendents of the games (*ἀθλοθέται*) must be elected from the third or the second class. *SUSSEX*. (227)

13 τὰς μεγίστας ἢ ἀρχάς. *τίμημα* is a property qualification, *census*. See *Laws* 744 B—E.

§ 20 14 τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἵρεσιν] Thus described in *Laws* 756 B—F: 'The council shall consist of 360 members. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety councillors for each class. First all citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined (*πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων ἀπαντα φέρειν ἕξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ἡμιόσθαι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον τῇ δοξῇ ἡμίλη*). When the candidates have been elected some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner as on the previous day (*τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ φέρειν ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων κατὰ ταῦτά καθάπερ τῇ πρώτῃ*); and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote (*τρίτῃ δ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων φέρειν μὲν τὸν βουλόμενον, ἐκτάναγες δὲ εἶναι τοῖς τῶν τριῶν τιμημάτων*), but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and lowest class (*τετάρτῃ δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ συμπεράτου τιμηματος ἀπαντας*); they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished; he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple.' The number of candidates thus nominated is reduced

first, by election, to 180 of each class and next, by solicitation, to 90 from each class. The passage continues: 'On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny' these are to form the council for the year' (Dr Jowett's translation).

Plato's object is to give the numerically smaller and wealthier first and second classes not only then half of the senators, but also a preponderant influence in the return of the other half, which they will secure provided these are abstentions enough among the poorer citizens. It is obvious that Aristotle is referring to the proceedings of the first four days. What is the number returned from each class? (a) Grote thinks 360, *Plato* III. 363 n. 9. (β) Stallbaum, J. G. Schneider follow older editors in assuming it to be ninety, but omit to explain what takes place on the fifth day (γ) Mr Cope supposed that on each successive day each class voted for 90 candidates belonging to a given class, so that the abstentions of classes III and IV might, in the extreme case, reduce the roll of candidates published on the fifth day from 1440 to 1170 (360 + 360 + 270 + 180). Perhaps none of these suggestions is correct; the proceedings of the first four days are in reality a nomination of candidates, not an election; there is no limitation to the number of candidates nominated, each citizen presumably recording a vote, i.e. sending in one name. The votes recorded are taken down and published on the fifth day (*ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐνεχθῶσι, τοῦτους μὲν κατασημαίνεσθαι πέμπτη δὲ ἡμέρα τὰ κατασημασθέντα ὀνόματα ἐξερεκεῖν μὲν τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἰδὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πολιταῖς*). The voting on the fifth day is confined to these duly nominated candidates, and as 180 must be then selected from each class (*ἐκλέγεσθαι*) Plato appears to assume that more than that number will be nominated on each of the first four days.

αἰροῦνται μὲν κατὰ] For all are bound to elect from the first class, and then again equally [i.e. in like manner] from the second: and next from the third, save that it is not compulsory on all (to vote),

15 ται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης [ἀλλ'] ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμῆ- (III)
ματος, εἶτα πάλιν ἴσως ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων,
πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες, <ἀλλ'> ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμη-
μάτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου [τῶν τετάρτων] μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς
§ 21 πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις· εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἀφ' ἑκάστου τιμῆ-
10 ματος ἀποδείξει φησι δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ
§ 22 αἰρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπάναγκες. ὥς μὲν οὖν 13
οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-
την πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν καὶ τῶν ὑστερον ῥηθησομέ-
25 νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις·

15 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, from Plat. *Laws* VI, 765 B ff. Schmidt (and probably Ar.), ἐπ-
αναγκες Γ II Bk., [ἐπάναγκες] Schlosser Susem.¹ || [ἀλλ'] Madvig, ἀλλ' trans-
posed to 17 before ἢ Susem.¹; ἀλλὰ <πρῶτον> Lambin, πρῶτον Bender, 'as Muret
before him changed ἀλλ' into εἰ' (=go) || 16 ἴσως Nickses (Plato has κατὰ ταῦτά),
ἴσους Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ || τοῦ τρίτου Oncken || 17 [πλὴν] Madvig || οὐκ
[πᾶσιν] Bender || <ἀλλ'> ἢ Susem., ἢ Γ II Ar. Bk. Bender, πλὴν Gottling in his
edition and Madvig, ἢ Gottling in *Jenaer Lectioeskat.* 1855, εἶτα <δ'> ἐκ τῶν τρί-
των οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες <πλὴν ἀλλ'> ἢ τοῖς [ἐκ] τῶν τριῶν [ἢ] τιμημάτων, ἐκ τε κτλ
? Susem. Of course ἀλλ' ἢ or πλὴν would do just as well as πλὴν ἀλλ' ἢ || εἰτ'
ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πλὴν <ἀλλ'> οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢ τῶν τετάρτων τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων
<φέρειν μὴ βουλομένοις>· ἐκ δὲ κτλ Schmidt || εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες
πλὴν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριῶν· εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις Weldon || [ἐκ] Susem.
(Plato omits it) || τριῶν τιμημάτων Gottling *Jenaer Lectioeskat.* ut sup., from
Plato; τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων Γ II Ar. Bk., τριῶν [ἢ τετάρτων] Gottling in his edition,
Madvig; Engelhardt Spengel Bender and Jowett omit τρίτων ἢ || 18 [τῶν τε-
τάρτων] Engelhardt Bender Susem.; but [τοῦ τετάρτου] with Sylburg is perhaps as
good: τῶν τετάρτων Camot Sepulveda's mss. Vettori² (and a marginal note from his
own hand in the copy of his 1st edition in the Munich Library), τῶν τιμημάτων
Gottling in the *Jenaer Lectioeskat.* l. c. || ἐπάναγκες <ἢ> Schmidt || 20 δὲ Π¹
(emended by p¹) || [22 ὥς . 25 σκέψις] Schmidt, probably rightly, cp. u. (223) ||
23 οὐκ omitted by Π¹ (supplied by p¹) || μοναρχίας Heinicus Schmidt
|| <ολεσθαι> δὲ Schmidt || συνεστάναι Π¹ P² (1st hand) P² (corr.¹), συνιστάναι Π²
Bk. and P² (1st hand—altered by corr.¹) and P² (corr.¹), perhaps rightly || 24
<καὶ> ἐκ τούτων Schmidt

but only on those of the three (higher)
classes, and (in electing candidates) from
the fourth (class) it is compulsory only
on the first and second.

§ 21. 19 εἰτ' ἐκ τούτων κτλ.] More ac-
curately stated, there is *first* an election of
180 candidates belonging to each class out
of the larger number first returned, and in
a similar manner: *secondly*, a selection of
one half of these, 90 from each class, by
lot, to make up the whole number of 360.
Vide supra. SUSEM. (228)

20 ἔσονται δὴ κτλ.] Thus those who

belong to the highest classes and who are
superior men will be a majority (of the
voters); because through the absence of
compulsion some citizens of the popular
party will abstain from the election.

21 βελτίους] I.e. men who take a
higher interest in political life. So far,
then, even this oligarchical regulation
contains an aristocratic element. SUSEM.
(229)

§ 22 24 τῶν ὑστερον...σκέψις] γι(IV).
c. 7 and esp. cc. 8, 9, 11. SUSEM. (230)

25 ἐπιβάλλῃ=devolves (upon us). see

ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν (III)
αἵρετοὺς ἐπικίνδυνον. εἰ γὰρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέ-
τριον τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἵρεθήσονται βούλησιν.

7 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τοῦ IV
30 του ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· εἰς δὲ τινες πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄλλαι,
αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν, πᾶσαι (p. 31)
δὲ τῶν καθεστηκυῶν καὶ κατ' ἃς πολιτεύονται νῦν
ἐγγύτερόν εἰσι τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὔτε
τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος
35 κεκαينوτόμηκεν, οὔτε περὶ τὰ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν,
§ 2 ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονται μᾶλλον. δοκεῖ γάρ
τισι τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι [ἀναγκαῖον] μέγιστον τετά-
χθαι καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιείσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάν-
39 τας. διὸ Φαλλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τοῦτ' εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·

30 Krohn pronounces the whole of c. 6 as far as τῶσων to be spurious and of late origin, but see *Int.* p. 33 n. 4 and *Comm.* III, (213, 215) § 31 αἱ μὲν φιλοσόφων καὶ ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Spengel, αἱ μὲν ιδιωτῶν αἱ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν I Π Ar. Bk., αἱ μὲν ιδιωτῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων αἱ δὲ πολιτικῶν Piccart. See p. 80 || 37 ἀναγκαῖον erased by p¹, omitted by I² Ar. Bk., possibly a variant of μέγιστον || 39 Φαλλέας I², and so throughout || πρῶτον Q^b A¹. perhaps rightly, πρῶτως Piccart

on I. 13. 13 and 14ff. there given. A further use of the participle is seen in the Gortynian inscription lately found, οἱ ἐπιβάλλοντες=οἱ ἐπιβάλλει, the next of kin on whom certain obligations devolve. Cp. λεκτέον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα λόγον *De gen. athen.* I. 2. 1, 716 a 3; and *Pol.* VI(IV). 13 § 7 τὸ πόσον ἐπιβάλλει.

26 τὸ ἐξ αἵρετῶν αἵρετοῖς] 'it is unsafe to elect from a larger number previously elected.' This would be done in the election to the Council, and in the election of νομοφύλακες. First 300 were chosen, then out of these a hundred, and out of the hundred thirty-seven. It was partially so in the election of the Supreme Board of Control SUSEM. (281)

27 συστήναι] This apparently portends something like the wire-pullers and caucus of our day. Comp. VIII(V). 3. 9.

c. 7 Examination of the polity proposed by Phalaes. See *Analys.* p. 105.

§ 1 31 For the antithesis comp. I. 7. 5 πολιτεύονται ἢ φιλοσοφῶσιν, II. 12. 1 οὐκ ἐκωνώρησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ἄντωνον, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ιδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον. Pl. *Tim.* 19 κ τὸ δὲ τῶν σοφῶν γένος φοβέσθαι μὴ ἀστοχῶν ἅμα φιλοσόφων ἀνδρῶν ἢ καὶ πολιτικῶν.

33 τούτων ἀμφ.] that of the *Republic* and that of the *Law.*

35 συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν] Comp. 6 § 5 with n. (196); also n. (153) on 5 § 2 and (116) on I. 13. 9. SUSEM. (281 b)

36 τῶν ἀναγκαίων] the necessary considerations of every-day life as opposed to its luxuries or ornaments: practical requirements)(fanciful theories.

§ 2 37 μέγιστον τετάχθαι] The sentence is inverted, with τετάχθαι καλῶς take τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας; the infinitive clause so formed, τὸ περὶ ..τετάχθαι, is subject of δοκεῖ εἶναι μέγιστον. 'Some hold the right regulation of the relations of property to be of the utmost importance.' There has been no lack of representatives of this view. Apart from physiocrats old and new, we may refer to M. de Laveleye *Primitive Property* Preface xxvii—xxxi, also pp. 149, 158 ff., 223.

39 διὸ Φαλλέας...πρῶτος] From c. 8 § 1 (comp. Exc. II to B. II) it is clear that Phalaes was younger than Hippodamos: but if πρῶτος is the right reading, he must have come forward with his political scheme before Plato published either of his. This conjecture finds support in the apparent meagreness of his proposals, its lack of all finished execution as com-

- § 3 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο ²
 1266 b δὲ κατοικοιζομέναις μὲν εὐθύς οὐ χαλεπὸν ᾤετο ποιεῖν, τὰς
 δ' ἤδη κατοικουμένας ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάχιστα¹ ἂν
 ὁμαλίσθῃναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
 λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-
 § 4 νειν δέ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος
 6 ᾤετο δεῖν ἔάν, πλείον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίου εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-
 χίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-
 περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον.
 § 5 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λαυθάνειν τοὺς οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὃ λαυ- ³
 10 θάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάπτοντας πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν
 τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν ἔάν γὰρ ὑπεραίρη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγε-
 θος ὃ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθμὸς, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύεσθαι, καὶ χω-

1266 b 2 δ' ἤδη Γ, δὴ P¹ Π², δὲ M¹ Δ¹. || § 3 τὰς omitted by M¹ P¹, [τὰς] Sussem.¹
 perhaps rightly || § [Πλάτων...δ πρότερον] ? Sussem. The brackets are necessary if
 Schmidt is justified in rejecting 1265 b 21—26 (see Comm.) || 6 εἰν omitted by Π¹,
 [εἰν] Sussem.¹, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1359 f. || 9 μὴ Benda || 12 τὸν τε
 νόμον Bas.³, τὸν γενόμενον M¹ U¹

pared with the Platonic schemes (comp. *ibid.* 1255, 1256 on § 3, 4). According to Aristotle's account, Phaleas thought there was no more to be done when once he had demanded an equal division of the land into inalienable and indivisible lots, and the preservation of this equality by a uniform education which is not more minutely described, and when he had recommended the degradation of artisans to the position of public slaves. He had nothing to say about the size or number of these lots, about moveable property, or in fact hardly anything else. The spirit and tendency of these proposals strongly suggest the idea expressed by Bockh *Staats-haushaltung der Ath.* I. p. 65 and Roehke *Thukydides* p. 247 that they concealed a practical aim: that he wanted to restore, in his Dorian native town especially, the old aristocracy of well-born landholders. Henkel *Studien* p. 165 further remarks in support of this view that popular rule found its way first into Byzantium, B.C. 390, and thence to Chalcedon, under the influence of the reviving strength of the Athenian Demos: Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 8. 27, Theopompus *Ἱστ.* 65 in Athenaeus XII 526 D. At the same time, he adds, it must be remembered that the absence from Phaleas' scheme of the warlike spirit of a chivalrous aristocracy, and his silence as regards everything military, are great

hindrances to this hypothesis. SUSSEM. (232)

§ 3 1266 b 1 εὐθύς should be taken with the participle.

¹ τάχιστα] The expedient of modern writers for bringing about this much desired equality is limitation of the right of bequest.

§ 4 6 εἰν = *laissez faire*
 8 καὶ πρότερον] 6 § 15 n. (213).

Hence if that § be bracketed the same suspicion attaches to this one. SUSSEM. (233)

§ 5 9 δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ κατὰ] This remark was made before, § 10—13, cp. n. (210). It is strange that Aristotle does not refer back to that passage. SUSSEM. (234)

11 ὑπεραίρη = exceed, i.e. above. 'If the number of children becomes too great for the size of the property.'

12 ἀνάγκη λύεσθαι] Schlosser thinks this remark unfounded, because Phaleas is only speaking of landed property, as Aristotle says himself, § 21. And he reminds us of the custom in some parts of Germany where only one child (the eldest, or the youngest, or any one whom the father chooses) succeeds to the real estate and provides portions for the rest at a fair valuation. But he should have reflected that Phaleas Plato Aristotle all alike exclude the sons of citizens from engaging in any trade. SUSSEM. (235)

ρὶς τῆς λύσεως φαῦλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένντας (IV)
 § 6 ἔργον γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιούς εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν
 15 οὖν ἔχει τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἢ τῆς οὐ-
 σίας ὁμαλότητος, καὶ τῶν πάσαις τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνώσκότες, οἷον
 καὶ Σόλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἔστι νόμος ὃς κωλύει
 κτᾶσθαι γῆν ὅσην ἂν βούληται τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
 οὐσίαν πωλεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Δοκροῖς νόμος
 20 ἐστὶ μὴ πωλεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φανεράν ἀτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβη-
 § 7 κῦϊαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασφάζειν (τοῦτο δὲ λυ-
 θὲν καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
 αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συνέβαιεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρισμένων τιμημᾶ- (p. 26)
 των εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν)· ἀλλ' ἔστι τὴν ἰσότητα μὲν 5

18 ὁπόσην Ald. Bk., ὁπόσην or ὅσην Δι., ὁπόσην P²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b U^b § 19 οἱ νόμοι] ἐκείνοι Bucheler, probably right || 24 ἔστι] εἰς τὸ P²⁻⁴ U^b Ar. Ald. and P² (1st hand, γρ. ἔστι corr.³ in the margin), εἰς Q^b T^b

χωρὶς=quite apart from the violation of the law, it is a defect that many citizens should decline from wealth to poverty Comp. § 3, χωρὶς ἀπὸ. .

13 φαῦλον κτλ] Comp. 6 § 13 n. and IV(vii), 16 § 15 ff n. (946). SUSEX. (238)

14 ἔργον to be taken as b 2 ἐργωδέστερον 'it is hard for such people not to encourage sedition.' In III. 15. 8 also ἔργον ἐστὶ=it is improbable, in the same way as μόλις 'with difficulty' comes to mean 'hardly ever.'

§§ 6, 7 The influence which equality of possessions must exercise upon civil society was recognized (1) by Solon's legislation, (2) by laws which fix a limit to the accumulation of landed property, (3) by the law of Locri which forbids the sale of land, (4) by a law of entail, as at Leucas, where the disuse of the law altered the constitution to an advanced democracy.

Yet the rise of properties needs regulation, if, when equalized, they are not to be overlarge or over-small.

Compare c. 12 § 10 (Philolaos at Thebes), VII(vi) 4. 9 (the Aphytneans and Oxylos in Elis), VIII(v) 7. 9 (Thurii). See further Laveleye op. c. pp. 161—165 Eng. trans., A. Lang Essay XIII, esp. p. 89; 'all attempts to restrict the sale of land and to keep it parcelled out in small lots may be taken as survivals of early custom.' An early equal distribution (Maine's *Village Communities* p. 81), perhaps a periodic redistribution, was a tradition to the early lawgivers of Greece. Long after them Phalcos, and Plato in

the *Laos*, 744 κ, desire a return to the old usage.

διότι μὲν ὁμαλότης] At this point then Aristotle's own socialism begins to come out more clearly than before. See notes on § 7 (158), § 15 (166); 6 §§ 10—14 (208—211), and 7 § 5 (234). Further comp n. (192) and *ἡμεῖς* p. 33. SUSEX. (238 b)

17 Like the law of Oxylos prohibiting mortgage, VII(vi) 4. 9, Solon's *σεισάχθεια*, or relief measure, restored mortgaged lands to their proprietors. γῆ μέλαινα τῆς ἐγὼ ποτὶ | ὄρουσι ἀφείλον πανταχοῦ πεπηγότας | τὸ πρόσθε δουλεύουσα νῦν δ' ἐλευθέρη. His graduated assessment must also have tended somewhat to equality. But in addition to this Schomann, *Antiquities* p. 330 Eng. tr., and Curtius, *Hist.* i. 329 Eng. tr., represent Solon as enacting a special law, that there should be a maximum limit to the acquisition of landed property: Grote (III. 182) thinks no such inference borne out by the present passage.

παρ' ἄλλοις] It is not known where.

19 ἐν Δοκροῖς] Presumably the Epizephrian Locri, where Zaleucus was legislator, c. 12 § 6.

§ 7 22 καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα] Cp. VII(vi) 4. 9 ἦν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι νεωμοθετημένων μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξέσθαι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους with notes, and on the custom at Sparta, c. 9 § 14 n. (300). SUSEX. (237)

24 ἀλλ' ἔστι μὲν κτλ] But then there may be equality of possessions and

25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτην δὲ ἢ λίαν εἶναι πολλήν, ὥστε (IV)
 τρυφᾶν, ἢ λίαν ὀλίγην, ὥστε ξὴν γλίσχρους. δῆλον οὖν ὡς
 οὐχ ἱκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ
 § 8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτι δ' εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειεν
 οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος μάλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας
 30 ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένους
 ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλάας ὅτι α
 ταῦτα τυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἶεται γὰρ δυοῖν τούτοις ἰσό-
 τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας.
 § 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἔσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν
 35 εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὄφελος· ἔστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν
 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἧς ἔσονται
 προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ-
 § 10 φότερων, ἐπεὶ στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά τῆς
 κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν, τούναντίον δὲ περὶ
 40 ἑκάτερον (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνι-
 1267 a σον, οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, εἰς ἴσας· ὅθεν καὶ
 εἰν δὲ ἢ τιμῇ ἢ μὲν κακὸς ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐσθλός),

27 ποιῆσαι ἔσται Γ apparently || 28 τάξει M¹ P¹ || 31 ἂν εἴποιεν M¹, εἴποι ἂν P²⁻⁴ Q¹ T¹ U¹ Ald. Bk. and a later hand in P², εἴποιεν P² (1st hand) || 38 ἐπεὶ .. 1267 a 17 πολτελείας = 1267 a 37 ἐστι... b 13 ἐπεί. See the text arranged in parallel columns *Introd.* p. 80 f. || ἐπεὶ Spengel, ἐτι Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, ἐτι ? Susem. || 39 διὰ τὴν omitted by M¹, διὰ by P¹

1267 a 1 δ' M¹ P¹⁻²⁻³ Ald. || καὶ omitted by Γ and M¹ (1st hand)

yet the equal shares of citizens may be either immoderately large or excessively small

26 γλίσχρους] stingily, 'so as barely to make a living.' Demosth. c. *Arist.* 689, 25 ὡς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα (δημοσίᾳ οἰκοδομεῖται), c. *Pant.* γλίσχρους καὶ μόλις; Plato *Rep.* VII 553 c γλίσχρους καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν φειδόμενοι καὶ ἐργαζόμενοι, i.e. frugally and gradually, by saving and working

28 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον] See this more precisely defined in c. 6 §§ 8, 9; IV (VII). 5 § 1, with the notes; also VI (IV). 11 § 2 ff., as quoted in n. (207). SUSEM. (287 b)

§§ 8, 9 Men's desires need to be regulated no less than the amount of their property: this Phalaes must admit, as he holds that there should be a public education, though he does not give a detailed scheme. Crime springs from ill-regulated desires (a) for the necessities of life, (b) for its superfluities, and for the gratification of the passions generally,

(c) for higher gratifications. Phalaes can only cure the minor social evils due to (a), but not the ambitious wishes which produce a tyrant.

30 τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ.] Compare with what follows 5 § 15 n. (165 b); see further on 9 § 12 n. (206) and Exc. II on Bk. II p. 333. SUSEM. (288)

36 ἐξ ἧς = ὥστε ἐκ ταύτης.

§ 10 38 στασιάζουσιν] Cp. VIII (V). I. II πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνίσον ἢ στάσις.

40 This opposition of οἱ χαρίεντες, the educated or enlightened classes, to the mass of ordinary men recurs in *Nic. Eth.* I 5 §§ 3, 4. They are joined with πρακτικοί, in *Pol.* VII (VI). 5. 10 with νοῦν ἔχοντες.

1267 a 1 εἰς ἴσας sc. αἱ κτήσεις.

2 Homer *Iliad* IX. 319. SUSEM. (289) The exclamation of Achilles, as one of the nobles, at the levelling policy which he attributes to Agamemnon.

- § 11 οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν, ὧν ἄκος (IV) εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητά τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε μὴ λωποδυτεῖν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν· ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω ἔχωσιν ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν
- § 12 ταύτης ἰατρείαν ἀδικήσουσιν, οὐ τοῖνον διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα-^s
- 10 χεῖα καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνη· τρίτον δ', εἴ τινας δύναιτο δι' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ
- § 13 φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. αἱ γὰρ ἅλλαι ἀνθρώπων δέονται. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσιν γὰρ τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, οἷον τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ῥιγῶσιν (διὸ καὶ

3 θ' Susem.², δ' Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.^{1,2} in the text || 8 ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν or ἀνεπιθυμητοί (cp. Clem. Al. *Strom.* VII. p. 742. A. B.) Bojesen, ἀν ἐπιθυμοῦν Γ II Ar. Bk., ἀν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν? Schneider following Lambin's translation, Bernays omits the words || 11 δύναιτο] βούλουτο P¹ II² Ar. Bk. perhaps rightly || αὐτῶν P¹, αὐτῶν Γ M² P^{2,3,4} Ald. || 12 ἐπεὶ II Ar. Bk.; ἐτι οἱ ἐπεὶ <δ'> Rasso. Then the apodosis begins with ὥστε. William does not translate ἐπεὶ: hence [ἐπεὶ] and ἀδικοῦσιν δὲ Susem.^{1,2} erroneously for ἀδικοῦσιν γὰρ

§ 11 Shilleto pointed out that these three causes of crime strongly resemble those which are mentioned in *Rhet.* I. 12. 17 ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς τ' εἰς ἀναγκαῖα ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν, whence see Cope's note.

6 ἐὰν γὰρ μείζω] sc. τῆς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιθυμίας 'Foi if the desire goes beyond the necessities of life.' Compare *Nic. Eth.* VII. 4. 2 1147 b 23 ff. ἔστω τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ποιοῦντων ἡδονῆν, (viz. τὰ σωματικά, e.g. τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν,) τὰ δ' αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ ἔχοντα δ' ὑπερβολὴν; these are οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα; πλεον, τιμῆ, πλοῦτος are examples: and VII. 14. 2 1154 a 15 ff. τῶν δὲ σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστω ὑπερβολή, καὶ ὁ φιλοσ τῷ δυνάμει τὴν ὑπερβολὴν (sc. φιλοσ) ἔστω, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ἀναγκαῖας (Compare). SUSEM. (240)

§ 12 8 ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 12. 2 1152 b 36 ff. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδοναί, οἷον αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαι: X. 3. 7 1173 b 16 ff. δύναιτο γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ τε μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀσθητικῶν αἱ διὰ τῆς σοφίης, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ καὶ ὁράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. Taken from Plato *Phil.* 51 B—52 B where occur αἱ περὶ τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν αἱ πλείστα, καὶ αἱ τῶν φθόνων, also αἱ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδοναί. (Eaton.) SUSEM. (241)

One could hardly have supposed that this last was a fruitful source of crime.

9 ἄκος] Here is a digression into the region of practical suggestions and expedients, in the same spirit as VII(VI). c. 5, VIII(V). cc 8, 9.

10 ἐργασία] constant employment σωφροσύνη] Cp. II (206 b) on 6 § 9. SUSEM. (242)

Here this word means self-restraint generally, and not thrift, as before.

11 παρὰ φιλοσοφίας] As in 5 § 15, 'culture.' The education of the citizens and the elevation of the masses are the leading ideas of B. V(VIII).

12 αἱ γὰρ ἅλλαι sc. ἡδοναί. ἀνθρώπων δέονται] Compare *Nic. Eth.* X. 7. 4 1177 b 27 ff. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων..., τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις viz. τοῖς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίοις, ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δικαίως δέεται πρὸς οὐδὲ δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν. . ὁμοιᾶ ἀταρτέστατος: IX. 4. 5 1166 a 26 f. (Eaton.) SUSEM. (243)

§ 13 14 τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἵνα μὴ p.] 'It is not to keep out the cold that men become tyrants' Cp. *Nic. Eth.* V. 6. 7 1134 b 6 ff. μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος <ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἄπὸρ δικαίος>, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας' ὅψω δὲ μὴ ἱκανὰ τὰ

15 αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ὧν ἀποκτείνῃ τις οὐ κλέπτῃν ἀλλὰ (IV)
 τύραννον). ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον
 § 14 ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἔτι τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται α
 κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,
 δεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειννιώντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.
 20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολε-
 § 16 μικρὴν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἧς ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν εἴρηκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως. δεῖ γάρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς
 χρήσεις ἱκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν κιν-
 δύνους· διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δεῖ πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὧν οἱ
 25 πλεῖστον καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν
 οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιόντας, οὐθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε μὴ δύ-
 § 16 νασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἴσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκεῖ- 10
 νος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, [δ'] τί
 συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἴσως οὖν ἀριστος ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσι-

17 ἔτι τὰ . . 37 πολιτορίας transposed by Susem. to follow b 13 ἐστὶν ἢ δὲ
 κατασκευάζεσθαι Susem.¹ wrongly from William, <φ> λέει κατασκευάζεσθαι? Schmidt,
 βούλεται κατασκευάζεσθαι? Susem.², but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1365, βουλεύεται
 κατασκευάζειν M¹ || 20 ἀρα? Koraes, but see Dittenberger *l. c.* || 24 ὧν
 ὥστε Spengel, but see Vahlen *Αἰτίαι*. *Antistates* II. p. 21 (Wiener Sitzungsber., phil-
 hist. Cl. LXXII. p. 23) || 25 ἐπιθυμοῦσιν P¹, ἐπιθυμοῖ M¹ || ἀμύνεσθαι Ridgeway
 || 26 οὐθ' <οὐσίαν>? Schmidt, but κτήσιν can be understood from what precedes ||
 28 [δὲ... b 13 ἐστὶν] Bender, [δὲ] 37 πολιτορίας Susem.², probably ight: see
 Comm. || τί Coming, δ τι Stahr Susem.¹ in the text, δτι Γ Π Ar. Bk., φ τι
 Lindau. Bender retains δτι and suggests πλῆθος <τι>

τοιαῦτα, οὗτοι γίνονται τύραννοι: IV. i. 42,
 1122 a 3 ff.: meanness is shown in petty
 gains,—those who take on a large scale,
 despots who plunder cities and not tem-
 ples, are called πορῆοι, ἀρεβέες, δδικοί, but
 not mean, ἀνελύθεροι (Eaton). SUSEM.
 (244)

διδ] The crime is greater because the
 excuse is less: it is not διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα.
 Hence the higher reward given to those
 who punish it.

§ 14 19 δὲ δὲ κατὰ] The same citi-
 cism as was passed on the *Λαῶν*, 6 § 7.
 That the constitution must necessarily
 have reference to the maintenance of the
 military force follows directly from the
 assumption of the military régime which
 Plato and Aristotle make without reserve.
 Cp. again VII (VI). 6. §§ 1—5.

— § 16 24 πλῆθος sc. τῆς κτήσεως. ὧν =
 ὥστε τοῦτων; as ἐξ ἧς, § 9.

25 οἱ πλεῖστον = οἱ πέντας, *Rhet.* I. 5.

17 where see Cope's note.

ἀμύνειν τοὺς ἐπιόντας may perhaps

be defended by Plato *Γραμμ.* 260 n
 πολέμους ἀμύνειν. But see *Critical Notes*.

27 πόλεμον ὁμοίων] to support a
 war even with an equal or similar power,
 ἴσοι καὶ ὅμοιοι = a state of the same stand-
 ing, an equal

§ 16 We should not fail to decide
 what limit to property is advisable.

28 δὲ δὲ κατὰ] This limitation has been
 sufficiently noticed in the preceding § 15,
 yet the repetition might be justified, if it
 now appeared under a new form, much
 sharper and better defined. This would
 not be the case unless the second expla-
 nation of 29 ἴσων οὖν κατὰ, as given in the
 next note, were correct. But, as is there
 shown, this can hardly be accepted. That
 being so, there is certainly then fairly
 good reason to suspect, with Bender, that
 it is now appended solely for the purpose
 of introducing the anecdote about Eubu-
 los. SUSEM. (246)

29 ἴσων οὖν... 31 οὐσίαν] 'Perhaps
 the best limit of wealth is that its excess

30 τελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλ' (I)
 § 17 οὕτως ὡς ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οἶον Εὐβου-
 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ-
 σεν αὐτόν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χωρίον,
 λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν δαπάνην· ἐθέλειν γὰρ ἔλατ-
 35 τον τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλείπειν ἤδη τὸν Ἀταρνέα· ταῦτα δ' εἰ-
 πὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννονον γενόμενον παύσα-
 § 18 σθαι τῆς πολιορκίας. || ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 11

34 ἐθέλειν δεῖν Γ? (*debere* William) || 35 ἐκλείπειν Π² Bk. || 37 ἔστι μὲν .b 8
 ἀδικοῦνται, with which goes b 9 οὐ ... 13 ἐστίν, is believed by Susem. to be another
 recension of the preceding 1266 b 38 ἐπεὶ .. 1267 a 17 πολιορκίας. See *Introd.* p. 81

should not make it profitable for the stronger to attack us, but should leave them no motive for so doing which they would not have had, even if our possessions had been less.' The ellipse may be filled up thus, ἀλλ' οὕτως πολεμεῖν λυσιτελεῖν ὡς ἂν ἐπολέμησαν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων, i.e. τῶν ἡττόνων, τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. Our wealth should never tempt aggression. we should then only be exposed to the same attacks as a poorer state in our place. That is, we should aim at being the 'lean wiry dogs' with whom their neighbours are glad to make common cause against 'fat and tender sheep'. *Republic* IV 423 D.

A less simple rendering has been proposed: 'that is the best limit of wealth when a stronger power does not find it profitable to make war upon us for the sake of the excess of the booty to be gained over the costs of victory, but when (even if it conquers us) it is no better off than if it had not made so great an acquisition.' This suits the sequel better, but somewhat strains the meaning of *ὑπερβολὴν* and *οὐσίαν*, besides leaving a harsh genitive absolute. ἀλλ' οὕτως συμφέρειν ὡς ἂν συνέφερε μὴ ἐχόντων (τῶν κρείττωνων) τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. It can hardly be right.

§ 17 During the last years of Artaxerxes Mnemon and at the commencement of the reign of Artaxerxes Ochus, the confusion in Asia Minor, more particularly owing to the revolt of Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia Lydia and Paphlagonia, suggested the idea of wresting a part of the Hellenic lands on the coast of Asia from the Persians. The requisite means for effecting this were secured, and it was even possible to maintain the severance. Eubulos was a Bithynian by birth, a money-changer, i.e. banker, by trade, and at the same time *ἀνὴρ φιλόσο-*

φος, i.e. probably one of Plato's scholars, like his freedman and successor Hermias. Through the medium of his business he found he could execute such a scheme as this, and make himself absolute ruler (*τύραννος*) of Atarneus on the Aeolic coast of Mysia, and of the stronghold of Assos in the Troad with the adjacent districts: *Vita Aristotelis* in Westermann's *Bioῦράφαι* p. 402, Suidas s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης, Ἐρμίας, Strabo XIII. 610. Bockh (*Hermias of Atarneus in his Ges. K. Schriften* VI. 183 ff.) tries to show, as others have done, that this event happened before 359 B.C.; that in 359 Autophadates as general of the Persian king marched against Artabazos and took him prisoner, and that in the course of this same campaign he laid siege to Atarneus. The suggestion by which Eubulos raised the siege is, as Bockh remarks, one worthy of a banker. We know that he maintained his power down to his death, also that it was not before 345/44 that his successor, the eunuch Hermias, Aristotle's friend (see I. 6. 9. n. 56) was overthrown by the Rhodian Mentor, the Persian commander-in-chief, and that solely by stratagem deceit and treachery. SUSEM. (247)

Bergk's posthumous paper *On the chronology of King Artaxerxes III, Ochus, in Rhein. Mus.* XXXVII. 1882. pp. 355—362 fixes the fall of Hermias and the escape of Aristotle and Xenocrates to Mitylene (and thence to Athens) in the year 345/44. Comp. Susemihl in Bursian's *Jahresber.* XXX 1882. pp. 4—7

36 σύννονον γενέσθαι, to become thoughtful, to reflect.

That §§ 18—20 are parallel to §§ 10—13 has been explained *Introd.* p. 80 f.

§ 18 37 ἔστι μὲν .. 38 πολιορκίας] Comp. line 3 ὡς ἄκος.. 4 οὐσίαν.

τὰς οὐσίας ἴσας εἶναι τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν (IV. πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὥς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ
 40 χαρίεντες ἀναγκαστοῖεν [ἀν] ὥς οὐκ ἴσων ὄντες ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ
 § 19 φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ'
 1267 ἢ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἰκα-
 νὸν διωβολία μόνον, ὅταν δ' ἤδη τοῦτ' ἢ πάτριον, αἰεὶ δέον-
 ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἕως εἰς ἀπειρον ἔλθωσιν. ἀπειρος γὰρ ἢ
 τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ
 § 20 ὥσων. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχή, μᾶλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμα- 18
 6 λίζειν, τὸ τοὺς μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιούτους παρασκευά- 19
 ζειν ὥστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους ὥστε μὴ
 δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἤττους τε ᾧσι καὶ μὴ ἀδικῶν-
 § 21 ται. || οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας εἴρηκεν. περὶ
 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἰσάζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δούλων

§ 8 ἴσας after εἶναι II³ Bk., perhaps Γ; possibly 1187 || 40 ἂν II³ Bk., omitted by II¹

1267 b 5 ἀρχή is corrupt: ἀκῆ Scaliger, ἀκος Schneider, ἀρωγή M. Vermehren, ἀλκή? Madvig probably right, <ἀπαλλαγῆς> or <λατρείας> ἀρχή Schmidt; ἀρεῖς Koraes, certainly not right

§ 8 πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν recalls στασιάζουσι of § 10.

§ 9 οὐ μὴν μέγα κτλ.] a 16 ὥστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας κτλ.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν κτλ.] "For even then (ἐὰν ἴσαι αἱ κτῆσαι, § 10) the higher classes would be discontented, as they lay claim to something more than an equal share, and hence are often found aggressive and factious."

40 οὐκ ἴσων] ἀλλὰ πλείονος· on the ground that they deserve something more than an equal share, something proportionately greater. Comp. III 13, 13 and Thuc. VIII. 89. 4 πάντες γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὸν πρῶτος αὐτὰς ἕκαστος εἶναι. In Thuc. I. 132 § 2 μὴ ἴσοι = superioi.

§ 19 1267 b 2 διωβολία] This refers to the so-called θεωρικόν, a grant of public money to provide for shows or public amusements introduced at Athens after Pericles' time. In the first instance at those festivals only at which plays were exhibited, the sum of two obols, the price of an ordinary seat in the theatre, was paid from the state-chest to the lessee of the theatre for every citizen present. (Every one who went to the theatre received a counter which he gave up on going in; the lessee collected from the state the two obols for every counter; but

he had to pay a rent out of his receipts and to keep the theatre in repair. See Benndorf *Bestiage in Zeitschrift f. d. ost. Gymn.* XXVI. 1875 p. 23 ff.) Subsequently the poorer citizens received the like dole for all the other festivals, and these outgoings swallowed up no small part of the revenues. See Boeckh *Public Econ. of Athens* p. 217 Eng. tr., Schoemann *Antiquities* I p. 341, p. 438 ff. Eng. tr. An Attic obol = 1/3d. of our money, a little more than five farthings, or 11 German Pfennige: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 172. SUBEM. (248)

4 ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν κτλ.] Comp. a 5 ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν. § 20 ὁ τὸ τοὺς μὲν .. γὰρ πλεονεκτεῖν] Substantially the same remedy as in § 12 τῶν δ' ἐλ τινος... ἀκος.

§ 21 The argument from inconsistency is pressed from opposite sides here and in 6 § 15. Phalaes must have meant to include personal property, § 3.

10 ἐστι δὲ καὶ δοῦλων κτλ.] Comp. *Rhet.* I. 5. 7 πλοῦτον δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πληθεῖ, γῆς χωρίων κτήσιν, ἐτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσιν καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων, where Cope explains ἐνιπλά as "moveables" opposed to fixities, such as houses and land. Hence furniture, even if of bronze, Xen. *Oecon.* IX. 6, Thuc. III. 68.

καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίματος, καὶ κατασκευῇ (IV)
 πολλῇ τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων· ἡ πάντων οὖν τούτων ἰσό-
 § 22 τητα ζητητέον ἡ τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, ἡ πάντα ἐατέον. φαί- 13
 νεται δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τὴν πόλιν μι-
 15 κράν, εἴ γ' οἱ τεχνῖται πάντες δημόσιοι ἔσονται καὶ μὴ
 § 23 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἴπερ δεῖ δη-
 μοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους, δεῖ καθάπερ ἐν
 Ἐπιδάμῳ τε, καὶ Διόφαντός ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήνησι,
 τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον.
 10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἄν
 τις θεωρήσειεν, εἴ τι τυγχάνει καλῶς εἰρηκῶς ἡ μὴ κα-
 8 λῶς Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφώντος Μιλήσιος, δς καὶ τὴν τῶν V

16 δεῖ] δὴ P^b Q^b T^b U^b L^a A¹. Ald. and P^a (1st hand, emended by coir.¹) ||
 17 δεῖ] καὶ with a comma after 16 εἴπερ Bernays; if so, ἐργαζομένους <μύνοι>
 Susem.; probably right, but see Comm. The same sense can be obtained by Well-
 don's punctuation εἴπερ δεῖ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δεῖ, καθάπερ
 provided ὡς be inserted after 18 τε καὶ || 18 ὡς inserted by Morel Bk. before Διό-
 φαντος, omitted by II; the translations of William and Ar. are no wariant that they
 had ὡς in their mss. || 21 τῇ τις II³ || 22 [δς .. 28 βουλόμενος] Congreve; the
 passage had been suspected by Fulleborn. See Comm.

§ 22 15 δημόσιοι=public servants. Such were the executioners and physicians always (see III. 11. 11 δημοῦργοι=iatres); also ναυπηγοὶ and others, Plato *Gorg.* 455 b with Dr Thompson's note, *Politeia* 259 A.

16 πλήρωμά τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως] Exactly Plato's expression *Rep.* 371 ε πληρωμα δὴ πόλεως ἐστὶ καὶ μισθωτοὶ (Eaton). SUSEM. (248)

Comp. III. 13. 13, VI(IV). 4. 12.

§ 23 17 ἐν Ἐπιδάμῳ κατ.] "No one but a political dreamer or dreamy politician like Phaleas could hatch the thought that the handicrafts throughout the city should be carried on by public slaves. The proposal made at Athens by Diophantos, we do not know when, was that only the artisans who worked for the community were to be public slaves"; Boeckh *Syllab.* I. 65. [not in the Eng. trans.] This was certainly the case at Epidamnus. With the present text this sense can only be obtained by interpreting the words τὸν τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους to mean 'those who do common work for the whole community'; and we should be forced to assume that even Phaleas' proposal went no further than this, which is very improbable. Hence the alteration

suggested by Bernays is tempting. The archon of the year Ol. 96, 2=395/4 was named Diophantos, but he can hardly have been the man. "Aelian relates that the people of Epidamnus allowed any one who liked to settle amongst them as a resident, Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἐπιδημεῖν καὶ μετακεῖν παρέχον τῷ βουλομένῳ: V. H. III. 16" (J. G. Schneider). But this fact throws no light on the passage. On the constitution of Epidamnus see further III. 16 § 1, VIII(V). I § 10, 4 § 7 *ms.* SUSEM. (249)

Bernays renders: "But if (this proposal is to be tried), state-slaves ought only to be employed upon works for state objects, and the arrangement must be made as it is found in Epidamnus and as Diophantos wanted to introduce it at Athens."

c. 8 Examination of the scheme of Hippodamos of Miletus. This chapter is analysed p. 105 f.

§ 1 22 Ἰππόδαμος] See Excursus II to B. II p. 331 ff.; also K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo Milesio* (Munich 1841). SUSEM. (250)

This chapter is treated slightly by Hildenbrand pp. 58-61, Oncken I. 213-218, Henkel 162-165. See also

πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὔρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος (V)
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως
25 ὥστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζῆν περιεργότερον τριχῶν τε πλήθει
καὶ κόμης, ἔτι δὲ ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλευνῆς δὲ οὐκ
ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινούς χρό-
νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλούμενος,
§ 2 εἰπεὶν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει α
31 μὲν μυρίαδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην· ἐποίει γὰρ
ἔν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἔν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-
§ 3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ἑπ' αὐτῷ ἔχον. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη <καὶ> τὴν

23 περαιᾶ (not παραιᾶ as Susem.¹ gave) P^{2.3.4} Q^b T^b (?) U^b || 26 κόμης κόσμω
πολυτελεῖ II² Ar. Bk. Bernays and γρ. p¹ in the margin, καλλωπιεῖται Bender,
κόσμω Ridgeway, κοσμήσας Weldon || 27 ἐτι δὲ omitted by T^b Sepulveda's codices
Bender Ridgeway Weldon, ἐπ' Bernays || 28 λόγος P^{2.3.4} T^b, σπουδαῖος W^b L^a
Ar. Ald. || 32 μὲν omitted by M^a Q^b || 33 τὰ L^a and U^b (corr.), τὸ M^a P^{1.2.3.4}
Q^b T^b Ald. and U^b (1st hand) || <καὶ> τὴν Schmidt

M. Erdmann *On Hippodamos and symmetrical town architecture in Greece in Philologus* XLII. 1883 pp. 193—227.

22 ὅς καὶ 28 βουλούμενος] Fullborn remarked long since: "every reader must be struck with one strange thing in this introductory notice by Aristotle, viz. the picture he draws of Hippodamos. With what object has he preserved for posterity these proofs of the man's vanity and effeminacy? Do they serve to explain the spirit of his work? I doubt it." And Congreve, who rightly holds that this description would be more consistent with Theophrastus than with Aristotle, suggests that here we may reasonably suspect a later hand. SUSEM. (262)

23 κατέτεμεν] cut out, i.e. laid out the streets, Pindar *Pyth.* 5. 84 εὐθέτομον κατέθηκε...σχυρῶν δῶν.

25 ζῆν περιεργότερον] was held to be somewhat affected in his way of life.

In the following words ἐσθῆτος must be taken with πλήθει according to the reading of II² adopted in the text. It is plausible to make it depend upon some word like κόσμω, the reading of II² (so Ridgeway, who quotes Aeschyl. *Supp.* 246 for κόσμος, meaning fashion or style of dress), or possibly καλλωπιεῖται or κοσμήσας, which are the conjectures of Bender and Weldon respectively.

τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ κόμῃς] In Sparta it remained the custom, on account of war and warlike exercises, to wear long

hair from the time of entering upon the military age. But at Athens from early times it became the practice to cut the hair upon attaining the full age for civic rights and to wear it short from that time onwards. Not to do so passed for vanity, foppishness, dandyism. The orator Hagesippos, a contemporary and supporter of Demosthenes, was on this account nicknamed Κρωβάλλος or Top-knot. The knights alone are said to have kept the privilege of wearing long hair: μὴ φθονεῖθ' ἡμῶν κομῶσι, Aristoph. *Knights* 580. See Becker *Charakter* III. 233 ff. ed. 2, Eng. trans. pp. 453—55. SUSEM. (261)

26 εὐτελοῦς] of cheap material, though warm.

28 λόγιος] a man of learning, as in IV(VII). 10 3 and often in Herodotus (Congreve). Suidas calls him μετρωσάλογος

§ 2 30 τὴν πόλιν] Oncken I. 214 n. (1) takes this to mean that in the 10,000 are included not the citizens only but the entire free population. But according to the design of Hippodamos § 7, not merely those who bear arms but also the artisans and husbandmen are to be citizens, although it must be conceded to Aristotle's criticism §§ 8—12, that his end could hardly have been attained in such a manner. SUSEM. (258)

§ 3 33 διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη κτλ] So too Aristotle IV(VII). cc. 9, 10. (Eaton.) Cp. n. (365) on II. 10 § 8. SUSEM. (264)

χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν τὴν δ' ἰδίαν ὅθεν (V)
 35 μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ἱερὰν, ἀφ' ὧν
 δ' οἱ προπολεμούντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν
 4 ἰδίαν. ᾧτο δ' εἶδη καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνον περὶ
 ὧν γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, § (p. 41)
 ὕβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν
 40 τῷ κύριον, εἰς δὲ πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί-
 σθαι δοκούσας δίκας· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκευάζεν ἐκ τινῶν γε-
 3 ῥόντων αἰρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ
 ψηφοφορίας ᾧτο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον πι-
 νάκιον, ἐν ᾧ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς [τὴν δίκην], εἰ

35 ἱερὰ P³ Q³ T³ L³ and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || 37 δὲ καὶ εἶδη I
 apparently, possibly right || 40 δεῖ I¹

1268 a 2 ᾧτο omitted by W³ L³ Ald., in P⁴ inserted in the margin || 3 κατα-
 δικάζει P¹ and 1st hand of P²⁻³ (emended by corr.¹) || τὴν δίκην omitted by Π¹

35 ἀφ' ὧν δ' κατ.] Here there is just
 a germ of Plato's ideal state, when we
 consider that the soldiers answer to the
 second order, and the artisans and far-
 mers together to the third order of citi-
 zens in the *Republic*. However even when
 viewed in this light the differences be-
 tween the two schemes are as great as
 the resemblances. But the state proposed
 in the *Laws* may be described as hardly
 anything more than an improved working
 out of Phalaris' ideal. Comp. L. Stein
op. c. p. 162 f. SUSEM. (285)

§ 4 37 ᾧτο κατ.] See Exc. II. to
 B. II p. 333 f. SUSEM. (285 b)

ὕβριν and βλάβην answer to crimes
 against the person and against property.
 Not precisely however; for ὕβριν implies
 insult; it is whatever wounds the feelings
 or honour, whether accompanied by vio-
 lence or not. Whereas βλάβην implies
 loss or damage sustained, whether to per-
 son or property. See *Rhet.* I. 12. 26, II.
 2. 5 with Cope's excellent comments.

39 ἐνομοθέτει δὲ.] This idea of a
 court of appeal is further evidence that
 Hippodamos had a fine sense for juris-
 prudence. It is appropriated by Plato
 also *Laws* VI 767 C—E, XII 956 c f.
 (Oncken). Cp. also Exc. II. SUSEM.
 (286)

40 τὸ κύριον = the supreme court.

§ 5 1268 a 1 οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας] In
 the Athenian courts the voting was secret:
 each juryman (δικαστής) received two
 ballots, one for condemnation, the other

for acquittal; and there were two urns,
 one of copper, into which the ballot con-
 taining the verdict was thrown, the other
 of wood, into which the other, unused
 ballots, were thrown. The ballots for
 voting were either differently coloured
 stones or small metal balls, or even dif-
 ferently coloured beans or shells. At
 what time the one or other of these were
 used is not known. Stones were cer-
 tainly the most common; a black stone
 served for condemnation, a white one for
 acquittal: with balls of metal, one with a
 hole in it served for the former purpose,
 a whole one served for the latter purpose.
 Equality of votes was counted as acquit-
 tal. (Meier and Schomann *Attische Pro-
 cess* 720 ff.) SUSEM. (287)

Aristotle himself is our authority for
 the voting at Athens: see *Frags.* 1548 b
 5—41 of the Beilin ed.

2 ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἕκαστον κατ.] Nearly
 the same arrangement was actually in-
 troduced amongst the Romans: a fact which
 shows how clearly this proposal testifies
 to a legal mind of great originality. At
 Rome the voting was by tablets in the
 manner here proposed, leaving it to the
 iudices to affirm not simply condemna-
 tion (C) or acquittal (A), but also a ver-
 dict of "not proven" (NL, non liquet).
 That Aristotle (§ 13 f.) is as yet quite un-
 able to realize to himself the proper mean-
 ing of the proposal is a further proof of
 its originality (L. Stein.) Comp. n.
 (268) on §§ 13—15. SUSEM. (288)

δ' ἀπολύοι ἀπλῶς, κενὸν <ἐάν>, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, τοῦτο (V)
 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ᾤετο νενομοθετῆσθαι καλῶς ἀναγκά-
 8 ζειν γὰρ ἐπιτορκεῖν [ῆ] ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. ἔτι δὲ ἄ
 νόμον ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον,
 ὅπως τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-
 λευτάντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν, ὥς οὕτω τοῦτο
 10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετημένον· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναῖς οὗτος
 13 ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἐτέραις τῶν πόλεων. τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ
 τοῦ δήμου αἰρετοὺς εἶναι πάντας· δῆμον δ' ἐποίει τὰ τρία
 μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' αἰρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν
 καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν
 15 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀξιόλογα τῆς Ἱππο- 8

4 ἀπολύει M^a P¹ Q^b, ἀπολύσει L^a || <ἐάν> Meier (*De bonis daemnationum* p. 58)
 || <καὶ> τοῦτο Meier *l.c.* p. 181, rightly || ὁ ῆ omitted by Γ M^a, ῆ ταῦτα omitted
 by L^a and P¹ (1st hand, both words added by P¹) [ῆ] Susem.¹, but see Dittenberger
op. c. p. 1360 f. || ἔτι δὲ ἐτίθει νόμον P⁴ in the margin, in the text ἐτίθει is omitted,
 ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον P²³ Q^b T^b L^a Ald. Bk. || 9 τοῦτο τότε and 10 Ἐλλῆσιν instead
 of ἄλλοις Spengel, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* p. 1369 ff. and Comm. || 11 ἐτέροις
 P²³ Q^b T^b L^a Ald and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.²) || ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου after 12
 αἰρετοὺς Π² Bk. || 14 καὶ ξενικῶν omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹
 in the margin)

5 ἀναγκάζειν sc. τὸν νόμον.
 § 8 9 ὥς οὕτω κτλ.] "just as if this
 law had not been made before elsewhere."
 So K. F. Hermann *De Hippodamo* p. 44,
 who is defended by Dittenberger (*Gott.*
gel. Anz. 1874 p. 1369) against Spengel.
 It is true that ὥς with the participle
 might equally mean (1) *because in fact*,
 as in Pl. *Phaedr.* 245 E ὥς ταύτης οὕσης
 φύσεως, or (2) *because as he thought* (ὥς
 οὐκ ἐν ἀδύνατον § 6): but νῦν is not de-
 cisive in favour of (1), see n. (259).

οὕτω, not μήτω; cp. Lyais 14 § 10
 ἐτόλμασεν ἀναβῆναι, ὥς οὐκ ἐξεσόμενον τῇ
 πόλει δίκην λαμβάνειν: 27 § 16 ὥσπερ τοῦ
 δεινούς ἄλλ' οὐ τῇ ζηλῶς αἰσῶς μέλον;
 Xen. *Cyr.* v. 1. 13 ὥς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ
 κλέπτειν, αἰετὶ τὸν κλέπτοντα. The clause
 is virtually oblique, and the negative is
 reposed unchanged.

10 ἔστι 82...νῦν] Here as often νῦν =
 as things are, "under the existing system"
 not simply = now, as Spengel explains it.
 Unless one follows Spengel in an unten-
 able alteration of the text, the drift of the
 passage can only be a censure upon Hip-
 podamos, which is even in this form
 quite intelligible, though it would cer-
 tainly have been more clearly expressed
 as follows: "whereas a law like this was

already at the time in force at Athens."
 We cannot however prove the date of
 this Athenian regulation (on which Wila-
 mowitz *Ans. Kydathen* p. 26 may also
 be consulted), but the present passage
 would seem to make it earlier than the
 treatise of Hippodamos. It is quite pos-
 sible that Aristotle's censure is unfair;
 for who is to inform us that in its author's
 intention the scheme of Hippodamos was
 restricted to new proposals, never before
 realised? Cp. Heimmann *op. c.* 43 f.
 Susem. (269) Cp. for νῦν § 5, c. 1 § 3,
 3 § 6, 5 § 11, § 17, 6 § 11 οὐχ ὁμοίως τότε
 (in Plato's supposed state) καὶ νῦν (as
 things actually are), *Rhet.* 1. 1 § 4, 1354 a
 19 καθάπερ ἐν ἐνταῖς γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων.
 § 7 11 τοὺς δ' ἄρχοντας κτλ.] All
 officials (perhaps even the priests) were
 consequently to be appointed by popular
 election and not by lot; comp. *Excursus*
 II p. 332. Susem. (260)

12 δῆμον...πόλεως] It would seem
 that Hippodamos did not state whether
 all three classes were eligible (Oncken).
 See however n. (262). Susem. (263)

13 τοὺς δ' αἰρεθέντας] the magistrates
 elected to have the charge of state mat-
 ters and of the affairs of foreigners and
 minors in the city.

δάρμον τάξεως ταύτ' ἐστίν· ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν (V)
 § 8 διαίρεσιν τοῦ πληθους τῶν πολιτῶν. οἳ τε γὰρ τεχνῦνται καὶ οἱ γε-
 ωργοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες,
 οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὄπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνῦνται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε
 20 ὄπλα, ὥστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὄπλα κεκτημένων.
 § 9 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ
 τῶν τὰ ὄπλα ἐχόντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγούς καὶ πο-
 λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπέτω· μὴ
 μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οἶόν τε φιλικῶς ἔχειν
 25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ κρείττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὄπλα
 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τοῦτο δ' οὐ ῥάδιον
 § 10 μὴ πολλοὺς ὄντας· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, τί δεῖ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέ-
 χειν τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων κα-
 ταστάσεως; ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνῦνται
 30 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πᾶσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), (p. 42)
 καὶ δύνανται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-
 σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ
 ὄπλα κεκτημένοις τὴν τροφήν εὐλόγως ἂν ἦσαν τι τῆς πό-
 λεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἰδίᾳ γεωρ-
 § 11 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινὴν, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἔξουσιν
 36 τὴν τροφήν, εἰ μὲν αὐτοὶ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μά-

17 οἱ omitted by M^s P¹, [οἱ] Susem.¹ || 25 καὶ omitted by Π³ Ar. Bk. || 26 γε
 omitted by M^s P¹, [γε] Susem.^{1,2} || 34 ἰδίαν Π¹ || γεωργήσουσιν Ar. Motel Bk.

16 τάξεως] scheme, polity: cp. 10
 § 4, 11 § 8. The fuller phrase is τάξις
 τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνίας 1. 2. 16, or τῆς
 πολιτείας 11. 6. 1, where the sense of
ordering, arrangement, is as apparent as
 in 11. 2 § 4, or 11. § 9, or 111. 1. 1.

ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πρῶτον] Aristotle
 criticises (§§ 8—15) (1) the entire division
 into classes, (2) the special position of
 the agricultural class, (3) the innovations
 in the administration of justice.

§ 8 20 δοῦλοι] This partly explains
 the proposal of Phaleas to make them
 δῆμοιοι.

§ 9 21 μετέχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν κτλ.]
 Yet Aristotle seems to assume this to
 have been the intention of Hippodamos.
 SUSEM. (262)

Obviously he is applying his own
 standard πολιτὴς ὁ μετέχων ἀρχῆς.

22 πολιτοφύλακας] what sort of ma-
 gistracy Aristotle understands by this
 word is not clear and is not sufficiently
 explained by the notice, VIII(V). 6 § 6 n

(1573), of a magistracy under this name
 in Larisa. SUSEM. (268)

As τὰ οἶα are attested by an inscription
 for Larisa of 214 B.C. (Ridgeway *Traus-*
actions II p. 138) it seems likely that Ais-
 totle there uses a different term in order
 to express the functions of the office.

24 μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ κτλ.] Aristotle
 himself altogether excludes the farmers,
 tradesmen, and citizens in his ideal state
 from the rights of citizenship; which is a
 much stronger measure. But possibly he
 thinks it is not essential for those who
 are thus excluded to be attached to the
 constitution, but that if they are to be
 citizens, it is SUSEM. (264)

§ 10 31 διαγίνεσθαι = earn subsistence;
 so καταγῆν, καταγίνεσθαι

33 εὐλόγως ἂν κτλ.] They would
 then be in the position of the δῆμος of
 the Republic.

34 νῦν δὲ = whereas what Hippoda-
 mos proposes is that they shall have land
 of their own.

χιμον ἔτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργούν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ (V
 δ' ἑτεροὶ τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἴδια γεωργούντων καὶ τῶν
 μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόνιον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὐδε-
 § 12 νὸς μετέχον, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ
 41 τις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τε τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν
 γεωργούντας, τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν
 1268 b ἕκαστος γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς
 ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφήν
 λήψονται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πολ-
 § 13 λὴν ἔχει παραχρήν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
 5 ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιούν διαιροῦντας τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς
 γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τὸν δικαστὴν διαιτητήν. τοῦτο γὰρ
 ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογούνται γὰρ
 ἀλλήλοισι περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
 ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούναντιον τούτου τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ

37 γεωργούν M^a P¹ || ἔτερον εἶναι after νομοθέτης Γ M^a, a similar gloss τούτους
 ἐτέρους εἶναι p^o in the margin || 39 αὖ οὖν Π³ || τοῦτο after τῆς πόλεως M^a P¹ ||
 41 Spengel thinks καρπῶν corrupt, Schmidt suspects ἄπορον, for which δυσπρόσιτον
 seems to him to be required by the sense

1268 b 1 γεωργήσει II Bk., *ministrabit* William, *habebant ministrare* Ar., doubtless
 on mere conjecture; hence erroneously θεωρήσει Vettori Sussem¹⁻³ and others ||
 δύο οἰκίας can hardly be sound, δισὶν οἰκίαις Ar. Camerarius, <eis> δύο οἰκίας Ber-
 nays, δύο [οἰκίας] Busse not happily || 2 τῆς <αὐτῆς> Bockei (not bad),
 <δίκης> τῇ Μάδινγ, [καὶ] Bernays Sussem.²; there is some corruption || 5 τὸ κρίνειν
 ἀξιούν II Bk., ὁ κρίνειν ἀξιῶν Sussem.¹⁻³ wrongly from the translations of William and
 Ar. || διαιροῦντα P¹⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. Bk., διαιροῦνται L^a || δίκης II¹ A¹, κρίσεως II³
 Bk. (which Bojesen saw to be wrong) || 6 γὰρ Ar., δ' Γ II Bk. || 7 καὶ <μή>
 πλείοσιν? Koras || 9 καὶ omitted by Γ M^a || τοῦτω τῶν p¹ P¹⁻⁴ Q^b T^b Bk.,
 τοῦτω W^b L^a Ald. (omitting the following τῶν)

§ 11 37 βούλεται κατὰ Comp. n.
 (201) on 6 § 6.

§ 12 41 τό τε πλῆθος ἄπορον κατὰ
 "the amount of produce will be in-
 adequate for the maintenance of two
 establishments."² This again is a mere
 assertion which ought to have been
 proved. SUSEM. (265)

1268 b 1 γεωργήσει οἰκίας] See
Critical Notes. It is impossible to defend
 the text as meaning *in mansuāis two house-
 holds by agriculture on the analogy of oi-*
κίας οἰκείν.

§ 13 4 ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως] the law
 about passing sentence.

5 τὸ κρίνειν ἀξιούν κατὰ] "the require-
 ment that a verdict shall be returned
 upon separate counts (τὸ μὲν sc. καταδι-

κάζει τὸ δὲ μή, § 5) when the charge in
 the indictment is simple, whereby the
 juror is turned into an arbitrator." ἀξιούν
 is infinitive.

6 τοῦτο γὰρ κατὰ] This is practi-
 cable in arbitration even (καὶ) where there
 are several arbitrators, for they confer
 with one another about the decision.

7 καὶ πλείοσιν] At Athens a single
 public arbitrator decided each case, but if
 private arbitrators were chosen by the
 parties to the dispute themselves, a body
 of 3 or 4 might well have been more
 common. SUSEM. (266)

8 ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστῇ] In this respect
 then the practice in the Greek courts of
 justice was just the reverse of that in
 ours. SUSEM. (267)

10 παρασκευάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικάσται μὴ κοινολογῶνται πρὸς (V)
 § 14 ἀλλήλους. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ ἔσται παραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὁ
 ὀφείλῃ μὲν ὁ δικάστης οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δι-
 καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἴκοσι μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικάστης κρίνει
 δέκα μνᾶς (ἡ δὲ μὲν πλεον ὁ δ' ἔλασσον), ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ
 15 δὲ τέτταρας (καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δῆλον ὅτι μεριού-
 § 15 σιν), οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάζουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-
 πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἔτι [δ'] οὐδεὶς ἐπιπορεῖν
 ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἴ-
 περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλημα γέγραπται δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μη-
 20 δὲν ὀφείλῃ ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς· (p 43)
 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἤδη ἐπιπορεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὀφεί-
 § 16 λειν τὰς εἴκοσι μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρίσκουσὶ τι τῇ 10
 πόλει συμφέρον ὡς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τινα τιμὴν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-

12 μὲν after ὁ Π³ and perhaps Γ || δὲ Π¹, omitted by M^a and perhaps Γ ||
 13 κρίνει Bk.², κρίνει Γ Π Ar. Bk.¹ || 15 δῆ || δὲ Π³ || 16 οὐδέν] οὐ Γ M^a and Π¹
 (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 17 δ' omitted by Π¹ || 19 γέγραπται· δι-
 καίως Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 21 ἀλλ'.. 22 μνᾶς omitted by M^a || 21 ἥδη
 omitted by Γ M^a and Π¹ (1st hand, added by corr.¹), [ἥδη] Susem.¹ wrongly || 23
 γένεσθαι M^a Π¹

§ 14 12 ὁ δικάζόμενος may be either
 litigant. If the participle is *present*, it
 denotes the defendant, if *middle*, the
 plaintiff. Here the latter is the case.

13 ὁ μὲν γὰρ... 15 τέτταρας] "For he
 (the plaintiff) claims 20 minae, but the
 juror will decide for ten—οἱ whatever
 the larger sum may be which is claimed
 by the former and the smaller sum which
 is awarded by the latter—while another
 (juror) will award five, and yet another,
 four" (Bernays). This seems slightly
 better than to understand πλεον, ἐλασσον,
 πέντε, τέτταρας of sums awarded by
 different jurymen (dicasts).

15 μεριούσιν] will estimate damages,
 according to a graduated scale. Comp.
 Demosth. adv. Lept. 494, 4 δεῖ τοῖνυν
 μεμερίσθαι τὰ τῶν διαρῶν.

§ 15 16 τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος] In what
 way then are the votes to be counted, i.e.
 sorted? διαλογῆ=collecting and arrang-
 ing: *divinitio* Cic. *Pro Plancio* § 14.

19 ἔπειρ ἀπλῶς· δικαίως] "if the in-
 dictment has been framed (not condition-
 ally but) absolutely with justice." (It
 has also been proposed to put a colon be-
 fore δικαίως: "and justly too; for &c.")
 If the suit be for 20 minae, acquittal
 means that the defendant does not owe 20
 minae, it says nothing about liability for

a smaller sum.

21 ἥδη] when we turn to the judge
 who condemns while not believing the
 twenty minae to be owing, it is quite true
 that he commits perjury Comp. VIII
 (v). § 6 ὥσπερ δῆμος ἥδη οἱ δμοιοὶ (Cope).

§§ 13—15 'L. Stein op. c. 162 n.
 rightly calls this whole criticism a misap-
 prehension. If the judges, or jurors, are
 forbidden to converse with one another,
 it is certainly impossible for them to find
non liquet in concert: it is however pos-
 sible for all to reach the same result with-
 out consultation, and still more likely that
 only in this way can some one of them
 clear his conscience. And if, after the
 fact of a pecuniary indebtedness has been
 established, the jurors cannot agree upon
 the amount, then a conditional verdict
 is the only one possible, and in that case
 certainly there can be no final decision
 except by way of compromise. Thus this
 objection makes for Hippodamos, rather
 than against him' (Oncken). And lastly
 how is it made out that the 'majority of
 legislators' were right in excluding con-
 sultation amongst the jurors? At any
 rate our modern regulation (see n. 267)
 has pronounced them to be wrong. Cp.
 also n. (258) on § 5. SUSEM. (268)

§ 16 23 οὐκ ἀσφαλές] "the proposed

λὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκούσαι μόνον· ἔχει (V)
 25 γὰρ συκοφαντίας καὶ κινήσεις, ἂν τύχη, πολιτείας. ἐμ-
 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν ἀποροῦσι
 γὰρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ
 § 17 κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ἢ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διόπερ
 οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-
 30 ρει κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἰσηγεῖσθαι τινὰς νόμους λύσειν ἢ
 πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιήμεθα μνείαν, 11
 § 18 ἔτι μικρὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστειλάσθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ,
 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ
 κινεῖν. ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν,
 35 οἷον λατρικῇ κινήσεια παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικῇ
 καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν
 τούτων θετόν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύ-
 § 19 τὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημείον δ' ἂν γεγενέαι φάιη
 τις ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων· τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λῶαν

27 τὸ <μῆ> W^b L^s Ald. || 30 γὰρ Spengel, δ' Γ II Bk. || 32 μικρὰ Π^a Ar. Bk.

legislation is not safe, but only specious to the ear,"—a curious confusion of metaphors.

24 [ἔχει γὰρ κτλ] for it leads to false accusation and possibly to changes in the constitution (see n. on line 30 below). Informers would always claim to reveal facts highly useful to the state, as did the Roman delatores. ἂν τύχη=should it so happen; and so εἰ τόχει, τυχεῖν, εἰ ἐτυχε.

26 ἄλλο πρόβλημα] another question. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες] Can this have been in written works? SUSEM. (269)

§§ 16—25 Is it expedient to alter the laws of a country in order to introduce improvements?

With this interesting discussion compare *Rhet.* I. 15 §§ 4—12 (Spengel); also Plato *Polit.* 294 A—302.

28 τοὺς πατρίους νόμους] 'The ancestral laws' would include much that is unwritten: customs, institutions, those traditional practices of the society which serve as a basis (ὅσων ἐρείσματα) to the written code, Plato *Laws* III 680 A οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πῶ, ἀλλ' ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἐπίμειναι ἔωσι. Comp. *Laws* VII 793 B—D: see n. (48) on I 6. 1, and II. 5 § 4, § 15.

§ 17 29 τῷ λεχθέντι=the proposal of Hippodamos.

εἴπερ μὴ συμφέροι κινεῖν] "in case it

turns out to be inexpedient": i.e. if on the wider question we decide against change.

30 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ] "Some may propose the repeal of the laws or the constitution as a public benefit." When thus distinguished from πολιτεία, νόμος = the code of positive law. The revolution of the Four Hundred, it will be remembered, was effected by the suspension, in legal form, of the γραφὴ παρανόμων, the great safeguard against the subversion of the Athenian constitution.

32 διαστειλάσθαι=enter into detail. It is used in *Topics* V 3 8, 131 b 15, 17, as synonymous with διορίσασθαι. Cp. Pl. *Rep.* VII 535 B πῶς δὴ διαστέλλει, § 18 33 βέλτιον τὸ κινεῖν] This view is maintained §§ 18—22.

34 ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων κτλ] Cp. III. 15. 4, n. (638) medicine in Egypt; 16 §§ 7, 8. IV (VII). 2 § 13 n. (720); 13 § 2 n. (870) III. 6 § 7 n. (531). SUSEM. (270)

36 μίαν.. 37 πολιτικὴν] It is Aristotle's invariable practice to rank Politics with the "arts and faculties": e.g. VI (IV). 1 §§ 1—3, *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 1.

§§ 19, 20 A most valuable line of inquiry. We could wish he had noted down a few more of these antiquated usages.

40 ἀπλοὺς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ ^(V)Ἐλ-
 § 20 λημες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τε
 λουπὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐστί που νομίμων, εὐήθη πάντων ἐστίν,
 1269 a ὅλον ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φονικὰ νόμος ἐστίν, ἂν πληθὺς

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τὲ γὰρ P^{1,2}, ἐσιδηροφορουσσι γὰρ P², ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ
 P⁴, ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο γὰρ Q^b T², ἐσιδηροφόρουν τότε γὰρ Bas.³, ἐσιδηροφόρουν τε γὰρ
 Κοιαν., ἐσιδηροφόρουν γὰρ τότε Susem.¹ misled by William's version; see Ditten-
 berger *op. c.* p. 1371

1269 a 1 κόμη ΓΜ^a

40 ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο] Thuc. i. 5 § 3
 τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τοῖσι τοῖς ἡπειρώ-
 ταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστρίας ἐμμενέει·
 6 § 1 πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφόρει, διὰ
 τὰς ἀφράστους τε οὐκ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς
 παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐξέδουσι, καὶ ἐννήθη τῆς
 δαίταν μεθ' ὅπλων ἐποιήσαντο (J. G.
 Schneider). SUSSEM (270 b)

41 τὰς γυναῖκας ἐωνοῦντο] The suitor
 purchased the daughter of her father by
 means of presents (ἐδνα): see Schomann
Griech. Antiquitäten i. 52 [Eng. trans. by
 Mann and Hardy p. 48 ff.]. Schneider
 compares marriage by *compréhension* among the
 Romans. SUSSEY. (271)

There is a valuable note on the ἐδνα
 or *bride-price* in the English translation
 of the *Odysssey* by Butcher and Lang.
 "The ἐδνα in Homer are invariably gifts
 made by the wooers to the father or kin-
 smen of the bride, that is, the bride-price,
 the *kolyma* of the dwellers on the Volga...
 The father of the bride was thus said
 ἐδνασθαι τὴν θυγατέρα (*Od.* ii. 53), to accept
 certain ἐδνα as the price for his daugh-
 ter,—what is called 'coming to terms
 about the marriage' in *Iliad* xiii. 381
 (ἔφρα. συνώμεθα... ἀμφὶ γάμῳ). As a rule
 the woman would go to the highest bid-
 der, but in the case of a favoured wooer
 it seems to have been not unusual either
 to remit the price and give the bride
 ἀνάδενον (cp. Agamemnon's offer to A-
 chilles, *Il.* ix. 141), or to return a portion
 of the ἐδνα after marriage (*Od.* i. 278,
 ii. 196). As is still the custom among the
 Kanakas in New Caledonia." Homer
 also mentions gifts from the wooers to
 the bride, and μεδνα, gifts from the bride's
 father to his daughter: but φερνῆ, the
 later word for dowry, does not occur.
 Even in Pindar ἐδνα is used in the sense
 of φερνῆ. *Pyl.* 3. 94. (Eaton compares
Tac. Germ. 18, but that is the 'Morgengabe,' something quite different.)

§ 20 1269 a 1 ὅλον ἐν Κύμῃ] This
 forcibly recalls compurgation, the estab-
 lished legal usage in ancient times in

England and amongst other Teutonic
 peoples. That the oath might thus be
 employed on behalf of the accuser is suf-
 ficiently attested, although cases where it
 is taken on behalf of the accused are
 usually mentioned. The Greek custom is
 confirmed by the inscription of Gortyn,
 column 11, lines 36—44. The law has
 prescribed certain fines, the price to be
 paid for the ransom of an accused person
 charged with adultery and in the power
 of his captors. But he may plead that he
 was (wrongfully) seized by force: cp.
 [Demosth.] *c. Neaerum* § 66 1367, το
 ἀδίκως εἰρησθῆναι ὡς μοιχῶν. If so, the
 captor must support his charge by com-
 purgators, whose number depends on the
 amount of the fine or ransom. (a) Four
 are necessary if the fine is 50, 100, or 200
 staters i.e. if the aggrieved husband is
 a full citizen (β) Two are necessary if
 the aggrieved husband is an ἀφεταιρος,
 i.e. free but not a full citizen: while
 (γ) if the aggrieved husband is a serf
 (οικετός), the serf's lord (πάστας) and one
 other compurgator must appear. The
 fine for (γ) is 2½ staters, for (β) 10 or 20
 staters. The Cretan text of the law runs
 thus: αὶ δε κα ποτε δολοσασθαι [i.e. ἐὰν
 δὲ φωνῇ δουλῶσασθαι], ὁμοσσι τὸν λῳτὰ το
 πεντεκονταστᾶτερο [τοῦ πεντεκονταστᾶ-
 ρου] καὶ πλινος πεντὸν αὐτὸν, ἔν αὐτοῖ
 [ἐαυτοῖ] ἑκαστον ἐπαριόμενον [ἐπαρώμενον],
 το δ' ἀπεταίρο [τοῦ δ' ἀφεταιροῦ] τρεῖς
 αὐτὸν, το δε Φουκος τὸν παστὰν ἀπὸ
 αὐτὸν, μοικιστ' ἐλεν [μοιχῶνθ' ἐλεν] δολο-
 σασθαι θε με [μή]. And if he shall plead
 that (the captor) overmastered him, the
 captor shall swear—in the case of the 50
 staters or more, himself with four others,
 each imprecating on himself. in the
 case of a clanless man, himself with two
 others. in the case of a house-thiall,
 his lord with one other—(an oath) that he
 took him in adultery and overmastered
 him not. See Zitelmann in *Das Recht
 von Gortyn*, pp. 101—107; and Mr H. J.
 Roby *The twelve Tables of Gortyn* in the

τι παρὰσχεται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φόνον τῶν αὐτοῦ (V)
 § 21 συγγενῶν, ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τὸν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσι δὲ
 ὅλως οὐ τὸ πατριον ἀλλὰ τάγαθόν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς
 5 πρῶτους, εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσώθησαν,
 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὥσπερ καὶ
 λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὥστε ἄτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς
 τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἔαν
 § 22 ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, (p.)
 10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι·
 καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γράφειν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ τῶν
 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσὶν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ὅτι κινή-
 15 τείει καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσὶν ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
 ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβείας ἢν δόξειεν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ
 ἢ τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρόν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὐχερῶς λύειν τοὺς
 νόμους φαῦλον, φανερόν ὡς ἐστέον ἐνίας ἁμαρτίας καὶ τῶν

6 ὁμοίως II¹ Ar. || 7 τὸ omitted in II² || 8 ἔαν I¹ Ar. || 11 γραφῆναι
 II² Bk.

Law Quarterly Review 11. 1886. p. 142, who prefers the other rendering of δολοσασθαι 'beguiled,' as if from δολοῦν.

§ 21 5 εἴτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν] It is well known that this was the popular view in Greece about the oldest inhabitants of a country, αὐτόχθονες, see Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. 62 f. Plato makes use of it for his myth *Polit.* 271 ff., cp. *Sym.* 191 n f. In *De Gen. Anim.* III. 11 25, 762 b 28 Aristotle expresses grave doubts on the question whether such a so-called 'generatio aequivoca' should be assumed for men and quadrupeds as well as for lower forms: yet he goes on to inquire how it must be supposed to take place. SUSEM. (273)

εἴτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινος ἐσ.] This agrees with the view explained in n. (167) on 5 § 16, and was much more Aristotle's real opinion, as it was the opinion of Plato *Timaeus* 22 C· πολλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γενέσθαι ἀνθρώπων καὶ θέντων, πρὶν μὲν καὶ ὕδατι μέγιστα, μῆρος δὲ ἄλλως ἑτέροις βραχύνεται: *Latius* III 677 A ff. πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γενέσθαι κατακλιμῶς τε καὶ νόσους καὶ ἄλλους πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχὺ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος. SUSEM. (273)

6 ὁμοίους εἶναι καὶ] "were much the same as the ordinary silly people" of to-day: cp. Vahlen *Bücherg.* III. 314. ol

τυχόντες occurs in c. 9 § 23, 10 § 10, 11 § 3.

ὥσπερ καὶ λέγεται] Plato makes the same remark *Politicians* 274 B f.: αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες διαπραΐζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν θεῶν), καὶ εἴτ' ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἀγεχοὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους ἦσαν χρόνοι. ἐκ τούτων πάντων ἐν μεγάλοις ἦσαν ἀπορίαι. SUSEM. (274)

Cp. *Protag.* 321 C· man naked and defenceless before the introduction of the arts (Eaton).

8 οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους] Positive law as contrasted with the δόγματι καὶ ἀγραφα νόμῳ discussed in §§ 19—21. See VII(VI) § 2 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιοῦτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους. The distinction is best explained by Cope *Introd. to Rhetoric* pp. 239—244.

§ 23 9 ὥσπερ γὰρ 12 καθ' ἕκαστον εἰσὶν] See III. 16 § 11 with n. (652) f. and n. (637) on III. 15 § 4; also III. 11 § 19 n. (579): the rulers or rulers are supreme where the laws cannot prescribe exactly διὰ τὸ μὴ βέβαιον εἶναι καθόλου διατάσαι περὶ πάντων. SUSEM. (275)

10 καὶ (περὶ) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν] "So too in the political system it is impossible that all things should be prescribed in writing."

§ 23 A sound argument, quite in Bentham's spirit.

νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὠφελήσεται (V)
κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν ἐθισθεῖς.

§ 24 ψεύδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ¹⁴

20 γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον· ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἰσχύει
οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο
δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὥστε τὸ ῥαδίως

§ 25 μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους

25 εἰ καὶ κινήτεοι, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ
οὐ; καὶ πότερον τῷ τυγχόντι ἢ τισιν; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγά-
λην διαφορὰν.

9 διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφώμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν (ἄλλων γὰρ
ἐστὶ καιρῶν)· περὶ δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς VI

30 Κρητικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν δύο

17 ὠφελήσεται τις M^a P¹, ὠφελήσεται <ὁ> Susem.¹⁻² misled by the translations of
William and Ar. § 18 βλαβήσεται ὁ Schneider || ὑπάρχουσιν Bernays, which I
should unconditionally accept were it not for the addition of καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων after
17 νομοθετῶν || 21 παρὰ Π¹, πλὴν corr.¹ of P²⁻², πλὴν παρὰ Π² Bk. || 23 νόμον
P² T² and P² (1st hand altered by corr.²) || 25 καὶ before κινήτεοι omitted by Γ² M¹,
[καὶ] Susem.¹⁻² || λιντήον Π² || καὶ πάντες P² Q² T² I² Bk. || 28 δὴ...1273 b 24
ἡσυχίας noticed by Michael of Ephesus

17 οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον κτλ.] Comp.
Rhet. I. 15. 12 οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασφί-
ζεσθαι τὸν λατράν (to outdo your doctor).
οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ λατροῦ
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίξεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἀρχόντι;
Thuc. III. 37 χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις
χωρὶς πῶλις κρείσσον ἐστίν (Eaton).
Eur. Bacchae 971 f., οὐ γὰρ κρείσσον ποτε
τῶν νόμων | γιγνώσκων χρὴ καὶ μελετᾶν.

§ 24 19 ψεύδος δὲ κτλ.] 'These re-
marks are very true 'This is a difference
between the sciences or arts and the laws.
In the former only he who follows the
science has to act and his action on an im-
proved method proceeds from conviction;
whereas, if the laws are altered, all must
act according to the new law and though
unconvinced of the need for alteration'
(Schlosser). SUSEM. (276)

21 παρὰ τὸ ἔθος] 'has no force to
secure obedience apart from habit.' The
Critical Notes show how the 'conflate'
reading, πλὴν παρὰ, arose.

§ 25 24 ἐν δὲ 27 διαφορὰν] Plato's
utterance Laws I 634 D exactly agrees
with this: ὅν μὲν γὰρ (Cretans and
Lacedaemonians), εἴτε καὶ μετρίως κατε-
σκεύασται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἰς τῶν καλλίστων

ἀν εἰς νόμων μὴ ἰσχυρῶν τῶν νέων μὴ δένα
εἶναι, ποῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει,
γέρον δὲ εἰ τις τὴν ἐκείνων τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν,
πρὸς ἀρχόντα τε καὶ πρὸς ἡλικιώτην μηδενὸς
ἐναντίον νέου ποιέσθαι τοὺς τοιοῦτους λό-
γους. Oncken, I. 252, strangely alleges
this passage of the Laws as a proof of its
author's design 'to strangle the healthy
common sense of men in the name of
political order.' SUSEM. (277)

28 νῦν μὲν ἀφώμεν] See *Introd.* pp.
19, 53 SUSSEMI. (278)

This implies that the question has to be
decided elsewhere in the treatise.

c 9 Examination of the Spartan
polity.

See *Anal.* p 106. Since Gottling's
Eichornis, pp 463—471 of his edition,
this chapter has been most fully treated
by Oncken I 218—299, II 317—376, who
writes with especial reference to Grote's
memorable chapter on Lycurgus and, in
vol. II, to the later monographs by Trierer
Forschungen and Gilbert *Studien*. See
p 35 note 3. The fragments of the *Politeia*
1557 b 38—1560 a 28 should be com-
pared. See also Jannet *Les institutions*
sociales à Sparte.

εἰσὶν αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἴ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν (VI) ἀρίστην νευρομοθέτηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δ' εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

§ 2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν α
35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογοῦμενον ἐστίν·
τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ ῥᾶδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε γὰρ Θετ-
ταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς, ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τοῖς Λάκωσιν οἱ εἰλωτες (ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες

33 <§> ὑπεναντίως Scaliger, ὑπεναντίως <ἢ μὴ ὑπεναντίως> Susem. would prefer: but no alteration is needed || αὐτοῖς αὐτῆς M^a Q^b T^b L^a and P^a (1st hand), αὐτῶν P¹, αὐτῶν P⁴ (cor.), αὐτῶν Ar. || 34 <πῶς> πολιτεύεσθαι? Madvig || 37 πενεστεία M^a P^a and P² (1st hand, altered by cor.), P³ and a later hand in P⁴ || 38 oi omitted by M^a T^a L, [oi] Susem.¹⁻²

§ 1 31 μία μὲν κτλ] The two points to consider are (1) its absolute, (2) its relative success. "whether its legislation is good or bad in relation to the best system; secondly, whether it is inconsistent with the fundamental assumption and scheme of the constitution proposed." πρὸς=when judged by a given standard.

32 εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὑπεναντίως δὲ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διάθεσιν.

The Helots or Scifs §§ 2-4.

§ 2 34 ὅτι μὲν οὖν... 35 ὁμολογούμενον ἐστίν] Here we are allowed a very important glimpse of the nature of Aristotle's own ideal state. Cp also n. (192) on § 5; c. II § 10 n. (393), IV (VII). 9 §§ 3, 4, 7, 8; 10 § 9 with n. (813), and *Introduct.* p. 22 n. (3). SUSEM. (279)

35 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολήν] leisure free from imposed labour: I. 7. 3. II. 6. 5.

36 τε followed by 38 δέ.

ἢ τε γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία κτλ] Compare § 22 n. (178). Whenever in Greece bodies of scifs stood midway between freedom and slavery, it is well known that the relation invariably arose in consequence of a subjugation of the earlier inhabitants by victorious invaders. Thus the earlier inhabitants of Laconia obtained the freer lot of Provincials (Περλοῖκοι) or else were forced into a dependent position of this kind as Helots according as they submitted to the Spartans earlier or later, more or less easily, of their own free will or by compulsion. See Schömann *Antiquities of Greece* I p. 191-194, Eng. tr., to whose account of the Helots p. 194-200 it is sufficient to refer (comp. however Gilbert *Studien* p. 76 ff.). The Penestiae

were the descendants of that part of the old population of the country occupied by the invading Thessalians, which, instead of emigrating, made a friendly agreement with the conquerors and concluded a treaty, by which for a fixed rent they remained tenants of the land they had formerly possessed and were under obligation to furnish military service, but were not to be sold or driven out of the country or put to death. See Schömann, p. 132, Eng. tr. The authorities quoted by J. G. Schneider are Archemachos *Fr.* 1, from Athenaeus VI. 264 A: Βοιωτῶν τῶν τὴν Ἀρναίαν κατοικησάντων οἱ μὴ ἀδρανῆς εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, ἀλλ' ἐμφύλοισιν ῥήσαντες παρέδωκαν αὐτοὺς τοῖς Θετταλοῖς δουλεῖν καθ' ὁμολογίαν, ἐφ' ᾧ οὕτως ἐξέδουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς χώρας, οὗτε ἀποαινεύουσιν αὐτοὺς δὲ τὴν χώραν ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς συντάξεις ἀποδίδουσιν οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογίας καταμείναντες καὶ παραδόντες αὐτοὺς ἐλήθησαν τότε μενέσται, νῦν δὲ πενέσται: and Theopompus *Fr.* 134 in *Ath.* VI. 265 n, c: Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Θετταλοὶ φανήσονται κατασκευασμένοι τὴν δουλείαν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν οἰκούντων πρότερον τὴν χώραν, ἣν ἐκείνοι νῦν ἔχουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἀχαιῶν, Θετταλοὶ δὲ Παρβαίων καὶ Μαιωνίων καὶ προσηγύρεσαν τοὺς καταδουλωθέντας οἱ μὲν εἰλωτας οἱ δὲ πενέσται. On the similar relation between the Mairandynians and the people of Heracleia see n. (777) on IV (VII). 6 § 8. SUSEM. (280)

Plato compares Helots, Penestae and Mairandynians *Lysis* VI 776 C, D.

38 ἐφεδρεύοντες] always in wait to pounce upon their misfortunes: Thuc. IV. 80 δὲ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς τοὺς εἰλωτας τῆς φυλακῆς περὶ μάλιστα καθεστῆκει.

§ 3 τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδέν
 40 πῶ τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν. αἷτιον δ' ἴσως τὸ τὰς γειτνιάσας
 1269 b πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμ-
 μαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς (p 45)
 κεκτημέναις περιοίκους, τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιώντες
 ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ καὶ Ἀρκάδες·
 5 ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ τὸ
 πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περαιβοῖς καὶ
 § 4 Μάγνησιν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τό γε τῆς 4
 ἐπιμελείας ἐργῶδες εἶναι, τίνα δεῖ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι
 τρόπον· ἀνέμενοι τε γὰρ ὑβρίζουσι καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσιν
 10 ἑαυτοὺς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι
 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δῆλον <δ'> οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον
 § 5 τρόπον, οἷς τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλωτείαν. ἔτι δὲ ἡ
 περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πο-

1269 b 3 περὶ οὐκον M^a and apparently Γ (*praedia circa domus* William) || 5
 ἐφίσταντο Ba^a in the margin || 6 περαιβοῖς II^a Bk. Susem.¹ || 9 ἀνεμένοι
 Tricbe (perhaps rightly) || 10 κακοπαθόντες P¹ (1st hand, perhaps rightly), γγ.
 κακοπαθῶς ζῶντες corr.¹ of P¹ in the margin || 11 <δ'> οὖν or γοῦν Susem., οὖν
 Γ II A. Bk. || 12 ἐτι. 1270 a 8 πάλιν Plat. Lj^a. 14 quotes similar statements
 from Aristotle, but, as Heide (*Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles* p. 30) rightly
 judges, from his *Λακεδαιμονίων Πολιτεία*

§ 3 40 αἷτιον δ' ἴσως] It might be
 thought that one very material reason
 was the much freer and less oppressed
 position which, according to Aristotle's
 own evidences § 19 π. (171), the
 Cretans granted to their dependants
 (Oncken). Compare also c. 10 § 3 π.
 (355), § 5 (357), § 8 (364), § 16 (374).
 SUSEM. (381)

1269 b 3 περιοίκους] See c. 10 § 3
 and Exc. III.

§ 4 τοῖς Θετταλοῖς ἀτίους ἐκοντοῖς.
 ἀφίσταντο sc. οἱ πεισθέντες.

§ 4 γ τό γε τῆς ἐπιμελείας κατ] "the
 task of attending to this; how, namely,
 we ought to associate with them"—the
 sentence τίνα δεῖ τρόπον being dependent
 on the noun ἐπιμελείας, just as in
 IV(VII). 16. 1 πότε χρὴ ποιέσθαι τὴν ὁμι-
 λαν is dependent on ἐπιμελητέον. We
 may render. "It would seem too that
 apart from everything else there is the
 irksome task of seeing that we behave to
 them as we ought. for when allowed
 their freedom, they grow insolent and
 claim equal rights with their lords: if
 treated harshly, they plot revenge and

chevish hatred."

11 δῆλον κατ] The truth of this re-
 mark no one will wish to question. But
 does Aristotle really know of a remedy?
 He hopes to get over the difficulty in his
 own 'best state' by taking men of non-
 Hellenic race to till the soil, slaves or
 serfs, if possible; failing this, dependent
 freemen of different nations but only of
 the gentler races. IV(VII). 10 §§ 13, 14,
 π. (840): cp. IV(VII). 8 § 8 (815), and π.
 (364) with Exc. III. Supposing all this
 could be so fortunately arranged, would it
 have been any real remedy? SUSEM.
 (382)

The women of Sparta: §§ 5—12.

§ 5 13 ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις]
 So Plato speaks *Λαίης* i 637 c δεικνύς
 τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ὧν ἀνεσις, and
 Euripides *Ἀνδρομ.* 595 οὐδ' ἂν εἰ βού-
 λαιτό τις | σὺ φρον γένοιτο Σπαρτιατῶν
 κόρη (Eaton). SUSEM. (383)

πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας]
 'judged by the intention of the constitu-
 tion,' the second point of view for criti-
 cism as mentioned in § 1. The other, the
 standard of the best constitution, is here

§ 8 *τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε γὰρ* (VI)
ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεύξαι τὸν Ἄρην
πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἥ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
30 ἥ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κοσ. κώχιοι πάντες
οἱ τοιοῦτοι διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Δάκωσι τοῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ
 § 9 *διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι*

28 πρώτως M^aP¹, perhaps ighly || 4ρη P² Q^b Ald. Bk. || 32 διώκτο
 M^aP¹

§ 8 28 *ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος* Aristotle imagines that myths, like laws and customs, *πρ* (296) (300) on § 12, § 14, are direct inventions of individuals, who consciously intended by means of them to represent to sense certain ideas and thoughts. Cp. also v(viii) 6 § 13 n. 1078. *SUSEM.* (288)

29 *ἥ γὰρ κτλ* 'In his assestion, that martial race, are also the most amorous, Aristotle is supported by the views of modern anthropologists' (Fülleborn). *SUSEM.* (289)

30 *κατακώχιοι* easily captivated, with *ὅτι* v(viii) 7 4, with *ἐκ Nic Eth.* x. 9. 3; with *πρὸς* one might say "easily allured to."

31 *διὸ παρὰ κτλ* Schomann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 268 Eng. it is certainly right in saying that the social position and influence of women in Sparta was not higher than it is amongst the modern peoples of the west, and that the prevailing condition of things with us in this respect would have appeared to an Athenian of the best time to be a species of feminine rule (*γυναικοκρατία*), although it does not at all alienate our women from their natural and most appropriate calling of housewives and mothers. But this does not thoroughly answer the question proposed by J. G. Schneider (see n. 295 b) and by Oncken: whether true womanliness can have thriven under so rough a treatment of the marriage relation as was customary at Sparta: whether a family life and true domesticity could be found when the Spartan full-citizen was, as a matter of fact, banished from the family, lived continually with his comrades in arms, ate at the public table, slept in a tent, and only paid stolen visits to his wife; where consequently the household was without a head, the wife without a home of common duty and mutual improvement, where parental duty was removed and the natural field for the wife's activity abolished. If

in the latter respect Aristotle mistook the cause of the evil (as his retention of common messes for the men and his excessive public education prove), does this justify us in assuming that his description of the evil itself is wholly incorrect? In reference to the first question, if it was nothing unusual at Sparta to hand over one's wife to another, if, as Schomann himself thinks, *ὅς* c. p. 267, a Spartan woman, to whom proposals were made by another man, hardly felt herself insulted by them but refused the lover to her husband, then (as Fülleborn and Schomann after him have remarked) the boast of the Spartans, that adultery was never heard of amongst them, does not amount to much. Adultery here only means an intrigue with another man without the husband's permission. The further boast of the Spartan women, that they were in an especial degree good housewives (Schomann *ὅς* c. p. 268), must accordingly be reduced to its proper dimensions. Plato however concedes (*Laws* vii 805 b f) that though the Spartan women did not weave and spin, occupations which they left to their female slaves, they yet led an active life: since they had nearly half the responsibility for the management of the household and the education of the children. Certainly there is some exaggeration in the charges of license and love of power brought against them, and this must be moderated from the above points of view but it is quite as certain that they are not all pure inventions. Oncken refers his readers to the proof given by him *Hellas and Athens* ii. 85. Cp. *Introduct.* p. 26 n. (1). *SUSEM.* (290)

32 *ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς* during their supremacy. Cp. § 10 n. (292): vii(v). 6. 13 *ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλεαδῶν ἀρχῆς*, 7 § 14 *ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων* and *De Caelo* iii. 1 § 7, 300 b 30, *ἐπὶ τῆς φιλότητος*, during the reign of Love.

τὴ διαφέρει γυναῖκας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν (VI)
 γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταῦτό γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' οὐ- (α 46)
 35 σης τῆς θρασυτήτος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερώταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
 § 10 Λακωνῶν ἦσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς·
 χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἐτέραις πόλεσιν,
 θάρσυνον δὲ παρῆχον πλεῖον τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γυν-
 40 οὖν εἰκε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Λάκωσιν εὐλόγως ἢ τῶν γυν-
 § 11 ναϊκῶν ἄνεσις. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας
 1270 α ἀπέξεονοντο πολλὸν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργεῖους
 πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίους·
 σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρῆχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προωδο-

35 εἴπερ II Bk.; ἢπερ Sylburg Susem.¹ misled by William's version nisi ad bellum
 || 36 τοῦθ' τοῦτον Spengel

1270 α 1 τῆς οἰκείας (οἰκίας ? Γ' Ar.) omitted by M² and P¹ (1st hand), added by P¹
 in the margin || 4 προωδοσκοποῦνται Bk. Susem.¹ by a misprint (corrected by
 Bender)

§ 9 35 τῶν ἐγκυκλίων] See § 4 n.
 and I. 7 § 2. SUSEM. (291)

§ 10 37 ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς]
 'at the time of the Theban invasion'
 under Epameinondas 369 B.C. SUSEM.
 (292)

38 χρήσιμοι κτλ.] "For they were
 of no use, any more than the women in
 other cities, but they caused more con-
 fusion than the enemy." It is significant
 that the encomiasts of Sparta, Xenophon
 (*Hellen.* vi. § 28 α) μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τὸν
 λαπρὸν ὁρῶσαι ἵπρουντο, ἀπὲρ οὐδέποτε
 ἰδοῦσαι πολεμοῦντες and Plutarch (*Agee* 31
 α) αἱ τῶν γυναικῶν οὐ διναμένους ἡσυχάζειν,
 ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόνων οὖσαν πρὸς τὴν
 τῶν κραυγῶν αἰ τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων
 speak much more strongly on this point.
 Oncken observes quite rightly, that this
 was the first opportunity the Spartan
 women had for putting into practice the
 brave speeches they had been making for
 centuries; they might at least have dis-
 played a quiet bearing, even if they were
 not to be taken at their word. SUSEM. (295)

Bernays renders, 'although the women
 in other cities are of use' [on such occa-
 sions]. But is it so? The *Septem* of
 Aeschylus scarcely bears this out.

Plato must allude to this, *Laos* 806 B.

§ 11 1270 α 1 ἔξω γὰρ κτλ.] Accord-
 ing to Plutarch *Lycurg.* i, in his account
 of the constitution of Sparta Aristotle
 placed Lycurgus apparently no earlier
 than the time of Iphitos, about the begin-

ning of the era of the Olympiads, 776 B.C.
 (J. G. Schneider). See this passage
 among the *Fragmenta* 490, 1558 α 13,
 Rose = 485 in *Rose Aristot. pseuip.* = 716
 Muller. Further compare especially Gil-
 bert *Studies* 72 ff. 158 ff. SUSEM. (294)

The passage is as follows: α) μὲν γὰρ
 ἰφίτης συνακμάσαι καὶ συνδιαβῆναι τὴν
 Ὀλυμπιακὴν ἐκκαίριαν λέγουσιν αὐτὸν, ὃν
 ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τεκμήριον προσφέρειν
 τὸν Ὀλυμπιακὸν δίσκον ἐν ᾧ τοῦτομα τοῦ
 Λυκούργου διασώζεται καταγεγραμμένον.
 E. Curtius, *History* Eng. tr. i. p. 191,
 adopts this date. Even so, there would
 be a grave chronological difficulty if
 these Arcadian wars be supposed to pre-
 cede Lycurgus. The first Messenian war
 is dated 743—723 B.C. But as to the
 main fact Aristotle is correct. A long
 period of camp-life, of war in which the
 Spartans lived perpetually in the field,
 must have preceded the complete estab-
 lishment of the system and the institu-
 tions which are referred to the Lycurgian
 legislation. Such a period we find in
 the tedious and difficult conquest of La-
 conia by its Dorian invaders.

4 προωδοσκοποῦνται] Note the double
 formation of perfect.

* I entirely agree with Wilamowitz *Homere-
 sche Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884, p. 467 ff., that
 Lycurgus is only a mythical person, and that the
 supposed Lycurgian legislation never had an
 existence; and I also regard the account which
 he gives of the real state of things as altogether
 correct. SUSEM

- 5 πεπονημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει^(VI)
 μέρος τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἀγειν ἐπιχει-
 ρῆσαι τὸν Λυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον,
 § 12 ἀποστήναι πάλιν. αἰτίαι μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αὗται τῶν γενομέ-⁹
 νων, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας· ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς
 10 οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίμη δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν,
 § 13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-

7 ἐπὶ] ὅτῳ? Koraes || 8 γενομένων M^o P¹ || 11 τοῖ] τὰ Q^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand), γρ. τοῦ P¹ in the margin

5 πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει μέρος κτλ.] Cp. Plato *Laus* I. 630 ε οὐχ ὡς πρὸς ἀρετῆς τι μέρος αὐτὰ τὰ φαυλότατα εἶναι [δ Λυκοῦργου] βέλτερον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετῇ: Thuc. I. 84. 3 πολέμοιοι τε καὶ εὐθουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐλοσμον γιγνόμεθα: V. 66. 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (294 b)

6 φασί] As to whether this is an anonymous quotation from Ephorus, or an appeal to oral tradition, see *Introd* p. 35 n (3). Cp. also below n (310) on § 7. SUSEM. (298)

7 ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουον κτλ.] Precisely so Plato *Laus* VI 781 A τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας οὐδαμῶς ὀρθῶς ἀναμνησθέντων μετέπειτα „ἀλλ' ὁ καὶ ἄλλως γένος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαθραίτερον μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντερον ἔφην, τὸ ὅφην, διὰ τὸ ἀσθενέει, οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο εἰς ἄντρος τοῦ νομοθέτου δόξα-
 των ὄν ἀφείθη. This Plutarch must have forgotten, when (*Lycurg.* 14) he attacks Aristotle alone on account of this same remark and tries to refute him. The facts which he adduces with this object prove simply nothing; but directly afterwards (c 15) he gives a detailed account of the Spartan custom of lending wives, and this does not make the assertion, which he appends to it, very credible. viz. ταῦτα δὲ οὕτως πραττόμενα φυσικῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς τότε τοσοῦτον ἀπέειχε τῆς ὑστερον λεγομένης γενέσεσθαι περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εὐχερίας, ὥστε ὅλους ἔπιστον εἶναι τοῖς τῆς μοιχείας παρ' αὐτοῖς. Even he does not venture to deny the subsequent laxity of the women at Sparta. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSEM. (295 b)

§ 12 8 "These then are the causes of the events which happened and therefore clearly of this mistake. but the question before us is not who is, or is not, excusable; but whether as a matter of fact (a legislator) is right or wrong"

9 ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς .. ὀρθῶς] Thus Aristotle is not unaware that the author of a code or a constitution is by no means able to proceed simply at his own good

pleasure, but is tied down to the given circumstances. cp. § 22 n. (323), 12 § 5 (409); VI(IV). 1 § 3 ff. n. (1116), c 6, 11 §§ 7, 8, 12 § 1 ff.; VII(VI). c. 4. It is only in case these circumstances are highly favourable that he considers his own best constitution possible. But this is still a long way off the knowledge that a nation's constitution and code of laws are in general the product *primarily* of its individuality and history, and only *secondarily* of the legislator's wisdom or unwisdom. Nor does Aristotle omit forthwith to mark precisely the spirit of his own examination in that 'he never purposes to account for the constitution by the circumstances under which it arose, or to fathom the necessities which confronted the legislator. Instead of this, Lycurgus, who left behind him an actual state, is treated like Plato who constructed an imaginary state. Aristotle's criticism neither is nor claims to be historical criticism in our sense of the term, which is more concerned to explain the connexion of the facts than to award praise or blame. He is as one-sided in pointing out the defects of this political structure as the admirers of its excellences had been in earlier times and continued to be later on. Nor could it have been otherwise: for neither he nor they had the requisite historical data for appreciating the personal responsibility of Lycurgus.' Nor have we even now—assuming that we still retain our belief in the existence of such a person as Lycurgus. Moreover in spite of his recognition of the force of circumstances Aristotle shares with Plato 'and all the political theorists of Greece the belief in the omnipotence of positive legislation, as if mighty historical developments which are not of today or yesterday could be simply swept out of the world by a command or prohibition. Besides, he makes Lycurgus responsible for things for which no legis-

ναίκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον, (VI)
 οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς καθ'
 αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.
 15 * *. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν 10
 § 14 τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμῆσειεν ἂν τις. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν συμ-
 βέβηκε κεκτῆσθαι πολλὰν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμπαν
 μικράν· διόπερ εἰς ὀλίγους ἦκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ διὰ
 τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ἀνεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡ πωλεῖν
 20 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, διδο-

12 εἶκεν omitted by Γ M^s || 13 αὐτὴν M^s J^s Bk, αὐτὰ Ar. || 14 αὐτὰ Ar. ||
 ἀλλὰ <καὶ> Koras || 15 * * μετὰ γὰρ Susem., see Comm.; μετὰ δὲ Zwinger ||
 17 λίαν omitted by M^s P¹ || τοῖς τὸν M^s, τῶν P¹ || 18 ἦται ? Congreve || 19
 τὸν νόμον M^s and perhaps Ar. || 20 οὐκ before ἐποίησεν inserted by Π (erased
 by corr. P¹), οὐσίαν ? Bender

lator can be responsible, and he partly blames him for effects of certain laws, when the effects could not be imputed to him even if the laws in question had really been his own work, and that in the sense in which Aristotle attributes them to him' (Oncken). Cp. also *n.* (82) on I. 9 § 8: *n.* (238) on II. 7 § 8; Exc. II on Bk. II; *n.* (339) on § 30 below; (466) on III. 3 § 9; (552) on III. 9 § 8: II. 5 § 8 *n.* (160): IV (VII). 14 § 16 (916). Even that which rests on no express command or prohibition, but simply on the force of popular custom, that is, the so-called 'unwritten law' (cp. *n.* 48 on I. 6 1 and Exc II to Bk II), is directly attributed by Aristotle, as by Plato, to the authorship of a definite individual lawgiver: this is especially clear from § 14 below, see *n.* (300). Exactly similar is his assumption of a first founder of the state: I. 2 § 15, ὁ πρῶτος συνστήσας, *n.* (28 b) or his judgment as to the origin of the conceptions of popular mythology, § 8 above, ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος, *n.* (288).

¹ In spite of these undeniable weaknesses the whole chapter may lay claim to a full measure of authority, as much as any other of Aristotle's historical statements. It is its merit to have most acutely corrected the aberration from sound intelligence revealed in the adoration paid to the Spartan state, and here also to have confronted romance with criticism' (Oncken). SUSEM. (296)

12 καὶ πρότερον] § 5 ff., see *nn.* 284—286. SUSEM. (297)

The land question and the decline of population: §§ 13—19.

§ 13 15 μετὰ γὰρ καὶ] Possibly we should alter γὰρ into δέ, as Zwinger proposed, and not assume a lacuna; since as a matter of fact no proof is needed to show why license amongst the women tends to increase the love of wealth: every one can easily imagine the reason for himself. Nor was a reason stated in § 7; the passage where this was touched upon above (καὶ πρότερον, see last *n.*), which is referred to in § 13, see *n.* (286). Yet it may equally have been omitted there in order to be introduced here, when the subject comes up for further discussion. This may have been followed by a transition to the relations of property generally amongst the Spartans, in the form of a remark, to which the passage μετὰ γὰρ καὶ served as a reason or explanation. This much is certain that these words are not at present related to what precedes either as a reason or as explanation, and if no lacuna be assumed the γὰρ of the text is an inconsistency. SUSEM. (298)

§ 14 16 τοῖς μὲν γὰρ καὶ] Cp. VIII (V) 7 § 10 ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται *n.* (1603) SUSEM. (298 b)

20 ἐποίησεν sc. Lycurgus The name is not mentioned, but this is the only subject which can be understood (from § 11). From this then it follows that Aristotle was not as yet acquainted with the famous story according to which a certain Epitadeus carried the law which allowed the family estate to be given

ναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις. (VI)

καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως τε καὶ οὕτως.

§ 15 ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν
24 πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,

21 καταλείπειν M^a P¹ Susem.¹ || 22 ταὐτὸ P¹, τοῦτο Π² Bk.¹ || 23 ἔστι] ἐτι Bender very tempting, yet ἔστι would then be required after τῶν πέντε μερῶν || δὴ Susem.¹ wrongly, see Comm. || καὶ omitted by Π¹, [καὶ] Susem.¹: if we read ἐτι with Bender, it is not needed || 24 γενομένων Koiaes

away or freely disposed of by will: Plutarch *Agis* 4, cp. Schomann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 216 Eng. tr. As far as he knew, this had never been prohibited. Should we expect later writers to be really better informed? Or would it not be as well to consign the said story to the great lumber-room of historical fable which Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us so richly furnished? See further the next note. SUSEM. (299)

ἐποίησεν οὐ καλόν] Aristotle implies that Lycurgus never expressly prohibited, by a declaration of illegality and a penalty, the sale of the old plot of ground or the purchase of a new one. When translated into our mode of thought and expression this means that the force of usage and custom was against the practice; it was held dishonourable to sell. 'With this agrees the omission of Spaita, 8 § 6, from the list of states where alienation or enlargement of the inherited estate was prohibited by law' (Oncken), as one means of restoring, in a certain sense, equality of possessions; comp. II (237). (This decisive circumstance was quite overlooked by Gilbert.) Is it not then a fair inference that Aristotle was also unaware of any equal division of property amongst the Spartans, whether by Lycurgus or any one else, *with the design that this equality should be perpetual*? (This last is the only point here in question with Aristotle.) Otherwise, since such a division amongst those who are actual citizens was also his own ideal, IV(vii). 10 §§ 9—12 n. (835),—cp. *nn.* on II. 6 § 5 (192), § 15 (214)—would he not have expressly appealed to the authority of Lycurgus in support of it, and expressly commended him for this excellent design? Would he not also have expressly blamed him, no less than Plato or Phalens—6 § 10 ff. (208—211), 7 § 5 (234)—for having neglected, to a still greater extent than these theorists, to take the appropriate means for bringing this about: nay more, for having taken

as good as no means whatever? The 7th fragment of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* attributed to Herakleides (Müller *Frag. Hist. Gr.* II. 211) undoubtedly goes back to the Aristotelian work *On the Spartan constitution*, see II. (360) on 10 § 6. But this by no means proves that these extracts must be wholly free from foreign additions, or that τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἔστιν is not one here. Cp. II. (310 *) on § 17. Gilbert, *op. l.* 162 ff., attempts in vain to show that it is quite natural that Aristotle should omit this limitation in the present passage. For, if he had known it, it is obvious how much it must have both weakened and again aggravated the blame he has here expressed. For whatever we may make of the 'ancient portion' (ἀρχαίας μοίρας), it would testify to a stronger care on the part of the legislator to preserve the family estates if the sale of this portion was absolutely forbidden by law and declared null and void, at the same time that it would be so much the stronger inconsistency if even this property was to be freely disposed of by will or given away. Besides Gilbert's whole method of explaining this ἀρχαίας μοίρας has already been briefly, but correctly, refuted by Frick in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CV. 1872. 667. SUSEM. (300)

21 διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν] Translated into our language this means: in all ages after Lycurgus usage and custom were often evaded by apparent free gift or by testamentary disposition of land SUSEM. (301)

22 καίτοι ταὐτὸ συμβαίνειν κτλ.] Cp. VIII(v) 8 § 20 s. fin. II. (1618) SUSEM (301 b)

§ 15 24 τῶν πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο] two fifths.

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων κτλ.] why the number of heiresses in Sparta was disproportionately large Aristotle considers it superfluous to show, because it is readily understood that in the many long wars an unusually large number of sons fell

25 καὶ διὰ τὸ προῖκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἦν (VI) μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλίγην ἢ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι. * * νῦν δ' ἔξεστι (α. 47) δοῦναί τε τὴν ἐπικληρον ὅτῳ ἂν βούληται· καὶ ἀποθάνη (μ) διαθέμενος, ὃν ἂν καταλίπη κληρονόμον, οὗτος ᾧ ἂν § 16 θέλῃ δίδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἑπ- 30 πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν 12 δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην· μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπώλετο § 17 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-

25 ἦν omitted by Π¹, [ἦν] Sussem.^{1,2} doubtfully || 26 * * νῦν Bucheler, see Comm. n. (304): νῦν δ' ἔξεστι δοῦναί <ὁπόσον ἂν τις θέλῃ> καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἔξεστι δοῦναί > τὴν καὶ Wellkion || 27 τε omitted by M¹ P¹, [τε] Sussem.^{1,2} || 28 ὃν ἂν καταλίπη, <τὴν> ἀληρονόμον, οὗτος οἱ ᾧ ἂν καταλίπη <τὴν> ἀληρονόμον, οὗτος Κοττας || 30 τρισμύριον τρισχίλιον P¹ in the margin || 33 οὐδὲ μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν ὑπήνεγκε Sussem.^{1,2} mislaid by William's version *nullam enim plagam pertulit* || 34 μὲν omitted by Π¹. [μὲν] Sussem.^{1,2}

(Hender). Aristotle's statement concerning the great wealth of Spartan women is confirmed by Plutarch's from a yet later time. *Agis* 4. 7 ἦν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πλοῦται ἐν ταῖς γυναῖξι τοῖς πλείστον. (J. G. Schneider.) SUSSEM. (302)

The Spartan name for them is ἐπιδάμονες, ἐπιτάματιδες.

25 καίτοι βέλτιον] Here again later authors are apparently better informed of the fact, than Aristotle. We are told that dowries had actually been prohibited, and that down to the time of Lyandeu none were ever given, see Schomann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 195 Eng. tr. SUSSEM. (303)

26 νῦν δ' ἔξεστι καὶ] It is obvious that this sentence forms no antithesis to the preceding and thus νῦν δὲ gives no sense. All however is right if one imagines something like the following to have fallen out before νῦν δέ: <'And besides it would have been necessary to prescribe who had the right and obligation of marrying heiresses,' whereas at present every father can marry his daughter to any one he pleases, and if he die without a will his heir at law bestows her upon whom he pleases.' SUSSEM. (304)

28 κληρονόμος usually means 'heir': here it must mean the person entitled to the rights of the deceased, the next male relation of full age, or, if there were more than one such, the eldest of them. SUSSEM. (305)

This privilege is assigned to the king by Herod. VI. 57: διαδίδει δὲ τοῖς βασιλέσι πατρὸς τε πατρὸς τε πατρὸς τε, ἐν τῶν ἐκείνου ἔχειν, ἦν μὴ περὶ οὗ πατρὸς αὐτῶν ἐγγυῆσθαι.

§ 16 20 δυναμένη] Of course Aristotle makes this calculation, as Oncken remarks, with regard to the total population of Laconia, whether Spartan or of non-Spartan descent. In any case it is rather too high an estimate, as this total population amounted to only 400,000 at the most: see Schomann *Antiquities of Greece* p. 195 Eng. tr. But on the other hand the reading, or rather conjecture, τρισχίλιον would not merely give a number far too small, but also one out of all proportion to that of the 1500 cavalry. SUSSEM. (306)

30 οὐδὲ χίλιοι] 'In the time of Agis B.C. 241 (Plut. *Agis* c. 5) the Spartans were but 700, and only 100 retained their family allotments' (Eaton). SUSSEM. (307)

33 μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν] The battle of Leuctra Cp. further § 34 n. (345), IV (VII), 14 § 21 n. (916): V (VIII), 4 § 4, § 7 n. (1008). SUSSEM. (308)

οὐχ ὑπήνεγκε] The negative to be taken closely with the verb 'under one blow the city sank'. Cp. Aristoph. *Knights* 1377 δέλω οὐκ ἀπώλετο, Plato *Phil.* 23 Α μύρονος οὐκ ἀντεκείσθαι τῶν νεκροῦν: and below *Pol.* VI (IV), 4. 30 οὐ πολέλειαν.

34 διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν] Here

15 ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδωσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι (VI)
τότε ὀλιγαρχωπῆαν πολεμούντων πολλὴν χρόνον, καὶ φασιν
εἶναι ποτε τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴτ'
ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ ταῦτα εἴτε μή, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως
8 ὁμαλισμένης πληθύνει ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ 13
ο καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθω-

37 τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας A1 Bucheler Sussem², τοὺς Σπαρτιάταις II Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text and probably Γ; Thucot first suspected an error

again of course only Spartans proper are meant, not Provincials (Περσῶν) and Helots. According to Xenophon, *Hellen.* VI 4 15, 1000 Lacedaemonians fell at Leuctra, including 400 out of the 700 Σπαρτιάται who took part in the battle. Xenophon also, *De Rep. Lac.* 1. 1, calls Sparta one of the least populous of states (J. G. Schneider) *Sussem* (309)

§ 17 34 λέγουσι δ' ὅς κτλ. 'It would appear as if Aristotle is our only authority for this fact. Herodotus, IX. 35, is very positive in his assertion that Themistocles the Athenian and his brother Kleonides ἀφ' οὗ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐγένοντο Σπαρτιάται πολῖται' (Congiunt). Cp. also II. (112) (Plutarch *Instit. Lac.* 22 speaks somewhat differently. It is there stated that the stranger, who submitted to the Lycurgean discipline were by the ordinance of Lycurgus also allowed a share in the 'ancient portion,' τῆς ἀρχαίας διατεταγμένης μοίρας, which they were not permitted to sell. (Cp. II. 300) Ephoros however, as Tücher shows, had the following story, *Frag.* 18 found in Strabo VIII 364. The first kings Eurysthenes and Procles had divided Lacedaemon into four states, besides Sparta and Amyclae, and on account of the paucity of men had authorized the dependent rulers of these four provincial states to admit aliens to the right of citizenship: at that time the *περίοικοι* were as yet completely on an equality, political and civil, with the pure Spartans. Now it is indeed true that this account cannot have been the authority which Aristotle is here quoting, as Tücher and Sussemhl once supposed. But this being the case the partial agreement of the two accounts is still striking enough to suggest that Aristotle has here cited some other passage of Ephoros. For Herodotus may possibly refer only to historical times, Aristotle to the earlier period, e.g. perhaps only the reigns of the oldest kings. No doubt he is also thinking of such old Spartan families of non-Dorian descent as the Aegidae and

Talthyridae: see Schomann p. 193, 208, 225 I., 249 Eng tr; Gilbert p. 52 ff, 57 ff, 149 I., Fick in *Fahrb. f. Philol.* (v 1872. p. 65; ff. It might again be said that Herodotus obviously has in mind only foreign-born subjects, whereas Aristotle might mean the *μυῖαται*, as they were called, children of Helots brought up as Spartans, who were perhaps invariably the illegitimate sons of Spartan lords by Helot women. But then such *μυῖαται* were not confined to the times of the earlier kings: even Lyander, Gylippos, Kleandridas, for example, belonged to their number, see Schomann p. 200 Eng. II. Ridgeway, again, suggests that the reference is to the *μυδομαῖδες*, i.e. Helots enfranchised for their services in war, and to their descendants. But a similar objection may be still more strongly urged: the earliest mention of *μυδομαῖδες* is as late as the period of the Peloponnesian war, Schomann p. 198 Eng. II.—Comp. § 11 n (295) and esp. *Intro.* p. 35 n (3)

SUSSEM (310)
35 ὥστ' οὐ γίνεσθαι, and that therefore there was then no lack of men although they were at war for a long time. The indicative would have been used in *oratio recta* hence οὐ, not μή, in *obliqua*. Thucyd. V 40 ὥστ' οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι and Demosth. *De falsa leg.* § 166, 167, 351 with Shilleto's Appendix II.

36 καὶ φασιν εἶναι κτλ. Evidently here again the pure Spartans are meant. Demetrius in Herod. VII 231 reckons them at about 8,000 (Estlin) *SUSSEM* (311)

37 εἴτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ εἴτε μή] Aristotle himself then doubts it. *SUSSEM* (312)

38 βέλτιον 39 τὴν πόλιν] "It is better to fill the city with men by means of an equal division of property" than by the admission of aliens

§ 18 40 ὑπεναντίος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν] is an obstacle to a correction of the evils of Sparta, viz. by equalization of property. See § 1 for

1270 b σιν. βουλάμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς (VI) Σπαρτιάτας, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς § 19 υἱοὺς ἀφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καίτοι 5 φανερόν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως. ἡ γὰρ ἀρ- 14 χὴ κυρία μὲν αὐτῇ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου παντός, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπέπτουσιν ἄνθρωποι σφό-

1270 b 2 προάγει Spengel || τοὺς πολίτας omitted by M^o P¹ || 8 ἀπὲρ Ar., omitted by Γ^o M^o Welldon || 9 παντός Sauppe (*Erst. crit. ad G. Hermannum* p. 94 f.), πάντες Γ^o II Ar. Bk.

constitution. Division of the larger properties would ensure the maintenance of an increased population: the existing law encourages an increase without due regard to their subsistence.

1270 b 2 προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας κτλ] 'stimulate the citizens.' Just the opposite of what Aristotle himself requires. Plato and Phalaris did not go anything like so far, and yet are blamed severely enough by him in this respect. See 6 § 10 ff. *nn.* (208—211), 7 § 5 *nn.* (231, 235). SUSK. (313)

4 ἀφρουρον] not liable to military service, 1) ἀφρουρον φρουρά is a Spartan word for στρατιά, found frequently in Xenophon *Hellenici*, II. 4. 29 ἐξάγει φρουράν, so IV. 7. 2, v. 2. 3. Xenophon uses the phrase φρουράν φάινειν = to declare war in III. 2. 23 and some 15 other places. Also in Thucydides II. 25, Πραεῖδας φρουράν ἔχων

τέτταρας] Aelian *Var. Hist.* vi. 6 says 'five' (J. G. Schneider). Further Manso *Spartia* I. 1, p. 128 f., is undoubtedly right in asserting that this law was of a more modern origin, as the state certainly never dreamed of taxing pure Spartans in the olden times, and the remission of military duty as a reward appears to agree but ill with the spirit of ancient Sparta. The measure reveals that the decadence of the national power had already set in (Tieber). Aristotle however does not say that this law came down from Lycurgus: see *n.* (321) on § 21. SUSK. (314)

§ 19 4 καίτοι φανερόν κτλ] Since the Spartans lived simply and solely on the produce of their estates, this is plain enough. But considering the numerous wars, it is unfortunately not easy to see how decrease in the numbers of fighting

men would be prevented by equality and unalienability of the estates. From the nature of the case the only effectual means to prevent it would have been that which according to tradition was adopted by the early kings, 'to repair gaps in the ranks of the old citizens by the admission of new citizens.' Compared with this effective remedy no great importance attaches to the encouragement given to families of three or four sons by a reward which from its character excited the dangerous vanity, that for distinguished services to the state Sparta had no better prize to offer than release from the honourable duty of serving the state. We know now that no stock which goes on breeding in and in can be preserved from extinction. Significant enough too is the proportionately large number of distinguished men in Sparta who came from the ranks of the μάχαιες (see *n.* 310 on § 17): in whose case fresh blood was imported into the ancient stock. 'The peculiar feature in the social malady of the Spartan state was this, that inequality of property, which we know to be as old as property itself, gained ground here, not as usually, in the train of over-population, but as a consequence of the very opposite condition, viz. depopulation' (Oncken). SUSK. (316)

The Ephorality §§ 19—24. Amongst other monographs see A. Schafer *De ephoris commentatio* (Greifswald 1863), H. Stein *The development of the Ephorality* (Jahresber. des Gymn in Konitz, 1870), Ulrichs in *Rhein. Mus.* vi. 1847. p. 221, G. Dum *Entstehung und Entwicklung der spartanischen Ephorats* (Innsbruck 1878).

8 αὐτῇ] in itself, simply as such.

9 ἐκ τοῦ δήμου] Thirlwall (iv. 377) supposed the δήμος to include the ὑπο-

10 δρα πένντες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ἄνιοι ἦσαν. (VI)
 § 20 ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν
 τοῖς 'Ἀνδρίοις' διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρῷ τινές, ὅσον ἐφ'
 ἑαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπάλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-
 χὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύραννον δημαγωγεῖν αὐ-
 15 τοὺς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ συν-
 επιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστο- 15
 § 21 κρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ
 ἀρχεῖον τοῦτο (ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δῆμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς (p. 48)
 μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὥστ' εἶτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἶτε διὰ τὴν
 20 τύχην τοῦτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμα-

10 ἀν εἶσαν? Schneidei || 12 'Ἀνδρίοις' A1, ἀνδρίοις even Bk¹, ἀνδρείοις P^o (1st hand, emended by a later hand), ἀντρείοις Γ M^a and Γ¹ (1st hand), ἀνδρείοις con. of Γ¹ (τ altered to δ), γρ. ἀνδρίοις p¹ in the margin || 14 [αὐτοῖς] Oncken, αὐτοῖς Ridgeway (αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν καὶ τοὺς Συσμ.?, εἰς τοὺς ἰσούς φοβήσιναι εἰς κοινὴν αὐτῶν Ατ.; τούτοις φοβήσιναι εἰς ἰσούς κοινῶν τούτων William, whence αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν [το] καὶ [οἱ] Συσμ.¹ || 16 ἀριστοκρατίας P²-4 Q^b T^b || 19 τῇ om. by Π² Bk.

μείονες as well as the ἕμιοι, and so too K. F. Hermann. The opposite view is taken by Schumann *Antiquitates* p. 245 Eng. 11. See Büchel *The Lacedaemonians and their allies* I. p. 21 f (Leipzig, 1878). For πάντες, not πάντες, see § 22, 10 § 10. 10 ἀρχεῖον = magistracy, board. 20 § 21, 10 § 10 τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον. ἄνιοι. See below 10 § 12 n. (370 b) and Thuc. I. 131. 2 ὁ δὲ (Παυσανίας) πιστεύον χρήμασι διαλίσσιν τὴν διαβολὴν (Eaton), also *Rhet.* III. 18 b, 1419 a 31 ff.; the Lacedaemonian Ephor called to account for his conduct says οἱ μὲν γὰρ (his colleagues) χρήματα λαβόντες τὰτα ἐπραξον, ἐγὼ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμῃ (Götting). SUSEM. (316)

ἦσαν] were often. 'Why this tense? Is it that in Aristotle's time it mattered little whether they were so or not?' (Congreve). It is imperfect in § 14 ἦσαν, § 16 ἦσαν, § 20 ἡναγκάζοντο, συνέβαινε.

§ 20 11 ἐν τοῖς 'Ἀνδρίοις' what circumstance is meant we do not know. For the expression καὶ νῦν = recently, compare VIII (v) 10 § 31 καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονυσίου, n. (1699). SUSEM. (317)

14 καὶ ἰσοτύραννον] Cp. Plato *Latw* IV. 712 D καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδι δοκεῖ μοι προσοικεῖν [ἢ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ πολέτεια] τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἐφόρων θαυμαστὸς ὡς τυραννίδι ἐν αὐτῇ γέγνηται. See c 6 § 17 n. (219). SUSEM. (318)

δημαγωγεῖν = to conciliate, flatter an individual like a demagogue, in VIII (v).

6 § 6, 10 § 31. But, as Oncken remarks, it hardly seems to convert the constitution into a democracy that the kings pay court to the Ephors. SUSEM. (319) If therefore αὐτοῖς be retained, it will more conveniently apply to the Spartans themselves as in § 16, 19, 24. The kings themselves were compelled to court the favour of the people in order thereby to secure power to counterbalance that of the Ephors.

"This seems to me impossible in this context. If then αὐτοῖς is right, Aristotle has, I think, erroneously exaggerated. For I cannot agree with Busse who thinks that Oncken's objection is sufficiently removed by c. 6 § 17, 1265 b 38, δημοκρατεῖσθαι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς ἐφόρους." SUSEM.

16 ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας] See n. (536) on III. 7 § 3. SUSEM. (320)

§ 21 17 συνέχει = is the keystone of the constitution.

19 διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην] Not Lycus in this case but, on Aristotle's view, VIII (v) 11 § 2, Theopompus See n. (314) on § 18 SUSEM. (321)

εἶτε διὰ τὴν τύχην] Aristotle is not unaware, then, that many good or bad consequences may arise out of legal regulations quite apart from, or even contrary to, the legislator's intention: cp. 12 § 5 n. (409). SUSEM. (321 b)

20 συμπέπτωκεν] Cp. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος c. 12 § 5.

- § 22 σὺν δὲ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σφίζεσθαι πάντα (VI)
 βούλεσθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτά·
 οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν,
 οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν—ἀθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ
 25 αὐτῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν—, ὁ δὲ δῆμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν—κα-
 § 23 θίσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων—)· ἀλλ' αἵρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν 10
 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον δὴ
 νῦν (παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λίκυ). ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεων μεγά-

22 ταυτὰ P¹, ταῦτα ΓP⁴, τὴν αὐτὴν οἱ [ταυτὰ] Schneider, <κατὰ> ταῦτά Βει-
 nays; either this οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν is right || 24 ἀθλον ..ἐστίν] Trieber considers these
 words to be a gloss from Demosth. *Lept.* § 107; even Giphanius remarks on the
 agreement of the two passages "valde minor": see Comm. || 26 εἶδει ἡδὴ M¹ P¹
 || 28 κρίσεων εἰσι μεγάλων Π² Bk.

§ 22 21 δὲ γὰρ ..22 διαμένειν ταῦτά] Cp. VI(IV). 9 § 10 n. (1267), 12 § 1 (1307); VII(VI). 5 § 4 (1434); VIII(V). 9 § 5 (1634). SUBLM. (322)

The order (which Bähr, and apparently Congreve, have mistaken) is δὲ πάντα τὰ μέρη (subject) τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μ. σ. (object of βούλεσθαι) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν. If a constitution is to be preserved, all classes in the state must desire its existence and continuance. Hence we are led to Bernays' or Schneider's correction.

23 οὕτως ἔχουσιν=βούλονται τὴν πολιτείαν διαμένειν (Congreve). Comp. 10 § 10, of the δῆμος.

24 καλοὶ κάγαθοι] This expression in Aristotle—see e.g. VI(IV). 8 § 3 ff.—always denotes the more educated and capable men; and this meaning in the present passage is confirmed by the addition ἀθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῇ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν, which Trieber hardly has sufficient grounds for regarding as an interpolation. Hence Unger in *Phalol. Answer* v. 1873, p. 370 has rightly protested against the completely mistaken assertion of Gilbert *op. c.* 151 ff., and Frick *De ephoris Spartanis* 28 f. 7, who prefer to understand by it the nobles. From passages like 11 §§ 3, 4 and VI(VI). 7 § 4 (which Gilbert p. 153 incredibly mistakes) any one who reads without preconceived opinion will see beyond all doubt that Aristotle knows nothing of an election of Senators at Sparta, for which only certain families were eligible (as was the case in Crete c. 10 § 10), or of a privileged hereditary nobility within the pale of those pure Spartans who had the right to take part in the popular assembly. Nor can the

opposite of this be inferred from VI(IV). 9 § 9, see n. (1264). But the mode of election may very well have been such that in practice members of certain families were successful time after time: see VII(VI). 6 § 21 n (1586). SUBLM. (322 b) ἀθλον γὰρ κτλ] To be a member of this body is a reward of special excellence, or at least it should be. see below § 25, Demosth. XX. *Lepten.* § 107 ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ (at Lacodæmon) τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίως γινέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὁμοίων; Plat. *Lyc.* 26. SUBLM. (323)

26 καθίσταται γὰρ sc. ἡ ἐφορεία ἐξ ἀπάντων. Cp. 10 § 10 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, n. (370). SUBLM. (323 b)

§ 23 28 παιδαριώδης κτλ] Here Aristotle calls the whole method of electing the Ephors childish, yet he says of the election to the senate § 27, κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, it is childish as to the means of ascertaining the results. Consequently the mode of election was probably not the same for the two offices. Plato again describes it in the case of the ephors as approximating to a nomination by lot *Laws* III 692 A, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς διανομῆς. This points to auspices (Ulrichs *Rhein Mus.* N. S. VI. 1847. 223). But it is hardly possible to determine whether elections were chosen by the people and then, after observing certain signs, they appointed the new ephors, as Ulrichs thinks or whether, according to Schomann's conjecture p. 240 Eng. tr., a larger number of persons were nominated by the people, and the five selected from them in accordance with certain auspices. SUBLM. (324)

Schneider had suggested that as in the election of the Senators (see n. 333)

λων εἰς κρίριοι, οὐτες οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώ- (VI)
 30 μονας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς
 § 24 νόμους. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίαίτα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη
 τῷ βουλευματι τῆς πόλεως· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἀνεμένη λίαν
 ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκλη-
 ρόν, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λίθρα τὸν νόμον
 35 ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν. ἔχει 17
 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς
 § 28 ἐπισικῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἱκανῶς πρὸς
 ἀνδραγαθίαν τάχα ἂν εἴποι τις συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει (καί-
 τοι τὸ γε διὰ βίου κυρίου εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφι-
 40 σβητήσιμον· ἔστι γιέρ, ὥσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας

30 τὰ inserted after κατὰ by II¹ Bk. 31 πολιτείας Scaligeri, probably right. αἰτῇ II² Bk. § 38 εἴποι I¹, εἴτη II¹ and I¹ (corr., what the 1st hand wrote cannot be determined), εἴπει II¹ I¹ (a later hand) and I² (1st hand, c. 15 c. 1500), εἴπει (Z^b T^b A^b L^b and I¹ (1st hand), εἴπειν Bk. 2

the people voted by acclamation, which would generally favour those who have the right of proposing candidates. Oncken (p. 281 f.) assumes this view. Götting (p. 468) assumed that the people nominated a certain number of candidates and that from these the Ephors were taken by lot. Stein (p. 20) puts forward a more complicated theory: that elections designated by lot nominated a number of candidates, and that the ephors were elected from the candidates by the same process as the senators.

κρίσεων μεγάλων] The ephors had the greatest part of the administration of justice in private suits especially in all actions arising from contracts; see III. 1 § 10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων <δίκας> δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλος *III.* (443-1), Schommann *op. c.* 237, 216, 250 f. Eng. tr. *Syst. II.* (326)

30 κατὰ γράμματα] There were no written laws in Sparta: Schommann *op. c.* 251 Eng. tr. *Syst. II.* (328)

κοιμ. μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀλλ' αὐτο-γνώμονας, 10 § 11

§ 24 31 οὐχ ὁμολογουμένη] inconsistent with (the design of) the polity

32 ἀνεμένη λίαν] The ephors had a separate jurisdiction to themselves, Schommann *op. c.* 245 Eng. tr., and there they were able, so great was their authority, amongst other things to provide a far more elaborate cuisine than the ordinary soup, the 'black broth' of Sparta (J. G. Schneider) *Syst. II.* (327)

34 ἄλλα λάβρα ἡδονῶν] *Cp.* § 35 *III.* (346-7), IV (VI) 15 § 6 *n.* (227). Thus amongst the Spartan men, too, the much-valued abstinence of marriage had its limits, and the all-important condition was merely not to be detected in excesses. How else would Spartan abstinence even be explicable? *Syst. II.* (328)

§§ 28-28 *The Senate or Ephors.*

§ 28 37 ἐπισικῶν. ἱκανῶς] 'If only honest men, sufficiently trained to manly excellence, entered the senate.' No doubt this was part of the original design of the institution; but frequently it was not carried out: see § 22 *n.* (323). *Syst. II.* (329)

39 κρίσεων μεγάλων] The Spartan senate had criminal jurisdiction in particular: see III. 1 § 10 *n.* (413 b), VI (IV) 9 § 9, ὁλόγου εἶναι κριτοὺς πάντων καὶ φυλάττει *n.* (266) *Syst. II.* (329 b)

40 ἔστι γὰρ, κατὰ] In conformity with this principle Aristotle in his ideal state releases very old citizens from the administration of the state and allows them to retire as priests, IV (VI) 9 § 9 *n.* (816-7). Plato too was of the same opinion on this point. In his state of the *Laws* he prescribes that no one be allowed to be a member of the highest magisterial office, the board of νομοφύλακες (see above *III* on 6 §§ 18, 19), under 50 or over 70 years of age; *Laws* VI 755 A f. Compare also *Rhet.* II. 14. 4 ἀκμάζει. ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνδὲς δὲν πενήττονα: Herod. III. 134 ἀβανόμεν

α γήρας)· τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον πεπαιδευμένων ὥστε καὶ τὸν (VI)
 νομοθέτην αὐτὸν ἀπιστεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ
 § 26 ἀσφαλές φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδωροδοκούμενοι καὶ κατα- 18
 χαριζόμενοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοινωνηκότες τῆς ἀρ-
 5 χῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀνευθύνους εἶναι·
 νῦν δ' εἰσὶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πᾶσας εὐ-
 θύνειν τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λαν τὸ δῶ-
 ρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖν τὰς εὐθύ-
 § 27 νας. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν ἣν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ

1271 a 3 δὲ] γὰρ Spengel || 5 ἀνευθύνους Sylburg, perhaps rightly || 9 καὶ
 ἣν αἵρεσιν ποιοῦνται ..αἵρεσιν οἱ 1aether κατὰ τὴν .γερόντων ἣ τε κρίσις Bender, much
 too violently

τῷ σώματι συναυθύνονται καὶ αἱ φρένες· γηράσ-
 κοπτι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐκ τὰ πρήγματα
 πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται, Livy VI. 23 cum
 corporibus vigescit et deflorescere animos,
 Lucret. III. 445 pariter cum corpore et
 una crescere ventum paukerque crescere
 mentum (Eaton). SUSSEX (330)

1271 a 1 δὲ answers b 37 ἐπεικῶν
 μὲν, the intermediate words from αἱρεῖται
 being parenthetical. Comp. 2 §§ 3, 4
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι...ἐκ δὲ δὲ κρίσις.

ὥστε ἀνδράσιν] 'But if they are
 trained in such a way that even the legis-
 lator cannot trust them' Camerarius long
 since asked how Aristotle came to this
 conclusion. Presumably from the fact he
 mentions directly afterwards, § 26, that
 every senator (as well as all the other
 officials and even the two kings) was
 placed under the control of the Ephors.
 SUSSEX. (331)

§ 26 3 φαίνονται δὲ κατὰ] C^p. c. 11
 § 4. μεγάλη βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐβλαψάν ἦδη
 n. (384). SUSSEX. (331 b)

5 δόξειε δ' ἂν κατὰ] It might be held
 (cp. 8 § 18) that the board of Ephors
 controls all the officials. But this is too
 vast a trust to commit to the Ephorality
 and it is not in this sense that we assert
 the necessity for responsible control.

8 τὸν τρόπον οὐ τοῦτον] Because
 the superintendence and control exercised
 by the Ephors was far too unlimited and
 violent (J. G. Schneider). See above
 § 20 n. (318). SUSSEX (332)

§ 27 ο κατὰ τε τὴν κρίσιν κατὰ] "The
 proceedings are described by Plutarch
 (*Lycorg.* c. 26) in the following manner.
 After the assembling of the 'people,' i.e.
 of all the Spartiates who possessed the
 right of voting, some men selected for

the purpose proceeded to a neighbouring
 building from which no view was afforded
 of the place of meeting, though the voices
 of the assembled crowd could easily be
 heard. Then the candidates for the vacant
 office passed silently one by one through
 the assembly in an order fixed by lot, while
 the people, according to the various de-
 grees of favour with which they regarded
 them, made their feelings known by
 correspondingly loud or feeble acclama-
 tions. The party confined in the building,
 to whom the order in which the candi-
 dates appeared by lot was unknown,
 observed on which occasion the acclama-
 tion was the loudest, and the candidate
 who was thus greeted was regarded as
 the popular choice.....Aristotle's judg-
 ment upon these proceedings is quite
 intelligible in an age in which the man-
 ners of the people had long degenerated
 from their ancient purity and simplicity.
 For obviously there was nothing easier
 than to turn the whole election into a
 mere fraudulent farce, and to determine
 the result beforehand" Schomann p. 231
 f. Eng. 11. One of the main questions
 that arise is, how the committee which
 decided on the loudness of the acclama-
 tions was itself appointed:—and on this
 point we have no information (Oncken).
 Besides, this mode of election is only a
 peculiar survival of the primitive election
 of chiefs by acclamation in a rude an-
 tiquity, retained in a time for which it
 had long since ceased to be adapted.
 In general the votes of the Spartans in
 the popular assembly continued to be
 taken *in voce*, by acclamation, *βοή*;
 and only in case of a doubt as to the
 decision did an actual division of the

- 10 τε τὴν κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι (V1)
 τὸν ἀξιωθισόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ
 βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.
 § 28 νῦν δ' ὑπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης 19
 φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολί-
 15 τας τοῦτ' κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν γερόντων. οὐδεὶς
 γὰρ ἂν ἄρχειν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὢν. καίτοι τῶν γ'
 ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει σχεδὸν διὰ
 § 29 φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ 20
 δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν βέλτιον ἐστὶν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν
 10 ἢ μὴ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος· ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον, * 1 γε
 μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἕκαστον

10 τὸ τὸν Bk.², perhaps through a painter's error || 14 κατασκευάζει P³ and P⁴ (corr.) || 15 τοῦτοις P¹ P²⁻³ Q^h T^b A1. Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand) || 16 ἂν omitted by M¹ P¹ || 17 τῶν omitted by P² Bk.¹ || διὰ omitted by M¹, perhaps by Γ, [ἡδ] Susem.¹⁻² || 19 βέλτιον .. 20 μὴ βέλτιον) μὴ βέλτιον ... 20 βέλτιον P² Bk. (μὴ over an erasure P²) || 20 αὖν Γ, μὴν Π A1. Bk., μὴν εἰ καὶ Schneider Susem.¹⁻² || <βελτιὸν γε> αἰ <δεῖ> γε Susem., <συνώσει> γε Schmidt || 21 αὐτοῦ Bk. αὐτοῦ ΓΠ

assembly take place. See Schomann p. 236 Eng. tr. Further compare § 23, n. (324) Susem. (338)

10 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν αἰτεῖσθαι = (the obligation to) a personal canvass. Schlosser and Fulleborn think this a wise arrangement, since otherwise the *προσείας* might nominate whom they liked;—as if it were Aristotle's meaning that any one who aspired to be a senator had the right to canvass, but need not do so unless he liked. But beyond all doubt, as is clear from n. (333), he means that the candidates are obliged to canvass personally. SUSEM. (334)

11 δεῖ γὰρ κτλ] This is the principle adopted in its entirety by Plato, in whose ideal state the philosophic rulers only undertake the government against their own inclination, Zeller *Plato* p. 463 Eng. tr. Compare also II § 12 n. SUSEM. (335) Add *Rep.* 317 B ff., 517 D, 519 C.

§ 28 13 νῦν δ' ὑπερ κτλ] But here the legislator is evidently acting with the same object as in other provisions of his constitution: in the endeavour to make his citizens covetous of honour he has adopted this device for the election of senators (τούτω=τῷ αὐτῷ αἰτεῖσθαι, a personal canvass). See Xen. *De Rep.* Lac. IV. 2.

16 τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων] Here the term *ἀδικημα* is used in a sense

different from that of *Rhet.* I. 13. 16, 1374 b 8 ἐστὶ δ' ἀδικήματα ἕσα μῆτε παράλογα ἀπὸ ποιητῆς τε ἐστίν, αἱ τὴν ὑποθέσιν ἡμιγυνομένης ἄλλοι. *Ét.* v. 8. 2 where every *ἀδικημα* is also *ἐκούσιον* SUSEM. (336)

Note esp. *N. E.* v. 8. 2 ἀδικημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγμημα ὄρεται τῷ ἐκούσιῳ καὶ ἐκούσιῳ· ὅταν γὰρ ἐκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδικημα τόν ἐστιν· ὅστ' ἔσται τι δίκον μὲν ἀδικημα δ' ὅπῃ, ἔαν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῇ; also *N. E.* v. 7 § 7, both with Jackson's notes. Also the table, p. 109, of his edition of *Nic. Et.* v.

17 τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει κτλ] Here Lysurgus would certainly have been able to reply to Aristotle on the same lines as the latter takes in his objection to Plato c. 5 § 9: ψέγεται διαίωτος. τὸ πολλὸν ἢ δεῖ <χρήματα> φιλεῖν. Besides as no one could become senator until he was 60 years of age, 'an ambition which is contented with this prospect until then must have a very tenacious life, such as is only attained under strict discipline, and cannot easily become dangerous to the state' (Oncken). SUSEM. (337)

The office of king §§ 29, 30.

§ 29 20 ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος] III. cc. 14—17. SUSEM. (338)

21 κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον] 'that each king should be chosen in virtue of his life and conduct': an elective monarchy.

- § 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς (VI) οἶεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὥς οὐκ οὖσιν ἰκανῶς ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδράσιν διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον
 25 συμπρεσβευτάς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνδύμζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ 21 συσσίτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νενομοθέτῃται τῷ καταστή-
 § 31 σαντι πρῶτον. ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύννο-
 δον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Λάκωσιν ἕκαστον δεῖ
 30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ ταῦτο τὸ ἀνά-

25 ἐφόρους Gottling || 27 φιλίτια II¹ (emended by corr. of P²)

§ 30 22 ὅτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κτλ.] In the developed state Aristotle only recognizes kingship as an actual form of government in the case where the preeminently best man exercises an unlimited monarchy: III. 13 § 13 n. (601), §§ 14, 24 n. (614), § 25, 17 § 5 n. (678): VI(IV). 2 § 1 ff. III. (1133, 1136—7); 10 § 3 n. (1280), see also the notes on III. 5 § 10 (521), 13 § 9 (595), § 11 (597), 14 § 15 (633). It is only consistent in him therefore to set up an analogous standard even for a very limited monarchy, and to ignore hereditary descent altogether, except in a family where special capacity may be inherited. Compare I. §§ 3, 4 III (381—3). But when again, cp. n. (296) on § 12, he treats such a peculiar fact as the dual kingship at Sparta, a fact rendered intelligible only by historical events of a very special nature, exactly as if it had come from the brain of a single legislator, then, as Oncken (I. 287) rightly remarks, here if anywhere is a point of view foreign to historical criticism; and such criticism is hardly anything more than superficial. See C. Wachsmuth *The historical origin of the two kings at Sparta in the Jahrb. f. Philol.* xcvi, 1868. 1—9. E. Curtius *History of Greece* 1 p. 186 f. Eng. tr.: Schömann *op. c.* 208, 225 f., 541—4 Eng. tr. But when they come to particulars, these authors diverge seriously from one another in their conception of the subject. SUSKEM. (389)

24 ἐξέπεμπον κτλ.] Two ephors regularly accompanied the king on an expedition: see Schömann *op. c.* 242 Eng. tr. SUSKEM. (390) Cp. Xen *Rep. Lacod.* 13 § 5, πᾶσαι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐφόρων δύο, οἱ πολυταγματοῦσι μὲν οὐδὲν, ἢν μὴ ὁ βασιλεὺς προσκαλῇ· ὁρῶντες δὲ ὅτι πάλαι ἕκαστος πάντας σωφρονίζουσιν, ὡς τὸ εἰλός. Τὰν ἑμβόλους were given to Agis, Thuc. v. 63.

25 συμπρεσβευτάς] A less forcible word, like *συναποδημοῦντας*, might have been expected.

26 τὸ στασιάζειν] Grote II. p. 464. Schneider compares Plut. *Agis* c. 12, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀρχαῖον (the Ephors) ἐρχέσθαι ἐκ διαφορᾶς τῶν βασιλέων τῷ τὰ βελτίονα λέγοντι προστιθέμενον τὴν ψήφον, ὅταν ἄλλος ἐρίῃ πρὸς τὸν συμμέτρον.

The public messes: §§ 31, 32.

§ 31 27 φιλίτια] The derivation is uncertain. Plut. *Lyc.* 12 guesses wildly. Perhaps *λεισθ* to sit; if indeed *φιδίτια* is the true form and *φιδίτης* = *ἐλεμ-εθ-ι-της* (?), see n. on 1272 a 22. Clearly *ἄνδρια* was the older Dorian name, and *συσσίτια* is only an Attic term.

28 ἔδει γὰρ κτλ.] Cp. 10 §§ 7, 8 III. (363, 365). IV(VII). 10 § 10 (834). Plato's criticism, *Λακων* VIII 847 E, is precisely the same: *τροφῆς δὲ καὶ διανομῆς τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἑγγύς τῆς τοῦ Κρηταίου νόμου εἶεν ὁρθότες ἐν τῇ γυνομένη κατὰ τρόπον γίγνεσθαι κτλ.* 'But on Spartan ground this was once for all impossible; for Aristotle himself knows best, § 36, that the Spartan state as such (τὸ κοινόν) possesses no property at all, neither in land, nor in money and money's worth' (Oncken), or at least, to put it more correctly, the state treasury for the most part was not well supplied, cp. Schömann *op. c.* p. 291 Eng. tr. SUSKEM. (381)

For *σύννοδος* = *πρόσδοον* the lex. quote Herod. I. 64 *χρημάτων συνδοίαι* = contributions. But here the singular (*σύνδοον*) and the entire phrase *ἀπὸ κοινού* (*sumptu publico*) favour the rendering 'the gathering should have been a state affair.' Cp. VII(VI). 4 § 13, 1319 a 32; *τῆς συνόδου ταύτης* = *τῆς ἐκκλησίας*. The original design of public messes was military comradeship: see *Sikothianus* pp. 271, 282 Eng. tr.

30 φέρειν = contribute.

λαμα οὐ δυνάμενων δαπανᾶν, ὥστε συμβαίνει τοῦναντίον (VI)
 § 32 τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-
 τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκευάσμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεταί δ'
 35 ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν οὕτω νευρομοθετημένον. μετέχειν μὲν
 35 γὰρ οὐ ῥᾶδιον τοῖς λαῶν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
 οὗτός ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
 § 33 τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρ- 22
 χους νόμῳ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτι-
 μῶντες. στάσεως γὰρ γίνεταί αἰτίας· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν
 40 οὖσι στρατηγοῖς αἰδίοις ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία
 § 34 καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὥδι δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή-
 11 βειεν ἂν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετιμήκεν (a 50)

§ 32 συμβαίνει, apparently M^a (1st hand), συμβαίνειν Q^b T^b Bk. || 36 οὗτος αἰεί
 ἔσται (ἐστὶν M^a) M^a and P¹ (1st hand) || 37 αὐτῶν P^a, αὐτοῦ P^a (1st hand, altered
 by a later hand), αὐτοῦ P¹ || 40 αἰδίοις P^a Ar Bk, ἄλλως αἰδίοις p¹ in the margin
 || 41 καθέστηκεν was apparently omitted by Γ

§ 32 37 μὴ μετέχειν] That is, they
 ceased to be full citizens (δῆμοι). They
 were then, in all probability, included
 unless the term *ποριεῖσιν*. Xen. *Hell.* III.
 3. 6. See Schumann *op.* i. pp. 217—220,
 270 Eng. tr. Since Aristotle censures
 the measures as *ἥκιστα δημοκρατικαί*, it is
 not likely that the persons thus dis-
 qualified were included in the *δῆμος*, as
 Thirlwall supposed iv. 377.

The office of admiral. § 33.

§ 33 38 ἕτεροί τινες] See *Introd.*
 p. 9. n. 1. SUSEM. (342)

39 ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι—in addition
 to the kings. The command of the
 army was the most essential feature in
 the royal power at Sparta: see III. 14 §
 3 n. (616), § 14, n. (631), § 15. also n.
 (381) on II. 11 § 3, (630) on III. 14 § 13.
 Compare also II. 10 § 6 n. (360). We
 can hardly follow Oncken (i. 293) in
 assuming that Aristotle's criticism here
 implies a further reference to Lysander's
 plans for the entire overthrow of the
 kingly power, VIII(v). 1 § 10 n. (1498).
 A design entertained by one distinguished
 holder of the office, such as Lysander
 undoubtedly was, cannot be attributed
 without further ado to the institution of
 the *ναύαρχος* as a whole. Certainly a
 startling anomaly was introduced into
 the political structure of Sparta by the
 necessity which gradually arose for the
 employment of a fleet: and it is sig-
 nificant 'that of four native Admirals
 (*ναύαρχοι*) in whom Sparta trusted in

the last period of the Peloponnesian
 war, two, Phinias and Deinamides, were
 Provincials (*περίοικοι*) and two, Lysander
 and Gylippos, were *μόθαιες* (Oncken).
 Further compare VII(vi). 8 § 15 n. (1473):
Beluch The office of ναύαρχος at Sparta in
Rhein. Mus. XXXIV. 1879. 117—130.
 SUSEM. (343) The Spartan government
 took the same view as Aristotle does here
 when they nominated Agelaos to the
 command of the fleet as well as of the
 army, in order to secure unity in the op-
 erations, 395 B.C., Xen. *Hellen.* III. 4. 27:
ὅντι δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ τῷ ὑπὲρ Κόμης
ἔρχεται ἀπὸ τῶν οἴκων τελευτῶν [the ephors]
ἀρχεῖν καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ὅπως γιγνώσκωσι καὶ
λαταστήσασθαι ναύαρχον ὄντινα αὐτοῖς βοῦ-
λοῖτο. τοῦτο δ' ἐποίησαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
τοῦτον λογισάμεν, ὡς εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀμφοτέρων
ἀρχοι, τό τε πεζὸν πολὺ ἂν λοχυρότερον
εἶναι, λαθ' ἐν οὐσιν τῆς λοχύος ἀμφοτέρων,
τό τε ναυτικόν, ἐπιφαινομένου τοῦ πεζοῦ
ἐνθα δέου.

The military spirit: §§ 34, 35

§ 34 1271 b 1 Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νό-
 μοις] I 625 C—638 B, esp. 630 E, quoted
 in n. (294 b) on § 11. Compare II 660 ff.
 666 E, III 688 A f., IV 705 D: or even
 earlier *Republic* VIII 547 E ff. τῷ δὲ γε
 φοβέσθαι τοὺς σοφούς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀγεῖν,
 .. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς θυμοειδέσι τε καὶ ἀπλουτέροις
 ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πόλεμον μάλλον
 πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην...καὶ πολέμουσα
 τὸν δὲ χρόνον διαγίγναι. The same
 criticism in IV(VII). 2 § 9, 14 §§ 15—18,
 15 § 6 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς: V(VIII). 4 § 2

πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύναξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, (VI)
 τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-
 γαροῦν ἐσφίζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
 5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδ' ἡσκηκεῖναι μηδε-
 § 35 μίαν ἀσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ 28
 ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλαττον νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ
 γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχῃτα δι' ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἢ κακίας, καὶ
 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς
 § 36 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ
 11 κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
 τῆς πόλεως ἔστιν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους
 πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσί τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρ-
 τιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων

1271 b 3 αὐτῇ M^a P¹ || χρησίμη <μόνον>? Sussem. || 5 ἡσκηκεῖναι] *ad virtutem exercitai*: Willam doubts on his own conjecture, hence πρὸς ἀρετὴν wrongly inserted by Sussem.^{1,2} || 6 τοῦτο P¹, τοῦτο P⁴ Q^b A¹, P² (1st hand, altered by con.¹), and perhaps also Γ || 7 μὲν omitted by Γ M^a, perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Sussem.¹ || γίνεσθαι after τὰγαθὸν M^a P¹ || 12 ἀναγκαζομένοι P^{2,3} Ald.

οὔτε πρὸς μίαν.. οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην;
 § 4, § 7, the reference being given in the notes SUSSEM. (344)

4 ἐσφίζοντο μὲν πολ. κτλ.] Repeated in substance IV(VII). 14 § 16 ff. τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελεργεῖται νῦν, § 22 τὴν γὰρ βαθὴν ἀνείων, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγόντες. αἴτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνανθαι σχολάζειν, 15 §§ 5, 6: V(VIII) 4 § 4 τοὺς Λάκωνας ἴσμεν νῦν. καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρον where references will be found in the notes. Aristotle must have said the same in his account of the Spartan constitution, in the *Politeia*; for, as Eaton remarks, the polemic in Plutarch *Lycurg* 30 is directed against a similar criticism, though Aristotle is not mentioned as the author: the passage begins θαυμάζω τῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ἀρχαῖοι μὲν ἴδεναν, ἀρχεῖν δ' οὐκ ἠπίσταντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι. SUSSEM. (342)

ἄρξαντες=after they had won their empire, when they had become a sovereign people.

§ 35 8 τὰ περιμάχῃτα] i.e. external goods: cp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 8 § 4, 1168 b 15 ff. αἱ μὲν οὖν...φιλάντουσιν καλοῦσι τοὺς ἐαυτοῖς ἀποστέμοντας τὸ πλεόν ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς.. ἐκπουδάσκειν [οἱ πολλοί] περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἀριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχῃτα ἐστίν: § 9

1169 a 20 f. πρόσεται [ὁ σπουδαῖος] καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχῃτα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἐαυτῷ τὸ καλόν. SUSSEM. (348)

9 τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς] They are right in thinking valour the means of obtaining external goods: they are wrong in exalting the goods which valour wins above valour itself.

"Cp. IV(VII). 1 § 3 n. (697), 15 § 6 n. (927—8)." SUSSEM (346 b)

ἐπὶ μέντοι ταῦτα κτλ.] See above § 24, n. (328) and again IV(VII). 15 § 6 n. SUSSEM. (347)

The finances. §§ 36, 37.

§ 36 12 ἀναγκαζομένοις] if they are compelled.

14 τὴν πλείστην γῆν] Only the smaller part of the land belonged to the Provincials (περίοικοι). SUSSEM. (348)
 οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἐσφοράς] Even at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war Thucydides (I. 80. 4) makes the Spartan king Archidamos say. πολλῶν ἐπὶ πλεόν τοῦτον (sc. χρυσὸν) ἐλλείπονται καὶ οὔτε ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν (Vetтори). Cp. also what Pericles says (I. 141. 3) αὐτοῦργοι εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδία οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. SUSSEM. (349)

§ 37 τὰς εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκέ τε τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ- (VI)
 16 φέροντος· τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀχρήματον, τοὺς
 δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους.

10 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦ-
 του εἰρήσθω (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἐπιτιμή-
 20 σσειεν)· ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεργυς μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης, VII
 ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυ-
 ρῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἔοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα μεμνησθαι
 τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Λακωνίων· τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα

15 τε] δὲ Γ || 16 γὰρ omitted by P⁴ Q^b T^b || 22 δὲ] τς M^a P¹, *quidem* Wil-
 liam, γε Γ ?

§ 37 16 τοὺς δ' ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημά-
 τους] As early as the first quarter of the
 sixth century B.C. Alcæus (*Fr.* 50) quotes
 the saying of Aristodamos, a Spartan,
 'money makes the man' as in full force at
 Sparta. *ὡς γὰρ εἶπεν* 'Ἀριστὸδᾶμον φασι'
οὐκ ἀπώλαμμεν ἐν Σπάρτῃ λῶρον | εἴημ'
χρήματ' ἀνὴρ, πένυχρος δ' οὐδεὶς πέλεν'
ἔσθαι οὐδὲ τίμιος. Amongst well-known
 instances of peculation or corruption
 Eaton quotes Leucylides, Pleistoanax,
 Astyochos, Kleandridas, Gylippos, Ly-
 sandes to which he adds Plutarch's own
 admission, *Lycurg.* 30; 'Ἀγῶς δὲ βασιλεύ-
 οντος εἰσαφύρῃ νόμισμα πρῶτον εἰς τὴν
 Σπάρτην καὶ μετὰ τοῦ νομισματος πλεονεξία
 καὶ πλοῦτον ἔβηκεν ἐπὶ τῇ διὰ Δόσανδρον, δὲ
 αὐτὸς ὡν ἀνάκτορος ἐπὶ χρημάτων ἐπέπλησε
 τὴν πατρίδα φιλοπλουτίας καὶ τρυφῆς.
 Besides the corruption of the ephors,
 § 19 n. (316), and senators, § 26 (331 b),
 11 § 4 (384), Aristotle might have
 spoken confidently of that of the kings
 and admirals. There was a well-known
 oracle, ἡ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν διέει-
 ἰλλο δὲ οὐδέν, quoted in Aristotle's *Polity*
of Lacedæmon Frag. 501, 1559 b 28
 (= *Aristot. pseudepi.* 496=88 in Muller's
Ev. Hist. Gr II p. 131), and even
 Tyrtaeus (?) seems to have cited it, *Fr.* 3.
 See further Xenoph. *De Rep. Lac.* 14 3
 and the statement in Ps.-Plato *Alc.* I.
 122 E f., quoted by Eaton; *χρησίων καὶ*
ἀργύριον οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι Βαλλίων ἔσαν
ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ 181a. This may very well
 be an exaggeration; the writer of the
 dialogue is however generally well in-
 formed on historical matters, see Cobet
Admones. N. S. II 1874. 360 ff. Compare
 with this the instances of great wealth
 possessed by Spartans, some of which
 have been collected by Grote *Greece* IX.
 321 f., Gilbert *op. c.* 154 f. If the Spar-

tiats, with the exception of the kings,
 ever were prohibited from possessing
 gold and silver—a statement which H.
 Stein in the dissertation quoted in n. (85)
 on I. 9 § 8 seeks to disprove—it was at
 a very early time that the prohibition
 was removed. For gold and silver money
 were first coined by Phidon king of
 Argos (whose age is, I admit, very vari-
 ously estimated, 760 or 670 B.C.), and even
 down to the time of Ctesias gold and
 silver were scarce in Greece; see n.
 (1653) on VIII (v) 10 § 6 and Blockh
Public Economy I p. 6 f Eng. 11. H.
 Stein, Oncken, and others would reduce
 this supposed prohibition to the fact,
 that gold and silver money remained un-
 known for a longer time in the secluded
 valley of the Eurotas than in the trading
 districts on the coast; and thus the
 Spartans retained their old iron money
 in use for a long time, first in bars, and
 afterwards as a sort of coinage (see
 Schomann *op. c.* p. 275 Eng. tr.) and
 employed it even later *along with gold*
and silver money for internal trade. See
 however Thierber *op. c.* 111. SUSEM. (380)
 c. 10 The Oretan polity.

Congreve refers to the article *Cyts* in
 Smith's *Geogr. Dictionary*. See also
 Schomann's *Antiquities of Greece* I 295
 —310 Eng. tr., Oncken II. 377—409;
 Hock *Arete* (Gottingen 1823—9 3 vols.).
 21 γλαφυρῶς] neatly, 'less finished'
 (Congreve).

22 καὶ λέγεται δὲ] Ephoros *Frag.* 64,
 in Stabio x 481? This passage is: *λέ-*
γεσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τινων, ὡς Λακωνικὰ εἶη τὰ
πολλὰ τῶν νομιζομένων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ'
ἀληθές, εὐρήσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων, ἠκριβω-
κέναι δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάδας. Comp. n. on
 §§ 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 below, and esp. *Introd.*
 p. 35 n. (3). SUSEM. (381)

§ 2 τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ (VI
 25 τὸν Λυκούργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ
 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον δια-
 τρῖναι χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποι-
 κοι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Λακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ
 29 πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχου-
 § 3 σαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. [διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τὸν

25 ἐπιτροπίαν P¹ and 1st hand of M¹ P² (in P², altered by a later hand) || τοῦ
 Χαρίλλου P¹ || Χαρίλδου Bas.¹, see Comm || 26 τότε omitted by P¹ Ar., [τότε]
 Susem.¹ || 27 περὶ περὶ τῆς P² Bk || 28 Λύκτιοι κρήτης P², ἄλλως λύκτιοι P¹ in
 the margin || 30 [διὸ .40 Κάμιον] Susem sec Comm. n. (355) || [οἱ περίοικοι]
 Spengel

24 διαρροῦν = quasi per membra et art-
 us distinguere et certum in ordinem iedi-
 gere (Bonitz): to articulate, elaborate
 (Wellm).

§ 2 24 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δ.] Ephoros
 l.c. (Stiabo X. 482) relates that Lycurgus,
 as guardian of Charilaos the posthumous
 child of his brother Polydektes, for certain
 reasons which are stated went to Crete
 and did not return until Charilaos him-
 self had assumed the government. Compare
 Plutarch *Lycurg* cc. 2-5; Trieber *op. c.*
 p. 65 ff., 100; Flügel *Die Quellen in*
Plutarchs Lykurgos 22 ff. (Münch
 1870.) SUSEM. (352)

25 Χαρίλλου] The form is Charilaos
 in VIII (V). 12 § 12 (see n.): probably we
 should restore it here, or else read Cha-
 rillos there SUSEM. (353)

28 κατέλαβον δ'. κατοικοῦσιν] "And
 the settlers who had gone out to Lyttos
 had found the system of the laws estab-
 lished at that time amongst the inhabit-
 ants." In just the same way Ephoros (*l. c.*
 481) replies to those who claim a Lacedae-
 monian descent for the Cretan institutions
 on the ground that the Lyttians were a
 colony from Sparta and that colonists
 generally preserve the usages of the
 mother state. He urges that many co-
 lonies did not do this and that many
 Cretan towns, not colonies from Sparta,
 yet had the same institutions as the
 Spartan colonies in Crete. On these con-
 siderations of Aristotle and Ephoros,
 then, the Lycurgean institutions at Sparta,
 so far from being genuinely Spartan,
 were not even of Dorian origin, but had
 belonged in the first instance to the pre-
 Dorian population of Ciete; unless in-
 deed even these earliest inhabitants of
 Ciete are to be regarded as Dorians as
 they are by Otfried Müller *The Dorians*

I. p. 36 ff. Eng. t.). But this view has
 been refuted by Trieber p. 81 ff. In
 opposition to the view of Ephoros and
 Aristotle, which is in itself improbable,
 he has sought to maintain the truth of
 that comulated by Ephoros, that Spartan
 institutions actually passed over into
 Ciete with the Spartan settlers Compare
 n. (356) on § 4 Polybios *moreover* iv. 54-
 6 describes Lyttos (Λύττος being the read-
 ing there also) as the oldest of the Cretan
 towns and likewise as a colony of Lacedae-
 mon Trieber has shown conclusively
 p. 105 ff. as against K. O. Müller that there
 never really existed any 'specialty 'Dorian'
 political or social principles, such as are
 presumed to have found their highest and
 completest embodiment in Sparta. SUSEM.
 (354)

§ 3 30 οἱ περίοικοι] Why mention
 merely the περίοικοι i.e. the descendants
 of the pre-Dorian population, if after all
 the Spartan and other Dorian settlers
 had accepted the same institutions? Ari-
 stotle cannot have contradicted himself
 in such a manner as this, or have written
 such nonsense. It is much more likely
 that some learned Peripatetic added this
 in order to tack on the following remarks
 about Minos, his maritime power, and
 his death. He did not however perceive
 that they are not at all appropriate to this
 connexion, and that to speak of Ciete as
 favourably situated for maritime supre-
 macy over the Hellenes agrees but ill
 with Aristotle's own statements §§ 15, 16:
 where the remoteness of the island is
 said to have shut it off from external
 complications and from foreign dominion.
 SUSEM. (355)

Ciete II. 484 n. 2 has another way
 out of the difficulty. He takes the word
 as in Thuc. I. 17, "the neighbouring

- 31 αὐτὸν τρόπον χρώνται ἀντοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω (VII)
 πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νήσος καὶ πρὸς α
 τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεφυκέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς· (p. 51)
 πάσῃ γὰρ ἐπικείται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων
 35 ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων· ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν
 τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρόν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόπιον
 § 4 τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διδὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέ-
 σχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νήσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς
 δ' ᾤκισεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύ-
 40 τησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον.]
 § 5 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις πρὸς τὴν Λακωνικὴν. γέ· 3
 172 a ὠργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰλωτες τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶν οἱ περιόικοι,

32 [τὴν... νόμων] Stahr || 34 πάσῃ... 35 πάντων noticed by Theodoros Metoehit. Miscell. p. 644 ed. Kiesling || 34 πάσῃ] μέσῃ Bucheler wrongly || 35 τῇ μὲν τῆς] τῇ μὲν ΓΜ^a || 36 μικρόν] ὄλιγον before τῆς Πελοποννήσου P⁴ || τῆς. . τῇ δὲ omitted by Q^b T^b and I³ (1st hand, added in the margin by a later hand and then again erased) || 37 Ῥόδου II² A1. Bk. || 40 Κάμικον Vettori, Καμικόν Bas¹ in margin, perhaps lightly, κᾶμικον ΓΜ^a P¹⁻²⁻⁴ Ald., καμικον P^a, κᾶμικον Q^b T^b, Camerinam Albertus Magnus and A1.

1272 a 1 τε omitted by M^a P⁴

states" (?) The words of Ephorus in Strabo x p. 737 are τοὺς δὲ Κρήτας ἐλι-
 γωρήσαι (sc τῶν νομίμων) καλωθεύων τῶν
 πολεμίων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν Κνωσίων, τῶν
 πολεμίων μάλιστα δὲ τῶν νομίμων
 παρὰ Λυκίους καὶ Γερωνίους καὶ ἄλλους
 τοὺς πολυχροῖς μάλλον ἢ παρ' ἐκείνοις καὶ
 διὰ καὶ τὰ Λυκίων νόμιμα ποιεῖσθαι μαρ-
 τύρια τοῖς τὰ Λακωνικὰ πρεσβύτερα ἀπο-
 φαίνοντας ἀπολοῦς γὰρ ὄντας φυλάττειν τὰ
 τῆς μητροπόλεως ἐθῆ ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε εἴρηθες
 εἶναι τὸ τοῦ βέλτιον συνεστώτας καὶ πολιτευ-
 ομένους τῶν χειρόνων ζηλωτὰς ἀποφαίνειν.

34 ἐπικείται=commands the whole
 sea (Congreve).

§ 4 After the Dorian invasion Crete
 lost its fleet and maritime supremacy.
 Cp. Thuc. I. 4: Ephorus *Ἰσθμ.* 64
 (Müller I. 250) καὶ γὰρ ναυκρατεῖν πρό-
 τερον τοῖς Κρήταις οὐκ ἀποβεβληκέναι
 τὸ ναυτικό.

41 ἔχει δ' ἀνάλογον...Λακωνικὴν]
 Triebei p. 86 ff. shows that, although the
 points of difference as well as of resem-
 blance are not brought out forcibly
 enough, yet in the main the whole com-
 parison is just. He tries to make it
 probable that from its quite peculiar char-
 acter the similarity can only be explained
 by a real transference from Sparta to
 Cete. Oncken on the other hand, II.

377, finds a reason both for the resem-
 blance and the limitations to it in the
 one point which Aristotle has not men-
 tioned, "the fact that in Sparta as in
 Cete a dominant race of the same
 Dorian descent broke in from a foreign
 land upon an old political order, overcame
 it by violence, and then directed their
 whole energies to the task of maintaining
 themselves uncontaminated and *unassail-
 able* at the head of their new settlement."
 Polybios VI. 45, 46 goes still farther and
 even denies that there were any resem-
 blances at all between the two polities.
 SUSSEX. (356)

He insists (1) on the absence of any
 legal restriction on the possession of land
 or money, and (2) on the annual tenure
 of offices (as contrasted with the life-long
 tenure of Spartan Kings and Gerusians)
 and the democratic character of the Cretan
 governments. Undoubtedly as we ap-
 proach Roman times the power of the
 ἐκκλησία increases: Hock III. pp. 64—
 97, who supports his case from inscrip-
 tions, infers that a democratic revolution
 had subverted the governments of Aris-
 totle's time.

§ 5 1272 a 1 οἱ περιόικοι] See n. 355
 and esp. Exc. III. to this book p. 336 ff.
 SUSSEX. (357)

καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔστιν, καὶ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ (V)
 Δάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεῖα, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἣ καὶ
 § 6 δῆλον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. οἱ
 5 μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ
 καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν ἀρι-
 θμὸν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν· οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς νέρουσιν,
 οὗς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες βουλὴν, ἴσοι· βασιλεία δὲ πρότε-
 ρον μὲν ἦν, εἴτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
 § 7 οἱ κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέ-
 11 χουσιν πάντες, κυρία δ' οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἡ συνεπινηγίσειαι
 τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοις.

τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς
 Δάκωσιν (ἐν μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἕκαστος εἰσφέ-
 15 ρει τὸ τεταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετέχειν νόμος καλῶναι τῆς πολι-
 § 8 τείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κοινοτέρως·

3 φιλία Γ M^a and P¹ (1st hand, apparently altered by P¹) § ἀντρεῖα M^a, ἀν-
 δρεῖα Π² Bk., ἄλλως ἀνδρεῖα P¹ in the margin § 8 βουλὴν "a gloss under which
 lurks a Cietan name" Spengel § πρώτων Γ Thomas Aquinas and Δι., perhaps
 rightly § 11 ἀλλῃ P² and P² (1st hand, emended by con.²)

3 ἀνδρεῖα = meals of men. or more
 precisely, clubs or companies of men who
 messed together: see n. (378) on 11 § 3.
 SUSLM. (358)

καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες The same re-
 mark is found in Ephoros l.c. 482, with
 the object of proving the same conclusion.
 Comp. also Plut. *Lyming.* c. 12. But
 that Ephoros repeats this argument
 three times, is a very inexact statement
 of Triebner, p. 100. for at p. 480 the ex-
 pression is only ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις δὲ
 καλοῦσιν ἀνδρεῖα and p. 482 εἰς τὰ συσσί-
 τια ἔχουσι τὰ ἀνδρεῖα. SUSLM. (359)

This constitution analogous to that of
 Sparta was the constitution of every inde-
 pendent Cretan town. We learn from
 the inscriptions that little places like
 Hierapytna, Priastos (Praesus), Saxos,
 Allaria, had each its own κόσμοι, βουλὴ,
 and ἐκκλησία.

§ 6 On the analogy between the Ephors
 and the κόσμοι, see Exc. III. p. 335 f.
 SUSLM. (360)

7 οἱ δὲ γέροντες See § 11. SUSLM. (361)
 § 7 τοῖς ἐκκλησίαις δὲ κατὰ Cp. 11
 §§ 5, 6 with Exc. IV. Although the
 simple verb ἐπινηγίσειν does not mean
 "to vote," but "to put to the vote," yet
 so far as I know συνεπινηγίσειν is
 everywhere found in the sense of "vote

approvingly," i.e. "confirm by a vote,"
 anchors here: Polyb. XXII 13. 1, Pla-
 tach *De Cassiliato* 511 F. Here it can
 have no other meaning. The only doubt
 is whether we should take it literally (1)
 that the popular assembly was bound to
 ratify by its vote, or (2) that it only had
 the right, without proper debate and
 without amendment, simply to confirm
 or reject the proposal previously decided
 by others. That question will be dis-
 cussed in n. (380). SUSLM. (362)

Aesch. *De Fals. Leg.* 35 has the middle
 voice in the same sense. Compare κατα-
 σιωπᾶν with both meanings (1) to be very
 silent, (2) to put to silence (Cope). In
 the Gortynian inscription the assembly
 in the market-place and the stone from
 which the speaker addressed the people
 are twice mentioned X. 34, ἀμπαυεῖν
 δε κατ' ἀγορὰν λαταφειμένον τοῦ πολί-
 ταν ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ, οὐ απαγορεύοντι, i.e. ἀνα-
 παύεσθαι [he must adopt] δε κατ' ἀγορὰν
 κατελεμένων (Hom.) τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ
 λαοῦ (cp. Soph. *O. Col.* 196) οὐ απαγορεύ-
 ονσι, adoption shall be in the market-
 place, when the citizens are assembled,
 from the stone where they make speeches.
 and again XI. 10.

16 εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 31.
 Cp. n. (341). SUSLM. (363)

ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γινομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά- (VII)
 των ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ * * φόρων οὓς φέρουσιν οἱ περι-
 οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-
 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσιτίοις, ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέ-
 φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς δ'
 δὲ τὴν ὀλιγοσυνίαν ὥς ὠφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφίλοσθ' ἔφηνεν ὁ
 νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἵνα μὴ
 πολυτεκνώσῃ, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας ὁμίλιαν, (p 5a)
 25 περὶ ἧς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ δια-

18 καὶ ἐκ Q^b T^b Lambin Bk., perhaps Γ; [ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] Gottling, [ἐκ] Congreve || καὶ <ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν>? οἱ καὶ <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν>? Susem., see Comm., [καὶ] Lambin, καὶ <ἐκ τῶν> Congreve || καὶ ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων before ἀπὸ πάντων οἱ else after ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ by transposition, Schmidt || 21 [καὶ γυναῖκας ... 26 διασκεψάσθαι καιρός] Oncken; but see the Comm. || 21 πρὸς δὲ ... 26 καιρός transposed by Susem.¹ to follow 27 φανερόν, but wrongly || 24 ποιήσας is corrupt, <νομίμην> ποιήσας or something similar? Susem., better πορίσας Schmidt

κοινότηρας] ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον of 9 § 31, in a more public fashion.

18 ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων] "from the public domain." Zitelmann pp. 139, 140 conjectures that the citizens had the right of pasture on this domain-land. By the law of inheritance in the Gortynian inscription, certain of the cattle with the house in the town pass to the sons as *παῖδες γυναικῶν*; but the daughters have a share of the land which is cultivated by *κλαῖοντα*.

οἱ περιόικοι] See Exc. III. p. 336 ff. SUSEM. (364)

§ 8 19 τέτακται μέρος] Partly on this model, partly on that of Hippodamos (8 § 3 n.), is based the division of the land in Aristotle's ideal state, IV(VII). 10 § 10 n. (834), into property (1) of the temples, (2) of the *syssitia*, (3) of private individuals, (1) and (2) together forming the public land. In the state of the *Laws* there is no public land, although Plato mentions the Cretan institution with approval, VIII 847 x quoted in n. (341) on 9 § 31. SUSEM. (365)

20 ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κτλ.] If we understand this as e.g. Schomann does, *op. c.* 307 Eng. tr., that the mess-funds maintained the members of the family, wives daughters younger boys and slaves, who had their meals at home, then the whole of Oncken's proof (II. 385), that καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας καὶ ἄνδρας is a spurious addition, falls to the ground. Such slight inaccuracies of expression, due to excessive brevity, are no uncommon thing in

Aristotle. The sense might be made clearer by a slight insertion (thus 'one part is set apart for the worship of the gods and for the state expenditure, the other for the public messes—and the entire maintenance of the households of the citizens', so that all, men women and children, are kept at the public cost.' Schomann rightly remarks that this explains why an Aeginetan state had to be paid for each slave. see Exc. III. p. 337. Oncken however gives a different explanation (II. 387), he makes each of the subject population (?) contribute an Aeginetan state. SUSEM. (366)

§ 9 22 ὀλιγοσυνίαν] Our only authority for a Cretan *ἀνδρείον*, Heraclides Ponticus, and the writers quoted by Athen. IV. 142 f., Dosiadas and Pygion, do not enable us to verify this statement: Schomann p. 308. They kept up the old practice of sitting at table: Cretes quorum nemo gustavit unquam cubans, Cicero *pro Murena* § 74. Their moderation in drinking: [Plato] *Alcibiades* 320 A.

23 πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν κτλ.] See Schomann p. 304 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (367) Also Zitelmann *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 101 and the inscription itself II. 1, 6, 8, 9.

25 ἕτερος ἔσται τοῦ διασκ. καιρός] Since Aristotle thought it so important for his own ideal state to maintain uniformity in the number of citizens (see c. 6 § 10 ff., 7 § 5: IV(VII). 16 § 15 ff. with notes), and is not too nice about the means of securing that end, it would

σκέφασθαι καιρός)· ὅτι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλτιον (VII)
 τέτακται τοῖς Κρησὶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωσι, φανερόν, τὰ δὲ
 § 10 περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτι χειρόν τῶν ἐφόρων. ὃ μὲν γὰρ
 ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις
 30 (γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες)· ὃ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρεи πρὸς τὴν
 πολιτείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γάρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν
 αἵρεσιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχων ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης
 ἀρχῆς βούλεται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάν-
 34 των αἰροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς
 § 11 γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων, περὶ ὧν τοὺς αὐτοὺς αὖ τις α
 εἴπειε λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων (τὸ
 γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἐστὶ γέρας τῆς
 ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχειν ἀλλ' αὐ-
 § 12 τογνώμονας ἐπισφαλές). τὸ δ' ἡσυχάζειν μὴ μετέχοντα τὸν
 40 δῆμον οὐδὲν σημεῖον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ λήμ-

26 δὴ Lambin, δὲ Γ II A1. Bk. || 29 τούτων Π² Bk, τούτῃ ? Sylburg, <τῷ>
 τούτων Bernays || 34 γενῶν] γερόντων Γ || 35 ἐκ τῶν Π¹ || 36 α-
 πειν Γ² (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), εἴποιε Μ² P¹ Q² T² Ald., εἴποι Γ⁴ and
 P² (cor.?) || τῶν Bas.², ὧν II || γερόντων Congreve, γενομένων Π¹ P² 34 T² B.
 Ald. Bk., γενομένων Q^b || 37 γέρας Γ || 40 καλῶς οὐδὲν] καλῶς οὐδὲ Γ Bk.
 and perhaps Ar.

have been strange if he had not intended to take this question into consideration when describing the best state. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. 4, p. 53. How he would have decided it, we have no means of knowing. For, taken alone, *Nic. Eth.* vii. 5. 3 hardly justifies an immediate inference that he would have disallowed such means. Thus the grounds on which Oncken, *ii.* 389 ff., tries to prove that § 9, αὐτὰς αἱρεῖται, is interpolated, are wholly untenable and it is a misapprehension on his part that I bracketed the clause. But he is right in one point, that the introduction of this subject is not very fitting here, we must however put up with it, as it would be still less appropriate in any other part of the chapter. SUSSEX (368)

§ 10 30 γίνονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες] Ephoros *Fr.* 64 (in Stabro p. 482) gives the same statement as Aristotle here, that the senators were chosen from those who had been *Kóρμοι* but adds that only tried and approved men were selected. There is no divergence in the facts here, but only in the judgment upon them: though it is of such a kind that, as is

stated in *Enc. III* p. 336, Aristotle must have depended upon other accounts than those of Ephoros for the facts on which he based his judgment. Furthermore even in *Σηματα* those who had been Ephors must frequently, to say the least, have entered the senate. SUSSEX. (369)

32 διὰ τὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν κατὰ] See c. 9 § 22 n. (123 b). SUSSEX. (370)

34 ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν] Called *στρατός* in the Gortynian inscription v 5 οὐκ ο αὐθα-
 λευστατος ἐκοσμων αἱ συν κυλλαι=when it was the turn of the 'troop' of the Aethalians to assume office and Kyllas was *κόσμος ἐκόντων*. Comp. Hesych. *στάροι* (*σι*)=αἱ τάξεις τοῦ πλῆθους. Similarly in the oath of Dioscori, Causer *Delect. inscript.* 38, ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰθαλέων κοσμητόνων τῶν συγ-
 Κυλλαι.

35 κεκοσμηκότων] like ὁ ἀρχάς, ὁ βασιλεύσας, the *cosmet* being more usual.

§ 11 38 μὴ κατὰ γράμματα] without written rules to guide them. Cp. 9 § 23.

§ 12 See i. § 2.

40 λήματος] They make no private gains, such as bribes from allies and dependent states, or from hostile powers (comp. Pericles' bribe to the ephor Kleon-

ματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ' (VII)
 § 13 ἀποικοῦσιν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθερούντων. ἦν δὲ ποιοῦνται
 τῆς ἁμαρτίας ταύτης ἱατρῆαν, ἥτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἀλλὰ
 δυνασταυτική, πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβιάλλουσιν συστάντες τινὲς τοὺς τ'
 κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχόντων αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· ἔξεστι
 § δι καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταῦτα δὲ
 πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων βού-
 § 24 λησιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλὲς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ
 τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἦν καθιστάσι πολλάκις οἱ ἂν μὴ δίκας βούλων-
 ται δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν· ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει τι πολιτείας
 10 ἢ τάξις, ὅλλ' οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ δυναστεία μάλλον. εἰώ-
 θασι γὰρ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἀναρ-

41 γ' τ' ἰγνυμένῳ Λι, γὰρ Sussem¹ wrongly, *enim* William, whence nothing is to be inferred about 1'

1272 b 1 διαφθερόντων Γ' Δ' ἀντὶ πειρήας Λι, διαφθερόντων 1st (1st hand) || § 8 δὴ] δὲ Conjecture, rightly, I think f 6 πάντα πόρρω 1st (1st hand), πόρρω 1st (1st hand) || 8 αὐτὸν Κίρατος, δταν Γ' II. Λι. Schneider Bk || 9 τῶν δυνατῶν (not here but before 8 ἢν λαβόντων) II² Λι. Bk. and p³ in margin; αὐτὸν λαβόντων, δυνατῶν <τινὲς> or even better αὐτὸν λαβόντων? Schneider || Πεννίσιας τινὲς ποιεῖσιν

12 ἀλλήλοισι before 9 ἢ καὶ δῆλον κτλ. 1, 11 γὰρ Sussem following Beitzay² translation, δὲ Γ' II Λι Bk. Sussem¹ || διαλαμβάνοντες unpunctuated by Bonitz (*Jud. Ait.* 182 b 6), καὶ λαμβάνοντες Sussem¹, ἰδίᾳ λαμβάνοντες Schmidt, needless if we alter *μοναρχίαν* into *ἀναρχίαν* 1, *ἀναρχίαν* Beitzay², *μοναρχίαν* Γ' II. Λι. Bk. Sussem.¹

δικας, Plat. *Ph.* 22). Hence the office is not such a privilege as to enable the judiciary of the commons.

11 τοῖς ἐφόροις Cp 9 § 19 n. (316). SUSSEM (370 b)

1272 b 1 τῶν διαφθερούντων goes with πόρρω at a distance from any who are likely to corrupt them.

§ 13 3 δυνασταυτική] A *dynastasia* is the worst and most extreme form of Oligarchy, standing nearest to a Tyranny, and, after it, the worst of all forms of government. VI(15) § 2 δταν παῖς ἀπὲρ πατρὸς εἰσὴν καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχόντες n. (1215); 6 § 11 n. (1228); 14 §§ 7-9 m. (1328, 1331) VI(15). 7 § 3 n. (1447) VII(V). 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (1509); 6 §§ 11, 12 m. (1586, 9), 7 §§ 12, 13 n. (1606), 8 § 7 n. (1613), § 11 n. (1617). SUSSEM (371)

Theltes at the time of the Persian war is an instance. Thuc III. 62, 3

5 μεταξὺ ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν] to resign office before then (10m of a year) expires. The verb is ἀποσπῆλαι in the Goitynian inscription ε λ' ἀποσπῆαι = ἦν ἀποσπῆ; οἱ (?) ἀ = ἦ (after) ἀν ἀποσπῆ

§ 14 8 τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας = the fact of the suspension of the office of Κόσμοι, often brought about by cabals of influential families who did not want to have trials against themselves proceeded with.

For the construction cp. Thuc. I 138 καὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἦν ὑπερίδει αὐτῷ δουλεύσειν; II 42 πέντα ἐλπίδι, ὅς κεν ἔτι διαφύγων αὐτὴν πλουτήσεν (Shilleto).

οἱ ἂν μὴ κτλ Oncken (II 393) is quite wrong in inferring from this passage that even the judicial office probably passed from the kings to the Κόσμοι. From the complete analogy which Aristotle finds between the Spartan and Cretan senates, and between the Ephors and Κόσμοι, in all the essential features of the authority of these offices, it is clear on the contrary that, as in Sparta III 1. 10 m. (443-4), so in Crete, the Senate had criminal jurisdiction over the most serious offences, and the Κόσμοι appeared, like the Ephors, as accusers in the case of crimes against the state. Where there is no prosecutor there is of course no judge. SUSSEM (372)

11 διαλαμβάνοντες = by forming parties

§ 15 χ'αν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καί-^(VII)
 τοι τι διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τινος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν
 εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἀλλὰ λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; (p 53)
 15 ἔστι δ' ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλεις * * τοῖς
 βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένοις. ἀλλὰ καθάπερ
 εἴρηται, σφίζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον· ξηνηλασίας γὰρ τὸ πόρρω
 § 16 πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρησίν, οἱ
 δ' εἰλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἑξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς
 20 κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικός διαβέ-
 βηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὅς πεποίηκε φανεράν τὴν ἀσθένειαν
 τῶν ἐκεῖ νόμων

περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης τοσαύτῃ ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω τῆς πολι-

15 ἐπικίνδυνος] *valde periculosa* William on his own conjecture probably, hence
 λαν ἐπικίνδυνος Sussem.¹⁻² wrongly || τῶν βουλομένων and 16 δυναμένων II² A. Bk.
 "because those who wish to attack it can also (easily do so)" Beinays; <ὅτων> τῶν
 βουλομένων Bn.³, <ἀπό> τῶν β. Dussé. If the dative is right an infinitive has
 dropped out, as Bucheler saw || 21 φανεράν Bk.¹, a misprint || 23 εἰρήσθω before
 τοσαύτῃ P¹ II² Bk.

from amongst the people and their own
 friends. SUSSEM.

§ 15 17 ξηνηλασίας] Acc. plur. 'The
 distance has kept out aliens as effectually
 as a formal prohibition.' No foreigner
 could come to Sparta and live as a resident
 alien (*μέτοικος*); strangers stopping
 there for a time were strictly watched
 and, as soon as it seemed advisable to
 the Ephors, dismissed: see Schumann p.
 276 f. Eng. II. SUSSEM. (373)

§ 16 18 διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν π. καλ.] Consult
 however n. (281) on § 3. where also a
 different reason, it should be observed,
 is assigned by Aristotle himself, viz. that
 the Cretan states, even if at war, assist
 one another against the revolted *περιοικοί*.
 SUSSEM. (374)

19 οὔτε γὰρ] It is the isolation, not
 the strength, of the Cretans that secures
 their independence, for (1) they are not
 strong enough to acquire foreign domi-
 nion (*ἑξωτερικῆς ἀρχῆς*), while (2) their
 internal weakness is now patent.

20 νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος καλ.] There
 are two events to which this passage,
 taken by itself, may refer. (1) With
 Höck, *Agis* III 61 f., we may under-
 stand it of the Phocian war. Phalaecus,
 the last leader of the Phocians, after
 withdrawing from Phocis came at last
 with his mercenaries to Crete: by a strata-
 gama he conquered Lyktos and drove
 out the inhabitants who turned to their

mother city, Sparta, for aid. This aid
 they received under the command of
 Archilamos, who beat the mercenaries
 and re-established the Lyktians in their
 city Phalaecus however stayed in the
 island and fell at the siege of Kydonia
 II 343. See Schafer *Demosthenes* II.
 339 f. (1) (2) we might with Fülleborn
 (II 253) refer it to the despatch of Agis
 with the mercenaries of his brother
 Agis II, who was allied with the Persians
 and sent the expedition directly after the
 battle of Issos (333) to conquer Crete.
 The Lacedaemonians with their mercen-
 aries effected a landing successfully and
 met with no material resistance; see
 Schafer III p. 163 f. As therefore
 both events suit, if, when he wrote the
 passage, Aristotle had been acquainted
 with the second he would certainly have
 spoken of *his* foreign wars, and not of
 one only: thus it seems as if this passage
 were composed before the latter of the
 two events took place. But it need not be
 inferred from this that the completion of
 the book, so far as Aristotle did at all
 complete it, could not have been of a
 much later date. Aristotle often worked
 at several of his treatises at the same
 time. Cp. *Introd.* p. 66. SUSSEM. (375)
 ξενικός = of mercenaries (Congreve)
 Beiler, 'foreign' For III. 14. 7 ξενικόν
 as opposed to *οἰ* *πολεῖν* means a foreign
 force, though a force of mercenaries.

σίτια τῶν ἐταιριῶν τοὺς φιδιτίους, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκατὸν (VIII)
 35 καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταύτην δ' αἰροῦνται τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον
 § 4 τοὺς ἐκεῖ βασιλευσὶ καὶ γέρονσιν, καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βασι-
 λεῖς μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος μῆτε τοῦτο τὸ τυχόν, τεί τι
 40 διαφέρουν ἐκ τούτων† αἰρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ' ἡλικίαν μεγα-
 λων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστῶτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὦσι, μεγάλα βλά-
 1273 a ππουσι, καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἥδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.
 § 5 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν διὰ τὰς 3

34 φιλιτίους II¹, corrected by P¹ || τὴν... 35 ἀρχὴν is noticed by Theodoros Metoch. *Miscell.* p. 667 Kiesel. || 35 <δ>οὐ βέλτιον || 36 γὰρ omitted by P²⁻³ Q¹ T^h Ald. Bk. Bernays || 38 ἐκεῖ inserted after τοὺς by Q¹ T^h and in the margin of P⁴ || 39 καθ' αὐτὸ Γ and γρ. P¹ in the margin, καθ' αὐτὸ P¹ (1st hand) καὶ αὐτὸ M¹ (1st hand), κατὰ M¹ (correction), κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ II² Bk. and P¹ above the line, κατὰ τὸ Ar. (?) || μῆτε before τοῦτο Schneider, μῆδὲ II Bk. || ἐκ τι Γ, ἐκ τι M¹ II¹ Bk and P¹ in the margin, ἢ A¹. and P¹ (1st hand), ἐκ τέ τι Wellon || ἐκ τι διαφέρουν ἐκ τούτων is corrupt: * * ἐκ τούτων Conring, who first saw that from ἐκ τούτων onwards Aristotle is speaking of the senate and not the kings: but this is true of the whole clause from ἐκ τι. With approximate correctness τοὺς δὲ γέροντας τῷ Schneider, τοὺς δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον J Brandis (*Rhein. Mus.* LI 595 f.) which is closer to the text, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλοῦτων Bernays. On grammatical grounds I prefer Brandis' suggestion with Bucheler's slight change ἐκ δὲ τοὺς γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, or better still ἐκ τι δὲ γέροντας κατὰ πλοῦτον, though I have not ventured to introduce it into the text

1273 a 1 κερχθονίων οἱ καλχθονίων Γ

the magistracy of the Hundred and Four answering to the Ephors (only with this advantage in its favour that whereas the Ephors are chosen from quite ordinary persons the Carthaginians elect to this office by merit). See *ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝ* IV. pp. 340—347. *SUSEM* (378-9-81-2)

36 ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων] See c. 10 § 10 n. (360). *SUSEM* (380)

§ 4 38 "And it is a further advantage that the kings (at Carthage) are not a distinct royal line and that, too, of not more than average capacity," like the Heraclid royal families at Sparta, whose precise relation to the Dorian Spartans is obscure. See Hdt. V. 72, Curtius *Histor.* I. p. 186 ff. Eng. tr. and Schomann *Antiquities* pp. 203, 226, 541—544 Eng. tr.

39 μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ κατ.] Comp. 9 § 30 n. (339) and p. 344. *SUSEM*. (383)
 ἐκ τι διαφέρουν] See the *Critical Notes*
 The sense required is "and that the senators are elected for wealth and not by seniority."

40 καθ' ἡλικίαν] The unsoundness of the text is felt when this has to be interpreted of the Spartan kings. Congreve renders boldly "elected rather than hereditary": Cope more cautiously "according to age." But there was no limit of age for the kings, though there was for the Gerusiasts, at Sparta.

μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι κατ.] The Spartan senators were venal, 9 § 26 n. (331 b) But the conditional phrase here given to the constitution of Carthage is sensibly modified § 8 ff. *SUSEM* (384)

41 εὐτελεῖς = cheap, of little worth; intellectually, in *Rhet.* II. 15 § 3; here, in moral character also.

§ 5 1273 a 2 τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα κατ.] "Most of the things which might be censured on the score of divergences" sc. from the best type "are common to all the constitutions mentioned." And therefore in reference to Carthage Aristotle passes over all such defects in silence (Kluge) *SUSEM*. (385)

παρεκβάσεις * * κοινὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὄντα ταῖς εἰρημέναις (VIII)
πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας
5 καὶ τῆς πολιτείας * * τὰ μὲν εἰς δῆμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον,
τὰ δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσάγειν (v 54)
τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν τρὸς τὸν δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κύριοι
μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἂν ἑμογονωμονῶσι πάντες, εἰ δὲ μή,
§ 6 τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος, ἂν δ' ἂν εἰσφέρουσιν οὗτοι οὐ δια-
10 κοῦσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόσσι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-

3 παρεκβάσεις ~ τὰς τῆς ἀρίστης τάξεως> or something similar Susem., cp. § 1.
Γαλλοὶν finit ~ partial a defect | 4 ὑπόθεσιν <ὑπεναντίων> Deinang.; cp also
y § 1 | 5 πολιτείας ~ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις> Susem., ἐλλείπει <τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις>
Thiout, who discards the lacuna | ἑλλένει I¹, ἐλλένειν M¹ (corr.) || 6 γὰρ τὸ
Μονοκλι Deinang. | 7 τὸ δὲ αἰ II-Bk. Deinang. In Q^b τὸ is a correction of τὰ,
apparently by the writer himself | 9 τούτων καὶ Susem., καὶ τούτων P II Bk., καὶ
τούτων Deinang. | εἰσφέρουσιν II² (emended by cor¹ in I²) ? οὗτοι omitted by
II², [οὗτοι] Susem¹ 2, perhaps rightly | 10 τὰ δόξαντα τὰξάντα M¹, ταξάντα P¹ (1st
hand, corrected by P¹), ταξάντα P

4 With τῶν δὲ supply ἐπιταγθέντων ἀν.,
and take πρὸς ~ when judged by

τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κατὰ] The
whole passage requires to be read in the
light of c. 9 § 1 where the two standards
of the citizen are more definitely stated.
μία μὲν εἰς τὴν καλὴν ἢ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν
ἀρίστην νενομοῦνται τάξιν, ἕτέρα δ' εἰς τὴν
πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως
τῆς προειρημένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας. The
second, then, which is now under con-
sideration is, how far the Carthaginian
constitution, although not the best, that
is, a true Aristocracy, nevertheless remains
faithful to its own distinctive principle.
It is still to be regarded as an aristoc-
racy: i.e. a so-called, or mixed aristoc-
racy: more precisely a combination of
aristocracy with oligarchy and democracy:
see VI (11) 2 § 4 n. (1241), 7 § 1 n. (1245),
and cp VIII (V), 7 § 1 n. (1297), 12 § 12 n.
(1772), § 14 n. (1780) or else at any rate
as a polity (πολιτεία) i.e. a mixture of
oligarchy and democracy. Now the prin-
ciple or fundamental assumption (ὑπό-
θεσις) or proper basis of every aristocracy
is excellence and capacity see esp. § 9 τὸ
κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀριστοῦναι ἀρ., § 11 μάλιστα
ἀμεινὰ τιμᾶται, VI (IV), 8. § 7 ὅρος ἀρετῆς
and n. (536) on III 7 § 3. Even in a
nominal aristocracy, regarded at least for
these must stand highest, hence the
more concessions are made to the oligar-
chical principle of wealth, or again to the
democratic principle, at the expense of
excellence or merit, the more the aristoc-

cracy departs from its own standard.
Polity takes for its standard the complete
adjustment and neutralization of Oli-
garchy and Democracy, hence the more
the oligarchical principle on the one hand
makes itself felt at the expense of the
democratic or the democratic principle on
the other at the expense of the oligarchi-
cal, the more violently does a Polity
diverge from its own principle in the
one or the other direction: see VI (11), c.
9.

Cato quoted by Servius on Ve-
gil's Aeneid IV. 687, Polybios vi. 51, 2
and Cicero / c. call the constitution of
Carthage, less accurately, a combination of
monarchy, aristocracy (Cato, optumatum
potestas. Cicero, genus, optimas), and
democracy Susem. (386)

6 τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ] "For the kings in
conjunction with the senators have full
powers either to bring certain matters
before the people or not, provided they
are both agreed otherwise in this case
the people, too, have a voice."

8 πάντες both; viz the Sphoetes on
the one side, the Seniores on the other.
For this is a genuine Aristotelian use of
the word "πάντες ubi de duobus tantum
agitur, i. q. ἀμφότεροι ὁποτέρωθεν" (Ind.
Ar.). Comp Anal Priora I. 28 44 b
21 ὅσα πάντα ἐρεται "h c ὁποτέρωθεν,
et maiori termino et minori" (Waitz):
also VI (IV) 4. 2 See also Exc. IV, δ
δῆμος, p. 347. Susem. (387)

Add Anal. Priora I. 27 § 12, 43 b 36,
Meteorol. II. 4 § 1, 359 b 33, IV 5 § 8,

χουσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνουν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλευμένῳ τοῖς (VIII)
 12 εἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν. ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολ-

382 b 17, and *De Anima* 111. 6 § 2, 130 b 4 (Vahlen).

§ 6 11 ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνουν] Here then in reality the final decision rests with the popular assembly; and Aristotle, judging by the standard of Aristocracy or Polity, disapproves of this, which furnishes another indication of the character of his own best state, in so far as that also is Aristocracy. see on 6 § 16 n (218) and *Él.* 1 to B. 111. In keeping with this (he says) in the most moderate democracy the people are best restricted to electing the council and the officers of state and to holding them responsible, VII(vi). 4. 4 n. (1418), perhaps with a share in legislation and the decision upon changes in the constitution VI(iv) 14. 4 f.: at least only the most indispensable meetings of the popular assembly are held VI(iv) 6. 1, the administration being left to the council and the officers of state. Or even the magistrates may be elected by a mere committee of the whole people upon which all the citizens serve by rotation, VII(vi) 4. 4; or it may come to this that no popular assembly is held but it is represented by the aforesaid committee, which moreover has in many cases simply to hear the resolutions of the magistrates, VI(iv). 14. 4 n. (1312) And these are the forms of democracy which Aristotle regards as the best. *ΣΤ'Ι* v. (388)

12 ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις καὶ] In the Spartan assembly only the kings, the senators, and at a later period the ephors, were allowed to take part in the debate: other persons needed special permission in order to do so (see Schenkl *Antiquities* p. 235 Eng. tr.). Undoubtedly it was similar in Crete. But when Aristotle says, or seems to say, here that in Sparta and Crete the popular assembly had merely to listen to the resolutions of the government without really having the final decision in its own hands, and so § 7 (cp. n. 362) that it had in those states no greater powers entrusted to it than to ratify the decrees of the Comiti, or the kings, and the senators, all this certainly looks at first sight as if the assembly had not the right to reject these decrees, and indeed many have so understood it [e.g. *Huck Arist. III* 59 ff., *Rulgemay op. c.* p. 134]. But that these expectations should not be thus pressed is shown by the simple consideration that if the assembly

had merely to "listen to" these resolutions, it would not have been allowed to vote even in ratification of them, and thus Aristotle would have contradicted himself. But he further states that at Carthage the popular assembly, once convoked, possessed far larger privileges than in Sparta and Crete, although in respect of being summoned its rights were smaller because there was no need to convocate it in case the *Shofetes* and the senate were agreed, whereas in Sparta and Crete it always had to be summoned, in order to ratify the decrees of the two ruling bodies. Now if it had always to ratify or vote affirmatively, where is this greater right? But in fact when nothing might be said in the assembly except by permission of the government, and no amendments might be proposed, there was little reason to fear, so long as the kings, the senators, and the ephors were agreed, that the people would actually use their formal right of rejection. Hence it is that Aristotle uses these strong expressions which quite answer to the actual state of the case. Finally, supposing it must be conceded to Oncken (i. p. 279 f) and Gilbert (p. 137 f) that the obvious meaning of the clause in Plutarch *Lycurg* 6, which was added to the Spartan constitution (Rhœtra) by the kings Theopompus and Polydorus (*αἱ δὲ σελάναι δὲ δυνάμεις τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις καὶ ἀρχαῖς ἀποσταίῃας ἡμῖν*) 14, that it was left to the discretion of the kings and senators whether they should reject a vote in the assembly refusing ratification, or not;—supposing further that Aristotle's language really agrees most easily with this meaning (which is hardly the case, after what has been said), yet the whole hypothesis is simply wrecked by the fact that Gilbert himself explains this to be a quite abnormal *Spartan* institution, while Aristotle asserts that the powers of the Cretan and Spartan assemblies were altogether similar. Thus we are forced to be content with the interpretation of the additional clause given by Plutarch, *τοῦτ' ἐστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλέγειν τὸν δῆμον, ὡς ἐκτρέποντα καὶ μεταποιῶντα τὴν γνώμην παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον*, i. e. the popular assembly was restricted to a simple, unaltered acceptance or rejection of the proposals made by the king and the senate. *ΣΥΣΚΕ.* (389)

§ 7 τῆς αἰτίας οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὐσας πολλῶν
καὶ μεγάλων ἰφ' αὐτῶν αἰρετὰς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκατὸν
τῆς ταύτας αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας
πλέοντα ἄρχων χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες
ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀμύσθους καὶ
μὴ κληρωτὰς ἄριστοκρατικὸν θετόν, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτε-
ροι, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ἰπὸ τινῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πά-
σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.
§ 8 παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο-
νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα δύνειαν ἢ
συνδοκᾷ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστύνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ
πλουτύνδην οἶονται δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι τοῖς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
§ 9 γὰρ τὴν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἴπερ οὖν
τὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλουτύνδην ὀλιγαρχικόν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρε-
τὴν ἀριστοκρατικόν, αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη τάξις τρίτη, καθ' ἣν
περ συντέτακται [καὶ] τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-
λιτείαν αἰροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-
λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς.
§ 10 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἡμίρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρεκβασιν εἶναι

16 πλέον M¹, τέλειον I² 17 T¹ A11, Bk, Susem.¹ 17 (later hand), τέλειον T¹ (late hand) 17 μέγιστος Sylburg wrongly 1 τὸ τὰς T¹ 6 and 17 in the margin, τοῖς T¹ 7 18 καὶ εἴ ἕτερον Kluge thinks interpolated or out of place 19 τινῶν Kuster, (p 111 l 10), τῶν II A1 Bk, τῶν <αὐτῶν> Vellotti. τῶν ἀρχέων πάντων T¹ 10 A1. 20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι Benda thinks not genuine 28 [καὶ] Susem, untranscribed by A1, καὶ συντέτακται Congreve transposing, καὶ <παρεκβε-
βηκε> ut something similar Thuiot

§ 7 13 τὰς πενταρχ[ας] See Exc IV. p. 348 f. SUSEM. (390)

19 τὰς τινῶν ἀρχέων] Aristotle 323, "courts" in the plural, see Exc. IV. He regards the separation of jurisdiction from administration as a judicial provision (1) that the courts are not constituted by lot, and (2) that in electing to them greater attention can be paid to the appointment of the persons best qualified for the office than is the case when different branches of the administration of justice are more appendages to different offices of state. But he is p. III 1 §§ 10, 11 τὰς δίκας θετέοντες κατὰ μέρος τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρῖναι τὰς δίκας, *iii.* (113, 1): *also* *ii.* (125) on 9 § 23 above, p. 348 and *Introd.* p. 24 *n* 3 SUSEM. (391)
20 καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] On the jurisdiction of the senate and the Ephors at Sparta, see *iii.* (125, 329 b) on 9 §§

23, 25; on that of the kings Schomann p. 229 Eng. tr.; on that of the other magistrates *op. cit.* 250 ff. SUSEM. (391 b) § 8 23 ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτύνδην] Yet apart from the ideal state—see *n* (885) on IV(vii). 13 § 9 πάντες οὖν πολῖται—Aristotle himself approves of Solon's moderate census in this respect 13 §§ 3, 6 III. 11 § 8. SUSEM. (392)

§ 9 30 τοὺς στρατηγούς] See Exc. IV. p. 349 f. SUSEM. (392 b)

§ 10 31 δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν κτλ.] See 9 § 2 *n* (179) compare IV(vii) 9 § 3, 7, 10 § 9 *n*. "But if Aristotle demands of the legislator that he is to free the magistrates from all anxieties about their support, this can only be done by paying them. And yet in § 7 above he had himself declared it a better regulation not to combine such offices with payment." (Fulleborn). See however Exc IV p. 348. SUSEM. (398)

τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην. ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅρᾱν ἐστι (VIII)
 τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὥπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν
 34 καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδ' ἰδιω-
 35 τεύοντες. <βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
 36 <ὅ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς>
 37 εἰ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-
 38 λῆς, φαῦλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ἀνητὰς εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν,
 39 § 11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἔντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος
 οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν
 40 ὕλην φιλοσχρήματον. ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ
 41 κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολου-
 θεῖν τούτοις. ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
 1273^b
 § 12 οὐχ οἷόν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐθί-
 42 ξεσθαι δ' εὐλόγον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὠνούμενους, ὅταν δαπα-
 νήσαντες ἄρχωσιν ἄτοπον [μὲν] γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὦν ἐπιεικῆς
 43 δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ' ὦν οὐ βουλήσεται
 44 δαπανήσας. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ' ἄρχειν, τούτους
 45 ἄρχειν. βέλτιον δ', εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν
 ὁ νομοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.

32 ταῦθ' Bk.², a misprint probably || 33 βέλτιστον P²

1273 b 6, 7 βέλτιον... σχολῆς transposed by Susem., *Introd* p 81 f. ||
 6 εὐπορίαν P¹ P² Ar. || 7 ἀλλὰ καὶ Γ possibly

1273 a 35 δέ] δὴ T^u and Q^u (1st hand, corrected by later hand), δὴ δέ P² ||
 39 8 τε P², 8 τε M² P¹ Akl. Bk. and perhaps P² || γὰρ A1., δ' P² II (for which P² in
 Susem.¹ is a misprint) Bk. || 40 πολιτεῶν Γ M²

1273 b 1 τε . . τὴν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν P² Bk. || 2 δ' γὰρ Spengel ||
 τοῦτ' ὠνούμενοι Γ M² and P¹ (1st hand, corrected by P¹ in the margin), [τοῦτ' ὠνού-
 41 μενοι] Susem.¹ 2, τοῦτ' ὠνούμενοι Ramus || 3 μὲν ἵ, rightly omitted by P² Bk. || 4
 ὦν ἂν Γ M² || 5 ἀριστ' ἄρχειν Spengel, ἀριστὰρχειν Γ II Bk.

35 εἰ δὲ...πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν σχο-
 λῆς] "But even supposing that means
 must be taken into account, in order to
 secure leisure," i.e. magistrates who can
 devote their whole time to their duties,
 "it is a grave defect that the highest
 officers, like that of *Shofete* or general,
 should be purchasable." Here he takes
 up the condition postulated and justified
 above § 8, a 23, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλανήσθην Akl.

36 τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ἀνητὰς κατ] The
 same thing is said by Polybios vi. 56. 4
 (Schlosser). SUSEM. (894) Mr Wyse re-
 fers to Plato *Rep.* 544 D: ὡντα βασι-
 λεία and such like intermediate politics
 are to be found outside of Greece (περὶ
 τοῦς βασιλείους).

§ 11 40 τὸ κύριον] the supreme autho-
 rity, i.e. the government: 111. 6. 1 n. (523).

41 τοῦτοις=τῷ κύριῳ. In c § 15,
 7 § 8 he has dwelt on the comparative
 weakness of direct enactments and go-
 vernment interference. But public opi-
 nion can be legitimately educated and
 influenced, and thus τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς
 τὰς πολιτείας. See VIII(V). 9 §§ 11-15.
 § 12 1273 b 1 ἐθίξεσθαι κατ] "Not is
 it strange that the purchasers of place
 should be accustomed to make a profit out
 of it, when it has cost them dear." The
 article with the participle need not be
 suspected; the sense is "buying office as
 they do." Cp. c. 8 § 10 οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ
 παρίζοντες=if they supply, whereas οἱ
 παρίζοντες would be 'supplying, as they
 do'=as they supply (Tyrell).

§ 12 8 δὲ κατ] Cp. 9 § 27 n. (333).
 SUSEM. (395)

- § 13 φαῦλον δ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείους ἀρχαῖς τὸν α
αὐτὸν ἀρχειν ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ
10 ὅφ' ἐνδὲς ἔργον ἀριστ' ἀποτελεῖται δεῖ δὴ θπας γίνηται τοῦτο
ὀρίην τὸν νομοδίτην, καὶ μὴ προστάττειν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν
§ 14 καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν ὥσθ' ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλεις, πολιτικώτερον
πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικώτερον· κοινότερόν
τε γάρ, καί, καθύπερ εἶπομεν, κάλλιον ἔκαστον ἰποταλεί-
15 ται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν πολε-
μικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις διὰ
πάντων ὡς εἰπὲν διελήλυθε τὸ ἀρχειν καὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι.
§ 15 ὀλιγαρχικῆς δ' οὐσῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἀριστα <στάσις> ἐκ-
ο φεύγουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες

6 βέλτιον 7 σχολῆς hoc in 1273 a 35 || 10 δὴ Sussem., δ' I' II (δὲ M') Bk.
1 14 καὶ βελτιον καθύπερ Sussem., καὶ αἰεὶ εἶπομεν I' II A1 Bk. Sussem.¹. Bender,
with Πειρασμ., ἀρετῆς Sussemh's translation, or else would omit καθύπερ
εἶπομεν 15 τῶν αὐτῶν M¹ (1st hand), πρὸ τῶν αὐτῶν? I, ab eisdm William;
αὐτῶν ἢ ἐνδὲς τῶν αὐτῶν? Sussem., τῶν ἔργων Πειρασμ., (temping but not existant;
[τῶν αὐτῶν] Bender, as due to the τῶν ναυτικῶν following, not bnd || 18 καὶ ἰ-
ποταλεί αἰεὶ οὐσῆς h3 P¹ 4 (2^d T¹) <στάσις> Πειρασμ., illud effugunt A1 Schwei-
cker 1 w an oligar. was imperium sui exfugunt, <τοῦτο> Kluge αἰεὶ A1, <ἐκβάς>
fm ἀριστα H. Ulrich C1 || § 2 1 19 τῷ πλουτεῖν Sussem.¹ following Schneider,
misled by William¹, tending in itand

§ 13 Plato's principle of the division of labour, with the stock Socratic ex-
amples of shoemaker and flute player cp
c 2 § 5, 3 N, I' A1 11. 371 C.

§ 14 13 πολιτικώτερον more to the
advantage (in the interest) of the state,
which is in this way better administered
(ἀλλῶν οὐκ ἔκαστον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν
πολιτικῶν)

13 κοινότερόν τε γάρ] sc. ἐστίν. For
this the government concerns wider
interests, is more comprehensive. This
is given as the reason for δημοτικώτερον,
the next sentence justifies πολιτικώτερον.
On this paragraph consult further VI (IV).
15 §§ 5—8 N. (1352) ΣΥΣΤΗΜ. (398)

15 τῶν αὐτῶν] Each of the invariable
accidents to government is, with a
proper division of labour, better and
more quickly performed (I' L. Healy).

16 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ] The com-
mander in chief alone has merely to com-
mand, the private soldiers alone have
merely to obey, all ranks between have
both to command and be commanded
(Piccart) SUSI VI, (397)

§ 16 19 αἰεὶ τι τοῦ δήμου] C1
VII (VI) § 9, φίλον ἐκέρχεται τὸν δῆμον.

del γὰρ τινες ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς
τὰς περιουσίας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. The
subjects of the Carthaginian rule in Africa
may be classified as follows. (1) the so-
called Liby-Phoenicians, i.e. the old
Phoenician settlements and others re-
cently founded by Carthage, unfortified
towns, partly no doubt inhabited by a
mixed Phoenician and Libyan popu-
lation, which had to pay a fixed tribute
and furnish contingents. Utica alone
enjoyed a similar fate, and had its inde-
pendence and its walls preserved to it
from the pious feeling of the Cartha-
ginians towards their ancient protectors.
(2) The agricultural villages of native
Libyans who had been transformed from
free farmers into serfs; they had to
pay a fourth part of the produce of the
soil as land-tax (Polyb I 72. 2) and
were subjected to a regular system of
recruiting. (3) The loving pastoral tribes
(νομάδες) who had to pay tribute and to
furnish contingents. In the treaties of the
Carthaginian state preserved by Greek
writers (3) are called ἔθνη, "tribes," and
the villages occupied by (2) are called πό-
λεις, "towns," of subjects (Mommson II.

- 20 ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτω γὰρ ἰδῶνται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν (VIIII)
πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργον, δεῖ δὲ ἀστασιά-
§ 16 στους εἶναι διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην. νῦν δέ, ἂν ἀτυχία γένηται
τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρ-
μακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας.
- (12) περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίαν πολιτείας καὶ Κρη-
26 τικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίαν, αἵπερ δικαίως εὐδοκίμοισι,
12 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον· τῶν δὲ ἀποφνηαμένων τι περὶ πο- IX
λιτείας ἐνιοι μὲν οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ'
ὠντινωροῦν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἰδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίον, περὶ (p. 36)
30 ὧν εἴ τι ἀξιόλογον, εἴρηται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἐνιοι δὲ
νομοθεταὶ γεγύνασιν, οἳ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν οἳ δὲ καὶ
τῶν ὁθνείων τισί, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί· καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν ἐγέ-
νοντο δημιουργοὶ νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οἷον καὶ Λυ-
κοῦργος καὶ Σόλων· οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέ-
§ 2 στήσαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Λακεδαιμονίαν εἴρηται, Σόλωνα δ' 3
36 ἐνιοι μὲν οἴονται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαῖον. δλιγαρχίαν

25 περὶ. 1274 b 26 ἄν (c. 12) is noticed by Michael of Ephesus op. c. f. 188^b.
Gottling pronounced the whole of c. 12 spurious. See Comm. III. (399, 423, 427)
† κρήνη M¹ 11 † 26 αἵπερ] εἴ[περ]? Susem (It may have omitted περ, quia Wil-
liam) † 27 τι omitted in I¹, hence [τι] Susem, 12 † 32 νόμων inserted after μέν
by I¹ 2 Ar. Bk. † 33 νόμων] νόμων I¹ 2 Ar. Bk. † 36 γενέσθαι after νομοθέτην I¹ 2 Bk.

p. 9 f. Eng. tr.). See esp. Diod. XX.
55. 4. It is the latter which are here
meant (ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). We are not to
understand the passage, with Heeren (p.
42) and Mones (p. 358), of the foundation
of new colonies; but of appointments,
like that of governor and assessor of
taxes which gave the holder the oppor-
tunity of enriching themselves at the ex-
pense of their subjects. (See Kluge p.
193 ff., who however incorrectly assumes
that such offices were sent to Liby-
Phoenician cities, indeed chiefly to them.)
It was in accordance with the principles
of Carthaginian policy not, as a rule, to
give these appointments to decayed
nobles (as might be inferred from
Mommson's account II. p. 17 Eng. tr.),
but according to Aristotle's explicit state-
ment to plebeians, or citizens who did not
belong to the ruling houses. SUSEM.
(398)

§ 18 24 φάρμακον τῆς ἡσυχίας] "No
spell in their laws to restore peace," i.e.
no means of terminating civic strife.
Comp. the judgment of Polyb. VI. 51
on the second Punic War.

C. 12 The Solonian Constitution. §§ 1-6

For the historical bearings of this pas-
sage consult especially Grote cc. 11, 31;
Schömann *Antiquities* pp. 322-342 Eng.
tr. and *Athenian Constitutional History*
translated by Bosanquet (Oxford 1878).
Also *Case Materials for the History of*
Athenian Democracy (Oxford 1874).
Oncken *Athen and Hellas* pp. 161-173,
Staatslehre II 410 ff.

§ 1 28 οὐκ ἐκοινώνησαν κατὰ] see
1. 7 3, 11. 7. 1. Here legislation is ap-
parently a branch of practical politics;
cp. II. on πολιτείας, I 1 2.

33 νόμων, οἳ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας] This
distinction, which is quite in place here,
induced the author of the suspected pas-
sage, §§ 6-14, to believe that in Aris-
totle's opinion a list of mere legislators
was a further requisite. Whereas in fact
Aristotle intends with these words to
dismiss it as irrelevant. Finding no such
list drawn up by Aristotle the interpo-
lator supplied the supposed want on his
own account. SUSEM. (399)

§ 2 36 ἐνιοι μὲν οἴονται] *Introd.* p. 20

τε γὰρ καταλῦσαι λίαν ἄκρατον οὔσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὴν (IX)
 δῆμον παύσαι, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσαι τὴν πατριον,
 μίξαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείφ
 40 πάγῳ βουλὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετὰς ἀρι-
 38 στοκρατικὴν, τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον δημοτικόν. ἔοικε δὲ Σόλων
 71 ἐκείνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσαι, τὴν τε βου-
 λὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι,

27 γὰρ omitted by M¹ 41 τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια II² Li Hk, but see § 1, where
 Schenkl has customed the plural, λέγεται τὰ δικαστήρια ἀληρωτὰ ὄντα. ταῦτ'

11. The context shows that these eulogies of Solon were eulogies of a mixed constitution, and not of Democracy, as Ouckel strangely maintains. Such a combination of oligarchical and aristocratical elements they found in the 'old-fashioned' Solonian democracy in other words, not merely a moderate Democracy, but a nominal Aristocracy even, or at least a kind of Polity. Cf. 11 v (400)

Diels *Ueber die Politische Entwicklung der
 'Athenaischen Polis'* (Berlin 1885), p. 33,
 refers to Iwan. *Ueber* 16, *Antiq* 23, 312,
 for explanations of the current notion that
 Solon was the founder of Attic democracy,
 ὁ Σόλων ὁ παλαιὸς ἢ φιλοδηροτὴν φύσει

27 λίαν ἄκρατον] Too unequalled

24 τὴν πατριον] The old-fashioned,
 as distinguished from the modern, demo-
 cratic (ὁ γὰρ δ') comp. §§ 3, 4; 11(v).
 6 § 2; 11 § 7, 11, 12, 11(v), 4 § 1, 2,
 5 § 3, VIII(v). 5 § 10, 11 (μεταβάλλουσι
 δὲ αἱ αἰ τῆς πατρίδος δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν
 νεωτέραν) with the references in the
 notes. Comp also 11(v) 7 § 7 n.
 "modern oligarchies," III 6 § 9 n (232).
 Aristotle quite accepts the distinction,
 cp §§ 5, 6 III 11, 8; VI(v) 11 19 n
 (173). For he has no objection to raise
 against these minglings of Solon, except
 that they retained even the aristocratical
 and oligarchical elements of the combina-
 tion to Solon, whereas in fact only the
 democratic accession was his doing. With
 the following sentences compare Schom-
 mann *Die Solonische Verfassung und Erbkaiser-
 thum* d'Zur. an article in the *Jahrb. f.
 Phil* XLIII 1866, 585—594 and R
 Scholl *De Symmetris Attica* p. 10 ff. (Jena
 1876) 875 ff. (400 b)

"Inter eos, qui Solonem laudant, ni
 fallor, Iocantem in Arcyugitico intel-
 ligit, ita enim loquitur, ut Soloni et al-
 ierum ἀρχῶν et βουλῆν τριβunat, at nihil
 ille de δικαστηρίῳ" (Dengels)

39 "by a happy blending (of other

elements) in the polity."

39—41 Parallel to the account given,
 probably by the same writer, of the
 Spartan polity 6 § 17

§ 3 On this battle ground of con-
 cluding opinions there are at least three
 issues (a) Is Aristotle merely reporting
 the views of the minglers of Solon
 [Grote, Frankel], or is he connecting
 them [Hirshwall, Congreve, Schommann
Att. Const I 17 p. 37 Eng. tr.]? (β)
 What is the exact sense of the last
 clause? [See I 17 v, p. 350 ff.] (γ) Is
 the statement it contains historically true?
 [Grote, Cuntius reject it. Hirshwall, Schom-
 mann accept it.]

41 ἔοικε] Schommann, Frankel *Die at-
 tischen Gewerkschaften* 61 f. (Berlin
 1877, 8), and others lay far too much
 stress on this word *εἶναι* = 'seem', here
 and below, § 5 l. 15 Aristotle often
 speaks in a qualifying manner about
 things, of which, in reality, he has not
 the slightest doubt. Thus *εἶναι*, l. 15,
 comes very close to *φαίνεται* l. 11; the
 force of which, as often in other writers,
 besides Aristotle, is to express not so
 much what is merely apparent and pro-
 bable, as what is obvious, what has come
 to light. 875 ff. (401)

See *εἶναι* l. 1, 6, VIII(v) 3 § 16, 9 § 2
 "The word expresses Aristotle's own
 opinion, because (1) the construction re-
 quires it (*εἶναι μὲν οἴσεται εἶναι* δε),
 (2) the sense requires it, some thought
 that Solon established a mixed consti-
 tution, Aristotle contends that he only
 added a new element, the δικαστήρια"
 (Case)

1274 a 1 τὴν τε βουλὴν] What power
 Aristotle might ascribe to the council of
 the Areopagus which Solon found existing
 and left unaltered, it is not easy to see
 from this. 875 ff. (402)

2 καταστήσαι] laid the foundation
 for the democracy.

τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες
 § 4 αὐτῷ· λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερα, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστή-
 ριον πάντων, κληρωτὸν δν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἴσχυσεν, ὥσπερ
 τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαρίζομενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν
 δημοκρατίαν μετέστησαν· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βου-
 λὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
 9 μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τοῖτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον
 § 5 ἕκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αἰξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δη-
 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενέσθαι τοῦτο
 προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχ-
 ιας γὰρ ἐν ταῖς Μηδικαῖς ὁ δῆμος αἵτιος γενόμενος ἐφρο-

1274 a 4 θάτερα Κοιαεζ, θατέραν Π¹ Susem.¹ in the text, θατέρων Π² Ar. Bk. ||
 5 ἴσχυεν Π² Bk. || 7 μετέστησαν Tegge, κατέστησαν Γ¹ Π² Αι. Bk Susem.¹ || 8
 ἐκόλουσε Γ¹ Ar., ἐκόλυσε Q^b || [καὶ Περικλῆς] Sauppe, probably rightly, τὰ ..
 9 Περικλῆς omitted by Γ¹ M¹

3 τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων] See Exc. v. p. 350 ff. SUSEM. (403)
 μέμφονται τινες] See *Intro.* p. 20 n. 1. In representing that these critics of Solon were adherents of the oligarchy Oncken, II. 439, 440 n. (1), goes beyond Aristotle's own words. All that can be fairly inferred is that they were opponents of absolute democracy. But that does not prove them to be oligarchs; they might have been friends of a mixed constitution no less than Solon's panegyrist noticed just before or, comparatively speaking, Aristotle himself. SUSEM. (404)

4 λῦσαι γὰρ κτλ.] For (they think) he neutralised the other forces, in the state by making the court of law, a body chosen by lot, supreme over all matters.

§ 4 5 ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ] Cp. VI (IV). 4 § 27 ὁ δ' οὐ τοιαῦτος δῆμος ἀπὲρ μοναρχος ὡς γινεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρχεσθαι ἐπὶ νόμου, καὶ γίγεται δεσποτιὰς ... καὶ ἔστιν ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι, with notes. SUSEM. (405)

6 τὴν νῦν δημοκ.] 'The democracy of the present day' i.e. the extremest and most unfettered species. cp. VI (IV). 4 § 25 ff., 6 § 5; I 4 § 7, § 11: VIII (V). 5 § 10 and the other references given in n. (400 b). SUSEM. (406)

8 Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε] Schomann *Antiquities* p. 341 f. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (407)

9 μισθοφόρα] Boeckh *Economy of Athens* p. 233 Eng. tr.; also notes on V (VIII). 5 § 23 (1055), VI (IV). 13 § 5 (1260). SUSEM. (408)

Aristotle is quoting the opinion of others, but without denying it (Case).

§ 5 11 φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σ.] Thus while Aristotle agrees with Solon's panegyrist in respect of their judgment, but qualifies the historical grounds assigned for it, n. (400 b) on § 2, he entirely adopts the historical statement of Solon's critics, but attacks the census which they inferred from it as not justified. Compare furthermore § 9 12 n. (296), § 21 (321 b). SUSEM. (409)

12 ἀπὸ συμπτώματος] accidentally, "in the course of events" (Susemihl), ναυαρχία=the supremacy at sea, like *ναυκρατία*, not found elsewhere in this sense.

13 ἐφρονηματισθή] acquired overweening confidence in themselves, became aware of their importance. *Esion* compares V (VII). 6, 11 μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά

1 Thus is strangely overlooked by Oncken II. 440 n. (1). As against Schomann he appeals to the fact that Aristotle only makes these critics speak of Solon as having introduced the appointment of the Heliaea by lot. Oncken does not see that just on this occasion and in the mouth of these censorious critics the form used is the singular, τὸ δικαστήριον, which had given some show to the meaning which Schomann has refused; see Exc. v. Thus defence then is fatal to Oncken's position. Nor is there any ground for his rash assertion (II. 441) that Aristotle expressly exempts Solon from the reproach of having created anything like the later Heliaea. On the contrary the writer of this paragraph, whether Aristotle himself or some one else, agrees with Solon's critics and admirers in thinking that it was he who made the Heliaea, but that Pericles introduced the custom of paying them. It is a pity to spend so many words on a matter so clear

νηματίσθη καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευνο- (IX)
 15 μένων τῶν ἐπεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σόλωνα γε εἴκοι τὴν ἀναγκαιο-
 τάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖ-
 σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου κίριος ὦν ὁ δήμος)
 § 6 δούλους ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιους), τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρί-
 μων καὶ τῶν εὐτόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίο- (P. 57)
 20 μεδίωνων καὶ ζευγίων καὶ [τρίτου τέλους] τῆς καλουμένης

11 ἀπὶ πολιτευομένων Γ' P² Δ¹ 11 ἰδ' ἀποδοῦναι? Schneidei, reihars 11ghtly ||
 17 ὦν ὁ δήμος κίριος M¹ L¹ Suscm.²; ὁ δήμος ὦν κίριος [?] Γ' Suscm.¹ || 18 [τὰς δ'
 ἀρχὰς 21 μετῆν] Suscm. *Ἰακίβ. f Philol.* XLIII p. 331 Diehl's ; 19 ἐμπόρων
 P² L¹ Q² T² 11 πεντακοσίων μεδίωνων Γ' M¹ || 20 [τρίτου τέλους] Suscm. doubtfully,
 τοῦ τέλους, heuguel, who alternatids transposed καὶ το follow τρίτου τέλους; [τρίτου
 τέλους] and καὶ ζευγίων transposed to follow 21 ἐπὶ πάσας Oncken But then we
 should expect καὶ τῶν ζευγίων and might equally well conjecture καὶ τῆς καλου-
 μένης ἐπὶ πάσας καὶ τρίτου τέλους ~ τοῦ τῶν > ζευγίων

φρασημασιθίτες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, and
 VII (VI. 4 § 8 πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενέ-
 μινος αἰτίος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῶνα μάχης καὶ
 διὰ ταύτην τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τῆν ἀπὸ
 θαλάτταν ἐγένετο τῆν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυρο-
 τέραν ἔκαστος, where see n. (1321)
 S¹ VI (410)

This is why in a fragment of his *Polity of Athens*, Aristotle mentioned 'Themistocles' proposal to create a fleet from the annual profits of the silver mines (see Poljaen *Ad* i 30 86) Diehl *op. cit.* p. 31

14 There is elsewhere Aristotle's sym-
 pathies go with the Athenian opposition to extreme democracy: the Moderates (ἐπιματῆς) headed by Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides (ὁ Μετριοίτης), Nicias, and Themistocles (Ῥίσις 369 Plut. *Ath* 2), who opposed the democratic leaders from Themistocles to Cleophon

15 ἐπὶ Σόλωνα γε κατὰ] But above § 3, Aristotle has said that Solon merely allowed the previously established mode of electing the archons to continue. In any case his words are not clear, as Schomann remarks. Either before Solon's time the archons were elected by the whole body of the people, and then Aristotle himself commits the fault he has censured in Solon's advisers, of inaccurately describing him as the author of an institution which he merely perpetuated. Or else he intends to attribute to Solon the transference of this election from the people to the whole body of citizens; if so, he ought to have mentioned this beforehand, amongst the other democratic additions which Solon made to the Athenian constitution. Which of these alternatives is correct cannot be decided

SUSEN (411)

17 καὶ εὐθύνειν] By this control over the magistrates, it meant, that during their tenure of office the magistrates could be brought before a popular court or *peitharchia* before the popular assembly itself, and more particularly that after the expiration of their term of office they could be brought before a popular court and required to give an account of their conduct Cp. *Ec* v., further III 11 § 8 n. (469), VI (IV). 11 § 19 n. (1703), 14 § 3 (1319), § 6 (1325), § 10 (1332), n. on 16 § 2, and VII (VI) 1 § 4 (1475). SUSEN. (412)

"With this statement of the ἀναγκαί-
 ατα of democracy, compare the sum-
 mary of the characteristics of true *ισονομία* which Herodotus III 80 puts into the mouth of Otanes: πάλω μὲν ἀρχαίς ἀρχαί, ὑπερθεῖναι δὲ ἀρχῶν ἔχει, βουλευ-
 ματα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει [sc. τὸ πλῆθος]" (Jackson).

μηδὲ γὰρ δούλους ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέ-
 μους] Here again is a substantial contri-
 bution to Aristotle's own views on the requirements of a good constitution
 SUSSEN (413)

§ 6 18 τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς] The right of electing officers and holding them strictly accountable, which the commons en-
 joyed, is opposed to the right of office from which they were in part excluded

19 ἐκ τῶν πεντ κατὰ] On these four Solonian classes see Schomann *Anti-
 quities* i p. 329 ff. Eng. u. Further see
 III 11 § 8 n. (569), VII (VI) 4 § 5 (1477).
 SUSSEN (414)

The order of the classes is not correct even if we omit the words *τρίτου τέλους*

ἰππίδου· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον τὸ θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετῆν. (IX)

[ιομοθεταὶ δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιξε-
φύριος, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολῖταις καὶ
24 ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν καὶ
§ 7 Σικελίαν. πειρῶνται δὲ [[καί]] τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὡς Ὀνομακρί-
του μὲν γενομένου πρώτου δεινοῦ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-
σθῆναι δ' αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδιημοῦντα
κατὰ τέχνην μαντικὴν· τούτου δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἐταῖρον,
Θάλητος δ' ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργου καὶ Ζάλευκου, Ζαλεύκου
30 δὲ Χαρώνδαν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἰσχυρότερον τῶν
χρόνων ἔχοντες· ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος ο

22 [νομοθεταί... h 26 δν] Bujesen || 23 αἰτῶθ Γ I^a, αὐτοῦ M^a II^a || 24 ταῖς
hefere Χαλκιδικαῖς Schmitt would omit || 25 καὶ omitted by II^a Δr. || 27 αὐτὸν
omitted apparently in Γ, perhaps rightly || ἀλλὰ οἱ καὶ <ἐλεῖ> Teggē, per-
haps rightly || 28 μαρτυρῶν omitted in Γ M^a || ἐλάττω (in Γ after ἐταῖρον)
and 29 θέλητος Γ M^a || 30 τῶν χρόνων A1, τῷ χρόνῳ Γ II Bk. || 31 ἔχοντες
Suem., λέγοντες Γ II Δr. Bk., cp. Plat. *Gorg.* 501 c ἀσάπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνων

οι, with Spengel, transpose them to go
with ἰσχυρότερον. Cp. H. Landwehr in *Philo-
logus* Suppl.-Band V 1885, pp. 118 ff.

21 Comp. Julius Pollux VIII. 130 αὐ
δὲ τὸ θητικὸν οὐδεμίαν ἀρχὴν ἔρχον.

A list of legislators: §§ 6—14.

Many of the arguments with which
Gottling *Comm.* p. 345 f., impugned the
genuineness of the whole chapter were
answered by Nitzsch *De Aristotelis politi-
cismi libri* p. 55 ff., and Spengel, *Ueber
die Politik* p. 11 note, *Arist. Studien* III.
p. 18 f. Gottling was followed by Buchh
and Bernay, *Gr.-Litt.* I 172. The case
must depend mainly on the language

22 Λοκροῖς τοῖς ἐπιξεφύροις i.e. the
Locrians living on the promontory Zephy-
rion in Lower Italy. The laws of
Zaleukos about (?) 664 B.C. are said to
have been the first which were committed
to writing: see Schomann p. 17 Eng. tr.,
Antiq. sur publ. 89 n. (8). SUSEM. (416)

23 Χαρώνδας] Mentioned I. 2 § 5 n
(16), vi (IV). II § 15 n., 13 § 10. SUSEM.
(416) On his laws see Diod. XII. 15.

24 ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι i.e.
the colonies which Chalcids in Euboea
planted in those countries: see E. Cur-
tius *Hist.* I. 436 ff. Eng. tr. SUSEM. (417)

§ 7 25 πειρῶνται δὲ τινες] Ephoros
Strabo p. 482; cp. Plutarch *Lycurg.* 4,
Trieber *op. c.* 67, 72, 101. SUSEM. (418)

The construction after συνάγειν, ὡς
and genitive absolute in the one clause
balanced by an accusative with infinitive

in the other, is awkward; but it can be
nearly paralleled from Plato *Philokus*
16 c· τῇ φήμῃ πορεύσασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐνό-
μην· ὁρῶντων, πέραις δὲ ἐχόντων. δεῖν
οὐκ ἔστιν αἰτῶν. Cp. *Rep.* II. 383 A λέγειν
καὶ ποιεῖν ὡς μῆτε αὐτοὺς γύγασιν ὄντας,
μῆτε ἡμᾶς παράγειν.

28 κατὰ with the accus. may mean
“for the purpose” κατὰ θεῶν ἔχειν, or
“in connexion with,” almost “plac-
tating his mantle at”

Θάλητα] see Exc. VI. p. 351 f. SUSEM. (419)

29 ‘To the arguments advanced
against the genuineness of this portion
of the chapter may be added one derived
from the fact that here we have Θάλητος
as the form of the genitive, and Θάλητα
of the accusative. Aristotle elsewhere
uses the proper dialectic form, the Ionic
gen Θάλεω 1259 a 7, the Doric Ἀρχόντα
1340 b 26; comp. also the quotation from
Alcaeus III. 14 § 10. Plato on the other
hand regularly changes quotations from
other dialects into Attic; cp. *Gorg.* 185 E,
505 E, with Di. Thompson’s note’ (Ridge-
way *op. c.* p. 134).

30 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κατὰ] This crite-
rion is very just. SUSEM. (419 b)

The same date *circa* OL 29 or 664 B.C.
is the best attested for Thaletas, who comes
second, and Zaleukos, who comes
fourth, in this succession, with Lycurgus
between them whom the latest estimate
only brings down to 776!

§ 8 νομοθέτης Θηβαίους. ἦν δ' ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν (IX)
 Βακχιδῶν, ἐραστήης δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικῆσαντος
 Ὀλυμπιάσιν, ὥς ἐκείνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλιπε διαμισήσας τὸν
 35 ἔρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυόνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Θήβας· καὶ
 § 9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν ὑμφοτέροι. καὶ ἵνυ ἔτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς
 τάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλήλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ἔντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
 τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὐ συνόπτου
 μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφὴν, τὸν μὲν 7
 40 Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἄποπτος
 ἔσται ἢ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χόματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὥπως
 127^b § 10 ἄποπτος. ὥκησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ
 τοῖς Θηβαίοις, νομοθέτης δ' αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόλαος περὶ
 τ' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὓς καλοῦσιν
 4 ἐκείνους νόμους θετικούς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἰδίως ἱπ' ἐκείνου
 § 11 νεομοθετημένοι, ὥπως ὁ ἀριθμὸς σφίζεται τῶν κλήρων. Χα-
 ραίνδου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ψευδο-
 μαρτυριῶν (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκρι-

33 βακχιδῶν Γ¹ M¹ (unless Γ¹ had βακχιδῶν) βακχιδῶν Γ¹ P² Δ¹. Bk. Sussem. 12 ||
 34 Ὀλυμπιάσιν Götting, perhaps, rightly || 35 μητρὸς Spengel || 39 γραφὴν
 II², corrected in the margin of I¹

127^a b i τὴν omitted by I² 9 || 5 σφίζεται Bucheler || 6 οὐδέν ἐστιν ἴδιον P¹,
 ἴδιον οὐδέν ἐστι P¹, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδέν ἐστι P² 3 (b T¹ Akl. Bk || ψευδομαρτυριῶν Scaliger
 and Bentley (Phalaia is p 358 Leip. ed.), ψευδομαρτύρων Γ¹ II Δ¹. || 7 ἐπίσκηψιν Scaliger
 and Bentley, ἐπίσκηψιν Γ¹ II (in P² the scribe's correction conceals the original reading)

§ 8 32-33 τῶν Βακχιδῶν] The
 ancient royal house at Corinth; see E.
 Curtius *Hist.* i. 271-277, 434, Eng. tr.
 Schomann pp 114, 153 Eng. tr. Com-
 pare also *nu.* (533) on III 9 § 9, (1658) on
 VIII(v), to § 6. Si 52.v. (420)

34 Ὀλυμπιάσιν] In the 13th Olym-
 piad B C. 718. See Giote II. 394.

§ 9 40 ἄποπτος = 'seen from far'
 may be used for *εὐπρόσθετος*, as here, or *εὐ-
 νομήτος*, but the former in late writers.

§ 10 127^a b i ὥκησαν μὲν οὖν κτλ.]
 The interpolator here explains why he
 has related the history of Philolaos at
 such length, namely to make clear how
 this Corinthian came to Thebes. But if
 he really considered such a detailed ex-
 planation necessary, when its necessity or
 even utility is not further discoverable,
 then he ought at any rate *αὐτοῖς* i to have
 shown how a Corinthian stranger came
 to give laws to the Thebans. SUSSEM (421)
 4 θετικούς] laws of adoption. The
 Cretan term for adoption, we now learn,

was ἀνάφανσις, ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἴδιος κτλ.] Aelian
Var. Hist. II. 7 relates that at Thebes it
 was forbidden under penalty of death to
 expose a child; but in case of pressing
 poverty the father might bring his child
 in its swaddling clothes to the magistrate,
 who then sold it by a regular contract to
 the lowest bidder (τῷ τμηρῷ ἐλαχίστην
 δόντι), whom it had to serve like a slave
 when grown up, in return for its mainte-
 nance. Perhaps, thinks J. G. Schneider,
 there is here a survival of the old laws
 which tended to preserve the original
 family estates unaltered by means of
 adoption. Hardly so, for the purchased
 child is bought as a kind of slave.
 On the further constitutional history of
 Thebes see Exc. i to B. VIII(v).
 SUSSEM. (422)

§ 11 7 ἐπίσκηψιν] sc. ψευδομα-
 ρτυριῶν (Stobaeus says *συκοφαντιῶν*) pro-
 secution for perjury. Editors quote Pl.
Latius XI. 937 B, [Dem.] i 139, 7.

- βεία τῶν νύμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν. (IX)
 § 12 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ (p. 36)
 10 τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ
 τὴ συσσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος,
 τὸ τοὺς νύφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμο-
 14 ῳς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρῆσιμον εἶναι ταῖν χεροῖν τὴν δὲ
 § 13 ἄχρηστον. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρ-
 χούση τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν ἴδιον δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὐδέν

§ τῶν νόμων omitted by Π¹ Ar., perhaps rightly || 9 φιλολόω Π³ Ar. and 1st hand of P² (corrected by cori.) || ἀνομάλωσις Bk., ἀνωμάλωσις Π., ὁμολότης Sprague, ὁμάλωσις Chanler || 12 τὴν.....τὴν ἀσκητὴν Vetoli first observed the harsh construction; either ἢἀσκητὴς οἱ <ὁ περὶ> before τὴν would be expected. Schneider proposed to read the former and Schmidt the latter || 13 γίνονται 124.1 (P² T^b) || 14 τοῖς P² 3 Q^h T^b Ald. Bk. (perhaps right), τῶν M¹ (1st hand)

§ 12 9 Φαλέου δ' ἴδιον κατ.] Even Fullerton with good reason wonders what we want with Phaleas and Plato here over again, and is surprised that their original ideas are presented so imperfectly and in a manner which agrees so ill with the preceding criticism. Cp note (425). The interpolator did not reflect that Aristotle himself expressly tells us in § 1, that in the above review of Plato Phaleas Hippodamus, he has said enough of the political ideas of these theorists (ἐφ' ἃς σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων): also that in § 1 f. he has given us to understand no less clearly that amongst practical statesmen, who created not merely a code of laws but a constitution, he has only Sokrates to consider, since Lycurgus has already been taken along with the criticism of the Lacedaemonian constitution. Accordingly if the interpolator, contrary to Aristotle's intention (see on § 1 n. 399), wanted to append a list of legislators, simply, this ought at least to have consisted of practical men, who neither changed nor desired to change the constitution in any respect. Both limitations are inapplicable to Plato and Phaleas. From this may be seen what a misconception it would be to deny to Aristotle §§ 1—6 and assign them, with Gotting, to the same interpolator as the 1st of the chapter. SUSSEX. (423)

ἀνομάλωσις] equalization? Rhet. III. 11. 5 καὶ τὸ ἀνομαλίσθαι ('καὶ ἀνομαλίσθαι'; A., our almost unique authority, has δὴν μέλιστα εἶναι SUSSEX.) τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολλοῖς διέχοντι ταῦτά, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ

καὶ διδάσκει τὸ ἴσον. See Cope's note. Not a *strict* equalization, but a *striving* up of the present distribution to restore equality, so *διατρεῖν, ἀναδρασμός, ἀναδιδόναι* ψόφοις.

10 ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν κατ.] Cp. 6 § 2 n. (153); 6 § 5 n. (196). SUSSEX. (424)

11 ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην κατ.] *Law* 1 637 ff., 643 ff., II 661—673, 673 D ff. The fancy is strange enough; and Plato insists so much upon it that there is some justification for including it amongst the special peculiarities of his legislation. The next point however is not material enough for this, and much besides would have far greater right to be mentioned: cp n. (123) just above SUSSEX. (426)

12 καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολ. κατ.] *Law* VII 791 D—795 D. SUSSEX. (426)

Fuit auctor, quod ad structuram venibunt fieri, duntaxat. videbatur enim vel eodem casu, quo prima duo protulit, dicere debuisse καὶ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκήσιν vel plene loqui hoc pacto καὶ <ὁ περὶ> τὴν ἐν τοῖς π. ἀσκήσιν (Vetoli). One of these suggestions was taken up by Schneider, the other by Schmidt. SUSSEX.

§ 13 15 πολιτεία δ' ὑπαρχούση κατ.] From n. (123) the irrelevance of this remark is obvious. It would imply that the same statement was not true of Zaleukos Chiondas, Philolaos, in which case it follows from the explanation given in n. (423) that they should not properly be included here. It may be said that the remark serves to distinguish Draco's laws from those of Phaleas and Plato, which

ἐστὶν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιον, πλὴν ἢ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζη- (IX)
μίας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων δημιουργὸς
ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύνοντας,
10 ἂν τι πταίσωσι, πλείν ζημίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ
γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν
συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύουσιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ
§ 14 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ἐργίνοιο νο-
μοθέτης Χαλκιδικέσσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περὶ τς <τὰ> φο-
25 νικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἐστίν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἴδιόν γε οὐδὲν
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἄν.]

20 τι πταίσωσι L¹, τι πταίωσι C¹, τυπήσωσι Γ P¹·2 21 Q M¹ Q¹ T¹ Ar. Ald. Bk,
τυπτήσωσι U¹, τυπήσωσι M¹, τι ποιήσωσι Bal.² 1 ἀποτίνειν Γ (?) Ar, ἀποτίνειν
M P¹·1·1 (U¹ I¹ Ahl), ἀποτίνειν P¹ 21 γάρ omitted by Γ M¹ 22 ἀπέβλεψαν P¹
U¹ T¹ 23 <τὰ> - Κοινὰς 25 ἄλλο Κοινὰς

were made for an ideal state. But this
does not mend matters here, as Draco
was not the author of a constitution, there
is a marked antithesis between them of
quite another kind. SUGM. (427)

17 πλὴν ἢ χαλεπότης κατὰ] Cp. *Rhet.*
II 23. 29, 1400 b 21 καὶ ἀράματα τὸν νομο-
θέτην ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ ἐρά-
κοντες χαλεποὶ γὰρ. ΣUGM. 17. Δρά-
κων (Drakon) Aelian *Vari. Hist.* 1111 10,
Plut. *Drac.* 17, Gell. 11. 18 1—1 (J. G.
Schneid.) On Draco, the Athenian
legislator shortly before Solon, see fur-
ther E. Curtius *History of Greece* I. p. 301
f., 663 n 115 [Eng. II 1 313]. SUGM.
(428)

18 On Pittacus see III 14 10 with
Eac II on B 111. SUGM. (429)
νόμων δημιουργός has been objected to;
but Nickses cites ἀρετῆς δὴμ. IV (VI). 9. 7.

20 διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους κατὰ] Cp. *Rhet.*
II. 25. 7, 1402 b 11 ἐνστάσις ὅτι οὐκ οὐκ
Π αἰρετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μέλυνε ζημίας ἐνομο-
θέτησεν ἂν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ· *Λίτ.*
Εἰδ. III. 5. 8, 1113 b 30 καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ
ἀγνοεῖν λολάζουσιν, ἂν αἰτίος εἶναι δοκῇ
τῆς ἀγνοίας, οὐκ ὅτι μεθύοντι διπλὰ τὰ
ἐπιτίμια· λόγος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθισθῆναι
(Lalon) SUGM. (430)

§ 14 24 Χαλκιδικέσσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης]
The inhabitants of the peninsula Chalci-
dice, which derived its name from its
colonization by Chalcis in Euboea. Thus
took place before the settlement of the
western colonies of Chalcis, noticed in §
6 n. (417) see E. Curtius I. 428 ff Eng.
II. SUGM. (431)

25 Laws of Charondas respecting
heiresses are mentioned by Diodorus XII.
18.

NOTE ON ARCADIA.

διαίσει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτ' καὶ πόλις ἔθνος, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥς κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἀρκάδες: II. 2. 3.

"It is well known that the entire population of Arcadia was divided into a number of city communities politically independent, nor was this altered by the subsequent foundation of Megalopolis (see *n.* 459). They were held together by a tribal league sometimes more loosely, sometimes more rigidly organized, which left the political sovereignty of the various cities pretty nearly intact. Clearly a race or tribe thus organized does not greatly differ from a *συνμαχία*, or league offensive and defensive, and Aristotle is right in remarking that qualitative differences between the members (which are the separate towns) are not required in the one case any more than in the other, but that the essential advantage depends upon something quantitative. To this kind of *ἔθνος*, however, conceived as analogous to a *συνμαχία*, is opposed another which Aristotle excludes from this analogy by the addition of the words *ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κώμας ὥς κεχωρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος*, 'provided their population be not dispersed over a number of villages.' By the latter he means the *ἔθνος* which forms a political unity (usually with monarchical constitution), which is not divided into a number of city-states, nor centralized in a single city, but where the people live scattered all over the territory in detached villages or unwall'd towns without political independence (*κώμαι*). In other words it is the organization with which the Greeks became acquainted in most of the neighbouring non-Greek nations, whereas tribal federations composed of separate city-states were a somewhat more Hellenic development. It is obvious that a non-Greek tribal state of the kind certainly bore no analogy to the *συνμαχία*, and that in its case the qualitative distinction between the individual members, the rulers and those whom they ruled (see *n.* 133), was as essential as in the separate Hellenic *πόλις*." Dittenberger in *Gott. gel. Anz.* 1874, p. 1382. *SUSEM.* (132)

To Dittenberger's explanation of this obscure passage it may be well to append a short conspectus of other interpretations. It has been commonly supposed (1) that there is a reference to some *συννοικισμός* of Arcadians, and that the *πόλις* is distinguished from *ἔθνος* = *the unorganized race*. Then if it be granted that *ὅταν μὴ ὥς* = *διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι* or *τῇ μὴ εἶναι*, the words will be rendered: "A city will differ too from a tribe by not having the population scattered over villages but centralized like the Arcadians." Thus *μὴ κατὰ*

καίμας κεχωρισμένοι will denote the previous condition of Arcadia, the primitive stage of village life, which long lingered there as in Epirus, Aetolia, Acarnania. The analogy between this state of things and the *συμμαχία* must consist in the isolated independence of the villages the *ἔθνος* 'Αρκαδικὸν being composed *ἐξ ὁμοίων*, of unorganized units, submitting to no central authority. The foundation of Tégua and of Mantinea absorbed eight and five villages respectively: but Megalopolis was the most recent example of centralization and on the largest scale, as it absorbed no less than forty pre-existing townships. After their Great City was settled, it may be argued that there was no part of the Arcadian race which had not reached the stage of city life.

It would appear that, though this interpretation is open to the serious objections enumerated in the note *ad loc.*, it can hardly be directly refuted. Aristotle *may* have interposed at this point the remark that as the *πόλις* differs on the one hand from the larger aggregate, a confederacy of cities, so too it differs on the other hand from those more primitive elements of which it is itself an aggregate. But such an interposition is, on other grounds, unsatisfactory. "No one," says Mr Postgate, "could mistake a disunited and unorganized community, with nothing but race in common, for a state; but when it has received a sort of union and organization, and, so to speak, simulates a state, confusion may arise and discrimination is necessary. In other words, the state, an organized combination of parts for a common end, requires distinguishing from similar combinations, the confederacy and the organized race, but *not* from the non-organized race, which conforms to none of these conditions" (*Notes* p. 3). Yet on the above interpretation of the passage the organized race *is* the *πόλις*; Aristotle has distinguished between race and state where there is no danger of confounding them and has omitted to distinguish them precisely where one may be mistaken for the other.

Another solution is (ii) to understand by *ἔθνος* the *organized* race or tribe, as something distinct from the *πόλις*, retaining the reference to the events of 370—369 B.C., but primarily to the rise of the new Arcadian league, or federal state, which is wholly distinct from the contemporaneous foundation of Megalopolis, to serve as the federal capital. The principal references to the constitution of the league are as follows¹: Xenoph. *Hell.* vi. 5. 6 τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον συνήγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι τε πᾶν τὸ 'Αρκαδικόν, καὶ ὃ τι νικήσῃ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῷ πόλει· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἔπραττον εἶναι τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι: *ib.* vi. 5. 12 ὁ δὲ 'Αγησίλαος, καταλαβὼν πόλιν δημορ. οὐσαν ἑστῆσαν καὶ εὐρὼν τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικίᾳ οἰχομένους εἰς τὸ 'Αρκαδικὸν ὅμως οὐκ ἠδίκησε τὴν πόλιν: *ib.* vii. 4. 2 ὁ Λυκομήδης πείθει τοὺς μυρίους πράττειν περὶ συμμαχίας. (Comp. Harpocr. p. 280 μύριοι ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει...συνδεδρὶν ἔστι κοινὸν 'Λρκαδικὸν πάντων' διελεκεται δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ 'Αριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ 'Αρκαδικῶν πολιτεία.) Xenoph. *Hell.* vii. 4. 12 καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ἕλληες Λασιῶνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι

¹ With what follows compare Freeman *Federal Government* pp. 197—207.

συντελούντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν: § 38 εἰ δὲ καὶ τινες ἐπαιτιῶντο, ἔλεγον [οἱ Μαντινεῖς] ἐπαγγέλλοντες ὅτι ἡ τῶν Μαντινέων πόλις ἐγγυῶτο ἢ μὴν παρέξειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων ὅπουσους τις προσκαλοῖτο. VII. 5. 5 ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐλογίζετο σφίσις ἐπάρχειν. Ἀρκάδων τοὺς τὰ σφέτερά φρονούοντας. ἦσαν δ' οὗτοι Τεγεάται καὶ Μεγαλοπολῖται καὶ Ἀσπᾶται καὶ Παλλαντιεῖς, καὶ εἴ τινες δὴ πόλεις διὰ τὸ μικραὶ τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν μέσαις ταύταις οἰκεῖν ἡναγκάζοντο.

From these passages it may be inferred that τὸ κοινόν, the League, was a federal state, trenching in some respects upon the autonomy of its constituent members, the individual communities. It had a στρατηγὸς and other officers, an assembly (μύριοι), a federal army (ἐπάρτοι) paid out of a common fund (Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4 33, 34), and a common foreign policy. It would appear that the League is something distinct from, and politically superior to, its members, not excepting Megalopolis the greatest of them all. It is not impossible then that Aristotle intends here to draw a distinction between the organized race, as illustrated by τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, and the ordinary autonomous canton-state (πόλις), yet this solution does not remove all difficulties, especially those of an historical nature. (1) An Arcadian league of some sort existed from ancient times, as attested by coins. Vague notions of tribal kinship and some degree of unity had been kept up, as in Ionia, by common religious rites. It is true that this secured no real political union, and that the leading states, Tegea and Mantinea, were generally hostile to each other. But in this respect the events of 369 B.C. made no permanent alteration. (2) Within eight years of its formation the new Arcadian league was broken up: after the party strife of the years 364—362 it ceased to exist as a federal union of all Arcadians, who cannot be said to have been ever again one as towards other states. Arcadians fought on opposite sides at Mantinea (362 B.C.) and in the struggle between Agis and Antipater thirty years afterwards (Aesch III 165, Quint. *Cult.* VI. I. 21). Indeed, not long after Mantinea many of the smaller townships incorporated in Megalopolis demanded autonomy. The Great City would have been dismembered upon the disruption of the League but for the timely interference of 3,000 Thebans under Pammenes, who compelled the seceders to return, Diod. XV. 94. About a century and a half later Philopoemen actually made Aliphera, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa, independent members of the Achaean league, thus putting an end to their dependence upon Megalopolis (194 B.C.). In the time of Pausanias, all except Aliphera and Pallantion were again reduced to the condition of 'villages' of Megalopolis¹.

Bearing these facts in view, we proceed to inquire about the meaning to be assigned on this hypothesis to the words κατὰ κάμῃς κεχωρισμένοι. Since its supporters would probably not take them as Dittenberger has done, they may be presumed to fall back upon the former suggestion that they describe the unorganized race, which lives κατὰ κάμῃς τῇ παλαιᾷ τῇ Ἑλλάδος τροπῇ. And doubtless such was the mode of life of certain districts in the south-west of Arcadia, down to the foundation of Megalopolis. But just as certain

¹ Plut. *Philop.* 13; Paus. VIII. 27. 7; Freeman p. 616 n. 4.

is it that (a) the league embraced Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, Heraca, πόλεις which were not absorbed in Megalopolis, while (β) most of the townships or tribes whose coalition provided the population of the capital are unmistakably called πόλεις, not κώμαι, in respect of their previous existence¹. It was after the foundation of the capital and the formation of the new league that these places became κώμαι: previously they had been πόλεις². Nor is this the only difficulty. For if Aristotle is really desirous of distinguishing the πόλις (1) from a *συνμαχία* or federation of states (Staatenbund) and (2) from a federal state (Bundesstaat), and if Arcadia is the illustration of (2) which he has chosen, he must regard the federal state as still existing in his own times, which in face of its manifest disruption would only be possible if he judged Arcadian politics exclusively from the point of view of Megalopolitan interests. A zealous partisan might hold no doubt that the opposite faction had cut themselves off from the Arcadian race. Yet even with the scanty evidence at our command we can discern that the league of all Arcadia must have been reduced, at certain times, to the single federal city Megalopolis, in which case the distinction between the organized tribe and the πόλις, *ex hypothesi* all-important, disappears.

(11) Some of the older commentators inferred from the passage that the condition of Arcadia was one of extreme disintegration, an organization so low in the scale as to contrast unfavourably with that of the village-community. Bernays perhaps adopts this view when he translates: 'when the tribe is not divided into villages with a definite number of inhabitants, but lives scattered and without political organization.'

The obscurity of the passage is increased by the uncertainty of those who have examined it as to whether the Arcadians are cited as an example of a πόλις or an ἔθνος. The view cited as (1) makes them both. Victorius³ and Cameiriarius apparently consider them adduced as exemplifying the πόλις, implying that distribution of the population over villages or 'demes' (κατὰ κώμας) was a characteristic feature of the normal Greek state. But apart from other obvious difficulties one fails to see how *any* tribe or region of Greece, whether it had towns or not, can have been without villages.

¹ Paus. VIII. 27 §§ 3, 4, describing the founding of Megalopolis: πόλεις δὲ τοσαυτὴ ὁπόσας πατριδας σφίσιν οὖσας ἐκλείπειν ἐπαύοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες. Then follows a list of forty names. Mr Wyse however rightly remarks that not much stress can be laid on the term πόλις which is often interchanged with κώμαι. cp. Thuc. II. 15 κατὰ πόλεις φέρεται, but Isocrates X. 35 σποράδην καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκοῦσαν (both of Attica before Theseus).

² Ib. VIII. 27. 7, τῶν κατελεγμένων πόλεων αἱ μὲν ἐς ἄπαν εἰσὶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἔργμοι, τὰς δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολιταὶ κώμας, Γόρτυνα, Διπύκνας, Βεισθάν τὴν πρὸς Ὀρχομένῳ, Μεθόβριον, Τεθβιν, Καλλίνας, Ἐλίσσαντα. 12 § 2 Μεθόβριον πόλιν μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ κώμην δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ Μεγαλοπολί-

τικὸν συντελοῦσαν (cp. the similar language of Xen. *Hell.* VII. 4. 12, as quoted above, with regard to a single city, Lasion, as a member of the Arcadian League).

³ Excipio, inquit, cum cives ipsius totaque illa multitudo, quae civitatem confiat, non fuerint per pagos distincti, . ut sunt autem, addidit, nunc Arcades, e quibus distantibus inter se intervallis locorum, domiciliaque habentibus valde diiuncta, conficiebatur tamen civitas. Victorius *Comm.* p. 78.

⁴ οὗτοι [sc. οἱ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ] μὲν γὰρ κώμας τὰς περὶοικίδας καλεῖν φασίν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δῆμοντι, *Forcl.* 3 § 6, 1448 a 36. Dr Jackson has supplied this reference.

EXCURSUS I.

ἔπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων¹ εἶναι γάρ τισι τῶν ἄνω Διθύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαιρεῖσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. II. 3 9.

'Certain of those who have written books of travel round the world assert that this is actually the case: that there are tribes in the interior of Africa who have community of wives, and assign the children that are born to different fathers by their likeness to them.' From the fragments by writers of this kind anterior to Aristotle nothing of this sort can be adduced; only Herodotos (IV. 130), who is in a way at least to be ranked with this class of authors, tells this story of the Auscans (Αὔσται) living near Lake Titonis, west of the Lesser Sytis. Of later writers Mela I. 8 relates it of the Garamantians (Schlosser), for which compare Pliny v. 8. 45 (Gottling). Nicolaus Damascenus, *Frags.* III. in Stob. *Flor.* XLIV. 41 (Muller *Frags. hist. Græc.* III. p. 458), of the Liburnians (Eaton). Diodorus III. 15. 2 does indeed attribute community of wives to the Troglodytae on the Red Sea, but he says explicitly that they have community of children as well. Herodotos (IV 104) ascribes to the Scythian race of the Agathyrsi community of wives, but without a distribution of children and for the same object as Plato had in view 'in order that they might all be brothers,' ἵνα αὐσίγητοί τε ἀλλήλων ζῶσι καὶ οἰκῆσθαι ἔχοντες πάντες μήτε φθόνῳ μήτ' ἔχθει χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους. The case of the Massagetae, cited by Congreve, Herod. I. 216, is still less in point. Other stories of community of wives and children adduced by Oncken, I. p. 134 f., p. 178 n. 1, border on the fabulous; as those related of the Tyrihemians by Theopompus *Frags.* 222 in Athen. XII 517 D, E, Muller *Frags. hist. Gr.* I 315², and of the Scythian Galaktophagi by Nicolaus Damascenus *Frags.* 123 in Stob. *Flor.* v. 73, Muller *Frags. h. gr.* III 460³.

¹ Διθύριοι κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχουσι καὶ τὰ τέκνα ἐν κοινῷ τρέφουσι μέχρι ἐπὶ τῶν ἔντε, ἔπειτα τῷ ἐκτῷ συντρέφοντες ἀπαντα τὰ παῖδια τὰς ὁμοιότητας πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐκρίνουσι καὶ ἐλάττω τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδοῦσι πατρὶ.

² Θεόπομπος δ' ἐν τῇ μὲν τῶν ἱστοριῶν καὶ νόμον εἶναι φησὶ παρὰ τοῖς Τυρρηνοῖς κοινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰς γυναῖκας· ταύτας δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σφοδρὰ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι πολλὰς καὶ μετ' ἄνδρων, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς. τρέφειν δὲ τοὺς Τυρρηνοὺς πάντα τὰ γινόμενα παῖδια οὐκ εἰδότες ἔστιν πατὴρ ἐστὶν ἑκάστων. ζῶσι δὲ καὶ οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς θρεψαμένοις κτλ. The description seems to owe much to Plato's republic.

³ εἰσι δὲ καὶ διαλείπασθαι, κοινὰ ἔχοντες

τὰ τε αἰτήματα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ὥστε τοὺς μὲν πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν πατέρας ὀνομάζειν, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους παῖδας, τοὺς δ' ἡλικίας ἀδελφοὺς. [This is the system of nomenclature (in use in Hawaii and Rotuma and other islands of the Pacific), classifying and not describing the person addressed, which Morgan calls Malayan. See *Ancient Society* pp. 401—423. If there is anything fabulous in the account of Nicolaus it must be sought in his further statements παρὰ τοῖσιν οὐδὲ εἰς οὐτὴ φθονῶν, ὡς φασιν, οὐτὴ μισῶν οὐτὴ φοβούμενος ἱστορήθη διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου κοινότητα καὶ δικαιοσύνην. μάχιμοι δ' οὐχ ἦσαν αὐτῶν αἱ γυναῖκες ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, καὶ συμπολεμοῦσιν αὐτοῖς ὅταν δεῖη.]

It is worth while to reproduce the remarks of Oncken *l. c.* pp 179—181. 'Here Aristotle touches the surface of a profound problem. Unquestionably there is a maternal instinct which assures the mother more than any external likeness that the child is hers; and though Aristotle is here looking at the whole matter from the outside a passage in the *Ethics* shows clearly that at least this is not due to the want of a right conception of the moral dignity of marriage and the inner relationship between parents and children. On the contrary he regards both relationships as altogether moral and spiritual in thoroughly modern fashion. Between man and wife, he tells us, *Nic. Eth.* VIII 12 7, 1162 a 16, there is a natural tie of love and friendship, for man is by nature even more designed for fellowship in marriage than in the state, inasmuch as the family is prior in time and more indispensable than the state, and propagation a characteristic common to all living beings, whereas the social life of a community is only found in a few other cases. But in the animal world pairing is restricted to one purpose, whereas human beings do not marry merely to bring children into the world, but to share their lives together. From the outset the functions of man and wife are distinct, by making their different endowments common property they mutually assist each other. Hence such a relationship of love and friendship combines utility with pleasure; and this pleasure, provided both are excellent in their own way, rests on the mutual delight of each in the other's diverse excellence¹. Children are the bond of union as being the common property of the parents, for what is possessed in common strengthens their union and this is the reason why a marriage is more easily dissolved when there are no children.

¹ Further, § 3 of the same chapter, 1161 b 27; parents love their children as themselves, for, owing their origin to their parents, children become by the separation as it were a second self. Children love their parents as the source of their being; brothers and sisters love one another on account of their common origin; for their common relation to their parents unites them to one another, whence the expressions *one blood*, *one stock*, and the like. Again, § 5, 1162 a 4; the relationship of children to their parents, like that of men to the gods, rests on the feeling of attachment to benefactors and superiors, for they have received from them the best gifts, life, sustenance and education: enjoyment too and utility make this a closer tie than that between strangers, since it has in it a greater and more intimate fellowship in life.' Comp. also Zeller, *op. c. II.* II. p. 688. 'Hence it is not simply its impracticability that Aristotle urges against community of wives and children. Whereas in Plato's view human marriage is no more than the pairing of animals¹—and to use Zeller's apt expression (*Plato* p. 478 Eng. tr.) his proposals 'degrade it to a mere economic breeding of population'—'Aristotle has upheld against him the right and dignity of marriage in its relation to civil life, has shown what is at stake if marriage be abolished, the loss of the most

¹ διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρησίμων εἶναι γὰρ ἑκατέρου ἀρετῇ, καὶ χαίρουσιν ἄν τῷ δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ἴδόν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλῇ. ἐν δ' τοιοῦτῳ.
 ἄν καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς, εἰ ἐπιμελεῖς εἶεν· ὅστις

primitive and sacred ties which bind man to man before a state arises to develop out of the family a higher unity¹. That these considerations do not recur in the *Politics*, when he is expressly refuting Plato, may be partly due to the fact that he did not wish to repeat himself; partly and more especially it is because his object is only to meet Plato with arguments which the latter must himself concede. A thinker who once took such a view of marriage as Plato, could only be opposed with arguments deducible from his own premises. He who roundly denies that marriage has any but a political aim is safe from attack on the side of its moral purpose' SUSEM. (142)

[Clearly Oncken, writing in thorough sympathy with his author's conceptions², understands by the family which is the ultimate social unit approximately the modern or monogamous family³. From the time of Plato⁴ and Aristotle down to the present generation this belief has been almost universal⁵. But two causes combine to render the Aristotelian theory untenable. The comparative study of customs, ceremonies and social usages discloses facts in abundance which will not square with it: while at the same time the extension of the doctrine of evolution from man's physical to his mental and social condition shows us what interpretation to put upon these facts. In short, when Aristotle derives other social forms from the monogamous family, he commits a mistake in scientific procedure; for the family is a *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*, and what he assumes to be its simple and primary form turns out to be a product of long elaboration.

The facts tell against a primitive monogamous family exactly as they tell against innate moral ideas. Locke showed that in many parts of the world men lived apparently destitute of such ideas. Ethnologists are busily at work collecting notices of varieties of men who are equally without the monogamous family and apparently destitute of the ideas on which it rests. Beginning with the Auscans, Tioglodytes, &c. adduced in this Excursus, nearly all the stages of social progress can be illustrated from the ancient world, many of them from facts within the knowledge of Aristotle himself⁶. The phrase *εἶναι κοινὸν τὰς γυναῖκας* is not likely to have been literally true, or to have had one and the same meaning, in all cases⁷. Few tribes are so

¹ It is well known that Plato was a bachelor, whilst Aristotle had been twice happily married.

² Prof. Susemihl is in no way responsible for the remainder of this excursus, and he would perhaps consider the subject hardly relevant in an edition of the *Politics*.

³ But for this limitation of his view Oncken would have observed that maternal instinct, however important in Calipolis, has nothing to do with the Libyan custom in question which attempts, in a rough fashion, to settle paternity.

⁴ B. III. of the *Law* is a most interesting study in the history of civilization.

⁵ McLennan's epoch-making work

Primitive Marriage is here followed. Down to the year 1857 its author accepted the Aristotelian account of the origin of society. See *Enc. Brit.* (8th ed.) Art. LAW, vol. XIII. p. 255 f.

⁶ That is, assuming the reports to be trustworthy. There must have been a rich harvest for a scientific observer in Greece about 330 B.C. How much Aristotle collected in *Νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*, we cannot tell. The few extant fragments are of little value.

⁷ What else it may have meant we can conjecture in the light of the fuller information we possess respecting Hawaiians, Nairs, and Tibetans.

backward as to have no rule of incest at all; they mostly follow definite rules, but not our modern ones. Thus over a wide area it is incestuous to marry within the group to which one belongs (Exogamy), the 'group' being constituted by all of the same blood who trace their descent through females only from a common ancestor (who is often an animal, a vegetable or inanimate object)¹. It is quite certain that, under favourable circumstances, the working of this rule conferred great powers upon women. Of such a state of things, known as the Matriarchate, there is evidence in the important place of the Greek female divinities, in certain legends (e.g. of the Amazons and the Lemnian women), in eponyms like Oenone, Thebe, and Messene, in the use of *μητρὶς* by Cretans and Messenians². Down to historical times it was in force in Lycia (amongst a people possibly of Indo-European race)³ and amongst the Cantabrians of Spain⁴. Athenian traditions assert that children were once named after their mothers; amongst the Locrians nobility came on the mother's side⁵. Kinship is traced through females in Homer and succession to property is so regulated in the legend of Meleager⁶. Exogamy must anciently have been the rule of the Roman gentes⁷. The Attic law permitted a man to marry his half-sister by the father's side. The Levirate is found in Sparta and in legendary Troy⁸.

¹ Called a totem in North America and a kolong in Australia. Reverence for it is the rudimentary germ to which the worship of animals and plants, of the animal gods and the heavenly bodies, can be traced. The *aparaugus* was the totem of an Attic gens, Plut. Theseus c. 8 § 7 ὅθεν Ἰωίδαις καὶ Ἰωίσι πάτριον κατέστη μήτηρ δαίμων ἀσφαράγου, μήτε στοιβὴν καίειν, ἀλλὰ σέβειν καὶ τιμᾶν. See 'The Worship of Animals and Plants' in the *Fortnightly Review* Oct. 1869—Feb. 1870.

² Plato *Rep.* IX. 575 D, Pausan. IV. 26 § 3.

³ Herod. I. 173, Nicolaus Damasc. *Frag. Hist. Gr.* III. p. 461 (Müller) Δόκιος τὰς γυναῖκας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἀνδρας τιμᾷσι καὶ καλοῦνται μητρὶν, τὰς τε κληρονόμους τὰς θυγατέρας λέγουσιν, οὗ τοῖς υἱοῖς Comp. the genealogies of Sappho and Glauco, Hom. *Il.* VI. 150 ff. the daughter's son succeeds before the agnate. The bilingual Etruscan inscriptions prove that Etruscans were named after the mother.

⁴ Strabo III. 4 § 18, p. 165 τὸ παρὰ τοῖς Καντάβροις τοὺς ἀνδρας διδοῦναι τὰς γυναῖξί προίκα, τὸ τὰς θυγατέρας κληρονόμοι ἀπολείπεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδελφοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκδίδωσθαι γυναῖξιν. ἔχει γὰρ τινα γυναικοκρατίαν. The couvade among the *chaco* people, *ib.* § 17 p. 164 τρεοῦσαι τε διαποινοῦσι τοὺς ἀνδρας, ἐκείνους ἀνθ' ἐαυ-

τῶν καταλλύσασαι. From Herod. II. 35 matriarchate and female kinship were suspected amongst the Egyptians. This has been confirmed by the evidence of the monuments.

⁵ Valer. apud Augustin. *De civ. Dei* XVII. 9. cp. Justin I 8 2, Suda s. p. 3102. For the Locrians, Polyb. XII. 5 πάντα τὰ διὰ τῶν προγόνων ἐνδοξα παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, εἴη: Aristotle apud Polyb. XII. 6, 1560 b 8 ff. διὰ καὶ τὴν δογμασίαν τῇ πόλει τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐκείτως ἐπέθεσαν καὶ τὴν οὐκ εὐήγησαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς φύλας καὶ τὰς συμμάχιας τὰς προγονίαις τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνεσθύντο.

⁶ Hom. *Iliad* II. 661 ff. (Pierolomus), XII. 95 cp. XXII. 49 (Lykaon). Hyginus *fab.* 229, 174 implies that Meleager's maternal uncles were his lawful heirs, and hence arose the feud narrated in Homer *Iliad* IX. 563 ff.

⁷ Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* § 6 p. 265 π μὴ νομομαρμένον συγγενέας γαμῶν πρότερον γὰρ οὐκ ἐγάμοιεν τὰς ἀφ' αἵματος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς τιτθίδας οὐδ' ἀδελφὰς γαμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτ' συνεχώρησαν ἀνεψίαῖς συνοικεῖν. § 108 p. 289 ε διὰ τί διὰ τὰς ἐγγυὺς γένουσι οὐ γαμοῦσι;

⁸ Deiphobos is an instance. Lycurgus declined to take his brother's wife. This is a survival of polyandry which, though

The presumption is, then, that the system of male kinship established in Greece (as amongst other Indo-European peoples) in historical times had superseded an earlier system of female kinship. And if so, the 'stocks' (*γένη*) and 'brotherhoods' (*φρατρίαι*) which when we discern them already appear on the point of falling into decay, or made subservient to political ends, are the survivals of the ruder tribal associations, anterior to the rise of the family in our sense of the term, which were formerly the only recognized ties of blood. Their common rites and burial-place, the obligation on all the members to succour and avenge one another, their right (in certain cases) to inherit property, all point to close ties of kinship, though of a rudimentary form. Certainly in no other way is the intermixture of alien blood and alien rites in the same city and local tribe so naturally explained. Aristotle, apparently transferring to ruder times the freedom of communication and voluntary action of his own day, leaves it to be accounted for arbitrarily, by contiguity of residence. Others, not more successfully, bring in the fiction of adoption and artificial extension of homogeneous groups. Unfortunately these questions have been only recently investigated, and in the present state of our knowledge we must be satisfied with provisional results, leaving many matters of detail in uncertainty. The Greeks, when they first become known to us, are so far advanced as to recognise kinship both by males and by females; they have marriage by contract or purchase (see *n.* 271), though traces of the custom which was superseded by purchase, viz. wife-stealing, are particularly well preserved¹. What interval separated them from the matriarchal period? To what age belong the terms cited from Charondas and Epimenides, *ἑμοσίπνοι* and *ἑμόκαπνοι* or *ἑμόκαπνοι*? And which is the true form of the latter word? Something of more than usual importance is involved in this v. l. The *ἑμογάλακες* (I. 2 § 6) were undoubtedly united by female kinship; i.e. all the members of a *γένος* (for *ἑμογάλακες* = *γενήται*, though Aristotle brings in the term to explain the village community) might be said to be nourished on the same mother's milk. On this analogy the members of a primitive *family* (*οἶκος*: I. 2 § 5) may have been known as 'sharers in one meal-sack and the smoke of one hearth.' This can be supported by two Gaelic words for family, one meaning 'those who eat together' (*coediche*), and 'those who have a common residence' (*teadhloch*)². There is no mention of the blood tie, which is particularly emphasized in *ἑμογάστριος* and *ἑδελφός*, the latter word having superseded in Greek the earlier *φράτωρ*, as we see by the cognate languages. In Greek *φράτωρ* continues to designate a member of the older and ruder association³.

outraging all our instincts of decency, is an established institution of semi-civilized tribes, superseding still ruder arrangements and itself gradually decaying as monandry increases. Comp. Polyb. XII. 6 *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ πατρίων ἦν καὶ σύνθησις τρεῖς ἀνδρας ἔχειν γυναῖκα καὶ τέτταρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδελφούς ὄντας, καὶ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινά, καὶ γεννήσαντα παῖδας ἰκανοὺς ἐκδοσθαι*

γυναῖκά τινα τῶν φίλων καλὸν καὶ σύνθησις.

¹ The form of capture a marriage ceremony at Sparta, Herod. VI. 65, Plut. *Lyc.* 15, Xen. *Rep. Lac.* I § 5. In Crete, Ephoroi apud Strab. X. p. 482 D. The Ionian etiquette (one consequence of capture), Herod. I. 146.

² *Studies in Ancient History* p. 123; *Lang. Essays* p. 97 n.

³ This explanation seems the most

Aristotle with his healthy respect for facts would doubtless have modified his own theory, if this line of inquiry had been suggested to him. He had a poor, though just, opinion of the lower varieties of mankind¹; he has to admit that γένος, γονικὸς fail to express his own conception of marriage (I. 3 § 2); and he speaks with contempt of the κοινωμία δοῦλης καὶ δούλου, the different species of which he can hardly have examined with attention. Here, therefore, as upon the question of slavery, while the advanced thinkers of Greece had caught an early glimpse of truth², he is content with a cautious conservative attitude, partly idealizing the actual relations of husband and wife and assuming the social development to have begun from a point where its course was well-nigh complete.]

EXCURSUS II.

HIPPODAMOS OF MILETUS: II. 7. 1

Hippodamos, one of the most famous architects of his time, the first to introduce the fashion of laying out towns on a regular plan with broad straight streets, see IV(VII). II § 6 n. (850), was born at the earliest about 475 B.C. His oldest work appears to have been the construction, on the plan described, of the port town of Peiræceus, near the fortifications which had already been made by Themistocles. The market-place in the Peiræceus was called after him ἡ Ἰπποδάμειος ἀγορά; Xen. *Hell.* II. 4. 11, Andoc. I. 45, Harpocri p. 154. Next it was he, in all probability, who directed the building of Thurii 444 B.C., since only a long residence there would account for his being called a Thurian. Considerably later in 406 B.C. he built Rhodes, Strabo XIV. p. 654³. Through the outline of his ideal state there runs the same striving after mathematical regularity as in his town architecture, the persistent employment of a threefold division especially. It is quite possible, although by no means so certain as Hildenbrand and Oncken assume, that this was due to Pythagorean influence and that, at least in a certain fashion and to a certain extent, Hippodamos was an adherent

satisfactory, though we might have expected some rude mark of comradeship, such as tattooing (or better still a common totem) to have come down, rather than the *συνή*, from the times before the idea of blood relationship had arisen. "The apparent bond of fellowship between the members of such a group would be that they and theirs had always been companions in war or the chase—joint-tenants of the same cave or grove." *Studies in Anc. Hist.* p. 122

¹ See I. 2 § 23, II § 20 f., and III. 11 § 5 καὶ τὰ ἑκαστὸν ἐκείνων τῶν θηρίων, ὡς ἕκαστος εἰπὲν;

² An Orphic poet had described primitive men as cannibals, Sext. Emp. IX. 15 Kritias began his famous analysis of the causes which led to the origin of religion thus, ἦν χρόνος ἐπ' ἦν ἀνακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος καὶ θνητῶν λογῶν θ' ὑπερέτης, *Flag.* I, 2 of *Sisyphus*, Sext. Emp. IX. 54. Cp. Moschion *Flag. inc.* VI (9) apud Stob. *Ecl.* I. 9. 38 p. 240 ff. Epicurus pursued further the same line of inquiry. Lucretius V 922 ff.

³ ἐκτίσθη κατὰ τὰ Περσέωννησια δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὡς φασί, ὅφ' οὗ καὶ ὁ Περραινός. [A very cautious statement.]

of the Pythagoreans. During his residence at Thurii he might easily have come into personal relations with the sect, as also with many other philosophers and sophists. At all events this is the easiest explanation of the fact that subsequently two works were ascribed to him, one on Happiness (*περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Thurian, and one on Government (*περὶ πολιτείας*) under the name of Hippodamos the Pythagorean: we still possess extracts from these works in the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus. Both betray their spuriousness by a frequent use of Plato and Aristotle, and that the second is not the genuine work of Hippodamos which Aristotle criticized may be inferred from the fact that the contents of its fragments cannot be reconciled with Aristotle's statements.

The genuine ideal of a polity set forth by Hippodamos, Henkel (p. 164 f.) rightly places amongst the attempts to effect a compromise between democracy and oligarchy or aristocracy. 'It is a democratic feature to allow the whole body of citizens a share in public affairs' (§§ 2, 7, 9 *nn.* 253, 261, 262), 'to restrict legislation to the negative function of the protection of person and property' (§ 4 s. f. *n.* 255 b) 'and to attach especial importance to the improvement of the administration of justice' (§ 5). 'It is characteristic of aristocracy to adopt the vote instead of the lot as the normal mode of appointment to offices of state' (§ 7 *n.* 260 b), 'to subordinate the popular tribunals to a supreme court of appeal' (§ 4 *n.* 256), 'whereas the genuinely democratic popular tribunals exclude the very idea of an appeal, inasmuch as they are committees and representatives of the highest power in the state. This same tendency to mediate is perhaps discernible even in the regulation of professions. Democracy strives after an economic development of the nation, with which a prolonged service in the army is regarded as more and more incompatible: hence a growing inclination to hand over military service to foreign mercenaries. On the other hand, the warlike character of aristocracy which sees in military service a science and a lifework (Xenoph. *Or. an.* 4 § 3) leads its partisans to arrogate to themselves political rights to the exclusion of the producing classes; the productive labours of peace are considered irreconcilable with the fulfilment of political duties (Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, Plut. *Pol.* 23). Hippodamos, then, combines the two opposite tendencies by granting political privileges to the labouring and producing classes, and by handing over the profession of arms to an independent military caste in the nation, which is in return to derive its sustenance from the public land and possess no private property.' It may be quite true that in the Greek democracies the state had more and more laid aside its paternal character and had applied itself to the improvement of positive law, in order to safeguard person and property on all sides against attack. Yet it was after all something novel for men like Hippodamos and the sophist Lycophron (III. 9. 8 *n.* 552) to give explicit and conscious utterance to this truth in theory; and, in place of the positive educational function which more or less Laconizing theorists like Xenophon (see Henkel p. 137 ff.) Plato and Aristotle assigned to the law, either to

attribute to it a purely negative function as 'the mere surety of mutual rights' in Lycophron's phrase, or with Hippodamos to reject all laws whose aim is not solely the prevention or punishment of injuries to one's neighbour in honour, property, or life. We do not know for certain whether Hippodamos preceded Lycophron in the declaration of this opinion, but it is highly probable. still less do we know whether he was the first to put forward theoretically this new principle of legislation, which broke altogether with old Greek notions of law and justice, but the supposition that this is so derives support from the fact that he was the first to devise a theoretical scheme for a pattern state at all. If this is the case, then in spite of Henkel's dissent we must credit him, as Oncken does¹, with originating an important idea when he separated morality from the department of law, although after what has been said we cannot go so far as Oncken, who thinks that by these conceptions Hippodamos had left his age far behind. According to the old Greek notions, to which Socrates Xenophon Plato and Aristotle adhered, 'religious, ethical, and political duties are inseparably blended and united in law: nothing can be immoral that is not also illegal, and nothing can be morally right and yet at the same time illegal.' The later development of democracy had considerably loosened this unity; after which Hippodamos, it would seem, was the first to make its dissolution explicitly a fundamental principle, rendering impossible all such extravagances as those 'in virtue of which Aristotle goes the length of requiring the law to fix an annual budget of children' (II. 6 § 10 ff. cp. III. 209 and 211). After its full and logical development by the Roman jurists, this principle passed over into the modern state, so that in the law 'we see no more than the barrier against disturbances of the social order, and leave to the forces of morality and religion the training of citizens in virtue' The Greek political theories would be very imperfectly appreciated if, side by side with the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, we did not recognize the full importance of such ideas as these, which had their origin in democracy. In such spheres of thought there arose that repudiation of slavery as the law of nature which in a certain respect is all the more deserving of admiration for being so premature. In such spheres too, it is true, there arose doctrines and ideas which were not merely instrumental in disintegrating the Greek state, but in their tendency destructive of all political structures; and these were especially employed by Sophists. In opposition to these ideas even we moderns, although we look at the state as a mighty engine for dispensing justice rather than for education, are obliged to range ourselves on the side of Plato and Aristotle in so far as we violate our principle by compulsory education and the universal obligation to military service. It is significant that even Isocrates, 'the admirer of an idealised ancient Athens, assumes this separation of law and morality: but just for this reason, since he too regards the state as exclusively an educational institution, he thinks but little of a written code of laws: see Henkel p. 149 ff. From the above point of view we see why

¹ *Staatslehre* I. 214 ff. whose account is in the main followed here, the quotation marks indicating actual citations.

Hippodamos occupied himself so minutely with the improvement of the judicial system (§ 4 f.). And his political theory is essentially distinguished from that of Phaleas 'by its pervading ethical features, while in the scheme of Phaleas socialistic tendencies are prominent' (Henckel): see 7 § 1. *SUSEM.* (250)

NOTE ON THE CELTIC. II. 9. 7

On the Kelts see also IV(VII). 2 § 10 n (722) and 17 § 3 (953) and *Nic. Eth.* III. 7. 7, 1115 b 26 ff. where we are told the Kelts fear nothing, neither earthquakes nor waves of the sea. 'De Celtorum amoribus puerorum testatur etiam Athenaeus XIII. 603 A' (J. G. Schneider). 'See also Ammian Marcell. XXXI. 9' (Fulleborn). Plato *Laws* I 637 D f. describes them as warlike but fond of drinking. It is known that at this time there were Kelts in Western Europe, whence came mercenaries in the service of Dionysios the tyrant who aided the Spartans against the Thebans 369 or 368 B.C., Xenoph. *Hell.* VII. 1. 20. There were others again in Hungary and Scythia, who sent an embassy to Alexander the Great, when he had crossed the Danube, Arrian *Anab.* I. 4. 6 ff.: at a later time they repeatedly made incursions into Macedonia and at last sent out a band of immigrants to Asia Minor, which finally remained settled there, in the country called after them Galatia. Hence Aristotle *Meteor.* I. 13 § 18, 350 a 36 ff. makes the Danube rise in Celtic territory in the mountain Pyrene i.e. the Pyrenees. Still greater is the inaccuracy of Herodotus (II 33) a hundred years earlier; he is only acquainted with Kelts in the extreme west of Europe, but nevertheless makes the Danube rise in their country, and near Pyrene which he turns into a town.

To all appearance Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks, does not as yet distinguish between the Germans and the Kelts. While he mentions the story that the Kelts are not at all afraid of the sea *Nic. Eth.* III 7. 7, his pupil Eudemos III. 1 § 23, 1229 b 28 f., speaking more precisely, says that 'the Kelts go forth fully armed to meet the waves of the sea' The same story was told by Ephoros *Fr.* 44 (see Nicol. Dam. *Fr.* 104, Aelian. *V.H.* XII. 23): Strabo (VII. p. 293) says he told it of the Cimbrians; but here, as Casaubon saw, there is a mistake on Strabo's part. Müllenhoff *Deutsche Alterthumskunde* I. 231 ff. (Berlin 1870) rightly remarks that this story could only refer to the inhabitants of the coast of the North Sea: he thinks it quite conceivable that 'there, at times of inundation and high tides, when no escape was possible, the men put on their armour, not indeed actually to do battle with the invading waves, but in order that, in their best array, like heroes and warriors, they might meet the death which had not been granted them on the battle field. These stories must have been conveyed to the Greeks through Massalia, Sicily, and Italy.' The first Greek who made his way to the settlements of the Germans was Aristotle's contemporary Pytheas of Massalia: he at any rate recognized that they were different from the Kelts, but at the same

time undoubtedly fell into the other mistake of taking them to be Scythians—see Mullenhoff *op. cit.* 474—495. Although Mullenhoff's views in regard to the amber island described by Pytheas and the neighbouring coast of the Teutons, and their position in and on the coast of the North Sea about the mouths of the Eider, allow of considerable doubt, yet thus much at any rate seems certain, that in Pliny *N. H.* xxxvii 35 Pytheas Gutonibus Germaniae genti etc., the words Germaniae genti are an addition by Pliny himself, and the word 'Gutonibus' is wrong. Pytheas himself meant the same tribe 'Teutones' who are mentioned further on in the passage (πρωτονισque Teutonibus) δὲ γὰρ (287)

EXCURSUS III

THE EPHORS AND THE Κόσμοι.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δυνάμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἔφοροι πέντε τὸν δριμύδιν οὗ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσὶν. II IO 6.

The resemblance between the Ephors and the Κόσμοι is certainly far less than that between the senators of the two states. For the Ephors are a democratic element, but the Κόσμοι, being elected out of certain noble families, are an aristocratic or oligarchic element, § 10. But the similarity lies in this, that the Κόσμοι too are changed year by year, unlike the senate which sits for life; that after they have resigned office their conduct is subjected to a scrutiny and that in spite of the restricted election no pains are taken to exclude all from the office but men of especial merit. That the official powers of the two magistracies are (with the exception of the difference afterwards pointed out) the same, we must believe on Aristotle's authority the only other difference he finds is in their respective numbers. Both indicate a contrast between the proper governmental authority, the activity of the executive or the administration on the one hand, and that of criminal jurisdiction and deliberation on the other both magistracies share the idea that younger and more energetic force belongs to the former, while the latter is appropriate to the dignity of age. Lastly, while the power of both has grown at the expense of the enfeebled monarchy, only the Κόσμοι have entirely absorbed it, so that the supreme command in war is transferred from the kings to them, whereas the Ephors were content to direct all military operations from home or else to superintend the execution of everything by means of two of their number who were present in the camp. see *n.* 340 on 9 § 30 (Tiebei). Compare *n.* (343) on 9 § 33. Yet after all there remains a difference which is by no means unimportant, viz. that the Ephors never come forward as generals or superior officers; all they do is to observe the com-

manders in the field. By the very meaning of the terms themselves the *ἐφοροί* are 'overseers', the *κόσμοι* are 'orderers' (Oncken). Ephoraios (Strabo p. 481 f) also maintains the similarity of the functions of the two, although the offices have different titles: but he diverges from Aristotle in arguing from the similarity between the senators in the two states to that between the Ephorai and *Κόσμοι*. It may be that his judgment on the Cretan constitution is that of romantic, uncritical admiration and that Aristotle's is far less favourable and severely critical: still that does not justify us in inferring with Oncken (II. 401) that Aristotle *could* not have derived his facts, for the most part, from Ephoraios. Indeed the conclusion that he did, receives decided support from the great similarity, which even Oncken (II. 405) points out, between the account of Crete by Ephoros and that in the so-called *Πολιτεία* which we have under the name of Heracleides¹ of Pontos: for probably these are for the most part excerpts from Aristotle's *Πολιτεία*, as Schneidewin who edited them has shown; and in this instance from his *Cretan Polity*. It is less likely however that he could have taken from Ephoraios the facts which stand in strong opposition to the latter's verdict of approval, like most of those in §§ 12—14. SUSSEX. (360)

THE CRETAN *περίοικοι*.

φέρων οὗς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι: II. 10. 8.

It is in itself surprising that Aristotle does not compare the Cretan *περίοικοι* (see II. 355) with the Spartan *περίοικοι*, but rather with the Helots (§ 5, cp. II. 357); and this becomes still more strange when we learn from two later writers on Crete, Sosikrates and Dosiadas (*Frag.* 6. 2), as quoted in Athenaeus VI. 263 F f, that there were *three* dependent classes of the Cretan population, viz. (1) the slaves or serfs belonging to the state, the *Μνοῖται*, (2) those belonging to private individuals, the *Αφάμιοται*, and (3) the *περίοικοι*, with the additional information about these last that the Cretans called them "subjects".² Further, in a skolion quoted in Athen. XV. 695 F (in Bergk *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* no. 28 p. 1294), the Cretan poet Hyblis boasts that the *Μνοῖται* call him their lord³. Kallistatos, the disciple of Aristophanes of Byzantium, as quoted in Athen. VI. 263 E, describes the *Αφάμιοται* as

¹ Heracleides was not, as Oncken thinks, a pupil of Aristotle, but of Plato.

² τὴν μὲν κορυὴν δουλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφάμιας, τοὺς δὲ περίοικους ὑπηκόους.

³ Spear and sword are my great treasure and my goodly shield withal, my body's safeguard: for therewith I sow, therewith I reap, therewith I am called lord of the slave-folk. But whoso durst not carry

spear and sword, all shall fall down and worship (me) addressing me as lord and mighty prince.

ἔσσι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρυ καὶ ξίφος καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαοσφύον, πρόβλημα χρωτὸς τοῦτω γὰρ ἀρῶ, τοῦτω θερίζω, τοῦτω δεσπότης μνοῖας κέκλημαι. τοὶ δὲ μὴ ταλμῶν' ἔχουσιν δόρυ καὶ ξίφος ... πάντες γόνυ πεπτηῶτες ἀμὼν ... προσκυνεῖν τί (με) δεσπότην καὶ μέγαν βασιλεῖα φωνέοντες.

'the slaves or serfs on the estates, of native birth but enslaved in war, who are also called *κλειοταί*'¹ and earlier still Ephoros (*Frag.* 32 a, in Athen. vi. 263 f) says, not quite correctly, that the Cretans called their slaves *κλειοταί*. It may be conjectured that the estates in the private possession of the Dorian masters were called *δωμῆαι*, as well as *κλῆροι*, which is the ordinary term for allotments of land: see Schomann *Antiquities* p. 298 Eng. t. Accordingly we should expect Aristotle to compare with the Spartan *Πελοῖ* either (α) both the *κλειοταί* and *μνοῖταί*, or (β) the *μνοῖταί*, the villeins who tilled the state land or public domain, or lastly, if this seemed inappropriate because at Sparta there was no public domain, (γ) the *κλειοταί* alone, as being the serfs on private estates. And a closer investigation unquestionably shows that this last is what he has actually done. He has used the term *περίοικοι* in a somewhat different sense from Sosikrates, not for the inhabitants of dependent Cretan towns liable to pay tribute, but for the *κλειοταί*. It could not possibly be said of the former that they tilled the land of the Cretans: nor could Aristotle possibly have believed (§ 8) that the cost of the mess was defrayed by the state out of the public domain and the tributes of their subjects (which is the meaning that the words *φύρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι* would then have) but that private individuals contributed nothing to them from their own estates. Moreover, a passage of Dosiadas (*Fr.* 1) in Athen. iv. 143 a, which has unfortunately been rendered obscure by the inaccuracy of the epitomist and has probably come down to us in a corrupt text, unquestionably attests this fact at least, that at Lyktos every citizen was bound to contribute the tenth part of the produce of his estate towards the mess-table to which he belonged. The remainder of the passage² I interpret to mean that out of its own revenues the state assigned a fixed portion to every family of citizens and accordingly distributed these its contributions amongst the various mess-associations, and lastly, we read, each slave had to pay a poll-tax of an Aeginetan stater. Putting on one side this last point (see *u.* 366 on § 8 *ext.*), Aristotle's account in the main agrees with this, as soon as we assume him to mean by his *περίοικοι* the *κλειοταί*. Only his text too, as it has come down to us, is evidently not sound. For if *φύροι οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περίοικοι* can only mean that part of the produce of the estates cultivated by the *κλειοταί* which they pay to their lords as rent in kind, it is unreasonable to suppose that the citizens should have been obliged to pay away the full rent, from which they had to provide all other necessaries of life, to the state in order to defray the cost of the mess, the worship of the gods, and the public burdens. Dosiadas says that only a tenth part went towards the

¹ *καλοῖσι δὲ οἱ Κρήτες τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ πῶτεν οὐκ ἐταῖς χρησιμεύοντες, ἀφαιμῶτας δὲ τοὺς κατ' ἀγρὸν, ἐγχωρίοις μὲν ὄντας δουλοθεύοντας δὲ ἀπὸ πόλεμον* διὰ τὸ ἀλλοτρωθῆναι δὲ ἀναρῶντας

² *Ἀναρῶντας Κρήτες καλοῦσι τοὺς δουλοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ γενομένου περὶ αὐτῶν κλῆρον*

³ *Ἰσαὶ ἐλάσας τῶν γυναικῶν λαργῶν ἀναφέρει τὴν δαπάνην εἰς τὴν ἑταίριαν, καὶ τὰς τῆς πόλεως προσόδους [ἀς] διατρέμουσιν*

οἱ προσετημέτες τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἐκάστην αἰῶνα with Hase (M.-coll. Philol. prefixed to the *Breslau H'nto katalog* 1856—57), being unable to accept either the interpretation of the passage which Schomann doubtfully advances, for the reasons given by Hase, or Hase's own explanation of his conjecture, for the reason advanced by Schomann p. 307 *u.* 3 Eng. ti.

common meals, but the extract is our sole authority for this statement. And on grammatical grounds merely the assumption of a lacuna before *φόρων* is unavoidable, whether we supply <ἀπὸ μορίου τῶν>, or in agreement with Dosiadas <ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάτης τῶν> *φόρων*.

The term *περίοικοι* is adopted by Aristotle in order to characterize the free position which these peasants occupied (cp. II 5 § 19 n 171, 9 § 3 n 281) as compared with the Spartan Helots, since they were not obliged to contribute to their landlords anything beyond the rent before-mentioned, and in particular they had no personal service to render. For this latter purpose, in fact, the Cietan Dorians in the cities made use of purchased slaves: Schomann p. 298 Eng. tr. In IV(VII). 9 § 8, 10 § 13 (cp. *μη.* 815, 840 and 282 on II. 9 4) Aristotle expressly draws a distinction between the two cases when the land is cultivated by *δούλοι* and by *περίοικοι*: and this would be a reason for invariably rendering the term *περίοικοι* by 'villeins' or 'vassal-tenants', which is just what the Cietan *περίοικοι* are, whereas the Helots are *δούλοι* pure and simple¹. The former might very well get the name *περίοικοι*, i.e. "dwellers around", from living in the flat country round the cities which the ruling Dorians inhabited; as Schomann suggests p. 229 E. tr.² And seeing that Aristotle never mentions the Laconian *περίοικοι*, the attentive reader will be less likely to misunderstand him as meaning by the Cietan *περίοικοι* a class corresponding to them. SUSEM. (364)

[The discovery of the civil code of a Cietan state (for so the Gortynian inscription copied in 1884 by Halbherr and Fabricius may roughly be described) has thrown fresh light upon these problems³. It is gratifying to find the conclusions of the Excursus confirmed by most unimpeachable authority⁴. We recognise the *περίοικοι* of whom Aristotle speaks in the *Φυλίες* of the code⁵, and the *περίοικοι*=*ὑπὴκοοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates in the *ἀφένταιροι* of the code, both these classes of the population being legally distinguished from the full citizens (*πολιταί*) and from purchased slaves⁶. of the *μοῦραι* the inscription says nothing. Thus the threefold

¹ [Blackstone himself compares unemancipated villeins with the helots, *Commentaries* B. II. c. 6 vol. II p. 92. Prof. Susemihl renders *δούλοι* by Leibeigene, *περίοικοι* by Hintersassen. The Gortynian *οἰκῆς*, though a specially privileged class of villeins, are nevertheless called *δούλοι* *vid. infra*.]

² But when Schomann continues "and are actually once so called by Aristotle," he should have dropped the "once", for the term occurs three times, viz 10 § 5, § 8, § 16 as well as in the interpolated passage § 3 [also in c. 9 § 3]. It is only in c. 5 § 19 that Aristotle calls them *δούλοι*. Hock (*Äteta* III. p. 28) should not have censured Aristotle; he had simply his own misapprehension to complain of: and, as a climax, the mistakes of Oncken II 381 f. 387 ff. may be taken

to be sufficiently refuted by the above.

³ The text with English translation and commentary was published by A. C. Merriam in the *American Journal of Archaeology* I. pp. 324—350, II. 24—45.

⁴ Susemihl rightly recognised that Aristotle's *περίοικοι* are not the *περίοικοι* of Dosiadas and Sosikrates, but on the contrary the *κλαῖσται*. i.e. those who in the code are called *φυλίες*. Zitelmann in *Das Recht von Gortyn* p. 63 n. 56.

⁵ We find *οἰκῆς* for *οἰκῆτες* in Homer, Sophocles, and an Attic law quoted by Lysias X. 19, *οἰκῆς καὶ δούλης* (Bueheler). Comp. Kalistratos as cited above p. 337 n. 1.

⁶ The *ἐνδοθῆδα δούλα* or "maidservant that is within the house," mentioned in the code II 11, is obviously a 'purchased slave' (*χρηστωμένος*): Zitelmann *ib.* p. 64.

distinction of *πολιταί*, *ἀφῆταιροι*, *Φοικῆες*, answering to that of *Σπαρτιάται*, *πέρριοι*, *ἔλωτες* at Sparta, is vindicated against the doubts of Höck, Grote, Oncken, and others.

The full citizen of this Cretan city was necessarily a member of an *ἐταίρια*; he lived in his house in the town, this house and certain cattle (*τὰ λαπραίνοντα*¹, *Code* IV. 36), which he pastured doubtless on the common lands (*δημόσιον*), passing at his death to his sons. He had besides an estate (*κλῆρος*) outside the town, consisting of a certain allotment of land and the *Φοικῆες* who tilled it. To these *Φοικῆες* he stood in the capacity of *πάστας*, 'lord' or *πάτριον*. The rent in kind which they paid him secured him leisure to devote to the civil and military duties of political life.

The *ἀφῆταιρος* was also a freeman like the *πολιτῆς*, but his name implies that as he did not belong to any *ἐταίρια*², he was excluded from the citizenship. The law ordained that the money-fine which he was to receive in compensation for an offence committed against him was only one-tenth that of a full citizen, but four times that of a *Φοικῆς* (100 staters, 10 staters, 5 *diachmai* = 2½ staters, *Code* II. 3—9: in other cases the proportion between the seif and the freeman is 1 : 2 and 1 : 5, Zitelmann p. 102 n. 8).

The *Φοικῆες* were not free men. *Φοικῆς* and *δωλός* are used indifferently in the code³, and the terms *ἀφαιμῶται* and *κλαρώται* do not occur. The Cretan peasants were in a state of villenage or serfdom, but assuredly their condition was far superior to that of the ordinary bondman or slave⁴. They were annexed to the lands which they cultivated, on which they had houses: they are accounted as part of the household and together with the lands which they tilled are entitled *κλῆρος*⁵. They could acquire property and are assessed at a money-fine for the offences they commit. Strange as it may appear, a villen possessed a subsidiary right of inheritance to his lord's property in default of nearer heirs⁶. His family rights were legally protected, and he could marry without his lord's consent. He could even marry a free woman, and if he was received into her house the children of the marriage were free⁷. In legal proceedings he was represented by his lord. Thus his status was something altogether far removed from that of the *servus*, if indeed it be not that of the *clenus*, at Rome.]

¹ By the 'strong-footed' may be meant (1) all large beasts, as opposed to sheep and goats; or (2) oven (cp *Pind. Ol.* XIII. 81, where the scholiast says the word means a bull in the Delphic speech); or (3) horses and mules, like *μῆνυχες ἵππων*.

² It is probable that the *ἐταίρια* as a division of the *φύλη* answered to the Attic *φρατρία*, and that admission to it was an indispensable condition before any one could become a full citizen. See *Athen.* IV. 22 p. 143, Zitelmann pp. 55, 161. In the *Διέως* inscription fines paid by the *Κόρυμνοι* are to be divided amongst the *ἐταίρια* (p. 337). At the foundation

of these close mess-companies lay, no doubt, an earlier and ruder tribal association (p. 330 f.): cp *Höck Kreta* III. p. 126.

³ In the code, as by Aristotle, *δωλός* is used to include any form of servitude.

⁴ Their tenure of the land might almost be compared with that of the privileged villeins who by gradual emancipation are on their way to becoming copyholders.

⁵ *Code* V. 26 *τὰς Φοικῆας* of *τῶν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν* (= *ἐν ὧσι*) ὁ *κλῆρος*.

⁶ V. 27, Zitelmann pp. 64, 144.

⁷ VII. 1, 2 Zitelmann p. 65 f. That the children follow the status of the mother is probably a survival of the matrilineal and female kinship; see above p. 329.

EXCURSUS IV.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CARTHAGE: II. II §§ 3—8.

τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιριῶν.

Movers tries to show that the class of full citizens at Carthage—patricians, nobility, optimates—was divided into three tribes and thirty gentes, the former answering to the Greek *φυλαί* and the three ancient Roman *tribus*, the latter to the Greek *φρατρίαι* and the 30 Roman *curiae* (see below on *γερονσία*, and compare III. 2 § 3, 9 § 13). According to him it is these latter divisions or 'gentes' that are here called *ἑταιρίαι*, 'mess-associations'.

This explanation has the great advantage of presenting a real similarity with the *φιδέτρια* in the Spartan state, although it is altogether a false opinion of Movers that the *αἵβαι*, the sub-divisions of the Spartan tribes (see Schoemann *Antiquities of Greece* I. p. 211, p. 231 Eng. trans.), were called *συσσίτια*: we are unable to suppose the existence of any systematic organization of the separate Spartan mess-tables 'in accordance with tribal divisions, or districts and places of residence' (*ib.* p. 271 E. tr.), and probably the same is true of the *ἀνδρεία* in Crete. It might indeed have been the case, as Movers himself observes, that the dinners of the Carthaginian associations were not held every day; yet they must have taken place frequently and at fixed times and were attended by all the members of each association, out of whose common property the costs were undoubtedly defrayed. 'In the ancient world feasts which were held at stated times by whole families or by political corporations acquired a politico-religious character and are to be connected with the sacrificial feasts celebrated by every family at stated times which are mentioned even in early Jewish history (1 Sam. c. 20. 6, 29: c. 9. 12, 23. 1 Kings 1. 9). In this respect we shall most suitably compare the *συσσίτια* of the Carthaginian associations with the banquets likewise held on certain festal occasions by the *curiales* in their places of assembly or *curiae*.' It is also to be remembered that *ἑταιρία* was actually the name in Crete for any division of the citizens who dined together at the same table at least Dosiadas specially used the term in reference to the Lyctians, *διήρηται δ' οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ' ἑταιρίας*, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία (*Frag.* 1 in Athenaeus IV. 143 B). Mommsen too takes the Carthaginian clubs to have been at least public corporations, though not composed of the privileged citizens, 'probably guilds under oligarchical management' (II. p. 17 Eng. tr.). But the *συσσίτια* at Sparta, with which Aristotle compares them, consisted of none but full citizens.

Kluge, Heeren, and most of the other commentators prefer to understand by this phrase the banquets of the political party-clubs, since such oligarchical clubs were certainly called *ἑταιρίαι* in Greece (cp. *κ.* 157). If we were obliged to share this view, Aristotle, who is professedly comparing the public institutions of the two states, would be convicted of the huge mistake

of having compared a Spartan *public* institution with the arrangements of merely *private* associations at Carthage, two things moreover in which one does not at all see how there can be any similarity.

The *civilis* and *convicta* at Carthage are further mentioned in Livy XXXIV. 61 § 5; their 'meetings' (σύνοδοι) also in Theodoros Metochita *Ilyponn* c 104 § 11 (cited by Kluge p 215): but from neither passage can more exact information about them be obtained. SUSEM. (378)

ἡ τῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ τετράρων ἀρχή.

Kluge and Heeren incorrectly hold that this is a different board from that of 'The Hundred' mentioned § 7. The latter however is only the shorter and less exact form or possibly, as Mommsen conjectures, p 552, the number of members proper was really only a hundred (he conjectures more precisely, 10 from the larger, 90 from the smaller senate: but is this right?) to these were added the highest magistrates, the two *Shofetes* (see below *βασιλεις*) and perhaps the two high-priests. It is not true that Aristotle's statements about the Hundred in any way oblige us to distinguish them from the Hundred and Four: if they were elected by the Boards of Five, why should this exclude the latter from taking account of personal merit? Now we learn from Justin XIV. 2 that the Hundred was not an original element of the Carthaginian constitution, but was introduced as a protection against the dynastic government of a few families or the usurpation by a single family of despotic power, about 450 B.C., when the house of Mago, which had laid the foundations of the Carthaginian power and had exclusively filled the office of general for three generations, had become so overbearing as to threaten the liberty of the state. For this reason, as Justin tells us, a hundred judges were chosen *out of the number* of the Senators, to demand an account of their proceedings from the generals on their return home, in order that the latter, thus possessed with a wholesome fear, might in their command abroad keep before their eyes the laws and the tribunals awaiting them at home: *dein cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicaret, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversi a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exgerent, ut hoc metu in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent.* Thus it was, as Heeren says, a high political tribunal exercising powers of police for the maintenance of the existing constitution, which however from the nature of the case soon degenerated into espionage and tyranny: hence he in every respect rightly compares it with the Council of Ten at Venice, and the political inquisition connected with it. Before long the power of the Hundred rose above that of the senate, so that Aristotle § 7 calls it the highest magistracy of all, since it summoned not only the generals 'but beyond doubt the *Shofetes* [kings] and *Gerusiasts* [senators] also, when circumstances required, on resigning their office to give an account of their stewardship, and even, if they thought fit, inflicted capital punishment, often with the most reckless

cruelty,' comp. Diod. XV. 10 3: since moreover as a general rule, 'in this as in every instance where administrative functionaries are subjected to the control of another body, the reality of power was transferred from the controlled to the controlling authority, and no doubt the latter came to interfere in all matters of administration,' so that 'the fear of the board of supervision at home, which regularly meted out its award according to success, hampered the Carthaginian statesman and general in council and action,' Mommsen II p. 17 Eng. 11. But there is no authority for Mommsen's assertion (*ibid.*) that the Senate submitted important despatches first to the Hundred and then to the people, and Heeren is decidedly wrong in thinking that generally the most important state affairs were first discussed in this committee (so to speak) of the larger senate¹. see below *γερονσία* and *π* (387) on § 5. During the second Punic war and the period immediately following, Livy (XXXIII. 46) even goes so far as to describe these 'judges' as, properly speaking, the supreme body in the state, whose arbitrary power respected neither the laws nor the magistrates and extended to the property the reputation and the lives of all, while its members were so closely united that whoever offended one had to face the hostility of all. Thus the state treasurer (quaestor) 195 B.C., because he would be elected to this board after the expiration of his term of office, ventured in a spirit of defiance to disregard the summons of Hannibal who was then Shofete and probably invested with extraordinary powers (praetor, cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6, *tum temporis consulem*. see below). This induced Hannibal on his side to appeal to the popular assembly and to carry a law, that these 'judges' instead of serving for life, as formerly, should only be elected for a year, and that no one should be 'judge' two years in succession: *iudicumordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime, quod idem perpetui iudices erant res fama vitaeque omnium in illorum potestate erat. qui unum eius ordinis offendisset, omnis adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensos iudices decrat. hominum in tam impotenti regno, praetor factus Hannibal vocari ad se quaestorem iussit quaestor id pro nihilo habuit, nam...quia ex quaestura in iudices, potentissimum ordinem, referebatur, iam pro futuris mox opibus animos gerebat. enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quaestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, prae quorum superbia atque opibus nec leges quicquam esset neque magistratus, accusavit. et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam*

¹ In Diod. XIV. 47. 2 the declaration of war which the elder Dionysius sent to the smaller senate, was not read as Kluge states, p. 103, first there, then in the larger senate, and then in the popular assembly; not, as Mommsen seems to suppose, first in the Council of the Hundred and Four and then in the popular assembly. On the contrary, the words *αἱς ἀναγνωσθείσης ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ μετὰ ταύτ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ*, and *σύνκλητος* is therefore the same as *γερονσία*, the

smaller senate of thirty (see below), just as the Roman senate is frequently called *σύνκλητος* by Polybios. Consequently the smaller council first deliberated upon the document, and then laid it before the popular assembly. As to Polybios' general usage (when he is speaking more exactly) of *γερονσία* for the small council and *σύνκλητος* for the Great Council of Carthage, see below (*π*. 382). But the council of the Hundred and Four is never called *σύνκλητος*.

corum, legem extemplo promulgavit petulitque, in singulos annos iudices legerentur. neve quis biennium continuum iudex esset. After all this, the points of resemblance between this board and the Spartan ephors are so great that it would be quite inexplicable if, notwithstanding, Aristotle had compared another Carthaginian magistracy with the ephorality. The only remaining point which could render another comparison possible would be the civil jurisdiction of the Ephors (9 § 23 *n.* 325): and as such civil judges the Hundred and Four are regarded by Kluge and Heeren, who insist that they should be distinguished from the Hundred and existed before them. But their own admission, that there was no further similarity between the Hundred and Four and the Ephors, is sufficient to refute their hypothesis. To make matters superfluously clear, the Ephors are called the highest office in the state (*μεγίστη ἀρχή*, 9 § 21) in precisely the same words as are used of the Hundred, 11 § 7 (comp. also 9 § 19 ἡ γὰρ ἀρχή κυρία τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστί). In particular what is said of the Ephors, 9 § 26, that they control to some extent all other magistrates (*δόξεε δ' αὖν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴ πάσας εὐθύ- νειν τὰς ἀρχάς*), is exactly applicable, as we have seen above, to the Hundred. Even the remark (9 § 20) that in order to find support and protection against the Ephors, the kings themselves had been forced to flatter the people, reminds us forcibly of Hannibal's procedure on the above occasion, when he had recourse to the popular assembly. In Aristotle's time, moreover, the members were not as yet chosen for life, since according to his statement the Boards of Five exercised their powers longer than any other officials: thus we should be obliged to assume that the nomination for life was of later introduction. But even Livy's account allows of no other interpretation than that the quaestor had previously belonged to the Hundred and Four and after resigning his office again entered this body or at least (see below) had the right to enter it. and, as the number of members was strictly limited, this can only be reconciled with their holding office for life by the assumption that in such cases a substitute was appointed for the intervening time. Probably then Livy's statement simply means, as Mommsen assumes, that for the most part the same individuals were always on this board, because each retiring member could be immediately re-elected, and that Hannibal's reform only provided that no member of this Council of the Hundred could be elected to hold office for two consecutive years. SUSEM. (379).

οἱ βασιλεῖς.

Greek and Roman writers as a rule call these officers 'kings' and seldom by their proper official title shofetes (suffetes), i.e. Judges, the title borne by the heads of the Israelites before the establishment of the monarchy. That there were two shofetes is expressly attested by Cornelius Nepos alone (*Hannib.* 7. 4), but it may be inferred from the comparison with the consuls at Rome (Livy XXX. 7. 5, Festus p. 309 b 29, Orosius v. 11, Nep. l. c., cp. Justin XXXI. 2. 6): and Polybios also vi. 51. 2 speaks at least more vaguely of kings at Carthage in the plural, as does Livy of shofetes at Gades

(XXXVIII. 37 2', remarking that this is the highest office amongst all the Phoenicians. All the more apposite is the comparison made with the dual kingship at Sparta. But that these two Shofetes were elected from different families, is a statement which Movers through a strange mistake attributes to Aristotle, who only says, that while at Sparta the royal dignity was hereditary in the same family, that of the Heracleidae, which moreover was not distinguished by any special excellence above all the other Spartan families, the Shofetes at Carthage could be taken from any of the gentes of the citizens with full civic rights. Comp. 9 § 30 *n* (339). Further, Movers thinks that the consistent mention in historical narratives of only one Carthaginian king, even in notices of the annual election 'of a king' (Zonaras *Ann.* VIII. 8) in ancient writers must be explained from the fact that the second Shofete was to a certain extent subordinate to the first and appointed more to act as a check upon him, and for that reason mostly elected out of another, and preferably a hostile, family: an opinion which may indeed be correct but cannot actually be proved, though this kind of policy would be in further accord with the Spartan belief that discord between the two kings was advantageous for the state (9 § 30) and was largely put into practice at Carthage on other occasions also (Diod. XX. 10 1 *n*. 1597, comp. however on the other side Diod. VIII. 80 2)¹. It is readily intelligible that only one of the two Shofetes conducted the business referred to in the above historical narratives; besides, it frequently happened that one of them was absent, because employed in the service of the state abroad². It is indeed very surprising that Aristotle should designate the command in war as a distinguishing prerogative of the Spartan kings and of the ancient kings in Crete (10 § 6)—see the parallel passages given in *n*. (343) on 9 § 33—while at the same time expressly noting that the generals at Carthage were distinct from the kings (11 § 9, § 12), so that here, generally speaking, civil and military powers were disjoined. However it was not infrequent, especially as the accumulation of several offices in the same hands was customary (§ 13), for one of the two Shofetes to be invested with the generalship at the same time; but then the supreme command had to be conferred upon him expressly by the senate (Justin XXII 7 7, Diod. XIII 43 5, XIV. 54 5³, XV 15 2, XX 29 2, cp. 33 2, Polyæn 1. 27 2). The office of Shofete was held by the celebrated Hanno who at the command of the state undertook a voyage, with 60 ships and 30,000 persons of both sexes, to the west coast of Africa to found settlements of Liby-phoenicians, and wrote a narrative of this voyage which we

¹ It is a curious parallel that Xenophon in his pamphlet *De Reg. Lacid.* speaks throughout of the king in the singular, except once, c. 15 § 5 (Wyse).

² Only the incorrect statement of Zonaras, i.e. remains without justification on this view: but in fact neither is it justified upon the hypothesis of Movers.

³ Comp. Oros. IV. 6. The words *κατὰ νόμον* added to the title of King in these passages of Diodorus (*κατὰ νόμον τότε*

βασιλεύοντα and *βασιλέα κατὰ νόμον*) have been wholly misunderstood by Kluge p. 92, and Heeren p. 136. They denote an elected king as distinguished from an hereditary king *βασιλεύς κατὰ γένος*, as is clear from pseudo-Plato in *Diog. Laert.* III 82 f. *τῆς δὲ βασιλείας ἡ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, ἡ δὲ κατὰ γένος ἐστίν. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐν Κερκυραίωνι, κατὰ νόμον· πολιτικὴ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἡ δὲ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Μακεδονίᾳ, κατὰ γένος.*

still possess in a Greek translation. The points of resemblance to the Spartan kings were as follows: (1) the Carthaginian Shofetes may be assumed to have had like the kings (III. 14. 3) a sort of priestly office; (2) in any case they had, as their title denotes, a kind of supreme judicial office; although after the appointment of the council of the Hundred and Four,—whose members were also called “judges” or shofetes (see above, also Cato as cited by Festus s. v. *mansueti*), but no doubt, with some distinguishing addition,—this would be mainly restricted to the duty of presiding at that board (which though not expressly attested can hardly be doubtful) and in the full session of the ordinary courts (see below): further, (3) they held meetings of the senate and the popular assembly, and one of them directed the business of these meetings (Polyb. III. 33. 3, Livy XXX. 7. 5, 46 5 f.). Mommsen asserts that the Roman writers also called the kings *praetoris*; but without laying stress on the fact that Nepos l. c. expressly distinguishes the Praetor at Carthage from the King in a passage which is, it is true, in the last degree confused¹, we find that the term praetor is only used by Livy and Nepos in reference to the appointment of Hannibal in C. 195 and thus in any case denotes, as Heeren and Kluge assume, the devolution of extraordinary official powers, although only in combination with the dignity of shofete (Justin XXXI. 2. 6 tum temporis *consulem*, Zonai. IX. 14 s. f. τῇ μεγίστῃ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῇ). According to Cicero's statement, *De Rep.* II. 23. 42, if indeed this is really what he means to say, one could easily suppose with Heeren that the shofetes were elected for life: but this is disproved by what Aristotle says of the Boards of Five (§ 7)²; and not merely Zonaras VIII. 8, as was already said, but Nepos also l. c. definitely states that the election was made annually, although it is very surprising that Aristotle has not emphasized such a pronounced deviation from the Spartan kingship. SUSEMI. (381).

ἡ γερουσία § 3.

Mommsen says (II. p. 15 Eng. ti), it is doubtful whether along with the senate there existed a larger one, as Heeren and others assume. But at any rate Livy XXX. 16. 3 says unambiguously that thirty leading senators formed a smaller council which had the real direction of the senate: *triginta seniorum principes, id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis*. It may be conjectured that one of these thirty was chosen from each of the thirty Carthaginian families (see above). And as Mommsen himself actually limits the number to thirty on the authority of this very passage, there must have existed another larger senate, because the Hundred were elected out of the number of the senators (see above). Such a larger council is usually called *σύνκλητος*, even by Aristotle III. I. 10 (cp. II. 442), and although the terms *γερουσία*, *σύνκλητος*, and *συμέ-*

¹ Praetor factus est, postquam rex fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo. Heeren, p. 138 n., proposed to alter rex into dux: but that here also rex denotes the Shofete and that the alteration is there-

fore unnecessary is shown, apart from all other reasons, by the very next words: ut enim Romae Consules sic Carthagine quotannis annui binique reges creabantur.

² πλείονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων.

δραον are indifferently used with the same meaning for even the smaller senate at Carthage¹, yet Polybios expressly distinguishes the smaller and the larger senate by the terms *γερονσία* and *σύγκλητος* X. 18 1 δύο μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερονσίας, πέντε καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου and XXXVI. 2. 6 τριακισίους ἡμέριους... τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερονσίας. Possibly from the last passage we may infer with Mommsen that both senates together consisted of 300 members, so that the 30 gentes were again divided into 300 families, the heads of which—if this supposition is correct—were life members of the full senate, and presumably elected from amongst themselves (and probably only for a year) the smaller senate and the shofetes, unless we prefer to assume with Mommsen that the popular assembly had the right to elect the members of both senates and the shofetes out of the privileged gentes (see below). At any rate if we except this point, Mommsen is right in observing that the larger senate was not of much importance, and accordingly Aristotle evidently does not notice it, but in his comparison with Sparta is thinking of the smaller senate, especially as the number of members either tallied exactly, if we follow Mommsen in the assumption (which is however wholly unsupported) that the two shofetes were included in the thirty as the two kings were at Sparta²; or at any rate corresponded approximately, supposing the shofetes to have been added to this number. 'It was this senate of Thirty which mainly transacted the business of the state, making for instance the preliminary arrangements for war, directing levies and enlistments, nominating the general' and assigning to him a certain number of Gerusiasts [senators] from whom' ³ probably, see Polyb. I. 21. 6, 'the subordinate commanders were taken; to it despatches were addressed' (Mommsen II. p. 15 E. tr.), 'to it reports were made through the shofetes, and it received foreign ambassadors' (Heeren). If it agreed with the shofetes, see II § 5, n. (387), it undoubtedly possessed full legislative powers and even the power to decide upon war and peace (n. 387), although in this respect it might seem advisable often, if not in most cases, further to lay the question before the popular assembly. Lastly, it certainly had the control of the financial administration. Over and above the common baths for the citizens there were at Carthage special baths for the senators⁴ (Valei. Max. IX. 5. 4 ext.

¹ As in the passages which Kluge pp. 103, 105 f. has misunderstood, viz. Diod. XIV. 47. 1 (see p. 342 n. 1) and XX. 59. 1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς γερονσίας ἐν Καρχηδόνι βουλευσάμενης περὶ τοῦ πολέμου [λαλῶν] ἔδοξε τοῖς συνέδροις τρία στρατόεδρα. ἐκπύματα. The συνέδροι are the members of the γερονσία itself; the transaction takes place in the γερονσία alone and not, as Kluge thinks, first in the smaller senate and then in the two senates combined. The word συνέδριον is not found at all in the sense of such a full sitting of the two senates, as he asserts; when applied to Carthage it everywhere denotes the smaller senate only.

² Duncker (*Hist. of Antiquity* II. p. 185, ed. 4, 1875) formerly agreed with Mommsen. But in the English translation of Duncker, Vol. II. p. 275 (which follows the 5th German edition), this assumption is withdrawn and 30 is given as the number of senators *exclusive of the kings*.

³ See above n. (381), also n. (392 b) below.

⁴ Whether it was so "regularly", as Mommsen writes, can hardly be proved.

⁵ For the senators Mommsen (II. p. 16, E. tr.) arbitrarily substitutes the judges, namely the Hundred and Four, although it may certainly be quite true

insolentiae vero inter Karthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi aemulatio fuit: ille enim separato a plebe balineo lavabatur, cp. *Juven.* v. 90 propter quod Romae cum Bocchae nemo lavatur, also *Movers* p. 501 n. 57). The deputies of the senate (*σύνεδροι*) with the army formed part of the general's council of war, *Polyb.* III. 71. 5; and in the oath ratifying the treaty concluded with Philip, next to 'Hannibal the general' and his three lieutenant-generals mentioned by name, all the senators in his camp and all the Carthaginians serving under him are introduced without mention of their names, *καὶ πάντες οἱ γερουσιασταὶ Καρχηδονίαν μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πάντες Καρχηδόνιοι οἱ στρατευόμενοι μετ' αὐτοῦ*, *Polyb.* VII. 9 § 1, § 4. *Movers*, p. 498, prefers to understand members of the smaller council by the three former names, and only members of the larger council by the *γερουσιασταὶ*; but this title is not suitable for the latter, nor can it be shown to have been given to them anywhere else. It is perfectly arbitrary for *Movers* to assume (p. 522 n. 308) that these plenipotentiaries of the senate also belonged to the Hundred. These deputies strongly remind us of the Ephors sent into the field along with the Spartan king (cp. *MM.* 340, 360). *SUSEM.* (382)

ὁ δῆμος.

'The kings and the senate, if both are agreed, have it wholly in their own power to bring any given question before the people or not: if however they are not agreed, the popular assembly must decide the question. But whatever is submitted to the assembly, the people are not merely allowed to listen to the resolves of the government, but have the supreme decision, and any citizen who likes may oppose the propositions submitted, which is not allowed under the other constitutions,' at Sparta and in Crete: §§ 5, 6.

Kluge was mistaken in supposing the passage to mean that unless the whole body of the senators was unanimous, a question had to be brought before the popular assembly; that this was not the case may be seen from *Livy* XXI. c. 3 f., c. 9 § 3—11 § 2, XXIII. c. 12 ff. However the senate and the *shofetes* might often find it advisable, as was remarked above (n. 382), to bring important and critical matters before the people of their own free will. Gradually this would become more and more frequent, so that at the time of the second Punic war, according to *Polyb.* VI. 51. 6, the popular assembly at Carthage already had the greatest influence on deliberations, whilst the senate held this position at Rome (*τὴν πλείστην δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς διαβουλίαις παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ὁ δῆμος ἤβη μετελήφει, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀκμὴν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος*). And yet even this way was decided by the *shofetes* and the senate alone, *Polyb.* III. 33, *Livy* XXI. 18. *SUSEM.* (387)

that the latter are also called "senators" being elected, as a matter of fact, from the Greek and Roman writers, as the (smaller and larger) senate.

αὶ πενταρχία.

This is all we know of these Boards of Five; we are therefore reduced to uncertain conjectures respecting them. But above all nothing should be read into this passage which is not contained in it. Now it says that there was not merely one such corporation, as Movers makes out (p. 499 f. n. 53), but a number of boards: it does not say, as Kluge and others state, that the members of these boards afterwards *entered* the council of the Hundred, but only that they *elect*ed that council: nor does it say that before entering upon office they had invariably filled another office, and after the expiry of their term again filled such an office, but on the contrary that they discharged the duties of the same office as members elect beforehand and as members retired for some time afterwards, probably in the capacity of assistants, substitutes, or assessors.

Further Heeren has shown that the government of the provinces did not belong to this office, as Kluge assumed: but Kluge and Heeren agree in thinking that the total number of the officers requisite for the special administration of Carthage itself were included in them: consequently the state-treasurer (see above p. 342), who is mentioned along with the *shofetes* at Gades and therefore as one of the highest officers of state (Livy XXVIII. 37. 2), and the censor (*praefectus morum* Nep. *Hamile.* 3. 2) would have belonged to them. And then certainly by *principibus quibusdam et magistratibus* mentioned by Livy in the course of his narrative of the events of B.C. 195 (cited above p. 342),—*vectigalia publica partim negligentia dilabebantur partim praedae ac divisui principibus quibusdam et magistratibus erant*, XXXIII. 46. 8—we should understand with Movers the magnates of Carthage employed upon the Boards of Five.

But there is at least as much probability in another conjecture, to which we are led by the fact that the Boards of Five elect the Hundred. According to Aristotle's own statement (II § 7 s. f., III. I § 11 cp. *un.* 391, 444) there was more than one board of judges at Carthage, and thus far there is some truth in Heeren's and Kluge's mistaken severance of the Hundred and Four from the Hundred (see above, p. 341). The Hundred was one such board and it is easy to conjecture that the Boards of Five constituted the others; that they had exercised high political jurisdiction before the introduction of the Hundred for the loss of which they were compensated by being at least allowed to elect the members of the new court of justice, while they retained the ordinary criminal, as well as the entire civil, jurisdiction, its different branches being assigned to different committees each of five men, while cases of special importance were no doubt definitively decided in full session under the presidency of one of the two *shofetes* as chief justice. This conjecture further receives considerable support from the fact that it is only these Boards of Five that are said to have discharged their duties without pay and not to have been chosen by lot, which is not easily intelligible except as in contradistinction to the popular courts in democratic states. Also immediately after (i) the Boards of Five and (ii) the Council

of the Hundred Aristotle goes on to treat of the exclusive administration of justice by boards appointed expressly for this purpose; and this fact favours the supposition that these boards were simply and solely the two already mentioned together with the two *shofetes* or chief judges. Moreover in their election of the Hundred and Four the Boards of Five were by no means entirely free, but obliged at least in part to select from certain officials of the previous year. at any rate it appears to follow from Livy's account (see above *n.* 379), that the state treasurer had a right to be elected to the Hundred and Four in the following year, and the Boards of Five could only pass him over for very special reasons. But they evidently could not elect members of their own body to the Hundred and Four, as would else have happened frequently; and the reason for the prohibition may perhaps have been that in the following year they had to continue to discharge their own official duties, as described above: unless we are bound to suppose, that here too the principle of concentrating various offices upon one person (§ 13) was applicable. SUSEM. (390)

οἱ στρατηγοί.

The powers of the Carthaginian generals must have been very considerable and in purely military matters perhaps unlimited, although they were also in the habit of consulting the council of war (see above *n.* 382). But state affairs were undoubtedly managed by the general in conjunction with the plenipotentiaries of the Senate, and alliances were likewise concluded (as above *n.* 382) by him in the name of the Senate (Heeren). Isocrates (III. 24) says that the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians had an oligarchical government at home but a monarchical government in the field: which means of course, that the generals, not the Carthaginian 'kings', exercised such a government: whereas Mommsen (p. 540) takes it to mean that 'the *Shofetes* were not held to be kings, unless they were also generals.' The Carthaginian generals are moreover called dictators by the Romans, Justin XIX. 1. 7¹, Cato cited in Gellius x. 24. 7, Frontin. *Strateg.* II. 1; as well as that one of the generals who discharged his duties in Carthage itself as director of the entire military administration, or war minister, Livy XXIII. 13. 8². The fact that state appointments at Carthage, in particular the offices of *shofete* and general, could be bought, which is likewise attested by Polyb. VI. 56. 4, seems to point to a right of election or confirmation by the popular assembly: yet possibly the smaller or the larger senate may not have been inaccessible to bribery, in spite of the fact that, in order to guard against it, only the richest citizens were, as a rule, elected into the smaller senate (§ 4). This much seems certain, that the election of the generals rested with the smaller

¹ There is no ground for assuming with Kluge, p. 92 f., that the term dictator was especially applied to those who were at once *shofetes* and generals, or

that the Hasdrubal in question filled both offices in conjunction eleven times.

² At least I take this to be the most probable view.

senate: see Diocl. XIII 43. 5 (ἀπεστήσαν; cp. above *n.* 381), XX. 10. 1 (ἡ γεροντία στρατηγούς...ἀπέδειξε) But it may be conjectured that the election required to be confirmed by the popular assembly. At least when Hannibal was elected by the army the Senate was not satisfied with an approval of the act on its own part, but invited the popular assembly to confirm it, Polyb. III. 13. 4; and such a confirmation may have been requisite for the appointment of the senators and shofetes, in case it did not entirely rest with the popular assembly to elect them (see above *n.* 382). SUSSEX, (392 b).

EXCURSUS V.

THE SOLONIAN CONSTITUTION: II. 12, 3

τοῖς δὲ Σόλων...τὸν δῆμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων.

The question whether in reality there is no sufficient ground for doubting this statement, as Schömann tries to show¹, must in this place be left undecided. Here we are only concerned with the meaning of the words and the question whether they are really by Aristotle. In the first place Schömann has sufficiently refuted the monstrous construction which Em. Muller and Oncken² have put upon the singular form τὸ δικαστήριον here twice used, as if it did not mean the Heliaea, but the whole community assembled to demand an account of their stewardship from the retiring officials—a general assembly of the people before which the judicial authorities were brought to render an account of their office, appeals were entered against their decisions, and these decisions cancelled confirmed or amended at pleasure³. It is another matter when Frankel *The Attic δικαστήρια* p. 63 f. infers from III. 11. 3 that the genuine Aristotle did not intend to ascribe the establishment of the tribunal of the Heliaea to Solon, but regarded the matter essentially in the same light as Frankel himself, who was partially anticipated by Em. Muller and Oncken. His view is that in certain cases Solon gave the assembled community the right of rejecting the sentence pronounced by their magistrates, that he compelled the magistrates, when their commission expired, to render an account of it publicly to the people in their assembly, where it was open to the people to bring a charge against them which the Areopagus had to decide. Now this hypothesis respecting Solon's legislation may be correct or not; but at any rate let the critics take upon themselves the responsibility for it, and leave Aristotle out of the question. Even he was by no means infallible in matters relating to Athenian constitutional history. Had Frankel not severed the passage in B. III. from its context, he would have seen that there Aristotle is saying

¹ This exposition Frankel has not quite fairly passed over.

² The refutation has not prevented Oncken from simply repeating his asser-

tions over again. Cp. *n.* (409). I do not defend everything which Schömann has stated, as is clear from the sequel.

precisely the same thing as here, only in fewer words. There he says that the people must be suffered to participate in the deliberative (or decreeing) and the judicial functions, and these only; and therefore Solon rightly ordained that it should merely elect officers of state and require them to render an account¹. Here he says that Solon allowed the people these two most indispensable rights and accordingly instituted tribunals taken from the whole people with jurisdiction over all matters without exception. If then, as Frankel thinks, it is really a contradiction to say both in one breath, at least the mistake has been committed not merely by the assumed interpolator, but by the genuine Aristotle. Furthermore, if Frankel's explanation be consistently applied to VI(IV), 14 § 3, § 6, § 10 (see *HH* 1319, 1325, 1332) it must lead to this absurdity; that wherever a popular assembly took into its own hands the control of responsible officers of state Aristotle was only acquainted with two results, one of which invariably followed, either condemnation by the assembly itself or a reference to the *Alcophagus* or some similar board; and that in no case was the matter referred to a popular tribunal. And since Aristotle regards those two fundamental rights as the most indispensable concessions to the democratic principle, without any indication that they should be limited, it is in itself scarcely conceivable that he should nevertheless have tacitly introduced the limitation that it is sufficient for the people to frame the resolution of accusation without either proceeding themselves to give a verdict or to procure the verdict of condemnation through a popular court; but that the case must be referred to a non-democratic board neither taken from the whole people nor even directly elected by the people. But if he regarded those two concessions in the sense explained above, it is not only not 'obscure', but from this point of view even strictly consistent that the gradual development of absolute democracy should be characterized as their result in Athens, brought about not through Solon's fault but by the course of events²; though Frankel may again object, rightly or wrongly, from his point of view³ that to entrust popular courts with power must be regarded as the consequence and not the cause of the democratic state principle. Lastly, the Athenian *Heliaca* consisted, as Frankel very ably proves (pp. 1—21), of all Attic citizens over 30 years of age with full civic rights, not legally hindered by other employment from entering their names in the list of judges for the year, who had actually had their names so entered and (p. 51 ff, cp. pp. 21—51) not only this *Heliaca* as a complete body but even each separate court of justice formed out of it was similarly regarded as another *ἐκκλησία*⁴, as

¹ Frankel himself observes (p. 47) that in the treaty of peace with Chalcis (445 B.C.) *εἰδέναι* has the wider sense of "trials" generally, and not the later, narrower sense of "trials" of state officers because when presenting their accounts they have not been granted a discharge; Wilamowitz *Aus Ägypten* p. 88f shows that the word has not even the former

sense in that place but means "punishments"

² ἀπὸ συμπτώματος.

³ For in any case it is not from such point of view that we can decide what Aristotle may or may not have said.

⁴ It is indeed more than questionable whether *ἐλία* = *ἐκκλησία*, popular assembly, is really only a shorter form of *ἐκκλησία*

a representation of the popular assembly¹. All the more readily and fittingly could Aristotle, if he ascribed their foundation to an author so early as Solon, characterize them as a boon granted to the people itself and to democracy². All this however does not exclude the *possibility* that on Aristotle's view even Solon at the same time granted to the popular assembly also certain plenary powers with reference to the deposition, punishment, and control of the officers of state. indeed on the analogy of VI(IV), 14, 6 (*n* 1325) there is a certain *probability* even, that by his remarks in II. 12 § 5 Aristotle intends to refer back to Solon the right of laying complaints or information, brought against officers of state during their time of office, directly before the popular assembly for immediate decision or with a view to further proceedings³. SUSEM. (408).

EXCURSUS VI.

THALETAS: II. 12. 7.

Thaletas or Thales was in reality a lyric poet (as indeed we are told in Plutarch) and musical composer of Ciotyn (or according to Suidas, of Elytos) in Crete, younger than Archilochus; the first to introduce the paeonian and cietan rhythms into artistic lyric poetry and vocal music (Glaukos cited in Plutarch *De Music.* 10. 1134 D, E, Ephor. in Strabo p. 480 f.). These he borrowed from the sprightly native dance tunes sung to the dance in the worship of Apollo in Crete (Athenae. v. 181 B), which were called Paeans and Hyporchemes, and it was songs of this kind which he himself wrote and set to music and brought to their artistic perfection (Herakleid. Pont. quoted in Plut. *De Music.* 9. 1134 C, Schol. on Pind. *Pyth.* 11. 127), availing himself in them not only of paeonian rhythms and metres, but probably of dactylic rhythms and rhythms compounded of successions of dactyls and trochees. According to the story which dates from so early a writer as Ephoros, Lycurgus while staying in Crete despatched Thaletas, a man well versed in politics, to Sparta, in order that he might by means of his songs spread the spirit of political harmony there and thus pave the way for the Lycurgean reforms in the constitution. But another and far more credible legend informs us that Thaletas was summoned to Sparta by the order of the Delphic oracle in order to assuage a pestilence by his musical art (Piatinas *fr.* 8 in Plut. *De Mus.* 42. 1146 C, Plut. *Philos. cum principibus* 5 p. 779 A, Aelian. *Var. Hist.* XII. 50; cp. Strabo p. 482). It can hardly be decided whether the only signification

or indeed whether the two words are at all connected in their derivation, see Wilamowitz *op. c.* pp. 87—94.

¹ Frankel, pp. 21—27, endeavours to show that the Heliaea possessed important functions besides those of a judicial nature, but he can hardly be said to have succeeded.

² And that they were at least earlier than Cleisthenes, and may thus very well have existed in Solon's times or even before them, is shown by Wilamowitz, pp. 94—96.

³ E.g. to induce the assembly to depose the magistrate.

underlying these legends is one which belongs to the history of literature, symbolizing the healing and soothing powers of poetry and music, or whether Thaletas was actually a priest wielding expiatory powers like Epimenides (Exc. 1 to B. 1). the latter explanation is supported by the fact that at his home of Gortyn there was really a shrine of Apollo, to which embassies were sent from foreign states, to obtain aid in case of pestilence (Stephanos of Byz. s. v. Γόρτυς). In any case Thaletas was also employed in Sparta, perhaps about 665 B.C. (?), and introduced the Cretan paeans and hyporchemes there also: the Laconian Sosibios, *frag.* 5 in Athenae. xv. 687 C, relates that his songs were sung even at a later time at the Gymnopaedia along with those of Alcman. In Crete he composed in Knosos as well as in his native town: for in all probability he was the same as the Knosian 'rhapsode Thaletas from whom he is distinguished in Suidas (Suidas asserts that Thaletas of Gortyn lived before Homer), and the same as the Thales who is said by Demetrios of Magnesia, in Diog. Laert. i. 38, to have been contemporary with Homer, Hesiod, and likewise Lycurgus. See on Thaletas Litzinger *De Thaletae poeta* Essen 1851 4, Hock *Kreta* III. 339 ff., Beinhady *History of Greek Literature* 3 ed. i p. 378, Christ *Metrik* p. 415 ff., also E. Cuijns *History of Greece* i p. 182 Eng. trans. SUSEM. (419)

Γ.

1274 b 17 τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς
 28 ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημέναις, ἔστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρίπον τοῦ-
 32 § 1 τὸν τῷ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι, καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ
 ποία τις, σχεδὸν πρώτη σκέψις περὶ πόλεως ἰδεῖν, τί ποτέ
 ἔστιν ἡ πόλις. ἵνυ γὰρ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷ μὲν φάσκοντες I
 35 τὴν πόλιν πεπραχέναι τὴν πρῶξιν, οἱ δ' οὐ τὴν πόλιν ἀλλὰ
 τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὸν τύραννον τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
 νομοθέτου πᾶσαν ὁρῶμεν τὴν πραγματείαν οὖσαν περὶ πόλιν,
 ἢ δὲ πολιτεία τῶν τὴν πόλιν οἰκούντων ἐστὶ τάξις τις.

In the notes to this book fr denotes the palimpsest Vat. gr. 1298, collated by Heylbut in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887 p. 102 ff. See *Exc.* III. p. 454. As a rule it is without accents or breathings, now are the words in a sentence separated.

1274 b. The first sentence, 27 τὰ μὲν οὖν 28 τοῦτων, was by all previous editors appended to II. II || 28 εὐρημέναις Korates; cp. II. I. 1, but see Dittenberger *op. c.* 1368 f. || τοῦτων ** Thurot; τῷ <δ>? Susem. This δὲ is all that we require; whether its loss is due to the copyists or to some ulterior cause is uncertain, see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || 32 καὶ before τίς ἐκάστη omitted in Γ Ar., perhaps rightly || 38 ἢ τε? Susem. || ἔστιν (ἐστὶν I²) after τάξις τις M¹ P¹

B III includes two parts: a statement of General Principles, cc 1—13, followed by a review of Monarchy, cc 14—18, the first of the forms of government examined in detail. See *Analysis* p. 108 ff., *Introd.* 37 ff. The former part is the most valuable exposition of Aristotle's positive political theory to be found in the whole work. Comp. Oncken II pp. 117—174.

cc. 1, 2. The definition of constitution to be obtained by reference to a city and citizen: §§ 1, 2 Neither (i) residence, § 3, nor (ii) the enjoyment of legal rights, § 4, constitutes citizenship, but a share in executive functions §§ 5—7. The definition applies to a varying extent in different states: §§ 8—11. Remarks on a rough mode of defining citizens by descent 1 § 12—2 § 3, and on the exercise of civic rights by persons not entitled to them: 2 §§ 3—5.

M¹ A. C. Brailley has some valuable remarks on Aristotle's conception of citizenship in *Hellenica* pp. 212—218.

1274 b 27 κυρίας] Constitutions "super," i.e. those actually in force or 'valid' in existing states as opposed to schemes on paper. So *ὑπὸ τῶν* with *ἐπιστάσθαι*, to know properly or unconditionally, is opposed like *ἄλλως* to *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*.

35 ἀλλὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν] "that it is not the state which has done this or that but the oligarchy." Comp. Thuc. III. 62 § 4 (Eaton) and n. (455) on c. 3 § 2 below. SUSEM (482)

36 πολ. καὶ τοῦ νομ.] See above on I. I. 2, II. 12. 1.

38 τάξις τις] "a certain ordering of the inhabitants." The character of this organization is explained 6 § 1 πόλις τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνων, n. (522). Comp. VI

§ 2 ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ πόλις τῶν συγκειμένων, καθάπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄλων
 40 μὲν συνεστώτων δ' ἐκ πολλῶν μορίων, δῆλον ὅτι πρότερον
 ὁ πολίτης ζητητέος· ἡ γὰρ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πληθὺς ἐστίν.
 1275 α ὥστε τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν πολίτην καὶ τίς ὁ πολίτης ἐστὶ σκε- (p 39)
 πτεον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πολίτης ἀμφισβητεῖται πολλᾶκις· οὐ γὰρ
 τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες εἶναι πολίτην· ἔστι γὰρ τις
 ὃς ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολίτης ὢν ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολλᾶκις οὐκ
 § 3 ἐστὶ πολίτης. τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἄλλως πως τυγχάνοντας ταύ- 3
 6 τῆς τῆς προσηγορίας, οἶον τοὺς ποιητοὺς πολίτας, ἀφετέον·
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που πολίτης ἐστίν (καὶ γὰρ μέ-
 § 4 τοικοὶ καὶ δούλοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς οἰκήσεως), οὐδ' οἱ τῶν
 δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὥστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά-
 10 ζεσθαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνω-

1275 a 10 καὶ τοῖς <μετοίσις καὶ τοῖς> Bucheler, most likely right.

(14). 1. το τάδε ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηται, καὶ τί τὸ κῆρυξ, κτλ., n. (1134), VI(14) 3. 5 n. (1156). SUSEM. (432 b)

§ 2 39 ἐπὶ δὲ κτλ.] "Since the state is an aggregate of individuals, like any other whole made up of parts" (Ebbels).

41 τι πληθὺς] "a body of citizens," namely, a body numerous enough for independence of life, *ἑαυτὸν εἰς αὐτάρκειαν ζῆναι*, § 12 (Eaton) See notes (434), (447). SUSEM. (433)

1275 a 1 ὥστε τίνα κτλ.] Schlosser's censure of Aristotle is not altogether without reason. The synthetic method which was applied before, I. 1 § 3 n. (4), 3 § 1 (29), 8 § 1 (66), is certainly out of place here. "There is far more truth in the remark at I. 2 § 12" where see note "that the conception of the state must precede that of its members. It cannot be said that we have to define *πόλις* by reference to *πολίτης*, on the contrary, the relative conception of the citizen must be explained by reference to that of the state" (Schlosser I. 218). In reality it is the latter course which Aristotle adopts. He takes the conception of the state obtained in cc. 1, 2 as the foundation for his definition of the citizen, as Schlosser justly observes. so that he is involved in a formal circle, when he afterwards defines the state (see III. 1. 12 n.) as a body of citizens adequate for independence of life, i. e. comparing I. 2. 8 n. (21), *adequate for the end of the state*. And just because this

is so, in spite of the grave formal blunder, the definition of the citizen has not in any way suffered. Schlosser assumes that it is only applicable to the most advanced democracy and not to the best constitution, and that it restricts the notion of the state obtained in I cc. 1, 2. But this is a misapprehension. On the contrary, Aristotle is of the opinion that the ideal exactly answering to this conception is never completely realized until all who are actually citizens have equal rights and duties. Hence he is certainly right. the *εἰσοί* is in looking for any such realization, because facts never do completely answer to conceptions. See n. (440) (441) on § 10 below. SUSEM. (434)

§ 3 6 τοὺς ποιητοὺς] "honorary citizens" (Susemihl). But probably cases like those of § 8 § 7, 8 are contemplated: "those on whom the franchise is conferred." [Demosth.] c. *Neuer*. 1376, 15, τῷ ποιῆσει πολίτας.

7 οὐ τῷ οἰκεῖν που] "Domicile does not make a citizen." Comp. on the one hand 9 § 12, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπων, with n. (357). on the other 9 § 10 n. (554) SUSEM. (434 b)

§ 4 8 οἷός' οἱ τῶν δικαίων] "nor the advantages of common jurisdiction, in the sense of the capacity to bring, or defend a civil action": *δικαίωμα* = *iura*.

10 τοῦτο] these civil rights, *δικὴν ὑπέχειν καὶ δικάζεσθαι*.

τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων] "the parties to a commercial treaty." More fully explained below 9 §§ 6, 7 (Schneider) n. 549, 550. SUSEM. (435)

νοῦσιν—καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτοις ὑπάρχει— πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν (I) οὐδὲ τούτων τελῶς οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ νέμειν § 5 ἀνάγκη προστάτην, ὥστε ἀτελῶς πῶς μετέχουσι τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας), ἀλλὰ καθίπερ καὶ παῖδας τοὺς μῆπω δι' 15 ἡλικίαν ἐγγεγραμμένους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας τοὺς ἀφειμένους φατέον εἶναι μὲν πῶς πολίτας, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ λίαν ἀλλὰ προστιθέντας τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς τοὺς δὲ παρηκμακότας ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει· δῆλον γὰρ τὸ λεγόμενον). ζητοῦμεν δὲ τὸν ἀπλῶς πολίτην καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοντα 20 τοιοῦτον ἐγκλημα διορθώσεως δεόμενον, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτίμων καὶ φυγάδων ἔστι τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ διαπορεῖν καὶ § 6 λύειν. πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν [κρίσεως καὶ] ἀρχῆς. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον, ὥστ' ἐνίας μὲν ὅλως δις

11 καὶ γὰρ... ὑπάρχει omitted by P¹ A¹: [γὰρ] Götting, [καὶ γὰρὑπάρχει] Susem.¹; Thurot proposed to transpose the words to follow 12 μετέχουσιν. Bender considers the whole passage 11 καὶ γὰρ . 22 λύνει spurious || μὲν οὖν here, as in IV (VII). 10 § 7, in the sense of μέντοι, which Schmidt proposed. This makes Bucheler's insertion all the more necessary || 12 ἀλλὰ νέμειν ... 13 μετέχουσι omitted in Q^b T^b Ald. and P¹ (1st hand, inserted in the margin) || 13 ὥστε] διὰ Vettori Bk. || 16 λίαν untranslated by Ar., [λίαν] Koraes, πολίτας Spengel, πλὴν Götting (in his lectures). Schmidt would transpose λῶν to follow 17 τοὺς δὲ. Possibly due to a variant πλὴν of ἀλλά: yet I do not venture to decide against λῶν ἀπλῶς = 'quite absolutely' || 17 ἀτελεῖς P² Q^b T^b || * * ἢ Thurot Susem.¹: Conring assumed a lacuna higher up before 14 ἀλλὰ, Spengel proposed to omit καθίπερ there: but see Vahlen *Poetics* p. 276 ed. 3, cp. Comm. || 19 δὲ Ar. Conring, γὰρ Γ II (including fr.) Bk. || 23 κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς] πολιτικῆς Stobaeus p. 328, [κρίσεως καὶ] Thurot || 24 διηρημέναι Γ II Bk., διωρισμέναι Scaliger, Susem.², probably right: *determinatae* Ar. ||

The treaties would contain provisions as to the mode in which charges might be brought and cases tried when disputes arose between members of the different contracting states: such perhaps as *μη ἐξ-εἶναι μὴδ' εἰρᾶναι μὴτε δῆσαι ἐλευθέρων*, Pseud.-Andoc. 4. 18. See [Demosth.] *De Halonneso* §§ 9—13, Pollux viii. 63, 88; Harpocration s.v. and Aitii. *Frag.* 380, 1541 b 1: whence some infer that *αὶ ἐνυμβολαῖται πρὸς τοὺς ἐνυμμάχους* δικαιῶται of Thuc. I. 77 are analogous, but this is denied by Boeckh *Publ. Econ. of Athens* pp. 40, 403 Eng. tr. and Grote c. 47 vi. 57 n. See also Cope's note on *Rhet.* I. 4. 11, and W. W. Goodwin in *Amer. Journal of Phil.* 1880. i. pp. 3—11.

12 νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην] "they must procure a patron." So at Athens: Meier and Schömann *Att. Process* p. 315 ff.,

561, 572: Schömann *Antiquities* I. p. 353 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (436) Cp. Harpoc. τῶν προστάτην μὴ νεμόντων μετοίκων (Wyse).

§ 5 13 τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας = a franchise limited to participation in legal rights.

14 καθίπερ καὶ παῖδας κτλ.] It is the same with common jurisdiction as it is in the cases adduced, viz children too young to be enrolled, and superannuated old men exempt from service: those who can bring or defend a civil action may in a certain approximate and restricted sense be termed citizens, but only with a qualification. SUSEM. (437)

17 τοὺς μὲν ἀτελεῖς] Cp. § 2, n. (505). SUSEM. (437 b) Add I. 13. 7.

20 ἐγκλημα διορθώσεως δεομ.] law or defect requiring correction, viz. by an added qualification, as citizen *under age*.

25 τὸν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔξεστιν ἄρχεῖν, ἢ διὰ τινῶν ὀρίσμενων χρό- (I)
 § 7 νων ὃ δ' ἀόριστος, οἷον ὁ δικαστὴς καὶ ἐκκλησιαστής. τάχα δ
 μὲν οὖν ἂν φαίη τις οὐδ' ἄρχοντας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους,
 οὐδὲ μετέχειν διὰ ταῦτα ἀρχῆς· καίτοι γελοῖον τοὺς κυριωτά-
 30 τοὺς ἀποστρεφῆναι ἀρχῆς. ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω μηδὲν· περὶ δυνάματος
 § 8 γὰρ ὁ λόγος· ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ
 ἐκκλησιαστοῦ, τί δεῖ ταῦτ' ἄμφω καλεῖν. ἔστω δὴ διορισμοῦ
 § 9 χάριν ἀόριστος ἀρχή. τίθεμεν δὴ πολίτας τοὺς οὕτω μετέ-
 χοντας. ὁ μὲν οὖν μάλιστα ἂν ἐφαρμόσας πολίτης ἐπὶ πάν- (2 6)
 τας τοὺς λεγομένους πολίτας σχεδὸν τοιοῦτος ἐστίν· δεῖ δὲ ο
 35 μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα

μὲν omitted by Γ, perhaps rightly, unless it be changed to ἢ with Spengel: ΑΙ. leaves it untranslated || 27 ἂν φαίη Γ¹⁴ + 6 fr., φαίη Δ¹, ἀντιφαίη P² Q³ T⁴ Ald., ἂν ἀντι-
 φαίη? Gotting || 28 αἰῶνι .. 29 ἀρχῆς omitted by Π¹, added by cor. 1 in the
 margin of P¹ || 31 οὕτω τούτων οὐ ταύτης? Spengel || 34 πολίτου <λόγος>?
 Schneider.

§ 6 αὐτὸς δ' ἀόριστος sc. ἄρχων: in other cases the office holds an undefined office; i.e. one of uncertain or indefinite duration and frequency. The context would be equally well suited by 'life-long' or 'perpetual': but from c. 11 § 13 f., § 18 f., we learn that even when discharging judicial or legislative functions no one would regard the δικαστὴς and ἐκκλησιαστής as themselves ἄρχοντες but only as parts of the complex ἄρχων, the δικαστήριον οἱ ἐκκλησία. A fortiori, the mere qualification for discharging these intermittent functions cannot make an ἄρχων when the actual discharge of them is not enough (Shute). In Aristophanes ἄρχων = δικάζειν, c.g. *Plutus* 916, οὐλομεν δικαστὰς ἐξεκίτηδες ἢ πόλιν ἄρχειν καθίστησιν; cp. n. (438).

§ 7 28 οὐδὲ .. διὰ ταῦτα that to serve on a court of justice or as member of the legislature does not constitute office; and yet it seems absurd to deny to those who wield the highest authority a claim to hold office

καίτοι γελοῖον Comp. Plato *Laus* 767 A, B: "in a certain sense to appoint courts of justice is to choose officers of state. For every member of the executive must needs be a judge of sundry matters, and a dikast, without really holding office, does virtually assume an office of no mean importance on the day when he decides the suit he is trying (δικαστὴς δὲ οὐκ ἄρχων καὶ τίνα τρό-
 πον ἄρχων οὐ πάνυ φαῖλος γίγνεται τῇ

δόξῃ ἡμέραν, ἥπερ ἂν κρίνων τὴν δίκην ἀπο-
 τελέῃ) Hence the dikasts may also be regarded as holders of office." For "at Athens the obligation to render an account of his conduct was necessarily presupposed in the case of every state official (cp. Aeschines III. 17), but the heliast is not obliged to render an account (Aristoph. *Vespæ* 587 καὶ ταῦτ' ἀνυπεύθυνοι δρώμεν τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμὶ' ἀρχῆ) Again, no one could hold an office for two terms in succession, as in that case he must have been reelected before he had rendered his account, which was illegal: whereas the heliast could go on discharging his functions time after time, uninterruptedly" (Fränkel p. 21 f.).
 SUSEM. (438)

29 ἀλλὰ διαφερέτω κτλ. "But let us waive the point, which after all is verbal, since we can find no common term applicable alike to the judge and the ekklesiast. For the sake of distinction, we will call the latter an 'indefinite' magistracy" (Jebb).

§ 8 33 ἐφαρμόσας is intransitive. "Such then is [the notion, or definition of] the citizen which best applies to all who are so called." We find ἐπὶ with gen. after this verb, 2 § 3 and 11 § 5 below. but the dat. (4 § 2) οἱ πρὸς with acc. is more usual.

35 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐν οἷς κτλ. "Where classes of things (like πολίτης) contain individual members distinct in species" i.e. essentially different, like the several

διαφέρει τῇ εἰδει, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρῶτον τὸ δὲ (1)
 δεύτερον τὸ δ' ἐχόμενον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ἔνεστιν, ἢ
 § 9 τοιαῦτα, τὸ κοινόν, ἢ γλίσχρως. τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν
 εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας τὰς δὲ
 275 b προτέρας οὕσας· τὰς γὰρ ἡμαρτημένας καὶ παρεκβεβηκυίας
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑστέρας εἶναι τῶν ἀναμαρτήτων (τὰς δὲ παρεκ-
 βεβηκυίας πῶς λέγομεν, ὕστερον ἐστὶ φανερόν). ὥστε καὶ
 4 τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἐκάστην πολι-
 § 10 τέλει. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ τ
 πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγ-

37 οὐδ' ἔνεστιν Madrig, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν Γ Π Δλ. Bk., οὐδενεστιν fi || [ἢ τοιαῦτα] Πα. 2

πολιτείας and, consequently, the πολίτης as determined in each of them, "one of these being primary, another secondarily, a third yet more subordinate, in such cases the generic attribute, in right of which they belong to the class [lit. are such], is either altogether lost or barely seen." If altogether lost, the things are, in technical phrase, ὁμῶνυμα. Here however πολίτης is probably παράνομον, like ἀγαθόν in *Λύκ. Eth.* i. 6 §§ 8—12, where also it is explained that there is no common attribute in virtue of which all the things denoted as 'good' are such. See Zeller *Plato* p. 259 n. 103 Eng. tr. In *Ind. Ar.* ὑποκείμενα is explained (1) res singulae quae continentur notionis alicuius universalis ambitu, (2) vel ad quas ea notio refertur et a quibus suspensa est: e.g. *Met.* A 2 4, 982 a 23, ὁ τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἔχων οἷός τις πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα. But Bonitz adds: τῶν πραγμάτων (ut πολίτων) ἐν οἷς τὰ ὑποκείμενα (singulae πολιτεῖαι ad quas refertur τὰ πολίτων notio) διαφέρει.

35—38 "See Chapter i. f. things are said to be homonymous or equivocal when they have merely the same name, the sense or meaning attached to the name being different (ὁμῶνυμα λέγεται ὡς ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτομα λόγος ἕτερος). Things are said to be synonymous or univocal when they are not only called by the same name, but also in the same sense (J. G. Schneider). Comp Waitz *ad loc.*, Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. ὁμῶνυμος [*Grote Aris.* i. 81 f.]; also i. 2. 13 above n. (28)." SUBEM (438 b) Hence obviously πράγματα 'things' must be taken in the not uncommon sense of 'classes': comp. *De Interpret.* c. 7 § 1, 17 a 38, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην. Any general notion,

however loose the connexion between the particulars which come 'under' it, is treated as a whole or 'thing,' if it is denoted by a single term.

§ 9 39 ὑστέρας προτέρας Logically 'posterior' and 'prior.' Not 'later' and 'earlier' in time or historical development, but 'lower' and 'higher' in the order of thought and of real existence: the former less really, the latter more really a form of government. See i. 2. 13 n. (27). SUBEM (439)

275 b 1 ἡμαρτημένας Plato's word *Rep.* v 419 A, viii 544 A. The participle 'perverted' has been converted into an adjective 'wrong, perverted'. cp. 6 § 11, viii(v). i. 5, *Λύκ. Eth.* iv. 9. 35, viii 10. 4. In viii(v). i. 15 it is a true passive participle. Compare ἀπονενοημένος = desperate

3 ὑστέρον] cc. 6, 7. Comp. 3 § 2 n. (456). SUBEM (439 b)

§ 10 5 ὁ λεχθεὶς The citizen as thus defined,

ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ κατὰ But democracy is one of the degenerate forms. If then Aristotle's conception of the citizen is particularly applicable to democracy, then clearly under the best constitution the position of the citizens will be just the same as under a democracy, and all will enjoy equal rights amongst themselves. See 13 § 12 *III* (598, 599): iv(vii). 9 §§ 7—9, 13 § 9, 14 §§ 3—5 with *III*. (816, 817, 885). Aristotle cannot make his meaning clear by reference to the best constitution because he has not yet determined in what it consists; thus he is compelled to take an illustration from democracy. Cp. also 5 §§ 4, 5 *III*. SUBEM (440)

6 ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις With the tacit exception of the best constitution, which

καίον. <ἐν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομί- (I)
 ζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέ-
 ρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει
 10 τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φοινίκας.
 § 11 ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἑτέρας. τὴν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ
 Καρχηδόνας πύσας γὰρ ὄρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας.
 ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ §
 ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀρίστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής
 15 ἔστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος· τού-
 των γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδίδεται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ
 (2) δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πύντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἔστιν
 § 12 ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν (φ' γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρ-
 χῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἦδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύ-

1275 b 7 <ἐν> Κοίνας || 11 <οὐ> τὸν? Schneider (afterwards rejected by him), Κοίνας, Triebes; [καὶ] Triebes. But see Comm. n. (444) || 13 γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔχει omitted by P¹ Q¹, possibly by P¹; erased in P⁴ || 16 ἀποδίδεται P, perhaps ight || βουλευσθαι P² (emended by corr. of P¹) fi. || 17 περὶ before τινῶν omitted by M¹ P¹, perhaps rightly || 19 καὶ Ar Spengel, ἢ P II (including fi.) Bk. Susem.¹ (in text)

would otherwise not become perfectly adjusted to the real nature of its citizens, as however it must be in order to be actually "the best." SUSEM. (442)

8 συγκλήτους] Meetings of a great council specially convened upon extraordinary occasions. It may be shown, as in Exc. IV to B. II p. 345 f., that there existed at Carthage a great council of this kind, side by side with the smaller council and the popular assembly. SUSEM.

(443) κατὰ μέρος] not "in turn" but "by sections."

καὶ τὰς δίκας κατὰ μέρος] "They try cases before special courts." Thus of the two 'indefinite magistracies', the popular assembly and the popular courts of justice, neither is here found; the larger council specially convened (σύγκλητοι) replaces the one, and the other is superseded by the conversion of the judicature into a special government department. SUSEM.

(443) 9 ἐν Λακεδαίμονι] Comp. II. 9. 25, VI (IV). 9 9 III. (329 b), (1266). SUSEM.

τῶν συμβολαίων] II. 5. 11. Cp. Cope's note on Rhet. I. 1. 10, "any private every-day transactions as opposed to σύμβολα which are κοινά" δίκας τῶν συμ. = civil suits, nisi prius cases.

§ 11 12 Καρχηδόνα] If we bear in mind what is said in n. (443) we shall

discover that there is no contradiction between this passage and II. 11. 7, καὶ τὰς δίκας ἐπὶ τινῶν ἀρχέων δικάζεσθαι πάσας καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἢ π' ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (cp. Exc. IV. p. 348 f. and III. 391, 391 b). The more subtle distinction that at Sparta the administration of justice was distributed over the different branches of the executive, while at Carthage it was separated from them all and entrusted to a special judicial department, is not here taken into account, but merely that which is equally a feature of both systems, viz. the jurisdiction of special boards as distinguished from that of δικασταὶ annually chosen for this purpose as a committee of the entire civic body. See further II. 9. 23 n. 325. SUSEM (444)

15 ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρισμένος] "the officer defined by his tenure of the office" (of judge or legislator) And therefore in such states Aristotle regards as citizens only those who have the unrestricted right of being elected to these definite offices. (Nothing can be more erroneous than Oncken's assertion, II. p. 121 n. 1, that presumably Aristotle has in mind the division of responsibility in the Athenian democracy between ἐκκλησία and βουλὴ on the one hand, Heliaea, νομοβέται, and Αἰεοπάγος on the other.) SUSEM. (445)

§ 12 18 ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς καὶ κριτικῆς.

20 τῆς τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν (I)
 2 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν· ὀρίζονται δὲ πρὸς
 τὴν χρῆσιν πολίτην τὸν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν καὶ μὴ
 θατέρου μόνον, οἷον πατρός ἢ μητρός, οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτ'
 ἐπὶ πλεον ζητοῦσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ ἀπάππους δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ πλείους.
 25 οὕτω δὲ ὀριζομένων πολιτικῶς καὶ ταχέως, ἀποροῦσί τινες τὸν
 § 2 τρίτον ἐκείνουν ἢ τέταρτον, πῶς ἔσται πολίτης. Γοργίας μὲν
 οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος,
 ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλμοποιῶν πεποιθη-

21 δὲ Γ. Δτ. δὴ Π (including fr.) Bk. || 23 τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἐτι? Κοινας ||
 24 ἐπιπάππους Γ¹ and corr. of Γ¹, ἐτι πάππους Cameiriarius, accepted by Schneider
 and Koraes || 25 δὴ Γ¹ Π¹ Αλ. Bk. || ταχέως: Cameiriarius, apparently right:
 πολιτικῶς, ταχέως ἀποροῦσι Spengel

κῆς] "He who is entitled to a share in legislative or judicial office." But this is not quite exact, for by what precedes Aristotle ought to include "executive office," as in fact he does, virtually in § 7 (ἀριστοὶ ἀρχή). See v. (446)

§ 8 is simply untranslatable: without going further, without anything more being necessary.

21 πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς] "a body of such citizens adequate to secure independence of life." Cp. *n* (21), II. 2. 8 *n*. (136) and the passage there cited. SUSK. (447)

c. 2 πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] "for practical purposes." This definition was adopted by Pericles, according to Plutarch, for the famous law which disfranchised 5,000 out of 19,040 citizens. νόμον ἔγραψε μόνους Ἀθηναίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐκ δυνεῖν Ἀθηναίων γεγονότας.

25 πολιτικῶς] Like our word 'popular' or *populaire* in Cic. *De fin.* IV. § 24, v. § 12; i.e. superficially. Comp. for the emendation ταχέως, pingui Minerva.

§ 2 26 Γοργίας] The celebrated orator and nihilistic philosopher, already referred to I. 13. 10 (cp. *n*. 118), who lived between 483 and 375, visited Athens on an embassy from his native city Leontini in 427, and a second time soon afterwards. There he enchanted every one with his florid and rhythmical periodic eloquence and gave a great impulse to the formation of an Attic prose style: at a later period he lived, and perhaps died, at Larisa in Thessaly. Isocrates went to Larisa to hear him. He trained a considerable school of rhetors, which subsequently had rivals in the schools of Isocrates, of Polycrates, and of the Cynics:

Alkidamas (*n*. 31), Polos, Lakymnios, Protarchos and Lycophron (*nn*. 297, 552) were its most eminent names. See Foss *De Gorgia Leontino* (Halle 1828), Frei in the *Rhein. Mus.* VII. 1850. 527 ff., VIII. 1853. 268 ff., Zeller *Pie-Societies* vol II. pp. 412—416 Eng. tr., Blass *Die attische Beredamkeit* (Attic Oratory) I. p. 44, III. 2. 323 ff. Susenuhl *Gorgias and Attic prose* in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXV. 1877. pp. 793—799, *De vitis Trime* etc. (Greifswald 1884) p. 25 ff., Diels 'Gorgias and Empedocles' *Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad* 1884. p. 343 ff. SUSK. (448) Also Cope in *Journal of Sacred and Class. Phil.* III. 65—80.

The following passage, II. 26—30, is elaborately treated by Prof. Ridgeway, in *Transactions of the Camb. Philological Soc.* vol II pp. 135—138. His results are here accepted. He further suggests (*Journal of Philology* XV. p. 164) that the particular occasion of creating new citizens, which called forth this jest, was a defeat of the Larisaeans by Lycophron of Pherae in 404 B.C., as related by Xenophon *Hellen.* II. 3. 4.

27 εἰρωνευόμενος=unofficially, though the word could have the meaning "jestingly." But we are told Rhet. III. 7. 11, 1408 b 20, ἡ μετὰ εἰρωνείας ἔπερ Γοργίας ἐπτολεῖ, that Gorgias used to be unisonal in his speeches. SUSK. (449)

28 ἔφη καθάπερ ὄλμους κτλ.] "said that mortars were the staple manufacture of the place and freemen of the magistrates." This untranslatable play upon words turns on the double sense of *δημοουργοί*, which was (1) the title for the chief magistrates in many places (cp. *n*. 1586), thus answering to 'mayor' or

29 μένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιη- (I)
 § 3 μένους[· εἶναι γὰρ τινες λαρισσοποιούς]· ἔστι δ' ἀπλουν. εἰ
 γὰρ μετείχον κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα διορισμὸν τῆς πολιτείας, ἦσαν
 [ἀν] πολῖται· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δυνατόν ἐφαρμόττειν τὸ ἐκ πολίτου
 ἢ ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οἰκησάντων ἢ κτισάντων.
 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔχει ἀπορίαν, ὅσοι με-¹⁰
 35 τέσχον μεταβολῆς γενομένης πολιτείας, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν
 ἐποίησε Κλεισθένης μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολήν· πολ-
 § 4 λούς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετόικους. τὸ δ'

29 *λαρισσους* fr., *Λαρισαίους* not *Λαρισσαίους* Bk.² (so throughout) || τῶν omitted by M¹ || 30 [εἶναι. .. λαρισσοποιούς] Ridgeway || *λαρισσαιοποιούς* Camerarius, *λαρισσαιοποιῖ factores* A¹, *λαρισσοποιούς* III (including fr.) Bk.¹ || 31 ἦσαν ἀν P²⁻³ Q² T² A¹, Bk., ἦσαν II¹ f. Ald. and, over an erasure, P⁴, § δ ἀν U^b || καὶ γὰρ οὐ P⁴ Q² T² L² Bk., οὐδὲ γὰρ Sussem.¹ misled by William's translation *neque enim* || 33 ἐκ omitted by P¹ and perhaps by Γ, [ἐκ] Sussem.¹ || 34 οἰκισάντων [ἢ κτισάντων] Bender || 34 ἐκεῖνο Vettori (ms. correction in the Munich copy of his 1st ed.) and an unknown hand in the margin of the Aldine at Munich, *ἐκεῖνη* P⁴ and, with an erasure over *εἰ*, P¹: *ἐκεῖνη* Sussem.¹ in text and perhaps M², *ἐκεῖνη* P² QM² Q² T² U^b A¹, Ald. and P³ (corrector), probably also M², accepted by Bender; *ἐκεῖνο* apparently I² (1st hand): Γ uncertain, *illi magis habent* William, whence *ἐκεῖνο*... ἔχουσι: the editors from Vettori and Mosel to Bekker || 35 οὐκ <δ> Chandler || 37 δούλους καὶ ξένους M² (1st hand) and Valckenaer (notes on Herod. p. 404) || καὶ δούλους <καὶ> μετόικους A¹, Bk.², καὶ [δούλους] μετόικους or καὶ πολλοὺς μετόικους Götting, *μετόικους καὶ δούλους* Niebuhr (II. 305 n. 2, Eng. tr.) || πολλοὺς ξένους Spengel. See however Meier *De gentili. Att.* p. 6, Bernays *Herakl. Briefe* p. 155 f., and on the other side c. 5 § 2 with n. (503)

'burgomastei,' and as this was so in parts of Thessaly (see Schomann *Antiq. iur. publ.* p. 84 n. 10, *Antiquities of Greece* p. 142 Eng. tr.) it may have been also at Larisa: while (2) at the same time in Attica, and the common language generally, it was the term for workmen or mechanics (J. G. Schneider). The jest, when cited in this context, raises a presumption that the magistrates of Larisa bore this same title at the foundation of the city and had full powers to make citizens of whom they pleased: yet who in the world would spoil such a joke or pun by inquiring whether this was historically true? (But the jest would lose all its point if *δημιουργοί* be taken, as Oncken suggests, to mean the founders, not the magistrates, of Larisa. For every town has its founders, and not merely Larisa and certain towns like it: nor does the word bear this meaning unless some more precise phrase be added.) Further comp VIII(V). 6 § 6 n. (1573), 10 § 5 n. (1651) VI(IV). 4. 16 n.

(1188) SUSSEM. (450) Cp. Thuc. i. 56 *ἐπιδημιουργοί*.

30 εἶναι γὰρ τινες λαρισσοποιούς] "For (he said) some [of them] are Laris-makers," i.e. hardware manufacturers. Why should Gorgias interpret his own joke? It is far more likely that this is a gloss by some one who did not see that *δμους* goes with *Λαρισαίους* above; or perhaps believed that *λάρισα*, *λαρίς* meant 'a kettle' on the analogy of *τράγχα*, *ταγχαίς*. In Anthol. Pal. VI. 305, τῶν *Λαρισαίων* *υπογάτορας* *ἐφηγῆρας*, *Λαρισαίος* is an *adjective*, and this makes against its supposed use as a substantive, and therefore against the emendation of Camerarius (Ridgeway).

§ 3 30 ἀπλοῦν] a simple question, οὐδὲν ποικίλον.

37 πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετόικους] "for he admitted into the tribes many resident-alien of foreign and servile extraction" (δούλους = freedmen). It is well known that Cleisthenes abolished the four ancient tribes

ἀμφισβήτημα πρὸς τούτους ἐστὶν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότε-
 ρον ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως. καίτοι κὰν τοῦτό τις ἔτι προσαπορή-
 1276 α σσειεν, ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης, ὡς ταῦτ' οὐνα-
 § 5 μένου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς. ἐπὶ δ' ὁρώμεν καὶ ἄρ-
 χοντάς τινας ἀδίκως, οὓς ἀρχεῖν μὲν φήσομεν ἄλλ' οὐ δικαίως,
 ὁ δὲ πολίτης ἀρχῇ τινὶ διωρισμένος ἐστίν (ὁ γὰρ κοινωνῶν
 5 τῆς τοιούτου ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν), δῆλον ὅτι πο-
 3 λίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέον καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ
 μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον ἀμφι-
 σβήτησιν. ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες πόθ' ἢ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ πότε
 9 οὐχ ἢ πόλις, οἷον ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται
 § 2 δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια ἔνιοι βούλονται
 διαλύειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος,

39 κἀν Bk.³, καὶ Γ II A1. Bk.¹, προσαπορήσειεν <ἀν> Götting, τις <ἀν> Spengel
 || τοῦτό W^b L^a Ald. Bk., τοῦτο M^a (1st hand), τούτω Γ I¹⁻²⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b M^a (cum).

1276 α 5 τῆς omitted by M^a P¹, [τῆς] Susem.¹ || ἔφαμεν P¹ P^a A1 Bk. || 7
 συνάπτειν? Κοίνας || 9 γίνηται Γ A1.

(see p. 340) and established in their place
 ten local divisions, for which he retained
 the name φυλαί: Cuiusius *Hist.* i pp.
 382—387 Eng. tr., Schömann pp. 336,
 365 Eng. tr. Comp. n. (488) on 9 § 13,
 vii (vi). 4. 19 n. (1427). SUSEM. (481)

Congreve supports the reading of
 Bekker² and Thirlwall (ii. 74) by a com-
 parison of iv (vii). 4 § 6 δοῦλων ἀριθμὸν
 πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων, § 14 ξένοις
 καὶ μετοίκους. But this is nullified by
 Aelostroph. *Arch.* 503—8, *Eg.* 347 εἰ που
 δικίδιον εἶπας εὐ κατὰ ξένου μετοίκου, *Pax*
 207 μέτοικοι καὶ ξένοι. That δοῦλοι may
 be used of freedmen is capable of abun-
 dant proof. Athenaeus vi 93, 267 n, c
 διαφέρειν δὲ φησι Χρυσίππος δοῦλον οὐκ
 ἔστι γράφον ἐν β' Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς, διὰ τὸ
 τοῦ ἀπελευθέρου μὲν δοῦλους εἶναι
 εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦ μὴ τῆς κτήσεως
 ἀφαιρέτου: Lysias c. *Agorast.* § 64 δοῦλος
 καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων ἐστίν (of a citizen): Isaeus
 vi § 49, οὕτως ἀμαλουργομένη οὖσα δοῦλη
 (of a freedwoman): Harpocration i, v.
 μετοίκων, cp. Boeckh *Finl. Economy*
 p. 48 Eng. tr. (the freedmen paid this
 tax). The proceeding of Cleisthenes was
 not more violent than that of Euphron
 at Sicyon: Xen. *Hell.* vii. 3. 82 δοῦλους
 μὲν οὐ μόνον ἐλευθέρους ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεις
 ἐποίησεν: and the two commonest sources
 of an citizen population are cited side
 by side, *ibid.* c. 5 § 3 παρ' ὧν οἱ μὲν
 δοῦλον τὸ βάναιον ἢ ξενικόν. There

is no authority for δοῦλους μετοίκους and
 if any change were needed Niebuhr's
 would be the simplest. See also Grote
 iv 170 n. 1, Schömann *Constitutional*
History p. 69 f. Eng. tr.

§ 5 1276 α 6 καὶ τούτους] Even those
 who have received the franchise in con-
 sequence of a revolution. SUSEM. (482)

7 πρότερον] i § 1 n. (432). SUSEM. (483)

c. 3 The identity of the state depends
 not upon its territory but upon its con-
 stitution.

§ 2 10 ἔνιοι] Possibly writers who
 advocated repudiation etc meant: *In-*
trod. p. 20 n. 1. SUSEM. (484)

11 διαλύειν = discharge, pay in full.
 ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως κατὰ] "on the ground
 that it was a loan to the tyrant and not
 to the state." This question was really
 raised in B.C. 403, when after the expul-
 sion of the thirty, the Athenian state
 debated whether it was obliged to repay
 a loan of 100 talents borrowed by them
 from the Spartans, Demosth. xx. 11 f.,
 Isocr. vii. 68 f. (Vettori). The con-
 veyance case, viz. that the credit of a service
 rendered by the expelled tyrants was
 claimed by the state, arose, when the
 Corinthians after the expulsion of the
 Cypselidae demanded that the offerings
 dedicated by this family at Delphi and
 Pisa should be inscribed with the name
 of the town, and the acts of their tyrants
 be thus regarded as acts of the state.

οὐτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων, ὥς ἐνίας τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ (I) κρατεῖν οὐσας, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον * *. εἴπερ οὖν 11 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται τινες, κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁμοίως
 15 <οὐ> τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλυγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.
 § 3 εἰκοι δ' ὁ λόγος οἰκείος εἶναι τῆς ἀπορίας ταύτης, πῶς ποτὲ χρῆ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν. ἢ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιωτάτῃ τῆς ἀπορίας (p.
 20 ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ διαζευχθῆναι [τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους], καὶ
 § 4 τοὺς μὲν ἕτερον τοὺς δὲ ἕτερον οἰκῆσαι τόπον. ταύτην μὲν οὖν

12 πολλά omitted by Ald. and P¹ (1st hand, added in the margin) || <ἐπὶ> τῷ Landau || 13 συμφέρον. <ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία οὐ σκοπεῖ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον> or something similar? Susem. || 14 καὶ δημοκρατοῦνται] κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ἐντραποντὸ Susem.^{1,2} following William's incorrect version in *democratiam viciat fuerunt* || 15 <οὐ> Hayduck || "ταύτης is pleonastic" Eaton; [ταύτης] Thuot; τῆς αὐτῆς Koias (with mark of interrogation after 16 τυραννίδος and a comma after 14 τοῦτον instead of before κατὰ) || 17 ὁ λόγος after οἰκείος P¹ P² Bk. || [πῶς] πότε Spengel Susem.¹, see § 5 || 21 [τὸν ... ἀνθρώπους] Susem., dittography from 20, [τὸν τόπον καὶ] Bucheler

The Delphians admitted the claim, the Eleans rejected it: see Plut. *De Pyth. orac.* 13. 400 E (Schlosser). Comp. further *u.* (432) on 1 § 1. SUSEM. (456)

Broughton (p. 171) cites the case of the United States and the bonds issued by the abortive Confederate government.

λαβόντων] Comp. Thuc. III. 81 ἀπέθανον... ἄλλοι (ἐνέκα) χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων (τῶν δανεισαμένων Schol.).

12 ὥς ἐνίας κατὰ] "for some forms of the state rest upon superior force and are not due to public expediency" This is the second time that Aristotle refers beforehand to his doctrine of 'degenerate' forms of government, more precisely laid down in c. 6. see above *nn.* (439 b, 440). SUSEM. (456)

13 συμφέρον. * *] The lacuna may perhaps be thus supplied. <But democracy also is a government of this sort.> SUSEM. (457)

14 δημοκρατοῦνται] Ridgeway suggests that William of Moerbeke took this word to come from *δημοκρατία*, and hence his rendering. in *democratiam vicissim fuerunt*.

§ 3 17 εἰκοι δ' κατὰ] But the true grounds of this controversy lie deeper in another question which now needs to be investigated. SUSEM. (458)

20 ζήτησις] The most obvious mode of investigation is concerned with the place and the inhabitants.

21 διαζευχθῆναι] "disjoined," "separated" Aristotle has in view the measure which the Greeks called *διοικεῖν*, cp. VII (γ). 10. 11 n. (1668), when a town was destroyed by its conquerors and the inhabitants were driven to seek new homes in the neighbourhood in a number of unvalled villages and hamlets, as was done to Mantinea by the Spartans in 385 B.C. This was an oligarchical measure: for the custom of living together in a walled town was usually favourable to democracy. The opposite and democratical procedure, the union of several country places, hitherto unvalled, in a single town was *συνοικεῖν*: and directly after the battle of Leuctra this was done by the Mantineans who rebuilt their city B.C. 370 and moreover gave the impulse to the foundation of a common capital of all Arcadia, namely Megalopolis. See Curtius *Hist.* IV. pp. 305, 417 ff. Eng. tr., Schömann *Antiq.* p. 171 Eng. tr. Cp. also I. 2. 8 n. (20 b). SUSEM. (459)

§ 4 22 ταύτην μὲν οὖν πρᾶστέραν] In this form the problem must be regarded as easier to solve, for the variety of meanings of the word 'state' facilitates a solution.

πραoτέραν θετέον τὴν ἀπορίαν (πολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως) λεγομένης, ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως. ὁμοί-
 25 ως δὲ καὶ τῶν τὸν αὐτὸν κατοικούντων ἀνθρώπων πότε
 § 5 δεῖ νομίζειν μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν; οὐ γὰρ διὰ τοῖς τεύχε-
 σιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν Πελοποννήσῳ περιβαλεῖν ἐν τεύχος. τοιαύτη
 δ' ἴσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν καὶ πᾶσα ἥτις ἔχει περιγραφὴν
 29 μᾶλλον ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως· ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας τρίτην
 § 6 ἡμέραν οὐκ αἰσθῆσθαι τι μέρος τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν
 ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν χρήσιμος ἡ σκέψις
 (περὶ γὰρ μεγέθους τῆς πόλεως, τό τε πόσον καὶ πότερον
 ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνειν τὸν πολι-
 τικόν). ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον, 13
 35 πότερον ἕως ἂν ἡ τὸ γένος ταὐτὸ τῶν κατοικούντων, τὴν
 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ αἰεὶ τῶν μὲν φθειρομέ-

23 πρoτέραν Q^b T^b, Spengel thinks the word corrupt || 25 αὐτὸν τόπον P^a W^b
 L^a Ar. Ald. Bk. Susem¹; perhaps also Γ, *eundem locum* William || 26 εἶναι μίαν
 M^a P¹ || 26 δὴ] δεῖ P¹ Q^b || 27 πελοποννήσῳ Γ M^a P¹ || 28 καὶ πᾶσα.....29 πό-
 λεως transposed to follow 30 πόλεως Ramus || 32 ποσὸν M^a P¹ || 33 ἔθνος omitted
 by Π^a Ar. and in P¹ where a lacuna of twice its length is left

23 *πολλαχῶς λεγομένης*] As in Greek there is only the one word *pólis* for 'city' and 'state,' in such a case as that just cited in *n.* (459) it might well be asked, whether the *state* of Mantinea continued to exist at all in the interval between the destruction and the rebuilding of the *city*. In fact, the dispute did not merely turn upon different meanings of the word *pólis*, as Aristotle thinks: but the imperfection of the Greek conception of the state, which even Aristotle has not surmounted (*Introd.* p. 22), is brought clearly to light. See however 9 § 10 *n.* (554). SUSEM. (480)

Unquestionably it would be a great gain if we could keep this limited conception always before us, and the translation of *pólis*, *πολιτικός*, by 'city' 'civic' rather than 'state' 'political' is in many cases desirable on that account. But one uniform rendering is clearly impossible. To bring home the fact that the citizens of Rome formed what we may call a 'municipal corporation' we cannot be always styling them the 'burgess-body.'

§ 5 26 οὐ γὰρ διὰ τοῖς τεύχεσιν] Editors compare Thucyd. VII. 77. 7 *ἀνδρες γὰρ πόλις καὶ οὐ τεῖχος οὐδ' αὖτε*; Soph. *Oed. Rex* 56 *ὡς οὐδὲν ἴσταν οὐτε πόργος οὐτε αὖτε ἔρμος ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἐνοικούντων*

ἔσω; Tac. *Hist.* I. 84 *quid? vos pulcherrimam hanc urbem domibus et tectis et congestu lapidum state creditis?* SUSEM. (481)

27 *Πελοποννήσῳ*] Cp. Pseudo-Lysias II (*ἐπιτάφιος*) § 45, *περὶ ἅπασαν τὴν Πελοπόννησον τεῖχος περιβαλεῖν*, viz. the wall across the isthmus proposed in the Persian wars.

28 *ἔχει περιγραφὴν*] has a circumference of a nation, i.e. encircles a nation rather than a state.

29 *μᾶλλον ἔθνους*] Comp. *n.* (11) and the passages there cited. SUSEM. (483)

ἥς γέ φασιν ἐαλωκυίας] The capture by Cyrus is meant; Herod. I. 178, 191. Nothing is there said however of an interval of three days, but we are told that when the extremities of the town were captured the Babylonians who lived in the centre had not yet discovered that it was taken. See also II. 6. 6 *n.* (200). SUSEM. (482)

§ 6 31 *εἰς ἄλλον καιρὸν*] The size is discussed in IV(VII). c. 4; the uniformity of race in VIII(V). 3. 11 f.; cp. *n.* (1531). See however *Introd.* p. 56. SUSEM. (484)

Comp. for the phrase *convivere in atheni diem*.

νων τῶν δὲ γινομένων, ὥσπερ καὶ ποταμούς εἰώθαμεν λέγειν (1)
 τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ αἰεὶ τοῦ μὲν
 ἐπιγινομένου νόματος τοῦ δ' ὑπεξιόντος, ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώ-
 40 πους φατέον εἶναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν κοινωτὴν αἰτίαν, τιν
 1276 b § 7 δὲ πόλιν ἑτέραν; εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τῆς ἢ πόλεως, ἔστι δὲ
 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ
 διαφορῆς τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξαιεν ἂν καὶ
 τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε
 5 μὲν κωμικὸν ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὐ-
 § 8 τῶν πολλὰκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀλ- 11
 λην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς
 συνθέσεως ᾗ, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἰ-
 § 9 ναι λέγομεν, ἂν ὅτε μὲν ἡ Δωρίος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦ-

1276 b 2 "πολιτείας is pleonastic or the text is corrupt" Eaton, *πολιτεία* Congreve, [πολιτῶν]? Sussem. || 3 ἂν omitted by Π¹, δόξει Μ¹ || 6 ἀνθρώπων omitted by P⁴⁻⁶ Q^b T^b || The punctuation (comma for full stop after *δοτῶν*) Welldon || 7 ἢ τῆς συνθέσεως Π² Bk || 8 εἶναι omitted by Q^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand) || 9 λέγομεν Albert Ar. Morel, λέγομεν Γ Π

37 ποταμούς] The allusion is to the *diata* of Heraclitus ποταμοῖσι δις ταῖσι αὐτοῖσι οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαλεῖ, *Frags.* 41, 42, 81 ed. Bywater (Eaton, Ridgeway).

§ 7 1276 b 2 κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας] Ridgeway rightly defends this, translating "For if the state is a kind of community, but it (ἡ πόλις) is in fact a community possessed by citizens in a constitution," and adducing the MS. text of 9 § 14 as another instance of the double genitive with *κοινωνία*. If any change is to be made at all, we should omit *πολιτῶν*, which, though grammatically unobjectionable, is superfluous and somewhat obscures the sense. Usually *κοινωνία πολιτῶν* or *κοινωνία* has been made the subject of the second sentence, and *κοινωνία πολιτείας* or *πολιτεία* its predicate, "and fellowship (of the citizens) is fellowship in a constitution" or "consists in a constitution." SUSSEM.

§ 8 γ' εἶδος ἕτερον τῆς συνθέσεως] "if the kind of combination be different," i.e. if the elements be differently combined.

8 ἁρμονίαν] See Exc. IV on B. v (VII). SUSSEM. (488)

In these two modes the notes (φθόγγος) are the same: but the Doian mode is from E to e, and b natural is μέση or key-note; while the Phrygian mode is from D to d and a is μέση. Comp. Dio Chrysost. II, p. 21 ἁρμονία Δωρίος καὶ

Φρύγιος ἄλλη καὶ Ἀδύδιος.

§ 9 γ' εἰ δὴ τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον] "On these principles then it is plain that we must affirm the identity of the city by a reference to its constitution." It would be unjust to Aristotle to apply to this conclusion* in its literal sense his assertion 6 § 1 n (523), 7 § 2 (535), 13 § 5 (592), that the constitution is nothing but the form of government, *πολιτεῖα, κύριον*. For the truth is that, like Plato, he includes under *πολιτεία* all which goes to condition the form of government as well as all that is directly conditioned by it. Thus, as Zeller II ii p. 551 rightly observes, he includes 'even the main features of the commonwealth which find expression in the spirit of the state' 'administration and in the mode in which 'the end of the state is conceived': see IV (VII). 8 § 5 n. (800), 8 § 3 (806). Thus his notion of a polity or *πολιτεία* is not narrower but wider than our notion of a constitution. For when we speak with scientific precision the term 'constitution' usually denotes only the particular form which the political organism assumes, or the sum total of the rules regulating the distribution of political functions;—although no doubt, as a matter of fact, the text of a modern constitution does

* Oncken (II, 122—130) ascribes to him, as his real view, almost the exact opposite of this conclusion.

10 τον ἔχει τὸν τρίπον, φανερόν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐ- (I)
τὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν (n. 63
ἕτερον ἢ ταυτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν
καὶ πάντων ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων. εἰ δὲ δίκαιον διαλύειν ἢ μὴ
διαλύειν, ὅταν εἰς ἑτέραν πολιτείαν μεταβάλλῃ ἢ πόλις, λό-
15 γος ἕτερος.

4 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν ἐπισκέψασθαι II

14 μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν II² Bk, μεταβάλλῃ II³ Bk.

not fully or exclusively contain constitutional rules answering to the definition just given; but admits all those laws in general which, as the fundamental laws of the state, appear to demand special guarantees. Hence it is that to Aristotle no less than to Plato the regulation of education in the spirit of the constitution is eminently and essentially a part of the constitution: see V(VIII). 1 § 1 f. n. (973), VIII(V). 9 § 11 (1611). Thus he by no means ignores a state of things in which the prevalent morality and education are out of harmony with the existing constitution, but where such is the case he firmly maintains that this existing constitution has not yet been fully realized, VI(IV). 5 § 3, n. (1216). Again, that he includes under the 'constitution' the regulation of property relations, is perfectly clear from IV(VII). c. 9, 10 § 9. Consult also n. (190).

But even when these admissions are made, our judgment must be that in coming to this conclusion he has again (see n. 82, 296, 339) left too much out of sight, nay utterly rejected, 'the conception of the nation as a natural whole,' to use the words of Hildenbrand p. 416. However the union of a people into one state may have been brought about, whether there is mixed nationality, or all are of the same stock, we shall never cease to regard its constitutional history as simply a main element of its history as a people, and therefore we shall always find it impossible to separate e.g. the English constitution from the English nation. To us the sentiment here expressed will appear outrageous:—that the English nation might be superseded by another race and yet that so long as the same constitution was preserved, there would still remain the same state. See further Isocr. VII § 14, who calls the constitution the soul of the state. SUSK. (408)

13 εἰ δὲ δίκαιον ἡ λόγος ἕτερος] 'But whether justice requires us to discharge or to repudiate our obligations (§ 2) when

the state changes to another constitution is a different question.' The point is not resumed in the sequel.

"This shows at once the defectiveness of Aristotle's decision. He feels himself that after so deciding he could only consistently answer the present question by affirming the justice of repudiation and guards himself against doing so because at the same time he does not want to say this right out. But in order to have a scientific justification for this course he should at least have indicated other instances favouring the other side of the question." SUSK. (407)

cc. 4, 5 *Is the virtue of the good man identical with that of the good citizen?* See Anal. p. 109, and Thurot *Études* p. 105—117.

Plato's identification of them is a fundamental principle of the *Republic*, implied in the analogy of the state and the individual and particularly evident in the treatment of imperfect states and imperfect individuals, B. VIII, IX. Aristotle admits it in some cases (4 § 9), i.e. in the perfect state; and he no less precisely asserts that in most constitutions they are distinct (6 § 1), the identity of the goodness of the man and of the citizen being only coextensive with the active exercise of the administrative powers, which he enjoys. This is in accord with *N. E.* v. 2. 11: οὐ γὰρ ἔστι ταυτὸν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ πολίτῃ παντί, on which see Jackson's note which disposes of Grant's strange view that the author of the 'Eudemian' Book V used, with essential discrepancies, the present chapter and other sections of the *Politics*.

16 τῶν δὲ νῦν εἰρημένων...18 μὴ τὴν αὐτήν] Schiessen's assertion that this is out of place is quite groundless. On the Aristotelian conception, the state is an institution for educating a human being, or more especially a man (see n. on § 3), at once for happiness and for the greatest possible fitness or excellence. Hence to

ότερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπου- (II)
 αῖον θετέον, ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε τοῦτο τυ-
 εῖν δεῖ ζητήσεως, τὴν τοῦ πολίτου τύπῳ τιλὲ πρῶτον λη-
 τέον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ πλωτὴρ εἰς τις τῶν κοινωνῶν ἐστίν,
 ἴτω καὶ τὸν πολίτην φαμέν. τῶν δὲ πλωτῆρων καίπερ ἀνο-
 μοίων ὄντων τὴν δύναμιν (ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐρέτης, ὁ δὲ
 κυβερνήτης, ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς, ὁ δ' ἄλλην τινα ἔχων τοιαύτην
 ἰωνυμίαν) δῆλον ὥς ὁ μὲν ἀκριβεστάτος ἐκάστου λόγος
 ἰος ἔσται τῆς ἀρετῆς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κοινός τις ἐφαρμο-
 αὶ πᾶσιν. ἢ γὰρ σωτηρία τῆς ναυτιλίας ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν
 ἀντων τοῦτου γὰρ ἕκαστος ὀρέγεται τῶν πλωτῆρων. ὁμοίως α
 ἰνυν καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἢ σωτη-
 α τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἢ πολιτεία.
 ὅπερ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πο-
 τεῖαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὥς οὐκ
 δέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τε-

17 ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς M^s Susem.^{1,2} and perhaps Γ || 19 πρῶτον omitted in P¹ (1st
 nd, added by coll.¹ in the margin), πρότερον? Spengel needlessly || 20 κοινῶν II¹ ||
 τῇν τοιαύτην fi. || 25 ὁμοίως Vettoi || 28 καὶ omitted by ΓM^s || 30 διὰ P¹ II² fi. Bk.

quire how far, under any constitution,
 a state can reach this goal touches a
 idamental point in constitutional theory
 the utmost generality; and constitu-
 ons may be classified as (1) better or
 st, (2) worse or worst, according as
 ey are more or less adapted to this end
 ie present inquiry accordingly serves as
 a basis of the classification of constitu-
 ons in order of merit which follows in
 6, and of the entire theory of the
 arate constitutions. This then, and
 is alone, is precisely the right place for
 . 4, 5. That they have defects in the
 ecution we are not prepared to deny,
 ce Aristotle must have himself intended
 erially to recast them subsequently
 e II. 471; compare III. 473, 478; but
 is intention was never carried out.
 SEM. (488)

One glaring defect in the execution is
 frequent violation of the rule forbid-
 ing the hiatus, which is fairly well ob-
 erved in the rest of B. III. There are
 bad cases in c. 4 alone out of a total
 90 odd for the whole of the book.

19 τύπῳ τιλ] in outline. A frequent
 pression: IV(VII). 16. 12, V(VIII). 7. 2,
 I(VI). 8. 24, VII(V). 2. 1: Nic. Eth. I.
 3, 3 § 4 παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ.

20 The simile of the crew is much

used by Plato: Rep. vi. 488 A ff., Poli-
 ticus 297 B, E ff.; in the latter passage
 joined with that of the physician which
 is perpetually recurring in B. III.

§ 2 22 τὴν δύναμιν is an adverbial
 accus. See II, on φύσιν I. 12. 2.

23 κυβερνήτης] steersman, or pilot,
 answers in some respects more to the
 ship's captain, as he is skilled in naviga-
 tion (Plato II. cc.) and responsible for
 the course of the vessel. Whereas the
 ναύκληρος or skipper, usually the owner
 of the ship, although nominally in com-
 mand, need not be a practical seaman.

§ 3 27 ὁμοίως τοῖσιν ἐπλ] Some of
 the citizens take part in the administra-
 tion of the state merely as members of
 the popular assembly, others merely as
 judges in the law courts or members of
 the council; others again in a higher
 degree by filling various official posts.
 (Schlosser has strangely mistaken the
 sense, he thinks that the skill of the cap-
 tain, helmsman, helmsman's assistant in
 the simile answers to the excellence of the
 man; and the performance of a successful
 voyage to civic excellence.) SUSEM. (489)

28 ἢ σωτηρία τῆς κοιν.] the mainte-
 nance of the (political) union.

30 πρὸς] relative to. Congreve com-
 pares I. 13 § 15.

· λείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαρμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι (I.
 § 4 τὴν τελείαν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται πολλήν τε ὄντα σπουδαῖον
 35 μὴ) κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν καθ' ἣν σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, φανερόν·
 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελ- 3
 § 5 θεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ

33 τὸν δ' ... 34 τελείαν omitted by M* P² Q² T² ff. Ald. and P² (1st hand, added by c¹),³ of P² and in the margin of P², and there τὴν is also above the line) || μίαν omitted by Albert A¹. (?) Bk. (who writes κατ') || εἶναι κατὰ Γ Bk. || 34 τὴν omitted by Bk and P² (1st hand, added by c¹), for P² see above || 36 ἀλλὰ omitted in ff. Π² (added by P¹) || 37 παρὰ? Susem., <κατὰ τὸν> περὶ Schmidt

33 τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα] Aristotle speaks here continuously of the virtue and fitness of the man (ἄνθρωπος) rather than of the human being, because he regards the ἀρετή of the woman as inferior and belonging to a separate species: see 4 §§ 15—18 *nn.* (497, 495). I. 13 §§ 9—11, *nn.* (114 b, 117, 119). SUSEM. (470)

§ 4 36 ἐπελθεῖν τι αἱ περὶ τινος are separately found: while VIII(v). 10. 1 ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας ἐξ ὧν φθιπέραι is equivalent to a conjunction of the two. The meaning would then be "to review the same question in the case of the model state." Spengel takes περὶ with διαποροῦντας; "by raising objections to the possibility of the model state." "But the sense seems to require that ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον should mean here 'to arrive at the same result'; and if so, παρὰ might be necessary = 'starting from the best constitution' or 'from the point of view of the best constitution'." SUSEM.

§ 5 37 εἰ γὰρ εἰδύνατον] "For if it be impossible that a state should contain none but virtuous men, since it is impossible for its citizens to be all alike." But how does this agree with the passages quoted in *n.* (133) on II. 2. 4, according to which at least approximate equality of the citizens must be assumed in the best state? Further (as Thurot p. 108 rightly observes) we are told at c. 18 § 1 that it had been shown at the outset of the discussion (ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις) that the virtue and excellence of the man and of the citizen of the best state is necessarily the same, and the reference can only be to cc. 4—6 § 1: see *n.* (684) on 18 § 1. We might try to get over the contradiction by assuming that at this present stage of the discussion, 4 § 5, the arguments *pro* and *con* had not all been weighed dialectically and the final correction, to which c. 18 § 1 refers us back,

may have fallen out either at the end of c. 4* or in the lacuna at c. 13 § 6 (see *Introd.* p. 43 ff. *n.* 599). But at c. 6† § 1 the statement here made is expressly set down as a part of the final result, while 13 § 6 is too near to 18 § 1 to be meant by the words ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. Should we then rather believe that Aristotle's genuine discussion is wholly or for the most part lost and that cc. 4, 5, which replace it, are wholly or in part a spurious interpolation? Sober inquiry will not easily be reconciled to such a desperate and violent step, although there is certainly much besides that points in this direction: see § 6 *n.* (473), § 8 (478), § 16 (491), § 17 (496); § 5 § 1 (501). But then the only possible alternative is to assume that when Aristotle wrote this he was not yet clear about his model state, and that when making the reference in 18 § 1 he had in view not the part at present executed but a revised version which he intended to make subsequently but never actually completed. For 18 § 1 is in agreement with his repeated declaration subsequently IV(vii). 9 § 3, 13 §§ 9, 10, 14 § 8: VI(iv). 7. 2 (*nn.* 684, 808 and *Introd.* p. 51), that in fact the best polity is that in which the virtue of the citizen coincides with the virtue of the man, and the citizens are not merely virtuous when judged by the standard of their polity, but absolutely virtuous and excellent men; and this alone is reasoned out logically (see *n.* 468). This of course does not at all affect the proposition that in the best state, as elsewhere, the citizens are not

* Not directly after 4 § 5, as Thurot thinks, for the rest of chapter 4, from § 7 to the end would not agree with that supposition. Then it is presupposed that hitherto the two sorts of excellence have been declared to be not absolutely the same even in the ideal state.

† As suggested by Susemihl in *Comment. de Arist. Pol.* p. 24 f. *n.* (24).

ἀδύνατον ἐξ ἀπάντων σπουδαίων ὄντων εἶναι πόλιν, ὅα δ' ἔκα- (II)

39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, ἐπει-
40 δὴ ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολλίτας, <δεῖ δ' ἔκα-
39 στον τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔργον εὖ ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς> οὐκ ἂν
1277 a εἴη ἀρετὴ μία πολλίτου καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
σπουδαίου πολίτου δεῖ παῖσιν ὑπάρχειν (οὐτὼν γὰρ ἀρίστην
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τοῦ ἀγα- (p 64)
4 θοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ πάντας ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς
§ 6 ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολλίτας. [ἔτι ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πό- 4
λις, ὥσπερ ζῶον εὐθὺς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῇ ἐκ
λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως καὶ οἰκίας ἐξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
κτῆσις ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ πό-
9 λις ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐξ ἄλλων ἀνομοίων

38 δυνατὸν Bernays || δε? δ'... 39 ἀρετῆς transposed to follow 40
πολίτας Thurot || 40 ἐπειδὴ δὲ P¹, ἵπαι δὲ P² fi. Ar., ἐπεὶ δ' Bk. Bernays, ἐπεὶ
Spengel || ὁμοίους P⁴ Q¹ T³ || 39 αὐτὸν P² Bk., αὐτὸν Γ, αὐτον fi.

1277 a 1 μία ἀρετὴ P² fi. Bk. || πολλίτου <τε σπουδαίου> Schmidt || 3 πολιτείας
P¹ (1st hand), perhaps right: γὰρ πόλιν κοιν.¹ in the margin of P¹ || 4 <ἀνδρὸς>
ἀγαθοῦ? Susem., ὁμοίους Bernays, perhaps right || 5 πολίτας * * Thurot, but see
Comm. n. (471) and (471 *) || [ἐτι ἐπεὶ ... 12 παραστάτου] Susem.; see Comm. n.
(473). Thurot suspected the § || 8 [κτῆσις] Bernays, [κτῆσις ἐκ] Weidion

all equally virtuous men, but it does affect the much more illogical inference that the inferior citizens of the best state have only civic virtue. On the contrary here the degree of civic excellence also must be regulated by that of individual excellence, and the special nature of the one by the special nature of the other; and one consequence of this is that which Aristotle in complete accordance with the facts lays down as a criterion of the best state, viz. that in its administration each is employed according to his special faculties and capacities and assigned to his right place. It may thence be inferred that Aristotle had no intention of permitting all the members of the governing civic body in the pattern state to fill all the various public offices in rotation, but that he assumed that this most virtuous civic body would always elect to particular state offices the fittest and most virtuous of its members. Cp. 11 § 8 n. (569). Consequently it must be allowed that the offices of state in the perfect city do not represent the union of the virtue of the citizen and of the man, as is here stated, but rather that they represent the highest and most perfect degree of this union. and so far from

being erroneous it is quite correct to say that Aristotle includes in this polity those who are not yet elected but are still eligible to such a position. Only they do not actually attain a complete confirmation of this highest individual virtue (which is at the same time the highest civic virtue) until they are elected to office. cp. further n. (521) on III. 5. 10. Nor should we forget that at IV (VII). 14. 8 n. (902) Aristotle makes only the virtue of the ruler (πολιτικὴ καὶ ἀρχον- τος) equivalent to the virtue of the man. in the best state the rulers are primarily the popular assembly composed of the elder citizens, but in a still higher degree the men selected out of it who are elected to offices of state. SUSEM. (471)

40 ὁμοίους] Seen on 11. 2. 3, 1261 a 24.
§ 6 1277 a 6 εὐθὺς—for instance, like
ἀντίκα. The first instance that comes to hand.

7 ὀρέξεως] Appetite, or impulse; here put for the irrational part of the soul in general (Eaton). See n. (40) on I. 5. 6. SUSEM. (472)

9 ἐξ ἀπάντων τε... ἀδύνα] But these constituents are not all citizens in the sense of the definition given c. 1 § 2, and yet this alone is material here (Thurot).

10 συνέστηκεν εἰδὼν ἀνάγκη μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πολιτῶν (II)
 πάντων ἀρετὴν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν χορευτῶν κορυφαίου καὶ
 § 7 παραστάτου.] διότι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ, φανερόν
 ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε
 σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δι' τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν
 15 σπουδαῖον εἶναι * * ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν
 § 8 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἐτίραν εἶ-
 ναι λέγουσί τινες ἄρχοντας, ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται οἱ τῶν βασιλέων
 υἱεῖς ἱππικὴν καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ
 μὴ μοι τὰ κοινὰ . . . , *Aeolus* (6-7)
 ἀλλ' ὅν πῶλε δέξαι,

§ 9 ὥς οὐσάν τινα ἄρχοντας παιδεύειν. εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἄρ-
 21 χοντός τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, πολίτης δ' ἔστι καὶ
 ὁ ἀρχόμενος, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀν εἷη ἀπλῶς πολίτου καὶ ἀνδρός,
 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχοντας καὶ πολίτου,

12 *λαυροστάτου*? Schmidt § ἀπλῶς omitted by II¹ || 15 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι II² Bk.
 || <ἀνδρα> ἀγαθὸν Blichelci, which I accept || τὸν τε Susem. || πολιτικὸν
 πολίτην ἀπὸ Congreve, followed by Beinaes || 17 τοῦ αἰδῶτο before ἀρχοντας by
 II² Bk. || 18 πολεμικὴν] πολιτικὴν Gottling || 19 κοινὰ Sprengel, κοινὰ II² Bk.
 Bk. || 20 δὲ II² Δτ. Bk., εἰ δὲ αὐτὴ fi. || ἀρετὴ omitted in II¹ || 22 ἀπλῶς ἀν εἷη
 II² fr. Bk. || 23 τοῦ δυναμένου ἀρχεῖν μόνον inserted after μέντοι by ΓΜ² and I²
 (1st hand, but μόνον is added by corr.), and the whole erased by P¹ in the margin,
 γρ. τοῦ δυναμένου ἀρχεῖν μόνον P⁴ in the margin. Evidently a gloss.

In fact this whole argument is so absurd that I cannot bring myself to attribute it to Aristotle. In the case treated in n. (501) on III. 5. 1, there is an essential difference. The interpolation may be due to a gross misapprehension of II. 2. 3: comp. n. (133). SUSEM. (473)

§ 7 13 ἀλλ' ἄρα ἔσται τινὸς κατὰ
 "Shall we say then that there is a particular case in which there is the same excellence in a good citizen and a good man?"

15 ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον] As distinguished from φρόνιμος, ἀγαθὸς refers to moral virtue (cp. n. 40). Just in the same way at I 1 § 2 we have ἀρετὴς καὶ φρονήσεως in combination; while ἀρετὴ is 'virtue' simply, i. e. moral virtue. Cp. n. (565) and n. (722) on IV (VII). 1. 10. On the relation of φρόνησις (Prudence, Insight) as the virtue of the practical intellect to the moral virtues see III. (45, 112, 115). Further comp. III. 4 § 18 with III. (493, 497, 498). SUSEM. (474)

16 φρόνιμον] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* VI. 5. 5, δὲ τοῦτο Περικλῆς καὶ τοῖς τοιαύτοις φρονίμους αἰετὰ εἶναι, ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν,

εἶναι δὲ τοιοῦτοις ἡγαῖμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς: *ib* VI c 8, which treats fully of φρόνησις οἱ Practical Wisdom; Plato *Politic.* 292 D, 294 A ἄνδρα τὸν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν (Katon). SUSEM. (475)

§ 8 17 λέγουσιν οἱ τινες] Whether these were authors, is doubtful. SUSEM. (476) Mr Wyse finds the reference in Pk.-Plato *First Alc.* 121 D ff.; the special education of the Persian and Spartan kings.

18 Εὐριπίδης] In the *Aeolus*, *Frags.* 16 Nauck. Further comp. IV (VII). 14. 1, n. (891). SUSEM. (477)

19 τὰ κοινὰ sc. ποικίλοι γενεῶν] let them not become vacillate in accomplishments.

§ 9 20 εἰ δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ κατὰ] For more just is Aristotle's admission VIII (V). 9. 1 that the moral virtue of the ruler also varies with the different constitutions, so that except in the best state he does not possess the single absolute moral virtue of the man, but only a virtue conditioned by such and such a way, *ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν* (Thurrot). Cp. n. (1630). SUSEM. (478)

23 τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου] 'but in a

- 24 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὥς (II)
 § 10 οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινείται γε τὸ
 δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἢ ἀρετῇ
 εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς. εἰ οὖν
 τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικὴν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πο-
 § 11 λίτου ἄμφω, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινέτὰ ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ οὖν
 30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε δεῖν τὸν ἄρχοντα μαν-
 θάνειν καὶ τὸν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφίτερ' ἐπι-

24 ἴσως omitted in II¹ (added by the corrector of P¹), [ἴσως] Sussem.¹ || τυραννίδι II¹ and P² (1st hand, altered by corr. 1) || 26 δοκίμου ἢ δοκεῖ ἢ Giphanius, δοκεῖ μὲν ἢ Zwingli, δοκεῖ πρὸς ἢ Welldon following Jackson, δοκεῖ αὐτῇ Rassow (cp. § 15, 1277 b 15), δοκεῖ δοκίμου ἢ Beinau. On this whole paragraph cp. *Quaest. ci. ii. col. i.* p. 387 f. || 27 οὐκ δὲ? Sussem. || 29 ἐπεὶ ἴσως Schlosser, ἐπὶ Κοίνας, εἰ μὲν Rassow, εἰ? Sussem. Yet ἐπεὶ may be right, if the lacuna after 32 ἀμφοῖν is much larger than the mere loss of τοῦτο τὸν σκοπῶμεν οἱ something equivalent; οἱ if Welldon's conjecture below is right || 30 ποτὲ δοκεῖ κτλ.] apparently corrupt, Beinau translates as if he read ποτὲ μὲν δοκεῖ? .. 31 ποτὲ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ.; ἀποδέχεσθαι δὲ? Sussem.² doubtfully; <ποτὲ> οὐ ταῦτ' Welldon, much more probably, if 29 et al. is right || ἀμφοτέρω] ἕτερα Κοίνας, ἄμφω ἕτερα Beinau, highly probable || καὶ] καὶ Schlosser || [οὐ] Rassow, [αὐ] Spengel: if so, τὸν τε in place of τὸν δὲ || 31 ἀμφοτέρω P^{1.2.3}, ἀμφοτέρω Q^b T^b

specific citizen.' The gloss fairly gives the sense.

24 [ἴσως] The famous tyrant of Phærae in Thessaly, who attempted to carry out a policy in Greece similar to that afterwards followed by Philip of Macedon. He came to the throne before B.C. 378 and was assassinated in 370. See Curtius *Hist.* iv. pp. 443—451 E. tr., and Krafft's *Atl.* 'Jason of Phærae' in Pauly's *Realencyclopædie*. Götting recalls another saying of his cited by Aristotle *Rhet.* i. 12 31, 1273 a 25, that he must do some wrong in order to have the power to do much right. SUSSEM. (479)

ἐφ] Not φησὶ, as it would be, if the quotation came from a tragedy.

πεινῆν [ἰδιώτης εἶναι] 'he must starve if he were not on the throne, implying that he had never learnt the trade of being a subject.' Eaton compares the saying of Asyages to Haipagos, and of Demaratos to Leutychides Herod. i. 129, vi. 67 and what is related of Theras *ib.* iv. 147; and Aeschyl. *Prom.* 926; but in all these cases the point is essentially different. SUSSEM. (480) Even Grote is caught napping here, for he represents Jason as saying that he felt hungry until he became despot (iii. p. 36 n.).

§ 10 25 ἀλλὰ μὴν. 27 καλῶς Eaton compares Pl. *Laus.* i. 643 E τὴν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παιδὸν παιδεῖαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητὴν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλειον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δόξης. SUSSEM. (481)

27 εἰ οὖν .. 29 οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄμφω ἐπαινέτὰ ὁμοίως] "If then we lay down that the excellence of a good man is that of rule, while the excellence of a citizen is that of both," ruling and being ruled, "they cannot both be equally praiseworthy." It is the virtue of the good man which alone is one and perfect, § 3 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τέλειαν. Of civic virtue this is true only in so far as it denotes the excellence of rule (here declared to be the excellence of the citizen), but not in so far as it is the excellence displayed in due obedience. This latter then is a subordinate excellence. SUSSEM. (482)

§ 11 Welldon, reading 29 ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ <ποτὲ> οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε κτλ., translates "Since then it seems that there are some cases where ruler and subject ought to learn both (rule and subjection) and other cases where they ought [each] to learn only one." But this states οὐ ταῦτ' αὖτε = not both the same.

στασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφοῖν, * * κἀντέθεν ἂν κατιδοὶ τίς. (1)
 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική· ταύτην δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα 8
 34 λέγομεν, ἃ ποιεῖν ἐπίστασθαι τὸν ἄρχοντ' οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, (1)
 § 12 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον· θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες. λέγω
 δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινικὰς
 πράξεις. δούλου δὲ εἶδη πλείω λέγομεν· αἱ γὰρ ἐργασίαι
 πλείους. ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χειρῆτες· οὗτοι δ'
 1277 b τῶν χειρῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ βάναντος τεχνίτης ἐστίν. διὸ παρ'
 ἐνίοις οὐ μετεῖχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν
 § 13 δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα τῶν ἀρχο- 9
 μένων οὕτως οὐ δεῖ [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν οὐδὲ
 5 τὸν πολίτην [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] μανθάνειν, εἰ μὴ ποτε χρεῖας χάριν
 αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοτὲ μὲν

32 κατέθεν M¹, τοῦντέθεν IP² h. Ar. Bk. Bernays—evidently a mistaken conjecture for κἀντέθεν obliterating the clear traces left of a lacuna; ἐντέθεν Komaz Razow || 33 [ἔστι . . 1277 b 8 ἐλευθέρων] Congreve || 34 λέγομεν d Lambin, λεγόμενα Γ Π Ar. || 38 χειρῆται P¹ and P² (corrector) || 39 αὐτὸς P¹ (1st hand, emended by a later hand), αὐτὸν οἱ αὐτὸ Montecatino

1277 b 4 ἀγαθὸν] ἄρχοντα Rassow, [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Sussem.⁴, [ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ τὸν] Sussem.², οὕτε πολιτικὸν οὕτε πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν Spengel, [οὐδὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Thuot || 5 [τὸν ἀγαθὸν] Welldon Sussem.⁴ || 6 γὰρ ἔτι] γὰρ τοι Riese || τοτὲ ... 7 τοτὲ Riese, τὸν. . . τὸν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Sussem.², cp. the variants IV(VII). 14 § 5 1332 b 37, τῶν. . . τῶν Lindau, wrongly

32 * * κἀντέθεν κτλ.] Quite apart from the distinct possibility of a longer omission, we may make out the sense as follows: "but the citizen's knowledge and experience of both <is now the question before us, > and may be understood from what follows." SUSSEM. (483)

33 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχὴ δεσποτική] Not 'despotic' rule, which would mean in English rule over a state. "For there is a rule of master over slave and this we say is concerned with the drudgery which the ruler need not necessarily know how to perform, but rather to employ: the former would even be degrading. I mean by the former the ability actually (καί=even) to serve in domestic functions."

τὰ ἀναγκαῖα] More clearly expressed II. 6 § 5, τὰ ἔργα τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: Cp. I. 7 § 3.

35 ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον] Cp. I. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8 § 2 n. (63, 68). also Xen. Oecon. c. 12. SUSSEM. (484)

Plato *Politt.* 259 c ὡς βασιλεὺς ἄλλας χερεὶ καὶ ἑμπάρτι τῷ σώματι σμικρὰ ἄλλα

εἰς τὸ κατέχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν δύνανται πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ νόμον.

θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδ.] The other (the former) would inspire the slave spirit mentioned in II. (43) on I. 5. 8. See III. 5 §§ 2, 3. SUSSEM. (486)

§ 12 38 ὧν ἓν μέρος κατέχουσιν οἱ χειρῆτες] Cp. I. 12 §§ 12, 13 with n. (103, 122) and III. 5 § 4 with n. (507). SUSSEM. (486)

1277 b 2 τὸ παλαιόν] An adverbial accus. of time, as τὸ ἀρχαῖον I. 2 § 7. This was the state of things at Athens under Solon's constitution.

3 δῆμον τὸν ἔσχατον] The most advanced democracy which by gradual development was usually the final outcome of the more nucleate democracy: see II. 12. 3 n. (406) and the passages cited in n. (400, 406). SUSSEM. (487)

§ 13 5 εἰ μὴ ποτε χρεῖας κτλ.] "except in certain cases for his private use." Comp. IV(VII). 14. 7 with n. (500, 501) and V(VIII). 2. 6 with n. (583). SUSSEM. (488)

ὁ οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] for (if he learns them

δεσπότην τοτὲ δὲ δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀρχὴ καθ' ἣν ἀρχει (II)
 § 14 τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων. ταύτην γὰρ λέ-
 γομεν εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, ἣν δεῖ τὸν ἀρχοντα ἀρ-
 10 χόμενον μαθεῖν, οἷον ἱππαρχεῖν ἱππαρχηθέντα, στρατη-
 γεῖν στρατηγηθέντα καὶ ταξιαρχήσαντα καὶ λοχαγήσαντα.
 διὸ λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο καλῶς, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν εὖ ἀρξαι μὴ
 § 15 ἀρχθέντα. τούτων δὲ ἀρετὴ μὲν ἑτέρα, δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην 10
 τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχε-
 15 σθαι, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρ-
 § 16 χὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἀμφο.

7 <καί> τις? Susem. || 10 καὶ before στρατηγεῖν Susem.¹⁻², misled by the vei-
 sions of William and Δ1. || 12 διὸ <καί> P⁴ Q^b T^b Bk.

for his private use) the objection that he is at one moment master and at another slave no longer applies

8 ὁμοίων τῷ γένει=his peers, his equals by birth. This healthy conception of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή is in accord with the soundest traditions of Greek political life and the presupposition of the free state or republic in the widest sense.

§ 14 10 ἱππαρχεῖν κτλ In Athens (and here too Aristotle has before him especially the circumstances of the Athenian state) the infantry of the city militia consisted of ten τάξεις, one from each φυλὴ (see n. 431), and perhaps themselves called φυλαί. They corresponded to our battalions or regiments, and were each under the command of a ταξιαρχος. Each such τάξις was divided into λόχοι or companies, as we should call them, and their commanders were called λοχαγοί. The command of the cavalry was given to two ἱππαρχοι, and under them were ten φύλαρχοι, one for each tribe. The generals, στρατηγοί, were ten in number elected annually. Originally they commanded the ten τάξεις, but between 460 and 455 B.C. they took a wholly different position and became from that time the highest executive-politico-military officers. Evidently it was at the same time that the ταξιαρχοι were created, to assume what had been earlier the functions of the στρατηγοί: of whom after this period only a few took the field, one having the supreme command, if it was not divided amongst them: or one might carry on war in one district, another in another. Subsequently as a rule only one took the field each year. See Schoemann *Antiquitates* p. 420 f., 422, 424 f.,

J. G. Droysen *Observations on the Athenian στρατηγοί* in *Hermes* IX. 1874, pp. 1—21, v. Wilamowitz *Ant. Sydalens* pp. 57—67, and VII(VI). 8. 15 n. (1473). SUSEM. (489)

12 λέγεται κτλ Comp. IV(VII). 14 6 f. n. (898) ff. This saying is attributed to Solon by Apollodorus in *Diog. Laert.* I. 60, Stob. *Flor.* XLVI. 22 (Eaton), but hardly on good evidence. SUSEM. (480)

§ 16 16 καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ κτλ Both belong to a good man, because individual excellence is one with the political excellence of the ruler: but this cannot be attained without the previous acquisition of excellence in obeying as a subject. But, Thurot objects, in that case the excellence of the man coincides with the complete excellence of the citizen. And it is meant to be so, and the best constitution tends to this end: only here, according to Aristotle's view, the virtue of the citizen who is governed is as such in all cases a civic virtue and yet does not amount to true individual virtue. It was shown in n. (471) that this latter is an untenable position, given up by Aristotle himself in the course of his exposition. But the censure which may be properly pronounced upon him here is also confined to this. This mistake is closely connected with the fact that Aristotle, going in truth beyond his own ideal opinion (see n. 120) represents the specific difference between the lower virtue of the woman and the higher virtue of the man, I. 13 §§ 7, 9, 10, III. (I. 14 b, 117, 119) so as to imply that the former is shown exclusively in obeying and serving, and the latter in ruling and commanding. Comp. n. (470). SUSEM. (481)

καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς (II)
καὶ [γὰρ] ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δέ, διήλον ὅτι οὐ μία
ἀν εἴη τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετή, οἶον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶδη
20 ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυ-
17 ναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία (δόξει γὰρ ἂν εἶναι
δειλὸς ἀνὴρ, εἰ οὕτως ἀνδρείος εἴη ὥσπερ γυνὴ ἀνδρεία,
καὶ γυνὴ ἀκόλαστος, εἰ οὕτω κοσμία εἴη ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ ἀγα-
θός, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς· τοῦ
25 μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν)· ἡ δὲ φρό- 11
νησις ἀρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετῇ μόνῃ. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν

18 [γὰρ] Gottling, τῆς? Sussem., γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> Bernays. The latter following all previous editors, except Gottling, punctuates with a comma after 16 ἀμφω and a colon after 17 ἀρχικῆς || 19 τοῦ ἡθους Sussem., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Γ (before διήλον ὅτι) II Ai. Bl., καὶ ἀρχοντος Rav-sow || 20 ὅς γὰρ II, ἄλλως ὥσπερ μ¹ in the margin || 23 ἀκόλαστος Sussem., Tieber independently, apparently also Ai. *inhonestu* see Bonitz *Zeitch. f. Gymnasialw.* xxvi. 1873 893—895, Sussem. and Bonitz *ib.* xxvii. 1873. 797; ἄκαλος P¹ Sussem.¹ (in the text), ἄλλος II¹ Bl., ἄλλος I² 3² T², ἄλλως Akl. Schmidt saw that the text was corrupt, and what sense the context required: see Comm. and Sussemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 389

17 σωφροσύνης] See n. (206 b) on II. 6. 9. SUSSEM. (492)

19 τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετή] Moral virtue as distinguished from the practical wisdom of § 17. See on I. 5 § 6 n. (40), § 9 (45), 13 § 6 (112), § 18 (115); III. 4 § 7 (474 ff.). SUSSEM. (493)

εἶδη ἔχουσα κτλ. "Clearly there will not be simply one form of a moral virtue like justice but it will have branches, one to regulate ruling and the other to regulate being ruled." A distinction quite correct in itself (Schlosser). SUSSEM. (494)

The adoption of Bernays' suggestion would slightly modify the translation of § 16. "And both, viz. to rule and to be ruled, belong to the honest man, although a different sort of temperance and justice is shown in ruling <and in being ruled>. For it is clear that a virtue, e.g. justice, is not one and the same in the ruler and the freeman who is subject to rule (καὶ γὰρ <ἀρχοντος καὶ> <ἀρχομένου>), but has branches which regulate rule and obedience, just as temperance and courage are distinct when shown in man and in woman." Antisthenes maintained the contrary: that the virtue of both is identical.

§ 17 21 σωφροσύνη here = parsimony, like σωφρόνως II. 6 §§ 8, 9. So also 23 κοσμία 'orderly' = parsimonious, frugal, and ἀκόλαστος (the opposite quality) = prodigal, extravagant

23 οὕτω κοσμία] "only just as frugal." It follows that the difference of degree between the virtue of the man and of the woman (see on I. 13. 7 n. 114 b, III. 4. 3 n. 470) is not of such a kind that all particular moral virtues are less developed, or need to be less developed, in the woman but such that in some cases the woman must possess a larger share than the man. SUSSEM. (495)

24 οἰκονομία ἑτέρα] It is only with difficulty that this assertion can be harmonized with B. i. cc. 8—10 = see Etc. III to B. i. p. 210. "See also Xenoph. *Mem.* II. 7 12—14, *Oecon.* 7" (Eaton). SUSSEM. (496)

25 ἡ δὲ φρόνησις] By this must of course be understood simply skill in governing, that is, practical wisdom only so far as it has to do with life in the house, a community or a state, to the exclusion of the private life of the individual. There can be no moral virtue in social life without this kind of intellectual virtue (Schlosser). See I. 5. 9 n. (42), I. 13 § 6 (112), § 8 (115); III. 4. 7 n. (474—5). Comp. *Ath. Eth.* vi. 10. 2 ἡ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιτακτικὴ ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνον; also n. (498); VI. 4. 14 n. (1186), and *Rhet.* I. 11. 27, 1371 b 27, ἀρχὴν τὸ φρονεῖν. Further references are § 8 of this chapter and IV (VII). 9. 5 n. (810). SUSSEM. (497)

ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν (II)
 § 28 ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετῇ φρόνησις, οὐ
 ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλοποιὸς ὁ ἀρχόμε-
 30 νος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητῆς ὁ χρώμενος. πότερον μὲν οὖν
 ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ
 5 ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τού-
 των· περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην ἔτι λείπεται τις τῶν ἀποριῶν III
 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πότερον πολίτης ἐστὶν ὃ κοινωνεῖν ἔξ-
 35 εστιν ἀρχῆς, ἢ καὶ τοὺς βαναύσους πολίτας θετέον; εἰ μὲν
 οὖν καὶ τούτους θετέον οἷς μὴ μέτεστιν ἀρχῶν, οὐχ οἶδόν
 τε παντὸς εἶναι πολίτου τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν (οὗτος γὰρ πο-
 λίτης)· εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων πολίτης, ἐν τίνι μέρει θε-

29 αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ P² Q^b T^b Al¹. Bk and P¹ (1st hand) || 37 οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης
 untranslated by Al., suspected by Schneider; οὗτοι γὰρ πολίτης <ἀγαθοὶ δὲ δυνάμε-
 νος ἀρχεῖν> or something equivalent 'thi mot

§ 28 29 866a ἀληθής] 'Right opinion' here denotes more precisely the capacity of rightly apprehending the order given in order to execute it aight, for which the person who executes it is often obliged to discover the ways and means either wholly or in part for himself. 'Right opinion' of this sort does not by any means correspond, as Eaton thinks, with that to which Plato applies the term, simply because the φρόνησις to which Plato often opposes, it (as in *Lanov* i. 632 c) coincides with philosophic knowledge. Hence Plato would not concede to right opinion, as Aristotle does *Nic. Eth.* vi. 10. 3, that σύνεσις consists in the right application of opinion so as to judge upon the report of another a matter coming within the sphere of prudence, ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι τῇ δόξῃ ἐπὶ το κρίνειν περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡ φρόνησις ἔστιν, ἄλλου λέγοντος. Comp. the last note. See further i. 13. 8 n. (115). SUSSEX. (498)

αὐλοποιός] This comparison is taken from Plato *Rep.* x. 601 D Cp. ii § 14 n. (374). SUSSEX. (499)

c. 5 § 1 33 περὶ δὲ τὸν πολίτην κτλ.] "It is an erroneous assumption to think, as Thucyd and others do, that this is an altogether different question from the one discussed in the last chapter. These opening words at once prove that Aristotle looks upon the discussion of c. 5 as most closely connected with the chapter preceding. There it was decided that the virtue of the citizen in republican states consists in his being qualified both

to rule and to be ruled: but in fact a restriction was needed in those cases where full participation in civic rights is granted to the lowest classes of the people, who live by manual labour, the mechanics and day-labourers. Aristotle's theory is that owing partly to their want of leisure, partly to their degrading occupation, they cannot raise themselves to a higher life of virtue and that therefore they are just as unqualified to rule as they are unable to claim, in the full sense of the words the title of ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, virtuous and capable men. To append this restriction is the main object of c. 5, and goes more diffusely into details, §§ 4—7, respecting the position of this class" (*Rassow's Bemerkungen* p. 10 f.). SUSSEX. (500)

34 ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ] 'whether he *only* is really a citizen who has the right to share in office or whether the working men also ought to rank as citizens'; as was indeed the case at Athens.

πότερον πολίτης] It is true that Aristotle ought not to have raised the question in this form after deducing the definition of the citizen given in i § 2 ff. comp 4 § 6 n. (473). But in the following discussion he has taken care that no material disadvantage results from this formal defect. SUSSEX. (501)

36 οἶδόν τε κ. ἐστὶ.

37 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν] τὴν πολιτικὴν, including τὴν ἀρχικὴν, to command as well as to obey

οὗτος = δὲ βαναύσος here would be an instance of a citizen not qualified to govern.

2 τέος ἕκαστος; οὐδὲ γὰρ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος. ἡ δὲ γὰρ τοῦτον (III)
 1a τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ
 δοῦλοι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελευθέροι. τοῦτο α
 γὰρ ἀληθές, ὡς οὐ πάντας θετέον πολίτας ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 πόλις, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες ὡσαύτως πολῖται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ'
 5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς οἱ δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· πολῖται μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν,
 3 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνόις
 ἦν δοῦλον τὸ βάναισον ἢ ξενικόν, διόπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τοιοῦ-
 τοι καὶ νῦν· ἡ δὲ βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναισον πολί-
 10 λεκτέον οὐ παντός, οὐδ' ἐλευθέρου μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅσοι τῶν ἔρ-
 14 γων εἰσὶν ἀφαιρέμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν α

39 οὔτεοὔτε Spengel

1278 a 5 ἐκ προσθέσεως Bas³ in the margin, ἐκ προσθέσεως Casaubon || 9 πολίτην * * Oncken, wrongly || 11 δ' [ἀναγκαίων] Sussem., δὲ μὴ ἀφαιρέμενον i Congreve, δ' αὐτοῦργων Schmidt; δὲ <μὴ ἀφαιρέμενον τῶν> ἀναγκαίων or simply δὲ <μὴ>? Sussem., δ' ἄλλων Beinays (perhaps rightly). The text may be defended (τῶν ἀναγκαίων neuter, Postgate)

39 ἕκαστος] each native citizen. "What are we to call him if we exclude him from the franchise? Even then he need not be classed as a resident-alien or a foreigner," in so far as he may still retain the right to speak and vote in the assembly, and to sit in the dicasteries, as under Solon's constitution: see II. 12 § 2, § 5; III. 11 § 8. SUSSEM (502)

§ 2 This question may however be said to involve no difficulty; for neither slaves nor freedmen come under the above mentioned classes (of aliens and foreigners). The indispensable elements of a state (ὧν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) need not be all citizens.

1278 a 1 οὐδὲ γὰρ κτλ] This reason is not altogether satisfactory. The slaves cannot come into the question: while the freedmen were regarded (and with good reason) as a special class of the resident alien: see Schomann p. 351 of Eng. tr. And so Aristotle himself considers them, if the reading is correct, c. 2 § 3. "But in the strict sense of the term, in accordance with its etymology μέτοικος denotes only a permanent resident in a town of which he is not a citizen, though he is a citizen somewhere else [cp. Eur. *Hcl*, 892]; and this condition is not fulfilled in the case of the freedmen" (Dittenberger). SUSSEM (503)

α τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, κτλ] "For this is quite true that not all who are indis-

pensable to the city ought to be classed as citizens." A very important point for our view of Aristotle's ideal state: see IV(VII). 8 § 1 ff. n. (795). SUSSEM. (504)
 4 ὡσαύτως καὶ] equally with. See on II. 8 21 ὁμοίως καὶ.

5 οἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς] the one, viz. adults, are citizens in an unrestricted sense; the others, viz. children, only in a qualified sense; i.e. on the supposition that they grow up

6 ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς] "but under age." See c. 1 § 4 n. (437 h). SUSSEM. (505)

§ 3 Formerly the mechanics in some places were slaves or foreigners. But see *Pleod.* II. 167, where contempt for handicrafts is said to be common to Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and Thracians, and to have been 'learned' from them by the Greeks

8 ἡ δὲ βελτίστη κτλ] Comp. IV(VII). 9 § 3, § 7, n. (809). SUSSEM. (506)

9 εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης] "But if the citizen too is a citizen, then the virtue of the citizen, as defined by us, must not be assumed to belong to every citizen, nor even to the free man as such, but to those only who are released from menial functions" [including free artisans].

§ 4 11 τῶν δ' [ἀναγκαίων] οἱ μὲν κτλ] Postgate (p. 26) treats ἀναγκαίων as neuter (in support of this use see II. 9 § 2 τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολῶν, and I. 7. 3, II. 6 § 5): 'in respect of compulsory work

ἐνὶ λειτουργούντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινῇ βάνουσιν (III)
καὶ θήτες. φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν μικρὸν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς
14 ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν· αὐτὸ γὰρ φανέν τὸ λεχθὲν ποιεῖ δῆ-
§ 5 λον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ πλείους εἰσὶν αἱ πολιτεῖαι, καὶ εἴδη πολί-
του ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλείω, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ ἀρχομένου
πολίτου, ὅστ' ἐν μὲν τιμῇ πολιτεία τὸν βάνουσιν ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι καὶ τὸν θήτα πολίτας, ἐν τισὶ δ' ἀδύνατον, οἷον εἴ
20 τίς ἐστιν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ἣ κατ' ἀρετὴν
§ 6 αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ' ἐπιτηδεύ- (p 7)
§ 6 ταις ὀλιγαρχικαῖς θήτα μὲν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι πολίτην (ἀπὸ
τιμημάτων γὰρ μακρῶν αἱ μεθέξεις τῶν ἀρχῶν), βάνου-
14 σον δὲ ἐνδέχεται· πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ [οἱ] πολλοὶ τῶν

12 κοινῇ II³ Bk. || 14 φανέν untranslated by Ar, suspected by the author of the erroneous conjecture <δ φανερόν> φανέν in the margin of Bas.⁴, and by Schneiders. Bernays, "at the first glance" but can it mean this? ἐπὶ πᾶσι? Susem., <ὡς> φανέν would be less alteration, but hardly right: <τὸ> φανέν or τὸ γὰρ φανέν Schmidt || 24 [οἱ] Schneider

those who perform such services for an individual are slaves, but those who serve the public are mechanics and labourers: 'οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι' of II. 7 § 23

12 οἱ δὲ κοινῇ] Comp. I. 13 § 13. ὁ μὲν δούλος κοινωνὸς ζωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορωτέρων· ὁ γὰρ βάνουσος τεχνικῆς ἀφωρισμένην τιὰν ἔχει δουλείαν, with n. (122); I. 11 § 6 n. (103), III. 4 § 12 n. (486). SUSEM. (507)

13 θήτες=ἐλεύθεροι διὰ πέναν ἐπ' ἀργυρίῳ δουλεύοντες Pollux III 82.

φανερόν δ' ἐντεῦθεν] "In what position the artisans stand becomes clear upon slight reflexion from the following consideration": viz that a variety of 'citizens' is implied by c. 1 § 8.

14 αὐτὸ τὸ λεχθὲν] Apparently this is the nom. Those who defend φανέν take it as=ἐάν φανῇ; "if seen" (i.e. understood) "even our former statement makes (the matter) clear." δῆλον ποιεῖν absolute, as in c. 8 § 6, 1279 b 35; so φανερόν ποιεῖν c. 13 § 9, 1283 b 28. "Yet in both passages a clause with δὲ follows equivalent to a substantive" (T. L. Heath).

§ 6 15 καὶ εἴδη πολιτῶν] "There must also be several species of citizens" See c. 1 §§ 8—11. SUSEM. (508)

18 οἷον εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἣν καλῇ] Here Aristotle purposely avoids saying that this is the constitution of the best state, in order not to anticipate (see n. 440 on

c. 1 § 10), although he has adopted the same rule for it too in § 3, with which compare 4 § 5. See below c. 7 § 3 n. (536), § 4 n. (538) c. 13 § 8 n. (593) SUSEM. (509)

20 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ'] See again n. (103). SUSEM. (510)

If we grant Aristotle's premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights. It is simply true that, as a body, they could not have possessed the qualities he demands in the citizen, even if they had found the leisure for military, political, and judicial duties. Nor again is the idea that such culture depends upon lower labour false. The existence of those excellences in which Aristotle finds the end of life and the virtues of the citizen, rests upon a mass of mere work as its necessary condition (A. C. Bradley). Congreve well remarks that "if by the arrangement of society the reason ceases to hold good" Aristotle would cease to require the exclusion of the industrial population from the citizenship.

§ 6 23 τιμημάτων μακρῶν=high property qualifications. Comp. VI (IV). 4 § 5 μακρὰν οὐσίαν.

§ 7 At Thebes there was a law that no one might take part in the government until he had retired ten years from the market-place.

§ 7 τεχνιτῶν. ἐν Θήβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τὸν δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ὑπε- (11
 16 σχημένον τῆς ἀγορᾶς μὴ μετέχειν ἀρχῆς. ἐν πολλαῖς δὲ
 πολιτείαις προσεφέλλεται καὶ τῶν ξένων ὁ νόμος. ὁ γὰρ
 ἐκ πολίτιδος ἐν τισι δημοκραταῖς πολίτης ἐστίν, τὸν αὐτὸν :

25 τὸν τῶν Q^b T^b and P² (1st hand, emended by con 1) || 26 ἀρετῆς Γ' Μ' ||
 27 προσεφέλλεται καὶ προσεφέλλεται τινας? Kiese. See my critical edition for other
 emendations, of which τοὺς ξένους (for τῶν ξένων) P¹ is the oldest

25 ἐν Θήβαις δὲ] Judging from an oligarchical standpoint, Aristotle comments this regulation VII(vi). 7 § 4, p. (1496), and justly too, as Scholassi long ago remarked. After this period of waiting the law really opened the door to merchants and tradesmen who had grown wealthy: on the other hand the long delay gave some security that the existing body of citizens would not be 'flooded' with alien or upstart elements. Further compare VIII(v) 3 § 5 n. (1512). But in Aristotle's own ideal state there is no means by which one who had formerly been engaged in trade could ever attain civic rights: not indeed on his principles is it intended that there should be. "In another work he is disposed to pay respect to the merit which owes all to itself and little or nothing to the favour of fortune, *Rhet.* 1. 7. 32, 1365 a 19: but his *Politics* nowhere exhibits any appreciation of social phenomena of this sort. Indeed he refuses every claim made on behalf of the man who is working his way up, if not supported by ancestry, by the formula that industrial occupations *invariably* incapacitate men for becoming truly virtuous or politically intelligent citizens. He ignores the important change in the social status of the same man, as soon as he ceases to perform the 'rough labour' of industry himself and is in a position to have it performed by others. In this respect he is but in the same case with all Greece and the Greek language which is devoid of any special word to denote the large manufacturer, the employer of labour or contractor (entrepreneur)." Such people do not lack the indispensable "leisure" which he demands; but in Greece they are still termed base mechanics (*βαναυνοί*) "at whom the polite world looks askance" (Oncken).

On the other hand Bradley, *Hellen.* p. 216, very justly remarks that "no honest observer will deny that there is a moral *βαναυνοί* which besets some of the occupations included under that term. Arist-

otle himself has laid down with the greatest clearness that even the most menial services need not be ignoble, and that the slavishness of a pursuit lies not in the things that are done, but in the spirit in which they are done, and in their object. And for this reason he would have some of such services performed by the youthful citizens" of the best state IV(vii). 14 § 7; cp. V(viii). 2 § 6 *mm.* (982 a—3). "And yet he seems hardly to ask himself whether work which is rewarded in money may not be done for its own sake: and, with ideas of art hardly less exalted than Plato's, he utters no word of protest against the identification of the artist with the *βαναυσος*. Nor, again, can it be said that these old prejudices are wanting in vitality at the present day. What 'society' thinks of 'persons in trade,' not to speak of the 'lower orders,' no one can help knowing. But there is a difference between this sentiment and Aristotle's. If he shares our prejudice, he does not share our ideal. The leisure which he thought indispensable for a citizen was not leisure to be stupid, idle, or lazy only in amusement. The strenuous exercise of the highest powers of body and mind in defending and governing the State, and in striving to quicken the divine reason in the soul,—this is the kind of 'high life' with which *βαναυνοί* is contrasted, and the citizenship of which it is declared incapable." SUSSEX. (811)

26 τῆς ἀγορᾶς] Hence ἀγοραῖος *πλοῦς* IV(vii). 9 § 3, *δημος* VI(iv) 3 § 2, ἀγοραῖον *πλῆθος* 4 § 10, 21 (Piston).

27 προσεφέλλεται] diag. in some aliens as well to citizenship. Themistocles, Cimon, Thucydides, Antisthenes, Iphicrates, Timotheus were sons of Thracian mothers; the mother of Demosthenes, though the daughter of a citizen, had Scythian blood in her veins.

ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολίτιδος] Whichever is born of a citizen mother, whether his father be a freeman or a slave: see § 8 n. SUSSEX. (812)

§ 8 δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόθους παρὰ πολλοῖς. οὐ (III
30 μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν γνησίων πολιτῶν ποιοῦνται
πολίτας τοὺς τοιοῦτους (διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὕτω χρῶν-
ται τοῖς νόμοις), εὐποροῦντες δὴ ὄχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦν-
ται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἢ δούλης, εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν,
§ 9 τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν. ὅτι μὲν α
35 οὖν εἶδη πλείω πόλितου, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ὅτι λέγεται μάλι-
στα πολίτης ὁ μετέχων τῶν τιμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὀμηρος ἐποίησεν
ὡς εἰ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετάνοστην·

ὥσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. ἀλλ' ὅπου
τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάτης χάριν τῶν συνοι-
40 κούντων ἐστίν.

31 τοιοῦτους [δὰ] πυρ' Beinays (without parentheses) || 32 ἀποροῦντες I' M' ||
δη Susem.³, 3' II (including fr.) Bk., untranslated by William A1., [8'] Syllabig
Susem.^{1,2}, γ' ? Susem. || 34 ἀστῶν fi. Peizonius (on Acl V H. VI. 10), αὐτῶν
I' and all other mss. || 36—40 The right order given only by cor.¹ of P¹, 36
ὥσπερ .. 38 μετέχων αἰτεῖ 40 ἐστίν fi. P¹ (1st hand) and P⁴ (connector), 37 ὡς εἰ .
38 μετέχων αἰτεῖ 40 ἐστίν P² 44 Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand), 38 ὥσπερ μετέ-
χων αἰτεῖ 40 ἐστίν I' M' || 38 ἐστίν ὅπου Beinays, omitting ἐστίν before 39 ἀπάτης
and αἰτεῖ συνοικούντων; not rightly

29 τοὺς νόθους] Under this name
were included not only those children
whose mother was not a citizen, but also
the children of a citizen mother if she
were not lawfully married to the father.
The latter were always accounted citizens
at Athens at least, but perhaps Aristotle
is only thinking of the former. See Scho-
mann pp. 356—8 Eng. ti. SUSEM. (513)

§ 8 "But as the admission of such
persons to the franchise is due to a dearth
of citizens of legitimate birth, as popu-
lation increases they gradually pass off
from the roll of citizens, first, the children
of slave fathers or slave mothers."

33 τοὺς ἐκ δούλουδούλης] See
preceding notes. SUSEM. (514)

εἴτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] This remark
has been rightly adduced to show that at
Athens even in those times in which the
bastard children of citizen fathers became
citizens in their turn (u. 516) the chil-
dren of a citizen mother by a father who
was not a citizen were not reckoned
citizens. The child followed the status
of the father in both cases, although the
former case was restricted to the period
in question. See Philippi *Contributions
to a history of Athenian citizenship* p. 64,
Schoemann p. 358 Eng. tr. (where the
reference in u. 6, incorrectly given, is to
the present passage). Compare too g

§ 13 u. (518) and VII(VI). 4 § 16 n. (1425).
SUSEM. (515)

34 τέλος δὲ κατλ] This was done at
Athens by a law of Peicles about 460
B.C., and by a law of Aristophon in 403.
Schoemann p. 357 f. Eng. ti. SUSEM. (516)

§ 9 36 Ὀμηρος] *Iliad* ix 648, xvi.
59. SUSEM. (517)

37 "Like some *metoikos* out-
lander," i.e. settles from abroad. But in
Homer the meaning of ἀτίμητος is probably
"without any τιμή" or blood price attached
to his life, i.e. one who may be killed with
impunity, rather than "without τιμή" in
the sense of civic privilege (u. 510).

38 ὥσπερ μέτοικος κατλ] "For he
who does not share in the privileges (of
citizenship) is no better than an alien
settled in the place. But where such a
principle is disguised, it is for the purpose
of deceiving the joint settlers."

ὅπου ἐπικεκρυμμένον] i.e. where the
poorer citizens and the lower classes of
people are nominally eligible (i.e. have
not been formally deprived of the right of
being elected) to the special offices of
state; but precautions are taken by
various means to secure that such persons
are not easily elected to any of them: cp.
vi.(iv). 13 §§ 1—4. SUSEM. (518)

39 τῶν συνοικούντων] Ridgeway pro-
poses to take this in a narrower sense as

¹⁰
^{8 b} πότερον μὲν οὖν ἑτέραν ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν <ἀρετὴν> θετέον, καθ' ἣν (III)
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἔστι καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων, ὅτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς τινὸς δ' ἕτερος,
κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς ἀλλ' ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ κύριος ἢ δυνά-
5 μενος εἶναι κύριος, ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων, τῆς τῶν
6 κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα διώρισταί, τὸ μετὰ IV
ταῦτα σκεπτέον, πότερον μίαν θετέον πολιτείαν ἢ πλείους,
καὶ εἰ πλείους, τίνες καὶ πόσαι, καὶ διαφοραὶ τίνες αὐ-
τῶν εἰσίν. ἔστι δὲ πολιτεία πόλεως τάξις τῶν τε ἄλλων

1278 b 1 <ἀρετὴν> Schneidei Sussem following Ar., ἑτέραν <ἀρετὴν> Spengel, less probably, θετέον <ἀρετὴν> an unknown scholar in the margin of the Munich Aldine || 2 ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων omitted by II¹ (added in the margin of P¹), ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων] Sussem.¹ || 3 <πῶς ἢ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, καὶ> δτι <βέλαντος καὶ πολίτης>, or something similar, Thuot: see however Comm. II. (500) || 4 κάκεινός P¹ (con.¹), κάκεινός Γ Μ Π² fr. Ar. Bk.¹ P¹ (1st hand) and con.¹ of P¹ (κάκεινός changed to κάκεινός and o again written over η) || δ' omitted by II² fr. Bk. || ἢ ... 5 κύριος omitted in Q^b T^b A¹. Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand: added in the margin, but in P² again erased) || 8 καὶ εἰ II² fr. Bk., probably right (καὶ εἰ πλείους omitted by M²)

'joint settlers of alien blood at the establishment of an *πολιτεία*.' and he quotes in support of this view VIII(V). 3 §§ 11, 12, διὸ οὗτοι τῆς συνουσίας ἐθέξαντο ἢ ἐταίρους, οἱ πλείους διεστασιάζαντο οὖν, ἐν θουρίαις συβαρίταις συνοικήσαν. It may however be sarcastically used, as Wyse suggests: the *σύνουκοι* are really *μέτακοι*.

§ 10 1278 b 3 δτι τινὸς μὲν πόλεως ὁ αὐτὸς that is, primarily in the states which in some sort share in the best constitution: secondarily in those which approximate to it in some degree, and the more completely the more they approximate to it. See on c. 4 § 5 II. (471). SUSSEM. (519)

τινὸς δ' ἕτερος The two coincide the least, or not at all, in the worst of the depraved forms of government; viz. (1) the advanced democracy which elevates all mechanics and day-labourers to the citizenship, (2) the most extreme oligarchy which is an even closer approximation to tyranny (*δυναστεία*), and (3) tyranny itself. In these forms of government there is the slave-master's rule (*ἀρχὴ δεσποτική*) which in c. 4 § 11 was distinguished from the genuine political rule (Rassow). Compare also c. 6 § 11 below. SUSSEM. (520)

4 κάκεινός δ' οὐ πᾶς "And in the former state, not in every case, but only in the statesman who is supreme over, or qualified to be, either by himself or along with others, supreme over the public administration."

5 ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων This is said in order to allow for the exceptional case where the best constitution does not present itself as an aristocracy but as an "absolute monarchy" under the pre-eminently best citizen: see cc. 13, 17. SUSSEM. (521)

c. 6. Is there one constitution or more than one? And in what do they differ? Compare A. C. Bradley *Hellenica*, pp. 222-230.

§ 1 9 πολιτεία = an order of the city in respect of the magisterial offices in general, and especially the sovereign power. "Comp. c. 1 § 1 τῶν τῆς πόλεως οἰκούντων τάξις τις; VI(IV). 1 § 10 τάξις ταῖς πόλεωσι ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον γενέ-
μηνται, (that distribution of public rights and duties which justice demands) καὶ τί τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκείνης τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίν: 3 § 5 with notes." SUSSEM. (522)

Zeller has remarked (II. 466) that 'constitution' is not a term wide enough to express *πολιτεία*, which is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it, and is in fact the 'form' of the organism, constituting, as we saw (c. 3 § 5, *fr.*) its identity. "An imperfect constitution is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilization, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it: no better order would fit it. And yet for all this one

10 ἀρχῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς κυρίας πάντων. κύριον μὲν γὰρ (πανταχοῦ τὸ πολίτευμα τῆς πόλεως, πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστὶν
 § 2 ἡ πολιτεία. λέγω δὲ οἶον ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατικαῖς κύριος ὁ δῆμος, οἱ δ' ὀλίγοι τὸνναντίον ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις· φαινὲν δὴ καὶ πολιτείας ἐτέραν εἶναι τούτων. τὸν
 15 αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦτον ἐροῦμεν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ὑποθετέον δὴ πρῶτον τίνος χάριν συνέστηκε πόλις, καὶ 3
 τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς.

§ 8 εἴρηται δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους, ἐν οἷς περὶ
 20 οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ δεσποτείας, καὶ ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ζῶν πολιτικόν. διὸ καὶ μηδὲν δεόμενοι τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων βοηθείας [οὐκ ἔλαττον] ὀρέγονται τοῦ συζῆν· αὐ³
 μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον συνάγει, καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει
 § 4 μέρος ἐκάστω τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τέλος, καὶ

12 δημοκρατίας P⁴, δημοκρατίας Sylburg, most likely right || 14 δὴ Spengel, δὲ Γ Π (including fi.) Ar. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text || 15 δὲ δὴ Casaubon wrongly || 16 δὲ Q^b (1st hand, corrected by the same hand) Bk. || 17 κατὰ Bernays, καὶ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Sussem.¹⁻² in the text || 19 δὴ P² Q^b T^b fr. Ald. Bk. || καὶ added after δὲ by P¹ Bk. P⁴ (corr.) and, if this may be inferred from Bekke's silence, Q^b T^b || 20 καὶ before ὅτι omitted by Γ Bk. and all editors except Götting and Sussem. || 21 ὁ omitted by Π² fi. Bk. || 22 παρ' περὶ M² P² fr. and P¹ (1st hand) || πολιτείας Γ M² fr. || οὐκ ἔλαττον omitted by Π¹ fi., in P¹ added by corr.¹ on the margin

2 885 81 88

constitution may be superior to another" (Bradley).

τῶν ἀρχῶν] This genitive may be paraphrased 'an order regulating the assignment of offices' as the parallel passages just cited sufficiently prove.

11 τὸ πολίτευμα] 'the ruling class' or 'government' of the city. "This Greek word cannot always be uniformly translated, as here and in c. 7 § 2 n. (534); but it denotes that individual man or that body of men, in whose name the state is governed, and hence the sovereign (κύριος). So far as we know Aristotle was the first to introduce the notion or, to be more precise, this correct notion of sovereignty. See also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9 and c. 13 § 5 n. (592)." SUSSEM. (528)

πολίτευμα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία] 'the constitution or the ruling class': an emphatic way of stating, in Greek as in English, that the character of the constitution is determined by the holders of sovereign power, who make the form of government what it is. The 'constitution' varies with

the 'government' or governing class

§ 2 14 φαίνεται δὴ κατὰ] 'Accordingly we say that in these cases' (a democracy and an oligarchy) 'the constitution is different. And we shall apply this same principle to all other cases.'

16 ὑποθετέον δὴ] We must therefore determine, as our fundamental principle in this investigation, the end for which the city is formed and the various ways of governing man in common life.

"See n. (530) on § 7." SUSSEM. (524)

§ 3 19 κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτους λόγους] In Book I. c. 2 § 9 ff. SUSSEM. (525)

For the prepos. = 'in' cp. c. 18 § 1, ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις λόγοις (Postgate).

23 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστω] to the extent to which each man is concerned in noble life. μέρος nom. to ἐπιβάλλει, which is not used impersonally but as in II. 6 § 22, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ ἡ σκέψις, and I. 13 § 13 (where however see note).

24 τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς] See n. (21) on I. 6 § 8. SUSSEM. (526)

15 κοινῇ πᾶσι καὶ χωρὶς· συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ (IV,
καὶ συνέχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν. Ἰσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι τοῦ
καλοῦ μῦριον καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζῆν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς
16 κατὰ τὸν βίον ὑπερβάλλῃ λαν. δῆλον δ' ὡς καρτεροῦσι πολ-
λὴν κακοπάθειαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γλιχόμενοι τοῦ ζην,
30 ὡς ἐνούσης τινὸς εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους ῥά- 4
διον διελεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις διο-
16 ριζόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν πολλάκις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία,
καίπερ ὄντος κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῷ τε φύσει δούλῳ καὶ τῷ
35 φύσει δεσπότη ταυτοῦ συμφέροντος, ὅμως ἄρχει πρὸς
τὸ τοῦ δεσπότητος συμφέρον οὐδὲν ἡττον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τοῦ
δούλου κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένου
7 τοῦ δούλου σφῆζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν)· ἡ δὲ τέκνων ἀρχὴ καὶ 5
γυναικὸς [καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης], ἣν δὴ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικήν,

25 χωρὶς <ἐκαστῷ> Spengel || 26 καὶ συνέχουσι... κοινωνίαν follow 27 μῦριον in II^a A. Bk Bernays and P¹ (connector) the order of the text in II^a B. || 28 ὑπερβάλλει P¹ 4, ὑπερβάλλει P² 2 Q^b T^b fr. || 29 γὰρ οἱ γ' οἱ (with only a comma before δῆλον) θ' Susem. || 31 γὰρ is added after ἀρχῆς by P²-8 fr., perhaps rightly || λεγομένους ἐνδεχομένους? Susem. || 32 διοριζόμεθα Q^b and perhaps Ar. || 39 [καὶ πάσης] Susem., who also suspects ἦν . οἰκονομικήν; see Comm. n (529)

§ 4 25 χωρὶς] to each separate individual.

26 συνέχουσι τὴν π. κοινωνίαν] Comp. Plato *Politicus* 301 E f.

Ἰσως γὰρ ἔνεστί τι κτλ.] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* IX. 9, 9, 1170 a 25, ei δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἥδύ; X. 4. 10 f. 1175 a 16, ἡ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ, οὐ δρέγονται... πότμον δὲ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὸ ζῆν αἰρούμεθα ἡ διὰ τὸ ζῆν τὴν ἡδονὴν, ἀφείσθαι. συνεῖναι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται (Eaton) SUSEM. (527)

27 κατὰ τὸ ζῆν] in life, a vague use of the preposition, as above 19, and again 28 κατὰ τὸν βίον

ἂν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κτλ.] The imperfect forms of civil society, missing the true end, and replacing it by such subordinate ends as freedom or wealth which fall short of man's true development, lead a feeble hazardous life and inflict great hardships on their members. Yet even in them mere living, provided it be not too painful a struggle, has something noble in it.

§ 5 31 τοὺς λεγομένους τρόπους] Bonitz: the usual modes, *Ind. Ar.* 424 b 43. i.e. the modes (usually) stated [cp. κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον τῶν εἰσθύνων λέγεσθαι

Meta. I. 9 § 11]. But what we require is 'all the possible modes,' and so Bernays, 'the modes in question.' This is supported by τὸ λεγόμενον I. 1 § 3, τὰ λεγόμενα ὄργανα 4 § 4. The modes of government in question = the modes of governing men. But even so we should rather expect τῆς λεγομένης ἀρχῆς τοὺς τρόπους: see *Critical Notes* and *Index* f. *Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, p. 271 n. (23). SUSEM.

32 διελεῖν] distinguish. Comp. II. 2 § 1 n.

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς]. See Excursus I. to B. IV(VII). SUSEM. (527 b)

διοριζόμεθα] not necessarily of accurate distinction.

§ 6 33 ἡ μὲν γὰρ δεσποτεία] See I. 2. 3 n. (7), I. 6 §§ 9, 10 n. (57) and on the other side I. 4. 5. SUSEM. (528)

35 ὅμως ἀρχαί] Nevertheless, the slave-owner's rule is primarily to the interest of the owner, though incidentally (or relatively, or in a derivative manner) to the interest of the slave.

36 οὐδὲν ἡττον = μάλλον, predominantly.

37 φθειρόμενος = while the slave is becoming useless, spoilt.

§ 7 39 καὶ τῆς οἰκίας πάσης] This

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν ἐστὶν ἡ <εἰ> κοινῷ τινὸς ἀμφῶν, (I
καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ὡς ὀρώμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας
1279 a τέχνας, οἷον ἱατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
δὲ κἂν αὐτῶν εἴην. οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τὸν παιδοτρίβην εἶνα
τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐνίοτ' εἶναι καὶ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ὁ κυβερ-
§ 8 νήτης εἰς ἐστὶν αἰὲ τῶν πλωτήρων· ὁ μὲν οὖν παιδοτρίβης (v
5 ἡ κυβερνήτης σκουπὲ τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἀγαθόν, ὅταν δὲ
τούτων εἰς γέννηται καὶ αὐτός, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχει
τῆς ὠφελείας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πλωτήρ, ὁ δὲ τῶν γυμναζομέ-
§ 9 νων εἰς γίνεταί παιδοτρίβης ὢν. διὸ καὶ τὰς πολυτελεῖας α
ἀρχαίς, ὅταν ἡ κατ' ἰσότητά τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκυῖα καὶ

40 εἴτε σοι ἦτοι Lindau || <ei> Susem, H. omits ἡ <ei> || 41 ὥσπερ Π² f. Bk.

1279 a 1 ἱατρικὴν ἑρετικὴν Lindau || 2 [εἶνα] Susem.^{1,2} m-taking William's
version, εἶναι Π² omitting 3 εἶναι || 6 κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς P¹ Q^b T^b || 7 ὠφελείας]
ἀσφαλείας Q^b T^b Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand) || 8 διὸ „το ὁμοίωτα probably quite
sound: * ~ δὲ Coming, ὥσι. συνεστηκυῖα A1 Ramus, τῶν πολιτῶν ἀρχῶν
Spengel, Schlosener thought πόλις had been dropped, ὁμοίωτα <ἡ πολιτεία> Schnei-
der, but if the word has been lost it would be more likely to drop out after πολιτῶν

addition appears contradictory and un-Aristotelian for it would include once more the rule of a master over his slaves to which the rule in question is held to be opposed. Nor are the words ἦν δὲ καλοῦμεν οἰκονομικὴν free from suspicion, for the rule of the householder again includes a rule over slaves. We must therefore understand οἰκονομικὴν in a narrower and more special sense 'emphatically' (as Congreve says) to mean the rule of the householder over the free members of his family as contrasted with his rule over slaves i. 13 §§ 1, 2. But even then it is very doubtful whether οἰκονομικὴ and δεσποτικὴ can be so opposed in Greek, nor is this proved by I. 1, 2. SUSEM. (589)

40 ἦτοι τῶν ἀρχομένων χάριν) Comp. τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον N. E. v. 6, 9 and Jackson's n. But in the state this good of the subjects ruled, and common good of rulers and subjects, consists in the 'end' of the state mentioned, or rather recalled to our memory, in §§ 3—5 viz. the highest possible life, εὖ ζῆν. This is the reason why the recapitulation of the facts in §§ 3—5, of πρότεροι λόγοι, had to be prefixed to this passage. SUSEM (589)

41 καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν...κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ] essentially, incidentally.
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας] Comp. Pl. *Politicus* 297 n: εἰ δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπαινοῦ-

μεν πόλιν, αἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἀπεικάζειν αἰ τοὺς βασιλικούς ἀρχοντας. τὸν γενναῖον κυβερνήτην καὶ τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἱατράν (Eaton) and earlier still, Socrates Xen. *Memorab.* III, 9. 11 (Henkel). See further below c. 15 § 4 n. (538), c. 16 §§ 6—8, IV(vi). 2 § 13 n. (726), 13 § 2 n. (870), and above II. 8. 18 n. (170). SUSEM. (581)

1279 a 2 αὐτῶν] i. e. αὐτῶν τῶν ἀρχόντων, cp. n on I. 6 αὐτοῦς. With this summary justification of δεσποτεία (§§ 6, 7) compare Plato's in *Rep.* IX. 590 D: ἕνα καὶ τὸ αὐτοῦ (ὁ ἀσθενὲς φύσει ἔχων τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος) ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἀρχῆται οὐσπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτὸν φάμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέβαιον ἀρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δοῦλου οὐδένοιο δεῖν ἀρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασυμάχος φέρεται τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμείνων ἐν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκίαν ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξωθεν ἐφειστώτος.

§ 8 γ δ μὲν, sc. δ ἀντιβρηνήτης, πλωτήρ (γίνεται).

§ 9 8 διὸ κατὰ] "Hence too with civic offices, when the city is framed upon the equality and similarity of the citizens, then claim is to hold office in turn."

9 ὅταν ἡ λατ' ἰσότητα...καὶ καθ' ὁμοίω-
τητα=ὅταν ἡ εἰς ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων sc. ἡ πόλις, supplied from πολιτικός.

"Although this is the case not only in

- 10 καθ' ὁμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἄρχειν, πρότερον μὲν, (IV.
 ἢ πέφυκεν, ἀξιοῦντες ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖν τινα
 πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἐσκό-
 10 πει τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον· νῦν δὲ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας τὰς
 ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς βούλονται συνεχῶς
 15 ἄρχειν, οἷον εἰ συνέβαινεν ὑγιαίνειν αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσι νοσα-
 κεροῖς οὖσιν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἴσως ἐδίωκον τὰς ἀρχάς.
 11 φανερόν τοίνυν ὡς ὅσαι μὲν πολιτεῖαι τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον
 σκοποῦσιν, αὗται μὲν ὀρθαί τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι κατὰ τὸ
 ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, ὅσαι δὲ τὸ σφέτερον μόνον τῶν ἀρχόντων,
 20 ἡμαρτημένα καὶ πᾶσαι παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν·

12 τῇ τοῦ P⁴ Q² B¹ || αὐτοῦ P¹ Ald., αὐτοῦ Γ M^a P^a 2-4 || 13 κεινὸν fi., ἐκείνῃ
 Schneidei (not necessary), κοινῇ Sylburg, κοινὸν Bojesen (wrongly), [συμφέρει] Beinays
 || 18 αὗται P¹ apparently, αὗται Γ M^a || 20 πᾶσαι καὶ Π³ Bk.

Democracies, but also in Aristocracy and in most Polities, yet Aristotle has principally in view the contrast between democratic Athens of the old and the new period." SUSSEX. (582)

10 πρότερον μὲν κτλ.] "in early times, as is natural, they required men to serve the state in rotation, and that some one else should, in return, look after you: interest as you formerly when in office looked after *his* but in our day the advantages derived from the public treasury and from office make them desirous to hold it uninterrupted; one might suppose that though of sickly constitutions, they were always well in office, for then too they would no doubt hunt as eagerly after place."

11 λειτουργεῖν] of the onerous task of the magistrate e.g. in old Athens: munus publicum dum gerit, commodum civium inveniunt cum damno etiam rei familiaris.

τινα and 12 αὐτοῦ] It is an error to understand these to refer to the same person. They are really A and B, two holders of office, A in succession to B. Comp. II. 2 §§ 6, 7 (where διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἴσως εἶναι πάντα ἰσέχοις the ἢ πέφυκε of the text here) and I. 1 § 2 where this rotation or exchange of functions is the external mark of πολιτικός, even if his essential identity with βασιλικός be assumed.

§ 10 15 οἷον εἰ. 16 ἀρχάς] Comp. ISOCT. VII. (Παραγενέτω) 24, 25: αἰτίαν δ' ἣν τοῦ μὴ περμαχέσθαι εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐπὶ μεμνημένους ἥσαν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ φείδεσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἕκ τῶν δημοσίων τὰ σφέτερον αὐτῶν διοικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκείνοις ὑπαρχόντων,

εἰ ποτε δεήσει, τοῖς κοινῇ ἐπαρκεῖν. οὕτω δ' ἀπείχοντο σφόδρα τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε χαλεπώτερον ἢ ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς χρόνοις εὐρεῖν τοὺς βουλευμένους ἄρχειν ἢ νῦν τοὺς μηδὲν δεομένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐμπόριον ἀλλὰ λειτουργίαν ἐνέμιζον εἶναι τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμέλειαν. SUSSEX. (582 b)

§ 11 obviously goes with c. 7.
 17 τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον] This is τὸ δίκαιον and the 'good' or 'end' of civil society: c. 12 § 1.

18 ὀρθαί] normal, as opposed to the perverted forms. Note that in the *Politics* Plato regards only the best state as 'normal.' Before he divides the others into three better and three worse (much as Aristotle does here) he asks 302 B τίς οὖν δὴ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τοῦτων ἥκιστα χαλεπὴ συζῆ, πασιὸν χαλεπὸν οὖσῶν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη; Comp. τὴν ὀρθὴν (i.e. the ideal state) χωρὶς ἀποκρίνας τούτων ἐβδόμῃ, ib. 302 C What Aristotle calls ὀρθαί, as the κόσμοι καὶ ἑταῖοι of the *Politeia*, just as his παρεκβάσεις are the παρανομοί and ἐκλάττοι of Plato.

κατὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον] As opposed to τὴ καὶ τισὶ δίκαιον.

19 τὸ σφέτερον explained by τῶν ἀρχόντων=τὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν: a usage common in Thucydides, e.g. IV. 114, VIII. 46.

20 παρεκβάσεις] 'perversions'; departures from, or corruptions of, the normal constitutions. The verb παρεκβαλεῖν is both intrans. and trans.=to violate, e.g. VIII(V). 10. 5. The noun=error in *Metaph.* XIV(N). 2 § 13, 1049 b 4. This is nearer to the sense in other writers; a digression, ISAEUS p. 62. 13, and 40 *Nic. Eth.* I. 5. 1.

δεσποτικά γάρ, ἢ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐστίν. (IV
 7 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπι- V
 σκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶ-
 24 του τὰς ὁρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις ἔσονται
 § 2 φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθειςῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ
 πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταῦτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον
 τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς
 πολλοὺς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοι-
 νὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 30 τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλί-
 γων ἢ τοῦ πλείους παρεκβάσεις. ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολλὰς φατέον
 εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
 § 3 καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν
 ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν
 35 πλειόνων δὲ ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρ-

25 δὲ] δ' Welldon || τὸ Π² fi (omitted by Π² Bk) || 27 ὀλίγων Γ Μ' || 32 <μ> ||
 μετέχοντας Beinays || 34 τῶν omitted by M' P¹, [τῶν] Susem.¹⁻³ || ὀλίγων] οὕτως fr.

21 δεσποτικά] like the sway of a master over slaves.

cc. 7, 8 (with c. 6 § 11) *Thiefold classification of normal and degenerate constitutions according as (a) one man, (β) a few, or (γ) the many, are supreme.*

§ 1 23 πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ] See Excursus 1. to B. III. p. 447 ff. SUSEM. (538)

§ 2 25 ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ] See c. 6 § 11 (523); also n. (466) on c. 3 § 9. SUSEM. (534)

26 σημαίνει ταῦτόν] For constitution we may substitute 'ruling body'

πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων] Cities contain a variety of parts or elements. Each class contributes something to the city, and so has a certain claim to political rights. The relative strength of these elements determines the question where the supreme power or 'sovereignty' lies, and settles what the constitution of the city shall be. In England to-day the πολίτευμα includes the sovereign, the lords, and the electoral body among the commons.

27 ἀνάγκη δ'...ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς] But as early as § 4 ff. it is seen that this merely numerical standpoint is only preliminary and by no means exhaustive: see *nn.* (538, 540, 543). SUSEM. (538)

Eaton compares Cic. *De Rep.* I. § 42, Tac. *Ann.* IV 33, and for the dependence of the constitution upon the magistrates Cic. *De Legg.* III § 12.

28 εἴαν...πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι] But how, a Platonist might ask, can they so govern, unless they have absolute knowledge, and not merely right opinion, regarding the common weal?

32 τοὺς μετέχοντας] sc. τῆς πόλεως. They may still be indispensable elements, c. 5 § 2 ὡς ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις.

ἢ δὲ κατὰ] If they are to be called citizens, the inhabitants must share in the 'weal' which is the end of the city: *N. E.* VIII. 9 § 4 ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ εἰς ἀρχὴν συνελθεῖν καὶ διαμεῖναι.

§ 3 33 μοναρχιῶν] A neutral word, convenient as including the two species βασιλεία and τυραννίς, Plato *Politic.* 302 D, E. In no single case of all the six is the use of the corresponding designation applied to modern states (monarchy, aristocracy, &c.) other than misleading, even when the qualifications are supplied. The most democratic of Greek democracies we should call an oligarchy.

35 ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἀριστον] Undoubtedly Aristotle himself has both reasons in view in adopting this term: but preeminently the former. It has been already explained, *n.* (386) on II. 11. 5, that he regards merit as the principle of Aristocracy: and he uses the word widely in this sense alone: II. 6 § 16 n. (218), 9 § 20 (320), 11 § 5 ff. (386); III. 5 § 5 (509), 12 § 8 (593), 15 § 10

χειν, ἣ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦ-^(V)
 σιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύη-
 38 ται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολί-
 39 τῶν, πολιτεία. <καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι
 <τὰ ὅπλα.> συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως. ἔνα μὲν γὰρ δια-
 40 φέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁλόγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλε-
 179^b πὸν ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολε-
 μικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθει γίνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην
 τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν. καὶ μετέχουσιν

37 <πολεμικὸν> πλῆθος Zeller (*Griech. Phil.* II. ii. 714 n. 1) || The trans-
 position of b3 καὶ μετέχουσιν.....4 ὅπλα to follow a 39 πολιτεία by Schmidt
 (see *Introd.* 82) || 39 <οὐκ> εὐλόγως? Spengel who first saw that the text was
 unsound; * * συμβαίνει Thunot, afterwards accepted by Spengel || μὲν omitted by fr.

(655), 17 § 6 (680), vi(iv). 2 § 1 (1133),
 2 § 5 (1142), 7 § 2 (1233 ff.), 8 §§ 4—
 10 (1245), 15 § 10 (1350), vii(vi). 2 § 7
 (1402). Other references in n. (471) on
 III. 4. 5. SUSEM (536) In *Khet.*
 I. c. 8 he adopts the former derivation.

39 πολιτεία] a constitutional govern-
 ment, a polity: a republic of the middle
 classes (so far as any Greek city can be
 so called). In this work without any
 other distinctive name, like the English
 Commonwealth; but in *N. E.* VIII. 10
 called τιμοκρατία: see Exc. I.

§ 4 1279 b 4 οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα]
 "Here it is the possessors of arms that
 share in the government": more pre-
 cisely, the heavy-armed, i.e. those who
 are in a position to equip themselves at
 their own cost with heavy armour and (as
 Zeller remarks II n. 748 n. 7) to undergo
 the gymnastic training requisite for this
 species of military service, to which time
 and leisure and also a certain material pro-
 sperity were essential. Accordingly this
 involves a moderate property qualification.
 Comp. Exc. I. to B. III.; II. 6. 16 with
 n. (216), vi(iv). 13 § 4 (1259), § 7 (1268);
 vii(vi). 7 § 1 n. (1452). From this point
 of view the Four Hundred at Athens
 restricted the franchise to 5000 citizens,
 Thuc. VIII. 97. 1 (Eaton). SUSEM. (537)
 From 411 to about 409 (or 408) Athens
 was a Polity in this sense, and again
 from 321 to 317 B.C.

1279 a 39 εὐλόγως] (παραλόγως, al-
 most=εἰκότως, with good reason. See
 p. 82.

40 πλείους δ' ἤδη. πολεμικήν] But
 when we come to the case of a larger
 number, it is hard for them to be per-
 fectly trained in all excellence: (ἀλλὰ

but on the contrary) at the most they can
 be trained in military excellence alone.

1279 b 2 διόπερ ..3 τὸ προπολεμοῦν]
 The military character of Polity is also
 emphasized by the author of the inter-
 polated passage, c. 17 § 4. Yet in the na-
 ture of this form of government itself, as
 Aristotle elsewhere describes it, scarcely
 any cogent reason can be found for
 making this such an inseparable and
 essential feature. He may have dimly
 perceived that the description of Polity
 as a mere blending of democracy and
 oligarchy without the addition of aristo-
 cratical elements,—as distinguished from
 those spurious aristocracies which, like
 Carthage, combine in themselves these
 three elements, vi(iv). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9
 (cp. II. II. 5 n. 386)—by no means
 agrees with the recognition of Polity as
 one of the three normal constitutions, as
 defined by him, but that on the contrary
 (as was remarked *Introd.* p. 62) if this
 recognition is to remain valid, some ac-
 count must be taken of merit also even in
 a Polity, and it must be presumed that
 a certain amount of excellence is spread
 generally amongst the citizens. And in
 accordance with the view here expressed
 about military excellence this may have
 induced him to transfer the warlike spirit
 of the Spartan system not so much to the
 other mixed aristocracies as to the re-
 maining constitutions, which are most
 akin to it, viz. the Polities, in order in some
 measure to bridge over the chasm; for
 indeed he cites Sparta vi(iv). 9 § 6 f. n.
 (1262), as an example of a successful
 blending of democracy and oligarchy in
 Polity, though this involves him in in-
 consistency. At the same time by this

§ 5 αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ἔπλα. παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
 5 μένων τυραννῶν μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας,
 δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστὶ μοναρχία
 πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία
 πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
 10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐ-
 δεμία αὐτῶν.

8 δεῖ δὲ μικρῷ διὰ μακροτέρων εἰπεῖν τίς ἐκάστη τού-
 των τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας, τῷ
 δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀπο-
 βλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκεῖον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ παρορᾶν μηδέ
 15 τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν περὶ ἑκάστου ἀλήθειαν.
 § 2 ἔστι δὲ τυραννὶς μὲν μοναρχία, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δεσπο-
 τικῇ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν ὧσι κύ-

1279 b 6 οὐν possibly Γ, *igitur* Willam. || 13 ἑκαστον (or ἐκάστου) μεθόδῳ? Κοῖαες || μὴ] μὴδεν? Schneidei, perhaps rightly if § 5 τι, which is not in IP Ar., should be omitted || 16 δὲ] δὴ οἱ γὰρ? Spengel, perhaps rightly || δεσποτικῇ? Sylburg

immediate emphasis on the fact that Polity is an inferior constitution, as compared with monarchy and aristocracy, the germ of dissolution has already unobserved found its way into this whole theory of three normal constitutions and their corresponding perversions. For then in fact only monarchy and aristocracy proper are really good forms of government; while mixed constitutions—and indeed not merely polities but even spurious aristocracies—are forms intermediate to them and the perversions proper, combining good and evil elements just as the corresponding *τυμοκρατία* in Plato's *Republic* (Excursus I.), and this assertion is made point blank by Aristotle himself later on, vi(IV). 8 §§ 1, 2, n (1239). Comp. Zeller II ii 713 f., 748. But even at this point, by thus restricting the excellence of Polity and adding to the definition its military character, Aristotle begins to transcend the merely numerical point of view to which he has hitherto adhered c. 7 §§ 2, 3. Cp. n. (535). SUSEM. (538)

§ 5 6 ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς] Earlier still Thucydides, I. 17, accuses the Greek tyrants of such complete selfishness. This view, which in later times was universal amongst the Greeks, can hardly be quite correct. SUSEM. (539)

7 ἡ δ' ὀλιγ. . . ὁ ἀπόρων] Here then

the numerical standard completely disappears, see n. (535, 538): as is quite clear from the further explanation in c. 8. See n. (544). SUSEM. (540)

c 8 § 1 11 δὲ δὲ τὰ ἐστίν] Not to be understood as meaning that this is intended to be done merely in the immediate context, where the description is by no means complete; the whole remaining part of the *Politics*, except Bk. VIII(V), has no other object. SUSEM. (541)

12 τῷ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι] Comp. c. 13 § 14 n. (601), vi(IV). 15 § 4 n. (1235): also *Introd.* p. 70 f. SUSEM. (542)

Further see vi(IV). 10. 1, v(VIII). 3. 12. Here *μέθοδος* = branch of inquiry, study, department of science: almost as in II x § 2 (a nearer parallel is *Nic. Eth.* I. 1 § 1, 3 § 1, 1094 b 11).

14 ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν] But in *Nic. Ethics* this is the supreme end of theory: οὐ γινώσκοντες ἀλλὰ πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ ὅσα εἰδόμενα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκοπεῖν μέθοδοι, ἀλλ' ἐν' ἀγαθοῖς γινώσκοντες.

μὴ παρορᾶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν] "not to overlook or omit anything." Cf. *De Part. Animal.* I. 5 § 4, 645 a 5, μὴδὲν παραλείπωντας εἰς δυνάμιν μῆτε ἀμιγνόμενον μῆτε τιμωτέρων.

§ 2 16 δεσποτικῇ κατὰ] ruling civil society like a slaveholder.

ριοι τῆς πολιτείας οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, δημοκρατία δὲ (V
 19 τοῦναντίον ὅταν οἱ μὴ κεκτημένοι πλήθος οὐσίας ἀλλ' ἄποροι.
 § 3 πρῶτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἴεν οἱ
 πλείους ὄντες εὐποροὶ κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δὲ ἐστίν
 ὅταν ᾗ κύριον τὸ πλήθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν καὶ ἐν πού συμ-
 βαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείτ-
 25 τους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύ-
 ριον πλήθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασίν· οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν
 § 4 διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ <εἴ> τις συν-
 30 θεῖς τῇ μὲν εὐπορίᾳ τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῇ δ' ἀπορίᾳ τὸ πλήθος (α
 οὕτω προσαγορεύοι τὰς πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν μὲν ἐν ᾗ τὰς
 ἀρχὰς ἔχουσιν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὀλίγοι τὸ πλήθος ὄντες, δημο-
 30 κρατίαν δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ ἄποροι πολλοὶ τὸ πλήθος ὄντες· ἄλλην
 § 5 ἀπορίαν ἔχει. τίνας γὰρ ἐροῦμεν τὰς ἀκριβέστερας πολι-
 τείας, τὴν ἐν ᾗ πλείους εὐποροὶ καὶ ἐν ᾗ ἐλάττους οἱ
 ἄποροι, κύριοι δ' ἐκάτεροι τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ μηδεμία
 § 6 ἄλλη πολιτεία παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένους ἐστίν; ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ γ
 35 λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι
 κυρίους συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν, τὸ μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸ δὲ ταῖς
 δημοκρατίαις, διὰ τὸ τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ὀλίγους, πολλοὺς
 δ' εἶναι τοὺς ἀπόρους πανταχοῦ (διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς

19 [πλήθος] Spengel, perhaps rightly || 20 <τοῦτον> τὸν? Susem. || 21 πο-
 λιτείας Schneider, perhaps rightly || 22 ᾗ ἐπὶ M^a P¹ || συμβαίνει Γ M^a P² Q^b
 T^b fr. Ar. Bk.¹, συμβαίνει Schneider, συμβαίη Sylburg || 25 δόξειε II¹ || 26 καὶ
 <εἴ> Susem., καὶ P¹ II² fr. Bk., ἐὰν (?) Γ M^a (?) Δ., si quis William || 28 προσ-
 αγορεύει Q^b T^b fr. Ald., προσαγορεύη Mouet Bk. || 32 <οἱ> εὐποροὶ Sylburg Bk. || 34
 παρὰ περὶ P² Q^b T^b || 38 <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείας Susem., if 39 διαφορὰς is right

18 οὐσίας] property (in plural).

§ 8 20 πρῶτη δ' ἀπορία]. "The first difficulty affects the definition," i.e. affects the question how we are to define. Another series of ἀπορία affects τὸ δίκαιον (Wyse).

§§ 4, 5 Are both features essential? Is democracy the government of the needy majority, oligarchy that of the wealthy few? [This view reappears in the double characteristics of VI (IV). 4 § 6 οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες, οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέστεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.] How are we then to classify the exceptional cases where these features are not combined?

§ 6 34 ἔοικε τοίνυν κτλ.] "Our argument seems then to show that the fewness or multitude of the sovereign body is an

accident, in the one case of oligarchy, in the other of democracy." Here as elsewhere he is in search of the true nature and end, essential qualities [cp. c. 9 § 1 n. on ὅρος] are severed from such as are purely external and quantitative; for τὸ πρὸν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἐν τῇ, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὁρισμένων. So in I. I. 2, IV (VII). 4. 4 ff. he denies that these quantitative distinctions are essential.

38 διὰ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφορὰς] A διαφορὰ or 'specific difference' is an essential quality, by the presence or absence of which two species of a genus, here two constitutions, differ (ᾧ διαφέρουσι) and can therefore be classified. The question in this sentence is, whether

- § 7 ῥηθείσας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς), φ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε (V
 1280 a 1) δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτος
 τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου
 § 8 δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπο-
 μεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς. εὐποροῦσι
 5 μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες· δι' αἷς
 αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας.
 9 ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας α
 καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ

39 διαφορὰς I, accepted by Koras Bk. Beinays etc. Then αἰτίας is predicate and πολιτείας must be understood with ῥηθείσας or else inserted; thus ῥηθείσας <πολιτείας> Beinays: ῥηθείσας <ἀπορίας> Koras wrongly, see *Quaest. c. u. coll.* p. 391 f. 1280 a 6 πολιτείας * * Coming, perhaps rightly, a transitional clause is needed

αἰτίας goes with τὰς ῥηθείσας, or whether it is a predicate. In the former case, we expect <διὰ> τὰς ῥηθείσας αἰτίας, as § 8, δι' αἷς αἰτίας. "And for this reason too it follows that differences between constitutions do not arise on account of the reasons mentioned!"—the mere numbers of the governing class. Otherwise Beinays (without inserting διὰ, but making αἰτίας διαφορὰς the predicate): "it follows that the constitutions mentioned, τὰς ῥηθείσας sc. πολιτείας, are not causes of specific difference."

Although from distinct points of view various causes seem to be assigned for the existence of different forms of government, yet the new principle of wealth and poverty is maintained through the rest of the treatise (with certain exceptions). But ultimately these different forms are traced back to differences in social conditions, and each represents a certain state of equilibrium or relative preponderance amongst the competing social elements. See *Introd.* pp. 60 f., 63; c. 7 § 1 n, c. 15 §§ 10—13, vi (iv), 9 § 10, xi §§ 9—11, §§ 16—18, 13 §§ 10, 11, viii (v), 9 §§ 8, 9. Also Bradley *Hellenica* p. 225 ff.

§ 7 1280 a 1 ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους] Here is a plain statement that any government whatever by the rich majority would be an oligarchy, any whatever by the needy minority a democracy. Yet the writer of the interpolated passage vi (iv), cc. 3, 4 has failed to understand this: see n. (1164) and vi (iv), 4 §§ 5, 6. SUSSEX. (248)

§ 8 5 δι' αἷς αἰτίας] 'on which

grounds both parties claim to be citizens,' viz. in an oligarchy because they are wealthy, in a democracy because they are free-born.

c. 9 *Right, or justice, in an oligarchy and in a democracy: their conflicting claims judged by the standard of perfect justice.*

Oncken i, pp. 30—33 has treated this chapter as a typical example of Aristotle's analytical method.

§ 1 7 Properly ὅρους = definitions, like ὁρισμοί. Better standards or determining principles, that which gives its special character to Oligarchy or Democracy: id quo alienius rei natura constituitur et definitur (*Ind. Ar.*), οἷς δοκεῖ ἀρῆσθαι [ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία] vii (v), 9 § 14. The word was so used by Plato *Rep.* viii 551 c (comp. 562 b δ' προβλεπο ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' οὗ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο = ὑπερπλοῦτος, ... δ' δημοκρατία ὁρίζεται ἀγαθόν = ἐλευθερία). We have had it before ii. 6 § 9, 9 § 32 and it occurs about sixteen times in the sequel. Giant's argument *Ethics* i, p. 61 f., that Aristotle adopted the term in the interval between writing the *Ethics* and the *Politics*, is disproved by its occurrence in the *Republic*.

All the various elements of the city contribute something in virtue of which they claim a share of political privilege. The predominant element (7 § 2) or class fixes its own contribution as the qualification for citizenship, or standard. This again may be viewed as the end which the citizens pursue.

§ 8 τὸ δίκαιον τὸ τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ
 The state is a realisation of distributive

δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἀπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ (V)
 10 μέχρι τινός προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως
 δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ'
 § 2 οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ <γὰρ> τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον
 εἶναι, καὶ [γὰρ] ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίστοις·
 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ'
 15 αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κριταὶ
 § 3 φαῦλοι περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὸ δίκαιον τισίν, καὶ ὃ
 διήρηται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς,
 καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, τὴν μὲν τοῦ
 πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, (α π.)

11 τὸ ἴσον δίκαιον? Velloué || 12 καὶ <γὰρ> Bas.² || 12 καὶ...13 ἀνίστοις omitted by Γ M' || 13 καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν P¹ Π² Bk., γὰρ transposed to come before 12 τὸ ἄνισον Bojesen, [γὰρ] Schneidei || 15 κριταὶ after 16 φαῦλοι Π² f. Bk.

justice, in so far as public offices, rights and privileges, are assigned to the citizens in proportion to their worth, κατ' ἀξίαν: so that the contributions of all to the state meet with a proportionate return, and all are justly treated by the constitution. But an oligarchy or democracy, while fairly applying this law of proportion, may set up a false or one-sided standard of worth, as wealth or free birth in place of capacity and merit. In such a case the justice of the state is a departure from perfect or natural justice and may be called an oligarchic or democratic justice, as the case may be (A. C. Bradley).

9 πάντες] Here again ἀμφοτέρωι might be expected. Comp. II. 11 § 5 n. (387) and *Rhet.* II. 9 § 3 ἅπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν=all who are envious or righteously indignant, 'both classes' (Shilleto).

ἀπτονται δικαίου τινός] The partial truth in these one-sided conceptions is fully recognized. The ἀξία which oligarchy or democracy take as the qualification for political privileges, although not the true one, still has a subordinate importance for the state. It is justice *in some measure*. See § 3, § 15; VIII(v). 1 § 5.

10 καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν κατὰ] They do not state absolute justice in its full extent.

11 οἷον δοκεῖ κατὰ] 'Thus justice, or right, is thought (by the upholders of democracy) to be equality.' They grasp the fact that all citizens are on a level in respect of freedom, and taking this partial

equality for absolute equality they give everybody equal rights, i.e. they give equals to unequals

§ 2 14 οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι... κακῶς] But they omit the qualification for *whom* equality or inequality is right, and form a wrong judgment

15 σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι κατὰ] Comp. c. 16 § 8, n. (642). SUSK. (544)

§ 3 16 ὥστ' ἐπεὶ κατὰ] "Hence since right means 'right for given persons,' and there is the same difference between them as between the things they are entitled to."

18 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] *N.E.B.* v. c 3 (Bekker's c 6) esp. §§ 4—6, § 10 διήρηται γὰρ ὁμοίως οἷς τε καὶ ἀ. Comp. n. (584), also VIII(v). 1, 2 n. (1493). SUSK. (546)

This reference was suspected, or rather condemned, as an interpolation by Giant *Ethics* I. p. 53, but see Jackson's commentary on *B. v. p.* 77—81.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος κατὰ] They agree as to what constitutes equality in the thing, but not as to that of the persons to whom it is assigned.

"This is in fact true of both oligarchs and democrats: for equality of political rights amongst themselves is also the demand of the oligarchs, but only for the rich, while the democrats admit it as far as possible for all citizens. The one demands equality for all who are equal or alike in wealth; the others demand it for all who are equal or alike in freedom. Cp. VIII(v). 1, 2 f. n. (1493)." SUSK. (546)

10 μάλιστα μὲν διὰ τὸ λεχθὲν ἄρτι, διότι κρίνουσι τὰ περὶ (V)
 αὐτοὺς κακῶς, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινὸς ἐκατέ-
 § 4 ρους δίκαιόν τι νομίζουσι δίκαιον λέγειν ἀπλῶς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ
 ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἀνισοίαν ὄντων, οἷον χρημάτων, ὅλως ὀλοῦνται ἀνι-
 24 σοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τὴν ἴσιν, οἷον ἐλευθερίαν, ὅλως
 § 5 ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν κτη- 10
 μάτων χάριν ἐκοινωνήσαν καὶ συνήλθον, τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι
 τῆς πόλεως ὅσον περ καὶ τῆς κτίσεως, ὥσθ' ὁ τῶν ὀλι-
 γαρδικῶν λόγος δόξειεν ἂν ἰσχύειν (οὐ γὰρ εἶναι δίκαιον ἴσον
 μετέχειν τῶν ἐκατὸν ταλάντων τὸν εἰσενεγκόντα μίαν μῦν τῷ
 30 δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὔτε τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε τῶν ἐπιγινω-
 § 6 μένων)· εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν μόνον ἀλλὰ μάλλον τοῦ
 εὖ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δούλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶντων ἦν πό-
 λεις· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστι διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ
 τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν), μήτε συμμαχίας ἔνεκεν, ὅπως
 35 ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν

22 νομίζουσι <τὸ> δίκαιον Spengel, perhaps rightly || 24 ἐλευθερίαν Vettois, ἐλευθερί-α (or -η) Γ Αι., ἐλευθερίῃ Μ*, ἐλευθερίαι Π² fr. (the first iota above the line), ἐλευθεροί Γ¹ || 27 ὀλιγαρχικῶν P⁴ Qᵇ Tᵇ || 29 ταλάντων Γ μῦν II (including fr.) Αι Bk. (in P³ μν οὐκ an erasure) || εἰσενέγκοντα Π² fr. Bk. || 30 δ' ἀντι Μ* P³ Tᵇ || 31 μίαν ἔνεκεν Π² fr., omitted by P¹ (1st hand, added by coi.¹ in the margin) || 34 ἔνεκα Μ* P¹

21 μέχρι τινός] See on § 1 above. 'Because each side contends for a partial justice, but thinks it is contending for an absolute justice.'

§ 4 22 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κτλ] Comp c. 12 § 2, and viii(v). 1 § 2 f. *un.* (584 b, 1493). SUSEM. (546 b)

25 κυριώτατον] what is most important; viz. the grand aim and object of a city.

§ 5 26 τοσοῦτον μετέχουσι κτλ] 'they have a stake in the city proportionate to their share of the property.'

29 ταλάντων] A talent=47½ German marks=£23 12s. 6d., a mina=78½ Goman marks=£3 17s. approximately: Hultsch *Greek and Roman Metrology* p. 173 f. SUSEM. (547)

30 οὐτὴ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιγινωμένων] 'ought not to have an equal share of the principal nor of the profits accruing' Congreve however suggests that the participles may be masculine, and so Bernays, with a different sense: 'either of those who originally contributed or of a subsequent generation of shareholders.' This can hardly be right. SUSEM.

§ 6 33 νῦν δ' οὐκ κτλ] Comp. 1.

2. 8 and the further passages cited in n. (21). Also *Nic. Eth.* x. 6. 8, 1177 a 8 εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀδραποδῶ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον, and x. 7. 6, 1177 b 4, where happiness is made to consist in leisure, ἐν τῇ σχολῇ. But that slaves have no leisure, is stated *Pol.* iv(vii). 15. 2 (Eaton). Cp. too *un.* (925, 926) at that passage. SUSEM. (548)

35 διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν (21). 'for commerce and mutual intercourse.' Here the sentence breaks off, the parenthetical example being elaborated and supported by other subordinate illustrations until the end of the chapter. Moreover the manner in which the true end of the state comes to light is not stated in antithesis to the false ends rejected, but is an incident of this elaborate treatment of the one false view, that the end is commercial intercourse viz. περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας διασκοποῦσιν, § 8. The upon the mention of the true end leads to its severance from some unessential though indispensable conditions (κοινωνία τῶν, περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, §§ 9—12); and this is followed by the formal definition of the true end of the state, § 13, from which

χρήσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους—καὶ γὰρ ἂν Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρ- (V)
 χηδόνοι, καὶ πάντες οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὥς
 § 7 μᾶς ἂν πολῖται πύλεως ἦσαν. εἰσὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς συνθήκαι 11
 περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων καὶ σύμβολα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
 40 καὶ γραφαὶ περὶ συμμαχίας. ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ
 1280 b τούτοις κοινὰ καθεστᾶσιν, ἀλλ' ἕτεραι παρ' ἑκατέροις, οὔτε
 τοῦ πόλους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ φροντίζουσιν ἄτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους,
 οὐδ' ὅπως μηδεὶς ἀδικὸς ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μὴδὲ
 μοχθηρίαν ἔξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μὴδὲν ἀδική-
 5 σοῦσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας [πολιτικῆς] δια-
 § 8 σκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ἥ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι

36 ἀλλήλους—] THUOT and Bonitz, to mark the anacoluthon. As far as the sense goes, the apodosis is at 1281 a 4 ff διόπερ κτλ. || τυρρηνοὶ P⁴ fr, τύρανοι P²⁻³ T^b and Q^b (1st hand) || 35 συνθήκαι] σωθῆναι P²⁻⁴ T^b and Q^b (1st hand), apparently P⁴ (1st hand), as σωθῆναι is written over an erasure || 39 καὶ omitted by P⁴ T^b Ald. and the 1st hand in P⁴ Q^b (added by a later hand in Q^b) || 40 ἐπὶ πᾶσι Schneideius transposing 1280 b 1 ἑκατέροις ἑτέροις A1. Koiaes, perhaps rightly || 2 τοῦ omitted by 11² fr, hence [τοῦ] SUSSEM.¹⁻² || ἕτεροι M¹ P¹ and perhaps Γ || 4 ἔξειν P²⁻³ T^b Ald. and Q^b (1st hand) || ἀδικήσουσιν Morel, ἀδικήσων Γ II (including fi.) Ar. || 5 [δὲ] Koiaes, as if the apodosis began here || πολιτικῆς omitted by 11² (added after ἀρετῆς by P¹ in the margin) || διασκοποῦσιν P¹ (1st hand, emended by P¹), διακο- νοῦσιν Γ M¹ fi. || 6 εὐνομίας <πύλεως μίας> Bernays

the real measure of political rights is a deduction made in § 15. Were the digressions dismissed, and the anacoluthic period rewritten, it would perhaps run as follows: εἰ δὲ μήτε τοῦ ἦν μόνον ἔσκεν (κοινωνοῦσι) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰ ἦν, μήτε συμμαχίας ἔσκεν ὅπως ὑπὸ μηδεὶς ἀδικῶνται, μήτε διὰ τὰς ἀλλαγὰς καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀλλὰ ζωῆς ἕνεκα τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκειας καὶ τῶν καλῶν πρέξων χάριν θεῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτους προσήκει πλείστον μετεχειν πόλεως. Bonitz *Synopsis* III pp. 139—141 (105—107).

36 Τυρρηνοὶ καὶ Καρχ.] This mai-
 time alliance between Carthage and the
 Etruscans, which was formed soon after
 the beginning of the sixth century, B. C.,
 to drive out the Greeks and keep them
 away from the western half of the
 Mediterranean, is noticed by Herodotus
 I. 166, Mommsen I. p. 153 Eng. II.
 SUSSEM. (549)

37 οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα] Comp. c. I § 4,
 21. (435). SUSSEM (550)

as it were, like ὅπερ.

§ 7 38 συνθήκαι...σύμβολα...γραφαί]
 Usually συνθήκαι=a general term for

a treaty or convention, usually of a
 public nature between two states, but
 also all private covenants: σύμβολα=a
 special kind of contract, viz. international
 commercial treaties (so § 6): see Meier
 u. Schomann *Attisch. Procc.* p. 494 n.
 49. Here σωθῆναι περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων
 are commercial treaties in general: σύμβ.
 περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν=special articles which
 made provision against the infliction of
 damage, or established a system of com-
 pensation for mutual injury (Cope).

40 ἀρχαὶ πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις κοινὰ]
 magistracies common to them all ap-
 pointed to secure these ends.

1280 b 2 τοῦ πόλους τινὰς κτλ] nor
 does the one state care what the character
 of the citizens of the other state should be.

3 τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκαι] those who
 come under the treaty.

4 ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως κτλ] The modest
 aim to which the modern state is re-
 stricted.

§ 8 6 εὐνομίας] "good government,"
 the goal and end of all political science;
Nic. Eth. III. 3. 11, I 12 b 14 (Ealon):
 οὕτε πολιτικὴ (βουλευτική) εἰ εὐνομίαν
 ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ
 τελούς, SUSSEM. (551)

δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γ' ὥς ἀληθῶς ἰνομαζο- (V)
 μένη πόλει, μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμ-
 μαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἀπωθεν
 10 συμμαχιῶν, καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ, καθότι ἐξῆλ' Ἀν-
 κόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητής ἀλλήλοισι τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' (v 12)
 § 9 οὐχ ὅσος ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς καὶ δικαίους τρὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ 12
 τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι
 τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἓν, ὥστε ἅπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ
 15 Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις. οὐδ' εἰ πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς

7 ἐπιμελὲς] ἐπιμελῆσαι P¹, ἐπιμε^λ M² || 9 ἀπὸθε fi., ἀποθεν M² P¹⁻³⁻⁴ Q^b T^b Ald.
 Bk.¹ and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.¹) || 10 συμμαχιῶν Coming, συμμάχων Γ II
 (including fi.) A¹. Bk. || 13 συνάγει II² Bk.

7 ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι κτλ.] "the city which truly and not in mere pretence deserves the name must give its attention to virtue." See A. C. Bradley *Hellenica* pp. 193 f., 210 f.

8 γίνεται κτλ.] For else the society is transformed into an alliance differing from all other leagues, whose members dwell apart, in locality alone: the law too is transformed into a compact and 'a guarantee of mutual rights' in the words of Lycophron, not calculated to make the citizens virtuous and just.

10 Ἀνκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής] See Exc. II. to B. II. p. 333 and *Introd.* p. 35. To all appearance Lycophron belonged to the school of Gorgias (n. 448). Perhaps, as v. Willamowitz conjectures *Hermes* XIV. p. 173, he was the same as the erotic poet Lycophronides (Beigk *Poet. byr.* III. p. 633 f.). He is specially known to us elsewhere only as the composer of an eulogy on the lyre, and as maintaining that one thing cannot at the same time be many and that therefore every combination of a predicate with the subject by means of the copula is inadmissible: also that nobility is only an imaginary good. Comp. Vahlen *The Sophist Lycophron in Rhetor. Mus.* XXI. 1865, p. 143 ff., Zeller *Pro-Socrati* vol. II. pp. 495, 477 Eng. II. A sophist was originally any man of intellectual impotence, who also made it his profession to acquire education and knowledge and impart them to others; hence the seven sages are also called the seven sophists. At a later time, after the age of Pericles, the name was given in a narrower sense to paid professional teachers of rhetoric and other

departments of an encyclopaedic education. They delivered single lectures and discourses of an instructive or amusing kind (*ἐπιδείξαι*), charging a fee for admission, or perhaps published them in writing, in some cases they appeared as experts in argument. In this sense the word occurs here. At the same time it received the odious connotation in which we exclusively use it at the present day, in consequence of the many subtleties, the pettifoggish quibbles, and paradoxes in which this class of people was often involved; although the movement towards freethinking* and critical scepticism, which they originated, and their bold innovations had much to justify them, and were in part of epoch-making importance. Cp. I. (31) on I. 3 § 4. *SUSEM.* (552)

See Cope in the *Journal of Sacred and Classical Philology* vol. II. pp. 140—143; also his note on *Rhet.* III. 3. 1.

§ 9 It will be remembered that Corinth and Argos were for a short time, 393—387 B.C., united ostensibly as one state, to the intense indignation of the philo-Iacanian party. See Xen. *Hellen.* IV. 4 § 6 ἀποθανόντων δὲ ἀφανισμένην τὴν πόλιν διὰ τὸ καὶ θροῦν ἀναστῆσαι καὶ Ἄργος ἀπὸ Κορινθίου τὴν πατριδα αὐτοῦ ἐνομαζέσθαι. v. I. § 34, § 36.

16 ἐπιγαμίας] Usually a lawful marriage could only be contracted between two citizens of the same Greek state: but the privilege was occasionally granted to individual strangers or to an alien community as a whole; and special treaties

* [A negative 'enlightenment' or 'Illuminism,' *Ανθρωπισμός*.]

- § 10 πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' εἴ τινας οἰκοῖεν (V
χωρὶς μὲν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν,
ἀλλ' εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν περὶ
20 τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς
ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν
μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων,
§ 11 οἷον ἀλλανγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδ' οὔτω πῶ πόλεις. διὰ 19
τίνα δὴ ποτ' αἰτίαν; σὺ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς
25 κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἕκαστος
μέντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς
ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικούντας μόνον,
οὐδ' οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειε πόλεις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἰ-
§ 12 περ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς. φανερόν τοίνυν
30 ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωνία τόπου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς
αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγ-
καῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων

18 ἄποθεν *fi.* Bk.³, ἄποθεν II Bk.¹ || 19 εἴησαν P¹ A¹., εἴ ἦσαν Γ¹ M¹ II¹ || 20 *ei*
omitted by II³ || 22 μύριοι Ald. Bk.¹ || 23 πῶ Ar. (apparently) and Bk., *πως* possibly
Γ (*quidem* William), πῶ II (including fr.) Susem.¹ || 30 ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι II¹ *fi.* Bk.

secured the right of intermarriage between different cities: Schömann pp. 101, 306, 356 Eng. tr. How far it was prohibited between members of the ruling and subordinate families when such a distinction was made within the limits of the same community, is not known. The Bacchiadae of Corinth (II 12. 8 n. 420) married almost exclusively amongst themselves, Herod. v. 92; and the prohibition of intermarriage with the former ruling families of Samos, after the popular insurrection in 412, forms an especially odious measure, Thuc. VIII. 21 (Eaton). The two royal families at Sparta seem never to have intermarried. SUSEM. (558)
τῶν ἰδίων τοῖς π. κοινωνημάτων] 'one of the means of combination peculiar to cities.'

§ 10 17 οὐδ' εἴ τινας οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς] Aristotle does not mean that civil society is not in itself quite possible between several contiguous villages and hamlets, without the inhabitants being concentrated into one city: c. 3 §§ 3, 4 n. (459, 460). In fact Sparta itself consisted of five such neighbouring villages, so close together, however, that as distinct from the district around them they were designated the 'city.' This was, it is true, an isolated and abnormal phenomenon: see Schö-

mann p. 123, p. 207 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (554) "Is not Aristotle taking an imaginary case, the elements of society (such as γεωργὸς) which are necessary πρὸς τὸ ζῆν μόνον i. living apart but exchanging products (μεταδόσεις) ii. living together and connected by a defensive league, § 11?" (Wyse).

20 οἷον *ei* *κατλ*] That is, supposing they belonged to these different crafts without which the state could not exist at all: see IV (VII) c 8. SUSEM. (555)

21 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰεν μύριοι] i.e. not at all too many even for a 'city' according to Greek ideas, as distinguished from a race or tribe: cp. IV (VII). c. 4, also n. (11); and II. 6 §§ 4-6, 9 §§ 15-17, n. 198-201, 306, 307, 309, 311. SUSEM. (556)

§ 11 24 διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας] because they did not live near enough to each other.

25 ἕκαστος μέντοι *κατλ*] Each making his own house his 'castle.'

29 συνελθόντες καὶ χωρὶς] after their union and when they lived apart.

§ 12 φανερόν τοίνυν *κατλ*] Comp. c. 1 § 3 n. (434 b). SUSEM. (557)

32 οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπαρχόντων *κατλ*] "yet not even if all these conditions are present is it then actually (ἔσθ) a city, but (a city is) the union of families and clans

τούτων ἀπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία καὶ (V)
 34 ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελέας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρ-
 § 13 κους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικοῦν-
 των τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διδ' κηδείαι τ' ἐγέ-
 ροντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φρατρίαι καὶ θυσαίαι καὶ δια-
 γωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ
 39 συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν,
 § 14 ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δι' ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν
 1281 a κοινωνία ζωῆς τελέας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν,
 ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πρῶ-
 ξεον [χάριν] θετέον εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ
 § 15 τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλείστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύ-
 5 την κοινωνίαν, τοῦτοις τῆς πόλεως μέγεσσι πλείον ἢ τοῖς
 κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μελίζουσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν
 πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίστοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι
 κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντες οἱ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀμφισβητοῦν-

34 τελέας Π³ Bk. || 35 καὶ η ἡ. || 38 τῷ συζῆν Koraes || 40 δὴ ἡ οἱ δὴ
 Susem., δὲ ἡ Γ Π (including ἡ.). A¹. Bk.

1281 a 1 <χάριν> Scaliger, ἐνεκεν Koraes, see next note || 3 χάριν omitted by
 Π¹ (added in P¹ by cor¹), [χάριν] Scaliger. This justifies the insertion of χάριν in
 line 1, rather than ἐνεκεν || 5 τοῦτοις omitted by Q^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand)

in noble living, to the end that they may
 attain a perfect and independent life.
 This however will not be secured unless
 they dwell in the same place and have
 the right of intermarriage."

§ 13 36 κηδεῖαι = ties of affinity.
 37 φρατρίαι See II. 3 § 5, 5 § 17,
 VII (VI). 4 § 19 *nn.* (141, 169, 1427 b).
 Amongst the Greeks these "brother-
 hoods" were [or appeared to be] the next
 subdivision of the old tribal stocks (φύλαί)
 having a number of clans (γένεα) included
 under them SUSEM. (568)

θυσαίαι Clubs which met to sacrifice.
 διαγωγαί Cp. IV (VII). 15. 2. n. (921).
 SUSEM. (568 b) "The recreations of a
 life in common which depend on φύλα"
 would include much, e.g. the commence
 of disciple and friend as well as the plea-
 sures of social reunions (Wyse).

38 τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον κτλ.] Comp. *Nic.*
Elia VIII. 3 § 5 1150 b 4, οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως
 ἐστὶν φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν 5 § 3, 1157 b 19,
 6 § 4, 1158 a 23, IX. 9 § 10 1170 b 10, 10
 § 4 1171 a 2, 12 § 1 1179 b 20 (Eaton).
 SUSEM. (569)

40 ταῦτα] all these minor associations,
 κηδεῖαι, φρατρίαι, &c., are necessary means

to the end, and that is why they came into
 existence (36 δὲ). "This certainly looks
 as if to Aristotle the φρατρίαι were some-
 thing posterior to the origin of a πόλις by
 συνοικισμοῦ καὶ κώμης" (Wyse).

§ 14 πόλις δὴ κτλ.] "Therefore a
 city is the union of clans and villages (to
 attain) a perfect and independent life"
 Ridgeway defends the double genitive:
 "the fellowship of clans and villages in a
 perfect and independent life."

1281 a 1 τελέας καὶ αὐτάρκους] Cp.
 I. 2 § 8 *nn.* (20 b, 21): further *nn.* (459,
 460) on III 3 § 3; also *III.* 1 § 12 n.
 (447): IV (VII). 4 § 11 n. (579), 5 § 1 n.
 (764), 8 § 8 n. (804) and n. (136). SUSEM.
 (560)

2 τῶν καλῶν...πράξεων] With re-
 gard to this conclusion, see n. (708) on
 IV (VII). 1 § 11. SUSEM. (560 b)

§ 15 The citizens have a stake in the
 city in proportion to their contributions
 towards civic fellowship, in the sense just
 given to the term. Superior contribu-
 tions to other objects (wealth, birth) are
 of no avail to confer a greater share of
 civic rights.

c. 10 There ought to be equality to all in the

10 τες μέρος τι τοῦ δικαίου λέγουσι, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέ- (V
νων· ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, τί δεῖ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. V.
ἢ γάρ τοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους, ἢ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς, ἢ
τὸν βέλτιστον ἕνα πάντων, ἢ τύραννον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα
ἔχειν φαίνεται δυσκολίαν. τί γάρ; ἂν οἱ πένητες διὰ τὸ
15 πλείους εἶναι διανεμῶνται τὰ τῶν πλουσίων, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἄδικον
2 ἔστιν, ἔδοξε γάρ [ἴν] νῆ Δία κυρίῳ δικαίως· τὴν οὖν ἀδι-
κίαν τί δεῖ λέγειν τὴν ἐσχάτην; πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων,
οἱ πλείους τὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων ἂν διανεμῶνται, φανερόν ὅτι
φθείρουσι τὴν πόλιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετῇ φθείρει τὸ
20 ἔχον αὐτήν, οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον πόλεως φθαρτικόν· ὥστε δῆλον
3 ὅτι καὶ τὸν νόμον τοῦτον οὐχ οἶόν τ' εἶναι δίκαιον. ἔτι καὶ 2
τὰς πράξεις ὅσας ὁ τύραννος ἔπραξεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάσας
δικαίας· βιάζεται γάρ ἂν κρείττων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πλῆ-
θος τοὺς πλουσίους· ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους ἄρχειν δίκαιον
25 καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους; ἂν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ταῦτα ποιῶσι καὶ διαρ-
πάξωσι καὶ τὰ κτήματα ἀφαιρῶνται τοῦ πλῆθους, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
3 δίκαιον; καὶ θάτερον ἄρα. ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνον ὅτι φαῦλα πάντα
καὶ οὐ δίκαια, φανερόν· ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄρχειν δεῖ 3

13 [ἢ τύραννον] or change to ἢ τὸν νόμον Spengel (not bad) || 16 ἂν omitted by P¹ P² fr. Ar. Bk. || 17 δεῖ] χρῆ P² fr. Bk. || πάλιν .. ληφθέντων corrupt according to Oncken. see Comm. n. (561) || 19 φθερεῖ Γ || 24 ἄρα P² and M² (1st hand) || δίκαιον ἄρχειν P² fr. Bk. || 25 ταῦτα Vettori and Lambin in their translations, ταῦτα Γ Π Ar. || 27 πάντα φαῦλα P² fr. Bk. || 28 δίκαια] σπουδαῖα P¹

In particular, (c. 11) *Should it rest with the Many or the Few?*

The modern doctrine of sovereignty is best expounded by Austin *Jurisprudence* Lect. VI. pp. 226—255, ed. 3.

§ 1 12 ἢ γάρ τοι κτλ.] It must either be (1) the masses, or (2) the wealthy, or (3) the virtuous, or (4) the one preeminently good man, or (5) a despot.

16 ἔδοξε γάρ κτλ.] Ironical. "It is not unjust, for, by heaven, it was justly passed by the supreme body. Then what (but this) deserves to be called the utmost injustice?"

§ 2 17 πάλιν τε κτλ.] And further, after all has been taken away, if the majority begin afresh to distribute amongst them the property of the minority, manifestly they destroy the city. SUSK. (561) The principle is self-destructive.

19 οὐχ ἢ γ' ἀρετῇ] Cp. II. 2 § 7 n. (135 b). On the contrary, the proper excellence of any object is that which

qualifies it for the fulfilment of its end or the performance of its special function: *Nic. Eth.* II. 6. 1, 1106 a 15 (Congreve): whereas, its vice is that which corrupts its true principle, *ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀκακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχὴ N. E.* VI. 5. 6, 1140 b 19 (Eaton). SUSK. (561 b) Cp. *Pl. Rep.* x. 608 a: if moral evil, which is *the* evil of the soul, does not destroy it, then it is indestructible.

20 οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον... φθαρτικόν] Comp. I. 2. 16 n. (28 c), II. 2. 4 n. (133), III. 12 § 1 n. (583), § 9, 13 § 3 n. (590). SUSK. (562)

§ 3 24 ἀλλ' ἄρα κτλ.] Passing to (2), the claims of the wealthy few.

27 καὶ θάτερον ἄρα] (If so,) then so also is the conduct of the majority justified.

§ 4 The claim of the virtuous (*ἐπιεικεῖς*) is very feebly opposed as involving the disfranchisement of all who are not virtuous. This is implied in the very name of aristocracy διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν.

καὶ κυρίους εἶναι πάντων; οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄλλους (VI)
 30 ἀτίμους εἶναι πάντας, μὴ τιμωμένους ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρ-
 χαῖς· τιμὰς γὰρ λέγομεν εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀρχόντων δ'
 § 5 αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς ἄλλους ἀτίμους. ἀλλ'
 ἓνα τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἀρχεῖν βέλτιον; ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο ὀλι- (p. 15)
 γαρχικώτερον· οἱ γὰρ ἄτιμοι πλείους. ἀλλ' ἴσως φαίνεται
 35 τὸ κύριον ὅλως ἀνθρώπων εἶναι ἔχοντά γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα
 πάθῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ νόμον φαῖλον. ἂν οὖν ἡ νό-
 μος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικός δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικός, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν
 ἡπορημένων, συμβήσεται γὰρ ὁμοίως τὰ λεχθέντα πρότερον.
 11 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος· ὅτι 4
 40 δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν
 ὀλίγους δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λίσσασθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν,
 § 2 τάχα δὲ κἂν ἀλήθειαν. τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς, ὧν ἕκαστός ἐστιν
 1281 b οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ, ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελ-
 τίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ
 συμφορητὰ δειπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων·
 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μόνον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρο-

35 ἔχοντα . . 36 ψυχὴν αἰεὶ 36 φαῖλον I¹ II² fi. 11k. || 37 διοίσῃ P¹ Q^b T^b ||
 41 λίσσασθαι . . . 42 ἀλήθειαν. That the text is unsound was seen by Camerarius,
 λίσσασθαι <δεῖν>? Schneidei, [λίσσασθαι] Golling, [λίσσασθαι καὶ] Sussem.¹ (λίσσασθαι a
 variant on ἀλήθειαν), τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶ λίσσασθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν Thuiot,
 <οὐχ ἱκανῶς> λίσσασθαι Shute || τινος Γ M^a || ἔχει M^a (1st hand) || εὐπο-
 ρίαν Κοῖνας, accepted by Beinays and by Sussem.² as less violent than the other
 proposals, cp. *De caelo* II. 12 § 1, 291 b 27, εἰ τις διὰ τὸ φιλοσοφίας διψῇ καὶ μικρὰς
 εὐπορίας ἀγαπᾷ περὶ ὧν τὰς μεγίστας ἔχομεν ἀπορίας.

1281 b 1 οὐ I¹ P¹ Ar., δ P² Q^b T^b

31 ἀρχόντων δ' αἰεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κτλ.] This is the reason why the same feature in Plato's government is called dangerous (ἐπισφαλές), though unavoidable, II. 5 § 25 ff. (181).

§ 5 Similarly the claim of the one pre-eminent citizen (the alternative form of Aristotle's 'best citizen') is reduced to a case similar to the last, which leaves a still larger number disfranchised.

34 ἀλλ' ἴσως κτλ.] Cp. c. 15 § 4, c. 16 § 5 ff. n. (641). SUSSEM. (582 b)

36 φαῖλον] sc. εἶναι περὶκλιτε, "that a human being, whoever he may be, with human passions in his soul should be supreme instead of the law, is a mistake."

ἂν οὖν κτλ.] The law itself may have a bias in favour of oligarchy or democracy; and if so, the fault remains uncorrected.

c. 11 § 1 39 ἔστω τις ἕτερος λόγος]. cc. 12—17 and B. VI(IV), B. VII(VI);

comp. *Introd.* p. 43. SUSSEM. (583)

40 μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ κτλ.] This is a defence of the claims of (1) as against (3). In c. 15 the claims of πλῆθος and βασιλεὺς are compared.

§ 2 42 τοὺς γὰρ πολλούς κτλ.] Comp. c. 15 § 7 n. (646); also c. 11 § 9 below, Thuc. VI. 18. ὁ ὅμοσ δὲ (νομίσαστε) τό τε φαῖλον καὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ πάνν ἀριμετῆς ἂν ἐνυγραθὲν μέλιςτ' ἂν ἰσχύειν, with Iliad. III. 80 z. *fin.* ἐν γὰρ τῷ πολλῷ ἐν τὰ πάντα (Eaton). SUSSEM. (584)

This is the one distinctively original thought of Aristotle, foreshadowed in his definition of citizen, c. 1 § 8.

1281 b 2 οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς σύμπαντας] See I. 3 § 2 and notes.

3 συμφορητὰ δειπνα] 'public dinners' to which many contribute.

4 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κτλ.] Cp. c. 4

5 νήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων ὥσπερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον (VI
τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ'
8 αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ
καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα
9 καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μῦθον, πάντα δὲ

5 καὶ <ὥς> or καὶ <ὥσπερ>? Susem, following Thuiot hesitatingly || συνελθόντας P^a Q^b T^b A¹. Ald. Bk. and com.¹ of P^a-8 || [ὥσπερ] ἓνα Thuiot || γ τῇ] περὶ τὴν M^a Susem.^{1,2} and perhaps Γ || 8 κρίης Γ M^a (et *hic* melius Willmann)

§ 7 n. (1474); also IV(VII). I §§ 10, 11 n. (703). SUSEM. (568)

Hobbes' Leviathan, the body politic, is similarly an artificial body.

5 καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντων .7 διανοίαν] Trendelenburg in his "Law of Nature" (*Naturrecht* p. 463) rightly objects that 'in works of art man is essentially a free, unprejudiced spectator' in politics he is a partisan fellow actor. There is a fallacy in an argument from analogy which draws an inference from the universal common to all the cases compared, when in fact it is the difference between them which is decisive.' But he proceeds to argue, that the comparison leaves out of account the desires and passions which in the case of the multitude dull the intelligence and pervert the will; that the truth brought together by their collective wisdom is materially prejudiced and hampered by the falsehood collected along with it; that the supplementing of the truth from various sides is hindered or frustrated by the resistance of errors and self seeking. In reply to this we must inquire, whether when the public at large judges and enjoys works of art, only healthy popular inclinations and instincts are brought together: whether they are not blended with others which are unhealthy and misleading. Aristotle at least is of this latter opinion V(VII). 6 § 16 n. (1080), 7 § 7 n. (1097), and certainly he is right. Further is there no fallacy in the criticism which overlooks the true analogy in the difference?

On the other side it is not to be forgotten, that where our own interest is concerned, although passion no doubt is inflamed and the critic is converted into a judge in his own cause (c. 9 §§ 1, 2, 16 §§ 8, 9), yet at the same time the intellect is sharpened: thus in accordance with the analogies applied in § 14, (whose correctness even Trendelenburg has not questioned,) in practical questions, where his own weal and woe are at stake, the

uneducated man approximates to an expert still more closely than in art criticism. If it were not so, art critics might be appointed by the popular vote, but not even the most indirect choice of its representatives should be left to the people, although our procedure is now universally the reverse and we believe it to be justified. Trendelenburg's objections (p. 147) to too numerous executive or deceiving assemblies are quite in point. But he forgets that in §§ 8, 9 Aristotle, if we take him literally, only allows the popular assembly to elect the officials: and that in any case (see Exc. IV. to B. II. n. 388) he restricts the decision of the people to a few definite questions. Had he been acquainted with the representative system, he would have judged more correctly: he would then most likely have referred to the council all matters which call for a full deliberation and responsible decision rather than a vote. That not merely capacity but prejudice also and ignorance are collected in the popular assembly is moreover expressly laid down by Aristotle in §§ 6, 7 (though Trendelenburg has altogether overlooked this); but he holds that the danger arising from the passions of individual sovereigns is the greater of the two (15 § 8 n. 647), whereas in a capable nation he maintains that the force of truth will finally triumph over falsehood. This is the thought upon which, as we know, his conception of rhetoric is based: see Zeller II. ii. 785. It may be that this is not capable of strict demonstration, but to a large extent remains merely a matter of belief. Yet this much is certain, that whoever does not cherish this belief has lost faith in humanity generally. See also n. (577) on II § 19. SUSEM. (568 b)

§ 3 8 κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοί] Both music and poetry are well able to illustrate this maxim. The present century is rich in good work which has won its way in spite of the critics.

§ 4 πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν^ε
 ἕκαστοι τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν, τοὺς καλοὺς
 ἴφασιν καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνή-
 χθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἓν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε
 14 κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐτέ-
 ρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον
 καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφο-
 ράν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἀδῆλον,
 ἴσως δὲ νῆ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνὶ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς
 κᾶν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἀρμόσειε λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν
 20 ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν πλῆθος
 § 6 οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότε-
 ρον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν
 ἐχομένην αὐτῆς, τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους (p. 76
 24 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν ὅσοι μῆτε
 § 7 πλούσιοι μῆτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδέν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διὰ
 τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀν<ἀγκη> τὰ δ'

11 ἕκαστοι Thuiot, ἐκάστου Γ II A1. Bk. || ὥσπερ] ὡς περ Vellon in the margin of his Munich copy || [καὶ τῶν μὴ . . 12 φασί] Oncken || 13 κεχωρισμένων Γ Susem. 12, καὶ χωρισμένων M' || γε<οὐδὲν κωλύει>? Spengel || 14 ἔχει P¹ and peithas Ar. <ἐστὶν ἔχειν>? Susem., but no change is needed || 18 περ] ἐπὶ Sylvaig, peithas rightly || ἔνιοι Spengel, which would also do, ἐνίοις Schneider (bad) || 24 μῆτε πλούσιοι omitted by Γ M' || 25 μηδὲ ἐν? Susem., μηδὲ ἐν P¹, μὴ δὲ ἐν M', μηδέεν P², 2, μῆδ' ἐν P⁴, μηδέεν Ald. || 27 ἀνάγκη Ransow, ἀν Γ II Bk. Schindler first saw the text to be unsound and violently changed ἀδικεῖν into ἀδικεῖν and ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτοὺς into ἀμαρτάνουσιν

§ 4 12 τὰ γεγραμμένα κτλ.] Comp. what Sociates says, Xen. *Memor.* III. 10. 2 καὶ μὴν τὰ γε καλὰ εἶδη ἀφομοιοῦντες, ἐπεὶ οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ περιτυχεῖν ἀμειπτα πάντα ἔχοντι, ἐκ πολλῶν συνάγοντες, τὰ ἐξ ἐκάστου κάλλιστα, οὕτως ὅλα τὰ σώματα καλὰ ποιεῖν φάνεσθαι. Zousis adopted this procedure, when he painted his Iselen. To make it a masterpiece of female beauty, he took as model the five most beautiful maidens in the city in order that he might unite in the picture the special excellences of each: see Biann *History of the Greek artists* II. pp. 80, 83 (Vahlen). Comp. n. (64) in Susemihl's edition of the *Politics*, c. 6 § 11. SUSSEM. (588)

13 κεχωρισμένων γε] With the brief gen. abs. comp. *N. Z.* VIII. 13 § 2 ἀμειψόμενον, 15 § 4 ὑπερβῆλλοντο.

§ 6 16 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν π. πρὸς

τοὺς ὀλ.] the difference between the many and the few. So διάστασις, Nic. *Eth.* IX. 3. 4.

18 ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς...ἀρμόσειε λόγος] For the same argument would apply to the animals

19 τί διαφέρουσιν] Comp. I. § 8 n. (43), and n. (54) on I. 6 § 8. SUSSEM. (587)

20 περὶ τὴν πλῆθος] in a certain (given) population.

§ 6 21 τὴν πρότερον εἰρημ. ἀπ.] Namely: who is to possess the sovereign power? Comp. also § 19 n. (578). SUSSEM. (588)

23 τίνων δεῖ κυρίους κτλ.] This next problem (§§ 6—14) is: how far does the sovereignty of the freemen, the mass of the citizens, extend? This was provisionally decided c. 1 § 8.

§ 7 27 ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη] There should be an independent causal sentence here,

ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτούς). τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν (VI)
 29 φοβερὸν (ἔταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι,
 § 8 πολέμιων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λεί-
 πεται δὴ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς.
 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττου-
 7 σιν ἐπὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόν-
 § 9 των, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἔωσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ
 35 ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μινύμενοι τοῖς
 βελτίοσι τὴν πόλιν ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή
 μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὅλ-
 10 γης· χωρὶς δ' ἕκαστος περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἀτελὴς ἐστίν. ἔχει

28 μηδεμιῶν ἀρχῶν Boeckl., μηδὲ μετέχειν Γ II Bk. || 38 ἀτελής περὶ τὸ κρίνειν II³ Bk.

something standing to τὸ μὲν μετέχειν .. οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς as the clause ἔταν γὰρ .. ὑπάρχωσι, πολέμιων .. ταύτην below stands to τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι φοβερὸν. With Rasmussen's conjecture, ἀνάγκη (ἐστίν), there is such a verb; without it there is no verb on which the infinitives ἀδικεῖν δν and ἀμαρτάνειν can depend.

29 ἔταν γὰρ κατὰ Cr. VII (VI). § 4 n. (1434). SUSSEX. (585 b)

This is presumably the sequel of the objections raised in c. 10 §§ 4, 5. The further development would be in the form of Plato's well-known simile of the dionys in his criticism of oligarchy *Rep.* VIII. 551 D, 552 A—E, 555 D.

§ 8 It remains for them to take part in deliberation and in trials.

32 διόπερ καὶ Σόλων .. 34 ἔωσιν] Comp. II. 12 § 3 (Eac. V. p. 350 f.), § 5 *μη.* (412, 413): VI (IV) 11 § 19 n. (1303), VII (VI). 4 § 4 n. (1415). Such a constitutional restriction is not admissible, certainly, for the citizens of the ideal state who have the best nature and education and are in the possession of a fixed amount of land. There suitable elections of officials must be assumed without such a restriction; there all the citizens have equal rights (cp. *μη.* 440, 885). But nevertheless, as was inferred in the *Introd.* p. 54 from II. 11 § 6 (cp. n. 388), there can be hardly any doubt that even in the ideal state Aristotle intends to restrict the activity of the whole body of full citizens to the election of the officials, together with the final decision upon legislation as well as upon questions of war and peace and treaties with foreign states. Comp. III. 4 § 5, 6 § 1 n. (471). SUSSEX. (589)

33 'set them over,' i.e. 'assign to them' the election of the magistrates and the scrutiny of their conduct (when they retire from office).

ἐπὶ αἵται τάττουσιν. Other conclusions are cis, κατὰ and ἐπὶ with dat.

§ 9 35 ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν] 'sufficiently clear sight' or 'enough discrimination.' The terms αἴσθησις and αἰσθάνεσθαι in Aristotle often go beyond the notion of mere sensation and sense perception to which Plato in the *Theaetetus* restricts them. Thus αἰσθάνεσθαι = to understand another's command in I 5 § 9 (cp. n. 45 b). Like Plato himself at an earlier time, *Phaedr.* 271 n, even where the terms express that notion, Aristotle always has in view the discrimination of the sensible individual by sense, the judgment of perception, so that he calls it a discriminating and judging faculty (δύναμις κριτικῆς, cp. n. 497). *Anal. Post.* II. 15 § 5, 99 b 35, *De Anima* III. 9 1, 432 a 15. Thence by a very natural transition he applies these terms to denote the discrimination of the individual and particular generally, and the decision as to what is right and wrong in relation thereto in practical life—an instinctive process, so to speak, or at all events one which rests merely upon observation and experience, *Nic. Eth.* II. 9, 8, 1109 b 20, IV. 5, 13, 1126 b 3 ff. SUSSEX. (570)

36 καθάπερ ἡ μὴ κ] "as in nutritious food when mixed with the nutritive makes the whole a better diet than the scanty supply" (of nourishment alone), § 2 n. (564). SUSSEX. (571)

38 χωρὶς alone, by himself, ἀτελής] Properly 'immature' or 'undeveloped' or 'incomplete': thence 'un-

δ' ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι (VI)
 40 δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρίναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰατρευκεν,
 οὐπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς
 νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρός. ὁμοίως δὲ
 1282 a τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. ὥσπερ οὖν
 § 11 ἰατρὸν δεῖ διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας ἐν ἰατροῖς, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἄλ-
 λους ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις. ἰατρός δὲ ὅ τε δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ ἀρχι-
 τεκτονικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην· εἰς
 5 γὰρ τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι περὶ πάσας ὥς εἰπεῖν τὰς τέχνας, ἀπο-
 δίδομεν δὲ τὸ κρίνειν οὐδὲν ἤττον τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις ἢ τοῖς
 § 12 εἰδόσιν. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὸν αὐτὸν ἂν δό-
 ξειεν ἔχειν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐλέσθαι ὀρθῶς τῶν εἰδό-
 των ἔργον ἐστίν, οἷον γεωμέτρην τε τῶν γεωμετρικῶν καὶ
 10 κυβερνήτην τῶν κυβερνητικῶν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ ἐνίων ἔργων
 καὶ τεχνῶν μετέχουσι καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινές, ἀλλ' οὐ τι τῶν
 § 13 εἰδόντων γε μάλλον. ὥστε κατὰ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὐκ

49 ὁ omitted by Π² Bk. || καὶ added after ὁμοίως δὲ by Γ¹ M²

1282 a 5 τοιοῦτοι καὶ Π² Bk., καὶ untranslated by William, Ai. || 7 καὶ omitted
 by Π², hence [καὶ] Susem.^{1,2} || 9 τε omitted by Π^{2,4} || 10 [περὶ] οἱ [περὶ ἐνίων]
 Spengel (the former perhaps right) || 11 καὶ before τῶν ἰδιωτῶν omitted by Γ¹ J^b T^b
 || οὐ τι Koenes Bk.³

qualified to judge.' The word was used
 in i. 13 § 7, § 11, to characterize the
 boy's powers of reflection and 'virtue'
 (Congreve) Cp. also n. (875) on IV(vii).
 13. 5 SUSEM. (873)

§ 10 A difficulty: only the physician
 can properly judge a course of treatment
 and pronounce with authority that it has
 been successful.

39 ἀπορίαν πρώτην] 'Certainly this
 mode of ordering the constitution involves
 a difficulty—in the first place that &c.':
 followed § 15 by ὅλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχόμενη
 ταύτης. cp. *Analyt.* p. 111. SUSEM. (873)
 1282 a 1 ὥσπερ οὖν κατὰ] Compare
 Plato's illustration of the physician (used
 by boys at the accusation of the cook,
Gorg. 521 E.

§ 11 3 ἰατρός δὲ κατὰ] 'The physician'
 may mean (1) the practitioner in ordi-
 nary cases, (2) the scientific student who
 has mastered the whole field of medicine,
 (3) the educated layman who has ac-
 quired his knowledge of medicine only
 out of scientific interests generally.

5 τινες καὶ τοιοῦτοι κατὰ] 'For there
 are even some such' viz. amateurs 'in
 nearly all the arts, and we assign the

right to judge to the educated layman as
 much as to the physician.' With the
 order of Π², τοιοῦτοι καὶ, Βειναγ and others
 must translate 'in almost all other arts
 as well,' which is a misplaced emphasis.
 Camerarius compares the first words of
 the treatise *De partibus animal.* περὶ
 πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον. δύο φαί-
 νονται τρόποι τῆς ἔξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν
 ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει
 προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τινα.
 πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον
 τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι ἐσθιόντος τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ
 καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων. SUSEM. (873 b)

§ 12 7 ἔπειτα—further, not answer-
 ing πρώτην; but rather completing so
 much of the problem as is expressed in
 §§ 10, 11 viz. περὶ τὴν κρίσιν.

περὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν] in the election of
 magistrates, § 13 ἀρχαιρεσιῶν.

8 τῶν εἰδόντων] experts in mathematics,
 Plato *Politic.* 301 A, B, ὁ ἐπιστήμων.

11 ἰφ' ἡμῶν ἔχειται, μετέχουσι—
 μετέχουσι τῆς αἵρεως virtually; 'have a
 voice in the election.'

§ 13 12 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] 'i.e.
 11. § 1 n.

- ἀν εἴη τὸ πλῆθος ποιητέον κύριον οὔτε τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν οὔτε (VI)
 § 14 τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς 10
 15 διὰ τε τὸν πάλαι λόγον, ἂν ᾗ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδρα-
 ποδῶδες (ἔσται γὰρ ἕκαστος μὲν χείρων κριτῆς τῶν εἰδόντων,
 ἅπαντες δὲ συνελθόντες ἢ βελτίους ἢ οὐ χείρους), καὶ ὅτι
 περὶ ἐνίων οὔτε μόνον ὁ ποιήσας οὐτ' ἄριστ' ἂν κρίνειεν,
 20 οἷόν τι οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γινώσκουσι καὶ οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες τὴν τέχνην, οἷον
 οἰκίαν οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ γινώσκειν τοῦ ποιήσαντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλ-
 τιον ὁ χρώμενος αὐτῇ κρινεῖ (χρηῖται δ' ὁ οἰκονόμος), καὶ
 πηδάλιον κυβερνήτης τέκτονος, καὶ θοῖνην ὁ δαντυμῶν ἀλλ'
 § 15 οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπορίαν τάχα δόξειέν
 τις ἂν οὕτω λύειν ἱκανῶς· ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης.
 25 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μειζόνων εἶναι κυρίους τοὺς φαύ- 11
 λους τῶν ἐπεικῶν, αἱ δ' εὐθυναὶ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέ-
 σεως εἰς τὴν μέγιστον· ὅς ἐν ἐνταῖς πολιτείαις, ὥσπερ εἰρηται,
 τοῖς δῆμοις ἀποδιδόσκειν ἢ γὰρ ἐκκλησίᾳ κυρία πάντων
 § 16 τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. καίτοι τῆς μὲν ἐκκλησίας μετέχουσιν καὶ
 30 βουλευέουσιν καὶ δικάζουσιν ἀπὸ μικρῶν τιμημάτων καὶ τῆς
 τυχοῦσης ἡλικίας, ταμιεύουσι δὲ καὶ στρατηγούσι καὶ τὰς
 μεγίστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχοῦσιν ἀπὸ μειζόνων. ὁμοίως δὲ τις ἂν 13

17 ἢ before βελτίους omitted by Π¹, [?] Susem.¹⁻² || 18 μόνος Susem.¹⁻² (solus
 William, Ar) || 21 αὐτῇ αὐτὸ P²⁻³ Ald. || κρίνει Π¹ Α1. || 26 εὐθυναὶ M² Ald.
 || 27 μέγιστα Γ, μέγισται P¹⁻⁴, μέγιστοι M¹, μέγιστον P²⁻³ Q¹ T¹ Ar. Ald Bk. || ἐν
 omitted by M¹ P¹ || 30 διδάσκουσι P¹ (1st hand), γρ. διαδύουσι in the margin of P⁴ ||
 32 ἀρχοῦσιν M¹, ἔχουσιν Π² || μεγάλων Π² Α1. Bk. || δὲ Spengel, δὲ Γ II Bk.

13 κύριον οὔτε.. οὔτε] The two *μήνισμα*
 without which it is reduced to virtual
 dependence on its rulers (δοῦλος ἂν εἴη
 καὶ πολέμιος II 12. 5).

§ 14 The reply to the objection of
 § 10: (a) the collective judgment of a free
 people may be even superior to that of
 the experts; (b) the uses of the laws
 may be better practical judges of them
 than their makers: the expert's know-
 ledge is not always an advantage.

15 διὰ τὸν πάλαι λόγον] for the rea-
 son stated above, §§ 2—4. πάλαι as in
 § 20; so II. 4 § 10.

μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες] answering to
 περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον of § 5.

17 καὶ οἱ περὶ ἐνίων κτλ] The user
 may be in a higher position than the
 maker: c. 4 § 18 ὁ αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος
)(δ' αὐλοποιός. π. (499). SUSEM. (874)

19 ὅσων τὰ ῥαγα κτλ.] viz. all those
 subjects in which the products (?) are

understood, even by such as are unac-
 quainted with the art.

§ 15 Second objection (see § 10).
 The least capable citizens have the most
 authority: sovereignty resides with them.

27 ὥσπερ εἰρηται] § 8. 'Solon and
 some other legislators.' SUSEM. (876)

§ 16 21 ταμιεύουσι... 32 μειζόνων]
 "But for the treasurer and the mini-
 ster of war and the highest officers men of
 higher property qualification are re-
 quired." Even at Athens the "Treas-
 urers of the Goddess" as they were
 called, and the treasurers of the other
 temples, though appointed by lot, were
 always taken from the highest class only:
 Schömann p. 418 Eng. tr. SUSEM. (876)

The reply. Strictly speaking no single
 ecclesiast or dicast is a magistrate: he
 is only a fraction or element of the com-
 posite magistrate or public official, the
 assembly and the law court.

λύσειε καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν. ἴσως γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ταύτ' (VI)
 § 17 ὀρθῶς. οὐ γὰρ ὁ δικαστὴς οὐδ' ὁ βουλευτὴς οὐδ' ὁ ἐκκλη-
 35 σιαστὴς ἄρχων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δικαστήριον καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ
 δῆμος· τῶν δὲ ῥηθέντων ἕκαστος μῦριόν ἐστι τούτων (λέγω
 § 18 στήν). ὥστε δικαίως κύριον μειζόνων τὸ πλῆθος· ἐκ γὰρ πολ-
 λῶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὸ δικαστήριον. καὶ τὸ τίμημα
 40 δὲ πλείον τὸ τούτων πάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ'
 § 19 ὁλίγων μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν διωρίσθω 13
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία ποιεῖ φανε-
 ρὸν οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὥς ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι κυ-
 ρίους κειμένους ὀρθῶς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἂν τε εἰς ἂν τε
 πλείους ὦσι, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίους περὶ ὧσιν ἐξαδυνα- (p. 211)
 5 τοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι καθύ-
 20 λου διορίσαι περὶ πάντων. ὁποίους μέντοι τινὰς δεῖ εἶναι
 τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, οὐδὲν παρὰ δῆλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μένει
 τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ὁμοίως ταῖς πολυτέλαις

40 τὸ before τοῦτων omitted by II¹, hence [τὸ] Suscm.^{1,2} || πάντων τούτων II²
 Bk. || 41 ἐχόντων II²

1282 b 1 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον M² P¹ || 6 διορίσαι] δηλώσαι II²Bk. || εἶναι δεῖ I² Bk.
 || 8 ἀλλὰ γὰρ... τοὺς ἀδικούς transposed to follow 11 νόμους by Comperce; to follow

33 καὶ ταῦτα] ἡ τάξις αὐτῆς τῆς πολι-
 τείας, § 10.

§ 18 39 καὶ τὸ τίμημα δὲ κατὰ] Meier
 over the amount of property at which all
 these are rated is far greater collectively
 than the property of individuals in high
 offices and of the members of small
 boards.

§ 19 41 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν κατὰ] Tien-
 dorf thinks that we do not quite
 clearly see whether Aristotle is only
 setting up his analogies dialectically or de-
 fending them as his own opinion. There
 can be no doubt, however, especially after
 such an explicit explanation as is here
 given, that the latter is the case: nor
 can any reason be discovered, even on
 other grounds, for a doubt of this kind.
 SUSCM. (577)

1282 b 1 ἡ δὲ πρώτη λεχθεῖσα ἀπορία]
 This is the question treated in c. 10, and
 then partly decided in c. 11 §§ 1—5, viz.
 who is to possess supreme authority?
 (Comp. § 6 n. 568.) The answer was
 "the whole of the bourgeois body in every
 state which has any degree of excellence":
 and on the basis of this decision, the
 point which came up at c. 10 § 5 is now

settled by the addition of the qualifying
 clause "but in accordance with the laws,"
 and in such a way that the greater or less
 degree of excellence and correctness of
 the laws is determined by that of the
 constitution to which they correspond.
 This raises the question of the relative
 merit of the normal constitutions which
 we proceed to answer in cc. 12, 13: see
 however *Introd.* p. 41 f. SUSCM. (578)

3 κειμένους ὀρθῶς] if they are good
 laws.

τὸν ἄρχοντα δὲ κατὰ] "and the ruler,
 be he one or many, must only be sov-
 ereign in such cases as the laws are quite
 unable to lay down precisely, because
 of the inherent difficulty of framing
 general rules applicable to all cases."
 Comp. c. 15 § 4 ff. c. 16 §§ 8, 11, with
 n. (637, 652, 653): *Nic. Eth.* v. 10. 4,
 1147 b 13. Hence again Aristotle is
 following Plato, *Politeia* 291 A 303;
 see n. (637) on c. 15 § 4. SUSCM. (579)

To these references, *Latius* IX 475 c
 may be added (Jachmann *ad loc.* *Nic. Eth.*)
 also *Ibid.* II. 8 § 22.

§ 20 8 πάλαι] At c. 10 § 5: *comp.* n.
 (578). SUSCM. (580)

- 9 ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι καὶ δι- (VI
 § 21 καίους ἢ ἀδίκους. πλὴν τοῦτό γε φανερόν ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὴν
 πολιτείαν κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους. <ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως ταῖς
 9 <πολιτείαις ἀνάγκη καὶ τοὺς νόμους φαύλους ἢ σπουδαίους εἶναι
 <καὶ δίκαιους ἢ ἀδίκους.> ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, δηλον ὅτι
 12 τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὰς ὁρθὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δίκαιους
 τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας οὐ δίκαιους.
 12 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις VI
 15 ἀγαθὸν τὸ τέλος, μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ κυρια-
 τάτῃ πασῶν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις. ἔστι δὲ
 πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμ-

13 *dikaious* by Schneider (who however brackets the sentence), and Schmidt (who then emends <τι> γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο <ἢ> ὁμοίως.... ἀδίκους;), while Thurot omits ἀλλὰ γὰρ and transposes § καὶ ὁμοίως..... 10 ἀδίκους 10 follow 11 ὅλον ὅτι. A double re-cension, § ἀλλὰ γὰρ.. 10 ἀδίκους = 10 πλὴν τοῦτο . . 11 τοῦτο, wrongly assumed by Susem.^{1,2} || καὶ before ὁμοίως II² Bk. Schneider Raskow Thurot Beinays, <εἰ> καὶ Κοινας, & Susem.^{1,2} (11 *emuliter* William) || On cc. 12, 13 see *Introd.* 41 ff. || 15 δὲ II² Bk. Scaliger Bonitz Spengel || 16 ἔστι δὲ Scaliger || 17 <τὸ> Susem.

ἀλλὰ γὰρ κἂν ὁμοίως] 'for relatively to the constitution the laws, too, must necessarily be bad or good, just or unjust.' Comp. vi(IV). 1 § 9 n. (1128), *Isoc.* VII. 14. SUSEM. (581)

In cc 12, 13 two constitutional principles take a more definite shape. In a note to his Translation, p. 172, Beinays remarks that these two chapters "contain a separate sketch for the discussion of the same questions which are partly treated in cc. 9-11, partly in cc. 16, 17. As the sketch presents some peculiarities, e.g. the mention of socialism, c. 13 § 15 ff., those who arranged Aristotle's papers thought it ought to be preserved; and the place they assigned to it seemed recommended by the close connexion of its contents with the neighbouring chapters. Where the tautologies, thus arising appeared too obvious, the attempt was made to lessen them by formulae like εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον 13 § 1, § 2. According to Aristotle's intention, the beginning of c. 14 should join on directly to the close of c. 11": the reason assigned being that the words φάμεν γὰρ τῶν ὁρθῶν πολιτειῶν μὴν εἶναι ταύτην, 14 § 1, find no connexion at the close of c. 13, but refer back to the words κατὰ τὰς ὁρθὰς πολιτείας of 11 § 22. This view has been already examined, *Introd.* pp. 42, 43.

§ 12 § 1 14 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις] Comp. 1

§ 1 n. (1), *Nic. Eth.* I. 2 § 4, 109 f. n. 26. SUSEM. (582)

The sentence of this sentence is disputed. Scaliger, Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 94), Spengel treat it as all one period from 14 ἐπεὶ to 22 λαμβάνειν. But this requires δὲ in line 15, whereas δὴ is the reading of II².

16 δύναμις] Joined with αἱ τέχναι, II. 8 § 18; so *Rhet.* I. 2 § 1, ἔστι δὲ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἑκάστων τοῦ θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἑτέραν ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον.

ἔστι δὲ... 17 δίκαιον] 'The good for the state, i.e. the interest of the commonwealth, can only be justice' πολιτικὸν ἀγαθὸν is the subject and τοῦτο refers to this: while τὸ δίκαιον, defined in the next sentence, is predicate. See c. 10 § 2 and the references, given in n. (562). SUSEM. (588)

It is convenient at this place to reproduce, from *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 4, the fuller account of πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, the embodiment of 'right' or 'justice' in civil society: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ κοινωνικὸν βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἰσῶν ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, the justice of free and (proportionately or actually) equal citizens living together with a view to the satisfaction of wants. When this is not the case there is only an analogical sort of justice, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοίτητα. ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οὐ καὶ νόμος πρὸς

φέρων. δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ μέχρι (VII)
 γέ τινος ὁμολογοῦσι τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς
 10 διώριστα περὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν (τὶ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ
 2 δεῖν τοῖς ἴσοις ἴσον εἶναι φασίν). ποίων δ' ἰσότης ἐστὶ καὶ
 ποίων ἀνισότης, δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνειν. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν
 καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κατὰ 2
 παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ δεῖν ἀνίσωτος νυνεμῆσθαι τὰς ἀρ-
 25 χὰς, εἰ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ μηδὲν διαφέρουσι ἀλλ' ὅμοιοι
 τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ δί-
 3 καιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἔσται
 καὶ κατὰ χρῶμα καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ καθ' ὅτιον τῶν
 29 ἀγαθῶν πλεονεξία τις τῶν πολιτικῶν δικαίων τοῖς ὑπερέ-
 3 χουσιν. ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦδος; φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων· τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν

19 [ἐν οἷς.....ἡθικῶν] Stahr || 21 δ' omitted by P⁴ C^o, [δ'] οἱ else τ' Spengel, δὴ
 Bonitz || 23 ἴσως. . . 1283 b 32 δίκαιον noticed by Pseudo-Plutarch de nobil.
 o. 8, p. 937 A ff. || 27 [καὶ] Schneidewitz, [τὸ] Ramus || 30 δ' γὰρ Spengel

αὐτοῦ· νόμος δ' ἐν οἷς ἀδικεῖ· ἡ γὰρ δική
 κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου... τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶ τὸ πλεον αὐτῷ νέμειν τῶν ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. See
 further Jaekel's admirable comments,
 pp. 101—103 of his edition.

18 ἴσον τι· 'All hold that justice is a
 species of equality.' So also in *Nic. Eth.*,
 see n. on 9 § 1.

19 τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις] Strictly
 scientific or philosophical discussions as
 contrasted with such as are merely dia-
 lectical, *Topic* I. 14 § 6, 105 b 30, and
 with the exoteric discussions carried on
 from the standpoint of the ordinary or
 'envenaging' consciousness, *End. Eth.* I.
 8 § 4, 1217 b 22, ἐπέσκεπται δὲ καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἑσπερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
 φιλοσοφίαν. Comp. c. 6 § 2; IV(VII). 1
 §§ 2, 3 and ἔκκειναι τοῖς B. IV(VII). τῶν
 ἡθικῶν] *Nic. Eth.* v. c. 3 which is simi-
 larly cited c. 9 § 3; see n. (545). Cp.
 VIII(V). 1 § 2 n. (1493). SUBEM. (564)

20 τὶ γὰρ καὶ τινί· 'For justice is
 held to be something assigned to certain
 persons, and must be equal for equals.'
 One's rights, one's just share, is the
 nearest English for the concrete δίκαιον.
 Cf. as Mr A. C. Bradley puts it, here is
 the nearest approach to our modern
 notion of a 'right.'

§ 2 21 ποίων δ' ἰσότης] Comp. c.
 9 § 4, κατὰ τὶ οἷον χρήμασιν, οἷον ἐλευ-

θερίῳ, n. (546 b); VIII(V). 1 § 2 n. (1493).
 SUBEM. (564 b)

23 ἔχει 23 φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν]
 'Here lies a difficulty, and a stimulus to
 research in political science.' SUBEM.

23 κατὰ παντὸς ὑπεροχὴν ἀγαθοῦ]
 on the ground of superiority in any ad-
 vantage. This is one of the phrases
 used in I. 6 § 3. Here certainly *external*
 goods; see line 28.

26 τοῖς γὰρ διαφέρουσιν] 'For (he
 would say) people who differ have dif-
 ferent rights and their relative merits are
 different.' The correction of Ramus, καὶ
 κατ' ἀξίαν, changes the sense, 'and their
 different rights go according to merit.'
 See n. (1493). SUBEM.

§ 3 On this view superiority in colour
 (white and dark races?) or in size (cp. IV
 [VII]. 14 § 3) or in any other external
 good would confer a larger share of poli-
 tical rights. The falsity of this is seen
 from the other side.

ἴσον compares *Nic. Damasc.* (n. voc.)
 Ἀλλοτρίοις ἴσους τοὺς ταχυαῖονας αὐτῶν
 αἰρουμένων βασιλεῖς.

§ 4 31 αὐλητῶν] A passive genitive
 with σύνεργτοις. The comparison be-
 tween αὐλητικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ is
 best known from the discourse of Pro-
 tagoras in Plato's dialogue 327 A (cp.
 323 b). It is doubtless Socratic. Cp. c.
 4 § 18.

τὴν τέχνην οὐ δοτέον πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν τοῖς εὐγενεστέ- (V)
 ροις· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐλήσουσι βέλτιον, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔρ-
 γον ὑπερέχοντι δοδῶναι καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν. (α.
 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγα-
 § 5 γοῦσιν ἔσται φανερόν. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τις ὑπερέχων μὲν κατὰ
 τὴν αὐλητικήν, πολλὸ δ' ἑλλείπων κατ' εὐγένειαν ἢ κάλ-
 λος, εἰ καὶ μείζων ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ τῆς αὐλη-
 τικῆς (λέγω δὲ τὴν τ' εὐγένειαν καὶ τὸ κάλλος), καὶ κατὰ
 40 τὴν ἀναλογίαν ὑπερέχουσι πλεον τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος
 κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικήν· ὥμως τούτῳ δοτέον τοὺς διαφέροντας
 1283 α τῶν αὐλῶν. δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον συμβάλλεσθαι τὴν ὑπερ-
 οχήν καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς εὐγενείας, συμβαίνονται δ'
 § 6 οὐδέν. ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν
 αὖν εἴη συμβλητόν. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τι μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως

33 οὐδὲ ΓΜ' || 35 εἰ δὲ 1283 α 3 οὐδέν is regarded as an interpolation by Riese, who wrongly thinks the inferiority of αὐλητικῇ to nobility and beauty to have been previously stated

1283 α 4 [μᾶλλον] Ridgeway, ἐνάμεινον? Ingram

32 τὴν τέχνην] Adverbial accus., after ὁμοίως, as after ἴσος II. 2 § 6, εἰ ἴσος I. 12 § 2; and so πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ in line 25.

33 δεῖ δὲ τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον κτλ.] So that the only superiority which constitutes a claim to power is superiority in virtue or capacity for serving the state, to which power is instrumental.

34 καὶ τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν ὑπεροχήν = the superiority also in instruments i.e. superior instruments as well, just as πλεονεξίαν τῶν αὐλῶν = advantage in respect of flutes.

35 προαγαγοῦσιν] "if we advance a little further." Initiates, as in *L'hy.* I. 1 § 2, 184 α 19, προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα, *Rhet.* 4 § 7, 1448 b 23, κατὰ μικρὸν προάγουσες. It appears then that αὐτὸ is a nom., as 5 § 4: 'of itself.'

§ 6 38 εἰ καὶ...4 αὐλητικήν] "even granting that each of them (good birth and beauty) is a greater good than skill with the flute and proportionately superior to flute-playing in a degree far exceeding his superiority as a flute-player, nevertheless we must assign to him the superior flutes." I once conjectured that the text was unsound; but these words give a correct sense if, with Weinay, we understand ἐκεῖνα from what precedes as the subject of ὑπερέχουσι. Riese treats the

entire passage 35 εἰ δὲ μήπω δῆλον. 1283 α 3 οὐδέν as an interpolation; but he proceeds on the incorrect assumption that the remark 'although flute-playing in itself is something less important than nobility or beauty' has already occurred in the context. See moreover Vahlen *Reitige zu Arist. Polit.* II. p. 71 (159) f. *SUSEM.*

Vahlen is there noticing Aristotle's constant striving after a clearness and precision which to us seems unnecessary, and amongst other instances cites c. 11 § 17 λέγω δὲ δικαστὴν, *Rhet.* I. 11 § 26, 1371 b 20, *ib.* III. 2 § 6, 1404 b 32. Vahlen also urges this in defence of καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς τοῖς ὑπάρχει in c. 1 § 4 of the present book of the *Politics*.

1283 α 1 δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἔργον] If the claim of wealth and good birth is valid they ought to contribute to the better performance of function, which they certainly do not.

4 συμβλητόν = commensurable. See *De rem. et corr.* II. 6 §§ 1, 2 c1 μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν (συμβλητά), ἀνάγκη ταυτὸ τι εἶναι ὑπάρχον ἀπασὶ τοῖς συμβλητοῖς ᾧ μετροῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἐξ ὕδατος κοτύλης εἰς ἀέρος δέκα.

§ 6 εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τι μέγεθος] 'For if a given bodily stature (civicais political privileges) more than' i.e. in preference to—hence we must supply 'a certain amount of wealth or good birth.'

5 ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς (VII)
ἐλευθερίαν. ὥστ' εἰ πλεῖον ὁδὶ διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ
ὁδὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλεῖον ἀρετῆς μέγεθος ὅλως ὑπερ-
έχειν * #, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ πάντα. τοσούδε γὰρ [μέγεθος] εἰ
§ 7 κρείττον τοσοῦδε, τοσοῦδε δῆλον ὥς ἴσον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἰδύ-
10 νατον, δῆλον ὥς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν εὐλόγως οὐ κατὰ
πᾶσαν ἀνισότητ' ἀμφισβητοῦσι τῶν ἀρχῶν (εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν
βραδεῖς οὐ δὲ ταχεῖς, οὐδὲν διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖον
τοὺς δ' ἑλαττον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἡ τού-
§ 8 των διαφορὰ λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν). ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλεις συν-
15 ἔστηκεν, ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν.
διόπερ εὐλόγως ἀντιποιοῦνται τῆς τιμῆς οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ πλού-
σιοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι. δεῖ γὰρ ἐλευθέρους τ' εἶναι καὶ τίμημα
φέροντας (οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη πόλεις ἐξ ἀπόρων πάντων, ὥσπερ

6 ἦ. . . ὑπερέχειν omitted by Q^b R^b || 7 <ει> καὶ πλεον ὑπερέχει δῶς ἀρετῇ
μεγέθους Bernays || ὑπερέχειν δῶς ἀρετῇ μέγεθος I².1.1 T^b Ald. Plutarch Bk. ||
ὑπερέχειν <ἐνδέχεται>? Sussem, ὑπερέχει Ai. Plutarch Bk. Sussem.¹ I¹ (conjector)
and perhaps Γ || 8 [πάντα] Bernays || [μέγεθος] Sussem || 10 καὶ omitted by
Π¹ Ar., [καὶ] Sussem.¹⁻⁴ || 11 ἀνισότητῃ P⁴ P¹ and Plutarch, ἰσότητ' Γ' M^a, ἰσότητῃ
P¹ (1st hand) || 16 περὶ τῆς P¹⁻⁴ Q^b T^b || ἐπιεικεῖς Sussem., εὐγενεῖς Π¹ I².1.1 Ai.
Ald. Plutarch Sussem.¹ (in the text), συγγενεῖς Q^b T^b. Cp. Quæst. ci. coll. p. 393
|| καὶ πλούσιοι αἴλει 17 καὶ ἐλεύθεροι Π² Ar. Plutarch Bk || 17 τ' omitted by M^a
P¹, hence [τ'] Sussem.¹⁻⁴

§ ἐνάμιλλον εἴη = would enter the lists with, be comparable to.

6 ὥστ' εἰ πλεον κατ[.] 'Hence if A's superiority in stature exceeds B's superiority in merit, and (if) in general stature *can* exceed merit, evidently everything is comparable with everything else' — *can* represents the ἐνδέχεται conjectured to stand after ὑπερέχειν. Bernays takes <ει> καὶ πλεον ὑπερέχει δῶς ἀρετῇ μεγέθους, εἴη ἂν συμβλητὰ as all belonging to the apodosis: "then, although virtue to itself is more excellent than bodily size, yet a common measure can be found."

8 τοσούδε γὰρ εἰ κρείττον κατ[.] If a cubic inch of gold is superior to a cubic inch of silver, then clearly a certain amount of gold is *equal* to a cubic inch of silver. But this being impossible in the case where wealth, or bodily strength, competes with virtue, it follows that "in politics as well as (καὶ) the other sciences or faculties (§ 3) it is not every kind of inequality on which men ground their claims to public office, and thus for good reason." μέγεθος, except in line 8, = stature, not 'amount.'

§ 8 14 ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν πόλεις συνίστηται] But it is on the ground of the elements of which a city is composed that they necessarily contend for state offices, *as* κατὰ τὸ ἔργον ὑπερέχοντας § 4. (If these 'elements' of the city, the various factions or sections of society whose representation fixes the constitution and the nature of the qualification for political power, he enumerates three; merit, wealth, and free birth. Comp. *usu.* on 7 § 2, 9 § 1; also vi(iv). 8 §§ 7—9.)

17 τίμημα is the rated valuation of taxable property, upon which taxes were levied. Generally speaking, it was greatly below the true, or selling, value. Thus τίμημα φέρων οἱ ἔχουσιν (to have property so estimated, to be a taxpayer, *hōmme retournant* a taxable value of property. So in vi(iv). 13 § 2, οὗς μὲν ἔχουσιν τίμημα and τοὺς ἀπόρους (without property), and *ib.* 6 § 2, ἀποδοῦναι τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρημένον. But in itself τίμημα does not mean taxes.

18 οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀπόρων δύνασθαι] A body of needy men could not have the necessary leisure, *etc.* 1. A body

§ 9 οὐδ' ἐκ δουλῶν)· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ δεῖ τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὡς
 20 δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης ἀρετῆς. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ τού-
 των οἰκείσθαι πόλιν δυνατόν· πλὴν ἄνευ μὲν τῶν προ-
 13 τέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οἰκείσθαι κα-
 ῖνά γε τούτων ὁρθῶς ἀμφισβητεῖν, πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγα-
 25 θήν ἢ παιδείαν καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴν μάλιστα δικαίως ἂν ἀμφισβη- (V 80)
 τήσαν, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτως
 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν δεῖ τοὺς ἴσους ἕν τι μόνον ὄντας οὔτε
 ἀνίσουν τοὺς ἀνίσους καθ' ἑν, ἀνάγκη πάσας εἶναι τὰς
 § 2 τοιαύτας πολιτείας παρεκβάσεις. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρό-
 30 τερον ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινα δικαίως πάντες,
 ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικαίως. οἱ πλούσιοι μὲν ὅτι πλεῖον
 μέτεστι τῆς χώρας αὐτοῖς, ἢ δὲ χάρα κοινόν, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ
 συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν· οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι

20 πολιτικῆς P⁴ and Plutarch || 25 δικαίως ἀναγκαίως P⁴ Q^b T^b || 27 ἴσων P² (apparently), P⁴ T^b Ald. P⁴ (1st hand) Q^b (1st hand, connected by a later hand) and P¹, ἴσων ἴσων A¹. and corrector of P¹ in the margin:—in P¹ another ἴσων is added in the margin after the ἴσων altered by P¹ into ἴσων || 32 τὰ omitted by M¹ P¹, hence [τὰ] Susem.¹²

of slaves would be without natural rulers, i. 2 § 4. It would seem that Aristotle could not consistently allow that any barbarian ἔθνος constituted a 'city.' The monarchy which is one of his normal governments is not monarchy over barbarians.

§ 9 21 ἄνευ τῶν προτέρων] These indispensable factors or elements, ἄν ἄνευ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις, c. 5 § 2, IV (VII). 8 § 1 But justice and virtue are equally indispensable if the city is to live properly.

c. 13 § 1 These claimants for power (ἀμφισβητοῦσι τὴν ἀρχήν, 12 § 7) stand on a different footing according as we look (1) to civil society of any sort, or (2) to the highest life, which is nowhere realized save in the ideal state.

23 πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πόλιν εἶναι] 'In view of the bare existence of a city,' as contrasted with εὖ ζῆν, see c. 6 §§ 4, 5. τὸ πόλιν εἶναι = τὸ συστῆναι of 6 § 3, 9 §§ 13, 14.

24 πρὸς μέντοι ζωὴν ἀγαθὴν κατὰ Comp. i. 2 § 8 n. (21). SUSEM. (585)

25 ἢ παιδείαν καὶ ἢ ἀρετὴν] and explicative. Education (culture) and virtue are words which Aristotle uses interchangeably in this connexion. We may add merit, κατ' ἀξίαν = κατ' ἀρετὴν, 5 § 5 (Bradley). See also *Rhet.* I. 8 § 4 with

Cope's note p. 156 f.

26 καὶ πρότερον] In c. 9. Compare *Introd.* p. 42. SUSEM. (586)

27 πάντων ἴσον ἔχειν κατὰ] 'that those who are equal in some one thing only (cp. 9 § 4 κατὰ τὴν ἴσιν) should have an equal share of everything.'

29 τοιαύτας] All states based on such equality and inequality (Congreve).

§ 2 καὶ πρότερον] c. 9 § 1. It was said, *Introd.* p. 42, that this reference cannot be dislodged from its place so easily as the preceding one, as Beinays' suggestion (*n.* on c. 12 § 1) requires. SUSEM. (587)

31 ὅτι πλεόν... 32 κοινόν] "that they are larger landowners and that the land is a public concern." A national interest; one to which we can widely or generally appeal: quod ad communem salutem et utilitatem pertinet, Beinays s.v. See also Cope on κοινότερον, *Rhet.* I. 1 § 10. But Beinays' remark 'is a common foundation of the state'—which can hardly be right.

32 ἔτι πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια κατὰ] "Further (that) for the most part they are more trustworthy for the transactions of life," as they have not the temptations of the poor.

33 "The claims of the free born and

καὶ εὐγενεῖς ὡς ἐγγυὺς ἀλλήλων (πολλοὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον οἱ (VII)
 35 γενναῖοι τῶν ἀγεννῶν, ἡ δ' εὐγένεια παρ' ἐκάστου
 § 3 οἴκοι τίμιος· ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ βελτιῶναι,
 εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ γένους)· ὁμοίως δὲ φήσομεν δι-
 καίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀμφισβητεῖν * *, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ
 39 ἀρετὴν εἶναι φάμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ἥ πάσας ἀναγκαζόν
 § 4 ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἄλλας· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους πρὸς τοὺς
 ἐλάττους, καὶ γὰρ κρείττους καὶ πλουσιώτεροι καὶ βελτίους
 εἰσίν, ὡς λαμβανομένων τῶν πλειόνων πρὸς τοὺς ἐλάττους.
 83 b ἄρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἰεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει, λέγω δ' οἶον οἷ τ'
 ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλήθος ἄλλο τι
 πολιτικόν, πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις ἔσται τίνας ἀρχεῖν δεῖ, ἢ

35 δ'] τ' Zwinger, τ' or γὰρ Susem. || 37 δὲ Plutarch Susem.^{1,2} and apparently Γ (αἰτέι William)—perhaps ight. But see Vahlen *Philo* p. 191 ed. 3 (p. 161 ed. 2)

|| 38 ἀμφισβητεῖν <καὶ μάλιστα τὴν δικαιοσύνην> or something similar Susem. || 42 συλλαμβανομένων? Stahl, συλλαβόμενων Κοινας

1283 b 2 omitted by II¹ (ἀλλ' ὅτι P⁴), hence [τι] Susem.^{1,2}

of the nobles are closely related." Supply *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἐγγυὺς* is nearly equivalent to an adjective, see n. on II. 9 § 5.

34 ὡς ἐγγυὺς ἀλλήλων] From time immemorial, as noble birth stands to nobility free birth so free birth and descent from citizens have been opposed to the status of slaves and freedmen: see I. 6 §§ 7, 8, a passage which should be compared with the following words also. SUSEM. (588)

34 ff. This is confirmed on two grounds: (1) the nobles are the true citizens, and (2) the cream of the citizens. Properly speaking, it is only in a republic that a real aristocracy can exist. Comp. Freeman, *Comparative Politics*, Lect. VI. pp. 246—270.

35 The use of *γενναῖοι* and *ἀγεννῶν* does not bear out the distinction made in *Phil.* II. 15 § 3, *εὐγενεῖς κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως*.

36 οἴκοι τίμιος] Cp. I. 6 § 7, *τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους νομίζουσιν οἴκοι μόνον εὐγενεῖς*, n. (52). SUSEM. (588 b)

βελτίους εἰκὸς] Ambition to win fresh honour is a trait of good birth, τὸ φιλοτιμότερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον, *Phil.* II. 15 § 2.

§ 3 37 ἀρετὴ γένους] Comp. *iii.* (54, 55) on I. 6 § 7, VI (iv). 8 § 9 n. (1248), VIII (v). 1 § 7 *προσόντων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος*, n. (1496). SUSEM. (589)

ὁμοίως δὲ...δικαίως ἀμφισβητεῖν] As the claim of (a) the wealthy *line* 31, (b) the free born and the nobles, so now that

of (c) merit, is pronounced to have a partial justification.

With δὲ in enumerations Vahlen, commenting on *Sen.* 18 § 3, 1455 b 31, compares II. 3 § 2, VIII (v). 3 § 16, 4 § 10. often strengthened at the close of a list, as καὶ θλῶν δὲ, καὶ καθόλου δὲ.

38 κοινωνικῇ] 'justice especially; for justice is, as we admit, a virtue essential to civil society (*κοινωνία*), on which all the others must necessarily attend': i. e. justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as is more fully explained in *Ath. Eth.* v. 1. 12—20, 1129 b 11, ff. [where see Jackson's notes]. Compare too *A. R.* VIII. 1 § 4, 1155 a 22, 9 § 1 ff. 1159 b 25 (Eaton). See also above c. 10 §§ 1, 2 and the references cited in n. (567). SUSEM. (590) A remarkable reason for the claim of ἀρετῇ, after all we have been told (Wynce).

§ 4 40 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ πλείους] i. e. δικαίως ἀμφισβητοῦσι. The justice of this claim has been argued in c. 11.

41 καὶ γὰρ κρείττους κατὰ] Comp. *Plato Gorgias* 488 b οὐκ οὐκ οὐ πολλὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ κρείττους ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν; (Eaton). SUSEM. (591)

42 ὡς λαμβανομένων] Comp. c. 10 § 2, *πάντων λεγόμενων*: "if the many are taken in a body and compared with the few in a body" (Carmichael).

1283 b 1 λέγω δ' οἶον] I mean, namely.

3 πότερον ἀμφισβήτησις κατὰ] The question raised in c. 10.

§ 5 οὐκ ἔσται; καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων
 5 ἀναμφισβήτητος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἀρχεῖν δεῖ (τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις
 διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ
 διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη
 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον). ἀλλ' ὅμως σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν
 § 6 αὐτὸν ταυτ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνον, πῶς διοριστέον. * καὶ δὴ τὸν 10
 10 ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάντες οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα
 δεῖ διελύναι τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκο-
 πεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πληθὺς
 ὄσ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; ἔστι δὲ ἀπορία τις πρὸς ἅπαν-
 § 7 τας τοὺς διαμφισβητούντας περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν τιμῶν. δό-

§ σκοποῦσι μὲν Ald., σκοπήσομεν? Sylburg, σκοπῶμεν Bas.³ in the margin, *con-*
siderandum est Ar. || 9 ὑπάρ^χ M¹, ὑπάρχει P¹ || εἰ δὴ. 13 αὐτῶν; trans-
 posed by Thurot to precede 1284 a 4 εἰ δὲ τις; see *Introd.* p. 82 f.

§ 5 4 καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν κατλ)
 "Under each one of the constitutions
 mentioned there will be no dispute as to
 the proper holders of office: for (these
 constitutions) differ in their sovereigns,
 e.g. the one by being in the hands of the
 wealthy, another by being in the hands of
 the good, and similarly with each of the
 others." τὰ κύρια is the plural of τὸ κύριον
 the 'sovereignty,' a supreme authority. also
 found in *Rhet.* I. 8. 2, 1365 b 27 τὰ δὲ
 κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας, ὅσαι
 γὰρ αἱ πολιτείας, τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύρια
 ἔστω, and Demosth. *Pseudo Leg.* § 259 p.
 424, 11 οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ καὶ τὰ κύρια ἔτα ποτ'
 ἔστιν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν πόλεων. Copc com-
 pares *N. E.* III. 8 § 15, 1116 b 18, τὰ
 πολιτικά = the citizen levies, as a similar
 plural.

§ τοὺς κυρίους Comp. c. 6 § 1 n.
 (523), c. 7 § 2 n. (537): also n. (466).
 SUPPL. (592)

§ περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον) So § 4, ἐν
 μιᾷ πόλει

On the following sentence, 9 εἰ δὴ .
 13 εἰ αὐτῶν, see *Introd.* p. 43. Thurot
Études p. 49 gives a brief analysis of
 §§ 6—14. Aristotle proposed to investi-
 gate what class ought to have power in a
 state when of all sorts of superiority (riches,
 nobility, virtue, numbers) are represented:
 and this is his answer: (1) *If the virtuous*
are few, we must inquire whether they
are numerous enough to govern the state
or to make a state by themselves, § 6. (2)
No superiority gives an exclusive right
to the exercise of power, §§ 7—10. (3)
The best laws are relative to the interest

of the whole state and to the great
body of the citizen. The citizen is not the
same under all governments; under the
best government he is the good man, §§ 11,
12. (4) If a single individual, or a hand-
ful of men not numerous enough to form
a state by themselves, be prominent for
virtue, they cannot be reduced to the level
of equality, §§ 13, 14. On this answer
 Thurot remarks: "the first proposition
 (1) has nothing to do with the question
 Aristotle has just raised. it is clear that
 before he discusses what is to be done
 with the virtuous few he should prove the
 right of the virtuous to command. The
 second, (2), has a direct bearing on the
 question, of which it is the negative solu-
 tion. The germ of a positive solution is
 found in (3), but this solution is not
 given directly; for Aristotle is handling a
 difficulty as to the end of the best legisla-
 tion. In (4) he discusses a particular
 case analogous to that which is the sub-
 ject of (1). This analogy and the im-
 possibility of understanding (1) in its
 present place lead me to suppose that the
 words εἰ δὴ . . . εἰ αὐτῶν should be trans-
 posed to come after κατ' ἀρετὴν and
 before εἰ δὲ τις (1284 a 3). Then there
 will be a good sequence of ideas."

§ 6 13 ἴστι δὲ ἀπορία) So 10 § 1 ἀλλὰ
 ταῦτα πάντα ἔχον φαίνεται δυσκόλιον.
 §§ 7, 8 'The refutation of the several
 claims is not the same as in c. 10, but is
 a species of *reductio ad absurdum* by the
 enforcement on the same ground of the
 right of the one richest, or noblest, or most
 virtuous man, or of the strongest group.

15 ξειαν γὰρ <ἀν> οὐδὲν λέγειν δίκαιον οἱ διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀξιοῦντες (VII)
ἄρχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ κατὰ γένος· δηλὸν γὰρ ὡς εἴ (H. 81)
τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, [δηλόν] ὅτι κατὰ
τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον τοῦτον ἄρχειν τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων δεήσει,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν εὐγενεῖα διαφέροντα τῶν ἀμφισβητού-
§ 8 των δι' ἐλευθερίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν τοῖς συμβήσεται καὶ 11
21 περὶ τὰς ἀριστοκρατίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· εἰ γὰρ τις εἰς ἀμεί-
νων ἀνὴρ εἴη τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων
ὄντων, τοῦτον εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κατὰ ταῦτ' δίκαιον. οὐκοῦν
εἰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι γε δεῖ κύριον διότι κρείττους εἰς τῶν
25 ὁλίγων, καὶ εἰς ἣ πλείους μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττους δὲ τῶν
πόλλων κρείττους ὡσι τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἂν δεῖοι κυρίους
§ 9 εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πλήθος. πάντα δὲ ταῦτ' ἔοικε ποιεῖν φανε- 13

15 δέξαι M^s, δέξαιεν P⁴ (connector), δέξαι Ald., δέξαιεν P²³ Q^b T^b Plutarch Bk. and P¹ (1st hand) || γὰρ <ἀν> Κοιας Bk.², <ἀν> γὰρ Götting || 17 [δηλόν] εἰς Cameaius Bk.², Vahlen (*Beiträge zu Ar. Politik* IV. 432) takes το καὶ ὅτι at least. Comp. also Bonitz *Ar. Stind.* I. p. 58 n (1) || 20 τοῖς τοῦτο ἴσως P²³ Plutarch Ar., τοῦτ' ἴσως Q^b T^b Ald. Bk. || 27 φανερόν ποιεῖν II² Plutarch Bk.

16 δηλόν γὰρ ὡς κατὰ] Comp. VII(VI). 3 § 3 n. (1407 b) ὅταν εἴς ἑχῃ πλείων τῶν ἄλλων εὐτόρων, κατὰ τὸ δλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν δίκαιος μόνος. SUSEM. (592 b)

17 πάλιν=ad, in this case as in the former.

18 τὸν ἕνα ἀπάντων] This is called τυραννίς in VII(VI). 3 § 3.

§ 8 21 περὶ τὰς ἀρ. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς] Cp c. 5 § 5 n. (508), c. 7 § 3, 4 with n. (536, 8). SUSEM. (593)

These provisionally we get a glimpse of the monarch whose rule he subsequently justifies even in the best state, cc. 16, 17; viz. εἰς τις ἀμείνων ἀνὴρ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι σπουδαίων ὄντων. All the governing class are good, but he is pre-eminent in goodness.

24 εἰ καὶ τὸ πλήθος κατὰ] Comp. P1 *Gorg.* 489 b ff. (Platon). SUSEM. (594)

§§ 9, 10 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κατὰ] Aristotle here returns to what he has already developed above c. 11, so that the inquiry has not made any real advance. I. Stein (*Zeitschrift f. d. g. Staatswissenschaft* IX. p. 157) and Hildenhaut (p. 422) are right in maintaining that the negative result which rejects as incorrect all these one-sided claims, is one of the most important passages in the whole work, since it proves most clearly how nearly Aristotle grasped the true concep-

tion of a state, as elevated above all particular opposing interests, although he could not quite attain to it, "since the autocratic conception of authority had not been able anywhere in Greece to rise above the conflict of parties to the development of its own activity, and even Aristotle was unacquainted with the only means of elevating it above this conflict, namely, the constitutional monarchy," cp. *Introduct.* p. 44 ff. Hildenhaut rightly remarks in answer to Stein, that it is just this negative result which leads to the positive construction of an ideal state, built upon this foundation. Hildenhaut however has also failed to see that even at this point something more than the mere negative result has been attained, and that one claim at any rate, viz. that of superior merit, is only provisionally rejected, - whether it be the case that the excellence of remarkable individuals is *superior* or *inferior* to that of the general mass of citizens. Comp. Aristotle's own express statements 17 §§ 5, 6 n. (580, 581), VIII (V). 1 § 6 n. (1495): which contain by implication the positive result, that only two kinds of government can be the best, viz. those which rest upon the one or the other of the above opposite conditions, an ideal monarchy and an aristocracy. The immediate context §§ 11, 12 shows that Aristotle does

- ρὸν ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς ὀρθὸς ἐστὶ, καθ' ὃν ἔξι- (VII)
 οῦσιν αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὑπὸ σφῶν ἄρχεσθαι
 § 10 πάντας. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀξιούντας
 § 11 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ
 πλοῦτον, ἔχοιεν ἂν λέγειν τὰ πλήθη λόγον τινα δίκαιον·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ καλῶς ποτὲ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν ὀλίγων
 καὶ πλουσιώτερον, οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον ἀλλ' ὥς ἀθρόους.
 § 11 διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἣν ζητοῦσι καὶ προβάλλουσιν
 § 12 τινες, ἐνδέχεται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν (ἀποροῦσι γὰρ 13
 τινες πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθετητέον, βουλευμένῳ τίθε-
 σθαι τοὺς ὀρθοτάτους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιόνων συμ-
 § 12 φέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλειόνων), ὅταν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν.
 § 12 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἕως· τὸ δ' ἕως ὀρθὸν πρὸς τὸ τῆς

28 ὀρθός Q^b Ald. and P⁸ (1st hand, altered by the same hand) || 36 (ἀποροῦσι .
 39 πλειόνων) Beinaes: earlier editions have a full stop at ἀπαντᾶν and no punctuation
 || 37 βουλευμένῳ <γε> Schneidei || 40 γὰρ Susem, δ' Γ II Putsch Dk. Susem.¹

distinctly to express this here. See III.
 (597, 599). SUSEM. (596)

28 τῶν ὅρων οὐδεὶς κτλ] Cp. 9 § 1 n.
 None of the 'standards,' i.e. the defining
 principles upon which they claim to
 govern.

§ 10 31 κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ πολιτεύ-
 ματος] to control the governing body.

33 τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βέλτιον τῶν
 ὀλίγων] This is the thesis which Grote
 is striving to prove throughout his history,
 taking the Athenian Demos as his great
 example. He dwells upon the sacrifices
 of which it was capable at Salamis, and
 Arginusae, upon its financial honesty,
 as attested by an undebased coinage, and
 its wise moderation in the hour of triumph,
 when after the unparalleled provocations
 of the Thirty it consented to a general
 amnesty, II c. 403. The appeals made
 to the humanity and enthusiasm of the
 multitude had most chance of success, as
 the cases of Paches and Diogenes prove.
 Against all this must be set the panic
 and terror at the time of the mutilation of
 the Hermæ and the hasty condemnation
 of the generals at Athens, the troubles of
 Coeaea and Samos, and other occasional
 outbreaks of popular fury like the Scylas-
 tism at Argos.

34 οὐχ ὥς καθ' ἕκαστον] See the
 parallel expression in c. II § 2 and the
 note on II. 2 § 2.

§ 11 35 ζητοῦσι . . τινες] Was this
 also in writing? SUSEM. (596)
 προβάλλουσιν] "bring forward as a

problem"; whence πρόβλημα.

36 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντᾶν... 39
 ὅταν συμβαίνει κτλ.] May be met as
 follows (in § 12) in the case supposed.

37 τίθεσθαι] Properly, to enact.
 But Heierl. I. 29, II. 177 of Solon.

39 τὸ λεχθέν] That is, the case
 when the aggregate merit of the great
 majority surpasses that of prominently
 able individual men. SUSEM. (597)

§ 12 40 τὸ γὰρ ὀρθὸν ληπτέον ἕως]
 The problem is to find the standard to
 which the most upright laws (τοὺς
 ὀρθοτάτους νόμους) must conform. Here
 the right must be taken to mean the
 equally right, and the equally right
 regard the interest of the whole city
 and the welfare of the citizens. Foi
 τῶν=aequaliter Shilleto quotes Plato
 Laws VII. 805 A Ζαννομάντας αἱς τῶν
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλων κοινῶς καὶ τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις τῇ προσεταγμένῃ ἑσὶ ἀσκέσται·
 ἔστιν. 991 A ἡ τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλάττωτος πλείον
 ἐλαττόν τε τοῦ μέγιστος· Iden. De Pace
 59, 18 ἡμῶς οὐτε συμφορὸς οὐτ' ἑσὶ οὐτε
 καλῶς προσέσθε Φωκίας; ἴσοι. Πανηγυρ.
 77 συνθήκαι . . αἵ τινες ἂν ἑσὶ καὶ κοινῶς
 ἀμφοτέρους ἔχωσι, and probably Nojitz.
 Philoct. 758. Though noticed in Phil.
 II. 6 § 20, it is not elsewhere certain in
 Aristotle. It is, however, a v. l. vi(IV),
 14 § 12, Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 6. Also found
 in Rhét. ad Alex. 9 § 10, 1430 a 1, ἂν
 ἑσὶ καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσεφερόμεθα
 (? a citation).

- 41 πόλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν. (VII)
 πολιτῆς δὲ κοινῇ μὲν ὁ μετέχων τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι
 1284 a ἐστὶ, καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν ἕτερος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρί-
 στην ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν
 a 3 πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν.
 § 6
 1283 b 9 <* * εἰ δὲ τὸν
 10 <ἀριθμὸν εἰεν ὀλίγοι πάμπαν οἱ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τίνα
 11 <δεῖ διελεῖν τρόπον; ἢ τὸ ὀλίγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν,
 12 <εἰ δυνατόι διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἢ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλεῆθος
 13 <ὥστ' εἶναι πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν; >

1284 a 1 πρὸς] κατὰ Schneider, perhaps rightly || 3 τὸν after βίον omitted by Q^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand)

1283 b 9 * * Courting Thurot (by Sussem.¹ placed after 13 αὐτῶν), see Comm. n. (599). Spengel assumes either a lacuna before this passage, or that it should be transposed to follow either (1) 1283 n 40 τὰς ἄλλας οἱ (2) 1283 b 8 τρόπον || δὲ Sussem.¹ δὴ Γ II Π Πταταχ 11k. Sussem.¹⁻² in the text || 11 διελεῖν τὸν Q^b T^b 11utarch Bk. || 12 [δ] Schneider, probably right

42 πολιτῆς δὲ κοινῇ μὲν κατὰ Ἀ
 neat formula summing up the results of
 cc. 1-9.

1284 a 1 καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ πολιτείαν
 [εἴδη] See c. I § 10 n. (440). SUSSEM.
 (598)

1284 a 1 πρὸς δὲ .3 ἀρετῇ] In
 the best constitution, the better class
 (βελτιότεροι) coincides not merely with
 the majority but even with the whole
 mass of citizens: cf. IV(VII). 9 § 3; 13
 §§ 9, 10; VI(IV). 7 §§ 2-4. Thurot
 rightly remarks that after the negative
 answer §§ 5-10 n. (595) to the question
 first raised in § 4, this paragraph §§ 11,
 12 also contains the germ of a positive
 answer. Indeed, when § 6 is transposed
 to follow directly upon it, the answer is
 continued in the context without
 interruption of the connexion. Thurot is
 no less right when he observes that this
 solution is no *direct* answer to the former
 questions, but as regards its form is only
 an answer to the subordinate question of
 § 11 itself. There is therefore a con-
 siderable hint at § 12. But Thurot
 is scarcely correct and clear when he
 assumes that it can be supplied from §§
 11, 12 if we draw the conclusion that "in
 a state where there are virtuous men, rich
 men, nobles, and a mass of citizens,
 power belongs to all those who have true
 civic virtue, this being something different
 from moral virtue not only under an ideal
 government but everywhere else." In
 my opinion, we should rather expect the

conclusion that in the best constitution,
 all citizens ought to have equal rights,
 and that the true aristocracy is one
 in which all citizens are provided with
 sufficient property. But where the excel-
 lence (ἀρετή) of the few is equal to that
 of the many, especially if neither exceed a
 certain amount, in default of other means
 of satisfying the claims of both parties,
 either the exercise of full citizenship, or
 else the merely passive right of being elect-
 ed to office (11 § 8 n. 569), must depend
 on a moderate property qualification, and
 wealth be introduced as a supplementary
 consideration. Thus, although inferior to
 aristocracy, this government, i.e. Polity,
 would still be included among the normal
 forms, and would in such a case be better
 than democratic equality SUSSEM. (599)

2 ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος]
 Comm. Thro. IV. 5 § 11, 12b 10; αὐτὸ γὰρ
 ὁ προαιρούμενος ἀθηναίων δ', αὐτὸ δ' ἰσχυ-
 ρεύμενος μὴ προαιρούμενος δὲ διακόλος ἢ ῥήμαξ.

§ 8 1283 b 9 εἰ δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν . 13
 πόλιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] "But if the possessors
 of virtue are altogether few in number,
 how should we decide (ῥημαξ: set the
 limits)? Or must then fewness be con-
 sidered relatively to the task; are they
 competent to administer the city on,
 in other words, numerous enough to form
 a city themselves?" Schneider rightly
 saw that the last sentence contained a
 single supposition: able to manage the
 city, because strong enough to form a
 city by themselves.

§ 13
1284 a 4

εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστὶν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερ- VI
5 βολήν, ἢ πλείους μὲν ἐνὸς μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα πα-
ρέχεσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων
ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δυνάμειν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς (n
τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θε-
τέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων,
10 ἄνιστοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δυνάμειν·
§ 14 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους 2
καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος.
αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοιόος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις

1284 a 4 εἷς] c1s Γ M^a P⁴ and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || § δυνατοὶ Γ M^a || παρα-
σχέσθαι Π³ Bk.

§ 13 1284 a 4 τοσοῦτον διαφέρων..
ὁ ὥστε μὴ...] So preeminent.. that the
merit of the rest is not commensurable.

4 κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν] 'in excess
of merit' = by reason of his exalted
merit. So *N. Eth.* IX. 4 § 6, 10 § 5 ἢ
ὑπερβολῇ τῆς φύλας = friendship in the
extreme, or exalted friendship.

Two cases are distinguished: (1) one
such prince of men, (2) a number of them
too small to form the 'complement' of a
city. Comp. *for* πλήρωμα VI (IV). 4 § 12
and *Pl. Rep.* II. 371 B (where the sense
is slightly different).

5 ἢ πλείους...ὁ πόλεως] The second
case hardly belongs, strictly speaking, to
this place, since it requires that one kind
of collective virtue be added to another;
and in this kind of calculation it is
impossible to decide where to stop
adding particular men to the virtuous
minority, while the result of the calcula-
tion varies according to our decision.
Therefore Aristotle in what follows
neglects this case entirely and does not
consequently form it a 'truest' form of
aristocracy beyond and above the true one.
Comp. c 17 § 5, 18 § 1 with *III.*
(578, 682). SUSKM. (600)

7 τὴν πολιτικὴν] In other words,
τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δυνάμειν (Congrove).

9 μέρος] The phrase μέρος εἶναι = με-
τέχειν οἱ κοινῶν εἰς τῆς πόλεως: see IV (VII).
4 § 6; 8 § 1, § 6; 9 § 4. It is opposed
to the indispensable adjuncts (ὧν ἀνευ
οὐκ ἂν εἴη πόλις) which are excluded from
the franchise. 'The conditions of com-
mon political life cease to be applicable;
the great man is not on an equal amongst
equals to be bound by equal rules'

(Bradley). Trans.: "these men must cease
to be accounted members of the city
For they will be wronged if they are
deemed worthy of mere equality when
they are so far superior (ἀριστοὶ) in merit
and civil capacity." See II. 7 § 18 n.,
VIII (V). 1 § 3.

11 ὥσπερ γὰρ θεόν] Comp. § 25 and
n. (615). Aristotle could hardly express
more strongly how improbable he himself
considers this case. His reason for
considering it notwithstanding are no
doubt those mentioned in 8 § 1 for
the consideration of other no less im-
probable cases. Cp. n. (542) and *Introd.*
p. 70 f. See also n. (678) on III. 17. 5.
Bradley *Hellenica* p. 239 rightly traces
this thought to its origin in Plato's
Politicus. SUSKM. (601)

Plato's words are πασῶν γὰρ ἐκείνην γα,
sc. τὴν ὁρθὴν πολιτείαν, ἐκκρετών, ὅσον
θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν,
303 B.

§ 14 13 κατὰ=against, applicable to,
binding upon; and not necessarily
'against'. Even the rule of law does
not bind such men.

"This sentence κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ
ἔστι νόμος occurs word for word in St
Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, c 5 v. 23,
suggesting, at all events, a direct adapta-
tion from Aristotle." (T. J. Heath.)

14 αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος] Comp. 17
§ 2 n. (675). SUSKM. (602 b)

"Comp. the identical sentiment in St
Paul *Romans* c. 2 v. 14, where ἑαυτοὶ
εἰσι νόμος is applied to ἔθνη τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα
νόμον, further described (v. 15) as men
who do by nature (φύσει) the same things
as the law prescribes, i.e. men who have

15 πειράζομενος κατ' αὐτῶν λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἄπερ Ἀντισθέ- (VIII)
νης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημιουργούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ
§ 15 ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν. διδὸ καὶ τίθενται τὸν δοστρακι-

16 δημιουργούντων P⁴ and M⁴ (1st hand), δημιουργούντων Γ § 17 διδὸ καλ.....
1284 b 34 πολλόν Κιοίν regards as a spurious addition. against this view see Comm.
n. (602 b)

moral virtue" (T. L. Heath). Comp
Nic. Eth. iv 8 § 10, 128 a 32, *ὅταν νόμος*
ᾧ ἐνταῦθα.

15 Ἀντισθένης] The celebrated
pupil of Socrates who founded the Cynic
school. The quotation is probably from
his work *Πολιτικός*, 'The Statesman':
cp. A. Muller *De Antisthenis Cynicae vitae*
et scriptis p. 64 (Maburg 1866). Zeller
Socrates and Socratici p. 323 n. (41) and
c. 13 generally, p. 284 ff. Eng. tr. SUSSEX.
(602)

Treatment of disproportionate eminence
in the imperfect constitutions. §§ 15—23.

Motives of self-preservation lead democ-
racies to resort to Ostracism: §§ 15,
16. This has a counterpart in the
execution by violence of eminent citizens
which tyrants practise (§§ 17, 18), and in
the policy pursued by sovereign states
(Persia, Athens) in humbling their
subjects, § 19.

Compare Grote's masterly defence of
Ostracism: c. 31, iv. pp. 200—212.

§ 15 17 διδὸ .δοστρακισμὸν] It is
improbable that this conception of Ostrac-
ism is the correct one. It was resorted to
to rather when two party leaders had
each about the same number of followers
and thus the machinery of the state was
likely to be brought to a dead lock. In
such cases, the removal of one converted
the other into the leading statesman.
Thus at any rate was the significance
of this institution at the best period of
the Athenian democracy, although ac-
cording to Philochorus, *Str.* 79 b, it was
at Athens originally directed against the
followers of the Peisistratidae (*μόνον δὲ*
*Ἐπείρολος ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν... ἐδοστρακί-
σθηναι διὰ μοχθηρίαν τῶντων, οὗ δὲ ὑποψίαν*
τυραννίδος μετὰ τούτων δὲ λαελύθη τὸ
*νόμος, ἀρξάμενος νομοθετήσαντος Κλεισθέ-
νους, ὅτε τοὺς τυράντους κατέλυνεν, ὅπως*
συνεβέβηκε καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτῶν... Müller
Frage. hist. gr. i. p. 397, 3 ff.); and else-
where too it may have had a similar
origin. Thus it is possible that here
Aristotle really adheres to the original
intention of Ostracism (so Seeliger in
Jaehrb. f. Philol. cxv. 1877 742, n. 8)
though on the other hand in his remarks

further on, § 23, there can be no doubt
that he refers to its later degeneracy
(n. 613). This institution prevailed at
Athens from the time of Cleisthenes
until the latter half of the Peloponnesian
War or even later (n. 613), at Aigos,
viii(v). § 3 n. (1509 b), Megara,
Syriacus, Miletus, and Ephesus. At
Athens the question whether there should
be an Ostracism in any particular year
was regularly debated and voted on in the popu-
lar assembly. If the result was affirmative,
a day was fixed for another meeting of
the Assembly, at which at least 6000
citizens had to be present; so Frankel and
before him Lagohl *On the nature and his-
torical significance of Ostracism at Athens*
in the Suppl. to the *Jaehrb. f. Philol.*
N. S. iv. p. 141 ff. Here every citizen
who possessed a vote wrote on a potsherd
the name of the person whom he wished
to banish, and the man who was thus
designated by the majority had to leave
Athens within 10 days for a term of ten
years, subsequently diminished to five; he
might however be recalled before that
time by a vote of the Assembly. See
Schomann pp. 182, 338, 395 Eng. tr. with
Frankel's corrections *op. cit.* p. 92 f. n.
1: cp. pp. 14 ff. 52, 86 ff. SUSSEX. (603)

One part of the Berlin papyrus, on
which hardly decipherable fragments of
Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* have been
discovered, relates to the establishment
of ostracism. 'Aristotle distinguishes
two phases in the development of this
institution. At first the deed of a res-
toration of the Peisistratidae prevailed,
and (a) relatives or friends of Περικλῆς
and Περικλέους were banished. Later on,
as a settled institution, it fell upon (b)
any who by preponderant influence threaten-
ed to become dangerous to democracy
equally, such as Aristides and Nani-
thippos.' Diehl restores *ἐπὶ μὲν αὖν ἱστῶν*
*[εἰς τὸν τοῦ τῶν τυράντων] φίλους ἐστρα-
κίζον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸν ἀποστρακισμὸν*
μὲν (δ) ὅταν τις δὲ ἐχθρὸς μέγιστος [ἢ Περικλῆς].
The name of Aristides is recovered from
a brief excerpt in pseudo-Heracleides
Müller *Frage. Hist. Gr.* ii. p. 209, 7 of the
very passage which is but half recovered

σμὸν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις, διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· ὅ
 αὐται γὰρ δὴ δοκοῦσι διώκειν τὴν ἰσότητά μάλιστα πάντων,
 20 ὥστε τοὺς δοκοῦντας ὑπερέχειν δυνάμει διὰ πλοῦτον ἢ πολυ-
 § 16 φιλίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύϊν ἀσφράκιζον καὶ με-
 θίστασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως χρόνους ὀρισμένους. μυθολογεῖται
 δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἑργοναύτας τὸν Ἡρακλέα καταλιπεῖν διὰ
 τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν Ἀργὴν
 25 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ὑπερβάλλοντα πολὺ τῶν πλωτήρων.
 διὸ καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιάνδρου
 Θρασυβούλῃ συμβουλίαν οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν
 § 17 (φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον εἰπεῖν μὲν οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν πεμ-
 φθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας, ἀφαιρούντα δὲ τοὺς
 30 ὑπερέχοντας τῶν σταχύων ὁμαλῆναι τὴν ἄρουραν· ὅθεν
 ἀγνοοῦντος μὲν τοῦ κήρυκος τοῦ γενομένου τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀπαγ-

19 ταύτας γὰρ δὲ P¹ || δοκοῦσι omitted by P² || διώκειν] *persecutitur* William ||
 20 πολυφίλιαν P¹ (1st hand), γρ. πολυφίλιαν corr.¹ in the margin of P¹

to us: Κλισιθένης τὸν περὶ ἀσφρακισμοῦ
 νόμον εἰσηγάγετο, ὅς ἐπέθη διὰ τοὺς τυραν-
 νίδοντας (α') καὶ ἄλλοι τε ἀσφρακίσθησαν
 καὶ Ξάνθιππος καὶ Ἀριστέλης (β'). Diels
Ueber die Berliner Fragmente p. 30.

18 διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν] For this
 reason, that law as only destined for
 those who are more or less on an equality,
 while an individual grows disinclined to
 be bound by law in proportion as he rises
 above this general equality. If this very
 simple connexion be borne in mind, there
 is no reason to suspect an interpolation
 SUSSEX. (602 b)

21 ἀσφράκιζον] Note the imperfect;
 here certainly because Ostracism was
 obsolete in Aristotle's time. See n on
 II. 9 § 19.

§ 16 22 μυθολογεῖται κτλ.] "Even in
 the story there is a naive hint that
 Heracles was out of place in the Argo.
 When he went on board the ship, it
 threatened to sink, and when he took
 hold of an oar, it broke at once in his
 grasp." (Pellier *Gk. Mythol.* II. p. 324.)
 Phekylos of Leios (*Fr.* 67), Antimachos,
 and Poseidippos also state that Heracles
 was set on shore because the Argo com-
 plained that his weight was too great for
 her (Schol. on Apoll. Rhod. I. 1290), but
 this was not the only form of the legend.
 See Apollod. *Bibl.* I. 19. 9; Herod. VII.
 193. SUSSEX. (604)

24 οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλειν] "For the Argo
 refused to carry (ἀγειν) him with the rest

as far outweighing her crew": φθγγα-
 μένη μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτου βάρος.
 Apollodori. I. 9. 19

27 οὐχ ἀπλῶς οἰητέον ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμᾶν]
 'must not be thought to blame it with
 absolute justice.'

§ 17 28 φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Περιάνδρον]
 In the account given by Herodotus V. 92,
 the parts of Periander and Thiasybulos
 are reversed (Vettest) Aristotle refers to
 the story again VIII(v) 10 § 13, n. (1669).
 For the tyrant Thiasybulos of Miletus see
 E. Curtius II. p. 108 f. Eng. tr., and for
 the tyrants of Miletus in general VIII(v).
 5. 8, n. 1557 Periander, ruler of Corinth
 probably from 626 to 585, one of the
 most brilliant and at the same time most
 tragical figures among the earlier Greek
 tyrants, was no doubt correctly regarded
 as one of the first to introduce all those
 measures which appeared, not without
 reason, to the Greeks who were con-
 temporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as insepar-
 able from the tyranny. See VIII(v). 11.
 4 n. (1711); also VIII(v). 12. 3 n.
 (1751, 1754), VIII(v). 4 § 9, 10 § 16 n.
 (1525, 1672); E. Curtius I. p. 230 ff.
 Eng. tr. SUPPL. (608)

Livy (I. 54) borrows the story for
 Sextus Tarquinius at Gabi.

32 συννοήσαι] Comp. σύννοον γενό-
 μενον, II. 7. 17.

§ 18 33 τοῦτο γὰρ κτλ.] Oncken
 (II. 173) says that Aristotle approves of
 Ostracism. It would be as correct (or

γελαντος δὲ τὸ συμπεσόν, συννοῆσαι τὸν Θρασύβουλον ὅτι (VII. § 18 δεῖ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας ἀνδρας ἀναιρεῖν). τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ μόνον 4 συμφέρει τοῖς τυράννοις, οὐδὲ μόνον οἱ τύραννοι ποιοῦσιν, 35 ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας· ὁ γὰρ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τροπον τινὰ τῷ κολουεῖν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας καὶ φυγαδεύειν. (p. 81)

§ 19 τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ποιοῦσιν οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους καὶ 40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους (ἐπεὶ γὰρ θᾶπτον ἐγκρατῶς ἔσχον τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐταπεινώσαν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας), ὁ δὲ Περ- 1284 b σῶν βασιλεὺς Μήδους καὶ Βαβυλωνίους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπέ- § 20 κοπτε πολλάκις. τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πείσας ἐστὶ 5

37 τῷ τὸ Γ Μ² P⁴ Q^b T^b || κωλθεῖν Γ Μ² P⁴ Q^b T^b Ald. and P²⁻⁴ (1st hand), γρ. κολουεῖν P³ (corr. in the margin), reviser of P³ in the margin, afterwards erased || [καὶ φυγαδεύειν] Valckenaei (on Hei. v. 6), perhaps rightly || 41 παρὰ περὶ P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. 1284 b 2 ἐπέκοπτε T^b, ἐπέσκωπτε P²

1sthai incoincident) to deduce from this exposition his approval of the violent measures of the tyrants. In point of fact, he approves of both, but only from the standpoint of Democracy and Tyranny, respectively, two forms of government which he condemns and pronounces to be degenerate types. See however n. (614). SUSKEM. (606)

35 ὁμοίως ἔχει] i.e. συμφέρει, it is the interest of oligarchies and democracies and accordingly they take such measures.

§ 19 38 περὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰ ἔθνη] 'in the case of cities and nations' (and subject to them). See n. (11) and the references there given. SUSKEM. (607)

39 Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίους] Aristotle is thinking of the famous Samian revolt, 441-440 B.C., see E. Curtius II. p. 471 ff. Eng. tr.; Von Wilamowitz *Ant. Kykladen* p. 11 f. SUSKEM. (608)

40 Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους] Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were the only independent states amongst the allies of Athens. In the year 424 however, the Chians were compelled by the Athenians, who had suspicions of their intentions, to pull down their new walls: Thuc. IV. 51. The revolt of Mitylene (428) and almost all the other cities of Lesbos, and their punishment (427) are noticed VIII(V). 4. 6 n. (1548); see E. Curtius III. pp. 100 ff. 118 f. Eng. tr. SUSKEM. (609)

ἐπεὶ γὰρ...41 παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας]

'For as soon as they had firmly grasped empire they humbled these states in violation of the compact made with them.' It is clear from n. (609) that this is not true of the Lesbians; even in regard to the Chians and the Samians, it scarcely holds good (Schlosser). SUSKEM. (610)

For ἐπεὶ θᾶπτον=αὐτοὺς ἔσχον αὐ, Skilleto compares Demosth. *Panathen.* § 41 p. 978, 18, *Cynon* § 5 p. 1257, 28: Plato *Protag.* 325 c ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον συνίη τις τὰ λεγόμενα, *Alc.* I. 105 A ἐάν θᾶπτον εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἄνθρωπον παρέλθῃ.

1284 b 1 τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους κτλ.] 'Who had become haughty from having once held empire.' The meaning of ἐπὶ, 'to have been in authority' or 'to have reached empire,' is worth noting. It seems a metaphorical parallel to ἐπ' ἀρχῆς εἶναι, or ἐπ' ἐξουσίας κινεῖσθαι. (Compare perhaps Dem. *Philipp.* I § 7 p. 42, 4 ἀν' ἐπὶ τῇς τοιαύτης ἐξουσίας γενέσθαι γνώμης οὐκ.)

2 ἐπέκοπτε πολλάκις] 'used often to reduce.' Cyrus and the Lydians, Herod. I. 156: externally regarded, his conduct was certainly unusually mild. In regard to the Babylonians see Herod. III. 159 (Babylon). Compare Dümcker's *History of Antiquity* (ed. 4) IV. pp. 334 ff., 464 ff., 477 ff. (vol. VI. cc. 6, 7, 14 Eng. tr.). SUSKEM. (611)

τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὁρθὰς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεκβεβηκυῖαι (VI.
 5 πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ
 περὶ τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοποῦσας τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει
 § 21 τρόπον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ
 ἐπιστημῶν· οὔτε γὰρ γραφεὺς ἑάσειεν ἂν τὸν ὑπερβάλ-
 λοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας ἔχειν τὸ ζῖρον, οὐδ' εἰ δια-
 10 φέροι τὸ κάλλος, οὔτε πρύμναν ναυπηγὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων
 τι μορίων τῶν τῆς νεῆς, οὐδὲ δὴ χοροδιδάσκαλος τὸν με-
 ζον καὶ κάλλιον τοῦ παντὸς χοροῦ φθειγόμενον ἑάσει συγ-
 § 22 χορεύειν. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν καλέει τοὺς μονάρχας

§ ἄλλὰ <καὶ> Κοινὰς || 8 ἑάσει ἐάν Μ^α, ἑάσει ἂν Ρ¹ || 10 ναυπηγὸς πρύμναν
 Π² Bk. || 11 τι omitted by Π¹, hence [Γκ.] Suscm.^{1,2}, perhaps rightly || 13 ὥστε
 ... 15 ὁρῶσιν transposed to follow 20 διορθοῦν Thurot (see *Introd.* 83), by Bernays
 to precede 7 ὁρῶσιν. See Comm. II. (612). OI is the sentence an interpolation, and
 no change is required?

The problem (what to do with men
 of preeminent merit) is urgent even in the
 normal state, § 20. Principles of sym-
 metry require that, as in the arts, there
 should be no disproportionate influence or
 power, § 21. This is a frequent cause of
 revolutions (δὲ ὑπερβολή), as is explained
 VIII(V). 2 §§ 6—8, § 3 (Eaton).

§ 20 4 καλ=εἶναι the normal forms.
 § 21 8 τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς
 συμμετρίας] 'a foot that violates symmetry
 in its size' (the gen. as in § 16, πλωτή-
 ρον), 'even if it were of surpassing
 beauty.' κάλλος adverbial acc., cp.
 λοιπὰ c. 12 § 2. For the order of the
 words (hyperbaton) see Vahlen's *Arist.*
Analitike II. pp. 41—44. On symmetry,
 see *Metaph.* M. 3 § 11, 1078 a 30, τοῦ δὲ
 καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τῆς καὶ συμμετρίας καὶ
 τὸ ὁμομερές: this is illustrated in *Pol.*
 IV(VII). 4 § 7, *Post.* 7 §§ 4—7.

§ 22 The transposition of these
 words was proposed by Thurot and
 Bernays (see *Introd.* p. 83). Bernays
 renders "Hence this point need not
 stand in the way of a good understanding
 between single rulers and the city com-
 munities; so far, that is, as their personal
 rule is useful (also) for the cities and they
 adopt this procedure." Thus he under-
 stands τὰς πόλεις to be those which are
 ruled by μονάρχαι. So Postgate (*Notes*
 p. 7):—"τὰς πόλεις in both sentences
 are not 'free states' nor 'dependencies,'
 but the states governed by the μονάρ-
 χαι (notice ποί τύραννοι)." See *note*
 (612).

15 κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς]
 Hence in regard to admitted instances of
 superiority the case for (M)onarchy involves
 a certain political justification, a ground
 of right.

§ 23 It would be better to frame the
 constitution so as not to require anything
 of the sort; failing that, the next best
 course is to adopt it as a corrective
 measure. Unfortunately it was used in
 the cities for factious purposes.

17 βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κτλ.] Comp.
 VIII(V). 3 § 3 n. (1510) where the same
 recommendation is given, καίτοι βέλτιον
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέσονται τοσούτων
 ὑπερῶντες, ἢ ἑδoυσας γενέσθαι ἰσάων
 ὑστερον, and c. 8 § 12 n. (1619). SUSCM.
 (611 b)

13 ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο κτλ.] It is only
 with the gravest misgivings that I have
 followed Thurot in the transposition of
 § 22, b 13—15, to this place and in his
 other by no means simple changes. But
 I see no other means of obtaining any
 really consistent connexion, corresponding
 to the one idea prevalent throughout the
 whole chapter, namely that the measures
 taken by Monarchs and Republics rest
 in this respect on the same principle, and
 that the same problem must be considered
 by the two forms of Monarchy and Re-
 public, and not merely by the degenerate
 ones. Thus in these matters a republic
 has no advantage over a monarchy; on
 the contrary the corresponding measures
 of violence are generally calculated with
 a view to the maintenance of the monarchy,

14 συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφέλιμον (VIII)
 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν. διὸ κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογου-
 μένας ὑπεροχὰς ἔχει τι δίκαιον πολιτικὸν ὃ λόγος ὃ περὶ
 23 τὸν ὁστρακισμόν. βέλτιον μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 οὕτω συστήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι τοιαύτης
 ἱατρείας· δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς, ἂν συμβῇ, πειράσθαι τοιοῦτον
 20 τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν. <ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει τοὺς
 14 <μονάρχας συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, εἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὠφέ-
 15 <λίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὕσης τοῦτο δρῶσιν.> ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο περὶ
 21 τὰς πόλεις· οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον πρὸς τὸ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς οἰκείας

14 μονάρχους Π² Bk. || τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ Thuiot, τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρχῇ <ὥς? Susem.
 <ἔτεκεν> ἀρχῇ Schneides, <χάρυν> ἀρχῇ Schmidt || ὠφέλιμον [ταῖς πόλεσιν
 οὕσης] Thuiot (the best suggestion as yet), ὠφέλιμον .. οὕσης transposed to follow 19
 ἱατρείας Schmidt || 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν] ταῖς πολλοῖς Lindau

while it often happens that they are employed in a degenerate republic not for the corresponding purpose, the maintenance of the republic, but without any plan or principle. In this way the connexion is best established. On the other hand it is impossible to fit into any part of the dissertation the idea which Beinays, Postgate, and others find there, that it is rather a question of an agreement between absolute monarchs and their subjects, of absolute rule for the benefit of the latter, and of the banishment of powerful party leaders; with a view to the maintenance of absolute rule and also to the advantage (and therefore with the consent) of the governed. The instance of Pittacus, quoted by Postgate, 14 § 10, is not even appropriate, for it was not as *ἀστυμνήτης* that Pittacus banished the Oligarchs; on the contrary, it was not till after their banishment that he was elected *ἀστυμνήτης* by the people in order that he might command them against the exiles who were trying to effect their return by arms and violence. His length brought about the peaceful return of the exiles, and reconciled the parties to one another. Even this interpretation cannot however be obtained without a transposition, viz. that, as Beinays proposed, § 22, ὥστε. δρῶσιν, be inserted between *πρόπον* and *δρῶσιν* at the end of § 20: these words, if understood in the sense required, cannot retain their present place, as Postgate thinks. For two conclusions, both introduced by particles of inference (*ὥστε...διὸ*) cannot possibly follow each other if, as the sense here

shows, the second does not follow from the first, but is like the first an inference drawn from preceding premises. Moreover Aristotle nowhere else designates a monarch's subjects as *πόλεις*; we should rather expect *τοῖς ἀρχομένοις* or at any rate *τοῖς πολιταῖς* in both places instead of *ταῖς πόλεσιν*; and, if the philosopher wished to employ this last expression, at any rate *ταῖς ἐαυτῶν πόλεσιν*. Besides, in the second place, the insertion of καὶ "also" before *ταῖς πόλεσιν* would be indispensable for the sense, as Beinays' own translation shows. Still in face of all these difficulties, the question may arise whether it is not advisable, instead of making all these violent changes, to regard the whole passage (which we can easily dispense with) as an interpolation by another hand. SUSEM. (612)

20 ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγίνετο] If Thuiot's transposition be approved, this means: "but the free states did not employ Ostracism as a measure beneficial to their government." Without any such change Beinays and others make it refer to the words *τοιοῦτον τινὶ διορθώματι διορθοῦν*—it was not used as a corrective.

21 οὐ γὰρ ἔβλεπον κτλ] It is probable that there was often chicanery in the exercise of Ostracism, especially under an absolute democracy. It is said that when it was enforced for the last time at Athens, Alcibiades and Nicias diverted it, contrary to the original intention, to a third person Hyperbolos, and that this led to its disuse. Even if the story in this form is not to be relied on, still it may have become apparent on that oc-

- § 24 συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ στασιαστικῶς ἐχρῶντο τοῖς ὀστρακισμοῖς. ἐν (VII
 μὲν οὖν ταῖς παρεκβεβηκυλαῖς πολιτεῖαις ὅτι μὲν ἰδίᾳ συμ-
 φέρει καὶ δίκαιον ἐστί, φανερόν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς
 25 δίκαιον, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας ἡ
 ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
 ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλὰ (p. 8
 § 25 ἂν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετὴν, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; οὐ
 γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ἂν δεῖν ἐκβιάλλειν καὶ μεθιστάναι τὸν τοιοῦ-
 30 τον· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου (παραπλήσιον
 γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἀξιοῖεν), μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς.
 λείπεται τοίνυν, ὅπερ ἔοικε πεφυκέναι, πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ
 πάντας ἀσμένως, ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους ἀδίδους
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

24 [οὐχ] Beannys || 25 ἐπεὶ P²⁻³ || 31 ἀξιοῦμεν Γ Suscm.^{1,2}, ἀξιοῦ μὲν M¹. The
 p¹aincheses Hampke, but the subject is not strictly the same as in the principal
 clause: μερίζοντας? Suscm. || 32 ὅπερ <καὶ> Suscm.^{1,2} and possibly 1' (ymad et
 videtur William); perhaps rightly || 33 ἀσμένως ἀναγκαῖως Γ^{1,2} Q^b T^b || βασι-
 λείας P²⁻³ T^b

casion how easily a combination of two
 parties could defeat the true aim of this
 institution, and turn it against the most
 zealous of patriots. Indeed there is no
 evidence that it was ever actually re-
 sorted to again at Athens. Cp. Schö-
 mann pp. 182, 395 Eng. ti When the
 healthy life of parties ceased there, and
 especially when its surplus strength be-
 gan to fail the state, and every man
 of talent was needed at his post, Osta-
 cism proved to be superfluous. When
 it had been more than once employed
 in order to remove some person dis-
 pleasing to the dominant party (Damion
 Plut. Per. 4., Aristid. 7., Callias Pseudo-
 Andoc. iv. 32) it disappeared from the
 frame-work of the Constitution (See-
 liger). SUSCM. (613)

Summary of results: the removal of
 eminent men is (a) expedient and just in
 the interests of perverted constitutions,
 but (β) not absolutely just. The best
 state can neither expel such a man of
 preeminent merit, nor treat him as an
 ordinary subject. It only remains to make
 him sovereign, §§ 24, 25

§ 24. 23 [864] expedient and just in
 the private interest of the government.
 Not 'in particular cases.' This is a
 restatement of §§ 18, 20.

24 οὐχ ἁπλῶς ο. ὅτι δίκαιον. The
 mere fact of its accord with the δίκαιον
 of a perverted state is decisive, c. 9 § 3.

25 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας]
 Aristotle does not say what should be
 done in a Polity or a false Aristocracy,
 which are also to be reckoned among
 right forms of government. Is it possible
 that he regarded Ostracism as still ad-
 missible? Further comp. *iii.* on II. 9
 § 30 (339), III. 6 § 1 (521); III. 13 § 9
 (595), § 11 (597), § 13 (601); I 7 §§ 4, 5
 (677—8); VI (IV). 2 §§ 1, 2 (1133 6-7),
 10 § 3 (1280) and *Introd.* p. 43 ff. SU-
 SCM. (614)

26 οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν
 ὑπεροχὴν κατὰ πόλεως ὑπεροχὴν. Note
 that the cases chiefly alleged for Osta-
 cism before, § 15, are now excluded.

§ 25 31 τοῦ Διὸς Used proverbially,
 as in Herod. v. 49 ἦδη τῷ Διὶ πλοῦ-
 του πέρι ἐρίσσει, 'ye vie with Zeus in
 wealth.' Comp. *Nic. Rth.* vi. 13 § 8,
 1145 a 10 ἐτι ὅμοιον ἔδν εἰ τις τὴν πολι-
 τεῖαν παρὰ ἄρχων τῶν θεῶν (Halm).

μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς] 'Nor to rule
 such an one, in a distribution of offices';
 i.e. to treat him as a subject. Better
 taken with ἀρχων γὰρ than, as Beannys,
 and others, with ἀξιοῖεν, in which case it
 must be explained to mean κατὰ μέρος ἀρχων
 καὶ ἀρχόμενος as in c. 17 § 7, οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν
 ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος.

33 βασιλέας ἀδίδους] Kinyr² for life.
 The form of the phrase, and the words ἐν
 ταῖς πόλεσιν certainly do not favour the
 inference to Alexander which it was once

14 ἵσως δὲ καλῶς ἔχει μετὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους λόγους μετα-IX
 36 βῆναι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ βασιλείας· φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν
 πολιτειῶν μίαν εἶναι ταύτην. σκεπτέον δὲ πότερον συμφέρει
 τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οἰκῆσθαι καὶ πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ βασι-
 λεύεσθαι, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον, ἢ τισὶ μὲν
 § 2 συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον διελέσθαι
 41 πότερον ἔν τι γένος ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ πλείους ἔχει διαφοράς.
 1285 a βῆδιον δὴ τοῦτο γε καταμαθεῖν, ὅτι πλείω τε γένῃ περι- 2
 § 3 ἔχει καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶν οὐχ εἰς πασῶν. ἢ γὰρ ἐν
 τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι βασιλεία μάλιστα τῶν
 κατὰ νόμον, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ

35 ὡρισμένους Γ Μ* || 37 εἶναι <καὶ> Koras || δὴ Sussem., δὲ Γ II Ar. Bk. ||
 40 δὴ Γ Μ* P¹.2.3 || 41 ἔν τι] ἔν τῷ P² Bk. || αὐτῶν P² A¹.

1285 a 1 βῆδιον Μ* P¹ || δὲ Sussem.² (perhaps lightly) || 4 δὲ] δ' ὃ P⁴ Q^b T^b U^b
 L^a, γὰρ Ar.

the fashion to discover in the treatise From VIII(v). 10 § 8 we learn that the historical origin of the Macedonian monarchy was widely different from this exaltation of one eminent citizen of extraordinary endowments to lifelong sway.

c. 14 Transition to the particular constitutions or forms of the state, the first of which is *Monarchy*. *There are five actual and historical types of single rule: (α) the Spartan king, (β) the oriental sovereign, (γ) the αὐστηρὴς or dictator, (δ) the king in the heroic age: §§ 2—14. To all of these is opposed a distinct type, (ε) that of the absolute sovereign with full powers, § 15.*

The last type is alone of value for our inquiry, because, as shown 14 § 25, 17 §§ 7, 8, it is a rare, but quite legitimate, form of the best constitution. See *Introd.* pp. 44—47, *Analys.* p. 112 f., and VI(iv). c. 10.

§ 1 36 φαμέν γὰρ τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν] Benay, *Thans.* p. 173 n., arguing in favour of his assumption that cc. 12, 13 are an independent sketch, points out that there is no link to connect these words with the foregoing, as the normal constitutions are not mentioned. He therefore proposes to take the clause in direct conjunction with c. 11 § 21, which closes with the words, 'the laws in the normal forms of the state must necessarily be just, but those in the perverted forms not just.' To this it may be replied that there is a mention of the 'normal forms' in c. 13 § 20 (cp. §§ 18, 24, which imply the same antithesis). But it is more im-

portant to insist that a merely verbal allusion of the kind, is, after all, indefinite, whereas the discussion of monarchy forms a natural sequel to the result enunciated in c. 13 §§ 24, 25 which, be it observed, answers the question of § 13 and § 6. Indeed Denays' view would have been more tenable if he had shortened the duplicate version to c. 12, c. 13 §§ 1—12, and had allowed the main thread of the discussion to be resumed at c. 12 § 13, instead of at c. 14 § 1. *Comp. Introd.* p. 42 n. (3).

38 οἰκῆσθαι middle, π. 1 § 3. πόλει καὶ χώρᾳ] *Comp.* IV(vii). 6 § 5 χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν. This admits the case of the *ἔθνος* or nation, and helps us to see that Aristotle would not have allowed Persia or Macedon to rank as a *πόλις*, although he would have admitted their claim to possess a *πολιτεία*, and although he calls the subjects *πολίτας*, § 7. *Op.* n. on 12 § 8.

§ 2 1285 a 1 γίνῃ] Used indifferently with *εἶδος* (§§ 5, 6, 8, 11) for 'species' or 'variety'. so I. 11 § 5 n., VI(iv). 4 § 8.

§ 3 'The kingly office in the Spartan constitution is held to be the truest type of monarchy according to law,' i.e. constitutional or limited monarchies) (γ-ianines).

4 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ κατὰ] "He is merely commander in war when he has quitted the country." See Schümann p. 228 Eng. t. It is remarkable that Aristotle does not notice the judicial power of the Spartan kings and their

- § 6 δ' αὖ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν αἱ δ' αἶρεται· παρὰ ταύτην δ' (IX)
 ἄλλο μοναρχίας εἶδος, οἷαι παρ' ἐνόμοις εἰσὶ βασιλείαι τῶν
 βαρβάρων. ἔχουσι δ' αὐταὶ τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν
 τυραννίσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί· διὰ γὰρ (p. 85)
 20 τὸ δουλικώτεροι τὰ ἦθη εἶναι φύσει οἱ μὲν βάρβαροι τῶν
 Ἑλλήνων οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν τῶν περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην,
 ὑπομένουσι τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνοντες.
 § 7 τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶσιν, ἀσφαλεῖς δὲ διὰ
 τὸ πάτριον καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασι-
 25 λικὴ καὶ οὐ τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. οἱ γὰρ πολὺ-
 ται φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλεῖς, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους
 ξενικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων οἱ δ' ἀκόν-
 των ἄρχουσιν. ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οἱ δ' ἐπὶ
 § 8 τοὺς πολίτας ἔχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν. δύο μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα 3
 30 μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλήσιν,

18 παραπλησίαν P³ (1st hand, emended by the same hand), παραπλησίως P⁴⁻⁶ C⁴
 Q M⁹ Q¹⁰ R¹⁰ S¹⁰ T¹⁰ U¹⁰ V¹⁰ L¹ and P² (1st hand, emended by cori.²) || 19 τυραννίσιν,
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ Susem., τυραννίσι καὶ κατὰ Γ M⁹, τυραννίσι κατὰ P¹ and P² (cori.²),
 τυραννὶ κατὰ P³ T¹⁰ V¹⁰ and P² (1st hand), τυραννικὰ κατὰ C⁴, τυραννικαὶ κατὰ Q¹⁰ R¹⁰
 S¹⁰, τυραννικῶν εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ P⁴⁻⁶ Q M⁹ U¹⁰ L¹, τυραννίδι εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ A¹,
 τυραννικῇ εἰσὶ δ' ὁμοῦ κατὰ W¹⁰ Ald. Bk. || πατρικαὶ Γ M⁹, πατρικὰ R¹⁰, πάτριον?
 Spengel || 20 δουλικώτεροι P⁴ Q U¹⁰ A¹. Ald. δουλικώτερος M¹⁰ || εἶναι τὰ ἦθη Bk.,
 εἶναι τὰ ἦθη Π² A¹. || 24 πάτριαι Π² Bk., πατρικαὶ Schneidei || 25 αὐτῶν τοιαύτην·
 Γ (talem William) Susem.^{1,2}, perhaps right || 27 <τὸ> ξενικόν? Sylburg (wrongly)

16 αὖ δ' αἶρεται] Possibly the τὰ γὰρ
 of Thesaly, called βασιλεῖς Her. v. 63,
 Thuc. i. 111; compared with the Roman
 dictators by Dion. Hal. Greece retained
 few traces of that older institution com-
 mon to many Aryan races, an *elective*
 monarchy or chiefdom but with pre-
 sumption greatly in favour of a few noble
 families (βασιλεῖς = duke, while ἀναξ =
 noble). See Gladstone *Hom. Stud.* III. 51,
 Piceman *Comp. Poetics*, Lect. iv pp.
 114—159.

§ 6 The oriental monarchy is a rule
 over inferior subjects (δεσποτικῇ) with their
 consent and in virtue of traditional forms.

18 παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν] In Esai.
Isai. 423, οὐ γὰρ τυραννὶς ὥστε βαρ-
 βάρων ἔχου, the rule of non-Greek kings
 is called a tyranny (Esaton). Susem. (870)

19 διὰ γὰρ τὸ δουλικώτεροι κατὰ] Comp.
 i. 2 §§ 2—4 n. (11), iv (vii). 2 § 15, 14 § 21;
 and notes (54, 780, 781). Susem. (821)

20 τὰ ἦθη] This accus. 'of respect'
 depends on δουλικώτεροι. Comp. 9 § 10
 πλεῖστοι ἐν μύθοις, 12 § 2, 13 § 6.

§ 7 23 ἀσφαλεῖς] firmly established,
 not to be overthrown (like tyranny).
 "Yet in 16 § 9, 1287 b 7, as in 11 § 7,
 1281 b 26, and in II. 6 § 16 'safe,' 'trust-
 worthy' is the meaning." (T. L. Heath.)

24 ἡ φυλακὴ] From meaning 'self-
 defence'—see viii (v). 11 § 27—the word
 came to be used in the concrete sense of
 a protecting force, or body-guard. So also
 ὅπως μὴτε φυλακὴν τρέφῃται, viii (v). 11 § 8.
 16 ξενικόν] Forcigners, a force of
 foreign mercenaries. Comp. c. 15 § 10 n.
 (656), § 14 (666), and especially viii (v).
 10 § 10, φυλακὴ τυραννικὴ διὰ ξένων, n.
 (1666), *Rhet.* i. 2 § 19, 1357 b 30 ff.,
 Herod. i. 59 (Esaton). Susem. (822)

§ 8 State officers called ἀστυνόμοι
 were appointed anciently in troublous
 times, some for life, others with a com-
 mission to accomplish a definite political
 task (πράξεω). Hence their analogy to
 the Roman dictators.

30 ἕτερον δ'... αἶρεται τυραννίς] Comp.
 15 § 14 n. 667, vi (iv). 10 § 2 n. (1277—9).
 In the *Poetics of Cyne* (Str. 481, 1557 a

οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυνμήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἱππῶς εἰπεῖν (IX)
 αἰρετὴ τυραννίς, διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ
 § 9 νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος εἶναι μόνον. ἤρχον δ' οὐ μὲν
 διὰ βίον τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οὐ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν ὀρισμένων
 35 χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἶλοντό ποτε Μιτυληναῖοι Πιττα-
 κὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ
 § 10 Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἶλοντο
 τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν μελῶν ἐπιτιμῇ γὰρ ὅτι

τὸν κακοπατρίδα

40
 1285 b

Πιττακὸν πόλις τᾶς διχάλης καὶ βαρυνδαίμονος
 ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαύοντες ἀλλήλους.

35 οἶαν M^a, οἶαν P¹, οἶαν P⁴ || φεττακὸν Π¹ and so subsequently || 38 σκολῶν
 Gottling || 40 πόλις Schneidewin, πόλις all mss. edd. || διχάλης Schmidt
 Bergk, ἐχάλης or ἐχάλης M^a, ἐχάλης ΓΠ²P¹ Ar. Bk. Supem. 1-2-3, ἀσχάλης Camerarius
 1285 b i μέγ' | μὲν Γ M^a and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || παίνοντες? II.
 L. Athens

§ ff. = 476 Rose *Ar. pseudeph.* = 192 Muller) Aristotle stated that in olden times the tyrants were called αἰσυνμηταί (ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Κυριακῶν πολιτεῖα τοὺς τυράννους φησὶ τὸ πρότερον αἰσυνμήτας προσγορεῖσθαι. εὐφημώτερον γὰρ ἐκείνο τοῦ νομα). SUPSEM. (628)

32 οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον] For he was constitutionally appointed, although to powers beyond the constitution.

§ 9 35 οἷον εἶλοντο κτλ] The similar fragment of Theophrastus in Dionys. *R. A. v.* 73, already mentioned in the *Introduction* p 18, n. 7, runs as follows: οἱ γὰρ αἰσυνμηταί καλούμενοι παρ' Ἑλλήσι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἰρετοὶ τινες ἦσαν τύραννοι ἡρώδης δ' αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὐκ εἰς ἀόριστον χρόνον, οὐτε συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ἐπὶ τὰ δόξαι συμφέρειν, καὶ εἰς πῶσον χρόνον: 'Those whom the Greeks in olden times called αἰσυνμηταί were, as Theophrastus states in his books on Monarchy, elected tyrants. But the states did not elect them for an indefinite period, nor yet regularly, but only during the pressure of misfortune, as often and for as long a period of time as seemed expedient, as e.g. the Mitylieneans once elected Pittacus to ward off the attack of the exiles, who followed the poet Alcæus.' The single expression "during the pressure of misfortunes" (πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς) is, as Krohn shows, thoroughly in the manner of Theophrastus and "so too is the further treatment which undoubtedly to assign to αἰσυνμηταί its

historical position in political development. Originally, he says, these reigned everywhere in Greece as law-abiding monarchy based on law; but gradually this degenerated into arbitrary rule, and the next step was to a republic. But neither did this prove strong enough to uphold law and right, and thus, though the pressure of circumstances, (καιροὶ πολλὰ νουχούμενες) they revealed in reality, though not in name, to the establishment of monarchical power. Compare the words, v. c. 74, ἡσυχάζοντο παράγειν πάλιν τὰς βασιλικὰς καὶ τυραννικὰς ἐξουσίας εἰς μέσον, ἀνάμεισι περιμαλύνοντες αὐτὰς εὐκρεπέστερας, Θετταλοὶ μὲν ἀρχοῦν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἀριστοὶς λαλοῦντες, φοβούμενοι τυράννους ἢ βασιλεῖς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, with the fragment from Theophrastus: Πολιτικά πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς η. i. (in Παιροι. s. v. ἐπισκοπος) πολλοὶ γὰρ λαλοῦν κατὰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ νόμου ὁμοίαν ὅσον, ὡς οἱ Λάκωνες ἀριστοὶς φάσκοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις πέμπειν, οὐκ ἐπισκοποῦν οὐδὲ φύλακας, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι, as a proof that the account moves in the sphere of ideas peculiar to Theophrastus." (Henkel *Zur Arist. Phil.* p. 3, n. 1.) SUPSEM. (628)

§ 10 38 σκολιῶν μελῶν] A skolion was a particular kind of drinking song, sung by the guests at a party singly in a certain order. Fragments of them may be found in Bergk *Poet. Syn.* III, p. 613 ff. SUPSEM. (628)

39 κακοπατρίδα] Does this mean base-born? (εὐπατρίδα?) They set up the base-born Pittacus to be tyrant of the

- § 11 αὐται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικά (IX)
 εἶναι τυραννικά, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόντων βασιλικά·
 τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωι-
 5 κούς χρόνους ἐκούσιοι τε καὶ πατριοὶ γινόμεναι κατὰ νόμον.
 § 12 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας
 κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι
 χάραν, ἐγίνοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι
 πατριοὶ. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας
 10 καὶ τῶν θυσίων, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικά, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις τὰς
 δίκας ἔκρινον. τοῦτο δ' ἐποιοῦν οἱ μὲν οὐκ ὁμνύοντες
 οἱ δ' ὁμνύοντες· ὁ δ' ὄρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάστασις. (p. 86)

2 δεσποτικά 3 τυραννικά Sepulveda, 2 τυραννικά. ... 3 δεσποτικά Γ Π Ar. Bk. || 5 ἐκούσιοι M², ἐκούσια. ... πατριοὶ Π² Bk. || 8 βασιλεῖαι Casaubon, perhaps ight || 10 οὐσιῶν Π², γρ. οὐσιῶν P¹ in the margin || 12 ἐπανάστασις M² P¹ and P⁸ (1st hand, emended by the same hand), ἀνάστασις Q^b Th², γρ. ἀνάστασις coll.¹ in the margin of P² and under the text of P³

wrathful ill-fated town with loud cries assenting in full assembly' (Wyse). Or is it 'bane to his country'?

40 Πιττακῶν] See *Exc. II.* on this book, p. 451 ff. *SUSEM.* (626)

§ 11 1285 b 2 διὰ τὸ δεσποτικά εἶναι τυραννικά κτλ.] These two species of monarchy—viz. oriental despotism and a native dictatorship, §§ 6—10—exclude the citizens from the government as completely as if they were slaves; hence they come under coercive or arbitrary rule (*δεσποτεία*, c. 6 § 6 f. with *note*). *Xerxes* is οὐκ ὑπεθθῆναι πῶλε, *Aesch. Persae* 213; Pittacus is αἰρετὸς τύραννος. So far they are akin to the rule of an usurper who must rest upon force because he has no legal title to his position. On the other hand they are definitely separated from such rule by having a very good and legitimate title. As *Aristotle* says, they are 'elective and over willing subjects'; or as we should put it, they rest upon the consent of the governed. See n. (634).

4 αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωικούς χρόνους] The monarchies of the heroic age are described by *Herod.* *Hist.* I c. 20; *Herodotus Studies on Homer II.* pp. 1—69. See also *Freeman Comp. Politics* *Lect.* IV. and *Lect.* II. p. 64 ff.

§ 12 6 διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους... εὐεργέτας] *Comm.* c. 15 § 11 (ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας) n. (659) and VIII (V). 10 § 3 καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, n. (1649). *SUSEM.* (627)

7 κατὰ τέχνας] In the arts (of peace).

He is probably thinking of the mythical inventions.

8 τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πατριοὶ] 'hereditary kings for their successors.' Yet we can hardly be wrong in conjecturing that the Hellenic chieftains had once been, like the Teutonic, elective. *Comp. Ridgeway The Land Tenure in Homer in the Journal of Hellenic Studies* vi. 1885, p. 337: the *τέμενος* of *Odyssey* is by no means remote to *Telemachus, Odyssey* xi. 184 f.

10 καὶ τῶν θυσίων κτλ.] 'Such as did not require a priest acquainted with special rites,' e.g. like the *Eumolpids* (*Jebb*). So *Saul*, the *Israelitish* king, is described as offering sacrifices.

11 τοῦτο=the judicial functions. It is not the 'coronation oath' that is in question, as *M. Lang* assumed, *Essays* p. 23.

12 τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάστασις] 'The form of oath considered in the act of appointing the sceptre.' *Comm.* *Ibid.* I. 233 f. ἐπὶ μέγαν θρόνον ἀνοδοῦμαι· καὶ μὴ τὸς σκῆπτρον, VII. 412 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνέσχετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, X. 321 τὸ σκῆπτρον ἀνέσχετο καὶ μοι δημοσίων· also n. (616) generally. *SUSEM.* (628)

The sceptre as an instrument of the oath is always a symbol of office, whether kingly or judicial. Note that while *Homer* calls the thing *σκήπτρον* by (*σκῆπτρον*, *Zeus* VII. 411 &c.), *Herod.*, *Aristotle* gives the name to the solemn accompanying act.

- § 13 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων [καὶ] τὰ κατὰ πόλιν⁸
καὶ τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια συνεχῶς ἤρχον· ὕστερον
15 δὲ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παριέντων τῶν βασιλείων, τὰ δὲ τῶν
ἄλλων παραιρουμένων, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν αἱ πάτριαι
θυσίαι κατελείφθησαν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι μόνον, ὅπου δ' ἄξιον
εἶπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν, ἐν τοῖς ὑπερορίοις τῶν πολεμικῶν
τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον εἶχον.
- § 14 βασιλείας μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα, τέτταρα τὸν ἀριθμὸν, χ
21 μία μὲν ἡ περὶ τοὺς ἡρωικοὺς χρόνους (αὕτη δ' ἦν ἐκόντων
μὲν, ἐπὶ τοῖς δ' ὀρισμένοις· στρατηγὸς τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικα-
στής ὁ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κύριος), δευτέρα
δ' ἡ βαρβαρική (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ γένους ἀρχὴ δεσποτική
25 κατὰ νόμον), τρίτη δὲ ἦν αἰσυμνητεία προσαγορεύουσιν
(αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν αἵρετὴ τυραννίς), τετάρτη δὲ ἡ Λακωνική
τούτων (αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεῖν στρατηγία κατὰ
§ 15 γένος αἰδίου)· αὗται μὲν οὖν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαφέρουσιν
ἀλλήλων, πέμπτον δ' εἶδος βασιλείας, ὅταν ᾗ πάντων²
30 κύριος εἰς ὧν ὅσπερ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκίστηι τὴν

13 [καὶ] St Hilaire || 16 αὐτῶν M^a, omitted by IP Ar. Bk. || οὐσίαι IP ||
|| 18 εἶναι καὶ Koiacs || 22 ὀρισμένοις M^a IP A1. (?) || τε omitted by IP Bk.
|| 27 εἶπεῖν ἀπλῶς IP Bk. || 30 εἰς omitted by I' M^a Q^b T^b || ὡς περ Böhcher,
probably right, [ὡς περ.....ἐκίστη] Coming

§ 13 14 τὰ ἔνδημα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια] domestic and foreign affairs.

15 τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν κατὰ] 'As the kings themselves resigned some of their functions, while others were taken from them by the populace.' παραιρουμένων = shirring or pating off, as in c. 5 § 8.

16 ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις κατὰ] This at Athens the second of the nine Archons specially superintended religious worship and bore the title of King Archon, as the successor in this respect of the ancient kings. Comp. further Herod. iii. 142, iv. 161 (kings at Cyrene), vii. 149 (kings at Argos), 153; also vii (vi). § 8 10 n. (1482) below and n. (1653) on vii (v). 10 § 6. SUSK. (629)

For the functions of the King Archon (whose wife was βασιλισσα, as the wife of the Roman 'rex sacrorum' was called 'regina') see also Lysias c. *Andocidem*, Or. 6 §§ 4, 5; on the Aigive kings Pausanias ii. 19 § 1 and Plutarch *De fort. Alex.* ii § 8, p. 340 D: and in general on these shadowy survivals of a former real kingship, including the interrex and rex sacrorum or sacrificulus, Dion. Hal. iv. 74, Plutarch *Quaest. Rom.* 63, p. 279 C, and Meerman

op. c. pp. 147 ff., 430—441, whence these references are taken.

17 ὅπου δ' ἄξιον sc. ᾗ; where it deserved to be called a kingdom.

19 τὴν ἡγεμονίαν μόνον] This is decidedly too strong an assertion, see n. (616). In § 14 where the Spartan kings are mentioned, it is more correctly limited by the qualifying phrase ὡς εἶπεῖν, for the most part. SUSK. (630)

The Aigive kings belonged to this class of commanders in war: Herod. vii. 149.

§ 14 23 ἐπὶ τοῖς δ' ὀρισμένοις] On certain fixed conditions: ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέραςι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι, Thuc. i. 13.

24 ἐκ γένους - κατὰ γένος, hereditary.

27 ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεῖν] See n. (630)

and ii. 9 § 33, ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡγεμονία αἰδίου, n. (343). SUSK. (631)

§ 15 The fifth species is opposed to all the foregoing, so far as they are limited or varieties of constitutional rule. It is a monarchy answering to the act of household management, *τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν*: cp. i. 1 § 2.

30 ὡς περ ἕκαστον ἔθνος καὶ πόλις ἐκίστηι] Like each separate barbarian

κοινῶν, τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ (X) οἰκονομική βασιλεία τις οἰκίας ἐστίν, οὕτως ἡ <παμ>βασιλεία πόλεως [καὶ ἔθνους ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων] οἰκονομία.

- 15 σχεδὸν δὴ δύο ἐστὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδη βασιλείας περὶ ὧν σκε-
35 πτέον, αὕτη τε καὶ ἡ Λακωνική. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων αἱ πολλαὶ μετα-
ξὺ τούτων εἰσὶν. ἐλαττόνων μὲν γὰρ κύριοι τῆς παμβασι-

31 τεταγμένων Montecatino: Bucheler rightly thinks no change needed; if any, he prefers *τεταγμένης* || 31 *παμβασιλεία* Susem., *βασιλεία* T Ar Bk. Sec vi(1v). 10 § 3, 1295 a 19 || 33 [καὶ... πλειόνων] Susem.², see Comm. n. (633) || καὶ] ἡ M^a || πλειόνων M^a II^a and P^a² (1st hand, altered by corr.²). Postgate explains this as the gen of πλειών used as a subst. || *οἰκονομίας* P^a II^a and P^a (1st hand, altered by corr.² or corr.²) || 36 *βασιλείας* II^a

tribe or Hellenic city. Comp. *iii*. (11. 633). SUSEM. (633)

33 πόλεως...οἰκονομία] It is difficult to see what could have induced Aristotle to describe absolute monarchy not only as dominion over a state, but also to add "and over a nation," where we should at any rate have expected "or" (as M^a gives); and not content with this, even to add "or several nations." Throughout his work he is dealing with the forms of government of a state, not of a nation: (see I. 2. 4 n. 12) and there is nothing in the nature of absolute monarchy, which would justify such an exceptional extension. On the contrary, it appears further on in the work (17 § 1, § 5 n. 677), as has been stated several times already, that the only admissible and possible non-despotic absolute monarchy is that which can be conceived in the ideal state in the exceptional case described in c. 13. The interpreter has been misled by the preceding words *ἐκίστην ἔθνους καὶ πόλεως*, and has made the mistake into which since his time many modern critics have fallen (see *Introd.* p. 26 and c. 13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615, 17 § 5 n. 678), of supposing that this Aristotelian absolute monarchy referred to the Macedonian Empire. Cf. also vi(1v). 10 § 3 and n. (1280). SUSEM. (633)

Doubtless there are some slight indications in the work itself that Monarchy was actually exercised over a wider area than the territory of a single city. But in such cases it seems to be assumed that the rule must be *despotic*, and the population not yet fully organized for civil society.

c. 15 From this survey it appears that Monarchy is either (1) a special state office, as at Sparta, or (2) Absolute Monarchy, or something intermediate to these two.

Whether it is expedient to have an hereditary or elective commander-in-chief for life, is a question in the theory of legislation: the expediency of Absolute Monarchy is a constitutional question. §§ 1—3. Montesquieu has criticized Aristotle's classification, *Esprit des Lois* B. XI cc. 8, 9.

§ 1 35 αἱ πολλαὶ] The oriental monarchy may be as absolute as the *παμβασιλεία*; but it is separated from it by the aim and mode of its administration, as *despotic* ἀρχὴ from *οἰκονομική* in c. 6 §§ 6, 7. Hence the arbitrary rule of an eastern king is no mere perversion of true monarchy: but because the subjects allow themselves to be enslaved (δουλιώτεροι τὰ ἑθνη) they submit to a rule which is primarily for the ruler's advantage (see 6 § 6), and in material results does not greatly differ from tyranny, even as to the four points emphasized c. 14 § 11: (1) the consent of the governed, (2) heredity, (3) legal forms, and (4) the body-guard.

36 ἐλαττόνων μὲν...παμβασιλείας] Of the 'despotic' kings of non-Greek peoples, this is scarcely true. In dealing with Monarchy Aristotle is guilty of the confusion of ideas with which Schwarz righty charges him, in *Die Staatsformenlehre des Arist.* p. 32 f. (Aristotle's Theory of the forms of government, Leipzig 1884): he does not properly distinguish between government in accordance with the laws and the legal (i.e. hereditary) origin of the government. [To the former is opposed any *arbitrarity* or personal government whatsoever, whether it be a tyrant, or the great king, or the citizen of transcendent virtue and merit, who rules all things at his own good pleasure (ἀρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν): to the latter is opposed only the *unlawful* rule of the tyrant.]

To what extent may this also be assert-

§ 2 λείας, πλειόνων δ' εἰσὶ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. ὥστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν (X περὶ δυοῖν ἐστίν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγὸν αἰδίου εἶναι, καὶ τούτου ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ αἵρεσιν, 1286 a ἢ οὐ συμφέρει, ἐν δὲ πότερον ποτε ἓνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ οὐ συμφέρει. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης στρα-3 τηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμον ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἢ πολιτείας (ἐν ἀπάσαις γὰρ ἐνδέχεται γίνεσθαι τοῦτο ταῖς πολιτεαῖς), (p. § 2 ὥστ' ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην· ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασι-6 λείας πολιτείας εἶδος ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας.

ἀρχῇ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς ζητήσεως αὕτη, πότερον συμφέρει μᾶλλον

39 αἵρεσιν P⁴⁻⁵ L² A¹, μέρος II² P²⁻³ Q^b T^b W^b Ald. Dk., ἀρετῇ Bas.³ in the margin 1286 a 1 *more* omitted by II² Ar. Bk., perhaps rightly || 3 ἔχει] ἔχεται omitting εἶδος? Benanys

ed of the *αἰσωνυγεία*? Aristotle does not seem to give a sufficient answer to this question. Both, it is true, are founded on law; but though the elevation of the ideal king in a genuine aristocracy is a suspension of the laws, the *αἰσωνυγεία* too, as long as he rules, causes a suspension of the old constitution, and has power to remodel both constitution and laws according to his pleasure. Still the *αἰσωνυγεία* himself governs according to his own laws, while the ideal king may, in each single case, disregard them if he pleases. SUMM. (684)

§ 2 1286 a 3 νόμον ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος=presents a branch of legislation rather than of constitution. ἔχειν as in ἔχειν λόγον I. 6 § 9, οἱ ἀπορίαι, III. 10 § 1, I. 11 § 1, § 10, 12 § 1; and so ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν, *De Part. animi*. I. 5 § 2, 644 b 31. The genitive with εἶδος is again explanatory or defining, much as in ἐν ὁράντων εἶδος, I. 4 § 2. A better example is *Rhet.* II. 22 § 1, 1395 b 21, ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἑκάτερον (Bekker ἐκατέρου) τοῦτον ἐστίν. Trans. 'a generalship of this nature is a question for the laws rather than the constitution to examine.' The meaning is better explained in the parallel passage c. 16 § 1.

4 ἐν ἀπάσαις Comp. 16 § 1 n. (669). SUMM. (685)

5 ἀφείσθω] 'We may dismiss it for the present.' One of the two passages from which it is inferred that Aristotle intended a treatment of legislation to form part of his *Polities*. See *Introd.* p. 32 n. 1. SUMM. (686)

τὴν πρώτην—at the first, as in *Meta.* Z (VII). 12 § 12, 1038 a 35, τοσαῦτα

ἐλήσθω τὴν πρώτην. In *Pieol.* I. 153 τὴν πρώτην εἶναι: cf. III. 134. In *P^ool.* II. 32 § 2, 869 b 24, ἐκ πρώτης=ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

§ 2 5 ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κτλ.] 'But the remaining mode of royalty forms one species of constitution; hence it must be examined, and the difficulties which it presents must be briefly reviewed.' Without doubt then, the difficulties of cc. 15, 16 concern the λοιπὸς τρόπος, i.e. *παμβασιλεία*. See *nn.* on c. 17 § 1. Ποι ἐπιδραμεῖν 'run over,' like *ἐπελθεῖν*, *comp.* *Rhet.* I. 15 § 1, 1375 a 23. The difficulties are collected and partly answered in cc. 15, 16, a decision of some sort is pronounced in c. 17. This is the most confused part of the treatise. The arrangement adopted in the text may be learnt from *Introd.* pp. 83—86, or in greater detail from *Philology* 22 v. 1867. pp. 386—392. Its *rationalis* is that the first editor (or publisher) found the discussion imperfect: a lacuna at 16 § 2, 1287 a 10, which he could not fill; three or four supplementary fragments, 16 §§ 4—10, for which he failed to find suitable places in the main discussion; and part of an independent sketch, 16 § 10 (*δοι δέ*)...§ 13. Hence the changes; c. 16 §§ 4—13 being cut up into four sections and distributed over c. 15, in sequence or juxtaposition to the treatment of related topics there. See *Anal.* p. 112 f.

First *ἀπορία*: is it expedient to be ruled by the best ruler or the best laws? The passage c. 16 §§ 4—9, on any view of its collocation, manifestly belongs to this question and not to the fifth *ἀπορία* stated in 16 §§ 2—4.

- 4 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχεσθαι ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρίστων νόμων. 80-4
 10 καὶ δὴ τοῖς νομίζουσι συμφέρειν βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ καθόλου μόνον ὁ νόμος λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ προσπίπτοντα ἐπιτάττειν. ὥστε ἐν ὅποιοῦν τέχνῃ τὸ κατὰ γράμματ' ἀρχειν ἡλίθιον· καὶ πῶς ἐν Διγύπτῳ μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον κινεῖν ἔξεστι τοῖς ἱατροῖς, ἐὰν δὲ πρότερον, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ κινδύνῳ. φανερόν τοίνυν ὡς
 15 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ νόμους ἀρίστη πολιτεία
 16 διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου τοῖς ἀρχουσιν· κρεῖττον δὲ ᾧ μὴ πρόσεστι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἢ ᾧ συμφυές. τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ψυχὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνάγκη τοῦτ'
 20 ἔχειν πᾶσαν.

9 δοκοῦσι Bas.³ Bk. || 10 ο νόμος Götting, οἱ νόμοι Γ II A1. Bk. || 12 <ὥστε> καὶ Conring, <καθὰ> καὶ Koiaes || πῶς M², omitted by P²⁻³ Q² T¹ A1. Ald. Bk and P¹ (1st hand), <ὥστε> πῶς <καὶ> ? Sussem. || 13 τριήμερον Γ M² A1., τετρήμερον P¹ II² Bk. || 14 αὐτοῦ P¹ II² Bk., αὐτῶ M², αὐτῶν perhaps A1., αὐτῶν an unknown scholar in the margin of Stahr's copy of Morel's edition, also Schneides following Vettori's translation || 17 δεῖ γὰρ Koiaes, wrongly || 19 τοῦτ' A1d., τοῦτω T¹ and P² (1st hand)

§ 4. Argument in favour of monarchy.
 9 δοκεῖ δὴ κατὰ] Now those who maintain kingly rule to be expedient hold that the law lays down general statements (only) and gives no instructions for treating the (various) cases which arise.

"This side is defended in Plato's *Politeia* 294—303. Cp c 11 § 19 n (279), c 16 § 11 nn. (652—3), II. 8 §§ 18—22 n. (275), VI (IV). 4 § 31 (1210)." SUSSEM. (687)

12 ἐν ὅποιοῦν τέχνῃ ἡλίθιον] Plato brings out the absurdity in navigation and medicine, *Politeia* 298—9.

καὶ πῶς ἐν Διγύπτῳ] Undoubtedly this is not found in Plato, yet he employs the analogy of the physician, 295 c. See II. 8 § 18 n. (270), III. 16 § 6 (726), IV (VII). c § 13 (870). SUSSEM. (638)

13 μετὰ τὴν τριήμερον...κινδύνῳ] "After the treatment has lasted three days the physician may change it; but if sooner, he does it at his own risk." Hecidoctus (II. 84) does not mention this, but Dioscorus I. 82 § 3 states, without any such limitation, that in Egypt the physicians were paid by the state, and were obliged in their treatment of patients to adhere to a written code, compiled by many of the most celebrated physicians of ancient times. If they acted contrary to prescription, they might be accused of a capital crime (Camerarius). It is not

easy to determine which of the readings, *τριήμερον* οἱ *τετρήμερον*, is correct. That *μελέτην* must be understood with *τὴν τριήμερον* οἱ *τὴν τετρήμερον*, is proved by Postgate from Pseudo-Hippocrates 817 § *τεσσαρακονθήμερον τὴν μελέτην καὶ τὴν ἐπίδεσιν χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι* Herodotus II. 77 relates that the Egyptians who lived in the coin country purged the body for three successive days in each month by means of emetics and clysters. Dioscorus § 1 says that the Egyptians sometimes made daily use of these precautionary means of fasting, vomiting and clysters, but sometimes omitted them for three or four days. Neither does this then supply a safe analogy, if indeed there is an analogy at all. SUSSEM. (638)

14 φανερόν τοίνυν κατὰ] An easy victory for one side of the discussion.

§ 5 Reply to this argument.

16 ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνον κατὰ] "But again rulers are obliged to have the general principle, too, before-mentioned; yet that which has no emotional nature" viz. the law "is in general superior to that in which it is innate."

18 τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ κατὰ] A similar statement in c. 10 § 5 n. (562 b); *Nic. Eth.* v. 6 § 5, 1134 a 35; X. 9 § 12, 1180 a 21 (Eaton). SUSSEM. (640)

19 τοῦτ' ἔχειν] i.e. τὸ παθητικόν, or (c. 10 § 5) τὰ συμβαίνοντα πάθῃ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν.

c. 16 § 5
1287 a 28

<ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον> (X)

29 <κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μό-
30 <νους, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπου κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίων· ἥ τε γὰρ
<ἐπιθυμία τοιούτου, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους

20 ἀλλ' 1287 b 34 ὁμοίως. That the right order has been disturbed was seen by Giphanius, Zwinger, Schneider, Spengel. See *Introd.* 83—86 on the arrangement here followed; also for Cook Wilson's resolution of cc. 15, 16 into two parallel versions 15 §§ 2—10 = 16 §§ 1—9, §§ 11—13, and for Spengel's proposals.

1287 a 28—b 8. a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν.....32 ἐστίν cited by Julian ad *Themistium* p. 261 B || νόμον || Ar. and the Codex Vossianus of Julian, νοῦν I Julian and Bk.² || 29 δοκεῖ.....ἄρχειν omitted by the Cod. Voss. of Julian || θεὸν γρ. νοῦν corr.¹ of P¹ and corr.² of P² (both in the margin), ὁμοίως νοῦν corr. of P¹ in the margin || τὸν νοῦν μόνους Cod. Voss. of Julian, τοὺς νόμους Γ Π (including fr.) A1. Julian and Bk.² || 30 θηρία Cod. Voss. of Julian perhaps rightly || ἥ τε || δ τε M², ὅτε Γ || 31 τοῦτον Cod. Voss. of Julian || ἄρχοντας omitted by Julian, ἄρχων τέλος Γ? (cf. *furor principum habuerit, tandem et optimis viis interimit* William), ἄρχων τέλος or ἄρχων <κατὰ> σπᾶς τέλος? Schmidt

Four objections to the human ruler.

c. 16 §§ 5—9; 1287 a 28—b 8. (1) *Law is passionless and therefore its rule is the better*; § 5

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] Whether οὖν marks an inference, or is merely a transitional particle, in either case there is a want of logical connexion in its present place. The section might follow 1287 a 23, but there too οὖν would have no force.

νόμον. νοῦν μόνους] The two versions in which this celebrated passage has come down to us can be traced back to an early date. For Julian had before him (as is clear from his words ad *Themist.* 261 c D ὅρῃς, ὁ φιλόσοφος τέλος ἐπιτίθῃς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναι φησὶ τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὁρέξεως) not the version in the text, but another recension, viz. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπου κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρία· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιούτου, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀνδράς. διόπερ ἀνεὶ ὁρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν. Yet Codex Vossianus of Julian restores to us the valuable reading τὸν νοῦν μόνους, the corruption of which into τοὺς νόμους is the key to the whole confusion. In the existing manuscripts the two recensions are variously blended and confused. See *Julian and Aristotle* in the *Yearb. f. Philol.* cxvii. 1878 p. 389 f. SUSEM.

Trans. 'he therefore who appoints the Law to rule makes none but God and Reason rulers; it would seem; he who

appoints a human ruler adds thereto a brute; for appetite is akin to the brutish, and anger corrupts even the best of human rulers. Wherefore Law may be called reason unaffected by passion.'

30 προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίων] Best explained by the Platonic simile in *Rep.* IX. 588 a c: the tripartite figure, man, lion, and many-headed appetite (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

ἥ τε ἐπιθυμία τοιούτου, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς] While Plato makes θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία two different parts of the soul (v. Zeller *Plato* p. 413 ff.), in Aristotle they are only two subdivisions of the sensitive and appetitive part of the soul (i. § 6 n. 40). They are not however the only ones in the region of desire and aversion, as Haecker seems to assume in his treatise *On the division and classification of the moral virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics* (Berlin 1863. 4) p. 6 ff., but there is a third subdivision, the Will, βούλησις. At any rate Haecker's careful investigation of the difference between them has not attained the right result. He maintains that, according to Aristotle, both are based on the instinct of self-preservation, but that ἐπιθυμία springs from the unpleasant sensation accompanying a want i.e. a stopping of vital activity, θυμὸς on the other hand from the feeling of unpleasantness, aroused by an external limitation of our vital energy; θυμὸς then consists in the reaction that we oppose to this influence, or in our striving to regain the sensation of pleasure in the unimp-

§ 6 <ἀνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ δ' >
 <δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παραδεδυγμένα ψεύδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ
 <γράμματα ἱατρνεύσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρη-
 § 7 <σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσιν τὰς τέχνας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φίλιαν
 36 <παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρρυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
 <κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
 <πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπῆρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰσάθασιν πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 <τοὺς ἱατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-
 40 <φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τῇ ἐκ τῶν γραμμῶν θεραπείαν

32 ἀρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας Π² fr. Julian Bk. and P¹ (in the margin), φθέρει Π¹ (1st hand, marked by dots for εἰσαίρεσις), *interlinea* William || ὁ νοῦς νόμος M² fr. Julian and P¹ (1st hand): no doubt Γ alone. The full text of this older recension was ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κλεῖσθαι ...τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὁ δ' .. διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους.... διόπερ ἄνευ ὁρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν, which gives a sense, though less appropriate than the other || νόμος] μόνος Cod. Voss. of Julian || 34 γράμματα M² P¹ fr. || καὶ omitted by fr. [καὶ] Suscm.² 4, ἀλλὰ untranslated by Ar., [ἀλλὰ] Schneider || 35 φίλιαν <ἢ ἐχθραν> Spengel (hardly needful) || 36 ἀρρύνται M² Ar. and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || 39 πιστευθέντας] *πεισθέντας* Schneider Bk.², probably right

peded activity of our natural individuality. But Aristotle does not limit *θυμός* to external reaction, nor indeed to mere reaction at all. For, in the first place, even if the passage in *Nic. Eth.* VII. 6 1 ff. 1149 a 24 ff. was not written by Aristotle himself, but only by some one who (whether directly or indirectly) was his pupil, we may still infer the master's opinion from the pupil's, and assume that in *θυμός* the idea of displeasure at oneself was not foreign to him. For Anger, Displeasure, Indignation, and on the other hand Courage and Love of Freedom, IV(VII). 7. 2 n. (781), are the principal manifestations of *θυμός*, indeed *θυμός* is sometimes actually used for "Anger," sometimes for "Courage." As regards Pickens' second statement, the conception of *θυμός* in Aristotle is by no means always confined within the limits of mere wailing off and rejecting; on the contrary Aristotle thinks IV(VII). 7. 5, n. (786), that the part of the soul whence hatred proceeds may also produce love. Thus, it embraces, at any rate in part, what we call "the affections." On this analogy however, Fear should belong to it as well as Courage (*Tóp.* IV. 5. 4 126 a 8 f.) but scicely, as Eaton supposes, all the passions in contrast to Desire. Plato also ascribes to it ambition and love of honour. And it is by no means as certain, as Hacker and Islands (*Gr.*,

Rom. Phil. III i p. 140) suppose, that Aristotle was of an entirely different opinion. In a pamphlet entitled *δ θυμός ἀπὸν Ἀριστοτέλιν Πλατωνισμῶν* P. Meyer has not been more fortunate than Hacker in his account of the Aristotelian distinction between *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* and Aristotle's conception of both, and the matter is no clearer than before. Compare Suscmihl in *Bursian's Jahrbuch.* 1876, v. p. 264 ff.; also III. 10. 5 with n. (562 b) and notes 182, 790, 839, 935, 1704, 1741. SUSCM. (641)

(2) *The analogy of the 'arts' is misleading; for there (e.g. in medicine) personal motives do not come in:* §§ 6, 7. In *Nic. Eth.* II. 4 §§ 2, 3 he points out that the [Socratic] analogy of the arts and moral conduct is seriously defective.

§ 7 35 οἱ μὲν καὶ] 'the physicians do not act unreasonably out of personal liking; on the contrary they earn their fee by healing patients,' so that their interest lies in effecting cures and this coincides with their 'art.'

38 πρὸς ἐπῆρειαν καὶ χάριν] "to spite (men) and to win favour; since when people once suspect their doctors are pledged to their enemies for gain" i.e. have been bribed "to make away with them, they will in that case more urgently require to be treated according to written rules."

16 § 8 <ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγουνται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς >
 1287 b <οἱ ἱατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἱατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυ-
 <μναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές
 <διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθῃ ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον
 4 <ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ
 <μέσον.

16 § 9
 5 <ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 <νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσὶν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 <ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ
 8 <τὸ ἔθος.>

1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦτου βου-
 1286 a 21 λεύσεται περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα κάλλιον.

1287 b 2 τὸ ἀληθές ... 3 κρίνειν omitted by P¹⁻⁶ Q^h T^h || 4 δὲ Thuiot, γὰρ Γ
 II (including fi.) Ar. Bk. || 6 ὥστ' (ὥστε M^s) ei Π' Al., ὥστε II² Bekk., ὥστ' ei
 <καλ> Schneider

§ 8 A fresh objection (3) to the human ruler. "But again physicians, when they are ill, call in other physicians to treat them, and trainees in their practice (call in) other trainees, which implies that they cannot here judge right, because they are judges in their own case and under the influence of feeling."

1287 b 3 διὰ τὸ κρίνειν κατὰ Comp. c. 9 § 2 n. [544]. SUSSEM. (642) ὥστε δῆλον κατὰ "Hence it is clear that whoso seeks what is just and right seeks an impartial middleman: now the law is such a middleman."

4 μέσον] The arbitrator or 'middleman' stands between the two contending sides and is therefore of neither side, i.e. is impartial. Comp VI (iv), 12 § 5, πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος, n. (1314), and Nu. Eik v. 4 § 7, 1132 a 22, καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐπὶ μεσιδίων. SUSSEM. (643) Add Thuc. IV. 63, ἐτοίμως ὡν Βρασίδα μέσῳ δικαστῇ ἐντρέπει.

§ 9 (4) In any case the authority of unwritten and social law is supreme.

5 κυριώτεροι] more authoritative. Comp. n. (48), on I. 6 § 1, and VII (vi). 5 § 2 n. (1430). Broughton adds Soph. Antig. 580 ff. SUSSEM. (644)

See Cope *Intro. to the Rhetoric* pp. 239—244. He shows that τὸ ἐπικαλὲς, Equity, is a special application of αὐτοῦ νόμος, which as universal law, or the law of nature, is opposed to positive, conventional and written laws; that both κοινὸς νόμος and τὸ ἐπικαλὲς are designated *unwritten law*, ἀγραφα νόμματα, *Rhet.* I. 13 § 2, § 12, 15 §§ 3—6, and correspond

to the *ἔθνη* and *ἐπιτηδεύματα* of Plato *Law* 793 D. Comp. *Politic.* 295 A, *Law* 680 A; Demosth. *De Cor.* p. 317, 20 ff.; Thuc. II. 37 s. fin.

6 a... 7 ἀλλὰ] Even granting a human ruler is more trustworthy than written statute-law, still he is not so safe as the law of social custom.

c. 15 § 5 1286 a 20 ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν φαίη τις... κάλλιον] "But perhaps some one will say that to compensate for this [a human ruler] will be better able to advise on particular cases." This sentence evidently belongs to the first *ἀπορία*, advocating like c. 15 § 4 the claims of the human ruler, though in a modified manner. But the words following in the ms., c. 15 § 6, are in no definite logical connexion; so that translators are at a loss to make any intelligible sequence, Jowett for instance inserting [to whom we in turn make reply:] after this sentence, though he does not propose to insert ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιθέτων before the *ὅτι* or to omit the *τοίνυν* after it: while Bernays translates "to this objection one might perhaps reply &c.," and separates off the next sentence by a break.

c. 16 §§ 4, 5 1287 a 23—28 This is at any rate a valid objection to the modified view just proposed, and is clearly still concerned with the first *ἀπορία*. "But yet in any cases where the law seems unable to decide, a man would equally be unable. Whereas the law gives a suitable training and then sets the magistrates to decide and manage all other matters 'to the best of their judgment.'"

16 § 4
By a 23

24 <ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος
§ 5 25 <ἂν δύναται γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος
26 <ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
27 <τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπαγορεύσθαι διδῶσιν, ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ
28 <πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.>

15 § 6
16 a 21

22 ἀνάγκη νομοθέτην αὐτὸν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσθαι νόμους,
ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων
εἶναι δεῖ κυρίους· ὅσα δὲ μὴ δυνατόν τὸν νόμον κρίνειν ἢ
25 δῶς ἢ εὖ, πότερον ἕνα τὸν ἄριστον δεῖ ἄρχειν ἢ πάντας;
§ 7 καὶ γὰρ οὖν συνιόντες δικάζονται καὶ βουλευόμεναι καὶ κρί-
νουσιν, αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κρίσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκα-
στον. καθ' ἕνα μὲν οὖν συμβαλλόμενος ὅστισόν τι ἴσως χείρων·

1287 a 23-28 24 οὐδ' ὁ δ' Ar. (accepted by Vettori and Schneider) || 25 <τὸ
καθόλου> ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας Sussem.¹⁻² wrongly (and similarly Schneider and Körnes),
misinterpreting William (from a gloss in Γ' on ἐπίτηδες): παιδεύσας omitted by II¹ || 27
ἐτι δὲ <πάντα> Sussem.¹⁻² wrongly, following William's version (*sed etiam omnia
dirigere debet*)

1286 a 21-25 25 δεῖ ἄρχειν | δεῖ διαίρειν or διαίρειν ? Körnes || πάντας | πάν
p²-3 Q^b T^b Ald., γρ. πάν π¹ in the margin, πολλοὺς Ar.

1286 a 26-b 3=1287 b 15-85. See *Intro* p. 84 f., the parallel columns.

1286 a 27 αἱ κρίσεις εἰσι II² Bk.

1287 a 26 τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ γνώμῃ κρί-
νειν) The standing expression apparently
used of the judge. the heliastic took
this oath, says Demosthenes, xxiii. c.
Aristocr. § 96 p. 652 s. fin. γνώμῃ τῇ δι-
καιότητι δικάσειν ἀπομόκασιν, cp. *adv.*
Lept. § 180, p. 493, ἰ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἂν νόμοι
μὴ ὡς γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ κρίνειν [ἀπο-
μόκαστε ἡμετέ], Pollux viii. 10 § 122, δ δ'
ἄρκος τῶν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι
εἰσὶ, ψηφισέσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ
ὧν μὴ εἰσὶ, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. (Eaton).
SUSSEM. (648)

Aristotle remarks in *Rhet.* i. 15 § 5,
1275 a 29 f. that the oath may be ex-
plained (οἱ μὲν τὸ μὴ παντὶ ὡς χρῆσθαι
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.

27 ἐπαγορεύσθαι) "and allows them
to adopt any correction which appears
upon trial to be an improvement upon the
established laws." The play upon words
ἐπαγορεύσθαι...κειμένων is quite accidental.

On behalf of the place here assigned
to c. 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23-28 it may be
urged (1) that the plurals (τοὺς ἄρχοντας,
πειρωμένοις) are not appropriate to the
transition from the first to the second
ἀπορία, and (2) that only in this way do

the words ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἢ παρεκβα-
ίνουσι become intelligible.

c. 15 § 6 Transition to the second
ἀπορία. If it be allowed that there is
a *propositio* (viz. that of particular cases)
in which the decision of the laws is in-
sufficient, should it be supplemented by
the one best citizen as ruler, or by the
entire community?

1286 a 22 αὐτὸν (that he (viz. the
ruler). Otherwise Eaton, "that there be
some one to make laws."

23 ἢ παρεκβαίνουσιν) "but should
not be unalterably binding where they are
wrong." This refers to the gradual cor-
rection of the established laws just men-
tioned, c. 16 § 5.

§ 7 With §§ 7-9 compare the parallel
version c. 16 §§ 10-13, printed in parallel
columns, p. 84 f.

26 συνιόντες) The subject is πάντες
sc. οἱ πολῖται, the entire body of citizens.

27 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον) Cp. *Rhet.*
i. 1 § 8 περὶ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,
ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,
§ 7 περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων.

28 καθ' ἕνα) Taken individually
χείρων inferior [to the one best citizen].

ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς (30 καλλίων μίξις καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κρίνει ἄμεινον § 8 ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἰς ὅστισιν. ἔτι μῖλλον ἀδιάφθορον τὸ πλὴν, καθάπερ ὕδωρ τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθορότερον· τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ὑπ' ὀργῆς κρατηθέντος ἢ τινος ἐτέρου πάθους τοιούτου ἀναγκαῖον διεφθάρθαι τὴν κρί- 35 σιν, ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον ἔμα πάντας ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν. § 9 ἔστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, μὴδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον πράττοντες, ἀλλ' ἡ περὶ ὧν ἐκλείπειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ τοῦτο ῥάδιον ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους εἰεν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ πολῖται, πότερον ὁ εἰς ἀδιαφθορό- 40 τερος ἄρχων, ἢ μᾶλλον οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀγαθοὶ

29 [ὥσπερ .. 30 ἀπλῆς] Oncken || 30 κρίνει M^a P³ || 32 καθάπερ <γάρ> Bk², iashly. Other changes have been proposed, but the construction is Aristotelian. Cp. Vahlen *Zeitachr. f. d. ost. Gymn* xvniii. p. 721 ff. || 33 γὰρ Sussem., δ' I^a II A1. Bk. || 37 ὅν I^a 3.1, ὅν Q^b T^b || 38 τοῦτο μὴ I^a 3 Bk.

29 ἐστίαςις συμφορητὸς "a feast to which many contribute." Cp. i 1 § 2, n. (564). SUSSEM. (646)

§ 8 31 ἔτι μῖλλον... 33 ἀδιαφθορό-
τερον] Vahlen has illustrated this construction, viz. a simile breaking the principal sentence (often worked out into elaborate detail) and a resumption of the main thought with οὕτως ἀσυνδετον, from vi (iv). 3 § 6, 1290 a 11—15; *Nic. Etic.* vii. 6 § 1, 1149 a 25—31, εἰκοε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούει μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούει δὲ, καθάπερ... ὁ δὲ θυμὸς κτλ.; *De Soph.* Et. 16 § 5, 175 a 26—30, συμβαίνει δὲ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασι καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλυσαντες ἐν ὅτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχου εἰδότες παρ' ὁ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνθεῖναι διαλύσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν; *Rhet.* 15 § 11, 454 b 8—13, ἐπεὶ δὲ μέμνηται ὅσων ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιῶνται, ἥρως δὲ μμεισάται τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα... γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν κτλ.; *De Anima* ii. 8 § 10, 420 b 17 ff., 9 § 7, 421 b 26 ff. (οὕτως οὖν the text, οὕτω καὶ the other recension) οἱ παρρησιασ of B], iii. 7 § 7, 431 b 12 ff. Comp. i. 3 § 9, 405 b 15—20 (ὁμοίως δὲ καλ.), *Rhet.* iii. 9 § 6, 1409 b 22—25, τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεται ποιεῖ ὡς ποτ. . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τοῦ κτλ., where the resumption is not ἀσυνδετον. "Add *Rhet.* i. 4 § 3, 1253 b 33—39, ii. 6 § 14, 1265 b 20 I., iii. 7 § 6, 1277 a 5 ff., v (viii). 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff." SUSSEM.

ἀδιαφθορον] "incorruptible," not merely by bribes, but by any raptison.

32 τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλίγων ἀδιαφθ.] Yet when, *Rhet.* i. 1 § 7, he is comparing the functions of the dicat and of the law, he expresses an opinion which it is difficult to reconcile with this, ὅτι ἔνα λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥέον ἢ πολλοὺς ἐν φρονούντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν.

35 ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον] "But in the other case it is impossible" lit. difficult, see ii. 7 § 3 n., "that all should cri at once."

ἐκεῖ δ' ἔργον. ἁμαρτεῖν] This is hardly correct. A large assembly is more likely to be led into over-hasty conclusions than a single capable man and ruler. Still it is true that in the case of a large assembly, the passion does not generally last so long; and they more easily regain composure; while a single ruler, if once misled by inclination or hatred, may easily consume obstinacy and stubbornness with energy, so that there is greater danger that he will misuse his unlimited power. SUSSEM. (647)

§ 9 36 μὴδὲν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κτλ.] "not acting against the law except," i.e. only acting against the law in cases where it (i.e. the law) must necessarily be defective.

38 ἐν πολλοῖς—ἐν τῷ πλῆθει line 36. ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους] "at least suppose a majority to be good men and good citizens." A majority, though not the whole body of citizens.

40 οἱ πλείους μὲν τὸν ἀριθμὸν] Numerous enough, indeed, in the best state, to

1286 b
§ 10 δὲ πάντες; ἡ δὴλον ὡς οἱ πλείους; ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν στασιάζουσιν (X)
ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀσπασίαςτος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι
σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ κείνους ὁ εἰς ||.

6 § 9
27 b 8 <ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βῆδριον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει (XI)

9 <ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
10 <ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα
§ 10 <καταστήσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἴπερ, δ καὶ πρότερον
12 <εἰρημένον ἔστιν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν
13 <δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ

14 <σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένω

καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

15 <τοιούτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.>

1286 b 1 δὲ πάντες] δ' ἄνδρες Γ Μ^a || στασιάζουσιν Δ1. Moel Bk.

1287 b 8—15 8 πολλά omitted by P^a Q^b T^b Ar. Ald. and 1^a.¹ (1st hand, added in the margin of P^a, and by a later hand in P^a, but after words erased) || 9 ὡς αὐτοῦ fi. 11 δ. . 12 ἐστὶν ἡεῖοις εἰ περ Γ II Δ1. Bk., transposed by Suscm.² See Comm II. (649) || 13 δὴ Cameiarius, γε Doekei; but see Bonitz *Ind. Arist* 167 a 19 ff. || 14 ἐρχομένω Γ Μ^a fi. || 15 δέκα] δὲ Μ^a, untranslated by William || ὡς οὐχ ἑνα· λοιπὸν (iam William) ἄρχειν δίκαιον added by Γ Μ^a after συμφράδμονες, a gloss which has found its way into the text, given by P^a, and in red ink on the margin of P^a, in the more correct and fuller form ἀπὸ κοινοῦ τὸ ὡς οὐχ ἑνα λοιπὸν ἄρχειν δίκαιον

form the popular assembly and to appoint the council, the magistrates and the courts of justice from themselves alone—or, more precisely, from the older members amongst them, provided they are not too old: see IV (VII). 14 § 5, n. (817). SUSCM. (848)

§ 10 1286 b 1 ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κατὰ Objection. "A larger body will split up into parties; with the one rule this is impossible. To which we must, I take it, reply that they are (*ex hypothesi*) as virtuous in soul as that one ruler."

c. 16 §§ 9, 10 1287 b 8—15. The place of this fragment is vindicated by the congruence between its subject-matter and the foregoing. The contrast is still between δὲς and πλείονες.

The one ruler cannot owe look all things himself: he must appoint a number of officials; so that the state of things is virtually the same as if there were a number [i.e. a large body of the citizens] ruling.

1287 b 10 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν] 'Whether this was the original state of things' as it would be if the great body of citizens were rulers.

§ 10 11 δ καὶ πρότερον κατὰ] In c.

13 § 8, §§ 13—25. See also c 15 § 3 s. fin. If we followed the manuscript order we should have to translate "Lastly, as was remarked before, if the virtuous man deserves to rule because he is superior" but then it would follow that the apodosis (τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς.. βελτίους) also occurred in the preceding chapters. But in the two passages which alone are conceivable and to which Demetrius refers us c. 11 §§ 1—3 and 12 § 9, 13 § 1 we do not find this, but something really quite different and only comparatively similar. Or could it have occurred in the lacuna which we assume after 13 § 5? This is hardly likely. We must therefore transcribe thus; "if, as was previously remarked, the virtuous man &c." SUSCM. (849)

13 τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς] For δὲ in apodosis after εἰ cp. *Phys.* IV 8 § 11, 215 b 15, εἰ γὰρ τὰ τέτταρα τῶν τριῶν ὑπερέχει ἐνί, πλείονι δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν.. τοῦ δὲ μὲν ἐνὸς οὐκέτι ἔχει λόγον ὅ ὑπερέχει. With ἀλλὰ this is frequent: see e.g. c 5 § 3 of this book.

14 σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένω] *Hom. Iliad* X. 224. SUSCM. (850)

ἡ εὐχὴ] Agamemnon says this of Nestor, *Iliad* II. 372 f. SUSCM. (861)

16 b 3

εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν 7

4 τῶν πλείωνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δ' ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρα-
 5 τίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς βασιλείαν, αἰρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς
 πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ
 χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾗ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμούςους.
 § 11 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπίνιον ἦν εὐρεῖν
 10 ἀνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε
 τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ
 δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμούςους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι
 ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.
 § 12 ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρους γενόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, α

1286 b 8—1287 a 23 1286 b 7 ὁμοίους Γ II³ Δι. || 9 πολλὴ βλινε Ar., πολλοὺς
 ? Sylburg || 10 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἐπεὶ Jackson, ἐτι δ' Susem.^{1.12} 3 with all earlier antho-
 rities || ἐτι δ' ... 11 ἀνδρῶν Kiohn rejects as spurious, but the change to ἐπειδὴ
 disposes of his doubts See Comm. n. (659) || 13 καὶ <ἀριστοκρατίαν καὶ ~ πολι-
 τείαν? Susem. || 14 γινόμενοι Π² Bk.¹, γινόμενοι Bk.²

c. 15 § 10 1286 b 3 εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν .
 5 θετέον] Compare n. (536) on 7 § 3.
 SUSEM. (655)

6 καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνά-
 μεως] "whether the king has an armed
 force granted to him or not." Cp.
 § 14—c. 16 § 2 n. (666), as well as 14 § 7
 n. (622). SUSEM. (656)

7 ἀν ᾗ λαβεῖν κτλ.] "provided al-
 ways a majority can be found of uniform
 excellence." In fact an 'assembly of
 kings' as Kineas' and of the Roman
 senate. ὁμούςους as in 4 § 5, and as in 15
 § 11 ὁμούςους πρὸς ἀρετὴν

In §§ 11—13 (δημοκρατίαν), we have
 a sort of historical appendix to the first
 two ἀπορίαι.

§ 11 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κτλ.] The im-
 mediate reason is rather to be sought—as
 Aristotle himself explains l. 2 § 6, n.
 (19 b)—in the development of the state
 from the family through the intermediate
 link of the village-community. It would
 have been better therefore to repeat that
 fact and then to add that on account
 of the further reason which is here ad-
 duced kingly rule was maintained for
 some time longer. Cp. n. (659). SUSEM.
 (657)

9 τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις] "con-
 sidering too the small size of the cities in
 which they lived then." Comp. § 13
 n. (663), and the passages there collected.
 SUSEM. (658)

10 ἐπειδὴ αὐτ' εὐεργεσίας κτλ.] It

would have been highly desirable to
 adjust this second reason to the first.
 For if monarchy is traced back on the
 one hand to the government of a com-
 munity by its elders, and on the other to
 personal merit, the two causes cannot
 simply be at once combined, though a
 partial combination is not only conceiv-
 able, but even right. Aristotle however
 has neglected to make it, and has thus
 left a difficulty unsolved. For when
 Isenkol writes *Stud.* p. 95, 'but even in
 places where the original connexion be-
 tween the state and the organisation of
 the family no longer exercised a deter-
 mining influence, it was only monarchy
 that grew up in the beginnings of civil-
 ization,' adducing the second reason to
 explain this, he is quite right, but un-
 fortunately there is nothing of the kind
 in Aristotle. See also viii(v). 10. 3 n.
 (1649). SUSEM. (659)

12 συνίβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς κτλ.]
 Comp. viii(v). 10 § 37 n. (1708). "They
 would no longer submit to the rule of a
 king, but stood after a commonwealth
 (κοινὴν τι) and tried to set up a free
 government" (πολιτείαν): i.e. a republican
 constitution, or more accurately, first an
 aristocracy or a 'polity' of horse holders,
 next a 'polity' properly so called, of
 heavy-armed foot: vi(v). 13 § 10, cp.
 n. (1273). SUSEM. (660)

§ 12 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ χεῖρους .. 15 ὁλι-
 γαρχίαι] And yet Aristotle (?) viii(v).

- 15 ἐντευθέν ποθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον (X)
 γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον. ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραν-
 νίδας μετέβαλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν·
 αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότε-
 ρον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δη-
 13 μοκρατίας. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεζῶν εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πό-
 21 λεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥάδιον ἔτι γίνεσθαι πολιτεῖαν ἑτέραν παρὰ
 δημοκρατίαν.
 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις ἄριστον θεῖη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι 9
 23 ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ
 τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γινόμενων ὅποιοι τινες

17 μετέβαλλον M^s II² fi. Bk. || 18 ἄγοντες <τοὺς ὀλίγους> οἱ ἄγοντες <τοὺς πλουσίους> οἱ something similar Henkel (*Studien*, p. 96 n. 24); see Comm. n. (662)
 || 22 εἰ ...27 φέσιν cited by Julian ad *Thomist*. p. 260 D 1. || 23 περὶ παρὰ the mss. of Julian except the Cod. Voss || 24 ὅποιοι (ὅποιοι M^s) II² fi. Julian and P² (conit.), δποῶν P² W² Ald. and P² (1st hand), δποῶν P⁴ Q² T² L² C²

12 § 14 has a hostile criticism of Plato, who accounts for the transition from Timocracy to Oligarchy in precisely the same way (Schlosser). See III (1767, 1777). SUSSEX (661)

18 εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες] Here τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχίαν must be supplied as object from what precedes. Henkel however would insert τοὺς ὀλίγους or τοὺς πλουσίους in the text and translate. "while the powerful" (viz. the tyrants) "from disgraceful avarice continued more and more to thin the ranks of the rich." But then there would be no justification for the development of Tyranny out of Oligarchy, and it would appear as though the people had only risen against the tyrants, and not against the oligarchs. It is true that if we keep to the received text, the passage is somewhat obscure through its brevity, but other passages quoted by Henkel himself supply the necessary explanation. The oligarchies were constantly tending to develop into the rule of single families (II 10 § 13 n. 371) by the exclusion of more and more families from power, and those who were excluded went to strengthen the commons, which took its leaders from among them; for the δῆμος in spite of its hatred for the rich, living as it did "dispersed over its farms and isolated," VIII(v). 5 § 8 n. (1558), stood in need of leaders. But for this very reason there was first a transitional state of things, viz. the tyranny of these same leaders; and

afterwards when the people grew stronger the tyrants were banished, and a democracy arose. SUSSEX. (662)

§ 13 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μεζῶν κτλ.] Comp § 11, VI(iv). 6 § 5 n. (1225), 13 § 10 (1272), § 11; VII(vi). 5 § 5 (1435), 6 § 5 (1448—9), also VI(iv). 12. 3 n. (1310). Beside this increase in the population Aristotle quotes as additional factors the development of cities, VIII(v) 5 § 8, 9, comp. n.n. (1558—9), and VIII(v). 10 § 5 n. (1650) the military organization of the people, which if trained to serve as light infantry would easily hold its own against cavalry and heavy infantry, VII(vi). 7. 2, and the development of the navy, id. n.n. (1453—5) (Henkel). SUSSEX. (663)

21 ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥάδιον κτλ.] "Nowadays hardly any form of government, except democracy, can easily arise." Kingship in particular is not to be expected; if a monarchical constitution arises at all, it is in the form of τυραννίς, VIII(v). 10 § 37; cp. VIII(v). 5 § 8—8 (Henkel) with n. (1708). SUSSEX. (664)

22 εἰ δὲ δὴ τις 23 πῶς ἔξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων.] This is the third ἀπορία: a standing difficulty of all monarchy. In order to meet it heretofore has been modified at different periods (1) by election from a royal line, as amongst the early Teutonic tribes, cp. n. on 1285 a 16; (2) by adoption, as in the best times of the Roman empire.

24 ἀλλὰ γινόμενων ὅποιοι τινες ἔρχον] "But that will be mischievous if

- § 14 ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλ' οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὦν τοῖς (X)
 26 τέκνοις. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ,
 καὶ μέλζονοι ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.
 ἔχει δ' ὑπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ¹⁰
 τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτόν, ἢ δυνήσεται (v. a)
 30 βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ) βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται
 § 18 τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν; εἰ γὰρ [καὶ] κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μη-
 δὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναιμι ἢ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.
 § 18 τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν
 35 διορίσαι (δεῖ γὰρ αὐτόν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην
 τὴν ἰσχύν ὥστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ συμπλεόντων κρείττω
 τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἦττω, καθάπερ οἱ τ' ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς
 ἐδίδουσαν, ὅτε καθισταῖεν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνή-
 την ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας, συν-
 40 ἐβούλετο τοῖς Συρακουσίοις δίδοναι τοσοῦτους τοὺς φύλακας·
 16 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα XI

1287 a

25 ἀλλ' . . . 26 τέκνοις omitted by Q^b T^b, given in P¹⁻⁵ L^s Q M^b U^b C^o in the form
 ἀλλ' οὐ καταλείψει τοὺς υἱὰς διαδόχους ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχων τοῦτο ποιῆσαι ||
 τοῖς τοιοῦτοις Aⁱ. Susem.¹⁻² (perhaps rightly), omitted by Julian || 26 οὐκ ἔτι ῥάδιον
 τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι Julian, οὐ ῥάδιον ἐστὶ τοῦτο Γ (?), οὐκέτι (οὐκ ἔστι M^s, οὐκ ἔστι I^a) τοῦτο
 ῥάδιον Π (including fr.) Bk., perhaps rightly || 29 αὐτόν Bas.², αὐτὸν Γ Π || § M^s
 P²⁻³ Q^b T^b Ald. || δυνήσασθαι M^a, possit William || 31 καὶ omitted by Π¹ I¹, un-
 translated by Aⁱ. || 32 αὐτοῦ Γ, αὐτοῦ Π || 33 φυλάξει P¹ Ald., φυλάξει P²⁻³ Q^b
 T^b I¹, φυλάσσεται M^s P¹ || 36 ἐκάστων Susem.¹⁻² (*singularum* William) || 39 [ἢ
 τύραννον] ? Susem., <ἀρετὸν> ἢ τύραννον? Schmidt || 40 συρακουσίοις I¹.

the children are liable to turn out good or bad at random" or "just as it happens," a euphemism for "if they are very inferior." So Pl. *Gorg.* 514 b *πρὶν πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχονεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατὰρῶσαι*; Eur. *Hipp.* 929 *τὴν μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δ' ὅπως ἐτύγχανε*.

"This is certainly a very serious difficulty in an absolute monarchy, but in limited or constitutional monarchies the question is not so important" (Comrieve). SUSEM. (888)

28 ἀπορίαν] The fourth difficulty stated is that relating to the forces to be placed at the monarch's disposal.

τῆς δυνάμεως] This means not only a body-guard, but a standing army generally, or even a standing police-force. Cp. further § 10 n. (556), 14 § 7 n. (622). SUSEM. (888)

§ 18 31 εἰ γὰρ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύ-

ριος] "For even if he be lawfully sovereign, still he must have a force to guard the laws."

§ 18 38 αἰσυμνήτην] Cp. c. 14 § 8 n. (623). SUSEM. (887)

39 ὅτ' ἦται τοὺς φύλακας] This is what Dionysius the Elder did, after he had obtained his nomination as general with unlimited power (*στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* Diod. XIII. 95 f.) in the manner described by Diodorus XIII. 85-94 (cp. n. 1562, 1576) n. c. 40 or 405. Cp. [Grote c. 81] Holm *Geschichte Siciliens* II. pp. 94-96, p. 128. Cp. VII (v). § 10 n. (1562), § 8 (1576), 7 § 10 (1604), 10 § 6 (1660), 11 § 10 (1723); also i. 11. 12 n. (106), *Rhet.* I. 2. 19, 1357 b 30, Plato *Rep.* VIII 566 n, Polyaen. v. 2. 2. SUSEM. (888)

c. 16 § 1 1287 a 1 περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως κτλ.] This clause with δὲ answers

πράττοντος ὃ τς λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέ- (XI)
ψιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν
εἶδος, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρ-
5 χειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν αἰδίων, οἶον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ
ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως·
τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἑπιδαμνον, καὶ περὶ
Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἔλαττον)· περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβα- 2
§ 2 σιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀρχεῖ πάντων κατὰ
10 τὴν ἐαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς, * 3.

δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ
11 φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἓνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου
συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἢ πόλιν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ
αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν

1287 a 4 *politeias* Cameianus and Vettori (also by an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine), *basileias* Γ II (including fr.) Ar. Susem.¹ in the text || 8 *ἐλάττων* Schneider and an unknown scholar in the margin of Sialhi's copy of Morel (probably right) || 8 *περὶ*. 13 *ἀναγκαῖον* quoted by Julian ad Themist. p. 631 A f. || 9 *δὲ ἐστὶ* Codex Vossianus of Julian || ἀρχεῖ. 10 *βούλησιν* perhaps transposed by Γ to follow 10 *βασιλεὺς* || πάντων Julian, πάντα II (including fi), πᾶν Codex Vossianus || 10 αὐτοῦ Cod. Voss (accent by a second hand), αὐτοῦ Heitlein || λεκτέον unsuited after *βασιλεὺς* by Γ, a gloss which has crept into the text, given in a fuller form by p¹: *κατὰ κοινὸν τὸ λεκτέον*. There is then a manifest lacuna: hence δέ, which is omitted in Julian, should not be altered, with Sylburg and Scaliger, to δὲ. || τὸ κατὰ Julian || 11 *εἶναι* πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν *ἓνα* Γ M² Susem.^{1,2} || ὅπου ... 12 πόλιν and 13 καὶ .. φύσιν omitted by Julian

to the preceding one beginning *τάχα μὲν οὖν* 15 § 16; and it is an objection to M¹ J. Cook Wilson's analysis of cc. 15, 16 that it ignores this correspondence.

2 *ἐφέστηκε* the question is now at hand, impends.

4 *καθάπερ εἵπομεν* c. 15 § 2, n. (635). SUSEM. (669)

5 *αἰδίων*=held for life.

6 *τῆς διοικήσεως* 'of the administration'. Not in the technical sense in which δ *ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως* meant the Minister of Finance at Athens.

7 *περὶ Ἑπιδαμνον* Comp VIII(v). 1 § 11, n. (1501), 4 § 7 n. (1550); also II. 7 § 23 n. (249) SUSEM. (870)

8 At Opus the holder of this office bore the title of Cosmopolis Polyb. XII. 16. Comp. Schomann p. 142 Eng. tr.

§ 2 There is a manifest lacuna after line 10 ὁ βασιλεὺς, the omission of δέ in the citation by Julian is one attempt to conceal it, as the change to δὲ is another.

For instead of extending to *παμβασιλεία* the fourth *ἀπορία* (which in 15 §§ 15, 16, 1286 b 34—40, received an easy solution in respect of limited monarchy) the text goes on to raise an entirely new problem, *ἀπορία* (5); viz. *Is not the rule of one an unnatural anomaly when all are free (ὁμοιοί)? Is it not natural that power should pass from hand to hand (ἀνὰ μέρος) and be vested in officials, whose functions are arranged by law?* Thus by the mention of law the fifth difficulty brings us round again to the first,—a circumstance in itself quite unexceptionable, though it is no doubt responsible for the collection here of the various fragments §§ 4—13 which bear more or less closely upon the first and second *ἀπορία*.

10 *δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν* Comp. II. 2 § 4 n. (133), § 6 (134 b); IV(vii). 3 § 6 n. (740); further I. 7 § 1 n. (58 b); IV(vii). 8 § 2 (797), VI(iv). II § 8 (1293). SUSEM. (872)

εἶναι, ὥστ' εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσῃν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφήν ἢ (XI)
 15 ἐσθῆτα βλαβερόν τοῖς σώμασιν, <καὶ> οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
 § 3 τὰς τιμὰς, ὁμοίως [τοῖσιν] καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους· διόπερ οὐδένα 3
 μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοί-
 νυν ὡσαύτως. τοῦτο δ' ἤδη νόμος· ἢ γὰρ τάξιν νόμος. τὸν (p. 90)
 19 ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα
 § 4 τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, καὶν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν
 βέλτιον, τοῦτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς
 νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕνα τοῦ-
 23 τόν εἶναι φάσι δίκαιον ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν 4
 ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἀνθρώπος
 § 5 ἂν δύναιτο γινώσκειν. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος
 26 ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν
 τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἔτι δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν, ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ
 28 περὶ μέρους ἀμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων. ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον

14 εἴπερ] ὥπερ an unknown hand in the margin of the Munich Aldine || ὥστ'
 εἴπερ καὶ] ὥπερ γὰρ? Schneider || 15 <καὶ> Gotling || ἔχει] ἔχειν Schneider
 || τὸ P⁴ Q^b T^b L^a Bk. || 16 τοῖσιν omitted by II¹ || οὐδένα Placcius, οὐδέν J¹ II (in-
 cluding f.). Ai. Bk. || 23 ὁμοίως II²

1287 a 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα..... 28 κειμένων transposed to follow 1286 a
 21 κάλλιον; see p. 433

1287 a 28 ὁ μὲν οὖν ... b 8 τὸ θος transposed to follow 1286 a
 20 πᾶσαν; see pp. 430—432

14 τὸ ἴσῃν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους] Comp.
Nic. Eth. II. 6 § 7, 1106 a 35 ff. (Brough-
 ton). SUSK. (878)

§ 3 16 ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ ἄνισον κτλ]
 "So too it is quite as harmful if unequal
 shares are assigned to those who are
 equal. Hence it is right that in ruling
 and being ruled all should be alike, and
 consequently should interchange with one
 another in both. But here we come to
 law, for the system" on which they inter-
 change "is a law."

17 τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος rotation in ruling
 and being ruled.

18 ὡσαύτως sc. διατείνεσθαι.

§ 4 21 νομοφύλακας=guardians of the
 laws: the expression used by Plato *Leges*
 IV 715 c (Ealon). SUSK. (878 b)

23 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ] "In order to bring
 this passage 1287 a 23—28, as it stands,
 into logical connexion with the preceding
 fifth *ἀπορία*, it will be necessary to regard
 it not as an objection to the view therein
 expressed, but as introducing a new objec-
 tion to a ruler who goes beyond the letter
 of the law; ἀλλὰ μὴν=but again, as in 1262

b 24, 1287 b 8. Yet the next sentence, a 25
 —27, allows that within certain limits the
 one ruler is really in a position to make
 such decisions, and speaks of rulers in
 the plural. Hence there can be no ques-
 tion here of attacking or defending monar-
 chy, and besides all the *ἀπορίαι* are alike
 in treating *absolute* monarchy unfavour-
 ably. It would still be open to us to
 read ὁ δ' with Arcturius instead of οὐδ',
 a 24; but if that were done ἀλλὰ in the
 next line would not be in place: Ai. omits
 it and we should rather expect *ὅδ' ὥστε*
 or something of that sort." SUSK.

28 ὁ μὲν οὖν] "It is not to be denied
 that, if the preceding passage 1287 a 23—28
 be transposed, this passage 1287 a 28—18
 might quite well follow the fifth *ἀπορία*,
 so far as the connexion of thought goes.
 But the form renders this impossible. The
 fact that law is passionless is not an infer-
 ence that can be drawn from the natural
 injustice of a permanent ruling body; so
 that οὖν will not stand as 'therefore.' Nor
 will it suit as a transitional particle, with-
 out something else, καὶ ὃτι δc." SUSK.

κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν (XI)
 30 μόνους, ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπων κελεύων προστίθῃσι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ
 ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους
 § 5 ἄνδρας διαφθείρει. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν. τὸ δ'
 32 δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψευδὸς, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ
 34 γράμματα ἱατρούεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] αἰρετώτερον χρῆ-
 § 7 σθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας. οἳ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φίλων
 παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἄρουνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς
 κἀμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἳ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς
 πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπῆρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰσάγειν πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 τοὺς ἱατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς δια-
 40 φθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν
 § 8 ζητήσασιν ἢ μάλλον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσαγοιγνῆται γ' ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς δ'
 1287 b οἱ ἱατροὶ κἀμνοντες ἄλλους ἱατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτροῖβαι γυν-
 μιναζόμενοι παιδοτροῖβας, ὥς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ δληθὲς διὰ
 τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ
 § 9 δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος τὸ μέσον.
 5 ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριώτερον τῶν κατὰ γράμματα
 νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη εἰσίν, ὥστ' εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμ-
 ματα ἀνθρώπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ (p. 92)
 8 ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥέδων ἐφόρᾳ πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει γ'
 ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας,
 10 ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα
 § 10 καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον; ἔτι, εἰπερ, δ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον
 12 ἐστίν, ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δι-
 13 καιος, τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ
 14 σὺν τε δ' ἔρχομένῳ

καὶ ἡ εὐχή τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος

15 τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες.

|| εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνὶ ὧν αἱ

16 ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνουν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος
 ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβη-

1287 b 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ..... 15 συμφράδμονες (transposed to follow
 1286 b 3 ὁ εἰς: see p 435)

1287 b 15 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ..... 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως is another recension of 1286 a 26
 —b 3. See *Introd.* p. 84 f. || δὲ γὰρ? Sussem. || 17 γε omitted by IP² Bk.

c. 16 §§ 10—13 1287 b 15—35. In
Introd. pp. 84—5, the reader will find this
 passage printed in parallel columns side by
 side with c. 15 §§ 7—10, 1286 a 26—b 3,

an arrangement which cannot be adopted
 here, simply because it is then no longer
 possible to preserve the lines of Bekker's
 quarto edition, as is done elsewhere.

τεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν. (XI)
 § 11 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ
 10 δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον
 τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄρι-
 στον περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων
 ἐστίν. οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γ' ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄν-
 24 θρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινόμενον περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλ' ὅτι
 § 12 οὐχ ἓνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαι-
 δευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἥτοπόν τ' ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δό-
 28 ξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἔχοι τις δυοῖν ὕμνασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς
 κρίνων, καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολ-
 30 αῖσι, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμούς πολλοὺς οἱ μονάρχαι ποιοῦσιν
 § 13 καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες
 οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι
 κακείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὁμοιος, ὥστ' εἰ
 τούτους οἶεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἶεται
 35 δεῖν ὁμοίως. ||

17 ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγου-

18 ὡς.....κρίνειεν translated to precede 17 ἐπεὶ by II², untranslated by Ar. || 19
 καὶ omitted by I¹ and I² (1st hand, added by p¹) || ἐπειδὴ II² fr. Ik. || 22 νομο-
 θετῆσθαι Suscm.^{1,2} lege statuta esse William || 25 κρινεῖ Spengel, κρινεῖ I II Δι. Ik.
 || 26 ἄριστον...81 συνάρχους cited in Scholia on Aristoph. Birds 92 || τ' II¹ fr.,
 δ' II² Δι. Schol. on Aristoph. || 27 ἔχοι Suscm., ἔσοι I II (including fr.) Δι. Schol.
 on Aristoph. Ik. || δυοῖν δυοὶ Sylburg || 28 πράττει Coming wrongly, but recogni-
 zing that the text was uncorrupt || 29 μόνον II² fr. Schol. on Aristoph. Ik. || 30
 αὐτῶν Moel, αὐτῶν II Schol. Aristoph., αὐτοῖς Suscm.^{1,2} (sibi William), possibly right
 || τῆς ἀρχῆς Casaubon || 31 αὐτοῦ Suscm.², αὐτοῦ I II Suscm.² Ik.¹, αὐτοῖς Schol.
 Aristoph. Suscm.¹, perhaps right, αὐτοῖς Ik.², but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 125 a 18 f. || 32
 δὲ omitted by fr. || 33 ὅ τε I, ὅτε I¹ T² Alcl., ὅτε (2^b, ὅ δὲ Δι. || φίλους ἴσους I M²

c. 16 § 11 19 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν κτλ. || It is on this account that 'equity' is necessary to supplement law, right, and justice, because the law only determines the general rule, but there are some things for which no general rules can be established; therefore besides laws there must be popular decisions. See *Nic. Eth.* v. 8. Cf. also *Rhet.* i. 13 § 12 ff. 1374 a 25 ff. [with Cope's comment¹ and his *In-
 t. ad.* pp. 190—193], Plato *Polit.* 294 n ff. (Eaton). Also see notes 275, 279, 237 and vi(iv). 4. 31 n. (1212). SUSCM. (682)

22 περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλευόνται || This department of human action is defined in the detailed investigation of *Nic. Eth.* iii. c. 3. SUSCM. (683)

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν || Here, it may be remarked, Mr. J. Cook Wilson finds a place for the fragment 16 §§ 4, 5, 1287 a 23—28, ἀλλὰ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀντι-
 λέγουσιν.

§ 12 29 ὀφθαλμοῖς || An allusion to the title of the king's eye, given by the Medes and Persians to a counsellor of the king; Herod. i. 114 (cp. c. 100), Aesch. *Persae* 973, Aristoph. *Ach.* 94 with scholiast, Xenoph. *Cyropaeid.* viii. 2 §§ 10—12. Compare also Pseudo-Arist. *De Mundo* c. 6, 398 a 21 ff., Pull. ii. 4 (Eaton) and ii. (1715) upon viii(v). 11 § 7. SUSCM. (684)

c. 17 A partial decision of the above difficulties. A reference to c. 15 §§ 2, 3

36 *σι, σχεδὸν ταύτ' ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ἴσως ταύτ' ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει* 10
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως. ἔστι γὰρ τι φύσει
δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ
δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον· τυραννικὸν δ' οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, (p. 92)
 40 *οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἔσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶν ταῦτα*
§ 2 γὰρ γίνεταί [τὰ] παρὰ φύσιν. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημύμων γε φα-
 1288 *νερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον*
ἔσται οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ ὄντων νό-
μων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγα-
 4 *θὸν ἀγαθὸν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν*
 § 3 *ἀμείνων ᾗ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον*
εἰρηται δέ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. [πρώτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ 11

38 *δεσποτικὸν*] *δεσποτὸν* P² Q^b T^b fi. Ald., probably also P¹ (1st hand), *δεσπο-*
στὸν Sylburg Bk., *ἀριστοκρατικὸν* in place of either *δεσποτικὸν* or *βασιλικὸν* Schlosse.
 See Comm. || *καὶ ἄλλο βασιλικὸν* omitted by Π¹ (in P¹ added in the margin) ||
βασιλευτὸν P² Q^b T^b fi. Ald. Bk., probably also P⁴ (1st hand), *βασιλευτῶν* P⁴ (101.)
 || 41 *τὰ ἰσχυρὰ* omitted by Π² A¹ Bk., retained by fi.

1288 a 2 *νόμων ὄντων* M² Π² fi. Bk. || 3 *ἀλλ' .. νόμον* omitted by Π³ || 5 *εἰ*
 omitted by fi || 6 *ἤδη* omitted by Π¹, [ἤδη] Susem.¹ || [*πρώτον*... 15 *ἀρχαί*]
 Susem. See *Quaest. cit. coll.* p. 398 f.

will suffice to show that the solution here proposed relates to nothing else than the *λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας*, *οἱ absolute monarchy*. Comp. Susemihl *Quaest. coll. cit.* p. 396 ff. If so, they must relate to *that community of virtuous men in which alone absolute monarchy will arise*. Comp. c. 15 § 9

§ 1 36 *ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν* i.e. in certain circumstances: *not*, as Beinays and others translate, "in the case of certain men (populations, civic bodies)." See n. (677) and *Quaest. cit. coll.* p. 397 ff. SUSEM. (674)

38 *δεσποτικὸν.. βασιλικὸν*] "*Δεσποτικὸν* *δεσποστὸν* after Sylburg and *βασιλευτὸν* as in Π². But we find *τυραννικὸν* standing side by side with these; and as this can hardly be used, like *ἀριστοκρατικὸν* and *πολιτικὸν*, in a passive sense it proves that we should rather read *δεσποτικὸν* with Götting, as in Π¹, and adopt *βασιλικὸν* from the com., of P⁴. Further, how else are we to construe *καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον* and *τῶν ἄλλων.. παρεκβάσεις*, to which Lambin raised an objection? But with the text before us *ἔστι φύσει* is the predicate of the first clause, *ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν* the predicate of the second clause: all the rest is subject." SUSEM.

40 *ταῦτα γὰρ ..παρὰ φύσιν*] Com-

pare the apparently inconsistent passage VII(IV) 12 § 3 n. (1310) SUSEM. (674 b)

§ 2 1288 a 3 *ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον*] Cp. 13 § 14 n. 601 b. SUSEM. (876)

This is the thorough-going Absolutism of the scientific expert in government, as advanced by Plato.

§ 3 6 *καὶ πρότερον*] viz. c. 13 §§ 13—25. SUSEM. (876)

6 *πρώτον* δι...15 *ἀρχαί*] Kiohn is right in objecting to the meaningless tautology in the definition of the peoples suited to monarchy or aristocracy. It is even worse that aristocracy is here described in a manner which, although it does not directly contradict Aristotle's conception, still by no means exhausts it, and therefore does not render it faithfully. It is indeed essential that a true aristocracy should possess citizens who are capable enough always to elect the most capable persons to office. But it is as essential to this ideal aristocracy, that these persons should only hold their offices for a certain time, and then be replaced by persons not inferior in capacity, so that there is a perpetual interchange of rulers and ruled. And it is yet worse to find the people suited for a monarchy represented as different from that suited for

βασιλευτὸν καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν. (X.)
 § 4 βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν
 γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀρι-
 10 στοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν [[πλῆθος ἄρχισθαι
 δυνάμενον]] τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος ἐν
 ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίνεσθαι πλῆθος πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρ-
 χεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμονται
 § 5 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς.] ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν 13

10 [πλῆθος φέρειν] Vettioi Bk. || [πλῆθος ἀρχεσθαι δυνάμενον] Sussem. following Ar. and Schneider. Perhaps another occasion of the preceding || 11 ἀρχὴν omitted by M² P¹ || 12 πλῆθος ἐν ᾧ.....13 ἐγγίνεσθαι Spengel Bk.², [ἐν ᾧ.13 πολεμικόν] Hiercher [*Hei mer VII. 467*] || 13 πέφυκε καὶ ἐν II² (only P¹ has ἐν for ἐν, written over an erasure), [καὶ ἐν] Bk.¹, omitted by II² fi. A1. || ἥθος Παιδικὴ (probably right) || πολιτικὸν fi. II (emended by con. of P¹) || καὶ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι M¹, ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν II² fi. Bk. || 15 ἀπόροις I² II² fi. A1. γρ. ἀπόροις I¹ in the margin. I² (1st hand) also had ἀπόροις: εὐπόροις was written over by con.³ and γρ. καὶ ἀπόροις inserted in the margin; <εὐπόροις καὶ> ἀπόροις? Stahr (not had) See Comm. II. (677): πολιταὶς Κορνεῖ || § P¹ II² Ar. Bk. Bernays Sussem.¹ || [τῶν ἄλλων] Sussem.¹, *ad hoc non ad est ab initio* Albeit; if § 14 is right either τῶν ἄλλων is a dittographia from 17, or must be transposed to follow 16 *ἐνα τινά*, or, as Schmitt proposes, to follow 19 *βασίλειά*

aristocracy, although according to the genuine teaching of Aristotle, the true monarchy and the true aristocracy are only possible with the same people, viz. that of the ideal state (13 § 24 n. 614, see *Introd.* p. 44). For this very reason, we would not translate above at 17 § 1 "for some people monarchical government is naturally suitable, for others the true Republican government"—but rather: "under some circumstances the one, and under others the other." But the interpolator, like many modern critics, misunderstanding the passage adopted the former meaning, and so it seemed to him necessary to interpolate here an exact account of each kind of people. When the passage is rightly interpreted, the incorrectness of this interpolation at once becomes manifest. While c. 17 § 5 is closely connected with καὶ πρότερον. (§ 3) the intermediate §§ 3, 4 disturb this connexion entirely. In its present form the definition of the people suited to a Polity is quite un-Aristotelian, whether we adopt the reading εὐπόροις or ἀπόροις; the former gives a mixture of aristocracy and oligarchy, the latter a monstrous combination of aristocracy and democracy, while the Aristotelian Polity is a compromise between oligarchy and demo-

cracy. Yet this mistake seems too bad even for this interpolator, and we ought perhaps to adopt Stahr's conjecture τοῖς εὐπόροις <καὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις> which would remove the difficulty. SUSSEM. (677)

§ 4 12 πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος κατὰ
 If we adopt the very probable change of the second πλῆθος into ἥθος, the sense is: "And the population suited for a Polity is that in which there is naturally a warlike character (ἥθος), qualified to be rulers as well as subjects in accordance with a law which assigns the offices of state in accordance with their merits to the rich (& the poor)." If this change be not made, the sentence will be differently rendered according as the second πλῆθος is regarded (1) as mere redundancy (*L'origine des Vices* p. 25), or (2) as used in a different sense from the first: i.e. as meaning 'body,' 'class,' within the entire civic population. Bernays, while adopting this latter view, makes δυνάμενον..ἀρχάς refer to the first πολιτικὸν πλῆθος: which seems inconsistent. If 'the population suited to Polity' were 'one in which a warlike class naturally abides,' it should merely be *this class* and not the population generally 'in which an interchange of ruling and being ruled can be carried into effect.' SUSSEM.

16 ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῆν διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν (XI)
 τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων,
 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάν-
 8 των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρό-
 20 τερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώ-
 θασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οἱ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς
 καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικὰς
 (πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν
 7 αὐτήν), ἀλλὰ <καὶ> κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ 13
 15 φυναδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δὴ που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν,
 οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος
 ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι
 8 τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ
 τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος [τοῦτον] ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. (p 93)
 30 περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας, τίνας ἔχει διαφοράς, καὶ πότερον XII

16 τινὰ omitted by Π¹, [τινὰ] Susem.¹ || 20 [οὐ μόνον] Bojeven || 21 ἀριστο-
 κρατίας and 22 ὀλιγαρχίας Γ M^a Susem.¹ || 22 δημοκρατίας Γ Susem.¹ and M^a (r1
 hand) || 23 πάντη li. πάντες Π² Ar. Bk. and P⁴ (1st hand), perhaps right; yet altered to
 πάντη by the copy of P¹ || ἀξιοῦσιν. ὑπεροχὴν omitted by T^b and P¹ Q^b (1st hand,
 ἀξιοῦσιν added in the margin of P⁴, and ἀξιοῦσιν ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν by a later hand in the
 margin of Q^b) || 24 <καὶ> Schneider, which supersedes Bojesen's violent change
 (line 20) and Spengel's suspicion of 20 οὐ μόνον οὕτως || 27 τὴν omitted by M^a P⁴
 Q^b T^b Bk. || 29 τοῦτον omitted by Π¹ || κατὰ μέρος εἶναι τοῦτον ἀλλὰ ἀπλῶς fr.

§ 5 18 τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος κτλ.] Aristotle speaks with far more correctness here than in 13 § 13 when he is dealing with a whole stock of individuals or even a single man. But this gives a fresh proof (cp. *Introd.* p. 46) that in describing his ideal monarchy, he was not thinking of Macedonia, for not even Oncken would attribute to him the absurdity of regarding the whole royal family of Macedonia as gods dwelling among men (13 § 13 n. 601, § 25 n. 615) SUSEM. (878)

§ 6 19 εἴρηται πρότερον] viz. c. 13 §§ 23—25 and §§ 1—12. SUSEM. (879)

21 τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς] Instead of aristocracy, we should at first sight rather expect polity: for aristocracy is founded on the right of fitness or merit, the only ultimate right (7 § 3 n. 536). But Aristotle is here pointing to the explanations in 13 §§ 1—12, in which it is aristocracy and not polity that is discussed; and even this is hypothetically designated as faulty, in cases, that is, where the excellence of the community is not weighed against that of individuals

to see which excels the other. SUSEM. (880)

24 κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν] sc. δίκαιον 'but also according to the right previously expounded': viz. the right of merit, when the estimate just mentioned (in n. 680) has been correctly made. Accordingly we are referred back to c. 9 as well as to c. 13. Further comp. n. (595) and VIIT(V). I § 6 n. (1495). SUSEM. (881)

§ 7 26 οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε. 28 συμβέβηκεν] 'For it is not natural that the part should outweigh the whole, and the possessor of such extraordinary eminence has happened to be in this case' viz. that all the others together stand to him as part to whole. The ordinary interpretation is, 'For it is not the course of nature that the part should surpass the whole, whereas this happens when a man is very superior to the rest.' But see c. 13 § 13. SUSEM. (881 b)

§ 8 29 μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς] 'not merely in totation' with others, 'but absolutely sovereign.'

31 οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρι, καὶ τίσι, καὶ πῶς, (XI)
 18 διαρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς φάμεν εἶναι τὰς
 ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, τούτων δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἀρίστην εἶναι τὴν ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἀρίστων οἰκονομουμένην, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ συμβέβη-
 35 κεν ἢ ἕνα τινὰ συμπάντων ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος ὑπερέχον
 εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν, τῶν μὲν ἄρχεσθαι δυναμένων τῶν δ'
 ἄρχειν πρὸς τὴν αἰρετωτάτην ζωὴν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδεί-
 χθη λόγους ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ
 πολέτου τῆς ἀρίστης πόλεως· φανερόν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
 40 καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ τε γίνεται σπουδαῖος καὶ πόλιν συ-
 στήσειεν ἂν τις ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην, ὥστε ἔσται ::
 33 b καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθνη ταῦτά σχεδὸν τὰ ποιοῦντα σπουδαῖον
 § 2 ἀνδρα καὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα πολιτικὸν [καὶ βασιλικόν]. Διωρισμέ-
 νων δὲ τούτων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἡδὴ περατέον λέγειν τῆς
 4 ἀρίστης, τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς.

36 ἄρχεσθαι <καὶ ἄρχειν> Spengel Bk.² || 39 τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης II² fi. Bk.
 || 41 <ἀριστ' ἢ> ἀριστοκρατουμένην Bucheler, probably right. Schmidt
 thinks ἀριστοκρατουμένην ἢ βασιλευομένην a gloss which has taken the place of the
 true reading ἀρίστα πολιτευομένην οἱ εὖ τεταγμένην; [ἢ βασιλευομένην] Spengel who
 first saw the text to be unsound

1288 b 2 πολιτικὸν πόλιν ἀγαθὸν (or σπουδαῖον)? Spengel || [καὶ βασιλικόν]
 Spengel, καὶ βασιλικόν <καὶ ἀριστοκρατικόν> Coming wrongly: καὶ βασιλευόν
 Nicks, accepted by Beinays, whose translation shows that it will not give a good
 sense || 4 καθιστάσθαι πῶς M², καθίστασθαι πως I² B² W² Ald. and I² (1st hand,
 the second acute has been erased).

c. 18 *Transition from Monarchy to the best constitution in the narrower sense*, i.e., excluding monarchy, to pure Aristocracy.

This chapter is of first-rate importance for the question of the order of Books IV (VII), V(VIII), because it enables us to decide whether the best (i.e. the ideal) state in its normal form is or is not identical with the ὀρθὴ πολιτεία Aristocracy: a point which Voichhammer (*Philol.* xv. p. 56 ff.) and Bendixen (*Philol.* xiv. p. 293 ff. *Die alte Staat des Arist.* p. 66 ff.), defending the traditional order of the books, denies. Their objections are examined by Spengel *Arist. Studien* II. p. 60 (652) f.

§ 1 34 οἰκονομουμένην] administered, managed. No stress can be laid upon this word: see VIII(V). § 8 15 τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομῇ.

35 ἕνα τινὰ # γένος ὅλον ἢ πλῆθος] The first two cases give the ideal kingdom; see c. 17 § 5 n. (678): the third

gives the ideal aristocracy. See also n. (600). SUMM. (682)

37 πρὸς τὴν ..ζωὴν] Compar. II. 1 § 1 n. (128): also n. (21) on I. 2 § 8, n. (281) on II. 9 § 5 and the passages therein cited. SUMM. (683)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] c. 5 § 10: see n. (471). SUMM. (684)

At the end of this chapter in the manuscripts and in the editions (down to and including Bekker's quarto) is appended the unfinished sentence ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν. It was Spengel's great merit, *Ueb. Arist.* Vol. p. 17 ff., *Arist. Stud.* II. p. 60 (652) ff., to recognize in this imperfect sentence a transition to the discussion of the ideal state, dating back from the time when that discussion immediately followed the present chapter, and consequently evidence of an older order of the books, than that adopted by the compilers of our present text (Aldronicus). See *Introd.* p. 17, p. 47 f.

EXCURSUS 1.

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS, POLITIES, OR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. III. 7. 1.

On the development of the theory of the different forms of government before Aristotle see especially Henkel *Studien* p. 38 ff., Oncken II. p. 139 ff. From Herodotos III. 80—82 we learn that the Athenians of the Peisiclean age used to distinguish three forms only, but with tolerable definiteness and clearness of view; the rule of the people, for which Herodotos nowhere as yet uses the term democracy; Oligarchy i.e. the rule of a picked association of the best men; and Monarchy. Thus Oligarchy means here what was in later times called Aristocracy, after that 'during the Peloponnesian war,' as Henkel says, 'men endeavoured to win credit for party efforts by well sounding names (Thuc. III. 82): afterwards the Sociatics used the term with great predilection as a word of good omen, τὴν εὐνομίαν δημοκρασίαν, Plato *Politi.* 302 D.' Lastly the terms Monarchy, Kingship, Tyrannis, are found in Herodotos as yet undistinguished side by side. Considerable progress is shown in the masterly descriptions of the Athenian and Spartan governments and their points of contrast by Thucydides, in Pericles' Funeral Oration and elsewhere; there indeed the Athenian constitution is already called a democracy. But it was Socrates who first prepared the way for the more subtle distinctions to be found in Plato and Aristotle. He divided the monarchical constitutions into kingships and tyrannies, and the oligarchies into aristocracies and plutocracies (governments of wealth). He took as the criterion for kingship the government of the prince in accordance with the laws and the willing obedience of the people; for tyranny, the arbitrary rule of the prince and the coercion of the people: for aristocracy, the appointment to the magisterial offices of men from among the number of those who are most law-abiding¹ as at Sparta (Xen. *Mem.* III. 5. 14—16: IV. 4. 15, cp. *De Rep. Lac.* 10, 7, Plato *Crito* 92 E); for plutocracy, their appointment by a property qualification, Xen. *Mem.* IV. 6. 12, cp. I 2 41—45. Here already is the germ of the distinction found in Plato and Aristotle between normal constitutions and the perverted forms corresponding to them. Yet the principle of law-abiding rule and willing obedience (and their opposites respectively), which Socrates followed, is carried out clearly in the case of

¹ And not, as Oncken II. 152 misinforms us only 'after performance of definite statutory injunctions.'

the monarchical constitutions only. Plutocracy, thus defined, does not present any such sharp antithesis to Aristocracy, although the mere wealth of the rulers in the one case, and their excellence and obedience to the laws in the other offer a strong contrast of a similar kind¹. In democracy he made no such distinction at all: he merely defined it by the fact that the appointment to the offices of state is open to all; and certain statements by him lead to the inference that in general he regarded it as a perverted form (*Xen. Mem.* III. 7. 5 f., I. 2. 9, cp. I. 2. 58 f., III. 9. 10).

Plato follows in his master's footsteps most closely in his *Politicus*, strange to say, for from the most recent investigations it follows that this is in all probability not his earliest exposition. But the principle which Socrates had already laid down, that the excellence of a man and of a ruler is only conferred by conceptual knowledge, is there put into serious application by the exaltation of reason above the law. He declares the most perfect constitution to be the rule of the wise man unfettered by legal restraint, so far as it can actually be realized. Next, after dismissing this ideal state, he carries out completely the Socratic opposition between states governed by laws and those which are subject to arbitrary rule, at the same time showing a correct appreciation of the numerical standard² which, though in itself something external, nevertheless involves essential intrinsic differences. Thus he distinguishes not only between Kingship and Tyranny, Aristocracy and Oligarchy (which latter name he employs instead of Socrates' Plutocracy), but also between Democracy governed by law, or moderate Democracy, and arbitrary or unrestrained Democracy. But it is quite a novelty when he undertakes to determine precisely the order of merit of these constitutions, reversing this order in the two classes of constitutions, (1) those where the laws are respected and (2) those where they are not; so that the former are less bad, the latter less good according as the number of the rulers increases.

With this the older account given in the *Republic* so far agrees that here also Tyranny is depicted as the worst of all constitutions and Democracy and Oligarchy as coming next to it. But while in the *Politicus* arbitrary Democracy is, as we have said, represented as more tolerable than Oligarchy, in the *Republic* on the contrary Democracy ranks below Oligarchy, and nothing is said about recognizing a good Democracy or Oligarchy along with the bad forms. Instead of this, Aristocracy, the name given in the *Politicus* to Oligarchy where the laws are respected, is here reserved for the ideal state itself and this Aristocracy is in its real and essential nature placed on a par with true Monarchy: cp. Zeller *Plato* p. 469 Eng. tr. But to make up for this, between the only good constitution of the *Republic* and the three wholly bad ones an intermediate form is inserted, a constitution after

¹ Hence Oncken's criticism is quite unfair when he asserts that this point of view is abandoned in the non-monarchical constitutions, purely external differences respecting the conditions for admission to office being alone taken into account,

and that Socrates reverts to the superficial view which loses a distinction simply on the number of rulers.

² That is, the distinction between government by one man, a few, or a multitude: *Plato Polit.* 219 D f., 302 c.

the fashion of Sparta and Crete, for which Plato invents the new name Timocracy (rule of honour) because he regards its intrinsic principle as being ambition and the love of honour. We may conjecture that this is partly due to the views of those theorists who originated the doctrine of the mixed constitution and discovered such a combination in Sparta and Crete (II. 6 17 with *n.* 219, cp. also *Introd.* p. 20) for Plato in the *Republic* does not simply describe Timocracy as a constitution intermediate between Aristocracy and Oligarchy, he expressly says it is a combination of elements of both, of good and bad. IX 544 E, 547 D ff

Lastly, it was pointed out in the notes on II 6 §§ 17, 18 that he shews himself very distinctly influenced by these theories in the last of his works, the *Laws*, where he himself sketches a wholly new and improved form of such a mixed constitution (cp. also *n.* 191 on II. 6 4). Thus forms of government are now divided by him into mixed or moderate and pure or unlimited, the latter he represents as merely governments of faction or party in the one-sided interest of the ruling power. This division in the main coincides with that followed in the *Politicus*, except that it is not stated in the *Laws* whether Oligarchy or absolute Democracy is regarded as the less bad: nor whether unlimited Monarchy, otherwise called Despotism or Tyranny, is still regarded as the most intolerable constitution of all. But in any case he no longer assigns to limited or constitutional Monarchy the same high place as in the *Politicus*, where it ranks not only above moderate Democracy but even above Aristocracy, nor does he make Kingship and Aristocracy identical, as in the *Republic*. It would appear as if he placed limited Democracy before limited Monarchy rather than in the reverse order. at least he apparently sets both on an equality in merit, but certainly ranks mixed Aristocracy before them both: for if we adopt his own terminology we may thus describe the pattern state of the second rank sketched in the *Laws*, since he uses the term Aristocracy III 701 A in the sense of a 'government by the best,' although in III 681 D it means a government by nobles, while in the decisive passage IV 712 CD it is employed in such a way that one does not rightly see whether that is still its meaning or what it is that Plato understands by "Aristocracy." We may however conjecture that it is at any rate a government by certain families in which special excellence is really hereditary. It may be seen from Aristotle (III. 7. 3, VI(IV). 7. 1, *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 10. 1—cp. *n.* 1230) that the champions of a mixed constitution before Plato's time gave it the common name *Politeia*, Constitution or Commonwealth in general: evidently (*a*) because, as a combination of several or indeed of all constitutions with one another, it is so to speak the all-comprehensive constitution or the constitution *par excellence*, or else (*b*) because as in their opinion the *best* constitution it seemed alone deserving of the name, or it may be (*c*) for both reasons. This name is retained by Aristotle, yet with the remark in the *Ethics* I. c. that the more correct term would be Timocracy, which however he applies to it in a sense different altogether from that in which Plato coined the expression, to mean the rule of the census or property-qualifica-

tion, i.e. the rule of a moderate property-qualification. Comp. III. 7. 4 *n.* (537), VI(IV). 9. 3 *n.* (1254), VI(IV). 13. 7 *n.* (1269).

Aristotle for his part follows very closely, as he himself remarks VI(IV). 2. 3 (cp. *nn.* 1139, 1140), the view presented by Plato in the *Politicus*, except that he replaces law-abiding Democracy by Polity and adheres firmly to the distinction between law-abiding or moderate Oligarchy and Democracy and their opposites, a distinction which with special reference to the Athenian state was certainly the common property of educated Athenians, even before Plato, in the form of the antithesis between the 'old fashioned' and the 'modern' Democracy—II. 12 §§ 2, 4, cp. VI(IV). 6 § 5, 14 § 7, §§ 11, 12: VII(VI). 4 §§ 1, 2; 5 §§ 3, 4. VIII(V). §§ 10 and *n.* (406)—which Isocrates, in particular, is fond of using¹. Hence follows the essentially original addition made by Aristotle to the Greek classification of forms of government, which he expressly claims as original VI(IV). 1 §§ 8—11 (cp. *n.* 1126, also VI(IV). 2 § 4 *n.* 1140 b, VII(VI). 1 § 7 *n.* 1383 b, VIII(V). 12 § 18 *n.* 1787), namely the accurate analysis of the principal forms of constitution, Oligarchy and Democracy in particular, into their sub-species, and the estimate of the comparative merit of the latter, which leads him to assume not simply two but more exactly four forms of Democracy and Oligarchy from the most moderate and law-observing species, which resemble Polity, down to the most unbidded and corrupt, which resemble Tyrannis, VI(IV). c. 4 f, VII(VI). cc. 4—7. Thus in contrast to Plato's procedure in the *Politicus* and the *Laws* he certainly regards even the first and most law-observing of these forms as already a degeneration, though it stands still very near to Polity. But even amongst the mixed forms he employs a more exact mode of distinction, particularly to delimitate spurious or mixed Aristocracies from Politics, the name of Aristocracy in its proper distinctive sense being reserved for what is really and truly such, Aristocracy pure and unmixed, the best constitution in the absolute sense: VI(IV). 7 §§ 2—4, 8 § 9, cp. 2 § 1 *n.* (1133), § 4 (1141); II. 6. 17 (218), IV(VII). 11. 5 (849), also *n.* (536) on III. 7. 3: for which an ideal Monarchy as the best form of all is at least conceivable: III. c. 13 *nn.* (595, 597, 601), c. 17 *nn.* (677, 678); VI(IV). 2 § 1 f *nn.* (1133, 1136—7), 10 § 4 *n.* comparing *nn.* (521) on III. 6. 1, (614) on III. 14. 24, (633) on III. 14. 2. But this, the only Monarchy which has any justification in the developed state, is not tied down to laws but is absolutely unqualified. Comp. *Introd.* p. 44 ff. The same sketch of the various constitutions had already been given by Aristotle, without specifying the sub-species, in the *Nic. Eth.* VII. 10. 1 3;² indeed he had probably expounded it still earlier in one of his dialogues. For it is assuredly probable, if not certain, that when Isocrates, who is trying to maintain the old threefold division into Monarchy, Oligarchy and Democracy, as found in Herodotus³, makes a hit at those who, caring little for essential points, regard Democracy blended with Aristocracy, and Timocracy

¹ Comp. e.g. Isoc. VII. 15 ff

² The divergences which Oncken, p. 158 ff. believes he has discovered rest upon misapprehensions.

³ But in such a way as to give Oligarchy the meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle.

in the sense of government by property qualification, as separate forms (*Panath.* §§ 131—133), he is attacking Aristotle. But Isocrates is not referring, as Henkel p. 46 n. 25 thinks, to the *Ethics*, which at that time unquestionably was not yet published¹; nor is there anything said in the *Ethics* about a combination of Aristocracy and Democracy at all, much less as a special constitution.

Van der Rest p. 415 f., criticizing the principle of classifying constitutions as normal and perverted which had been inherited by Aristotle from Sociates and Plato, says not without some reason: la science ne peut admettre une classification des gouvernements qui s'appuie, non pas sur le principe même ou l'organisation des divers gouvernements, non pas sur leurs différences intinsiques, mais sur la manière dont usent du pouvoir ceux qui en sont revêtus, sur les qualités morales dont ils font ou non preuve dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, c'est à dire sur quelque chose de tout à fait en dehors des constitutions mêmes. However there is always this difference; that certain constitutions by their essential organization may be adapted either to prevent such misuse, or on the other hand to call it into existence, sometimes indeed to render it inevitable. How else could the distinction between a despotism and a really free government be maintained? And is there not a difference in the 'principle of the constitution itself' between a constitution which really favours the rule of the masses and one which distributes power wisely? The conception of Plato and Aristotle may be untenable in this form, but there is something true underlying it. SUSEM. (532)

EXCURSUS II.

PITTACUS: III. 14. 10

In regard to the life of Pittacus, all that we either know with certainty, or may with some probability conjecture, amounts to very little, as Topffer more particularly has recently shown in his *Quaestiones Pisistratae* pp. 81—107

¹ Heitz in his continuation of K. O. Müller's History of Greek Literature, *Geschichte der griech. Litt.* II II p. 281 f. (cp. p. 245) is certainly of opinion that the *Nicomachean Ethics* owes its origin, in part at least, to pupils' notes of lectures delivered by Aristotle during Plato's lifetime in the Academy: but see, as against this, Susseml in *Philologischer Jahresbericht* XLII. 1886, p. 4 f. Another possibility, which occurred to Oncken II p. 160 f., is however by no means excluded:—if, that is, on other grounds we really must assume with Teichmüller and Beigle that the polemic of Isocrates in the *Panathenais* §§ 16—34 is directed against

Aristotle and his friends, and that consequently after Plato's death Aristotle paid a second visit to Athens from 314 to 312 B.C. and lectured there in the Lyceum on rhetoric and poetry (see Susseml *Jahresber.* XXX. 1883 p. 4 ff.). For this would make it at least possible that his lectures extended to ethics, and that Isocrates was informed of the subject-matter of these ethical lectures, and thus came to attack the part of them treating of politics in §§ 131—133 of the same pamphlet (the *Panathenais*). But we do not require such an altogether uncertain hypothesis, and therefore it would be better, I take it, to abstain from it.

(Dorpat, 1886) He is said to have been allied to the Lesbian nobility through his wife, who was descended from the once princely house of the Penthiilidae, VIII(v) 10 19 n. (1681); but on the father's side he was not of Lesbian, but of Thracian descent (Duis *Frag.* 53 in Diog. Laert. I. 74, Suidas). Yet whilst still in his vigorous manhood he attained great reputation. Mitylene was at that time torn with factions and Pittacus' first political act seems to have been to bring about the fall of the tyrant Melanchros with the aid of the nobles, or at least that party of them which was headed by Antimenides and Kikis the brothers of Alcaeus the poet. Perhaps this also contributed to his election by the Mitylenaeans (presumably not long afterwards) to be their general in the war with the Athenian immigrants into the Troad, who under the leadership of Phrynon had conquered the Mitylenaeon colony Sigeion. In this campaign, which proved disastrous to the Mitylenaeans, Alcaeus also took part. No mention is made of him on occasion of the expulsion of Melanchros, although according to Aristotle's statement here he was afterwards chosen as the leader of the exiled nobles along with Antimenides. He himself describes his flight after a battle with the Athenians, in a poem addressed to his friend Melanippos (*Fr.* 32 in Herod. v. 95, Strabo XIII. p. 600). The statement that Pittacus slew Phrynon in single combat (Strabo XIII. 600, Plut. *De Herod. malign.* c. 15, Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Suidas) is very suspicious, as Topffer has shown: probably it did not originate long before Strabo's time. At last peace was concluded in accordance with the decision of Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, and the Athenians retained Sigeion (Herod. and Strabo *ll. cc.*, Apollodoros *Fr.* 78 in Diog. Laert. *l.c.*, Topffer p. 86 ff.). But there was no cessation of the intestine feuds, in which Alcaeus largely increased his renown as a poet by the composition of his "Faction songs," *σπασμωδικά*, as they are called (Strabo. XIV. p. 617). The tyranny of Myrsilos, whose death Alcaeus celebrated in one of his poems, *Fr.* 20, probably falls within this period, although Strabo mentions him before Melanchros. At length the nobles themselves were banished, and when the exiles threatened to commence an attack, Pittacus was chosen Aesymnetes. He victoriously repulsed the invaders, taking Alcaeus prisoner; but he pardoned him (Heraclitus in Diog. Laert. I. 76, Diod. IX. 20) and permitted Antimenides also to return. He issued a general amnesty, and though he authorized a new division of the land he introduced no changes at all into the constitution, but only into the laws and courts of justice (see II. 12 § 13 n. 429). So completely was peace restored that several years before his death he was able to lay down his office.

The fixed dates in his biography which are given, from the same original source, most fully in Diog. Laert. I. 75, 79 and in Suidas, are based upon very arbitrary calculations. Nothing more was known about Pittacus and Alcaeus than what tradition and the poems of the latter had to tell about them, and that of course furnished very uncertain starting points for chronology. The only trustworthy date established by written evidence was due to the fact of Phrynon having previously won a victory at the Olympic games (viz. according to Julius Africanus, in 636), so that his name stood on record

in the corresponding list of victors. If I am right in my conjecture, he was reckoned as being 25 years old at that time and 50 when he conquered Sigeion, and Pittacus as being about ten years younger; hence the *floruit* (δκμῆ) of the latter, *i.e.* his fortieth year, perhaps also the beginning of the Sigeian war, was placed in the 42nd Olympiad; more precisely Ol. 42, 2=611 B.C., which would make his birth fall in Ol. 32, 2=651. To the same 42nd Olympiad, but somewhat earlier probably, was next assigned the fall of Melanchros. Those who wanted to bring in the single combat with Phrynon placed it half a decade later than the outbreak of the war, *i.e.* as Eusebius in the *Amenian translation* attests, Ol. 43, 3=606¹. Now counting two decades from 611 we arrive at 591; and as it was important that two events which followed at no long interval, *viz.* the expulsion of the nobles and Pittacus' appointment to be Acsymnetes, should be fixed here, a year earlier, 592, was chosen for the one (the *Parian Marble*, *Ep.* 36 as restored by A. Schöne 'Researches into the life of Sappho' in *Symb. phil. Bonn.* p. 755 ff.), and a year later, 590, for the other. Just as arbitrary was the assignment of ten years to Pittacus' tenure of office and ten years more to the remainder of his life (*Diog. Laert.* I. 75), whereby the year of his death became exactly Ol. 52, 3=570, and he was made to live just over 80 years, or between 80 and 81 (*Laert.* *Diog.* I. 79, where ἐβδομήκοντα must obviously be altered to ὀγδοήκοντα). Now this whole calculation in round numbers, decades and half-decades, may still be approximately correct; but it is quite possible that mistakes of more than ten years have crept in. Hence we must be contented, *e.g.* to place the Sigeian war in the latter part of the seventh century, some time after 636. Nor can we decide whether Alcaeus was younger than Pittacus, nor, if he was so, by how many years. About Antimenides we learn further, from a poem of Alcaeus addressed to him, of which the beginning has been preserved (*Fr.* 33), that he served in the Babylonian army. This must certainly have happened after his banishment which, though quite possibly previous to 592, can hardly have been earlier than 605; hence we are obliged to reject the conjecture of Otfried Müller that he took part in the battle of Carchemish, B.C. 605; see his essay, 'A brother of the poet Alcaeus fighting under Nebuchadnezzar,' in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1827, pp. 287—296. Müller's only reason on the other side, *viz.* that at the later date he would have been too old, is not valid; for there is nothing to contradict the supposition that he was a man of about fifty, or a little over, in 590. Possibly Pittacus himself was no older in that year; for we must be content to place his birth somewhere about 650—640, and that of Alcaeus still more vaguely, somewhere about 650—630. Hence Düncker is nearer the truth when he remarks *op. cit.* VI. p. 281; "Antimenides may have taken part in Nebuchadnezzar's Syrian campaigns, or in his conflicts with Pharaoh

¹ The text of Suidas (s. v. Πιττακός) καὶ τῇ μὲν ὀλυμπιάδι Μελαγχρον τὸν τὸν-ραννον Μιτυληνῆς ἀνέειλε. καὶ φρόνωνα στρατηγὸν Ἀθηναίων πολέμου ὑπὲρ τοῦ Σιγείου μονομαχίαν ἀνέτεκεν διατὸς περιβαλὼν αὐτὸν should be thus punctuated,

with a full stop, in place of a comma, after ἀνέειλε. If this be done, Suidas does not contradict Eusebius. This too has been correctly remarked by Tümpel p. 55 l.

Hophra, or in the taking of Jerusalem." Moreover, as Alcæus himself tells us that he reached Egypt (*Fr.* 106 in Stanb. I. p. 37), which was no doubt during his exile, it would appear that he at any rate was exiled for several years. SUSRM. (626) Cp. now *Rhein. Mus.* XLII 1887, p. 140 ff

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Ol. 32, 2	Pittacus born	B.C. 651
Ol. 36	Phrynion aetat. 25 victor	636
Ol. 42	Downfall of the tyrant Melanchios	
Ol. 42, 2	Pittacus flourit, aetat. 40	611
	Phrynion aetat. 50 conquers Sigæon	
Ol. 43, 3	Phrynion slain in single combat by Pittacus	606
Ol. 47	Expulsion of the Lesbian nobles	592
Ol. 47, 2	Pittacus aetat. 60	591
Ol. 47, 3	Pittacus made Aesymnetes	590
Ol. 50	Pittacus resigns his office	580
Ol. 52, 3	Pittacus dies, aetat. 81	570

EXCURSUS III.

FRAGMENTA VATICANA RESCRIPTA.

The printing of B III was almost completed when a very praiseworthy piece of work was published: in the *Rheinisches Museum* for 1887, vol. XLII p. 102 ff. G. Heylbut communicated to the world his collation of twelve leaves of a palimpsest in the Vatican library (gr. 1298) containing the following passages of the *Politics*: 1275 a 13—b 33, 1276 b 17—1277 b 1, 1278 a 24—1281 a 37, 1286 b 16—1288 b 37, 1290 a 36—1292 b 20. Notwithstanding their great age¹ the fragments, which we denote by fr., abound in more or less serious blunders of every kind, which need not be fully recorded in the critical notes². The gain accruing to the text is next to nothing: at 1278 a 34 they confirm Perizonius' conjecture *δερρών*, at 1287 a 34 my rejection of *καί*, and that is all. No one need be surprised at this when he reflects on the extraordinary accuracy which marks 1², the principal codex of the family II³, although it is, comparatively speaking, so recent⁴. For the definite separation between the two recensions II¹ and

¹ Heylbut pronounces the writing to be of the tenth century. Accentisæ even rare, but not altogether absent; iota adscriptum is written or omitted at random; etacism is very frequent; there are no pauses between the words except at the end of a paragraph.

² It will be found that of some 400 readings cited by Heylbut 59 record the

partial illegibility of the palimpsest; 79 consist in the retention of *ν* *ἐφελαιστικόν*; 81 are blunders of spelling (including etacism); there are 9 cases of ditto-graphy, 11 of omission through homocorection and 14 of words or letters omitted through other causes.

³ Namely, of XIV century, four centuries later than fr.

Π^2 was brought about, as I have shown¹, in the sixth or seventh century while the manuscript of which these fragments have been preserved, was copied from an original of an earlier date than that separation. So far it may be compared with the manuscript which Julian used; but with this difference, that of the two subsequent recensions Julian's MS apparently more nearly resembled Π^1 than Π^2 , while the case is just the opposite with the newly recovered fragments. That is to say, apart from the two readings above mentioned it shares in general both the merits and the faults of Π^1 and of Π^2 . Consequently, as I am bound to state in reply to Heylbut, it is not of the slightest importance for deciding the question, whether on the average the text is better preserved in Π^1 or Π^2 . On the contrary, the reasons which have led me to infer that Π^1 has retained the true reading (or traces of the true reading) somewhat oftener and in more important cases² than Π^2 , and must therefore in all more or less indifferent cases retain the advantage over it, remain, now that the palimpsest has been made known, exactly the same as they were before. More than this I have never asserted.

But besides, Heylbut has made no complete enumeration of the readings in which the fragments agree with Π^1 , or with Π^2 : sometimes too, where he records such agreement, his statement is not quite precise enough to make clear the actual state of the case. Thus he tells us, "1276 b 30 *διο* with Π^2 , 1281 a 35 *ερχοται. ψυχην* placed after *φ αυλων* with Π^2 , 1287 a 11 "ενα παντων ειναι with Π^2 , a 32 ο νους νομος as Julian reads, 1288 a 2 νομων οντων as Π^2 "· whereas in the fourth of these passages Π^1 also agrees with Julian, and in the other four it is not Π^1 , but only Γ M^a (or in the last passage Γ P¹), from which Π^1 diverge. If Heylbut chose to adopt this procedure (viz. to make divergence from Γ M^a equivalent to divergence from Π^1), he should in all fairness have set down to the credit of Π^1 the readings in which the fragments agree with Γ M^a only; namely, 1278 b 22 *πολιτειας*, 1280 b 5 *διακονουσιν*, 1287 b 13 *ερχομενων*. The second of these three coincident readings is of some interest: for while a codex so late as P¹ has not got beyond the first stage of corruption, *διακοπουσιν* for *διασκοπιουσιν*, the fragment as well as Γ M^a had already converted this into *διακονουσιν*³. Still more interesting is 1292 a 3, where M^a has the true reading with Π^2 , while the slightly corrupt reading which, as we now see, already stood in the palimpsest was also found in Γ , and originally also in P¹. At 1287 a 33 Γ P¹ rightly have *γραμματα*, fr. has *γραμμα* with M^a P¹. The statement "1286 b 17 *μεριβαλλον* with Π^2 " is quite misleading: for here it is only P¹ that has *μεριβαλλον* at all, at least we cannot determine the reading of Γ . At 1278 a 36 the order of the words in Π^1 is the same as in P¹ and corr. P¹, i.e. a branch of Π^1 .

¹ In my critical edition p. XIV. Cp. above, p. 2, n. 1.

² A reference to a single passage may suffice, II. 2 § 6, 1261 a 39 ff, where Π^2 affords an especially deterrent example: cp. *Chaest. vit. coll.* p. 360 f. I can with the greatest ease supply a

series of similar passages.

³ See above p. 76 n. (1). We know that P¹ was copied quite at the end of the fifteenth century: for on the last page but one the scribe, Demetrius Chalkondylas, records the births of his children from the year 1484 to the year 1501.

Remarkable, too, is the reading at 1291 a 39, if Heylbut's statement is accurate: for in that case *fi.* have βουλευόμενον with Π^2 and κρινοῦν with Π^1 . Heylbut's omission to annotate a number of readings in which *fr.* agree with Π^1 or Π^2 , as the case may be, is evidently intentional: but on his own principles he should have added "with Π^2 " in the following cases: 1276 b 33¹, 1277 a 20, 1278 b 19, 1281 a 3, 1288 a 29, 1292 b 9 (εἰσαμεν); and "with Π^1 " in the following: 1276 b 36, 1279 a 25 (το πολίτευμα), 1280 b 4 (εἴξει), 1287 b 41, 1288 a 23.

Leaving out of account the circumstance that *fi.* usually write οὐθείς and γίνεσθαι with Π^2 , on the basis of an exact calculation made by me the case stands as follows: *fr.* agree with Π^2 against Π^1 62 times; 15 times rightly, 16 times wrongly, while 31 cases are doubtful or impossible to decide: whereas *fi.* agree with Π^1 27 times, 20 times rightly and only 4 times wrongly with 3 cases doubtful or not to be decided². The correctness of the calculation that Π^1 has retained the true text oftener than Π^2 cannot be better brought before us. Moreover the right reading in *fr.* at 1275 a 27 αὐφαῖ is undoubtedly derived from Π^1 . And if we now take into account the cases mentioned above where *fr.* have the right or the wrong reading in agreement with a part only of the family Π^1 , even this makes but very little change in favour of Π^2 .

Assuredly we ought not to reckon amongst the doubtful cases 1278 b 20 *f.* φύσει μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν πολιτικόν. on the contrary there can be no doubt that Π^2 *fr.* are wrong in omitting the article. That by Aristotelian usage it might in itself be dispensed with, would never have been doubted even apart from the parallel passages which Heylbut adduces; but unfortunately Heylbut has left out the three closest parallels, which are alone sufficient to decide the case. 1253 a 7 δύτι πολιτικόν ζῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, *Eth.* Nic. 1097 b 11 φύσει πολιτικόν ὁ ἄνθρωπος³, 1169 b 18 πολιτικόν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. [Moreover ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ may be for ἄνθρωπος, as Stöhr suggests.⁴]

On the other hand in the above calculation καὶ εἰ οἱ κἄν εἰ, and in most cases the order of the words, have been regarded as doubtful. Yet as a matter of fact we may hold it more probable that Aristotle everywhere wrote κἄν εἰ. Again no one of course will dispute the fact that he frequently places the attribute after the substantive and repeats the article as in τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης: but precisely because this occurs often enough, we must

¹ It is a mere accident that M⁸ here agrees with Π^2 . With the copyist of M⁸ no other fault is so frequent as the omission of words in consequence of an homoeoteleuton: here too it is he, no doubt, who is to blame, and not his original.

² Besides the 51 passages noted below in which Π^2 *fr.* agree against Π^1 there are 11 others where the text with which Heylbut collated *fi.*, viz. Sussem.³, agrees with Π^1 against Π^2 , viz. 1275 a 28 *f.*, 1277 a 12, a 20, a 24, 1279 a 2 *f.*, 1280 b 5, 1288 a 16 (in which cases Π^1 omits words), also 1277 a 23, 1280 a 24, 1291 b 27, 1292

b 5. Similarly with the eight passages 1275 b 32, 1280 b 34, 1286 b 24, 1288 b 27, 1290 b 19, 1291 a 39, b 6, 1292 b 14 in which *fi.* may be assumed (from Heylbut's silence) to agree with Sussem.³, i. e. with Π^1 as against Π^2 : adding these 8 to the 19 noted below we get 27 readings in which Π^1 *fr.* are agreed as against Π^2 .

³ See Rasmussen *Forschungen über die Aristot. Ethik.* (Weimar, 1874) p. 51.

⁴ See *Commentationes Philologicae* (Monachi, 1891) p. 98.

feel some scruples about accusing the author of the recension Π^1 (which, as the figures above show, is on the average the better and more careful) with such confidence as to exclude all doubt, of having three times intentionally altered it 1260 b 23 f., 1288 a 39, 1331 a 5. Just as little do I hold the case to be decided, or even possible to decide, by Heylbut's examples at 1280 a 15 f.,¹ and 1288 a 13 f.² Those which he adduces in favour of *μία ἀρετή* 1277 a 1 have certainly somewhat more weight.³ However I have made it a rule as regards the order of the words, so far as it is of any importance, quietly to follow everywhere the class of manuscripts which is, on the average, the better, in order to limit as much as possible the editor's own subjective leanings: but I have no objection if in the future another editor, bolder than I am, prefers to attempt a decision of each case upon its merits, so long as he only refrains from the wish to deduce theories as to the order of words in Aristotle from a text like this preserved to us by a bifurcate tradition. Otherwise the matter is without significance and not worth contesting. And lastly I fail to see what right Heylbut has to prohibit Aristotle from using two alternative forms *μόναρχος* and *μονάρχης*: one should have learnt by now to guard against the endeavour after uniformity of this sort.

In my third edition I did not, at 1278 b 22, bracket the words *οὐκ ἔλαττον*, my reason being the observed fact that words are more often omitted by Π^1 than added by Π^2 without justification. But now it appears that fr. agree with Π^1 in rejecting these two words; and not only so, but Heylbut has proved that they are untenable⁴. On the other hand, at 1278 b 31 the *γε* inserted after *ἀρετῆς* by Π^{2-1} f. deserves perhaps to be accepted, and at 1292 b 15 I shall without hesitation replace *τοῦς* in the text with Π^{2-1} fr. Ad. Bk, as here the sense favours the article. SUSSEM.

Heylbut's collation with the text of Sussem.⁵ is as follows (words and letters in brackets being such as are illegible):

1275 a 15 *ἐγγεγραμμένους* | 19 *γὰρ* | *ἡπλως*: λ 14 added above the line | 21 *στῖν* | 22 *μαλον* | 24 *εἰσιν* | 26 *αὐριαιος*: ο added above the line | 33 (*ο μὲν*) | 34 (*λε*)*γομένους* | 39 (*ρας...ουτας*); there is only room for about 10 letters; probably the copyist omitted *τὰς δὲ προτέρας*

1275 b 4 (*νῦν...εκαστην*) *πολιτεῖαν* *δια* *περ(ολεχθεῖς)* | 5 *εστῖν* | 7 *εν* omitted | 8 *δικαζουσιν* | 10 *αλλοις* *αλλας* | 11 *της* *ετερης* | 12 *κρινουσιν* | 13 (*τον*) | 15 *εστῖν* | *αλλα* | 16 *βουλευσθαι* with Π^2 | 19 *βουλευτικῆς* *η* *κριτικῆς* | 20 (*πρας*)...21 (*ηρι-*

¹ In favour of *φάθλοι κριται*, the notes of Π^2 fr., Heylbut quotes 1282 a 16, 7th fr. VIII. 11 § 3, 161 a 37 *ἐπὶ δὲ φάθλος κοιρωνὸς ὁ ἐμπόδιζων κτλ.* *Ann. Edit.* 1. 3 § 5, 109 j. b 28 *ἀγαθὸς κριτῆς*.

² For the less usual order of Π^2 fr., *ἀρχισθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν*, Heylbut cites 1259 b 37, 1277 b 27, 1284 a 2, 1317 b 2. Comp. 1255 b 8 with *Cicil. note*.

³ They are 1276 b 32, 1277 a 10, b 18, 1312 a 8, a 26.

⁴ Heylbut points out that *ἐλάττων* denotes a less sum, or something less, in number, time or space: e.g. *πλείους -*

ἐλάττους VII(VI). 3 § 3, 1318 a 26: *ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἐς ἑκακοῦς ἤλθεν*, VIII(V). 6 § 3, 1305 b 12: *ὅτ' μὲν γὰρ ἐλαμψόν, οὐ δὲ ἐλάττους* (sc. *χρόνου*) *ποιήσει τὰς ἀρχάς* VI(IV). 15 § 1, 1299 a 6: *οὐ γὰρ ἐλάττων δίδσται* IV(VII). 3 § 2, 1325 a 28. Whereas the sense required in the passage in question is that invariably expressed by *οὐχ ἥττον*, *οὐδὲν ἥττον*, the opposite of which is *πολύ ἥττον* much less easily, e.g. VI(IV). 11 § 11, 1296 a 5. At VIII(V) 8 § 7, 1308 a 18, *ἥττον* is parallel to *οὐ γὰρ ὁμοῦς μέδων*.

ζονται) δη | 23 επι. οιον twice ονει | 24 πημπους | 25 απορουσιν | 27 ειρωνευ-
ομονος | 29 υπο των twice ονει | λαρισσποιους, but just before λαρισσιους | 30
εστιν | 31 διωρισμος | 32 και γαρ ουδε

1276 b 18 ημη collected from ημιν | 21 τωδε | 23 τινεχωτην τιναυτην |
24 δη(λον) | 25 (αρετη)ς | 26 (εργον εστ)ιν | 27 (των) | 29 εστιν, then κοινωνία
δ' εστιν is omitted | 30 διω with P¹ Π² | πολυ(του προς) | 31 εστιν | 32 α(ρετην) |
33 τον δ'...τελειαν is omitted with M^a Π² | 34 ενδεχετ(αι) πολυ(την) | 35 (καθην) |
36 αλλά is omitted with Π¹ | εστιν | 39 αυτον | π(οιει)ν | 40 επειδε as Π² |
(παν)τας

1277 a 1 ει(η)μ(ια)μετη as Π² | (κα)ι | 2 (σπουδαιου πολι)τι(ουδ)ει | 3 (μναγ-
καιον ειναι τ)η(ν) | πόλιν τ)ην πολιτην | αγαθ(ου αυτουαν ει μη) | 5 (τησπου)δαια |
6 (πολις ωσπερ ζων) | ψυχ(η εκ) | 8 κτησεις | 9 ανοποιων | 15 αγαθοινοικειαν
as Π² | 16 φρονημον | 17 λεγουσιν | 18 ευρηπιδης φησιν | 19 κομψ as Π² | 20 ειδε-
αυτη as Π² | 21 εστιν | 22 απλως αν ειη as Π² | 24 πωων | 29 αμφω επαιουσιν
ποτε | 32 τουττευθεν as Π² | 33 εστιν | 39 τουνομαντους as Π²

1278 a 29 τουνοθυς | οis in πολλοis over an erasure | 30 αλλα | 31 ολιγ(αν..)
θρωπια, between γ and θ room for four letters | 32 δοχλ(ου κα)τα | 34 αστων |
36 ωσπερ...38 μετεχω comes after 40 συνοικουτων εστιν as in P¹ col. 1⁴

1278 b 1 εστιν | εκ των ειρημενων with Π² | 3 κακεινος ου with Π² | 8 κινει with
Π² | after τινος an erasure of half a line | 9 εστιν | 10 κυριος | 11 δεστων |
12 διοιν | 14 δεκαι | 16 συνεστηκεν | 19 δη with Π² | 21 ο is omitted with
Π² | 22 περι αλληλων πολιτειας ορεγονται* | 24 εστιν τερος | 25 πασιν | 26 και...
κοινωνιαν between αυτου and ισως as Π¹ | 28 υπερβαλη | 29 κακισθαδιαν | 31 γε
after αρχης | 40 η <ει> omitted | 41 ωσπερ with Π²

1279 a 2 παιδοτρειβην | 13 το κεινω | 15 αρχ(ουσινοσας)αιροις | 16 αρχας :
χ above the line | 19 σφετερον] σ above the line | 22 εστιν | επι(σκεψασθαι) |
23 εισιν | 25 διωρισθεισαν | το πολιστευμα with Π¹ | 26 σημαινει... πολιστευμα is
omitted | (δ)εστιν | 28 (ο)ταν | (π)ολλοι | 31 (η)του | 32 (δει) | 33 (την) | 34 (απο-
βλεπουσαν .την) δε των οντων μεν | 35 δ(ε ενος αρισ)τοκρατιαν | 37 στανδετο |
38 (κ)αλει(ται τα) | (πασων δυν)λογως | 39 μεν is omitted

1279 b 2 πληθ(ει) γινεται | 6 εστιν | 8 (το) των | 14 εστιν (μη δε τι) |
15 καταληπειν | 16 εστιν | 20 εισ(νοι) | 23 συμβαινη | 26 κιντις | 28 πησι-
αγορευει | 34 the line ends with πο, the next begins τεια: either λi is omitted,
or it was written above. There is no trace of it. | 38 διω is omitted | 39 γιν-
νεσθαι | 40 δημοκρατια

1280 a 1 αρχωσιν | 10 πῶν τὸ: παντα | 14 αφερουσιν | 15 φαυλοι κρεται with
Π² | 19 ομολογουσιν | 20 διαλεχθεν omitting το | κρινουσιν | 22 νομιζουσιν |
ομιζουσι over an erasure | 24 ελευθεριοι: the first ε above the line | 26 μετε-
χουσιν | 29 εκαστον μων | εισενεγκαυτα with Π² | 31 μαρην ενεκεν with Π² |
33 εστιν | 36 τυρηνοι | 37 εστιν

1280 b 1 του is omitted with Π¹ | αδικος: κ above the line | 4 εξει with
Π¹ | αδικησωσιν | 5 δαρετης | διακινουσιν with ΓΜ^a | 8 γινεται | 9 απωθε |
10 συμμαχων | 11 λυκοφρον | 17 πολεισιν | δουδει | 23 που | 26 οικειαι | σφι(σι)ν |
28 δοξειεν | 30 η πολις ουκ εστιν with Π² | 34 γενεσιν | 35 και] η | 40 δεη

1281 a 1 χάρις is omitted | 3 χωρι with Π¹ | 5 μετεστιν | τ(οι)ς | 6 μειζουσιν |

* περι with M^a Π², πολιτειας with ΓΜ^a, οκ ελαττον omitted with Π¹.

7 (πολιτικηναρ)στην | υπερεχουσιν | 10 λεγουσιν | 16 *an* is omitted with P¹II² | 17 χρη with II² | παλι | λειφθεντων | 21 τιντων | 23 κρειττω)ν | 24 δικαιωμεναι with II²; *v* in αρχων above the line | 26 εστιν | 27 πανταφαιδα with II² | 28 δικαιο with II² | 35 εχουτω ..36 ψιχην after φαιδων with P¹II²

1286 b 17 μετεβαλλων with M^oII⁴ | 18 εισχροκερδιαν | 21 γινγεσθαι | 24 γινγεμενων | 26 τουτω ραιδιον | 31 και *is* omitted with II¹ | 33 φυλαξει | 34 βασιλεια τον τοιοδτον *is* omitted with II¹ | 40 συρακουςις

1287 a 2 εφεστηκεν | 4 βασιλειας | 5 οτου | 7 εστιν | 9 εστιν | παντα | 11 ενα πιατων ειναι with P¹II² | 16 ομοιος τινων και as II² | ουθεν | 25 παιδευσας with II² | 26 εφιστησιν | 29 των νουν μονους] τους νομους | 31 αρχοντας διαστρεφει as II² | 32 διασθερει *is* omitted as in II² | ο νους νομος with P¹ Julian | 33 γραμμα with M^oP¹ | 34 και *is* omitted | 37 καμωντας *is* corrected from σκαμωντας | 38 επηριαν | 40 θεραπιαν

1287 b 4 ο γαρ νομος | 5 τω κατα | 6 (κατα) | τω κατα | 8 υφαντου | 10 καταστησει | 11 ποτερον | (αν)ηρ | 13 εστιν | ερχομενων with Γ M^o | 16 εισιν | 17 αρξειν | 19 επειδη with II² | περιλιφθηναι | 24 α(λλο)τι | 26 τισως with II¹ | 27 (βε)λτιων ιδοι τις (δυοιν) ομμασ(ι και δυσι)ν | 28 ποσιν | 29 μοναρχοι with II² | 32 ποιησουσιν | δε *is* omitted | 37 εστιν | δεσποτον with II² | βασιλευτων with II² | 41 γιγνεται τα παρα φυσιν with II¹

1288 a 2 νομων οντων with M^oII² | 5 *ei* *is* omitted | 6 ποτερον | 8 εστιν | πεφυκεν | 13 πεφυκεν ενγινγεσθαι as II¹, omitting και εν | πολιτικων with II¹ | 14 αρχεσθαι και αρχειν with II² | ατται καταξιν dittoigraphy; διανεμουτων καταξιν, then διανεμουτα | 15 απυροις with II² | 17 (τασου)τον ω(σ)θ | 18 βασιλευκων | 21 ειτε φοι οηε | 23 παντη with II¹ | 24 και *is* omitted | 26 πεφυκεν | 29 κατα μερος ειναι τουτον αλλα απλως with II² | 30 προτερον | 31 ατται η συμφερεει dittoigraphy; ταε παλεσιν η συμφερεει τισιν | 33 δανειγκων | 34 απρεARENTLY οκοουμενης | 35 τισυμπαντων | 39 της πολεως της αρεστης with II² | 41 ωστεσται

1288 b 1 παιδια | 3 δηπουτων | πο(λι)τειας | τι(ν)α πεφυ(κε γιν)εσ(θαι) ροπον | 5 δη | 9 αριστοτλους πολιτικων . γ: in the margin by the same hand . Δ. [fol. 302^v begins with this heading] | 11 γυρομενης: the second γ scratched

out | 14 καλιστα | κεχορημενοι | 16 εργων with II¹ | δειν | 18 μηθεν | 19 εστιν with II² | 23 εστιν | 24 αρμοττουσα with II² | 26 τε απλως και την *is* omitted | 31 συμβεβηκεν | 35 ως | 36 λεγουσιν

1290 a 36 ομοις: the second *ε* above the line | ουθεις

1290 b 2 δοταν | πολλους with II² | 5 φισιν | 8 *ετι* instead of *επει* | πλειονα μορια with II² | 11 δημοσι | 12 τωται | τηται | 15 δημοσ | οονων as II² | 17 εστιν | 19 δοταν | 21 πολιτειαι or πολιτειων | πλειους...ατιων *is* omitted | 24 πασαν εχειν with II² | 25 μεν *is* omitted as II² | 29 δη | ειδημων | 33 πλει, no trace of ω | ταυτων | 35 ληφθωσιν | 37 δε | 39 συγκριτε | μερων with II² | 40 εστιν | καλλουμενοι

1291 a 4 διαγομαιων | 5 και τας ανας *is* omitted | 6 κατηλιαν | 7 ουθεν | εστιν αναγκων as II² | 11 φησι | 13 τουτου τους | 18 μιλων | 20 αποδιδωσιν | 21 απομενων as II² | 22 τεταρσιν | 27 δικαστικης corrected from δικαστηκης | 29 ουθεν | γαρ before διειφερεει with II¹ | 33 αναγκων μωτων την πολεως

with Π^a | 34 ο with Π^a , not $\delta\pi\epsilon\rho$ | $\sigma\gamma\theta\omicron\nu$ | 39 $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ with Π^{2*} | 41 $\pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$ | $\gamma\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ | $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$

1291 b 3 $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. ε above the line | 4 $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\iota\tau\alpha\varsigma$ twice | 12 $\kappa\alpha\theta\iota\sigma\tau\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ | $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\delta\omicron\kappa\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ twice | 14 $\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$ | 15 $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ | $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ | 17 $\lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu$ | 21 $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$ | 22 $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\nu$: the first ε above the line | $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha$ $\tau\alpha$ above the line | 27 $\alpha\mu\phi\omicron\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ | $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ | 30 $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha$ | $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ | 32 $\upsilon\pi\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ | 34 $\mu\alpha\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$

1292 a 3 $\tau\omicron$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota$ $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota\nu\alpha\iota$ | $\tau\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$ $\epsilon\omega\alpha\iota$ with $\Gamma\beta^1$ | 17 $\tau\omicron\iota\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$ | $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\varsigma$ as Π^a | 22 $\pi\alpha\rho'$ is omitted | 23 $\delta\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\omicron\iota$ | 24 $\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\nu$ | 29 $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\nu$ with Π^1 | 30 $\alpha\rho\chi\epsilon$ | 32 $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ | 33 $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha$ or $\epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ | 34 $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu$ | 36 $\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\nu$

1292 b 1 $\mu\alpha\kappa\rho\omega\nu$ with Π^1 | 3 $\pi\omicron\iota\omega\sigma\iota\nu$ | 5 $\sigma\tau\alpha\nu$ $\pi\alpha\iota\varsigma$ | 9 $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha\varsigma$ | $\epsilon\iota\pi\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu$ with Π^a | $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\nu$ $\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$ is omitted | 10 $\kappa\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ | 13 between $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ and $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ room for 3 letters | $\delta\epsilon$ after $\delta\iota\alpha$ is omitted | 14 $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ $\delta\epsilon$ $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\tau\iota\kappa\omega\varsigma$ | † 15 $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ | 17 $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron$ $\delta\epsilon$ | 19 $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha$ $\alpha\gamma\alpha\pi\omega\sigma\iota\nu$ ‡

* Apparently $\kappa\rho\epsilon\omicron\theta\epsilon\nu$ with Π^1 ; this at least is the inference to be drawn from Heylbut's silence.

† Apparently $\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ with Π^1 , Heylbut is silent.

‡ It should be observed that considerable alterations have been made in Heylbut's annotation of the readings (see p. 456): also that 1280 a 29 $\epsilon\iota\sigma\epsilon\nu\epsilon\gamma\kappa\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ is given as the reading at any rate of Π^a and presumably of Γ . ($\epsilon\iota\sigma\epsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\nu\tau\alpha$ Heylbut.)

NOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE TEXT.

In M¹ Newman's edition I. p. VIII. f. II. p. LIV. there recurs, although in a much milder form, Heylbut's assertion already refuted by me in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. p. 801 ff., and in EXCURSUS III. above, that I seek to base the text of Aristotle's *Politics* primarily on Π^1 , and especially on Γ . Mr Newman writes:

"Suscmihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ , but he frequently adopts readings from the second."

Now even in my first edition, in which as in the second I certainly too often followed Π^1 , I have nevertheless, already said at p. XXXII.:

"quanquam ex eo, quod dixi, satis apparet ita nobis traditum esse hoc Aristotelis opus similiter atque complura alia, ut non nisi mixtum ex utraque codicum familia recensionem perficere hodie queamus, tamen in hac mixtura artis criticae regulas diligentius, quam adhuc factum sit, esse adhibendas petiti omnes concedent. Quod ut fiat, ipsius vetustae translationis verba... cum libris affinis Graecis (sunt) conferenda, deinde quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent: ubique autem aequae bonam sententiam utraeque praebent, vulgata semper recensio alteri est posthabenda."

Here it is stated, that in my judgment any one who wished *a priori* to make the recension Π^1 the basis of the text would proceed just as perversely as any one who does, or as if any one were to do, the like with Π^a ; that on the contrary in the main each case must be decided on its merits: *quaerendum, ubi huius ubi alterius familiae lectiones praestent*; and

only afterwards in all these cases in which on material grounds (I might have added "and on linguistic grounds") a decision is impossible, that family must be followed which in the greater number of determinable cases and at the same time in essential matters has more frequently preserved the true text or the traces of the true text, i.e. according to my opinion and my figures the family Π^1 . The accuracy of this computation I have already endeavoured to establish statistically against Heylbut for those passages which are contained in the Vatican palimpsest: but I will not spare myself the pains of a similar demonstration as against Newman in respect to Books I. and II. which he has edited. I must however prefix one or two observations, although entering as little as possible upon a special controversy.

I gladly acknowledge, that Newman has adopted as against Bekker many readings from Π^1 . In spite of this, he cannot be wholly acquitted of a certain prejudice in favour of Π^2 , as some examples will hereafter show. In addition to this there is a particular circumstance which disturbs his impartiality. He believes that the text of the *Politica* has been transmitted in an excellent condition, and has therefore a strong dislike to conjectural emendations, so that in order to avoid one he prefers to adopt explanations implicitly containing an absurdity which but for this prepossession could not possibly have escaped a man of his discernment. A truly detestable example of this sort is to be found for instance at 1272 b 38. Hence wherever a reading in Π^1 , however convincing on other grounds, cannot be retained without the help of a conjecture, though it may be the slightest change in the world, this is sufficient for him to condemn it. But the truth of Spengel's dictum, that the *Politica* has come down to us in a state legible on the whole but very corrupt in particular passages, can be shown *a priori* by the consideration that shoals of mistakes in Π^1 are corrected by means of Π^2 and those in Π^2 by means of Π^1 ; whence it follows that in each of the two families the original is preserved with but very moderate fidelity. Who can rationally assume that the original is well preserved where the two families agree, and not rather that a quantity of errors lurk in both? Further Mr Newman has allowed himself to be misled by an assertion of Dittenberger's, to me incomprehensible, into the belief that all the good readings found only in the "*Vetusta translatio*," or in a single codex, are mere conjectures: whereas this opinion, partially true perhaps of Γ^1 and A_1 , for the rest is certainly true only of the "*deteriores*" of the family Π^2 (= Π^3). I ask any one just to consider the not unimportant class of readings to be derived solely from Γ or from Γ^1 and Γ^2 (corr.), and soberly to put the question: Do these really look like Byzantine emendations made (say) since the 11th century? And if he is not convinced by this, let him further ask himself: If the Byzantines had thus handled the text, then along with this after all but moderate number of good emendations should we not find a far greater number of attempts at emendation, i.e. of sheer corruptions, common to all our sources of the text? But yet apart from such general considerations how else is the excellence of an old manuscript to be demon-

strated, unless it be one so pieceminently excellent as e.g. A* of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetic*, or Z in Demosthenes, or Γ in Isocrates? Otherwise it might even be maintained, that the 70 odd passages, where K^b alone prevents right readings in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, are after all only good conjectures. If this cannot rationally be imagined, and if it is just as certain that the pair of right readings lately found in the Vatican fragments are traces of a good tradition, the same view is, in most cases, just as decidedly to be taken where not all, but only single representatives of the recension Π¹, or of the better class of Π², present us with the true text. And then it tells decisively in favour of Π¹, that while these cases are not quite rare in Π¹, in Π² they are almost zero. I am here obliged to repeat what I have put together in my third edition p. XII. ff. [cp. above p. 74 f. *notes*] on this matter:

"solī Γ liblo debemus praeteri 1260 a 4 ἀρχόντων καὶ has rectas lectiones: 1258 b 40 Χαρητίδῃ, 1260 b 41 εἰς ὁ τῆς, 1266 b 2 δ' ἡδῆ, 1271 a 20 κἂν (μὴν Π; partem veī vidit Busseus), 1276 a 33 ἔθνος ἔν, 1282 a 27 μέγιστος, 1285 a 7 αὐτοκράτωρ, 1331 a 42 ἔνια δέ, 1336 a 34 σπουδασομένων (aut σπουδασθησομένων, quod praebet P⁵), 35 κατὰ, 1296 a 8 συστάσεις (ut videtur), b 38 πλῆθει, 1320 b 9 τῇν Ταραντινῶν ἀρχήν, 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 1321 a 12 ὀπλιτικῇ, 1303 a 24 ἐγγύς δὲν (an ἐγγί(σ)ον?), 1311 a 6 χρημάτων (ut videtur),

solis Γ P⁶ has. 1328 a 5 παρὰ, 1336 a 6 εἰσάγειν, 1340 a 16 δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ, 1321 b 29 τὰ om., 1322 b 36 προσευθύνas (?), 1306 b 39 καὶ om.:

solis Γ et pi. P² 1259 b 28 δέ:

solis Γ P¹ 1265 a 16 παρὰ, 1272 b 39 καθ' αὐτό:

solis Γ et cor. P¹ 1278 b 22 παρ' :

solis Γ Ar. 1289 b 38 πολέμου:

solis Γ P⁶ A¹. 1336 a 5 δέ:

solis Γ R^b 1303 b 31 τὰ.

solis Γ Ald. cor.¹ P² 1332 a 33 τῶ:

solis Γ Ar. cor.² P² 1335 a 26 σώματος:

solis Γ P² 1254 a 10 ἀπλῶς (ἀπλῶς ὅλως M* P¹, ὅλως cet.).

Neque fas esse censeo in tali reum condicione 1260 b 20 et 1280 a 29 codicum seivatoium lectionibus οἱ κοινοὶ et μὲν multo illas exquisitiores et pleniores coloris Aristotelei postponere, quas suppeditat translatio, οἰκονόμοι et τολάντων. .

E solo P¹ has...depiomero licet rectas scripturas: 1257 a 40 ἐπαβαλόντων (nisi idem habuit Γ), 1259 a 13 ἐλαιουργίων, 1278 a 36 σφρ. iectum ordinem (cor.¹), b 4 κάκεινός corr.¹ (nisi potius retinendum est κάκεινός), 1286 b 17 μετέβαλον (nisi idem habuit etiam Γ), 1287 b 38 βασιλικῶν, 1328 a 5 ἀπάγγχει, 1335 b 20 γνωμένων, 1338 b 4 πρότερον corr.¹, 1340 b 30 παιδίων, 1299 b 24 ἐτέρων pr., 1314 a 35 τὸ ποιεῖν (?):

e solis P¹ et Ar. has: 1263 b 4 τὰ, 1280 b 19 εἴσαν:

e solis Ar. et corr. P¹ has: 1255 a 37 ἔκγονον, 1299 a 14 πολυτελείας:

e solis P¹ mg. P² 1c. P³ 1284 a 37 κολουῖν, quarum nonnullae. ita sunt comparatae, ut corrente calamo a Demetrio Chalcondylia demum et Leonardo Aetino e suis ingeniiis facile potuerint restitui, velut ἐλαιουργίων, πρότερον, παιδίων, τὸ ποιεῖν, εἴσαν, ἔκγονον...Solo autem M* codice praene nusquam

nititur textus, item nusquam paene solo P⁸, solo P² 1253 a 25 (καὶ post φέρεται om.), 1270 b 38 (εἶποι), 1325 a 29 (αὐτὸ τὸ κοιν.¹), 1339 a 14 (εἴπειν), quibus locis fortasse addendum est 1338 b 33 ἀπαιδαγωγήτους.²

This is exclusive of the cases, in which ΓM⁴ alone or M⁴P¹ alone or ΓP¹ alone have preserved the true text: and to these may be added (Lc. p. XI.)

1253 b 33 δ om. M⁴, erased by P⁴ (whether they are to be followed, is certainly a matter for dispute):

1279 b 22 συμβαίνει P¹⁴:

1336 a 17 ψυχρὸν P¹P⁴ (corr.).

1342 b 33 ἡ added by P⁴ and corr.¹ of P⁸ (here conjecture is really out of the question):

1290 a 1 δὴ P¹ and P²¹ (corr.):

1290 a 2 διειλόμεν P⁴ (corr.), διειλόμεθα P¹, διειλόμην ceteri:

1291 b 32 ὑπερέχειν P¹ Ar.:

1295 a 39 δ' erased by corr. of P⁴, γρ. καὶ χωρὶς τοῦ δὲ corr.³ in the margin of P² (this may be a conjecture):

1319 b 24 καὶ τὰ P¹⁸ and γρ. in the margin of P¹:

1309 a 40 αἴρεσιν P¹ (corrector):

1316 a 38 ἀναξιλίου P¹¹

From this also is seen, in what a very restricted sense I assert, or am entitled to assert, that the Vetus translation is "instar optimi codicis". That the text is to be based upon it as far as it can be based upon anything, I never once even dreamed of thinking (as the above remark in my first edition shows) even at an earlier time, when I still overrated the worth of this source of the text.

In the first book indeed Mr Newman has adopted the readings of Γ¹ only at

1252 b 28 (ἡδὴ ΓP¹),

1253 a 7, 1254 a 15, 1255 b 27, 1256 b 13, 32, 1257 b 3,

1258 b 40 (Χαρηγίδην Γ),

1259 a 37 (mirabile dictu, even here not without some doubt),

1259 b 28 (δὲ Γ 1st hand of P¹),

1260 a 37 (ἄρα):

and at 1253 b 37 he remarks with justice: ὑποθέσθαι ΓM⁴ possibly rightly.

But though it is true, as he mentions, that 1253 a 2 δ is only added before ἄνθρωπος in M⁴P¹, yet it stands in all the manuscripts just below, at line 7. The two similar passages in the *Ethics* (as I have remarked on p. 456) also defend the article, which should therefore be adopted 1278 b 21 from M⁴P¹; and all this makes for the article at 1253 a 32 also. Similarly in B. II. 1270 b 19 f. Mr Newman pronounces in favour of διὰ τύχην against M⁴P¹; but at 1323 b 29, as Mr Hicks reminded me, all manuscripts have διὰ τὴν τύχην. Further on the strength of the well-known Aristotelian idiom Mr Newman erases, 1255 a 35, the καὶ between εὐγενὲς and ἐλεύθερον with Π⁸; and at 1260 a 26 ἡ before τὸ with P²⁸S³T⁴. In the latter case he is right, in the former wrong: for this usage is restricted to enumerations (after οἷον, ὥσπερ especially, but also in other cases), and at 1316 b 15

unless $\kappa\alpha\iota$ be inserted (which might easily have dropped out before $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\kappa\iota\zeta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$) the explanation must be quite different, viz $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega\nu\tau\acute{o}\nu\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\omicron\kappa\iota\zeta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\iota$ must mean "accumulating debts in consequence of their profligacy." At 1252 a 9 Mr Newman himself wavers between admitting $\epsilon\dot{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ or leaving it out: as however the latter is the more unusual, to me at least it seems the safer supposition that it is interpolated in Π^2 . And while Mr Newman holds it to be almost indispensable 1257 b 7, I believe that on the contrary I have shown (*Qu. crit. coll.* p. 353 f.) it is quite out of place in that passage. Although Π^1 is more often wrong in omitting words which are found in Π^2 , yet I hold that anyone with an appreciation of Aristotle's mosaic style must unhesitatingly admit that 1252 b 19 he wrote $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa$ $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ without $\sigma\upsilon\nu\eta\lambda\theta\omicron\nu$. To be sure nothing of this kind can be demonstrated. At 1252 b 14 I also have accepted $\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma$, but it still remains doubtful whether $\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma$ be not right after all (see Addenda *ad loc.*). At 1253 b 27 $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$ (Π^2) is defended by Newman by means of a subtle interpretation. But he should say where the apodosis begins. It is certainly upon mere conjecture that b 25 $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ is omitted by $P^{10}O^1U^3L^*$ Ald., but one which is justified by the facts; for here the apodosis really begins (only it would be better to write $\delta\eta$). that being so, a rational sense can only be obtained by Rassow's emendation, which I have accepted, and this admits only the reading of Π^1 $\tau\acute{\omega}$ $\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}$. At 1254 a 10, whether it is more natural that $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omega\varsigma$ was explained by $\acute{\alpha}\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ or conversely, every one may decide for himself. I hold the latter to be much more probable: still the Byzantine gloss-writers were unaccountable people. Why I hold, at 1254 b 23, $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega$ (Π^1) to correspond better to the sense and grammar than $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\nu$ (Π^2), I have laid down *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 343, and Mr Newman says nothing about this. That at 1255 b 26 $\acute{\alpha}\psi\omicron\upsilon\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ and 1256 a 6 $\kappa\epsilon\rho\kappa\iota\delta\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$ are the genuine Aristotelian forms is unmistakably clear from the very materials collected by Mr Newman, and how anyone can prefer, 1256 b 8, the present $\delta\iota\delta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ to the perfect $\delta\epsilon\delta\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$ and conversely 1260 a 4 the perfect $\acute{\upsilon}\phi\eta\gamma\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$ to the present $\acute{\upsilon}\phi\eta\gamma\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, I cannot comprehend. As to 1260 a 4 $<\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota>$ $\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$, see Addenda *ad loc.*

Leaving out of account the order of the words at 1253 a 7, 11, b 3, 7, 1256 b 26, 1259 b 30, 1260 b 24, there remain, besides 1252 b 15 ($\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma$ or $\acute{\alpha}\mu\omicron\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma$), the following quite uncertain cases: 1252 b 2, 5, 14, 1253 a 1, 1254 b 18, 1255 b 24, 26, 1258 b 7, 1259 a 28, 1260 a 21, 31. Also 1256 b 1 $\kappa\omicron\mu\acute{\iota}\zeta\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota$ and 1258 b 1 $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\lambda\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ (Π^1) may be corruptions of $\pi\omicron\sigma\iota\zeta\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota$ and $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\lambda\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}\varsigma$; yet it is much more natural to suppose that on the contrary the former unusual expressions were arbitrarily transformed into the latter which are continually used elsewhere. Π^1 is certainly wrong 15 times: 1252 a 5, 1253 a 25, b 25, 1255 a 5, 24, 32, 39, b 12, 1256 b 18, 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 26, 39, b 17; besides it is probably wrong 1254 b 14 (as I must now concede), 1255 b 24 ($\tau\alpha\iota\varsigma$), 1257 b 24. Π^1 is right 24 times: 1252 a 9, b 20, 28 ($\eta\delta\eta$ ΓP^1), 1253 a 7, b 27, 1254 a 15, b 23, 28, 1255 a 35, b 26, 27, 1256 a 6, b 8, 13, 32, 1257 b 3, 7, 1258 b 40 ($\chi\alpha\rho\eta\tau\iota\delta\eta$ Γ), 1259 a 37, b 28 ($\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ Γ 1st hand P^1), 1260 a 4 twice ($\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ Γ and

ὁφθαλμοί), 1260 a 37 (ἀρα), of which it is true 1252 b 28, 1258 b 40 and 1260 a 37 have no decisive importance here: but in return 1253 a 32, 1254 a 10, 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, and also perhaps 1253 b 37 (p. 463), should probably be added, to say nothing of 1260 b 20 (p. 462). On the other hand possibly the mistake at 1256 a 10 extends to M^a as well as Γ¹. The glosses which have crept in (1256 b 26) are of course not to be reckoned to the disadvantage of the original recension Π¹, either here or elsewhere.

The comparison tells far more strikingly in favour of Π¹ in the second book, not merely numerically, but by a series of quite unique variants, whereas the mistakes for the most part concern trifles and simple *errata*, as e.g. φιλία, three times (for which moreover the archetype of this family is perhaps not responsible, see Susem.¹ p. XIV.), and the repeated φιλίας. Each of these is properly reckoned once only in what follows, and the same with the right reading ἀνδρεία (ἀντρεία). Apart from the order of the words 1265 a 37, b 15, 17, 32, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 11 f., 1271 a 19 f., 1273 b 36, 1274 a 17, b 6, an even approximate decision is impossible 1260 b 36, 1261 a 22, 1262 b 21, 1263 a 23, b 32, 1264 a 16, 21, b 26, 31, 1265 a 4, 12, b 19, 1266 a 23, b 3, 1268 a 6, 6 f., 17, b 5, 9, 17, 32, 1269 a 11, b 21, 28, 1272 b 15 f., 28, 1273 a 16, b 27, 32, 1274 b 8, 14. one feels inclined to decide in favour of Π¹ at 1261 a 22, b 21, 1269 b 21, but on the other hand in favour of Π¹ at 1263 a 23 (καὶ omitted), 1272 b 28, and 1269 a 11 Mr Newman himself describes with "possibly rightly" the reading of Π¹. In the remaining 109 cases Π¹ has preserved the right reading, or the traces of it, 69 times: 1260 b 27 (see Addenda to 1260 b 20), 28, 41 (ἐξ ὁ τῆς Γ), 1261 a 15 twice, 27 (ἐλαύσει Γ¹), 1261 b 2 f. five times, b 4 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.), b 5, 1262 a 3 twice, b 13 (at the least highly probable, see Newman's *crit. n.*), 33, 1263 a 12, 23 (ἐθεσι), b 7 (see *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 366 f.), 9, 11, 1265 a 33 f. four times, b 11 (ἀλάσας Γ¹), 30, 1266 b 2 (Γ), 24, 31, 1267 a 35, 40, b 16, 23, 26, 35, 1268 a 3, 11, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 a 21, b 6, 1270 a 13 (ἀντρεία Γ¹), 22, 1270 b 19 (p. 463), 32 (αὐτή affects only accent and breathing), 1271 a 15, 17, 20 (κάν Γ), 37, 40, b 37, 1272 a 3, 29, b 8 f. twice, 36, 39, 1273 a 7, 9, b 1, 41, 1274 a 5, 19, 21 (at least probable), 25, 39, b 13. Π¹ has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times. 1261 a 18 (ἡ omitted by M¹, probably wrongly, whether by Γ also, cannot be known), 35 (at least M¹Γ¹), b 7 (οὐ, it may however be right), 19, 1262 a 30, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 1, b 3, 1265 a 30, 35, b 4, 21, 39 (at least M¹Γ¹), 1266 a 20, 23, 37, 39 (φιλίας), b 6, 1267 b 40, 1268 a 26 (probably at least), b 16, 1269 a 6, b 26, 1270 a 20, 21 (at least M¹Γ¹), 25, 27 (at least M¹Γ¹), 34, 1270 b 12, 1271 a 27 (φιλία, cp. 1272 a 3, b 34), b 26, 28, 1272 a 1 (at least M¹Γ¹), 35, 1273 a 9, 10, b 2, 3, 1274 a 4 (unless θωρίαν is here nearer to the true reading than θώτερον, θώτερον being the original). To the latter cases Newman certainly adds 1260 b 27, 1261 a 27, b 4, 1263 a 12, 23, b 7, 9, 11, 1264 a 39, 1265 a 33 f., b 11, 30, 1267 a 40, b 26, 1268 a 3, 25, b 5, 12, 1269 b 6 (but Περαιβούς is the right orthography), 1270 b 19, 32, 1271 a 20 (but μὲν gives a wrong sense), b 37, 1272 b 9, 1273 b 41 (but was it not more obvious to change τὸ δικαστήριον into the more natural and simple τὰ δικαστήρια?), 1274 a 21: yet not without himself giving expression to his

doubts in regard to 1261 a 27, 1265 b 11, 30, 1268 a 3, b 5, 1271 b 37, 1272 b 9, 39 occasionally with some warmth.

I must here content myself with a brief mention of most of these last mentioned passages and one or two besides.

1261 b 2 f. Although Mr Newman is bound to admit that here Π² presents attempts at emendation as arbitrary as they are worthless, and although it is clear that in this way ἐν τοῖς has arisen from τοῦτο, yet he seeks to save the former reading, because then τὸ before ἐν μέρει need not be changed into τῷ; but there is no need of this with the reading τοῦτο: see Susem.⁴ *crit. n.* and *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 361

1262 b 32. The omission of τοὺς φύλακας in M¹P¹ is doubtless an indication that the place of these words varied, and if the old translator renders them at the only possible place, I do not see why under these circumstances it should be improbable that he actually found them in his codex Γ at that place.

1263 a 23. For ἔθελαι M₁ Newman himself cites the parallel passage 1263 b 39. I should think this would be sufficient for any unprejudiced person. As to 1263 a 28 ff. see the Addenda *ad loc.* If ἐκδοσθαι προσεδρεύοντες (ΓM*) is, as it seems, the true reading, this would make the 70th case in favour of Π¹.

1265 a 33 f. That frugality usually attends as a consequence upon a toilsome life, and liberality upon a life of luxury, is what only an unreflecting person, not Aristotle, would maintain: those who live luxuriously will soon find the means for liberality fail them. But the converse is perfectly true. Π¹ has therefore transmitted the right reading, and we must make up our minds to accept the excellent emendation of the sensible Koiaes, without which this reading transmitted to us cannot be maintained.

1265 b 11. How improbable it is that in any of the existing states such regulations as those here proposed can have existed, a man so well informed as M₁ Newman cannot fail to see. Nevertheless he admits πλείστους, not ἄλλους into the text

1265 b 30. In case the reading πολυτελεῖν were right, τὴν could scarcely be omitted before this word or before κοινοσίτην.

1267 b 25 f. With the reading κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ arises the absurdity, that ἐσθῆτος εὐτελοῦς would depend not simply on πλεῖσται, but on κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. Of this Mr Newman says nothing.

1268 a 3. Is καταδικάζειν τὴν δίκην in the sense of "to decide the case against the accused" Greek at all, except in the formula ἐρήμην καταδικάζειν?

1268 b 21. Mr Newman's statement in the critical note, that ἤδη is left out by Π¹ here, is erroneous: it was omitted only by Γ and Π¹ (1st hand). So too of his assertion, that 1271 a 15 I have taken τοῦτο (Π¹) not as neuter, but as masculine.

1272 b 8 f. In spite of all attempts to make sense of it, τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν is simple nonsense: and a man of Mr Newman's intelligence cannot in reality disguise this from himself. Hence he would willingly transpose

τῶν δυνατῶν, with Π¹, to follow δοῦναι (line 9): but unfortunately this is not possible without the conjecture - an extraordinarily slight conjecture, it is true—of Κοινας, οἱ δὲ (line 8) for ἔσαν. Now conjectures are once for all forbidden. There is nothing for it but to justify the order of the words in Π², as well, or rather as ill, as possible. Again, one might have imagined that δυναστῶν (Π¹) instead of δυνατῶν (Π²) was sufficiently defended by the fact that the Cretan constitution is declared to be δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτεία. Not so. Once for all, Π² is made out to be the better recension!

1272 b 39 Here in the first place Mr Newman is mistaken in saying that καθ' αὐτό is not found in any manuscript. It is in the margin of P¹, quite apart from the fact that beyond all doubt it was in P. He is exceedingly disposed to concede that it is most appropriate to the sense and the language. One might have imagined that given this most appropriate reading καθ' αὐτό, a second καθ' αὐτό (P¹ and somewhat corrupted M¹), and a third κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (Π²), the progress of the corruption from the first through the second to the third was at the same time given clearly enough. But it is all in vain. Again, once for all, Π² is made out to be the better recension!

1273 b 6 Here on the contrary Mr Newman has rightly restored to the text εὐπορίαν from Π² and O¹, in opposition to Bekker, myself, and the other editors.

I believe then that I exactly described the state of the case in relation to the recensions Π¹ and Π² when in my third edition p. v. I wrote: "haud raro hanc, saepius illam meliorem." Now to return with a few words to the Vatican palimpsest. According to Heylbut's account, which I have not correctly reported in the *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXV. p. 804 f., it is of the tenth century. Accordingly it furnishes a proof that even at that time, in which undoubtedly the sharp separation of these two recensions had already taken place, copies were nevertheless still made of older codices, which had arisen before this sharp separation, and thus still bore a mixed character, approximating in this case more to Π², but in the case of the codex used by Julian more to Π¹. If the two facts are viewed impartially side by side, no conclusion follows from them in favour of Π² any more than in favour of Π¹: on the contrary, the procedure which I have adopted is only justified anew. This and the confirmation of two conjectures, δαστῶν 1278 a 34 and 1287 a 34 καὶ omitted, form the total net result of this new discovery. If the codex had been preserved entire, it is probable that other isolated conjectural emendations would have been confirmed: as it is, these two cases are enough to restrain us from an exaggerated mistrust of this means for the restoration of the text.

Mr Newman thinks it possible that William of Moerbeke employed several Greek manuscripts. I see no ground for doing so much honour to the care bestowed by the worthy monk; indeed what makes this assumption very improbable is simply that all these codices must have belonged to the class Π¹. However if this was the case, it can remain tolerably indifferent to us, for the fact remains still the same: the *Vetusta translatio* is the oldest representative of this family and (excepting the Vatican frag-

ments and the citations of Greek writers) the oldest source of the text anywhere.

I should have much besides to adduce on my side against Mr Newman, but I have no intention of entering on a controversy with him and would far sooner take this opportunity to recognize with gratitude, in spite of all our differences, the very great merits of his work, which contains much both good and new. In regard to i. c. 11 I agree with him. I would not guarantee that this chapter was written by Aristotle himself, but I very much doubt whether a valid proof can be adduced to show that this is not the case, or even that Aristotle inserted it in his work at a later date. In any case it is well known to be older than the so called second book of the *Oeconomics*, which had its origin somewhere between 260 and 200 B.C. SUSSEX.

15 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσή-
 14 κουςαν σκέψιν [περὶ πολιτείας ἀρίστης τὸν μέλλοντα ποιήσα- I
 § 1

1288 b 5 ἀνάγκη. ὁ σκέψιν joined by all previous authorities to B. III, omitted by Bk.² See Comm. || δὲ Spengel, δὴ Π¹ P^{2,3} Q^b T^b fr. Ald. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, γάρ (with the omission of the following τὸν μέλλοντα) P^{1,2} L^a A¹.

1333 a 14 [περὶ .. τῆς ἀνάγκης] Spengel || δὲ added after περὶ by P² and correction of P²; perhaps rightly, yet see *Introd.* p. 14 n. 3 || τῆς inserted before ἀρίστης in P¹ and in the margin of P¹, cp. p. 456 f.

B. IV(VII), i.e. the fourth book of the new order, but in the traditional order of the manuscripts the seventh, commences a sketch of the best polity which is continued through the next book, B. V(VIII), there being no break between them, and finally left unfinished at its close. Preliminary questions are discussed in cc. 1—3, the external conditions (the land, the people, the agricultural class, the public buildings) in cc. 4—12; c. 13 treats of the end of the constitution and the means at the legislator's command for realizing it; the most important of which, viz. a system of state education (in the widest sense), receives a detailed exposition, beginning with c. 14 of this book and not completed at the abrupt close of the next. The two books are written in a finished style, carefully elaborated, with minute attention to the rule of the hiatus, which is seldom violated in B. IV(VII) and not at all in B. V(VIII).

1288 b 5, ἀνάγκη δὲ ὁ σκέψιν] That this conclusion of B. III, breaking off in the middle of a sentence, is only a parallel version of the beginning of the (old) seventh book, is acknowledged by all who recognize that the proper place for the (old) seventh book is immediately after the third. Beyond all doubt, of the two parallel versions, that at the end of B. III is the original one, as Spengel rightly decides, and it ought not to have been omitted from the text of Bekker's

octavo edition². When the text of this book had been torn away from its connexion and transformed into the seventh book, some transition was needed; hence the clause περὶ πολιτείας (ἡγήσιν ἀνάγκη) was added by the scribe. SUSSEM.

The grounds for making the transposition of the books have been already noticed: *Introd.* p. 16 n. (4), p. 17, p. 47 f. The main point to decide is, where in the treatise ought the description of the best polity (in the form of pure aristocracy) to come, whether before the description of the existing faulty polities or after them. The indications of B. III are unmistakable, especially c. 13 and 18; and upon them Spengel has rightly insisted (*Ueber die Politik* p. 16 f., *Arist. Studien* II. pp. 16 ff., 60 ff., 71). Not less convincing is the assertion in VI(IV), c. 2 that aristocracy, as well as monarchy, has been already discussed. But when the question has been decided upon these grounds, the unfinished sentence at the end of B. III certainly affords striking corroborative evidence.

c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2). *The connexion of the best constitution with the highest life.*

Few chapters in the work have been subjected to more minute examination than this. See Bernays *Dialoge des Arist.* pp. 69–84 and Vahlen *Aristoteles*.

Not that of Oshod, 1817, but *Thronum didit* L. Bekker, Berlin 1855; *num. dicendum* 1878.

- α 15 σθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν ζήτησιν ἀνάγκῃ] διορίσασθαι πρότερον τὴς (I)
αἰρετώτατος βλός. ἀδήλου γὰρ ὅντος τούτου καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην
ἀναγκαῖον ἀδήλον εἶναι πολιτεῖαν· ἄριστα γὰρ πρᾶττειν
προσῆκει τοὺς ἄριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων
§ 2 αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ τι γίνηται παράλογον. διὸ δεῖ πρῶτον
10 ὁμολογεῖσθαι τὴς ὁ πῦσιν ὡς εἶπεν αἰρετώτατος βλός, μετὰ
δὲ τοῦτο πότερον κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος. (IV 94)
νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξω- 3
τερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.
§ 3 ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητή-

15 πρότερον] πρῶτον P¹ II² Bk., reichar. rightly || 19 παρὰ λόγον Γ' Α1. ||
20 ὁμολογεῖσθαι Sussem.^{1,2}, confessum esse William || 22 [καὶ] Schneidei., [καὶ τῶν]
Oncken wrongly

Ische Aufsatze II 'On a chapter of the
Politics' (Vienna 1872; 52 pp)

§ 1 1323 a 16 αἰρετώτατος βλός] See
n. (683) with the passages there quoted.
SUSSEM. (685)

τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεῖαν] i.e. the abso-
lutely best constitution: see VI(IV). I § 3
πολλοὶ γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ὥς ἀδύ-
νατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν
ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ ληθ-
θεῖναι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν, and n.
(1116). SUSSEM. (686)

18 προσῆκει] 'We should expect the
citizens who live under the best con-
stitution possible to them (ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ-
χόντων αὐτοῖς to be taken closely with
ἄριστα) to fare best,' i.e. to lead the most
desirable life.

§ 2 21 κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι, χωρὶς ἐκάστῃ.

22 τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις] See ELL-
ENBURY I. to this book. SUSSEM. (687)

23 καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς] "It is
clear from passages such as *De Caelo* II
13 § 18, 295 a 2 f. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων
διάρματα πρότερον εἶσα λατὰ τὴν παρούσαν
δύναμιν εἰχμεν, χρηστέον ὡς ὑπάρχοισιν
and *Meteor.* III. 2 § 12, 372 b 10 f. ἔστω δὲ
περὶ τούτων ἡμῶν τε θεωρημένων ἐν τοῖς
περὶ τὰς αἰσθητικῶν δεικνυμένοις· διὸ τὰ
μὲν λέγωμεν, τοῖς δ' ὡς ὑπάρχουσι χρῆσθαι
μετὰ αὐτῶν, that this expression does not
imply that an exposition given elsewhere
is to be borrowed or introduced, but that
the results of some other discussion will
be employed and utilized. Those who
remember the tolerably frequent use of
the verb χρῆσθαι by Herodotus e.g. in II.
120 εἰ χρή τι ποιεῖν ἐπιποιεῖται χραιώμενον
λέγειν, corresponding to Thucydides I.
10 § 3 τῇ Ὀμήρου αὐ ποιήσει εἰ τι χρῆ

κάνταθα πιστεύειν, will hardly raise any
objection to our taking the word, used
here and in *Nic. Eth.* I. 13 § 9, 1102 a 27
in connexion with the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι,
but not as confined to them, in the sense
of the phrase in *Nic. Eth.* VI. 4 § 2,
1140 a 2, πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς
ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. It is plain that this ex-
pression does not in any way show whether
the discussion referred to is Aristotle's own
or belongs to some one else, nor to what
degree or extent it is utilized" (Vahlen).
SUSSEM. (688)

§ 3 21 πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς
ἀν] The appeal to the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι in
this passage and in § 5 (see n. 694) thus
amounts (in effect at any rate) to an
appeal to public opinion, to what was
at the time conceded by all, or at least
by all cultivated and intelligent men.
We should also notice how, as III. 12 § 1,
the strictly scientific (philosophical) dis-
tinctions and discussions are opposed
(1) to opinion universally current, and on
the other hand, (2) if not by Aristotle
himself at least by his pupil Euclides
(see n. 584), to the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι; and
it is hardly possible to regard the latter
as anything else but the expression of
that universal opinion. Beings, yes, in
these words an unusual phrase on Ari-
stotle's part in reply to the charge which
was no doubt often levelled at him, of
useless logical hair-splitting, when he
thus expresses the hope that he may
be allowed to make *one* division at
least without opposition. But Vahlen
rightly urges against this view that, in
quite of the announcement of at least
this *one* division, the emphasis is not

25 σιειν ἂν ὡς οὐ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, τῶν τε ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν (1)
 τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν
 § 4 τοῖς μακαρίοις χρή. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν φαίη μακίριον τὸν μηδὲν
 μόριον ἔχοντα ἀνδρῆας μηδὲ σωφροσύνης μηδὲ δικαιοσύνης
 30 μῦθας, ἀπεχόμενον δὲ μηδενός, ἂν ἐπιθυμήσῃ τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ
 πιεῖν, τῶν ἐσχάτων, ἕνεκα δὲ τεταρτημορίου διαφθείρουτα τοὺς
 φίλτατους φίλους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δίδουσαν

25 [σὺ] Oncken wrongly || 26 τῷ omitted by P⁶ S^b V^b Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand) ||
 27 χρή omitted by P⁶ Π² (added in the margin of P¹): δέi Vettoi Bk. || 29 [μηδὲ
 φρονήσεως] Sussem¹; see on a 32 || 30 του Κοινας, [τοῦ φαγεῖν ἢ τοῦ πιεῖν] Beinaue,
 perhaps rightly. Yet see Vahlen *Phil. Aufsätze* II. p. 11 (9) ff. || τοῦ before πικῶν
 omitted by Π⁴ P⁶ Bk. || 31 ποικῶν P¹ and M¹ (1st hand) || 32 [φίλους] Κοινας Bk.² ||
 τὴν δίδουσαν is omitted by M¹ (which has a lacuna of 4 or 5 letters) and apparently by
 P¹; quae circa prudentiam se habent, neque enim beatificant William, doubtless from
 a gloss. Hence ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ γὰρ μακαρίζουσιν Su-
 sem.¹ = wrongly

laid on the division, but on the inference drawn from it; that just because there are three kinds of goods, he who is to be happy cannot entirely dispense with any of the three. But I do not perceive why this thought ought properly to have been elaborated for all three kinds of goods, as Vahlen supposes; at any rate with the form of 'argumentum ad hominem' here chosen, proceeding from premises universally conceded, where all that was required was to prove the superior claim of intellectual goods, which was alone in dispute. Besides the request that 'he might be allowed just this one division' would appear very strange in connexion with this division of goods. For, except perhaps the comprehensive term 'external goods,' it is not at all peculiar to Aristotle; and he repeats it elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* I. 8 § 2, 1098 b 12 ff., *Rhet.* I. 5 § 4, 1360 b 25 ff., and often mentions it in passing as something well known and perfectly certain, without a word of justification or approval. SUSSEM. (689)

25 μερίδων] Even though it is plain to everybody that the subject is "goods," yet it is strange that no express mention of the term occurs either here (where it would be very appropriate instead of the word chosen, μερίδων) or in what precedes. SUSSEM. (690)

§ 4 28 σωφροσύνης] Comp. *n.* (206 b). SUSSEM. (691)

These are the four Platonic virtues,

which Aristotle substantially retained as the basis of his more extended list.

29 δεδιότα . . . 30 μύθας] This hyperbolic description, according to Bernays, also points to the passage having been transmitted from some dialogue. But an extravagant and diastolic picture of the kind is by no means rare in Aristotle. See *Nic. Eth.* I. 7 § 16, 1098 a 18 μᾶλλον γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον οὐτὶν δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαιμόνεια μᾶλλον οὐδ' ὀλίγοι χρόνοι: 10 § 14, 1101 a 8 ἂν Πραγματικὴ τήχαις περιπέσῃ: VII. 5 § 6, 1149 a 8 δεδιότα πάντα κἂν ψοφῇς μιν: X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 10 πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπορρίπτει χρεὼν αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς θεοῖς) κτλ. . . 19 οὐ γὰρ δὴ λαβόντων ὥστερ' τὸν Ἑρμύωνα. 8 § 10, 1179 a 4 διωσάντων δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ κατὰ: *Phys.* 7 § 4, 1451 a 2 εἰ μὴ ὡς σταθίων ἐν ἴσῳ, α 7 ἐκαστὸν τραγωδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι: *Rhet.* II. 12 § 8, 1389 a 23 f. τοῖς δὲ νέου το μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ. τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ ἡμερᾷ μεμνησθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἶόν τι, ἐλπίειν δὲ πάντα (Vahlen). SUSSEM. (692)

30 For τοῦ with the infinitive ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμῶν see Xenophon *Memor.* I. 7 § 3, III. 6 § 16; *Isaiah*. 14 § 9. For τὸ πικρὸν as a substantive *Plato Rhet.* IV. 439 b τοῦ διψήντος καὶ ἀγόντος ὥστερ' θηρίον ἐστὶ τὸ πικρὸν, and Xenophon *Memor.* I. 3 § 30 (Vahlen).

32 τὰ περὶ τὴν δίδουσαν] Here (in φρόνησις, the virtue of the practical intellect, stands in contrast to the moral vir-

οὕτως ἄφρονα καὶ διεψευσμένον ὥσπερ τι παιδίον ἢ μαινό- (I)
 § 5 μενον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὥσπερ πάντες ἂν συγ-
 35 χωρήσειαν, διαφέρονται δ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.
 τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔχειν ἱκανὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ὅπουσιν οὖν,
 πλούτου δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης καὶ πάν-
 § 6 των τῶν τοιούτων εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἡμῶς
 δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν ὅτι ῥᾶδιον μὲν περὶ τούτων καὶ διὰ τῶν
 40 ἔργων [δια]λαμβάνειν τὴν πίστιν, ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται καὶ
 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα ταύταις,
 :323 b καὶ τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως, εἴτ' ἐν τῷ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ

3; ὥσπερ] οὕτως before λεγόμενα P^o, [ὥσπερ] Scaliger who is followed by Spengel, ἀπλῶς Beinays, <ἀπλῶς> ὥσπερ ? Sussem., a conjecture which I hold to be probable even after Vahlen's defence of the text p. 14 (16). Nevertheless I concede to Vahlen that the transposition ὥσπερ λεγόμεν ἅπαντες would also make good sense. Other suggestions in my critical edition: ὥσπερ * * * Schneidei, ὡς ἐπεὶ Κοίλας, || 36 εἶναι omitted by P^o S^b V^b Ald. and P¹ (14 hand) || 37 [καὶ] χρημάτων Beinays, wrongly || 40 λαμβάνειν Iambin, διαλαμβάνειν H² P¹ 1^o Δ1, Hk.¹, διαβαίνειν H¹

tues; cp. I. 13 § 8, III. 4 §§ 7, 8, 18, I 1 § 2, § 6 and §§ 10, 11 below with *nn.* (40, 45, 112, 115, 474—476, 498, 565, 703). SUSSEM. (698)

§ 5 34 ὥσπερ πάντες] "Almost all would allow, when stated." Comp. *n.* (689). SUSSEM. (694) ὥσπερ πάντες: ὡς ἐπεὶ πάντες = ὥσπερ οὐδέν: ὡς ἐπεὶ οὐδέν. Vahlen compares *Rhet.* I. 6 § 24, 1363 a 11, ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἥδη ὁμολογοῦσιν = for this is now as good as an universal admission (Cope): and with the idiomatic use of the participle Plato *Sympos.* 199 B τῶν ἡμῶν λεγόμενα ἀκούειν, *Protag.* 311 B, τί ὄνομα ἄλλα γὰρ λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; and the Herodotean ταῦθ' ὡς ἀπεριεχθῆντα ἤκουσαν.

35 διαφέρονται] Men differ as to how much of each kind of goods they should have, and to which of the three superiority is due. The view of the multitude is that even so small a measure of goods intellectual suffices, but the possession of goods external should be increased without end.

37 Cp. I. 9, 10, 1257 b 7 πλοῦτον καὶ (that is) χρημάτων (Vahlen).

38 εἰς ἄπειρον ζητοῦσι τὴν ὑπερβολήν] Cp. I. 8 § 14 f., 9 § 13 ff. with *nn.* (76 b, 90). SUSSEM. (698)

§ 6 ἡμῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν] Here again Beinays finds a reminiscence of some dialogue. See on the other hand c. 3 § 1 *n.* (733), 11 (11), 2, 3, 1289 b 9 [add II. 9, 12, 1270 a 10], *De Anima* I. 3

§ 10, 406 b 22 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐρωτήσομεν; *Met.* III. 5 § 19, 1010 a 15 f. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺτον τὸν λόγον ἐροῦμεν (cp. § 6, 1009 a 30), *Enchiridion* I. 3 § 24, f., 72 b 18 ἡμεῖς δὲ φάμεν (Vahlen). SUSSEM. (696)

39 διὰ τῶν ἔργων] To convince oneself by means of the facts. Like γινώμενα, φαινόμενα, συμβεβηκότα we find ἔργα and πράγματα used for 'facts' as distinguished from λόγοι, 'theories.' See c. 4 § 7, 1326 a 25, § 12, 1326 b 12; B. II c. 8 § 19, 1268 b 39, c. 9 § 16; also c. 3 § 8, 1262 a 17 (λαμβάνειν τὰς πύσεις).

40 ὁρῶντας ὅτι κτῶνται κτλ.] Cp. II. 9 § 35 with *n.* (316 b) and c. 15 § 6 *n.* (928) below. SUSSEM. (697)

1323 b 1 εἴτ' ἐν τῷ 2 εἴτ' ἐν ἀρετῇ] Beinays argues that to leave several possibilities open in this way is another indication that we have something borrowed from a dialogue. But if we presuppose Aristotle's own view of happiness, there is no further need of this argument, or rather it becomes useless. "Opponents however are most effectively met by a proof of the untenableness of their opinions drawn from their own point of view, or the concession of their own assumptions. The conceptions of happiness here brought together in the form of alternatives, all of which alike make the goods of the mind its more important elements, occur elsewhere, e.g. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 11 § 2, 1152 b 6 ff. [yet it is doubtful if this part of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotelian]: cp. I 3

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἶτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τὸ (1)
 ἦθος μὲν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν κεκοσμημένοις εἰς ὑπερβολὴν,
 περὶ δὲ τὴν ἔξω κτῆσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάουσιν, ἢ τοῖς
 5 ἐκεῖνα μὲν κεκτημένοις πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις
 ἐλλείπουσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον σκοπούμενοις
 8 τ' εὐσύννοπον ἐστίν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἔχει πέρασ, ὥσπερ ὕρ-
 γανόν τι (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ χρησίμον ἐστίν, ὃν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἢ
 βλάβπτει ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὀφέλος εἶναι αὐτῶν τοῖς
 10 ἔχουσιν)· τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἑκαστον ἀγαθῶν, ὅσῳ περ ἂν
 ὑπερβάλλῃ, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον χρήσιμον [εἶναι], εἰ δεῖ καὶ τού- (p. 9)
 τοις ἐπιλέγειν μὴ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον.
 8 ὅλως τε δὴλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρί-

1323 b 6 ἀλλὰ omitted by M^a, by P¹ (1st hand), and possibly by Γ || 8 γὰρ
 Sussem., δὲ Γ Π Αι. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text and Heinays, who alters πᾶν into πέρασ,
 wrongly || χρήσιμον ἐσ τι Vahlen, peihays rightly; - χρήσιμον τοῦτ' ἔχει πέρασ εἰς δι-
 χρήσιμον ἐστίν (or something similar) Sussem. Both probable conjectures, the one is
 no easier than the other || ὥν ὥστε Heinays, and so (or peihays ὥστε αὐτοῦ) Ar.,
 εἰ μὴ William, αὐτῶν peihays Γ; ὥστε αὐτῶν Sussem.¹, but see Vahlen p. 21 (23) ||
 9 αὐτῶν omitted by Π¹ Αι, [αὐτῶν] Sussem.¹ with Koineas, αὐτῆς Oncken, quite need-
 lessly, but not (as Vahlen thinks) less correctly || 11 χρήσιμον μᾶλλον Π¹ S^b || [εἶναι]
 Schneider Bk.¹, ἐστίν ? Sprengel, <χρή> χρήσιμον Heinays. I am not convinced by
 Vahlen's defence p. 23 (25)

§ 2, 1153 b 15 ff., and 1. 8 § 6 ff. 1098 b
 25 ff., and also cp. *Rhet.* 1. 5 § 3 ff.
 (Vahlen). Cp. also below v(VIII). 5 § 10
 (Eaton) with n. (1033). SUSSEM. (688)

2 ὅτι μᾶλλον... ἐλλείπουσιν Cp.
Nic. Eth. ix. 8 § 9 f., 1179 a 3 ff. οὐ
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐδ' ἢ
 πράξις καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναται· ἂν
 τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν (Eaton).
 SUSSEM. (689)

§ 7 7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ... ὀργανόν τι Cp.
 1. 8 § 15, 9 § 13 with n. (76 b, 90), also
De Anima 1. 3 § 15, 107 a 23 ff., τῶν μὲν
 γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων ἐστὶ πέρατα, πύ-
 σαι γὰρ ἑτέρον χάριν, *Metaph.* 11 (a). 2 § 12,
 994 b 13 ff. [yet this is a humorous book].
Nic. Eth. vii. 13 § 4, 1153 b 24 ff. πρὸς
 μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ δὲσ ἀπὸ αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς
 εὐτυχίας] (Vahlen). SUSSEM. (700)

8 πᾶν γὰρ κτλ. The sense required
 is 'whatever is useful is useful up to a
 certain point [or, has a limit to its utility],
 to exceed which must necessarily either
 do harm or confer no benefit upon its
 possessor.' Vahlen supposes a particular
 clause to have been replaced by the words
 ὃν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. The simplest draft of
 the sentence would be τὰ ἁπλὸς ἔχει πέρασ

ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντα (i.e. ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ) ἢ
 βλάβπτει ἀναγκαῖον ἢ μηδὲν ὀφέλειν τοῖς
 ἔχοντα. Then by a familiar idiom the
 second alternative is replaced by ἢ μηδὲν
 ὀφέλος εἶναι αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐκτὸς). The
 sentence thus becomes somewhat un-
 symmetrical in form, because τὴν ὑπερ-
 βολὴν, though it goes well enough with
 βλάβπτει, is less suitable as the subject
 of μηδὲν ὀφέλειν.

11 καὶ τούτοις ἐπιλέγειν 'to predi-
 cate of these also,' viz. of mental goods.
 So *Nic. Eth.* 11. 6 § 9, 1106 b 10 ὁμο-
 ιώσας ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν ἔργois
 οἱ οὐδὲ ἀφίεναι ἐσθὺ οὐδὲ πρᾶσθαι.
 With the use of the prep. cp. the phrase
 ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν.

§ 8 13 ὅλως τε δὴλον... 15 διαθέσεις
 "Further, as a general rule it is clear
 that the relative superiority of the best
 condition of one thing [as compared with
 that of another] will be said to be
 measured by the difference existing be-
 tween the things of which these are said
 to be in themselves the best conditions."
 Comp. *Rhet.* 1. 7 § 4, 1363 b 21 ff.
 (Courteney), § 18, 1364 a 37 ff. καὶ ὃν ἢ
 ὑπεροχὴ ἀμετρώτερά ἢ καλλίων... καὶ ἀν-

στην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, (1)
 15 ἥνπερ εἴληχε διδάσασιν ὧν φαμεν εἶναι αὐτὰς ταύτας δια-
 θέσεις. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ τιμιώτερον καὶ τῆς κτήσεως
 καὶ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν διὰ-

15 εἴληχε Π² Bk¹ (emended by con.² of P²) || διδάσας Δι. (apparently) and Γ,
 but before ἥνπερ [διδάσασιν] Bojesen, ἥνπερ διδάσασιν ὧν Benaγs, wrongly, ἥνπερ . δια-
 σάσει? Vahlen accellivly: see Comm. || αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π² Γ² Bk.
 avoiding hiatus || ταύτας] ταύτας Benaγs, perhaps rightly, but not necessary: see
 Comm. || 16 τιμιώτερον translated to come after 17 σώματος in Π² P² Bk., Willwöl-
 ran M', *propositio* William

τικαίνουσιν δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ
 βελτίους καὶ καλλίωνων καλλίους So I. c. § 4,
 καὶ ἐν τῷ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχει, καὶ
 αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ θα[ρ]ύται αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ
 τῷ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου: *Top.* III. 384, 118
 b 4 ff. ἐν τῷ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ἀπει-
 ρωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ ἀπειρώτερον (Vahlen): 2
 § 9, 117 b 33 ff. εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτο
 βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τοῖς βέλ-
 τιστον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐτέρῳ βελτίστον (Benaγs).
 Even in this unmistakable and explicit
 'development of the logical formula'
 Benaγs discovers a proof of quotation
 from a dialogue. See n. (702). SUMER.
 (701)

14 A parallel to πρὸς ἄλλα αἰεὶ
 ἐκάστου is *Pol.* 23 § 2, ὅν ἐκαστον ὡς
 ἕτερον ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλα. Comp. ἀλλήλων
 αἰεὶ ἐκάστων Pl. *Phaedo* 97 A, *Aeschines* I.
 137, αἰεὶ καὶ ἄλλοι Δι. *Lyssist.* 49. Take
 κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν with what immediately
 precedes: 'the best condition of two things
 compared in point of superiority,' i.e. as
 judged by the superiority of the one
 relatively to the other. All this forms
 the subject of ἀπολοῦσθαι. What is the
 object? Either τῇ διδασκείᾳ, οἱ κατὰ τὴν
 διδασκείαν (for which cp. c. 14 § 1, 1332 b
 15), ἥνπερ κτλ. Normally one would ex-
 pect this to be changed by attraction of
 the relative into ἥνπερ εἴληχε διδάσκειν (οἱ
 καθ' ἥνπερ εἴλ. διδάσασιν). Instead of
 this, the antecedent is absorbed into the
 relative sentence and assimilated to its
 construction ἥνπερ εἴληχε διδάσασιν. Such
 absorption and assimilation may be seen
 in VI (IV). 4, 8, 1290 b 28, 5, 2, 1292 b 8,
 12, 3, 1296 b 20, possibly (see n. ad loc.)
 I. 8, 13, 1245 b 29. A good example is
 Pl. *Rep.* 400 D εὐθὺς ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἥν
 ἀνοίαν οὐσαν ὑποκειμένην καλομένην ὡς
 εὐθόαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῆς διανοίαν:
 where the construction of the relative
 sentence invades the resumed principal
 sentence. See 1323 b 34, 1324 b 13. The
 periphrasis of ἔχειν c. accus. for a verb is

sometimes varied. Here εἴληχε διδά-
 σασιν = διδάσκειν as Pl. *Tim.* 38 11, *Phd.*
 288 b, δύναμαι εἴληχε διδάσκειν = δύνασθαι, *Phd.*
 49 C γελοῖον εἴληχε τῶν = γελοῖα εἶσθαι.
 In its simplest form the proposition states
 that the *ὑπεροχή* of the best condition of
 two things compared corresponds to the
 διδασκείαν between the things. The best
 state of A: the best state of B :: A : B.
 Allow the soul's superiority, and you
 must allow the superiority of ἀρετῇ and
 φρόνησις its best states. (Vahlen.)

15 διδάσασιν] The order of the words
 in P² (*didastia quam quidem uoluit et
 quatuor diebus esse ipse hab. Will.*) may
 suggest that διδάσασιν was originally a
 variant of ὑπεροχή, and to be bracketed
 (Bojesen, followed by Spengel and Maunivg
 who also proposed $\alpha\lambda\epsilon\iota$ - διδάσασιν).
 But Vahlen pp. 28-34 (30-36) has
 shown that διδάσασιν is all but indispen-
 sable for the sense, and himself admits
 that it is not necessary to alter to ἥνπερ .
 διδάσκειν. Schneider, who first felt a
 difficulty, proposed violent changes ἐκ
 πράγματος κατὰ τὴν διδασκείαν ἥνπερ
 εἴληχε πρὸς ἄλλα τῇ ὑπεροχῇ ὧν
 φησιν κτλ. SUMER

αὐτὰς ταύτας] Vahlen shows that this
 is an instance of the idiomatic attraction
 of a pronominal subject (here a demon-
 strative, often a relative) into the number
 and gender of the predicate. In Plato
Phd. 57 E ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας
 ἀκριβεῖς μάλοισ' εἶναι. This is what we
 especially mean by the exact sciences. So
 here: 'the things which we say that
 just this and that are the attributes'
 becomes, not ὧν αὐτὰ ταῦτα, but ὧν αὐτὰς
 ταύτας φημεν εἶναι διαθέσεις.

17 καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν] Both ab-
 solutely and relatively to us. See *N. N.*
 I. 4, 8, 1039 b 2: *Ποιῖτα* *Ind.* *Ar.* 77 a
 21 ff. where *τοῖς*, ἐκάστῳ, πρὸς τινα, πρὸς τι
 are cited as similarly contrasted with
 ἀπλῶς. So III. 9, 3, 1280 a 21, *μέχρι* *τοῦτο*.

9 θεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ (1)
τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκεν αἰρετὰ πέφυκε ταῦτα καὶ δεῖ πάντας αἰρεῖ-
10 σθαι τοὺς εὐ φρονούντας, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ἕνεκεν τὴν ψυχὴν.
10 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐκάστω τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐπιβállει τοσοῦτον ἢ
ὅσον περ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύ-
τας, ἔστω συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμέ-

18 καὶ omitted by P¹ & P³ Bk. || 19 ταῦτα πέφυκεν αἰρετὰ P² 1³ Bk. || 20 καὶ
added before τοὺς εὐ φρονούντας by T M^a

18 Take τούτων αἰτεῖ ἐκάστου. For the use of ἀνάλογον ἔχειν absolutely cfr. II. 10 § 4, 1271 b 41, 11 § 3, 1272 b 37 § 9 18 ἔτι δὲ .. τοὺν ψυχῆν] C¹ p. 70b. III. 1 § 4, 1161 a 9 f. τὸ δ' αὐτο αἰρετὸν τοῦ δ' ἕτερον αἰρετὸν αἰρετώτερον. "What is desirable on its own account is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else" (Benays). Although this point of view (τόπος) is closely related to the one adopted here, yet it is not identical with it. A more important point is that as the precise argument of the *Topica* is employed e.g. in the *Ethics* also, 1. 7 § 1, 1097a 30, we have no right to follow Benays in ascribing to this chapter of the *Politics* a scientific character materially distinct from the method of the *Ethics*, and only suited for popular writings (Vahlen). Moreover there is no development of the 'logical formula' for this proof, as in the former case (see p. 701); while in the passage of the *Ethics*, this is done. SUBM (702)

The last remark because Benays argues (p. 80) that in the dialogues the treatment must necessarily have been somewhat abstract and dialectical; and this side of the dialogue he thinks is reflected in the present chapter. The author writes, he says, for the public at large, who, if impatient of technical terms, are nevertheless especially qualified to appreciate the fact which adapts to each branch of science its appropriate logic.

§ 10 22 ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως] C¹ p. 111. 4 § 7, 11 § 2, with *HN*. (474, 565). SUBM. (703)

καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας] Why Aristotle was obliged to add 'activity in accordance with the virtues' we learn from *V. Eth.* 1. 8 § 9, 1098b 31 ff. διαφέρει δ' ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσεσι ἢ χρησέσι τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἑκείνῃ ἢ ἐν ἐργείῃ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰν ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποστελεῖν ἀρχοῦσαν, οὐκ ἂν λαβέδωνται... τῶν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐκ οὐδ' οὐκ· πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὐ πράξει. We must agree

with Benays that it is owing to the manifestly popular character of the style of description here followed that Aristotle now avoids the technical term ἐνέργεια used in that passage. Cf. also § 13 with *n*. (710), and *n*. (736). SUBM. (704)

23 μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένους] Benays wrongly endeavours to discover a solemn religious tone in this expression. It denotes no more than 'taking the happiness of God as evidence' or 'appealing to the happiness of God,' cfr. *Thuc.* 1. 73, 2, just as in a similar phrase the Cynaeans and Epicureans are reproached with appealing to the lower animals, *Plat. Phileb.* 67 π τοὺς θηρίων ἰσχυράς οὐρανὺν κρείσσον εἶναι μάρτυρας, *Cic. De Fin.* 11. 33 § 109 bestis quibus vos de summo bono testibus uti soletis. It is nothing unusual in Aristotle in his strictly scientific writings to introduce God into the inquiry. Not only is there really not the slightest difference in this respect between 1. 3 § 10 (cfr. II. 746) and the passage before us, but further the very same thought is worked out rather more fully in *NH. Eth.* X. 8 § 7, 1178 b 7 ff, and similar references to the deity occur e.g. *NH. Eth.* VIII. 7 § 4, 1158 b 35, cfr. VII. 14 § 8, 1154 b 26 ff. Lastly, the comparison here between human and divine happiness is not in the slightest degree carried beyond the proper point. According to Aristotle the activity of God is only speculative thought, and indeed even this thought is nothing but his absolutely perfect thinking upon his own nature, and it is in this that his perfect happiness consists, see *Zeller op. c.* II. n. p. 365 ff. Aristotle's aim is to prove, as against the opposite view generally current, the greater necessity for goods of the mind, in order to happiness. A reference to the happiness of God was not unsuitable for his purpose: the inference from this is that happiness in general does not depend upon external goods, but is founded on mental qualities;

νοῖς, ὅς εὐδαίμων μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μακίριος, δι' οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (I)
 25 ἑξωτερικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιῶν τις
 εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ
 ταύτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι (τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν
 τῆς ψυχῆς αἰτιῶν ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δὲ οὐδὲς
 § 11 οὐδὲ σάφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστίν)· ἔχόμενον
 30 δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα

25 αὐτὸν M^a I^a || τῷ τὸ M^a I^a (perhaps lightly) || 27 [ἀγαθῶν] Beinays, [τῆς ψυχῆς] Spengel Suscm¹, but see Vahlen p. 40 (12) ff. || 29 ἐχόμενον... 30 σάφρων a duplicate of 1324 a 4 πότερον... 13 σπουδαιοτέρας first unrecognized by Suscmihl, Spengel (following Schliesser) having previously remarked that the two passages do not go well together. See p. 86 f. where they are printed in parallel columns

and consequently that man, too, cannot find his principal happiness in external goods. On the other hand the notion that man also may be able to dispense entirely with external goods and yet attain happiness is completely excluded by the whole previous course of the argument, which began with admitting each and all of the three kinds of goods to be necessary for human happiness (see N. 689) and endeavoured to determine the relative importance of external and internal goods (Vahlen). SUSCM. (708)

For this N. E. x. 8. 9, 1179 a 2, may be quoted, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἔναι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακίριον εἶναι. cp I. 10. 16, 1101 a 19.

26 καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἑτέραν εἶναι. Many see no difference between the two. N. E. 1. 8 § 17, 1099 b 7 f. 50c εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττονται εἶναι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Cp. Sociates apud Xen. *Memor.* III. 9 § 14 (Eaton). SUSCM. (708)

Add *J. H. v. II. 6 § 1*, 197 b 3 σημειῶν δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἵνα ταῦτα εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἑγγόνι, ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τῆς εὐπραγίας γὰρ.

29 ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην [τ' ἴ]. *Phys.* II. 6 § 4, 197 b 18 ff. ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἐνεκά του γινόμενοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἐνεκα γίνῃται οὐδὲν τὸ αἰτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου λέγομεν ἀπὸ τύχης δὲ τοῦτω ὅσα ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου γίνονται τῶν προαιρουμένων τοῖς ἔχονσι προαίρεσιν: "Hence it is clear that of events, which in themselves answer a purpose, we call anything not done by design a spontaneous occurrence; whilst all such spontaneous occurrences which happen in the region of purpose and to things possessed of

purpose are said to be by chance" (Eaton). SUSCM. (707)

Comp. the lucid comments of J. I. Heath *Misconceptions of Aristotle* in *Journal of Philosophy* VII p. 111 ff.

§ 11 ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ. Next these follows, without need for fresh arguments, the inference to the happiness and welfare of the best state. For welfare is impossible apart from well-doing. A literal version would be: closely connected and dependent upon the same arguments is the proof that the best state, too, is happy and fares well [like the best man]. It need hardly be insisted that 30 εὐδαίμονα and 31 πρᾶττουσαν καλῶς are predicates of which τὴν ἀρίστην πόλιν is the subject.

30 τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων. Although this makes the essential identity of happiness in the individual and the state rest on no other grounds than those already adduced, we nevertheless get a new proof that human happiness consists mainly in virtue, and we are told (§ 12) that this applies to the state precisely in the same way as to the individual. This supplementary proof is certainly very incomplete. All human thought is largely conditioned and fettered by the language of a nation. Thus among the Greeks the verb πρᾶττειν has (1) the transitive meaning 'to do to person certain acts', thus 32 κατὰ πρᾶττουσαν, (2) the intransitive meaning 'to do - to be (in a certain state)', as e.g. in this present connexion καλῶς πρᾶττειν = to be doing (or being) well, to be in a prosperous state. Hence it became easy to make the mistake of directly inferring the second meaning from the first, where we of course see only a dialectical play upon words. We do not however draw Ikemay's conclusion that Aristotle would

- τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καλῶς (I)
 πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττουσιν· οὐδὲν δὲ καλὸν ἔργον
 12 οὐτ' ἀνδρὸς οὔτε πόλεως χωρὶς ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως· ἀνδρῶν
 δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύ-
 35 ναμιν καὶ μορφήν, ὧν μετασχὼν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σόφρων.||
 18 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔστω πεφρομισμένα τῷ
 λόγῳ (οὔτε γὰρ μὴ) θυγάνειν αὐτῶν δυνάτον, οὔτε πάντας τοὺς
 οἰκέλους ἐπέξελεβεῖν ἐνδέχεται λόγους, ἐτέρας γὰρ ἔστιν ἔργον σχο-

31 γὰρ Bernays, δὲ Γ II A1. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen p. 45 [47] f.) || 32 τὴν Spengel, τῶς Γ II A1. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || πράττουσαν M*, πράττουσιν with all other authorities A1. Bk.¹ Sussem.¹ in the text (defended by Vahlen loc. cit.) || 33 [καὶ φρονήσεως] Schneider || 34 Κριταὶς and Bk.² insert καὶ σωφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and 1 36 ἀνδρῶς καὶ before δίκαιος: but see Vahlen p. 48 (50) ff.

not have allowed himself this licence except in a dialogue. Had he looked upon it as a mere play upon words, he certainly would not have admitted it into a dialogue either; most certainly he would not have transcribed it from a dialogue into the present work. As a matter of fact not only has Plato committed the same mistake in all scientific seriousness, *Geog.* 507 c [*Rep.* 353 b], but it is also to be found in c. 3, §§ 1, 8 (cp. *inn.* 732, 744) and III. 9 § 14 (cp. *n.* 560 b), and similarly in *Nic. Eth.* I 8 § 4, 1098 b 20 ff., though Bernays vainly attempts to disprove the last case (Vahlen). But Spengel is right in thinking it strange that the question disposed of in § 11 is in c. 2 §§ 1, 2 spoken of as still requiring to be settled and is accordingly there settled. This difficulty disappears so soon as we set the two paragraphs side by side as distinct versions of the same subject, and with it another difficulty raised by Hildenbrand p. 368 ff., on which Spengel *Ulat. Stud.* II. p. 73 (565) ff. has laid far more stress than it deserves. Hildenbrand's view is that in III. 18 the question, whether the virtue or the happiness of the individual and of the state is identical or not, is brought forward as having already been settled by III. cc. 2, 6 (cp. *inn.* 471, 681), whereas in IV(VII). I § 11, 2 § 1, the question is first submitted to investigation, and that therefore III. c. 18 is a draft from Aristotle's pen which he afterwards discarded. The error in this conclusion lurks (as Becker observes) in the words

'virtue or happiness'; for the latter term as used by Aristotle is not coincident with the former, but requires in addition a certain measure of external goods. The proof that the *virtue* of the state is identical with that of the individual does not therefore by itself in any way demonstrate the identity of their happiness [or wellbeing]. In any case, if we take the one version, that contained in c. I. § 11, there is no escape from the difficulty that the previous inquiry as to the identity of the *virtue* of both is also ignored. But if we replace it by the second version, c. 2 §§ 1, 2, there would be nothing to prevent Aristotle expressing himself as he does, even with the distinct presupposition of the earlier inquiry (cf. III. 5, 6) and the reference to it in III. c. 18 § 2. As to the identity of the 'virtue or excellence' manifested by the state and by the individual cp. also c. I. 3 §§ 9, 10 and VII(V). 9 § 12 with *n.* (1642). SUSSEM. (708)

§ 12 33. (Observe that this is the postulate of Plato in the *Republic*, made implicitly II. 3681 and associated expressly IV. 435 b, 1120 ff. On *ἡμεῖς* καὶ *πολις*, terms cognate to *εὐδαιμονία*, *λόγος*, *φύσις*, cp. Bonitz *Ind. I.* 206 b 12, and *n.* on I. 1. 6, 1254 a 14. Apparently the antecedent of *ἡμεῖς*, if expressed, would be *τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ φρονήσει*: see on 1323 b 15.

§ 13 39 *ἐτέρας σχολῆς* For this forms the task of another study, a lecture of another kind. Here only in this sense,

40 λῆς ταῦτα· νῦν δὲ ὑποκίςθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἀριστος, καὶ (I)
χωρὶς ἐκάστου καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς κεχο- (1. 96)
1324 a ρηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μετέχειν τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν πρά-
§ 14 ξων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντας, ἐίσαντας ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν
μεθόδου, διασκεπτέον ὕστερον, εἴ τις τοῖς εἰρημίνουσιν τυγχί-
2 νει μὴ πειθόμενος· || πότερον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν II
5 αὐτὴν εἶναι φατέον ἐνός τε ἐκάστου τῶν ἀνθρώπων
καὶ πόλεως ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν, λοιπὸν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. φα-
νερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πάντες γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειαν εἶ-
§ 2 ναι τὴν αὐτὴν. ὅσοι γὰρ ἐν πλούτῳ τὸ ζῆν εὖ τίθεν-
ται ἐφ' ἐνός, οὗτοι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὅλην, ἐὰν ἡ πλουσία,
10 μακαρίζουσιν· ὅσοι τε τὸν τυραννικὸν βίον μάλιστα τι-
μῶσιν, οὗτοι καὶ πόλιν τὴν πλείστων ἀρχουσιν εὐδαιμονεστά-
την εἶναι φατέον ἂν· εἰ τέ τις τὸν ἕνα δι' ἀρετὴν ἀποδέχεται,
§ 3 καὶ πόλιν εὐδαιμονεστέραν φήσει τὴν σπουδαιότεραν. || [ἀλλὰ §

40 καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστου omitted by P⁴ V^b Ald and the first hand of P³ S^b (added in the margin of S^b by the same hand, in the margin of P³ by a later hand and again expunged) || 41 ἐκάστου P² Ai. (?) Bk. and apparently a later hand in the margin of P³ || λεχορηγημένης P¹⁻⁶ L¹ Ald.

1324 a 4 πότερον... 13 σπουδαιότεραν a duplicate of 1323 b 29—36. See p. 86
10 μακαρίζουσιν οἱ μακαριοῦσιν Ar. Spengel || 12 ἀν before εἶναι II² Bk. and I² (in the margin, omitted by the 1st hand) || 13 [ἀλλὰ. 1325 b 34 πρότερον] Susem.²⁻³

Lat. disciplina, course of study or instruction; in all other passages of Aristotle σχολή=leisure. What is meant is of course ethical science or instruction, which is itself, according to Aristotle, only a portion of politics in the wider sense, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐπλεται, πολιτικῇ τις οὖσα, Nic. Eth. i. 2 § 9, 1094 b 11; see *Introđ.* pp. 67, 70 f. As there was a work of Theophrastus called *ἠθικαὶ σχολαί* (Diog. Laert. v. 47) Kohn *op. c.* p. 37 ff. finds in this an indication that we have here a passage from his lectures, and not from Aristotle's. But his view requires some stronger proof. SUSEM. (709) "That σχολή was the recognized term for lecture in the time of Plato is shown by the sarcasm of Diogenes the Cynic τῶν μὲν Βέλκλειδου σχολῇ εἰλεγε σχολῇ, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατα- τριβήν, Diog. Laert. vi. 42: cf. also Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* i. §§ 7, 8, ut iam etiam scholas Graecorum more habere audivimus..., itaque diebus quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libris contini" (Kiddgway). But the witicism attributed to Diogenes need very careful listening be-

fore they can pass as historical (Susemihl).

41 ὁ μετ' ἀρετῆς. 1324 a 1 πράξ- εων] Here also, as well as in § 10, what is said in π. (704) is applicable. Cf. also π. (736). SUSEM. (710)

1324 a 3 διασκεπτέον ὕστερον] Spengel rightly observes, *Ueber die Pol* p. 46, that this is not the way in which Aristotle usually speaks. But the mode of expression is very like that of a lecturer who invites his hearers to mention, and discuss, with him afterwards, any difficulties they may still have. Cf. *Excursus* i. SUSEM. (712)

c. 2 § 2 9 ἐφ' ἐνός] Cf. Plato *Theaet.* 157 A ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῦσαι.

c. 2 § 3—c. 4 § 1 (τελευτῶνται πρότερον).

A subsidiary question: is the virtuous life, which is most desirable, a life of active participation in civic duties, or a life of study and philosophical retirement? A life of war and external conquest, or of peaceful rule over freedom and of internal activity?

§ 3 13 ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη δέδο] The close

ταύτ' ἤδη δύο ἐστὶν ἢ δεῦται σκέψεως, ἐν μὲν πότερος αἶρε- (II)
 15 πότερος βίος, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πό-
 λεως ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπο-
 λευμένος, ἔτι δὲ τίνα πολιτεῖαν θετέον καὶ πόλιν δι᾿ ἡμῶν
 20 πύλεως ἀρίστην, εἴτε πᾶσιν ὄντος αἵρετοῦ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως
 25 εἴτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς
 30 διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἄλλ' οὐ τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον
 αἵρετόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην νῦν προσηρήμεθα τὴν σκέψιν, ἐκεῖνον
 μὲν [[γὰρ]] πάρεργον ἂν εἴη τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.
 35 ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πολιτεῖαν ἀρίστην ταύτην 3

See Comm. III 712—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—9 || 14 πότερον

ΓΜ* (?) Γ^o S^b A1. (M* has πὸ) || 18 αἵρετοῦ <τοῦ> Κοινῆς || 19 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπεὶ διὰ
 Μ*, τὸ δὲ περισσόν 14 a gloss of π² in the margin, γὰρ Srenge1, quite wrongly ||
 21 ὅν αἵρετοῦ προσηρήμεθα Π² Γ^o Ilk. || 22 γὰρ omitted by Γ¹ P^{4b} L² Ilk., rightly

sequence of cc. 2, 3 upon c. 1 leaves us only two alternatives: either cc. 2, 3 have exactly the same origin as c. 1, although in no way distinguished by the same excellences of style, or else the editor who inserted c. 1 has further added to it from his own materials cc. 2, 3, except of course c. 2 §§ 1, 2 (see n. 708). Even setting aside the difference of style, the second alternative is forced upon us by the numerous difficulties, some slight, others very considerable, which present themselves in this section, see III (713—717, 725, 729, 736, 738, 741, 743, 745, 747—749), with which the few points in c. 1 and c. 2 §§ 1, 2 that might cause doubt as to the genuineness of that portion (see III. 690, 709, 711) should be more closely compared. Read Ed. Muller's exhaustive examination in his *History of the theory of art among the ancients* II. pp. 366—373, Breslau, 1837, a work universally neglected, which ought to have led subsequent inquirers to a renewed consideration of these chapters. What a deal of pains he takes to remove the difficulties in them, and all in vain. Although my view differs considerably from his, in many respects it is most intimately connected with his exposition. This is not the place to enter into a more detailed examination of his argument, but see n. (743). Only one difficulty is common to the two portions c. 1 (with c. 2 §§ 1, 2) and c. 2 §§ 3, 4 § 1: viz. that later on in c. 3 §§ 3, 4 the inquiry of c. 1, and so too a little further on in c. 13 § 8 ff. the inquiry pursued in c. 2,

3, though in a slightly altered form, is commenced over again, in each case without the slightest sign that they have been already adequately discussed, whereas the interpolator does not fail to refer by anticipation to this later section, c. 3 § 1 (cp. n. 731). STRICK. (712)

14 ἐν μὲν—22 μεθόδου ταύτης] The transition to the best constitution took place as far back as III. c. 18, and in IV (VII). 1 it was stated that we must first examine the best life; now after having concluded this examination and after having stated that the result holds good for the state as well as for the individual, it seems very awkward to say that there are two questions remaining to be investigated, (1) whether the best life for the individual is one of scientific leisure or of political activity, and (2) which is the best constitution. The first question is violently thrust in, and, as it stands, cannot properly be allowed to take even a secondary rank as a question of politics, which the author at once declares is all that he himself claims for it; it has nothing whatever to do with the science of politics, as Scholzer long since observed. It would be a different thing if it were preceded by, and then taken up and treated as co-ordinate to, the inquiry whether the end of the state is peaceful activity or war, which in § 5 is treated as a co-ordinate question. SCHW. (713)

§ 5 23 ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . φανερόν ἐστιν] It is plain then that the [absolutely] best polity is that system under which any one of the citizens whatever would see

καθ' ἣν τάξιν κἀν ὁστισοῦν ἄριστα πράττοι καὶ ζῇ μα- (Π
 25 καρίως, φανερόν ἐστί· ἀμφισβητῆται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν
 ὁμολογούντων τὸν μετ' ἀριτῆς εἶναι βίον αἰρετώτατον, πότε-
 ρον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἰρετὸς ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ
 πᾶντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποκλεισμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις, ὃν
 30 μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. σχιδδὸν γὰρ τούτους τοὺς
 δύο βίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ φιλοτιμώτατοι πρὸς αἰρετὴν φαί-
 νονται προαιρούμενοι, καὶ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τῶν νῦν· λίγα
 δὲ δύο τὸν τε πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον. διαφέρει δὲ οὐ⁴
 μικρὸν ποτέρως ἔχει τὸ ἀληθές· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν γε εὖ⁵
 31 φρονούντα πρὸς τὸν βελτίω σκοπὸν συντάττεσθαι καὶ τῶν
 32 ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ
 μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μετ'
 ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον

24 ἢ *Ar.* apparently, [τάξιν] Spengel. The former probably right; yet see Vahlen p. 35 (37) || 25 *M*¹, 1¹ P¹ (1st hand, emended by cor. 1) || 28 *τις* <ὢν> ? *Koines*, [τις] would be a more obvious change, yet doubtless none is needed || 29 *φιλόσοφοι* [*αἱ αἰρετόν*] Jackson || 30 *τούτους αἵτιι τοὺς δύο M*¹ P¹ || *φιλοτιμώτατοι M*¹ 1¹ 5 *Alcl.* || 31 *πρότερον Koines* (needlessly) and P³ (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || 33 *γε Spengel*, *τε M*¹ P¹ P² Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, omitted by P³, perhaps rightly, [τε] Congreve || 35 *ἑαστον P*³ 4 *Al.* Bk. Spengel, *γρ. ἑαστον P*¹ (cor. in the margin), perhaps rightly || *τῇ πολιτῇ M*¹, *τὴν πολιτείαν* (πολιτεῖαν 1st hand of P³) P² *Ar.* Bk. (*γρ. τὴν πολιτείαν* corr. in the margin of P⁴), perhaps rightly; *τὴν πόλιν* Spengel, needlessly || 37 *τινὸς* omitted by P¹

best and live in the enjoyment of happiness' Cp. c. i § 1 and n. (685). *SUSEM.* (714)

29 *τινὲς* 'Some' only? We should expect 'all.' But this may be explained as due to Aristotle's minimizing style of expression. Cp. n. (401). *SUSEM.* (715)

§ 8 *σχιδδὸν γὰρ* . 32 *φιλόσοφον* The two sections §§ 5, 6 are unusually diffuse. *SUSEM.* (718)

No account is here taken of the view that honour is the aim of the political life, *N.E.* I. v. 4, 1095 b 23. Whereas in *N.E.* x. 7. 7, 1177 b 19 ff. *αἱ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις ἀρεταὶ αἰετῶς ἀκριβοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνονται* from ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια (θεωρητικῇ), here the object seems to be to represent the political and contemplative life as akin, though the latter is in both discussions regarded as *ἀποτελεῖς* (Newman).

34 *καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ τῇ πολιτείᾳ* But granting that the speculative (i.e. *κατανοητικὴ*) life is the better end for the individual, the state is in no

way concerned in this, beyond rendering such a life possible to the few fitted for it, provided that the rest consent to take active part in the administration; for otherwise the state would itself come to an end. The author is in error (cp. n. 736*) in supposing that the question, whether scientific or political activity ranks highest for the individual, corresponds exactly to the question which makes with regard to the state, whether it should pursue a policy of peace or of war. Cp. *nn.* (743, 745). *SUSEM.* (717)

§ 7 35 *οὐ μὲν* The advocates of a peace policy think that while despotic rule over others is never without a certain injustice of the deepest dye, even rule as exercised under a free government, though devoid of injustice, yet tends to disturb our own easy tranquillity. The conjunction of τὸ ἄρχειν and γινόμενον - ἡ ἀρχὴ γινόμενη is harsh, but can be justified. On *δεσποτικῶς* (roughly as 'slaves') see 1277 a 33 n.

οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ· τούτων (II)
 δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας ἕτεροι τυγχάνουσι δοξάζοντες. μόνον
 40 γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν· ἐφ'
 ἑκάστης γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐκ εἶναι πράξεις μᾶλλον τοῖς ἰδιώταις
 § 8 ἢ τοῖς τὰ κοινὰ πράττουσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις. * * οὐ μὲν οὖν
 42 οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν
 τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονα φασίν. παρ'
 4 ἐνίοις δ' οὗτος καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρος, ὅπως δε-
 § 9 σπόζωσι τῶν πέλας. διὰ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χύδην
 ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως εἴ ποῦ τι πρὸς
 ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες, ὥσπερ
 ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντάκται
 10 σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλήθος· ἔτι δ' ἐν
 10 τοῖς ἔθνεσι πᾶσι τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ τοιαύτη τε-
 τμήναι δυνάμεις, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις καὶ Πέρσαις καὶ Θραξί
 καὶ Κελτοῖς· ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνον-
 14 τες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθότι ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ
 14 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον λαμβάνειν ὅσας ἂν στρατεύσων-
 11 ται στρατείας· ἣν δὲ ποτε καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν νόμος τὸν

§ 8 αὐτὸν Γ, perhaps rightly, αὐτῶν Vettori², αὐτοὺς Schneider.

1324 b 1 * * of Sussem. and Bockei, <ἀμολὺς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πόλεις ἀμφισβητεῖται.
 οὐ μὲν γὰρ * * > οἱ οἱ something similar? Sussem. || 4 δ'...ὅρος] δ' οὗτος καὶ τῆς
 πολιτείας ὅρος τῶν νόμων P¹, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας οὗτος τῶν νόμων P¹⁴⁻⁹, δὲ καὶ τῆς πολι-
 τείας οὗτος ὅρος (καὶ added by Congreve) τῶν νόμων all other codices and editions ex-
 cept Sussem. || 8 πολιτικούς II¹ || 14 τῶν] τασούτων? Koraeus, but see Vahlen
 p. 34 (36) on 1323 b 15

41 οὐ μᾶλλον] not so much.

§ 8 Secuta est uberius expressio senten-
 tiae eorum qui vitam optimam esse con-
 tendunt civitatis quae καὶ αὐτὰς ἰδρυ-
 μέναι sint, cf. 1325 b 23-27. SUSSEM.

1324 b 1 πολιτευομένοις * *] To
 complete the connexion we require words
 to the following effect: "and there is
 the same difference of opinion with re-
 gard to states. For some think that
 those states lead the best and happiest
 existence which devote themselves purely
 to domestic politics, and have nothing
 to do with any policy of war. For, they
 say, etc." "This then is one view, but
 others (of δὲ) etc." SUSSEM. (718)

§ 9 7 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι -πλή-
 θος] Cp. II. 9 § 34, IV(VII). 14 § 15 ff.,
 V(VIII). 4 §§ 1-6, with III. (344, 910,
 1005). SUSSEM. (719)

§ 10 9 ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι] cp. I. 2 § 6,
 and II. (19 b). SUSSEM. (720)

11 καὶ Πέρσαις] cp. IId. VII. 2, IX.
 122 (Batou). SUSSEM. (721)

12 καὶ Κελτοῖς] cp. II. 9 § 7, and II.
 (287) p. 334 f. and below c. 17 § 3 and
 II. (953). SUSSEM. (722)

14 τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμον] I have
 this throw any light on the real signifi-
 cance of Hannibal's sending by Mago the
 rings of the Roman equites, as told by
 Livy XXIII. 12? (Kidgway).

§ 11 15 καὶ περὶ Μακεδονίαν] Here
 we see the Macedonians expressly reckoned
 among barbarian peoples. And even
 if this is pronounced the interpolation of
 a pupil, yet the more closely the earlier
 Peripatetics were attached to the Macedo-
 nian cause, the more probable it be-
 comes that the pupil is here introducing

μηδένα ἰππεκταγικάτα πολέμιον ἄνδρα περιεζώσθαι τὴν φορ- (II)
 βείαν· ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἐξῆν πίνειν ἐν ἑορτῇ τινι σκύφον
 περιφερόμενον τῷ μηδένα ἰππεκταγικότι πολέμιον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
 "Ιβήρσιν, ἔθνει πολεμικῷ, τοσοῦτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀβελίσκους
 20 καταπηγύνουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν
 § 12 πολέμιον· καὶ ἕτερα δὴ παρ' ἐτέροις ἔστι τοιαῦτα πολλὰ,
 τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατεληγμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν.

καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν ἄγαν ἥτοπον ἴσως εἶναι τοῖς βουλομένοις γ
 ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, τὸ δύνασθαι γ
 15 θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἄρχῃ καὶ δεσπόζῃ τῶν πλησίον καὶ βουλομένων καὶ
 § 18 μὴ βουλομένων. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἴη τοῦτο πολιτικὸν ἢ νομοθετικόν,
 ὃ γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἐστίν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίως,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκως ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἔστι καὶ μὴ δικαίως.

16 ἀπεκταγικάτα P^{1.2}, ἀπεκτανοτά P³ (1st hand, corrected in the margin by a later hand, but the correction was afterwards expunged), ἀπεκταλόντα P^{1.2} Ald., ἐπικταλόντα M² || 17 σκύφον περιφερόμενον? Schneidei || 18 ἀπεκτακότι M² P^{1.2.3}, ἀπεκτακότι P⁴ (1st hand, corrected by a later hand), ἀπεκτατότι P⁵ || 19 ἀριθμὸν αἰετῶν οἱ ἀριθμοῦντας, apparently, Γ (misreading William) || οὐ βελίσκους M² || 21 δὲ? Κορνακωσίνης || 21 δύνασθαι introduced by Lindau to follow 20 ἄρχειν, wrongly || 27 μόνον αἰετῶν δικαίως P³ Sussem.^{1.2} and apparently Γ

unaltered his master's view. SUSSEM.

(723) Cp *Introduct.* p. 46 n. (3)

17 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις] Comp. Herod. iv. 66. SUSSEM. (724)

18 ἐν δὲ τοῖς "Ιβήρσιν] The only mention of the Iberians, οἱ Σπανιοὶ, in the genuine works of Aristotle. They are mentioned in the spurious *De Mithridatibus* 46, 85, 87, 88, 833 b 15, 837 a 8, 24 ff. SUSSEM. (725)

19 ὀβελίσκους] What this word means, is not so easy to decide. The usual translation 'obelisks' or 'stone pillars' is quite reconcilable with the practice of savage tribes. Thus "in New Caledonia some of the houses are found commemorating the number of enemies killed and eaten in former wars." Mr Ridgeway writing to the *Academy* of Aug. 29, 1885, suggests that this Iberian practice accounts for the stone pillars actually placed around tombs in Western Europe. On the other hand Dr Jackson communicates the following note.

"ὀβελίσκος means, not 'obelisks' as the commentators suppose, but literally 'skulls'. Originally the skulls carried the heads of the slain; when the custom of affixing the heads fell into disuse, the

skulls, which should have borne the actual trophies, continued to be planted ὅσους ἐν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολέμιον, i.e. the trophy was converted into a badge. On trophy-taking, and its connexion with 'infidelity', of which Aristotle is quite aware, see Spence's *Ceremonial Institutions* ch. ii, p. 48 with p. 186."

§ 12 22 κατεληγμένα] established, confirmed, usual. Cp *Rhet.* ii. 2 § 20 compares Thuc. v. 21 σπονδὰς κυρὰν κατεληγμένας; Plato *Leges* vii. 813 A τὰ ταῦτ' ἐφημὶς ὑπὸ νόμον κατεληγμένα; *Nis. Jeth* x. 9 § 5 τὰ ἐκ παλαιῶν τοῖς ἥθισι κατεληγμένα λόγῳ μετασθένται; also the active use in Thuc. viii. 63 § 3 τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἐπὶ βεβαίωτον κατελήθηον.

25 τῶν πλησίον] Int. § 8, a 5 τῶν πλίστων.

§ 18 Example compares with this the discussion upon slavery i. 6 §§ 1-5: one phrase of which, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῖς δικαίῳ μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀφαιρήσασθαι, is certainly echoed by the phrase 27 f. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὅτι πάντως, whether justly or unjustly, is not lawful, and a victory may be won even by unjust means."

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμασι τοῦτο ὀρώμεν· οὔτε ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε τοῦ κυβερνήτου ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ [[ῆ]] πείσαι ἢ τὸ βιάσασθαι τοῦ μὲν τοὺς θεραπευομένους τοῦ δὲ τοὺς πλωτῆ-
οας. ἀλλ' εἰκόασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἶεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἔκαστοι οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἡσχοῦντες· αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ οὐ δεσποστὸν, ὥστε εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπόζειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστών, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυ-
τίαν ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν· ἔστι δὲ θηρευ-
τὸν ὃ ἂν ἄγριον ᾖ ἐδεστὸν ζῶον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴη γ' ἂν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μία πόλις εὐδαίμων, ἢ πολιτεύεται δηλονότι καλῶς, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται πόλιν οἰκεῖσθαι που καθ' ἑαυτὴν νό-

29 ἀλλὰ ὀρώμεν omitted by Π¹ (simplified in the margin of P¹) || 30 ἢ before πείσαι inserted by Π² P³ Bk || 31 τὸ omitted by Π² P³ Bk. || ἰάσασθαι Π¹ (but ἰάσασθαι a correction in P¹) || 33 ὅπερ <παρ' > αὐτὸ παρ' ? Sengenel, περιχαρῶς ighly || 36 μὴ φύσει κτλ can hardly be right: [μὴ] Thurot, περιχαρῶς ighly. ichneider suspected a lacuna. if so, it may conceivably be filled up thus: μὴ - φύσει ἐνθόμους, καὶ > φύσει || 37 δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν Στάλη, δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν (Σιρ-
ίους, δεσποστὸν—δεσποστὸν Γ' II A1. Bk. Suscm.¹ in the text || 39 δεσποστὸν a latei and in P² and Iamblich, δεσποστὸν Γ' M¹ P¹⁻² 2 34 V¹ Ald. and P² (1st hand), δεσπο-
στὸν P¹⁻⁴ L² || 40 ἐστὶ δὲ <πρὸς τοῦτο> θηρευτὸν Oncken ighly, though περιχαρῶς need only be understood

29 The appeal to the other 'arts and sciences' is strictly on Socratic and Platonic lines, and Dr Jackson points out that the mention of persuasion is γ no means superfluous. See Xen. Lem. III. 9 § 11, Pl. Rep. 488 D δε ν ἐλλαμβάνειν διωδὲς ᾗ, ὅπως ἀρξου-
ν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιάμενοι τὸν ναύ-
ληρον, Πολιτικῇ 206 B ἂν τις ἄρα μὴ εἴδων τὸν λατρεύμενον, ἔχων δὲ ὀρθῶς ὅν τέχνην, παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα βέλτιον ἀναγκάζῃ δρᾶν τινα, τί τοιοῦτα τῆς πλάσται ταύτης; Yet the repeated collision of vowels, 30 ἱατροῦ οὐτε, κυβερνήτου γον, πείσαι ἢ, 32 οἰεσθαι εἶναι, 33 ἔκασ-
τοι, is in striking contrast to the book as a whole, and in two cases is not remon-
able by transposition.

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ οὔτε κτλ] C¹ompr. lat. Gorg. 456 B (Xatton); also c. 13 2 n. (870), and above III. 6 § 7 n. (531). § 4 n. (638), 16 §§ 6 8: II. 8 § 18 n. 70). Suscm. (728)

§ 14 35 αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς] at home, in their own political affairs.

§ 15 37 φύσει τὸ μὲν δεσποστὸν] See II. I. c. 4 § 6, c. 5, 6. Suscm. (727)

39 θηρεύειν ἐπὶ θοίνην ἢ θυτίαν] Plu-
tarch. Alcand. 72 ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξήλθε, καὶ τὸ Κορ-
σαίων εἶδος κατεστρέφατο, πάντας ἡγήδων ἀποσφάττων. τοῦτο δὲ Π¹φαιστίωνος ἐνα-
γισμός ἐλαλέετο. This was n.c. 324 3 quite at the close of Alexander's career.

40 τὸ πρὸς τοῦτο θηρευτὸν] Implying that wild animals which are not fit for food may be hunted for other purposes, and to supply other necessities of life. It is not quite clear whether the writer thinks that for such other purposes it is also under certain circumstances permissible to hunt men, and whether therefore he would allow of war for the capture of slaves, which Aristotle shallows (I. 8 § 12 n. 65, 75) as a branch of θηροποιία. St. 4 M. (728)

μοις χρωμένῃν σπουδαίους, ἥς τῆς πολιτείας ἡ σύνταξις οὐ (Π)
πρὸς πόλεμον οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν ἔσται τῶν πολιμῶν·
5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων.

- § 17 δῆλον ἴρα ὅτι πάσας τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείας καλῶς 10
μὲν θετέον, οὐχ ὥς τέλος δι' πάντων ἀκρότατον, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνου
χάριν ταύτας. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου ἐστὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι
9 πόλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἑλληνικὴν κοινωνίαν, ζωῆς ἀγα-
§ 18 θῆς πῶς μεθέξουσιν καὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίας. δι-
οίσει μὲντοι τῶν ταπτομένων ἕνια νομίμων· καὶ τοῦτο τῆς νομο-
θετικῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπάρχῃσι γεινιῶντες, πόλιν πρὸς (D. 99)
ποίους ἰσκητέον ἢ πῶς τοῖς καθήκουσι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρῆσται.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν κἂν ὕστερον τύχοι τῆς προσηκούσης
15 σκέψεως, πρὸς τί τέλος δεῖ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν συντελεῖν·
3 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς εἶναι βίον III
ἀριεργάτατον, διαφερομένους δὲ περὶ τῆς χρήσεως αὐτοῦ, λε-
κτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς (οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμά-
ζουσιν τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου

1325 a 6 ἄρα αἰτεῖ δι: M^o P¹ a 3 G^o V^o || 8 τοῦ before σπουδαίου omitted by M^o P¹
|| 18 α...α3 γὰρ τὸν This whole parenthesis is transposed in P¹ a to follow 24 ὁρθῶς,
by means of the letters αβγ written above the line || 19 [rc] Spengel

§ 16 1325 a 3 ἥς τῆς πολιτείας We may well believe that such conceptions, though foreign to Pericles, and new even to Isocrates, had become familiar enough in the Athens of Phocion, especially amongst those who lived to compare the brilliant peace administration of Demetrios of Phaleron with the disastrous results of the active policy which had led to Chaeroneia and Ciannon. Comp. *Beinays Phocion* pp. 31 ff., 55 ff. and Newman 1 p. 311.

5 μηδὲν γὰρ ὑπαρχέτω τοιούτων But this is only true with the proviso that such a state is not attacked by offensive wars, for which it must by its constitution be prepared, as indeed the writer himself explains, § 18. *SUSEM.* (729)

§ 17 6 δῆλον ἴρα .10 εὐδαιμονίας] Precisely the same statement as in these two sentences is made by Plato *Latini* 1. 628 D: ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ πρὸς πόλιν εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ καὶ ἰδιώτῃ διαρροῦμενοι οὕτω τις οὐδ' ἂν ποτε πολιτείας γένετο ὁρθῶς, πρὸς τὰ ἐξωθεν πολέμια ἀποβλέπων μόνον καὶ πρῶτον, οὐδ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς, εἰ μὴ χάρειν εἰρήνης τὰ τοῖς μὲν νομοθετοῦ μέλλον ἢ τῶν πολέμων ἕνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Baldm.). *SUSEM.* (730)

§ 18 12 ἐάν τις γεινιῶντες So already II. 6 §§ 7, 8. The state must have a foreign policy, if it be only a policy of non-intervention and self-defence.

14 κἂν ὕστερον] c. 14 §§ 7—11. See *μ.* (712)—this reference may of course be interpolated—and (966). *SUSEM.* (731)

c. 3 The best life for the individual is practical activity in the service of a free city. Yet intellectual activity is also practical and is a higher life still.

§ 1 17 περὶ τῆς χρήσεως] How it is to be enjoyed.

λεκτέον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους] Comp. II. (696) on c. 1 § 6. *SUSEM.* (732)

19 'τε intention et vocabulaire additur, quod utique membrum continere est: φάσκει τε γὰρ - ἀρχικὴν πατὴρ ἰδὼν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων (i.e. φάσκει γὰρ ἀρχικὴν πατὴρ τὴν υἱὸν καὶ .) *N. E.* VIII. 13 [c. xi. § 2], 1161 a 18' *Sumit. Ind.* 11. 749 b 44 ff. τοῦ ἐλευθέρου] τὸ ἀποκλειστικόν, untranslatable by office and by civic obligations. Aristotle and Xenocrates were wise men, as Anaxagoras had been before them.

- ²⁰ βίον ἑτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἰρετώτατον, (III)
οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἄριστον· ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μηδὲν πρέττοντα
πράττειν εὖ, τὴν δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι
ταυτόν), ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀμφοτέροισι λέγουσιν ὁρθῶς τὰ δὲ οὐκ
²⁴ ὁρθῶς, οἱ μὲν ὅτι ὁ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίος τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ ὑπερβαίνει.
§ 2 τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές· οὐδὲν γὰρ τό γε δούλω, ἢ δοῦλος, χρῆσθαι
σεμνόν· ἢ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδενὸς με-
τέχει τῶν καλῶν. τὸ μέντοι νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δε-
σποτεῖαν οὐκ ὁρθόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔλαττον διέστηκεν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν δούλων ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ φύσει ἐλεύθερον τοῦ φύσει δού-
³⁰ λου. διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἰκανῶς ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.
§ 3 τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπαινεῖν τὸ ἀπρακτεῖν τοῦ πρέττειν οὐκ ἀλη-
θές· ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρῶξις ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν καὶ κα-

²² εἶναι before καὶ M^a P¹ || ²⁵ τὸ τῷ M^a P¹ ²¹, τῷ Ald. || ²⁷ δεσποτεῖαν P³
(1st hand, collected by a later hand), δεσποτικήν P¹ and perhaps P¹, so that this may
be right || ²⁹ αὐτὸ τὸ P³ (corr.¹), αὐτὸ τὸ Γ P¹ ¹⁻², αὐτὸ M^a Ald., αὐτὸ P² S^b V^b and P²
(1st hand)

²¹ ἀδύνατον γὰρ...²³ ταυτόν] Comp.
n. (704). SUSEM. (732)

§ 2 ²⁵ οὐδὲν γὰρ σεμνόν] Comp.
I. 7 § 5 n. (64) and below c. 14 § 19 n
(913). SUSEM. (734)

²⁶ ἐπίταξις] See note (124) on ἐπι-
τάξει χρῆσθαι I. 13 § 14.

²⁷ νομίζειν πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν δεσποτεῖαν]
See n. (58) Yet Plato was free from
this error when he classified the forms of
rule, *Λασις* III. 690 A ff. (On the other
hand he makes *πολιτικὴ βασιλική, Εὐ-
θυμῆ*, 292 C, a passage which should be
added to *Polit.* 258 E, as quoted in I.
1 § 2.

²⁹ ἢ αὐτὸ δούλου] How great that
difference may be, we learn from I. 5
§ 8 n. (47).

³⁰ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις] B. I. cc.
4—7. SUSEM. (735)

§ 3 ³¹ οὐκ ἀληθές] is not right, hand
verum est.

³² ἢ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρῶξις] This is
certainly a genuine Aristotelian doctrine.
See c. I §§ 10—13, nn. (704, 710); *Met.*
Eth. I. cc. 7—9; VI. 2 § 5, 1139 a 3, VI.
5 § 4, 1140 b 7, X. 6 § 2, 1176 a 33;
Phys. II. 6 § 1, 197 b 5; *Pol.* 6 § 12,
1450 a 17. *Rhet.* I. 5 § 3, 1360 b 14;
comp. Zeller II, p. 612. But still it is so
provided only that under πρῶξις is included
not merely practical, but also theoretical
or mental activity, and that consequently
the term is understood in the wider sense:
for otherwise this doctrine would not be

true of the highest felicity of pure thought,
as it remains to God alone (n. 705), to
which however the author himself appeals
§ 10, n. (746). And of human well-being,
too, scientific perfection in active opera-
tion is the higher element, moral perfec-
tion only the lower element, according to
the genuine Aristotelian doctrine. "It
must be granted, that then it would be hard
to say how the happiness of the individ-
ual and of the whole state can be one and
the same" (Schlosser). Here Schlosser en-
deavours to explain the mistake pointed
out in nn. (717, 745) by assuming that
"Aristotle subordinated the idea of in-
ternal activity to that of contemplation."
This thought is quite just; but does this
unhappy attempt to mend matters by such
a confusion look more like the master or
a pupil? Granted that this subordina-
tion is intended here (and from § 8 this
cannot be doubtful—see n. 743), still of
those who prefer the scientific life to the
practical life it cannot possibly be main-
tained with truth that they prefer in-
activity to activity, nor can Aristotle him-
self have written anything so inconsistent.
SUSEM. (736)

ἔτι δὲ πολλῶν κατὰ] "The actions
done by the just and temperate contain
a realization of many noble ends." This
is certainly in the spirit of Aristotle him-
self. Further comp. for σωφρόνων n.
(206 b), II. 6 § 9. SUSEM. (737)

λὼν τέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν δικαίων καὶ σωφρόνων πράξεις. (III)
 καίτοι τάχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὕτω διωρισμένων
 35 ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πίντων ἄριστον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν πλεί-
 40 σταν καὶ καλλίστων κύριος εἴη πράξεων. ὥστε οὐ δεῖν τὸν
 δυνάμενον ἄρχειν παρῆναι τῷ πλησίον, ἀλλὰ
 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, καὶ μῆτε πατέρα παιδὸν μῆτε παιδὰ πα-
 τρὸς μίθ' ὅλως φίλον φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογίζειν μηδὲ πρὸς
 40 τοῦτο φροντίζειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄριστον αἰρετώτατον, τὸ δ' εὖ πράτ-
 τειν ἄριστον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἀληθῶς ἴσως λέγουσιν, εἴπερ ὑπάρ-
 1345 β ξει τοῖς ἀποστεροῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετώ-
 5 5 ταν· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐχ οἷον τε ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ὑποτιθένται (ν. 100
 τοῦτο ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι καλὰς τὰς πράξεις ἐνδέχεται εἶναι
 τῷ μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἀνὴρ γυναικὶς ἢ πατὴρ
 5 τέκνῳ ἢ δεσπότης δούλῳ· ὥστε ὁ παραβαλὼν οὐδὲν ἂν τη-
 λοκοῦτον κατορθώσειεν ὕστερον ὅσον ἤδη παρεκβέβηκε τῆς
 ἀρετῆς. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τῷ
 5 6 <ἐν> μέρει, τοῦτο γὰρ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις

36 δὲν Sussem., δε? II Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text. || 39 ὑπολογίζειν Pas.², ὑπολογεῖν S^b Bk., ὑπολογεῖν M¹ V¹ 2-3 1-5 V^b Ald. Sussem.¹ in the text, ὑπόλογ<αν> εχ<αν> οἱ ὑπό-
 λογον ποιέσθαι Mainzig || Κοινὰ proposed either (1) to bracket μετὰ πρὸς τοῦτο
 φροντίζειν, οἱ to αἵται to (2) μηδὲν, οἱ (3) μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦτου φροντίζειν ||

1345 b 3 ψεῦδος untranslated by William, [ψεῦδος] Sussem.¹, ψευδὸς? Casaubon ||
 8 <ἐν> Thuiot

34 ταχ' ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις] 'Some one might imagine that, if these conclusions are laid down, universal sovereignty is the highest good.' This further inference is not at all easy to justify: it is fairly dragged in by force. SUSSEM (738)

§ 4 Development of this extreme view, that, as the practical life implies the possession of power, the more power the better.

37 παρῆναι = to surrender, cf. τὸ ἄρχειν, II. 14 § 13. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι = to deprive another (state or individual) of empire, Dem. VIII. *De Chalc.* § 42, p. 1007, ἔχωντ' ἀφαιρέσθαι.

38 πατέρα παιδὸν καὶ] Plutarch, *De metriis* c. 3, p. 890 B, complains that the Diatrichi sacrificed every natural tie to their lust for empire.

39 ὑπολογίζειν] This verb, if indeed it be right, is ἀπαξ εἰρημένος in Aristotle, though found in Plato and Demosthenes.

41 ὥσως] 'perhaps,' conforming to Aristotle's own dictum *Met.* II. 13 § 2, 1340 b 18 ἀμφωσθησάντες προστάσιν αἱ τὸ ἴσος καὶ τάχα. But in 1 2 it con-

veys a very positive opinion under a cautious formula.

§ 5 1345 b 3 τὰς πράξεις] The actions of one who has obtained power by violence (ἀποστερῶν καὶ βιαζόμενος).

4 ὅσον ἀνὴρ . 5 δούλῳ] These three species of domestic relations, and of household rule based upon them, are taken as the prototypes of all rule, except where it is government of equals by equals and so alternates with obedience. See I. 12 § 1 f. and *Nh.* *Eccl.* VIII. c. 11 (Eaton). SUSSEM. (739)

5 ὁ παραβαλὼν] An Athenian or a Napoleon.

6 κατορθώσειν] would perform a right action: rectum faciat. This use of the verb, as opposed to παραβαλεῖν, may be easily understood from *Nh.* *Eccl.* II. 5 § 12, 1106 b 26, ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπιαντίζει καὶ κατορθοῦναι, and in its turn led up to the Stoic use of κατορθώμα as a technical term.

§ 6 8 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον...παρὰ φύσιν] Cf. III. 16 §§ 2-4 M. (672), II. 2 § 6 M. (134 b). SUSSEM. (740)

καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν (III
 10 παρὰ φύσιν καλόν. διὸ καὶ ἄλλος τις ἢ κρείττων κατ'
 ἄρετῃν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, τούτῳ
 § 7 καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον. δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον
 ἄρετῃν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν, καθ' ἣν ἔσται πρα-
 κτικός. ἀλλ' εἰ ταῦτα λέγεται καλῶς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν §
 15 εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινῇ πάσης πόλεως ἂν εἴη καὶ καθ'
 § 8 ἕκαστον ἀριστος βίος ὁ πρακτικός. ἀλλὰ τὸν πρακτικὸν οὐκ
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρους, καθάπερ οἴονται τινες, οὐδὲ τὰς
 διανοίας εἶναι μόνας ταύτας πρακτικὰς τὰς τῶν ἀποβαι-
 νόντων χάριν γινομένης ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μάλ-
 20 λον τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν θεωρίας καὶ δια-

18 εἶναι αἰεὶ μόνας P¹, after ταύτας Γ || 20 αὐτῶν Veltou, αὐτῶν Γ II || διανοή-
 σεις... 21 μάλιστα] Should this be διανοήσεις? ἢ .πρᾶξις τίς. μάλιστα?

10 διὸ καὶ ἄλλος τις] To the genuine
 Aristotle this proposition holds provided
 only that the one great citizen is superior
 in virtue to all combined, not (as is here
 expressed) to each individual. see III. 13
 §§ 13—25, c. 17. SUBEM. (741)

§ 7 12 δεῖ δ' οὐ μόνον κτλ.] "He must
 have not only the virtue but the force to
 develop his activity fully" (without
 transgressing virtue). This is only pos-
 sible in the best state. see III. 13 §§ 24,
 25; also *u.* (677) and *Introd.* p. 44.
 SUBEM. (742)

14 ταῦτα] That while the life of
 freedom is preferable to that of rule over
 unwilling subjects, βίος δεσποτικός, § 1,
 yet the life of action is preferable to that
 of inaction § 3 (which however does not
 imply that conquest or mastery at uncon-
 ditionally is unconditionally desirable §§ 4
 —6).

16 ὁ πρακτικός] So far as the indi-
 vidual is concerned, comp. *Nic. Eth.* x.
 § 8, 1178 b 32, εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία
 τις, 7 § 9, 1178 a 7, οὗτος ἄρα (c. ὁ κατὰ
 τὸν νοῦν βίος) καὶ εὐδαιμονότατος· δευτέρως
 δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἄρετῃν. But the
 qualifications introduced in § 8 seriously
 impair the comparison.

§ 8 "But the practical life need not
 mean a life in relation to others, as some
 suppose, nor those intellectual acts alone
 be practical which are done for the sake
 of certain external results of the action;
 on the contrary the self-contained specu-
 lations and processes of the intellect are
 far more truly practical." By times we
 should naturally understand Plato; but
 the cap better fits Aristotle himself, *Nic.*

Eth. x. 7 § 4, 1177 a 30, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος
 δέεται πρὸς οὐδὲ διαποταγῆσαι καὶ μεθ' ὧν,
 § 7, αὐταί, c. αἱ πολιτικαὶ πράξεις, ἐσχολοὶ
 καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίεσται καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς
 αἰρεταί εἰσιν. Eudemian comp. *u.* κεφ. IV
 443 D where justice is expounded to be
 harmonious activity of all the parts of
 man, and therefore internal, περὶ τὴν ἑντὸς
 ὧς ἀληθὺς περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ
 [πρᾶξιν]

20 τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς.. διανοήσεις] This
 can only mean theoretical or purely sci-
 entific thinking; Ed. Muller's uncertainty
 on this point is the chief defect in his
 whole exposition, which hinders him from
 arriving at any really tenable result and
 is the cause of many errors. Cp. *Nic. Eth.*
 x. 7 § 5, 1177 b 1 οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, c. τῆς θεω-
 ρητικῆς, γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρησάι, ἀπὸ δὲ
 τῶν πρακτικῶν ἡ πλεονεξία ἢ ἐλαττον περιποι-
 ούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Upon Aristotle's
 view two things must be distinguished in
 every activity, the end and the means;
 theoretical activity differs from practical
 and creative activity (see *u.* 34) in this
 respect, that in the former internal ac-
 tivity is a self-contained end, while in
 practical activity the end lies in the act
 produced by it, which affords some ex-
 ternal reason, and in the creative activity
 of art the end is the work or result pro-
 duced. 'See *De Caelo* II, 12 § 9, 293 b 6,
 ἡ πρᾶξις ἐστὶν διὰ τὸ διδόναι, θάνατον καὶ οὐ
 ἐντα ἢ, καὶ τὸ τοῦτον ἐρεῖα, *Nic. Eth.* vi.
 c. 2 —5, *De Anima* III. c. 9' (Eudem.);
 Zeller *op. c.* II. ii. p. 177 f. If all authors
 λέουσιν θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις αἰεὶ τὰς
 truly practical, the supporters of the
 view that the intellectual life is to be

νοήσεις. ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ὥστε καὶ πρᾶξις. τις· μάλιστα δὲ πρᾶττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν
 § 9 πρᾶξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοαῖς ἀρχιτέκτονας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπρακτεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς καθ' αὐτὰς πόλεις ἰδρυμένας καὶ
 25 ἤν οὕτω προρηγμένας· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κατὰ μέρη καὶ τοῦτο α συμβαίνειν· πολλὰ γὰρ κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς μέρσι
 § 10 τῆς πόλεως εἶσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' ἐνὸς ὁτοῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος, οἷς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξωτερικαὶ πρᾶξεις παρὰ
 30 τῆς οἰκείας τὰς αὐτῶν.

21 μάλιστα. 23 ἀρχιτέκτονας cited by Julian *op. ad Themist.* p. 263 D || 22 καὶ inserted after δὲ by I² I³ Bk. || τῶν] τὸ Julian || 23 τῆς διανοίας Julian

preferred to that of the statesman are unconditionally right, nor can we see how far the writer thinks he is mediating between them and their opponents. He would have done so in orthodox Aristotelian fashion only by adding that man must exercise not only his intellectual, but also his moral, powers: that he is an integral part of the whole formed by the state, and not a god, i. 2 §§ 11, 12. That consequently, although it is life in the state which alone renders possible an advanced scientific activity itself, yet it may well be permitted to individual men to be active for science primarily, and for the state only secondarily and in the fulfilment of the most general duties of a citizen. That at the same time there must be others who find their true satisfaction in the activity of the statesman and consequently adopt the opposite procedure: while a symmetrical combination of excellence in both will be the highest, and for that reason certainly the least common. See c. 14 §§ 7—11, π. (706), also *nn.* (717, 1024) and *Introd.* p. 48, p. 50 ff. *SUSEM.* (743)

21 ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος] Comp. c. 1. § 11 n. (708). *SUSEM.* (744)

§ 9 23 ἀλλὰ μὴν... 28 ἑταυρῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων] 'However even for states placed by themselves and determined upon an isolated life there is no necessity for inaction: activity is still possible to them in sections, for the various sections of the city have many ways of associating. And in the same way this is true of each individual man.' What was recalled to mind in n. (717) is true here also. The comparison is not suitable; for neither is the internal administration of the state a theoretical activity, but rather it is practical or partly

practical, partly creative (see *nn.* 34, 743); while in the case of the individual man every activity (except the theoretical) is always finally directed to others. Even on the doctrine of Plato (*Zeller Plato* p. 451 ff. Eng. tr.), no less than of Aristotle, the individual's moral virtue is primarily a mutual relation of the parts of his soul, the rational soul and that which has to be subjected to the guidance of reason (see *nn.* 11, 112). Yet its active exercise is for the most part possible only in intercourse with others. *SUSEM.* (745)

28 ὁ θεός] See n. (705) on c. 1 § 10, n. (736). *SUSEM.* (746)

29 πᾶς ὁ κόσμος] An activity and happiness of the universe cannot, strictly speaking, be in question on the orthodox doctrine of Aristotle, as he combats the Platonic assumption of a World-soul. The world as a whole is only passively affected, i.e. God causes it to revolve round the earth, which is at rest, in 24 hours; or precisely stated, this passive affection belongs to the rest of the universe, the earth alone being exempt. All other motions and activities, affections and changes, belong to the several beings inside the universe. See *Zeller* II. ii. pp. 374 ff. 450, 462 ff. And though comprehending all this in its harmonious arrangement we may call it, in a metaphorical sense, the activity of the universe, or even say that the world has its wellbeing in this harmoniously ordered activity, yet considered as an analogy to the internal administration of the state this is more halting than the last (n. 715). For it is intended to prove that the highest happiness of the individual man lies in purely internal or theoretical

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον (III)
 32 ἐκείσθω τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς ἰσθρῶ-
 4 ποις, φανερόν ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφροίμιασται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ IV
 αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμῖν τεθεωρήται πρό- (p. 10

32 [καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] Κοιὰς followed by Spengel Bk.² Susem.¹, but see Comm.
 " (739) || 33 [περὶ αὐτῶν] Schneider, περὶ τούτων ? Nicken, perhaps rightly ||
 34 [καὶ . πρότερον] Spengel Bk.² Susem.¹ See on 1324 a 13

activity: hence the whole analogy has no meaning unless the wellbeing of the universe (*ἔχειν καλῶς*) is exactly identical with its happiness (*εὐδαιμονεῖν*). Yet happiness can only be predicated of a single thinking self-conscious subject, so that if the collective personality of the state may be said to be happy, a world without a world-soul scarcely can. At least, this can hardly be without extraordinary misuse of the term, which I cannot bring myself to attribute to Aristotle. SUSEM. (747)

32 καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις] This somewhat objectionable phrase I once believed, as others have done, to be a later addition. Now however I simply set it down to the interpolator of the entire section, cc. 2, 3, as one more proof of interpolation. SUSEM. (748)

c. 4 § 1 34 καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας] By "other forms of government" were formerly understood all others except the perfect one, and the context which here gives the exact transition to the discussion of the latter, would scarcely permit of any other interpretation. Indeed if we assume that Aristotle himself wrote this as well as all the rest of the chapter, from ἀρχῇ τῶν λοιπῶν onwards, the "other forms of government" can scarcely be understood except as in direct antithesis to the "state to be constituted according to an ideal," τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὖχην συνστάνας πόλις (cp. Diehl's excellent remarks, p. 8 f., in opposition to Teichmüller). But then these words would prove that the traditional order of the books is the correct one. Yet the whole of §§ 1, 2 is merely a recapitulation of the contents of the first three chapters, and it is only as much that it has any meaning and connexion, as Spengel, *Über die Politik* p. 26 f., has incontrovertibly proved. The only sensible explanation is this: "After disposing of the necessary introductory questions regarding the best state, we must discuss this best state itself, and must treat first of its external and then

of its internal requirements." Thus the intermediate reference to other forms of government (whether the discussion of them has preceded or not) is out of place here and breaks the connexion. Therefore Spengel pronounced the words in question καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας... πρότερον to be an interpolation, and he was followed among others by Susemihl.* But when Hildenbrand p. 363 f. and Teichmüller (*Philologus* xvi. p. 164 ff.) pronounced "the other forms of government" to refer rather to the other model polities, or at least those which are claimed as such, which have been already criticised in the Second Book, as distinguished from the true Aristotelian model state, Spengel gave his adhesion to this view. Yet even if the reference back to these is less injurious to the proposal connexion, still it is an inadmissible interruption, and would have to be set aside as an interpolation by another hand, besides that for the reasons previously stated it is only the former explanation of them, as referring to all other states except the perfect state, which appears possible. But the case is entirely different, if cc. 2, 3 are the work of an interpolator, who must then also be the author of c. 4 § 1 as far as πρότερον. We need then only add this new piece of awkwardness to the rest of his sins, and we shall have after all to decide in favour of the latter interpretation, that the words do refer to B. II., since the interpolator has lacked his commission on to the first chapter, the first sentence of which is immediately connected with the end of Book III., so that, as we have already stated, *Introd.* p. 48, he either found or made a section, which contained the books in the right order. At any rate this is the simplest explanation; we should otherwise have to assume that these words had been afterwards interpolated into his interpolation by a third person, who must already have been acquainted with the order of the

35 *τερον,*] ἀρχῇ τῶν λοιπῶν εἰπεῖν πρῶτον ποίας τινὰς δεῖ τὰς ὑπο- (IV)
 θέσεις εἶναι περὶ τῆς μελλούσης κατ' εὐχὴν συνεστάναι πόλεως.
 § 2 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε πολιτεῖαν γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην ἄνευ συμ-
 μέτρου χορηγίας. διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ προϋποθετεῖσθαι καθάπερ
 39 εὐχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον. λέγω δὲ
 § 3 οἷον περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ
 136a τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, οἷον ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγῇ, δεῖ τὴν
 ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεῖαν οὕσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν (ὥσφ γὰρ ἂν
 αὕτη τυγχάνη παρσκευασμένη βέλτιον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ γενόμε-
 νον ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης εἶναι κάλλιον), οὕτω καὶ τῷ πολιτικῷ καὶ
 5 τῷ νομοθετῇ δεῖ τὴν οἰκεῖαν ὕλην ὑπάρχειν ἐπιτηδεύουσαν
 § 4 ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλήθος τῶν ἀν-
 θρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ πόρους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ
 τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, πόσῃν τε εἶναι καὶ ποῖαν τινὰ ταύτην.
 οἴονται μὲν οὖν οἱ πλείστοι προσήκειν μεγάλην εἶναι τὴν
 10 εὐδαίμονα πόλιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, ἀγνοοῦσι ποῖα μεγάλη καὶ

35 [τῶν λοιπῶν] Spengel. See Comm. n. (749). If these words take up the sentence 1323 b 37 ἄλλα γὰρ ταῦτα μὲν... 1324 a 4 *πειθόμενοι*, we should excise ἀρχῇ <δε> τῶν λοιπῶν || 36 *περὶ* omitted by M*, [περὶ] Susem.^{1,2}, perhaps rightly || 37 *γενέσθαι* Susem.^{1,2}, *fore* William, *γίνεσθαι*? Susem || 38 *προϋποθετεῖσθαι* Sylburg Susem.^{1,2}, *πραεμεύεσθαι* William, probably right, unless we should write 39 εὐχομένους, as Sylburg suggested

1326 a 3 αὐτῇ Π² P² Bk. || 4 κάλλιον M* || 7 [κατὰ] Spengel, <τὰ> κατὰ? Schmidt correctly, if any change is needed || 8 πόσῃν Sylburg, ὅσῃν II Bk.¹ Susem.² in the text

books, in which they have come down to us. If we omit c. 2—c. 4 § 1, ἀρχῇ τῶν λοιπῶν καὶ naturally follows upon c. 1. But if it be objected that even c. 1 in its present form could hardly have made part of this work in Aristotle's own intention (see *nn.* 687, 712), we must observe that it is easy to give to what follows, ἀρχῇ τῶν λοιπῶν καὶ, a place immediately after the end of Book III. without the slightest disturbance or deficiency of meaning, if only we give the last unfinished sentence of B III. to B. IV(VII). —as has been done—and then get rid of it with the rest of c. 1. of B. IV(VII). and at the same time treat the words τῶν λοιπῶν in § 1 as the interpolator's addition. We should then translate here. "Our beginning is a statement of the necessary external conditions &c." SUSEM. (749) Cp II 1 § 2, 1260 b 36, ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέον, ἥ περ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτην τῆς σκέψεως.

c. 4 §§ 2—14, cc. 5—7: περὶ τε πλήθους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας With this compare generally Plato *Laosus* IV.

§ 2 38 χορηγίας] See n. on I 6 § 3, 1255 a 14.

διὸ δεῖ πολλὰ καὶ Cp. II. 6 § 7 n. (102); also II. 1 § 1, n. (128) and the references there collected. SUSEM. (750)

§ 3 40 ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ] The analogy was used I. 10 §§ 1, 2.

§ 4 Under the external means required for a city comes first the mass of the population how many ought they to be? and of what natural character? So likewise in regard to the territory: how large and of what nature ought this to be?

The proper number of the inhabitants is discussed in §§ 4—14; their race and mental characteristics in c. 7.

The size of the ideal city: c. 4 §§ 4—14. 1326 a 10 ποῖα μεγάλη] With §§ 4—6 compare Pl. *Rep.* IV. 423 b: *ἔτι δὲ ἡ πόλις σοι οἰκὴ σωφρόνους ὡς ἀπὸ ἐταχθῆ,*

§ 5 ποία μικρά πόλεις κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλήθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρί- (IV)
 νουσι τὴν μεγάλην, δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ εἰς τὸ πλήθος εἰς δὲ δύνα-
 μιν ἀποβλέπειν. ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὥστε τὴν δυνα-
 μένῃν τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οἰητέον εἶναι μεγίστην,
 15 οἷον Ἰπποκράτην οὐκ ἀνθρώπον ἀλλ' ἱατρὸν εἶναι μεῖζω φήσει-
 § 6 ἐν ἄν τις τοῦ διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος. οὐ ᾧ
 μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ δεῖ κρίνειν πρὸς τὸ πλήθος ἀποβλέποντας,
 οὐ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλήθος τοῦτο οἰητέον (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν
 20 καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων), ἀλλ' ὅσοι μέρος εἰσὶ πόλεως καὶ
 ἐξ ὧν συνίσταται πόλεις οἰκείων μερῶν· ἡ γὰρ τούτων ὑπε-
 ροχὴ τοῦ πλήθους μεγάλης πόλεως σημεῖον, ἐξ ἧς δὲ βάναν-
 σοι μὲν ἐξέρχονται πολλοὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀπλῖται δὲ ὀλίγοι, (p 102)
 ταύτην ἀδύνατον εἶναι μεγάλην· οὐ γὰρ ταύτῃ μεγάλῃ τε
 § 7 πόλεις καὶ πολυάνθρωπος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτό γε ἐκ τῶν 8
 26 ἔργων φανερόν ὅτι χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον εὐνομεῖσθαι

11 ποία added by Γ Μ^a Α., omitted by all other authorities and Bk. || 12 εἰς δὲ] ἀλλ' εἰς preferred by Thucol, but such variations should be noted without correction. The passage supports R Scholl's conjecture at 1253 a 22, <οὐκ> ἔσται || 14 οἰητέον omitted by Π^a, [οἰητέον] Sussem.¹, perhaps rightly || 18 ποιητέον Cameiriatus Bk², ὁριστέον? Schmidt || ἴσως attci 19 πόλεσιν Π^a P⁶ Bk. || 20 εἰς μέρος πόλεως apparently Γ, πόλεως εἰσι μέρος Π^a P⁶ Bk || 21 μερίων Π^a P⁶ Bk. || 25 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ Π^a, ἀλλὰ μὴν Π^a P⁶ Bk. || ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε καὶ? Κοινας

μεγάλη ἔσται, οὐ τῷ εὐδοκμεῖν λέγει, ἀλλ' ὥς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον ἡ χιλίων τῶν ποιομένων (Eaton) Plato also criticises the widespread belief that a state to be happy must be large and wealthy Laws 742 D ff, cp 738 D, E 11—13 Comp. Isoc. VII 13. SUSSEM. (751). Add vi. 81, xv. 171 f. (Newman).

§ 5 12 μὴ εἰς τὸ πλήθος εἰς δὲ δύναμιν] We should regard not so much their numbers as their efficiency explained, in the next line, as power to execute the proper task, or function, of a city. (In § 10, a 38 it is said "existence," cp. c. 1 § 12, 1323 b 33.) For the use of δὲ instead of the more usual ἀλλὰ, as in a 15 οὐκ ἀνθρώπον ἀλλ' ἱατρὸν, cp. Thuc. IV. 86. 1 οὐκ ἐπὶ κακῷ ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει δέ.

15 Ἰπποκράτην] We have no certain information concerning the life of this most renowned of Greek physicians, who flourished in the latter half of the fifth century. Of the numerous works bearing his name that have been handed down to us, the only genuine ones are the excellent descriptions of diseases, which

constitute the first and third books of the 'Epilemics,' the no less excellent little work 'On the influence of air, water and locality,' and perhaps 'On the origin and cure of diseases,' and the fragment 'On wounds in the head.' Still these are enough to prove the ability of the man, who is rightly called the Father of Medicine SUSSEM. (752)

§ 6 18 κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν πλήθος] 'We must not estimate it by the mass of any and every sort of people.' Comp. c. 8 § 8 n. (804) and VII(V). 3 § 11 ὥστε γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλιν γίνεσθαι οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ n. (1551 b). SUSSEM. (753)

20 ὅσοι μέρος 21 μερίων] 'but only count those who form an integral part of a city or the parts of which it properly consists'. see cc. 8, 9. SUSSEM. (754)

21 τούτων depends on πλήθος.

23 ὀπλῖται] Of course the soldiers are here mentioned only to exemplify the organic members of the city generally. SUSSEM. (755)

§ 7 26 χαλεπὸν, ἴσως δ' ἀδύνατον]

τὴν λίαν πολυάνθρωπον. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι (IV)
καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὀρώμεν οὔσαν ἀναιμένην πρὸς τὸ πλεῖθος.
§ 8 τοῦτο δὲ δηλὸν καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν λόγων πίστωσης. ὃ τε γὰρ
30 νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὐταξίαν
εἶναι, ὃ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν
τάξεως· θέλεις γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμει ἐργον, ἥτις καὶ τότε
συνέχει τὸ πᾶν ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλείεσι καὶ μεγάλῃ
§ 9 εἴθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους ὁ λεχθεὶς
35 ὅρος ὑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαῖον, <ἐπεὶ τό γε
<καλὸν ἐν πλείεσι καὶ μεγέθει εἴθε γίνεσθαι.> ἀλλ' ἐστὶ
36 τι καὶ πόλεως μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάν-
§ 10 των, ζώων φυτῶν ὀργάνων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον οὔτε λίαν
μικρὸν οὔτε κατὰ μέγεθος ὑπερβάλλον ἔξει τὴν αὐτοῦ δύνα-
μιν, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν ὅλως ἐστερημένον ἔσται τῆς φύσεως ὅτε

29 τε omitted by M^a P¹, very likely by Γ, perhaps rightly, [re] Sussem.¹ || 33 ἐπεὶ
34 γίνεσθαι transposed by Bockei to follow 35 ἀναγκαῖον. See p. 87. Schneider,
who first saw the difficulty, proposed to transpose the whole clause or to bracket ἐν
πλείεσι καὶ || τό γε δὲ τὸ and 34 [διὸ] Κοίνας || 34 πόλιν πόλιν P¹ P² and P³ (1st
hand) || ἡ Κοίνας, most likely right || 36 πόλιν P³ Bk., εἰναι Ar || 38
αὐτοῦ Γ P^{1,2}, αὐτοῦ M^a P²

Sparta and the small Cretan cities were the typical instances of εὐνομία. Syracuse, and to a less degree Athens, of the opposite. Yet Carthage is praised for its comparatively good government II. 11 §§ 1, 2. The most populous cities of the Hellenic world in the fourth century were the two already named. Syracuse may have had in its territory 800,000, the number given for Acragas Diog. Laert. VIII 63, Holm *Genet. des Siciliens* II. 402 (Diod. XIII. 84 makes the free population, exclusive of slaves, 200,000 at Acragas). Corinth, Rhodes, Byzantium, and Tarentum came next. The glory of Miletus, Samos, Sybais, Cioton, and Acragas had departed.

§ 8 30 νόμος τάξις τις] And πολιτεία=τάξις τις ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, so that this vague notion of system or arrangement does not tell us much. Editors compare Pl. *Gorg.* 503 ε ff. esp. 504 D ταῖς δὲ εἴ τῇ ψυχῇ τάξις καὶ κοσμήσεις (ἐνομα) νόμον τε καὶ νόμος.

32 θέλεις γὰρ . 33 τὸ πᾶν] "for this is a task for divine power, such as holds this whole world together." And this although Aristotle makes the whole activity of the deity consist in pure thought, νοήσεως νόησις, thought thinking upon itself. For God is not only the highest and ultimate

formal and final cause, but also the highest and ultimate moving cause. See esp. *Meta.* XII. (A) γ § 6, 1072 b 13 ἐστὶ τοιαύτης ἀρα φύσεως ἡρηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις; 8 § 19, 1074 b 3 παραδέδοται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων θνι... περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν θλίον φύσιν. SUSSEM. (756)

§ 9 34 ἥς μετὰ μεγέθους κτλ] "which has the definition here given," i.e. εὐταξία, "combined with a certain size," ἐπεὶ τό γε καλὸν κτλ "since beauty is usually found to depend on number and magnitude."

Comp. *Post.* 7 § 8, 9, 1450 b 34 ἐστὶ δ' ἐπεὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον πρῶτον δ' συνίστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τεταγμένα δὲ ἔχουν ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγας ὑπάρχει μὴ τὸ τυχόν· τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, διὸ οὐτε πᾶμικρον ἀν τι γένουσι καλὸν ζῶν... οὐτε παμμέγεθες: *Meta.* XIII. (M) 3 § 11, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγεθός ἐστι τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡς ὡς: *Protr.* XIX 38, XVII. 1; *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 5, 1123 b 6 τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δὲ ἀστέροις καὶ συμμετροὶ, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Ed. Müller *op. c.* II. pp. 84—107; Zeller II. ii. p. 765 f. SUSSEM. (757)

Plato *Phileb.* 64 D, μετρώτης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος ἔστι.

§ 10 39 ἐστερημένον κτλ] "deprived of its true nature," i.e. deprived, like the

40 δὲ φαύλως ἔχον, οἷον πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον μὲν οὐκ ἔσται (IV)
 πλοῖον ὄλως, οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίων, εἰς δὲ τὶ μέγεθος ἐλθὼν ὅτε
 1326 b μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα φαύλην ποιήσῃ τὴν ναυτιλίαν, ὅτε δὲ
 § 11 διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὀλίγων
 λίαν οὐκ αὐτάρκης (ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐταρκες), ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν
 ἄγαν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ'
 5 οὐ πόλις· πολιτεία γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον ὑπάρχειν· τίς γὰρ στρατη-
 γὸς ἔσται τοῦ λίαν ὑπερβάλλοντος πλήθους, ἢ τίς κήρυξ μὴ
 Στεντόρειος; διὸ πρῶτην μὲν εἶναι πόλιν ἀναγκαῖον τὴν ἐκ
 τοσούτου πλήθους ὃ πρῶτον πλήθος αὐταρκες πρὸς τὸ ζῆν
 εὖ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν· ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὴν
 10 ταύτης ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος εἶναι [μεῖζω] πόλιν,
 § 12 ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀόριστον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν ὁ
 τῆς ὑπερβολῆς ὄρος, ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἰδεῖν ῥάδιον. εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ
 πρᾶξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων,
 § 13 ἀρχοντος δ' ἐπιτάξεις καὶ κρίσεις ἔργον πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν (P. 103)
 15 περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ'

1326 b 3 ἢ δὲ πόλις αὐταρκες omitted by P¹⁻⁵ II³ Ar. || 4 μὲν after τοῖς P²⁻³⁻⁴ S^b V^b Bk. || αὐτάρκης, <αὐτάρκης δὲ> ὥσπερ ἔθνος or αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ <δὲ> ἔθνος Jackson, perhaps rightly || 5 πολιτεία] πολί P²⁻³, πολιτὴν S^b V^b || 8 ζῆν after 9 εὖ II³ P² Bk || 10 [μεῖζω] Schneider Bk³ Schmidt would transpose thus. μεῖζω ταύτης <αλλ>. Presumably μεῖζω is a variant or gloss upon ὑπερβάλλουσαν κατὰ πλήθος

διεφθαρμένα of I. 5 § 5 (cp. I. 2 § 13 n. 28), 'oi stunted,' in poor condition.

40 πλοῖον σπιθαμιαῖον] A boat a span long.

41 οὐδὲ δυοῖν σταδίων] noi yet a boat two furlongs long: comp. *Poel.* 7 § 9, 1451 a 2, οἷον εἰ μυρία σταδίων ἐστὶ ζών.

§ 11 1326 b 2 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλις] Comp. *Nic. Zet.* ix 10 § 3, 1170 b 31 ἢ ἔστιν τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικὸν πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλις; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις, οὐτ' ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν (Eaton). SUSEM. (758)

3 αὐταρκες] See I. 2 § 12 n. (21), also n. (136), III. 1 § 12 (447), 9 § 14. (560), IV(VII). 5 § 1 (764), 8 § 8 (804). SUSEM. (759)

4 αὐτάρκης, ὥσπερ ἔθνος, ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις] See n² (11) and II. 2 § 3 n. (132). SUSEM. (760)

5 οὐ ῥάδιον] The larger the city or canton state becomes, the more difficult is the working of the constitution. Babylon, like all Peloponnesus (II. 6 § 6, III.

3 § 5), has passed the limits within which civic unity is possible. Such an overgrown city or canton-state must be treated as an *ethnos*: or possibly that is what he contemplates in III. 14 § 1 (πόλις καὶ χώρα). The problem which to Aristotle seemed almost insoluble was solved by events, as the federal system became developed; the Achaean league, an *ethnos*, included for a while all Peloponnesus in political unity, Polyb. II. 37. 11.

7 πρῶτην] primitive, earliest as 18 πρῶτον. The term is applied to *oikta*, *κώμη* I. 2 § 5. So in the definition *De Anima* II. 1 § 6, 412 b 5, πρῶτη ἐντελέχεια σώματος φυσικοῦ οργανικοῦ.

§ 12 14 ἐπιτάξεις καὶ κρίσεις] Cp. VI(IV). 15 § 4, μάλιστα δ' ἀρχὰς λεγέον τὰς αὐτὰς ὅσαι ἀποδέδοται βουλευσασθαι περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐκτελεῖν ἀρχαῶν ἐστίν, n (1349 b). SUSEM. (761) Similarly Pl. *Politeia* 260 n, συμπόσης τῆς γνωστῆς τὸ μὲν ἐπιτακτικὸν μέρος, τὸ δὲ κριτικόν.

ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους, ποιοὶ τινές εἰσι, τοὺς (IV)
 πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, φαύλως
 ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις.
 19 περὶ ἀμφοτέρα γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν
 § 14 τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερώς. ἔτι δὲ ξένους
 καὶ μετοίκους ῥάδιον μεταλαμβάνειν πολιτείας· οὐ γὰρ
 χαλεπὸν τὸ λανθάνειν διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλήθους. δῆ-
 λον τοίνυν ὡς οὗτός ἐστι πόλεως ὕρος ἀριστος, ἡ μεγίστη τοῦ
 πλήθους ὑπερβολὴ πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς εὐσύνοπτος.
 5 περὶ μὲν οὖν μεγέθους πόλεως διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-
 26 του· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας ἔχει. περὶ V
 μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τινά, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν αὐταρκεστάτην πᾶς
 τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν (τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν παν-
 τοφόρον· τὸ γὰρ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηδεὶς
 30 αὐταρκες) πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει τοσαύτην ὥστε δύνασθαι
 τοὺς οἰκούντας ζῆν σχολάζοντας ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σω-

20 πολυανθρωπία τῇ πολυανθρώπῳ Sussem¹, *quae videtur multis non hominibus* William
 || 23 [τῷδε] Spengel, ὕρος <τῆς μεγίστης> Schneider, both unnecessarily || 24 ἦτοι
 εἰσβόητος P² (cori¹) and P⁴ (a later hand), a gloss from 1327 a 3 || 26 τὰ omitted
 by P⁴ S³ V^b || 27 τινά <δεῖ> τινά <δεῖ εἶναι τὴν χώραν> Scaliger, but
 πᾶς τις ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν should be understood from what follows || πᾶς Bk.² by
 a misprint

§ 13 17 ὡς ὅπου 18 κρίσεις] τοῦτο =
 τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους. A genuine Athenian
 sentiment; not only does Plato's judg-
 ment agree with this (*Laos* v. 738 E, *ὅπως*
ἂν φιλοφρονῶνται ἀλλήλους μετὰ θνητῶν καὶ
γνωρίζουσιν, οὐ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν πόλει ἀγαθόν, ἢ
γνωρίσας αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ
φῶς ἀλλήλους ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρόποις
ἀλλὰ σκότος, οὐτ' ἂν τιμῇ τῆς ἀξίας οὐτ'
ἀρχῶν οὐτε δίκης ποτέ τις ἐν τῇς προσήουσιν
ὁρθῶς τυγχάνει), but Thucydides also re- marks,
 VIII. 66 § 3, that during the reign
 of terror under the Four Hundred people
 were afraid to communicate then sus-
 picious to one another διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς
 πόλεως καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀγνωσίαν (Eaton).
 SUSSEM. (762)

19 οὐ δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν] "it is
 not fair to pronounce off-hand." Know-
 ing the ground of his objection to over-
 populous cities, we can argue (as in a
 similar case previously, see on III. 5 § 5)
 that his own principles require him to
 withdraw it where increased facilities of
 communication have enabled men to sur-
 mount this difficulty.

§ 14 23 ἡ μεγίστη... 24 εὐσύνοπτος]

'the largest excess of population which
 will promote independence of life and
 yet can be taken in at one view.' This
 closely corresponds with the decision pro-
 nounced by Aristotle as to the proper
 length of a poem, and the size of a work
 of art generally, *Poet.* c. 7 § 10, 1451 a
 3 ff. 23 § 5 1459 a 30 ff. 24 § 5, 1459 b
 18. *Comp. Rhet.* III. 9 § 6, 1409 b
 17 ff (Eaton). Also c 5 § 3 below with
 n. (768). SUSSEM (768)

c. 5 deals with the territory. *It should*
be sufficient for the support of the inhabi-
ants without external supplies, §§ 1, 2,
compact and easily defensible, § 3; and
with direct access to the sea, § 4.

§ 1 30 αὐταρκες] 'Independence'
 implies that the soil produces all the
 necessities of life. See 1, 2 § 12 n. (21),
 and the references in n. (759). SUSSEM.
 (764)

πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει] 'in extent and
 magnitude'; 'muchness and greatness are
 here nearly synonymous

31 [τῇ σχολάζοντι] Cp. *χώρας δεῖσθαι*
τοῖς τοσούτοις ἔξ ἧς ἀργοὶ θρέψονται, II.
 6 § 6 n. (201): *δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ*

- § 2 φρόνωνς. τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ὅρον εἰ καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγο- (V)
 μεν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτή-
 σεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίνει ποιεῖσθαι
 35 μυελαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν
 αὐτήν· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ τὴν σκέψιν ταύτην εἰσὶν ἀμφι-
 σβητήσεις διὰ τοὺς ἔλκοντας ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τοῦ βίου τὴν ὑπερ-
 βολήν, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν γλίσχρότητα τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν.
 § 3 τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν (δεῖ δ' ἔνια 2
 40 μείθεσθαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἐμπείροις), ὅτι χρῆ
 μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους εἶναι δυσέμβολον αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον.
 327^a ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔφαμεν εὐσύνο-
 πτον εἶναι δεῖν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ δ' εὐσύνοπτον
 τὸ εὐβοήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.

τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν εἰ χρῆ ποιεῖν κατ' εὐχὴν, πρὸς τε
 5 τὴν θάλατταν προσήκει κείσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τε τὴν χώραν. (p 104)
 § 4 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἐκβοηθείας κοι-
 νὴν εἶναι τῶν τόπων ἀπάντων) ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν

32 τοῦτο L¹ Ar. Ald. || τὸν ὅρον omitted by P² A1. (supplied by coll.² in P²) ||
 38 τὴν before γλίσχρότητα omitted by P¹ 2 P² || 41 μὲν τοῖς] τοῖς μὲν ? Susem. (cp
 v l. 1326 b 4)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν after εὐσύνοπτον P² P⁶ Bk || 6 μὲν <οδν> Schneidei

σχολῇ εἶναι ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολά-
 ζωμεν, Nic. Eth. x. 7 6

λευτερίως ἄμα καὶ σωφρόνως] 'at
 once with liberality and temperance':
 cp. II. 6 § 8 n (206), § 9 nn. (206 b, 207);
 also II. 7 § 7 n. (237 b), and VI(IV). 11
 §§ 3, 4 n (1200 b). SUSEM. (765)

§ 2 33 ὕστερον] An unfulfilled pro-
 mise; there is no such treatment of
 political economy See *Introd.* p. 49
 n. (4), 53 n. (6). SUSEM. (766)

36 ἀμφισβητήσεις] 'For there are
 many controversies on this subject, be-
 cause of those who urge us to one or the
 other extreme in life, to parsimony on the
 one hand and to luxury on the other.'
 Presumably written works are intended.

37 ὑπερβολήν] excess, extreme, as in
 c. 1 § 5, 1323 a 38, VI(IV). 11 § 10 τὰς
 ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς. Cp c. 1 § 7, 1323 b
 11, II. 9 § 24 (ἡ δαίτα ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ
 σκληρόν) and N. E. IV 1 § 39, 1121 b 27
 (ἀνάμυσται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ
 μηδὲν ἂν δοῦναι).

§ 3 41 τοὺς πολεμίους εὐέξοδον] 'a
 difficult country for the enemy to invade,
 but easy for the citizens to quit.' Comp.
 c. 11 § 3 n (848). SUSEM. (767)

1327 a 1 ἔφαμεν εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι]
 See c. 4 § 14 n. (763) SUSEM. (768)

"We say of the territory, as we said of
 the population, that it should be such as
 can be taken in at one view, meaning
 thereby that reinforcements can easily be
 marched for the defence of every part
 of it."

4 κατ' εὐχὴν] 'If we are to fix upon
 an ideal site': comp. n. (128). 'a position
 favourable for access to the sea and for
 communications by land is imperative.'
 SUSEM. (769)

§ 4 6 εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος] "One
 defining principle," see n. on II. 9 § 1
 "is that just mentioned": τὸ εὐβοήθητον
 εἶναι. "the city must be equally in com-
 munication with all parts of the country
 for defensive purposes." This is ex-
 panding c. 6 § 3, a 21—23. κοινὴν εἶναι =
 facilem aditum habere ad omnes locos
 Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* v. v.

7 ὁ δὲ λοιπός] "And the other is that
 it should be easy of access (τὸ εὐπαρα-
 κέμωτον εἶναι τὴν χώραν) for the convey-
 ance of the produce of the soil as well as
 of material like timber, or any other
 similar material in which the country may

γινομένων καρπῶν παραπομπάς, ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα (V)
 ὕλης, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνουσι
 6 κεκτημένη τοιαύτην εὐπαρακόμιστον περὶ δὲ τῆς
 11 πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας, πότερον ὠφέλιμος ταῖς 3
 εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ βλαβερὰ, πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν
 ἀμφισβητοῦντες· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιξενουσθαί τινας ἐν ἄλ-
 λοις τεθραμμένους νόμους ἀσύμφορόν φασιν εἶναι πρὸς
 15 τὴν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν· γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ
 ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τῇ θαλάσσῃ διαπέμποντας καὶ δεχομένους
 ἐμπορῶν πλήθος, ὑπεναντίαν δ' εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πολιτεῦσθαι
 2 καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, βέλτιον καὶ 4
 πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέχειν
 20 τὴν πόλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας <καὶ> τῆς θαλάττης, οὐκ ἄδηλον.
 3 καὶ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ῥᾶον φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους εὐβοηθήτους
 εἶναι δεῖ κατ' ἀμφοτέρα τοὺς σωθησομένους, καὶ κατὰ γῆν

8 The punctuation (a comma after παραπομπάς instead of a period, and no comma after 10 τοιαύτην) Jackson followed by Welldon || 9 τυγχάνει P¹, τυγχάνει P² S^b || 10 τοιαύτην before κεκτημένη M² P¹, before ἡ χώρα Γ || [περὶ... 1327 b 18 τοῦτων] Broughton: see Comm. || 12 πολλοὶ Cameiriensis and possibly M² P¹ (1st hand)· for

M² has πο^{λλ}, i.e. πολλὰ οἱ πολλοί, and P¹ has πολλ (with α written very small and apparently an assurance after it), πολλὰ Γ P² P² Bk.¹ P¹ (cor.) and perhaps M² || 14 εἶναι φασι P² P² Bk. || 17 ὑπ' ἐναντίαν M², ὑπεναντίαν P² C² || 20 τὴν πόλιν omitted by Γ M² || τῆς χώρας <καὶ> Bojesen (see c. 5 § 3, c. 11 § 1), τὴν χώραν Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 21 πολέμους Sylburg, πολέμους Γ II Ar. Susem.¹

trade" (Welldon). κεκτησθαι ἐργασίαν τινος=to have acquired a trade in any staple commodity.

c 6 *The advantage and disadvantage of proximity to the sea*

Comp. A. Lang *Introductory Essays* p. 71. Broughton maintains that c. 6 is not by Aristotle, but is wholly the work of some Peripatetic, which Apellikon or Andronikos first inserted in this place. Comp. n. (790), and on the other side nn. (881, 932). Susem.

§ 1 12 πολλοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντες] See Plato *Latius* iv. 705 A, 706 ff.; cp. XII. 950. But in Aristotle's account of the opinions held by representatives of this view there are some things not to be found in Plato accordingly it would seem that he has other writers also in view. At a later time Cicero 'is wholly in agreement' with such opinions, *De Repub.* II. c. 3 f. 'Aristotle looks at the question more impartially' (Oncken)

and really goes as far as it was possible for him to go with his narrow theories upon Political Economy. But of course even he was greatly hampered by them. See nn. (772, 774). Susem. (770)

13-18. Objections: (1) the continued residence of aliens brought up under alien laws, and (2) the populousness of seaport-towns, are prejudicial to good government. See *Latius* IV. 704 n.

15 καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν sc. ἀσύμφορον εἶναι, γίνεσθαι] sc. τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν. A large population is the result of their traffic by sea. The participants are accus. as subjects of χρῆσθαι.

§ 2 18 εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει] apart from these results.

20 "that the city should communicate both with the land and the sea." This sense seems certain from 25 ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν.

§ 3 21 φέρειν] To resist, hence the blunt of an attack.

καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν· καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι τοὺς ἐπιτιθεμέ- (V)
 νους, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄμφω δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θάτερον ὑπάρ-
 ξει μᾶλλον ἀμφοτέρων μετέχουσιν. ὅσα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ
 παρ' αὐτοῖς ὄντα, δέξασθαι ταῦτα καὶ τὰ πλεονάζοντα
 τῶν γινομένων ἐκπέμψασθαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν. αὐτῇ
 γὰρ ἐμπορικῇν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν·
 οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν προσόδου·
 χάριν ταῦτα πράττουσιν· ἣν δὲ μὴ δεῖ πόλιν τοιαύτης
 μετέχειν πλεονεξίας, οὐδ' ἐμπόριον δεῖ κεκτῆσθαι τοιούτου.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλὰς ὑπάρχον<τα> καὶ χώραις καὶ
 πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυνῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν
 πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστει μήτε πόρρω λίαν,
 ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τεύχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι,
 φανερόν ὡς εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς
 κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρξει τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν, εἰ δέ (p 105)

24 ἀλλ' εἰ Π³, ἀλλὰ γε Schneider || 30 ἦν P² 2.1 V^b Ald. and apparently A1. ||
 32 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Π² A1., ἐπεὶ δὲ Gottling || ὑπάρχοντα καὶ Welldon, ὑπάρχοντα
 Congreve Sussem 2.2, ὑπάρχον καὶ Γ II Bk.¹, ὑπάρχειν καὶ Schneider Bk.² || 34 νέμειν
 ἰσὺς τὸ Γ Ar. Sussem 1.2, αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ a lacuna P² (1st hand), τὸ αὐτὸ (αὐτὸν P⁴)
 ἔμεν other authorities and P² (later hand). Either may be correct. Cp. Busse
 2. 38

23 καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι] Cp c. 11
 12 n. (855). SUSSEM. (771) A150 II. 6
 8.

24 κατὰ θάτερον] 'in one of the two
 ways, if both are at their command,'
 μετέχουσιν dative plu. of the participle.)

§ 4 27 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστίν] Participle
 genitive. 'is one amongst necessary
 conditions' 40 II. 11 § 10, 1273 a 37.
 This periphrasis enables Aristotle to avoid
 the hiatus of ἐκπέμψασθαι ἀναγκαίων

αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικῇν καὶ] 'For it
 ought to carry on trade in its own interests
 exclusively and not for the advantage of
 others.' This dictum strikes at the root
 of free-trade legislation (Eaton). SUSSEM.
 (772)

Thirty years ago our other English
 commentator Congreve uncompromisingly
 enounced this dictum: "Any theory
 like this of Aristotle's—such as the main-
 tenant and protective system of later
 times,—which aims at exclusiveness, is to
 be condemned as a direct attack on the
 real interests of mankind." Even now
 how large a part of civilized mankind is
 Aristotle's position and fails to discern
 its real interests in this matter.

29 πᾶσιν ἀγορὰν] 'a universal mart.'
 This exactly describes the situation of
 Athens as the sole mart e.g. of corn from
 the Black Sea. Cp Xen. *De Vect* 3.

31 οὐδ' ἐμπόριον] The ideal city is not
 itself to be such a place of trade, nor is
 it to have a commercial seaport of this
 kind.

§ 5 32 ἐπὶ δὲ. 33 ἐπίνεια] "This was
 the situation of Peiræus, Cenchææ,
 Lechæon, Notion [cp. VIII(v). 3 § 15 n
 1541], Nisæa, Pegæ, Patræ, Aigæ"
 (Eaton). SUSSEM. (773)

35 τεύχεσι] As the long walls con-
 necting Peiræus with Athens, Lechæon
 with Corinth, and Nisæa with Megara

37 εἰ δὲ τι βλαβερόν] "while any
 harm they may cause it is easy to guard
 against by prescribing and defining in the
 laws who are, and who are not, to enjoy
 mutual intercourse." Here then even
 Aristotle adopts the principles of Plato's
 policy in regard to the treatment of
 foreigners, *Lysis* XII 950 ff., esp. 952 D-
 953 E (Eaton). SUSSEM. (774) Plato
 would exercise a strict surveillance on all
 who enter or leave the country· comp. n.
 (373) on the Spartan *ἐνηλασία*.

τι βλαβερόν, φυλάσθαι ῥάδιον τοῖς νόμοις φράζοντας (V)
 39 καὶ διορίζοντας τῖνας οὐ δεῖ καὶ τῖνας ἐπιμίσγασθαι δεῖ πρὸς
 § 6 ἀλλήλους. περὶ δὲ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ὅτι μὲν οὐ
 βέλτιστον ὑπάρχειν μέχρι τινὸς πλήθους, οὐκ ἔδηλον (οὐ γὰρ
 1397 b μόνον αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πλησίων τισὶ δεῖ καὶ φοβεροὺς
 εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι βοθεῖν, ὥσπερ κατὰ γῆν, καὶ κατὰ
 § 7 θάλατταν)· περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἤδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δυνάμεως
 ταύτης πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀποσκεπτέον τῆς πόλεως. εἰ μὲν γὰρ
 § 5 ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζήσεται βίον, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύ-
 την τὴν δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὰς πράξεις σύμμετρον.
 τὴν δὲ πολυανθρωπίαν τὴν γινομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν
 § 8 ὄχλον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ
 αὐτοὺς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατι-
 10 κὸν ἐλεύθερον καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων ἐστίν, ὃ κύριόν ἐστι καὶ
 κρατεῖ τῆς ναυτικῆς· πλήθους δὲ ὑπάρχοντος περιόικων
 καὶ τῶν τὴν χώραν γεωγούντων, ἀφθονίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 καὶ ναυτῶν. ὁρῶμεν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν ὑπάρχον τισίν,
 οἷον τῇ πόλει τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν πολλὰς γὰρ ἐκπληροῦσι
 15 τριῆρεις κεκτημένοι τῷ μεγέθει πόλιν ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέραν.

1397 b 1 αὐτοῖς M^a P^a 3.4 Ald. || πλησίον P^a 4 || καὶ φοβεροὺς εἶναι transposed to follow 2 βοθεῖν by Cameiriarius and Lambin, perhaps rightly || 5 πολεμικὸν Schneidei (in the translation) Bk.³, <μὴ μόνον> πολιτικὸν? Schneidei, which may also be right. His proposal to bracket καὶ πολιτικὸν is not commendable || 8 ἀρχεῖν? Schlosser (wrongly) || οὐδὲν Π³ Bk., οὐδὲ Γ³ M^a || 9 μέρος omitted by L^a C^a Ald. W^a || 13 καὶ added after δὲ by Π³ Bk. || 14 ἡρακλεωτῶν P^a 3 S^b V^b || 15 ἐμμελεστέραν Sepulveda, and Γ^a apparently had κεκτισμένης πόλεως τῷ μεγέθει ἐτέρων ἐμμελεστέρας (aestifitata civitate magnitudine alius contractioris)

§ 6 A naval force is essential within due limits Epaminondas shared this opinion apparently; see Grote c. 79.

§ 7 1397 b 4 εἰ μὴ γὰρ. βίον] "For if the city is to have a career of supremacy." One would have thought that in his ideal of a state Aristotle would have attended to the domestic activity of the citizens and not to external power and rule: 14 § 21 Nor is this really inconsistent with the present remark, which is very general in its tenor. Proximity to the sea, he says, and a naval force is an advantage to every state: a walllike, conquering state (which on Aristotle's principles therefore is not the best) needs of course a stronger naval force: the best state can do with a smaller fleet. See however n. (917) and *Introd.* p. 55. SUSSEX. (778)

§ 8 πολιτικὸν] Schneidei well remarks:

quasi reliquae civitates πολιτικὸν βίον non colant. Conservative critics defend the word as meaning "a true political life" by reference to II. 6 § 7, IV(VII). 2 § 3.

§ 8 γ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιβατικὸν καὶ] "For only the marines are free men and form part of the land army; and it is they who are supreme (on board ship) and control the crew."

10 καὶ τῶν πεζευόντων] At Athens too the soldiers for the fleet were sometimes taken from the actual citizen army, the heavy-armed infantry (cf. n. 1519). Thuc. III. 98 § 4, VIII. 24 § 2; but generally (n. 1453) from the Thetes or fourth class in the census, Thuc. VI. 43 (Eaton). Cp. Boeckh *Statisth.* II. 583 f., I² 649 f. p. 500 Eng. tr. SUSSEX. (778)

14 τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν] Xenophon also speaks of the large naval force of the

§ 9 *περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων καὶ (V)
θαλάττης καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἔστω διωρισμένα
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους, τίνα μὲν VI
7 ὅρον ὑπάρχειν χρή, πρότερον εἴπομεν, ποίους δὲ τινὰς τὴν
10 φύσιν εἶναι δεῖ, νῦν λέγωμεν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατανοήσειεν ἄν
τις τοῦτό γε, βλέψας ἐπὶ τε τὰς πόλεις τὰς εὐδοκίμουσας
τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν οἰκουμένην, ὥς διελή-*

16 καὶ πόλεως καὶ λιμένων Susem, καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεων Γ II A1. Bk¹
Susem.¹⁻² in the text, καὶ πόλεως λιμένων Weldon wrongly, καὶ λιμένων καὶ πόλεως
Congreve. In place of πόλεων Κοίνας conjectured *ἐπιτελων*, Schmidt *ἐμπορίων*,
Broughton *περιπολιων*, Jowett *πολιων*. Coming followed by Bk² bracketed καὶ πόλεων
|| 17 διωρισμένων L² P²⁻³ Ald. Bk.² and P¹ (con.), διορισμένων P¹, διωρισμένων S^b V^b ||
21 τὰς πόλεις omitted by P¹⁻² L² Ald W^b

Heracleiots, *Anab.* v. 6 § 10 (Ciphanus). He also calls Herakleia in Pontus a colony from Megara, settled in the land of the Maiandryniens (*Anab.* v. 10 § 1). We know from other sources that there were also Boeotians (from Tanagra) along with the Megarian colonists, and that the colony was founded about 550. Strabo xii 549 is wrong in designating it a Milesian settlement. The colonists had converted the Maiandryniens whom they had conquered into subjects or vassals, in virtue of a compact similar to that made by the Thesaliens with the Penestae (cp. n. 280) and by the Spartans with the Helots, containing a special proviso that they should not be sold out of the country. Indeed the Heracleiots did not call them their property or their slaves, but their *peni-beaters* (*δορυφόροι*). See Posidonius *Ῥῆγ.* 16 in Ath. vi. 263 c, Strab. xii. 542, Plato *Λόγος* vi 776 D (J. G. Schneider). Comp also Pseudo-Arist. *Οἰκον.* ii. 9 § 1, 1347 b 3 ff (Eaton). SUSSEM. (777)

15 τῶ μεγέθει .. ἐμμελεστέραν] "A city of but moderate size, as compared with others." We do not anywhere else find an accurate statement as to the probable size of Herakleia; but extracts from the work of its native historian Memnon in Photius give us information as to its power and history (J. G. Schneider). See Muller's edition, *Ῥῆγος ἱστ.* Gr. iii. p. 525 ff. There are notices of the early internal history of Herakleia viii(v). 5 § 3 n. (1555); 6 § 3 (1569), § 7 (1575), § 15 (1582). SUSSEM. (778)
Comp. also Grote, c. 98, vol. xii. p. 622 ff.

18 περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους .

19 πρότερον] "As to the strength of the citizen body, and what limit should be set to it, we spoke above (c. 4 §§ 4—14)." "

c. 7 *The natural characteristics of the citizens. they should be of Greek race, uniting intelligence with a spirit of temper.* §§ 1—4. *Criticism of Plato.* §§ 5—8.

§ 1 22 διέληνται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν] divided amongst different races. So διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας vi(iv). 11 § 13, 1296 a 11; εἰς διαφορὰς *De Part. Animal.* i 3 § 3, 642 b 30; διαμεμελεσθῆναι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς ἑθνη *Rhet.* i. 4 § 4, 1359 b 3.

§§ 2, 3 Compare the remark made by Plato *Rep.* iv. 435 E, that among the Thracians, Scythians and other northern nations courage predominates, among the Phoenicians and Egyptians love of gain; among the Greeks reason. Hippocrates in his work *de aere, aquis, locis* alluded to above in n. (752), p. 547 ff. Kuhn, compares in detail the natural differences between Europeans and Asiatics, and describes the happy mean of the Greeks. Herod. ix. 122 makes Cyrus say that fertile countries make effeminate people, since the same soil is not capable of producing rare fruits and valiant men; and in iii. 106, he says that Hellas enjoys by far the best climate. Plato *Tim.* 24 c commends in particular the happy blending of the seasons in Attica, and the combination of valiant excellence and love of knowledge resulting from this influence. In the Aristotelian *Problems* xiv. 8, 16, there is a discussion of the question why the inhabitants of warm countries are as a rule cowardly, and those of cold countries brave (Eaton). Cp. also n. (641). SUSSEM. (781)

- § 2 πται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη (VI)
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην θυμοῦ μὲν ἐστὶ πλήρη, διανοαῖς
25 δὲ ἐνδεέστερα καὶ τέχνης, διόπερ ἐλεύθερα μὲν διατελεῖ
μᾶλλον, ἀπολίτευτα δὲ καὶ τῶν πλησίων ἄρχειν οὐ δυνά-
μενα· τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν διανοητικὰ μὲν καὶ τεχνικὰ
τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄθυμα δέ, διόπερ ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα (p. 11)
§ 3 διατελεῖ· τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος ὥσπερ μεσεύει κατὰ
30 τοὺς τόπους, οὕτως ἀμφοῖν μετέχει. καὶ γὰρ ἔνθυμον καὶ
διανοητικὸν ἐστίν· διόπερ ἐλευθέρων τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλ-
τιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μῖα
§ 4 τυγχάνον πολιτείας. τὴν αὐτὴν δ' ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ 3

24 [καὶ] τὰ Spengel Sussem.² Oī betteri καὶ [τὰ] with explicative sense? Cp. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 357 b 13 ff., Vahlen *Bait. zu Plat.* II. p. 88. || 28 μὲν inserted after ἀρχόμενα by II¹ || 31 μάλιστα Γ (apparently) Sussem.¹⁻²

§ 2 23 τὰ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] "The nations which live in cold countries, and those which live in Europe" J. G. Schneider tried to explain the text as though Europe were here used in its oldest sense of the country between Peloponnesus and Thace (Hom. *Hymn to Apollo* 251). Not only is this interpretation itself improbable, but the contrast shows that it is not Greek but only non-Greek natives that are here alluded to; and as immediately afterwards Asia is opposed to Europe, the latter must refer to the whole continent just as much as the former. Similarly c. 10 § 3 n. (823). It is necessary therefore to bracket either καὶ or τὰ. In the latter case καὶ will be expegegetic: "those who live in the cold countries, i.e. in Europe." SUSSEM. (779)

26 ἀπολίτευτα] Without organized government; and, in consequence, incapable of common action for aggression. Probably on the analogy of the individual φύσει ἄρχων Aristotle considers that the race, like the city, ought to be capable of ruling over the φύσει ἄρχόμενοι

28 διόπερ ἀρχόμενα. 29 διατελεῖ] Comp. III. 14 § 6 n. (621) and n. (54). SUSSEM. (780)

§ 3 30 ἔνθυμον] spirited, courageous.

31 διόπερ ἐλευθέρων. 33 πολιτείας] "For which reason the Greek race is and always has been" [lit. continues to be] "free and best governed and capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under a single government" Herod. IX. 2 makes the Thebans say to Mardonius that so long as the Greeks keep united (as formerly had been the case) the

whole world could scarcely subdue them: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἱσχυρόν Ἕλληνας διαφορενόντας, ὥπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις (Eaton). See further *Introd.* p. 46. SUSSEM. (782)

This is the passage on which Oncken I. 18 ff. II. p. 273 relies for his interpretation of Aristotle's attitude to Alexander and to Greek politics. He compares Isocrates' repeated appeals to the Greek nation to cherish ὁμόνοια (*Panegyric*, *De Pace*, *Philippicus*, cp. *Ep.* 3). According to Oncken the *μία πολιτεία* was already realized *de facto* in the protectorate over Greece exercised by Philip, and after him by Alexander: the terms of which he infers from the contemporary speech (falsely attributed to Demosthenes) *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν*. But that the arrangement of 336 B.C. was an alliance of ostensibly free and independent powers, in short a confederation (*συνμαχία βοηθείας χάριν*) and not a *πολιτεία* (II 2 § 3) is proved most conclusively by the wording of the first article; by the orator's argument that Macedonia having broken the treaty, Athens has the right to appeal to arms; and by the terms *συνθῆκαι* and *κοινὴ εἰρήνη* themselves. (Cp. *Rhet.* II. 23 § 18, 1399 b 12 *ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν [ἐστίν], καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προστατόμενον*). Some however are not content to find in the words of the text, as in those of Herodotus, a sudden thought or passing hint. It remains then to inquire: what precisely was the constitution which Aristotle had in mind,

τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη [καί] πρὸς ἄλληλα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει (VI)
 35 τὴν φύσιν μονόκωλον, τὰ δὲ εὖ [τε] κέκρται πρὸς ἀμφο-
 τέρας τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ δια-
 νοητικούς τε εἶναι καὶ θυμοειδείς τὴν φύσιν τοὺς μέλλοντας
 § 5 εὐαγῶγους ἔσσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ὕπερ γὰρ
 φασὶ τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικούς μὲν
 40 εἶναι τῶν γνωρίμων πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας ἀγρίους, ὁ θυμὸς
 ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν τὸ φιλητικόν. αὕτη γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς

34 καὶ inserted by M^a P² Bk. || 35 τε omitted by Π¹ Bk.³ Spengel approves the omission unless καὶ be inserted after τε || 38 τῶν νομοθέτην P⁴, τῶν νομοθετῶν Γ apparently

under which he thought united Hellas could rule the world? The answer expected is either (1) an absolute monarchy, or (2) a federal state (Bundesstaat). Yet neither satisfies the conditions of a possible answer as given rather in the whole character and tendency of the work than in any single passage. That by 'constitution' Aristotle means the constitution of a city-state and not a race or nation or tribe, is a fundamental postulate, although nowhere expressly laid down. Nations other than the Greek are occasionally mentioned as monarchically and 'despotically' governed, and so far as oriental despotism is one variety of βασιλεία they may be said to have a constitution. But the very words in which this variety is described (see *n.* on III. 12 § 8) exclude its application to the Greeks: it is because Asiatics are of more servile temper than Europeans, and barbarians generally than Greeks, that they quietly endure the yoke, III. 14 §§ 6, 7. The difficulty lies in the absence of any detailed treatment of the interpolitical relations of the Greek cities. From the silence of our author it would be rash to affirm that theoretically the absolute king who may arise in a single city (III. 13 §§ 13, 14, 24, 25; 14 § 1, § 15, 17 §§ 5—8) has a counterpart in an absolute king over the whole Greek race. The slight evidence there is points to Aristotle's discerning in the hegemony of Macedon (which was nominally all that Philip or Alexander asked and the Congress of Corinth granted) a fact analogous to the old hegemonies of Sparta, Athens, Thebes see VI(IV) 11 § 18 f., and *Frug.* 81, 1489 b 26, Plutarch *De Alexandri virtute* I c. 6 ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονικῶς τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χράμενος. To us Chaeionea, or Ciannion, may mark the

end of Greek history. Such was not the feeling of contemporary Greeks—whether they sided with Demosthenes or with Phocion.

§ 4 34 The Dorian, Ionian, Thesalian, Arcadian, Acaianian, Aetolian ἔθνη, occur as examples of Greek tribal populations.

35 μονόκωλον] one-sided. The Aetolians approximated to the hardy peoples of the north—the Asiatic Ionians to the softer Asiatics.

§ 5 38 ὕπερ γὰρ φασὶ τινες] Plato in *Repub.* II 375 C ff. Comp *n.* (1006) on V(VIII). 4 § 2 SUSEM (788)

39 τοῖς φύλαξι] See *n.* (140) on II 3 § 5. SUSEM. (784)

φιλητικούς] The word itself is not used by Plato, but in substance his meaning is not essentially different (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς οἰκείους πρόσω αὐτοὺς εἶναι), so that it is difficult to see why Schneidei should believe that Aristotle does him injustice. See however *n.* (789). SUSEM. (785)

40 ὁ θυμὸς ἔστιν φιλοῦμεν] 'It is passion or temper which makes us friendly; for that is the faculty of soul with which we love' The logic reads faulty in the translation because we can scarcely render by the same word θυμός=courage, θυμός=affection, although we too speak of the heart as the seat of both. See *n.* (641) on III. 16 § 5. Comp. *Thrice* II. 7 § 6, 113 a 35 ff., οὐκ εἰ τὸ μῖσος ἐπεσθαι ὀργὴν ἔφησεν, εἴη αὖ τὸ μῖσος ἐν τῷ θυμῷ· εἰδέναι δὲ καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀργή, and *Thrice* IV 5 §§ 5, 6, 126 a 8 ff.: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχύνη ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ, ὁ δὲ φόβος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδῶς, καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ, ἡ δὲ ὀργὴ ἐν τῷ θυμοειδῶς, where fear and anger are hypothetically assigned to 'prudence' but love (φίλια) to the ἐπιθυμητικόν or impulsive principle of the soul (J. G.

1328 a δύνανται ἢ φιλοῦμεν. σημείον δέ· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις 3
καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἵρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας,
§ 6 ὀλυνγοῦσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος προσηκόντως τοῖς
φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμόν·

5 οὐ γὰρ δὴ παρὰ φίλων ἀπάγχει.

καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης
§ 7 ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀήττητον ὁ θυμὸς. οὐ
καλῶς δ' ἔχει λέγειν χαλεποὺς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγνώτας·
πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ εἶναι χρη τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγάλῳψυχοι

1328 a 5 οὐ Beigk, following Schneider, οὐ Π II Ar Bk Susem.¹ in the text || δει
M¹, untranslated by William || παρὰ Γ P² Ar. Beigk, περὶ with all other authorities
Bk. || ἀπάγχει P¹, ἀπάγχει M¹ and apparently Γ (a *lanchei perfoiationes* William),
ἀπάγχο P², L¹ Ald. Bk. Beigk, ἀπάγχετο P⁴, ἀπάγχετο P⁵, ἀπάγχο S^b V^b and
perhaps Al. (*lanchei transfixans es*)

Schneider). Just because this is only hypothetically expressed, there is no contradiction between it and the present passage. "Theognis, too, 109 ff, ascribes love and hatred to 'spirit' or θυμός" (Cameiriatus). Further comp. *iii.* (790, 182, 839, 935). SUSEM (786)

41 αὐτῇ] Not τοῦτο, see c. 1 § 8 n.
1328 a 1 πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς συνήθεις] Eaton compares *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις [ἀγνοῦνται] μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις· οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πᾶσιν ἐν ἑπ' αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ. SUSEM. (787)

3 αἵρεται] rises viz in indignation.
§ 6 3 Ἀρχιλόχος] *Frags* 67. Archilochus of Paros, who flourished about 680 or somewhat earlier, was the true father of Greek lyrical poetry. Before his time the *σῶμα* belonging to religious poetry had received its artistic development only from Terpander and Klonas (see n. 17 to my edition of the *Psalmi*). The invention of elegiac poetry was disputed between him and Kallinos. But his claim to be the inventor of iambic verse is undisputed, and also to be the first who made a regular arrangement of secular poetry. He seems also to have composed in regular fashion sacred songs for choirs, there is however a doubt as to the genuineness of the *Ὡ Βάκχε* attributed to him (*Frags*. 120), but none as to the hymn to Heiakes (*Frags*. 119). Whether he also wrote dithyrambs and paeans cannot be certainly inferred from *Frags*. 76, 77. He was the first to introduce the iambic and trochaic metre

stuctured according to the rules of art, and he supplied it with a series of strophes composed of whole dactylic iambic and trochaic verses, and of verses in which dactyls or anapaests and trochees, or iambs were combined. See Westphal *Greek Metru* II. p. 350 ff., 443, 450, 457, 479 f., 498, 563 ff. The fragment of verse here quoted is a trochaic tetrameter without the opening dipody, and it belonged to a poem composed throughout of such tetrameters, as we see from another longer fragment (*Frags*. 66). On Archilochus, see Benhardy *History of Greek literature* II. p. 486 SUSEM. (788)

§ 7 7 οὐ καλῶς κτλ] Here clearly Aristotle is taking Plato's statements much too literally, and in a much cruder and stricter sense than they are meant. SUSEM. (789)

9 οὐδὲ εἰσὶν οἱ μεγάλῳψυχοι κτλ] Plato also *Rep.* IV. 440 c designates indignation at injustice received as a main element of θυμός, and indeed, as already noticed in n. (647), he refers ambition to θυμός. But Aristotle also mentions *Psalmi* II. 12 § 22, 97 b 15 ff. as one of the chief characteristics of the μεγάλῳψυχοι, that they will not brook insult. On the other hand *Nic. Eth.* IV. 3 § 30, 1125 a 31 ff. that they are not revengeful, but know how to forgive and forget (Eaton). It is not easy however to reconcile what is here stated with the description given there § 24, 1124 b 9 ff., according to which the high-minded man is ready to confer benefits, but is ashamed of receiving

- 10 τὴν φύσιν ἄγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικούντας. τοῦτο δὲ μάλ- (VI)
 λον ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς συνήθεις πάσχουσιν, ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,
 § 8 ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν. καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει κατὰ λόγον· παρ' 4
 οἷς γὰρ ὀφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, πρὸς
 τῷ βλάβει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 15 καὶ χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν
 16 οἱ τοὶ πέραν στέρξαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ πέραν
 μισοῦσιν.
 § 9 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχειν
 18 δεῖ καὶ πόλους τινὰς τὴν φύσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν χώραν πόσῃ
 τέ τινα καὶ ποίαν τινά, διώρισταί σχεδόν (οὐ γὰρ τὴν (p 107
 20 αὐτὴν ἀκρίβειαν δεῖ ζητεῖν διὰ τε τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γνω-
 -8 μένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως)· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν VII

13 δὲν] δεῖ M^a, δὲ apparently P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹), δὴ? Κοινας, William leaves it untranslated, [δεῖν] Schneider Susem.¹, perhaps 11gh ly || τω' Κοινας || ὑπολαμβάνουσι] νομίζουσι M^a P¹ and very likely Γ || 14 τῷ βλάβει P⁴, τι βλάβει Γ^b, τῷ βλάβει P⁶ || 15 πόλεμοι (πολέμοι) Γ γὰρ Π¹ Plutarch *de frat. am.* p. 480 D, γὰρ πόλεμοι Π² P³ Bk || 16 πέρα—πέρα Π² P³ Bk. Susem.¹ || 18 ὁπόσῃ M^a P¹ || 21 τῶν ἄλλων omitted by P^b L^a Ald W^b and P⁴ (1st hand, supplied in the margin)

him by greater services in return, so that he may not be under obligation to others, but rather others to him (Broughton). Cp also *u* (878) SUSEM. (790)

§ 8 'And this is a result to be expected; for they imagine themselves to be robbed as well as slighted by those from whom they believe a kindness ought to be due to them.' ἀποστερεῖσθαι (ὅπ' ἐκείνων) παρ' οἷς—by those *in whose case* there ought to be an obligation to a service to themselves.

"Cp. *Rhet.* II. 2 § 15, 1379 b 2 ff. (Eaton, *Congreve*). SUSEM. (791)

14 ὅθεν εἴρηται] This is a line of Euripides, from what play is not known, *Frag* 965 (Nauck). SUSEM. (792)

16 οἱ τοὶ πέραν κτλ.] We know neither the author nor the play from which this is quoted (*Frag. adesp.* 53 Nauck) SUSEM. (793)

§ 9 19 οὐ γὰρ 21 αἰσθήσεως] Comp. c. 12 § 9 *u*. (868). SUSEM. (794) Also *Nu.* *Eth.* I. 7 §§ 18, 19, 1098 a 26 ff and *De Anima* I. 1 ad int. 422 a 2, with Wallace's note on ἀκρίβεια. Also I. 5 § 1, 1254 a 20, IV(VII). 1 § 6, 1323 a 39 with *uu*

cc. 8—12 contain the social conditions of the best city, which differs but slightly from those laid down by Plato (more

especially in the *Law*, B. v., VI.) and would command the assent of most reflecting Greeks as at least theoretically desirable.

c 8. *Distinction of the citizen proper, who are an essential part of the city, from the rest of the population, which is but an indispensable adjunct.*

This idea is already familiar to the reader of B III. c. 5, c. 13 § 13: see *u*. on 1284 a 9.

§ 1 21 ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων] Thus for instance the things without which happiness cannot exist are not all parts of happiness, *Eudem. Eth.* I. 2 §§ 2—5, 1214 b 11—27 (Eaton). Some of these (ὡν ἄνευ οὐκ) are only secondary causes, as Plato already called them (*Asi. Ler. Plat.* s. v. *συναίτιος*), or necessary conditions (Camerarius). Cp. *Metaph.* v. (Δ) 5 § 1, 1015 a 20: "necessary (or indispensable) is that without which as secondary cause life is impossible" (Eaton). See Zeller II. II. p. 331 *u*. (1). Cp. *u*. (907) and *u*. (504) on III. 5 § 2. SUSEM. (795)

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάτων] Natural wholes made up of organic parts, as in I. 5, 1254 a 29, with which πόλις was ranked III. 1, 2, 1274 b 39 *u*. (434). They are frequently mentioned in the zoological treatises.

κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταυτὰ ἐστὶ μόρια τῆς ὅλης συ- (VII)
στάσεως ὧν ἄνεν τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πό-
24 λεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν
— <οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος
<εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν> — οὐδ'
§ 2 ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος. ἐν γάρ

22 ταυτὰ M^a P¹, ταυτὰ Bk.¹, ταῦτ' P⁴, πάντα ? Wye || 25 ἐξῆς P² V^b and perhaps
P⁴ (1st hand), since in that ms. ἐξ ἧς is οὐκ ἐστὶν an easuic, [ἐξ] ἧς and τέλος for γένος
? Postgate || [τὸ] γένος ? Κοινας

32 μόρια] Also μέρη (μάλιστα δεῖτα
1329 a 4 f., cp. 1291 b 8): the technical
terms for 'full members', constituent
parts and not mere adjuncts of the or-
ganic whole. See the good instances
c. 4 § 6, 1326 a 20 f.; vi(iv). 4. 14,
1291 a 24. In contrast to them the ad-
juncts are (1) necessary appendages, ὅσα
ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, (2) *sim-*
plius *non*, ὧν ἄνεν ὅλως οὐ συνίσταται,
(3) requirements, ὧν δεῖ, or even (4) τὰ
ἐνυπάρχοντα e.g. τροφή, χώρα. Note that
both μέρος and μέρος are also used as
non-technical terms, for the adjuncts.
So μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως sometimes (as
here) of full membership, 1329 a 35:
sometimes again of the entire population,
1279 a 32. The relation between consti-
tuent parts and necessary conditions is
explained III 12 8 f., 1283 a 15—22 and
iv(vii). 6. 7, 1327 b 9: the ναυτικὸς
ὄχλος is no part of Aristotle's city. There
can be no city of brutes or of slaves

συντάσεις] A term with various
meanings: (1) the putting together =
constitution, (2) the thing so constituted
δ συνίσταται, thus duplicating τὰ κατὰ
φύσιν συνστ., cp. 1329 a 35. It is
largely used in the biological works for
'structure' or 'organism' so also vi(iv).
11. 8, 1295 b 23. On the latent analogy
between organism and state, implied in
this term and in ἔργα = functions, but
drawn out at length vi(iv) c. 4 §§ 8, 9,
see A. C. Bradley *op. c.* p. 203 ff.

The view of *Dr Partibus Animal* 1. 5
§§ 12—16, 645 b 14—20, is that every
part (μέρος) of the body, like an in-
strument (ὄργανον), is for an end: this end is
a function (πρᾶξις τις). The parts are
nose, eyes, face, etc.; the functions, noise
οἱ λέων specific, γένεσις, ἀλγισις, ὄπνος,
πορεία, κτλ

The transposition of the clause 27 οἷον
εἴτε τροφή.. 28 ἐστίν appears inevitable,
because 'food' and a 'quantum of terri-
tory' would otherwise be adduced as

instances of ἐν τι κοινὸν τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, for
which purpose they are clearly inapprop-
riate. The common object of the society,
which gives the city its unity, is its ethical
end, the conviction of the members that
they must endeavour to realize a noble
life, § 4, a 36—38 (cp. III. c. 9). On the
other hand a supply of food and so much
territory are indispensable requisites, and
would seem to be included under κτήσις
a 33.

24 οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι
τὸ γένος] "Nor is this true of any other
association which is to form a unity of
kind" (and not merely of mass, γένος is
adverbial accus.): i.e. which is to have a
true organic unity, not merely the collec-
tive unity of an aggregate or heap. After
135 ἐν τι there is no need to insert ἔσται,
for γερήσεται (οἱ ἔσται) can easily be un-
derstood. SUSSEX. (796)

§ 2 For the real members of the so-
ciety must have some one identical com-
mon interest, though they need not all
share in it equally Haec mihi videtur
esse sententia unum aliquid idemque
socius commune necesse est (Sussexi).

25 A generic unity, or natural compo-
site whole, I. 5. 3, 1254 a 29 ff., but not
a κράσις, μίξις, οἱ σύμμικτοι in which the
mingled elements vanish and give birth
to a new product. for the citizens con-
tinue to exist as parts of the whole 1. 2.
14, 1253 a 26. The difference between
the mere heap and the organic whole is
explained *Aléa*. Z 17. 8, 1041 b 18 ff. (ex-
amples, a syllable, flesh; each something
apart from its constituents). See also
Aléa. H. 6. 1, 1045 a 8, ὅσα πλείω μέρη
ἔχει καὶ μὴ ἐστὶν οἷον σωρὸς τὸ πᾶν,
ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μέρη. For a
parallel to the language see *Phy.* v. 3.
7, 227 a 11, ἐν τοῖς ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ
ὧν ἐν τι πέφυκε γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν.

The notion of Unity is analysed *Aléa*.
Δ 6. I. 1. τὰ πρῶτως λεγόμενα ἐν αἵε ὧν ἡ
οὐσία μία ἡ συνεχία (sometimes τὸ ὅλον is

τι [καὶ] κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἃν τε ἴσον (VII)
 ἃν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν (οἷον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν
 § 3 εἴτε χάρις πλήθος εἰ· ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν) ὅταν α
 δ' ἢ τὸ μὲν τοῦτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δὲ οὐ ἔνεκεν, οὐδὲν ἔν γε τοῦτοις
 30 κοινὸν ἄλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὁρ-
 γάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς·
 οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμουν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὃ γίνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ'
 § 4 ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως
 μὲν δεῖ ταῦς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς
 35 πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμφυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεως ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ

α6 τι] τοι M^a P^a 3, [τι] Κοινας || [καὶ] Sussem. || δεῖ Π^a P^a Δ^a, δὴ P^a α S^b V^b
 Alid. || ταὐτὸ τοῦτο Π^a || 27 οἷον 28 ἐστίν transposed by Bojensen to follow 24
 ὑπάρχειν, cp. *Introd.* p. 87 || 27 ἐστὶν elided by a later hand in P^a, perhaps
 ightly || 28 ὅταν . . 35 ἐστίν transposed to follow 1328 b 1 πολιτείας Sussem. See
 Comm. and cp. *Quaest. civ. coll.* p. 401 f. || 29 δ' ἢ] δὴ Π^a, δὲ Δ^a. || οὐδὲν] οὐδὲ
 Γ M^a || ἐν M^a and apparently P^a || 30 λαβεῖν] παθεῖν Postgate, perhaps ightly
 || 32 [δ γίνεσθαι] Schneidei || 33 δεῖ μὲν κτήσεως Sussem.¹⁴, δεῖ κτήσεως (without
 μὲν) Γ M^a || 34 οὐδὲν δ' ἢ ἀτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶ (ἐστὶ P^a) M^a P^a, ἢ δὲ ἀτῆσις
 οὐδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς πόλεως Γ apparently || 35 κτίσεως P^a V^b

added to τὸ συνεχές] ἢ εἶδος ἢ λόγῳ, 1016
 b 8 The last two together = ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος
 eis ff, 1052 a 29.

§ 3 There is no such 'common in-
 terest' in the case of the means to an end
 and the end itself, the tools and the
 craftsman, architecture (the builder's art)
 and the house. § 4 Hence property may
 be necessary to cities, but nevertheless
 does not form part of a city

28 ὅταν δ' ἢ . . . 35 ἐστίν] This pas-
 sage is closely connected with § 6 b 2
 ἐπισκεπτόν δὲ κτλ. No one would suspect
 any loss if the intervening passage §§ 4,
 5, 1328 a 35—b 2 were removed. In fact
 this intervening passage must be regarded
 as a parenthesis, suggested by a α6 ἂν τε
 ἴσον ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν, appar-
 ently inserted in the wrong place: *Quaest.*
civ. coll. p. 401. In confirmation of this
 view may be cited Dr Postgate's remark
 (*Notes* p. 9) "the same sense can be got
 out of the text by making ἐν γάρ τι . . . μετα-
 λαμβάνωσι, § 2, parenthetical, and ἢ δὲ
 πόλις κτλ., § 4, a resumption of it: thus
 οἷον ἐστίν will refer to ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν."¹⁵ That is, though his
 own remedies are different (see *Crit. n.*),
 he agrees as to the end in view; viz. the
 refutation of 27 οἷον κτλ to 24 ὅσα ταῖς
 πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and the re-
 sumption of 15 ἐν γάρ τι . . 27 μεταλαμβα-

νῶσιν αὶ 35 ἢ δὲ πόλις κτλ.

28 ὅταν δ' ἢ] 'When one thing is the
 means and another the end, in this case
 at least there is nothing in common, ex-
 cept that the latter receives the activity
 of the former.' A very doubtful use of
 λαβεῖν instead of λαβεῖν τι, said of the
 thing acted upon, by no means estab-
 lished, as Prof Ridgeway thinks, by Pl.
Alol. 25 B, where τινὰ μοχθηρὸν ποιῆσω
 τῶν ξυνόντων is followed by κακὸν τι λα-
 βεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. Dr Postgate's παθεῖν
 brings out the exact shade of meaning.
 "the one acts and the other is acted
 upon; the builder makes and the house
 is made."

30 οἷον ὁργάνῳ] *Nic. Eth.* VIII. 11.
 6, 1161 a 32 ff. The same incompati-
 bility exists between soul and body, work-
 man and tool, master and slave. Cp.
E. E. VIII. 9. 2, 1141 b 17—19. (Could
 λαβεῖν = be the recipient of services, ποιῆ-
 σαι = to render them?)

§ 4 33 That property is no 'part'
 of the state, but merely an indispensable
 condition, must weigh with us in deciding
 whether κτητικὴ is a branch of οἰκονομική,
 I. 4. 1, n (32), from the constant parallel
 of household and state I. 8 § 13, § 15,
 1256 b 30, 37 f.; II § 13, 1259 a 33 ff.

35 πολλὰ δ' ἔμφυχα κτλ.] Under

πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδε- (VII)
 § 5 χομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ 3
 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως
 ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχασθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἢ μηδέν,
 40 δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἰτίον τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ
 πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο
 1318 b θηρεύοντες τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας.
 § 6 ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ
 ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις·
 4 ἂν εἴη. διὸ * + ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. ληπτέον τὸίνυν τῶν 4
 § 7 ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον

39 αὐτῆς <πάντως> ? Spengel, needlessly || 40 τῷ τοῦ II² P⁵ Bk.

1318 b 2 ταῦτ' Schneider Bk⁴, ταῦτα Bas.³ || 4 διὸ omitted by II² P⁵ A1. Bk. and Vettoni, who detected the lacuna. But Bk. ignored it, and Welldon is content to punctuate 3 εἴη (καὶ γὰρ . . 4 εἴη)· διὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν

the head of 'animate property' are included slaves as well as domestic animals: see I. c. 4, c. 5 § 8 ff., c. 8 § 6 ff., c. 11 §§ 1, 2, c. 13 §§ 1, 2. Comp also n. (37). SUSKEM. (801)

¶ δὲ πόλις κτλ.] "Now the city is a society of like members": comp. I. 7 § 1, εὐεθέρων καὶ ἰσων, vi(iv). II § 8 ἴσων καὶ ὁμοίων, with notes (58 b, 1293). See also n. (133) and the passages there cited. On the other hand ἀδύνατον ὁμοίους εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, III I § 5, see n. (471). SUSKEM. (797)

36 ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς κτλ.] It is therefore this 'best life realizable' which is the 'one identical common interest' in question, ἐν τῷ κοινῷ (Congreve). Compare further n. (21) and the passages there cited. SUSKEM. (798)

§ 5 37 αὐτῇ δὲ κτλ.] No reference is made to a previous discussion as to the *Εἰσῆς*. Comp. the EXCERPTS I. SUSKEM. (799)

38 ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις τέλειος] A full paraphrase of the definition of *Nic. Eth.*, as may be seen from E. E. II. I, 1219 a 16, τῶν δ' ἢ χρῆσις ἔργων, 1219 b 2, ὧν ἕκαστον χρῆσις ἐστὶ καὶ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἢ ζωὴ καὶ ἢ πρᾶξις.

39 ἀπτε] Apparently redundant, as in II. 2 § 5 n.

40 τῷ γίνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους] This summarizes the statement of III. 1 § 8, 9. An imperfect constitution exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Either the subordinate ends, which fall short of man's true develop-

ment, are raised into ultimate ends: or the true end is sought, but not for all' (A. C. Bradley). Cp. c. 9 § 2, 1328 b 31.

41 ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κτλ.] Cp n. (406) on II. 3. 9. SUSKEM. (800)

1328 b 1 Cp. I. 8. 4 ff

§ 6 2 The recognition of the 'parts' or Members proper will be facilitated by an enumeration of social functions (*ἔργα*), i.e. 'occupations' (b 20 *ἐργασίας*) requisite to the independent existence of the community, which serves roughly to classify the inhabitants working at these occupations. food implies farmers, handicrafts workmen, etc. New terms are introduced in the parallel lists VII(vi) 7. 1, 1321 a 4 ff. (*βανανιστὸν, ἀγοραίων*) and VI(iv). 4. 9, 1290 b 40 ff. (*βανανιστὸν, ἀγοραίων, διαστικόν, δημιουργικόν, βουλευσόμενον*): but here *τεχνῶν* must include *βανανιστῶν*, while τὸ *ἐμπορὸν* or 'capital' probably furnishes the wealthier merchants (*ἀγοραίων*), so far as these are citizens, and the comprehensive *κραιπὰ τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων* corresponds in the main to three classes (judicial, official, deliberative) of VI(iv). c. 4. "Both lists reflect the imperfect industrial and professional development of Greek society" (Newman)

3 All the real members, or parts (*μέρη*), of a city will be indispensable, though not all things indispensable will be members.

4 διὸ * +] There are so many conceivable possibilities for filling up this lacuna that any definite attempt of this kind becomes idle. SUSKEM. (802)

- μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ (VII) ὁργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὄπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινω-
νοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον [καὶ] ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὄπλα πρὸς τε τὴν
ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδι- (p 108)
10 κείν ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχῃσι
καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς <τὰς> πολεμικάς,
πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν
1 καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἔκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγ-
καϊότατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων
15 τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
§ 8 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς ἡ
εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πληθὸς ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς
ζωὴν αὐταρκες, ὡς φαμέν, ἐὰν δέ τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ
19 ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι
§ 9 ταύτην· ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι
πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἱ παρασκευάζουσι
τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μίχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὐπορον,
καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων).
9 διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοι- VIII

§ [καὶ] Κοινας, for which [τε] Welldon, wrongly || αὐτοῖς P⁶ (?), αὐτοῖς I¹ and the rest of our authorities || 11 <τὰς> Schneider Bk.² || 12 [καὶ πρῶτον] Spengel || 16 ὧν] ἃ M¹ P¹ || 18 τούτων after τυγχάνῃ (τυγχάνει P¹) II² P⁶ Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 20 συνεστάναι M¹ P¹ || 21 παρασκευάζουσι P⁶ & Bk || 23 δικαίων Lambin, ἀναγκαίων Γ II Δι. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text

§ 7 An enumeration of functions necessary in a city, to some extent parallel, is attempted in Plato *Rep.* II. 381, cp. *Phaedr.* 248 D, E.

§ 7 8 πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν κτλ.] To these two legitimate ends of warfare is added a third c. 14 § 21, 1334 a 2 μ. (918).
12 πρῶτον] First in importance.

14 κρίσιν] Under κρίσις τῶν συμφερόντων is here included everything besides the administration of justice which belongs to the government of a state. Thus it includes the making of laws and the common action of the consultative and executive councils as well as of the officers of state. SUSEM. (808)

§ 8 18 ὡς φαμέν] III. 1 § 12, cp. μ. (417); IV(VII). 4 § 11 μ. (759); also μ. (21) with the passages there quoted. The present φαμέν is equivalent to a reference to what has preceded, not only here but c. 10 § 9, μ. (831), c. 13 § 4 μ. (872), 14 § 8 μ. (902). Any multitude of men taken at

random does not constitute a state; a remark which was made c. 4 § 6 μ. (753) and repeated VII(V). 3. 11 μ. (1531 b). SUSEM. (804)

§ 9 20 κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας] must be organized in accordance with these occupations.

21 Cp. II. 8 10, 1268 a 32 f.

23 κριτὰς] So above, § 7, b 14, κρίσιν c. 9 Exclusion from the franchise of the producing classes artisans, traders, husbandmen. Those who remain will have different functions, according to age, military, governmental, and judicial duties. This close body of citizens will own the land; taken supernumerary, to become priests.

This exclusion of the 'necessary appendages' from full civic rights was foreshadowed in the criticism of Plato's Republic, II. c. 5 §§ 18—28, and of Hippodamus, c. 8 §§ 8—12: it was laid down distinctly III. c. 5. see μ. (504).

25 νωνητέον πάντων τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαν- (V)
 τας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους
 καὶ δικάζοντας), ἡ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους
 ὑποθετόν, ἡ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 § 2 ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν,
 30 ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας
 πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολι-
 τείας ἐτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσιν
 § 3 πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τὸνναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ
 35 τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη
 35 δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστα· εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ'
 εὐδαίμονιαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἰρηται
 πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ καλλίστῃ πολιτευο-
 μένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἄνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ
 μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνουσιν βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον·
 40 δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς (p.
 § 4 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίως), οὐδὲ δεῖ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλ-

29 ταὐτὸ Susem., τοῦτο ΓΠ ΑΙ. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 32 μὲν omitted by Π¹, [μὲν] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 37 καλίστα P⁴, καλλίστη Π¹ || 40 ζῆν-
 τεον Γ P⁸ || 41 τὴν omitted by Π² P³ Ar. Bk. || δεῖ δὲ Π² P⁸ ΑΙ. Bk.

§ 1 25 τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας This would be the case in democracies

§ 2 29 καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν Just before, § 1, b 25 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κτλ. SUSSEM. (806)

33 πάντων i.e. ἔργων.

§ 3 34 αὕτη 35 εὐδαίμων Comp. c. I § 3 n. (686), c. I § 4 n. (872); also II. 9. 5 n. (284) and n. (21). For the wide range of πολιτεία, see n. (466). SUSSEM. (806)

36 εἰρηται πρότερον It was observed in *Exclusus* I. n. (687), that this can be referred to c. 8 § 5, 1328 a 37, and does not therefore compel us to infer that cc 1—3 originally formed an integral part of this treatise. Nay more had the reference been to c. 1, the more appropriate term would have been ἀποδεδεικται, 'proved', rather than εἰρηται 'related' Comp. further n. (872). SUSSEM. (807)

38 ἀπλῶς In contrast to the partial justice of oligarchy and democracy III. 9.

39 πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν Relatively to the constitution of the time being; under its conditions, taking its principle or special idea (ἄθος) for the standard. See III. 4 3, 1276 b 30, VI(IV). 7. 2, 1293 b 3 ff.

τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινὰ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, with n. (1233). Comp. also II. 9. 1 n. SUSSEM. (808) Add VI(IV) c. I § 5 fin. 1296 b y ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνῃ τις, but c. 16 § 1, 1300 b 14, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν, and *Idem*. XIII. (M) c. 7 § 30 1081 b 32 πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὁρθῶς λέγουσιν, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐκ ὁρθῶς Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 796 b 48 remarks that ὑπόθεσις does not differ much from τέλος οἱ ἄρες. Apparently the meaning is the same here as a 22 ὑποθέσεως οἱ Η. 2. 1, 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν.

40 ἀγεννῆς See III c. 5, esp. notes (506, 509, 511) Cp. also n. (103) SUSSEM. (809)

On the construction ὑπεναντίως πρὸς cp. II. 9. 1, 1269 a 32, § 18, 1270 a 40. For the thought Spengel has the parallel Demosth. *Olynth.* III § 32, p. 37, 10: ἐστὶ δ' οὐδέποτε, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῖλα πράττοντας· ὅσοι' ἄττα γὰρ ἂν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ φρόνημα' ἔχειν. Cp. Buike: (1) all empties and little minds go ill together.

§ 4 1329 a 1 δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς 'Let-

1309 a λοντας ἔσσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς (VI)
ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικὰς). ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ
πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ
κρίνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς
5 πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἑτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θε-
§ 5 τέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἀμφω; φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο,
διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις.
ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκότερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν
δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις· ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυ-
10 νάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ καλύειν, τούτους
ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν
ὑπάλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν.
§ 6 λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ἰσποδιδόναι τὴν

1329 a 1 πολιτας added after ἔσσεσθαι by P⁴ L¹ A¹ Ald. W¹, [πολιτας] Sussem.¹ ||
5 <ἐτέροις> Koras Bk.², previously Schneides viote ἐτέροις for ἑτερα || 6 δὲ] δὴ II¹
|| 11 δὲ untranslated by William, δὲ? Gottling || τοῖς αὐτοῖς Cameiriatus Bk.² perhaps
even Ar., τοὺς αὐτοὺς I¹ II Bk.² Sussem.¹ in the text || 12 ἢ] καὶ I¹ Ald W¹ || 13
ἀμφοτέρα² Sussem. followed by Welldon, who nevertheless retains 14 ταύτην

sure is needed if virtue is to be forth-
coming, as well as for the conduct of state
affairs.¹ Contempt for labour goes side
by side with exaltation of leisure = (93).
The citizen, the farmer even, is too busy
to cultivate virtue. Cp Aelian *V. H.*
x 16, ἡ ἀργία ἀδελφὴ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶ.
From the Greeks this estimate passed to
the Jews: see Ecclesiasticus c. 38, 24—
34 (Newman).

3 βουλευόμενον καὶ κρίνον] From
ἀμφω, a 6, it is clear that a single class
is meant, a body which deliberates on
questions of policy and decides questions
of justice. Cp § 9, a 31, τὸ τε ὁπλικὸν
καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν.

4 ἐνυπάρχει], 'are contained in the
city as members in the fullest sense' not
merely indispensable adjuncts.

6 ἀμφω = the functions (1) of the
military class, (2) of the deliberative and
judicial class

§ 5 7 διότι = that (after φανερόν): as
1253 a 7 and often.

8 ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς] *c.* ἐστὶ: belongs to
a different time of life.

9 φρονήσεως] Cp III. 4. 17 n (497).
also *III.* (45, 112, 115, 474—476). SUSEM.
(810)

ἢ δὲ κατὰ] This is said to be στάσεις
αὐτῶν, II. 5. 25, 1264 b 8. With the parti-
ciple genitive τῶν ἀδυνάτων cp. c. 6 § 4,
1327 a 27: in full ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀδυνάτων c. 14

§ 4, 1332 b 32

11 ταύτῃ δὲ] Resumptive of the δὲ in
a 9: 'in as far as it is impossible, in
so far they must be the same.' When δὲ
has preceded with the relative, it may for
emphasis be repeated with the demonstra-
tive. The idiom is found in Herod. (e.g.
II 50), Thuc (II. 46), Xenophon, Iso-
crates (*Panegy.* § 98, § 176), Plato (*Lach.*
194 D ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν,
ἀπερ σοφός, ἀ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακοί),
and Demosthenes (*c.* *Mid.* § 100, see
Buttmann's Exc. XII.). Bonitz, *Ind.* A.
166 b 58—167 a 12, and *Studien* II. III.
pp. 124—129, has disposed of the view
formerly held (by Zell, Gottling, etc.) that
Aristotle in some cases used δὲ where
other Greek prose writers introduce the
apodosis without any particle. The only
valid instances are (1) after a conditional
particle (1287 b 12 n.), (2) as ἀλλὰ occa-
sionally far on in the sentence.

οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλων κατὰ] Hence one
of the favourite measures of tyrants was
to forbid the use of arms VII(7). 10 § 11,
and II § 22 *nn.* (1667, 1742 b). See
moreover Xen. *Cyr.* VII. 5 79, Thuc. III.
27, the Demos in Mytilene obtained
arms; ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὅπλα οὐτὲ ἡρωῶντο
ἐν τῶν ἀρχόντων (Eaton). SUSEM. (811)

§ 6 13 τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην] 'hanc
partem rei publicae administrandae' Bon-
nitz *Ind.* A. s. v. 'It only remains to

πολιτεῖαν ταύτην, μὴ ἕμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν (VI)
 15 δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις
 ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμησθαι συμφέρει καὶ δίκαιον
 § 7 [εἶναι]· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους. ἀναγκαῖον
 γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ
 20 γὰρ βάνασσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν μέρος
 δὲ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργὸν ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς
 ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ
 τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαν-
 § 8 τας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φα-
 25 νερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγ-
 καῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ᾗ] περιοίκους.
 λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γένος.
 § 9 φανερόν δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε
 βάνασσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρόκειται

14 [ταύτην] Thurot (unless the word be transposed to follow 16 ἀμφοῖν, τὴν αὐτὴν Uelshweg, ταῦτα Susem Cp. *Quaest. cit. coll.* p. 402 f. || μὲν <γὰρ> Vetto in his translation || 16 ἐστίν] εἶναι (from l. 17) Lambin || 17 εἶναι was transposed to follow 18 τούτους by Camerarius, to follow 18 δεῖ by Susem.^{2,3}; εἶναι δοκεῖ Γ P^o A¹, εἶναι [δοκεῖ] Susem.¹ in the text, ἐστίν Lambin followed by Welldon || 18 <εἶναι> added by P^o Bk., and so William A¹. translate || 20 μέρος] γένος P^o P^o A¹ Bk which is just as good || 25 ὅτι—εἴπερ] εἴπερ—ὅτι Hayduck || 26 [ᾗ] Susem., cp. 1330 a 29 and *Quaest. cit. coll.* p. 403 || 27 ἱερῶν Γ P^o L¹ A¹. A¹id., ἱερῶν the other authorities || 29 ἱερέα omitted by P¹ (1st hand), πολίτην supplied by p¹ in the margin

entrust this whole side of political life to both who are the same persons" (a lame conclusion): as if agriculture, trade, etc. were the other side, contrary to the teaching of cc 8, 9. If however we adopt ἀμφοτέρα and ταῦτα (see *Crit. notes*), then τὴν πολιτείαν becomes the subject, not the object, of the verb ἀποδιδοῦναι. SUSEM.

17 ἔχει ἀξίαν] "This division recognizes desert." See c 14 § 4, 1332 b 35, which is a reference back to the present passage; n. (896). SUSEM. (812) § 7 18 <εἶναι> περὶ τούτους] Cp. § 8, a 25, εἶναι τούτων, § 9, a 33, τὴν ἀνάπαιστον ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοῦ. "περὶ c. acc. rem. significat ad quam aliqua actio referatur" Bonitz *Ind. Ar.*, who cites *Thém.* II. 7. 5, 113 a 31, cp. 579 b 43 διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ψὴν αἰσθήσεως=the sensation of sight. "The landed property must be in their hands."

19 Civic rights are not for the artisans, nor for any other class which is not employed upon the 'manufacture' of virtue.

21 ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως] We need not refer this to c. 1, it can be regarded as a reference to c 8 § 5, 1328 a 37 ff., as was explained in n. (807). SUSEM. (813)

23 εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν] "When we call a city happy, we have in view all the citizens and not merely a particular class." Cp. II. 5 27 n. (184). SUSEM. (814)

§ 8 φανερόν δὲ κατὰ] It is certainly not a direct inference, that the soil should be cultivated by slaves or barbarians. But it follows indirectly if we mentally supply two propositions (1) Aristotle's decision that the Greeks in general are not slaves by nature, so that they cannot be treated as such or half-free, n. (54); (2) his remarks, II. 9. 2 ff., 1269 a 36 ff., on the evil consequences attending the employment of slaves of Greek descent, Penestae, Hætelotæ, etc. *nn.* (280, 284). Further comp. c. 10 § 13 n. (849) and Evæ. "On the Cretan περίουχοι" p. 336 SUSEM (815)

§ 9 33 περὶ αὐτοῦς must be περὶ τοῦ

30 τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρῃται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο (VIII)
μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει (p 110)
δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυ-
σιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τού-
τοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

§ 10 ὃν μὲν τοῖνυν ἄνευ πόλιν οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη
36 πόλεως, εἴρηται (γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ
θητικὸν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς
πόλεως τό τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώ-
39 ρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰὲς τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος)
10 [ἔοικε δὲ οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γινώριμον τοῖς περὶ IX

33 αὐτοῖς ? Susem. || τούτους Γ P^o (1st hand, for οἱ 14 written over an era-
sue) and Bk. || 34 τὰς ἱερωσύνας Ar. and Baz.³, τὰς ἱερωσύνας Γ II Bk. || 36
γεωργοῦς—τεχνῖτας ? Scaliger || 37 [ὑπάρχειν] Spengel : the text can hardly be sound
|| 39 δὲ Schneider, δὴ Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 40 [ἔοικε .. 1329 b 39 χάραν]
Susem., [b 3 τὰ τε .. 25 Σωσώστριος] Chandler, [b 5 ἀρχαία.. 25 Σωσώστριος] Boyesen.
see Comm. and *Quaest. et coll.* p 404 ff.

θεοῖς; in their service (Welldon). But
see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 404.

τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας]
Those who are supernannated : upon the
principle stated II q. 25, see n. (330).
This is the solution of an apparent incon-
sistency; that in this, the only genuine
aristocracy, n. (530), all citizens have equal
rights, see n. (930), and yet aristocracy is
the rule of a minority. III. 7 §§ 1—3, 15
§§ 8—10 n. (648), cf. III. 18 1. For if the
citizens of the ideal state must complete
military service before admission, at the
age of 35, into the popular assembly (c.
16 § 9 1335 a 30 ff., Bk. II), and are not
eligible to the Council or the offices of
state (military commands excepted) till
they are about fifty, while later on they
are again released from all civic duties
and lose all civic rights by becoming
priests, it follows that it is only from his
fiftieth to about his seventieth year that
each citizen can have a share in the
entire government and administration,
as indeed was remarked *Introd.* p. 51,
p. 54. For these twenty years only is he
actually a full citizen, in the active ex-
ercise of his rights. This being so, the
ruling body of full citizens will always
remain, beyond all doubt, a minority of
the civic body in the wider sense, in-
cluding the soldiers and supernannated
old men, even if the boys and youths are
excluded. Comp. c. 13 § 9, 1332 a 34
n. (885), c. 14 §§ 4, 5. On the position

which the priests hold in relation to the
magistrates proper see VI(IV) 15. 2 n.
(1344), VII(VI). 8. 21 n. (1478). SUSEM.
(816, 817)

35 ff. 'Thus we have given (1) the
indispensable adjuncts and (2) the integral
parts of a city i.e. cultivators, artisans,
and the whole class of labourers are ad-
juncts indispensable to cities, while the
integral parts are the defensive force and
the deliberative body. These elements
are severally distinct, the distinction be-
tween integral parts and adjuncts being
permanent, that between the army and
the deliberative body only temporary.'
A valuable summary of results.

c. 10 [*Historical digression*: §§ 1—9.]
*Particulars respecting the division and
cultivation of the land*: §§ 9—14.

The historical digression is apparently
an interpolation by a well-informed Peri-
patetic. At all events the suspicion under
which it labours (see *Crit. notes*) has not
been dispelled by Spengel's fond admira-
tion of this "beautiful passage" (*Arist.
Stud.* III. p. 3 n.), or by Newman's dis-
passionate survey, Vol. I. p. 573 f.

§ 1 40 οὐ νῦν οὐδὲ νεωστὶ] Possibly
this is directed against Plato, and in-
tended to prove that he was by no means
the inventor of the particular classifica-
tion wherein Aristotle here follows him.
E. Curtius *History of Greece* i.^o p. 162
(t. p. 181 Eng. tr.) even goes so far as to
suppose that all the three 'ordres' of the

πολιτείας φιλοσοφούσιν, ὅτι δεῖ διηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη (IX.
 1329 b τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεω-
 γοῦν. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ ἔχει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔτι
 καὶ νῦν, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην, τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Αἰγυπτῶν
 + Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασιν, οὕτω νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ

1329 b 2 τε omitted by P² S^b V^b, perhaps by Γ || τοῦτον after τὸν τρόπον P² P^b
 Bk. and γρ. P¹ (corr. in the margin) || δὲ added αὖτε ἔτι by Π¹ (but corr. in the
 margin of P¹ marks it for omission γρ.) || 4 μένω Γ M^c

Platonic state had actually existed in Crete—an opinion which few people will accept. See II. 5. 16 n. (167). SUSK. (818) Hippodamos (see II. 8 a) also adopted this division between the military and agricultural population, which was always one of the main features of the Spartan state, II. 5. 17, 1264 a 10 note. A later historian finds a parallel to Plato's republic in the Indian state Holm *Greck. Genk.* III. p. 185.

41 γένη] Classes, castes. Seven in Egypt are enumerated by Herod. II. 164^a *ἱερεῖς* (ib. cc 37, 143), *μάχιμοι* (c 165), *βουκόλοι* (c. 65), *συνθῶται* (c. 47), *κάπηλοι*, *κυβερνήται*, *ἐρμηνεῖς* c. 154). See however E Meyer *Gesch. des Alterthums* I. § 53, p. 61, § 471, p. 665.

1329 b 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν] An instance of the idiomatic use of the particle οὖν not illative, at the beginning of a sentence, but explanatory and distributive, introducing a subordinate clause "μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronuntiata amplius explicatur" Bonitz *Ind. Ar* s v. The stock instance is *Poet c.* 22 § 4, 1458 a 23: ἀλλὰ ἂν τις ἀπαντα τοιαῦτα ποιῇσθ, ἢ ἀνίγμω ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός, ἂν δὲ μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, ἀνίγμω, ἂν δ' ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός. Vahlen *Beiträge* III. 317 f. points out that this sentence should not be divided by a colon or period after the first βαρβαρισμός. So closely is the whole connected that the clause ἂν μὲν οὖν serves simply to distribute the preceding clause into its parts, explaining τοιαῦτα by ἐκ μεταφορῶν and ἐκ γλωττῶν. Consequently οὖν is not illative: a simple μὲν and δὲ would have sufficed (as in the present passage they do suffice below § 2, b 6 f. τὰ μὲν...τὰ δὲ.). Vahlen classifies the present passage and *Soph. El.* 6 15, 169 a 19, as precisely similar. He admits *Calog.* 2 § 1, i 17, *Thp.* 105 b 21, 108 b 9, b 38 to be not very different while *Pol.* I. 2. 8, 1252 b 29 (see *Crit. note*), IV(VII). 17 8, 1336 b 4, b 6 (ὅλους μὲν οὖν μέλιστα μὲν οὖν), and VIII(V). 12 8, 1316 a 8 also

somewhat dissimilar. Perhaps *De Rep. Athen.* c. 43 § 3, p. 111, 6 K¹, but Harpocration omits οὖν.

4 Σεσώστριος] The Greeks were accustomed to refer all manner of Egyptian institutions to this celebrated king, in whom they seem to have combined (see Duncker *History of Antiquity*, I⁸ 134—158, Eng. II. 1877, pp. 142—159) two ideal kings, Sethos I. (1439—1388 B.C.) and Ramses II. (1388—c. 1350), just as all Spartan institutions were attributed to Lyncus, and all Cretan institutions to Minos. In reality the caste-system, or rather the organization of the Egyptian population (Duncker I⁸ 191 f., Eng. tr. pp. 197—200) existed long before these two kings, and in germ at any rate goes back to the earliest records of Egyptian history. SUSK. (819)

"The monuments prove that there was no such thing as caste, in the strict sense of the term, in Egypt. The son might, and usually did, follow the father's calling: professions and offices of state were often inherited. But there is no evidence of compulsion, or of obligation to marry only in a given caste". A. Wiedemann on Herod. II. 164, *Herodoti seniores Ruhn* p. 571, who quotes *Plat. Tim.* 23, 24, 140c *Ruhis* 6—8, *Diod.* I 73 f, i. 28, *Staho XVII* p. 787. Cp. *Les causes de l'Egypte in Le Monde*, 1886. Also E. Meyer *Gesch. des alten Aegyptens* (Berlin 1887) II. p. 169. Meyer (ib. p. 292) doubts whether Ramses II. really corresponds to Sesosis, any more than Userkesen II. (as supposed by Manetho), or indeed any one military conqueror more than another among the kings. Wiedemann however (*Aegyptische Geschichte* p. 429 f.) follows Lepsius in regarding Ramses II. as the nucleus, around whom, as around Alexander the Great, legends collected. Cp. Ranke *Weltgesch.* I. p. 26, *Maspero Genie* 1^{re} p. 83: 'Sethos, vni. Setho-râ, le nom populaire de Ramsès II.' Of Aristotle Wiedemann says (*Gesch.* p. 117): "the three notices dealing with

§ 2 *περὶ Κρήτην. ἀρχαία δ' εἴκεν εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ*
τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βα-
σιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῷ παλαιότερα τοῦ-
 § 3 *των. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοῦ ἐκεῖ κατοικοῦντων Ἰταλόν*
τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ' οὗ τό τε ὄνομα
 10 *μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς αὐτ' Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι καὶ τὴν*
ἀκτὴν ταύτην τῆς Εὐρώπης Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν, ὅση
τετύχηκεν ἐντὸς οὕσα τοῦ κόλπου τοῦ Σκυλλητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ
Λαμητικοῦ· ἀπέχει δὲ ταῦτα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ὁδὸν ἡμι-
 § 4 *σείας ἡμέρας. τοῦτον δὲ λέγουσι τὸν Ἰταλὸν νομάδας τοὺς*
 15 *Οἰνωτροὺς ὄντας ποιῆσαι γεωργούς, καὶ νόμους τε αὐτοῖς ἄλ-*
λους θέσθαι καὶ τὰ συσσίτια καταστήσαι πρῶτον· διδ
καὶ νῦν ἔτι τῶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου τινὲς χρώνται τοῖς συσσιτίοις
 § 5 *καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοις. ὥκουν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὴν Τυρρη-*

§ 2 λόγος Γ⁵, λογικοί Ρ¹ || 13 *Ναπετίνου* ? Sylburg (from Dion Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1. 35) || δ[?] γὰρ Π³ Ρ³ Bk. || 15 *τε αὐτοῖς ἄλλους Μ³, τ³ ἄλλους αὐτοῖς Ρ⁵, ἄλλους τε αὐτοῖς Ρ¹ Π³ Bk.* || 18 *τυρρηλίαν Μ³ Ρ³ 1-4-5 S⁵ V⁵* and perhaps Γ

the country leave a good impression: yet the statement that the division into castes originated with *Σεούτις* does not diverge from the current erroneous tradition. It would seem that Aristotle can hardly have made independent researches on Egypt in detail."

Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην] The division of the Cretan population is mentioned II 5 19, 1264 a 21, *π* (171), c. 10 §§ 1-8 with Exc III. p. 336 ff. *SUSEM.* (820)

§ 2 5 *τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις*] The system of public meals, as *ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας*, II. 11. 2, 1272 b 30. cp. also II. 5. 5, 1263 a 23.

6 *περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν*] Compare again II 10 § 3, § 5, § 7, § 9. *SUSEM.* (821)

§ 3 8 *οἱ λόγοι*] II. 8. 1, 1267 b 28. Comp. Antiochus *Strag.* 3, 4, 6, Müller *F. H. G.* I. p. 181 f. *SUSEM.* (822)

Ἰταλόν τινα . 15 γεωργούς] Antiochus (*Str.* 6 apud Strab. VI. 254 f.) however calls the *Lametic* gulf the *Napetine*: the name common in later times is δ' *Ἰεπωνιατικός*. This gulf is in the south-west of Italy, in Bruttium, and is now Golfo di S. Eufemia: just opposite to it, on the east coast, is the Scyllitic Gulf or Golfo di Squillaci. Strabo describes them as 160 stadia [i.e. 18 miles 660 yds] apart, i.e. more than half a day's journey. The name Italy was then

originally confined to the south-west promontory of the peninsula, between the strait of Messina on the one side and these two gulfs on the other. *Oenotria* means Wine-land, *Italia* the Ox, or calf-Italy, the land of Oxen. The ox used for ploughing must be meant, a symbol of the transition of the Graeco-Italians from a pastoral to an agricultural life; and this, one of the oldest legends of the Italian race, shrewdly connects the original Italian legislation with the transition. Another version of the same belief makes the ox the leader of the primitive Samnite colonies; while the oldest national names in Latin distinguish the people as reapers (*Siculi* perhaps also *Sicani*) or field-labourers (*Opsci*). See Mommsen, *History of Rome* I. p. 21 f. Eng. tr. Thucydides VI. 2. 4 calls this king *Italos* not an *Oenotrian* but a *Sicel*. For the name *Europe*, see c. 7 § 2, n. (779). *SUSEM.* (823)

§ 4 16 *καὶ τὰ συσσίτια*] There is no other authority for this statement of common meals in Italy. *SUSEM.* (824)

διδ καὶ νῦν . 17 *χρώνται*] The language is undoubtedly the echo of II. 10. 3, 1271 b 30 *διδ καὶ νῦν οἱ περιόικοι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον χρώνται αὐτοῖς*. But we hesitate to draw the inference that here, as there, an extract from Ephorus follows (Newman: I. p. 575 n. 2).

§ 5 18 *ὥκουν δὲ κατὰ*] Here the in-

- 19 νίαν Ὀπικοί καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν καλούμενοι τὴν ἑπαιν- (IX)
 20 μίαν Αἰσωνες, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ τὸν Ἴόνιον
 Χῶνες, τὴν καλούμενην Σιρίτῳ· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χῶνες
 § 6 Οἰνωτροὶ τὸ γένος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν συσσιτίων τάξεις ἐντεῦθεν 4
 γέγονε πρῶτον, ὃ δὲ χωρισμὸς ὃ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (p. 111)
 24 πλήθους ἐξ Αἰνύπτου· πολλὸν γὰρ ὑπερτείνει τοῖς χρόνοις τὴν

20 αἰσωνες M^s P⁴⁻⁵ V^b || 21 χῶνες (χῶνες S^b V^b) Π² P⁵ Ar. || Σιρίτῳ Götting Bk², Syrtiens William, σίρτῳ P⁶ and P² (1st hand), σίρτῳ the other authorities Ar. Bk.¹ Sussem.¹ in the text and P³ (1st hand), Σίρῳ Heyne (Orelli. II. 211, 235) from Arist. Frag. 542, 1568 b 11 ff. (Σίρῳ is the correct accentuation.) || χῶνες Π² P⁵ Ar.

interpolator has taken the opportunity to add his historic knowledge, for this whole passage has nothing whatever to do with the point he wants to prove. The nearest neighbours of the Oenotians or Itali on the north-west and north-east only, are mentioned here. At any rate this must be supposed to have been the writer's intention, if indeed the mention of these places has any meaning at all. The name of the one, Opici, is the same as the Opici or Oscans, explained in n. (823). Why the Greeks called them Ausonians we cannot tell. Iapygia denotes what was afterwards called Apulia and Calabria. The Siris is a river in the south-east of Lucania. His inclusion of the Chonians among the Oenotians is another proof of the author's agreement with Antiochus (Frag. 6, n. 823). But the Oscans were not near neighbours of that oldest Italy; even according to the account given by the interpolator they lived south of Tyrrhenia (Etruria) in Latium, and more especially in Campania, north of the Gulf of Paestum. Cp. Arist. Frag. 567 [558 Arist. pseud., = 609 ed. Teubn.] in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. I. 72 where Latium is described as a region in Opikē, τὴν τόσον τοῦτον τῆς Ὀπικῆς, δι καλεῖται Λατίον (Eaton). But Antiochus goes on to say that the name Italy, and probably also the earlier name Oenotria, had first been extended further north as far to the north-west as the river Laos, which flows through the south-west of Lucania and to the north-east as far as the plain of the Siris and Metapontum, situated to the north of this plain in the north-east part of Lucania, so that Tarentum, which is not far east of Metapontum, was still included in Iapygia; for he tells us, the country round the plain of the Siris had been inhabited by a great

Oenotian tribe, the Chonians, who gave it the name Chonē. Thus the whole of the west coast of this region newly added to the old designation Italy was washed by the Tarmaic Gulf, of which the Hipponatic in the extreme south is only a particular bay. Thucydides' use of the word Italy quite accords with this, for he includes Metapontum in Italy, but makes it the boundary towards Iapygia (VII. 33 § 3), while he appears to include Tarentum in Iapygia (VI. 44 § 2) and places Campanian Cuma in Opicia (VI. 4 § 5). Herodotus (I. 167) even extends the designation Oenotria beyond the Laos and the Tarmaic Gulf, so that Elea also is included in it. The country of the Opici would then touch this enlarged Italy on the north-west, but unfortunately in our present passage there is no mention of this extension of the name; and, besides, the Chonian territory is not said to border on this enlarged Italy or Oenotria, but is itself included in it. The whole passage is therefore doubtless a wretched interpolation, and as such would have to be removed from the text, if that really belonged to Aristotle. But it will be shown in notes (829, 830) that the whole passage §§ 1-9 has been added by another hand, and that its author, one of the oldest Peripatetics, though he has drawn from good historical sources, may yet have written this sentence, in which he has certainly made very bad use of them. SUSSEM. (828)

§ 6 24 πολλὸν γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κατὰ
 As shown in n. (819). SUSSEM. (828)
 τοῖς χρόνοις The plural as in VI(IV).
 6 § 5, 1293 a 1, and in the suspected
 chapter II, 12 § 7, 1274 a 30: more usually
 as in VI(IV). 3 § 3, VIII(V). 4 § 1.
 Another instance is *Nic. Eth.* VII. 12 § 2,
 1161 b 25, τὰ δὲ προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις.

- § 7 Μίνω βασιλείαν ἢ Σεσώστριος. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ (IX)
 26 ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὐρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,
 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρεῖαν
 εἰκὸς διδάσκειν αὐτήν, τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιου-
 30 σίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὐλογον λαμβάνειν τὴν αὐξη-
 § 8 ἔχειν τρόπον. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα, σημείον τὰ περὶ 5
 Ἀἴγυπτον ἐστίν· οὗτοι γὰρ ἀρχαιοτάτοι μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι,
 νόμων δὲ τετυχηκάσιν <ἀεὶ> καὶ τάξεως πολιτικῆς. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς
 μὲν εἰρημένοις ἱκανῶς χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ παρалеλεμμένα
 35 πειρᾶσθαι ζητεῖν.
 § 9 ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὴν χώραν εἶναι τῶν ὅπλα κεκτη-
 μένων καὶ τῶν τῆς πολιτείας μετεχόντων, εἴρηται πρότε-
 ρον, καὶ διότι τοὺς γεωργοῦντας αὐτῶν ἐτέρους εἶναι δεῖ, καὶ
 πόσῃν τινὰ χρῆ καὶ ποίαν εἶναι τὴν χώραν·] περὶ δὲ τῆς 6
 40 διανομῆς καὶ τῶν γεωργοῦντων, τίνας καὶ πόλους εἶναι χρῆ,
 λεκτέον πρῶτον, ἐπειδὴ οὕτε κοινὴν φάμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὴν

28 εἰκὸς after διδάσκειν II² P² Bk. || 30 τὰ omitted by Γ and Π¹ (1st hand, sup-
 plied by corr¹) || 31 δὲ] γὰρ ? Susem. || 33 <ἀεὶ> Beinau and Susem. inde-
 pendently, <πρῶτον> ? Schneider || 34 εὐσημένοις Lambin Bk.², apparently right
 || 36 τῶν <τὰ> Spengel || 41 δὲν after εἶναι II² P² Bk.

27 μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις] Cp. the well
 known passage *Metaph.* I. 3 § 8, 339
 a 29, οὗ γὰρ δὴ φήσομεν ἀπαξ οὐδὲ δις
 οὐδ' ὀλίγας τὰς αὐτὰς δόξας ἀνακλιεῖν
 γνωμένας ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις
 § 7 27 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα] Comp.
 n. (795) on c. 8 § 1. SUSEM. (827)

28 τὰ δὲ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην κτλ.] All
 these ideas are certainly genuinely Ari-
 stotelian see II. 5 § 16, 1264 a 3 with n.
 (167) and *Meta.* I. I. § 15, 981 b 17 ff.:
 esp. b 20 ὅθεν ἴδῃ πάντων τῶν τοιοῦτων
 κατασκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ
 πρὸς ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν.
 But see n. (819). SUSEM. (828)

§ 8 34 τὰ δὲ παρалеλεμμένα πει-
 ρᾶσθαι [ζητεῖν] How can that be done,
 if everything has been already discov-
 ered? It is hardly possible to attribute
 this paradox to Aristotle. The interme-
 diate link is wanting, which explains that
 what has been already discovered may
 be lost in oblivion and therefore require
 to be rediscovered. SUSEM. (829) Cp
 Plato *Lysis* 630 E of legislators: οὗ γὰρ
 ἀν ἑκαστος ἐν χρόνῳ γίνεσθαι, τοιοῦτο [ζητεῖν]
 οὐκ παραθέμενος. But Waits compares
 the end of the *Tophos*, 184 b 6—8.

§ 9 36 ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . 39 χώραν] If
 we compare this new recapitulation with
 the one given above in c. 9 § 10, it is
 clear that it passes over everything inter-
 mediate, as not containing anything pecu-
 liar or important for the course of the
 inquiry, but as seeking historic confirma-
 tion partly for what is assumed in c. 9
 and partly, with an eye to what is coming,
 for the system, which do not come up
 for discussion until 10 § 10, like the former
 recapitulation, it summarizes everything
 discussed before c. 10. But while the
 former is rightly confined to the contents
 of the two preceding chapters, with which
 alone what follows (6—9) is connected,
 the latter wrongly passes over the passage
 c. 5 § 4—c. 6 § 7, as though none of it
 were there at all, and goes back to the
 subject-matter of c. 5 §§ 1—3, although
 this has no immediate connexion with
 what follows. We can clearly detect the
 interpolator, who has framed this second
 recapitulation, so entirely out of place
 here, with the sole object of fastening his
 own composition (i.e. c. 10 §§ 1—8) on
 Aristotle's treatise. SUSEM. (830)

41 φάμεν] II. 5 §§ 4—9 n. (186, 186 b,

- 1330 a κτήσιν, ὥσπερ τινὲς εἰρήκασιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς (IX)
 γινομένη κοινήν, οὐτ' ἂν πορτεῖν οὐδένα τῶν πολιτῶν τροφήν.
 § 10 περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι χρησίμους εἶναι ταῖς εὖ
 κατεσκευασμέναις πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτία συν-
 5 δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν, ὅσπερ ἐροῦμεν. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτον κοινωνεῖν
 πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐ βῆδιον δὲ τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀπὸ τῶν
 ἰδίων τε εἰσφέρειν τὸ συντεταγμένον καὶ διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλ-
 λην οἰκίαν. ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς δαπανήματα κοινὰ γ
 § 11 πάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐστίν. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖνυν εἰς δύο μέρη
 10 διηρῆσθαι τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἶναι κοινήν τὴν δὲ τῶν
 ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τούτων ἑκατέραν διηρῆσθαι διχα πάλιν, τῆς
 μὲν κοινῆς τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μέρος εἰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς
 λειτουργίας τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην, (p. 112)
 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐσχα-
 15 τίαις, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ἵνα δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ
 νεμηθέντων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχωσιν. τό 8
 τε γὰρ ἴσον οὕτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς

1330 a 2 γινομένη Congreve, γινόμενη <γίνεσθαι> Sussem.², γινομένην Γ II Ar. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text. || 4 δοκεῖ? Sussem. || 14 τὸ μὲν ἕτερον Stob. p. 332 and Paris. 2042 || τὸ ἀπὸ μέλους omitted by Stob || ταῖς ἐσχατίαις Stob., *propter necessitates* William A1. Suid. and Phot notice this passage s v. ἐσχατίαν || 15 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ δὲ ἕτερον Stob. || τῇ πόλει Stob. || ἐκάστῳ P⁴, ἑκάστῳ L¹ Ald. W^b

158), 9 §§ 2—4 n. (279), 11 § 10 n. (393). Compare also II. 6 §§ 10—14 n. (211), IV(VII). 9 §§ 3, 7, 8 The same use of the present, φαμέν, as in c. 8 § 8 n. (804), and below c. 13 § 5 n. (872), c. 14 § 8 n. (902). SUSSEM (831)

1330 a 1 τινὲς Plato alone is meant by this. SUSSEM. (832) See n. on 1261 a 6.

5 οὐτ' ἂν πορτεῖν οὐδένα] A condition upon which special stress is laid in the criticism of Carthage cited n. (831)· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὅραν ἐστι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως αἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἀρχόντες ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιωτεύοντες, 1273 a 32 ff

§ 10 3 συνδοκεῖ πᾶσι] As c.g. Plato *Leges* 780 B, εἴδοε μέγα διαφέρειν εἰς σωτηρίαν τὸ νόμιμον, Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 5. § 5 ὅσπερ ἐροῦμεν] An unfulfilled promise. *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4) and p. 53. SUSSEM. (833)

8εῖ δὲ τοῦτον 8 οἰκίαν] "Now all the citizens must take part in these (syssitia), but it is not easy to arrange that poor men should contribute their quota from their own means and at the

same time pay all that is needed for their own housekeeping as well." See II. 9 § 31 n. (341), 10 § 8 n. (365). Compare also n. (153) on II. 5. 2. SUSSEM. (834) For τὸ τεταγμένον cp. II. 10 § 7, 1272 a 15.

8 κοινὰ πάσης τῆς πόλεως] "The *Politics* takes for granted the maintenance, even in the best state, of the popular faith and the traditional worship" (Newman). Comp. n. (859).

§ 11 13 εἰς τὴν τῶν συσσιτίων δαπάνην] This is precisely the solution which the criticism in Book II indicated: see n. on 8 § 3 (254), 9 § 31 (312), 10 § 8 (365).

14 τῆς δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν... 16 μετέχωσιν] See II. 6 § 15 n. (215). SUSSEM. (836) The land nearer to the city would possess many advantages over those more remote.

16 τὸ τε γὰρ ἴσον. 20 καλόν] Comp. Thuc. I. 120 § 2 (the various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy), II. 21 § 3 (the Achaeans); the Book of Numbers c. 32 (the tribes beyond Jordan), as

- § 12 ἀστυγείοντας πολέμους ὁμονοητικώτερον. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ τοῦτον (IX)
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οἱ μὲν δλιγωροῦσι τῆς πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους
 20 ἔχθρας, οἱ δὲ λίαν φροντίζουσι καὶ παρὰ τὸ καλόν. διὸ
 παρ' ἐνίοις νόμος ἐστὶ τοὺς γειτνιῶντας τοῖς ὁμόροις μὴ συμ-
 μετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, ὥς διὰ τὸ ἴδιον
 οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους βουλευσασθαι καλῶς.
- § 13 τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν ἀνάγκη διηρῆσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον
 25 διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας· τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας μάλιστα μὲν, ο
 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν, δούλους εἶναι, μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε
 θυμοειδῶν (οὗτω γὰρ ἂν πρὸς τε τὴν ἐργασίαν εἰεν χρήσιμοι
 καὶ πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν ἀσφαλεῖς), δεύτερον δὲ
 29 βαρβάρους περιοίκους παραπλησίους τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν φύ-
 § 14 σιν, τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν [ἰδίους] ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι ἰδίους
 τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ γῇ κοινούς.
 τίνα δὲ δεῖ τρόπον χρῆσθαι δούλοις, καὶ διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι τοῖς
 δούλοις ἄθλον προκεῖσθαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
- 11 τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅτι μὲν δεῖ κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς ἡπείρου τε X
 35 καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῆς χώρας ἀπάσης ὁμοίως ἐκ τῶν
 ἐνδεχομένων, εἴρηται πρότερον· αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι

19 τῆς] τὴν Π³ P⁵ || 20 ἔχθρας Π³ P⁵ || διὸ παρ' διόπερ Π³, perhaps rightly ||
 22 βουλῆς] τιμῆς Γ M² || 26 εἰ δεῖ] εἴθε Sylhuig, δεῖ Schneider, εἰ <εἶναι> δεῖ
 Spengel, possibly rightly || ὁμοφύλων πάντας—27 θυμοειδέες Schneider, hardly
 right || 29 <τ> περιοίκους Schneider, cp. 1329 a 26 || 30 ἰδίου before ἐν
 omitted by P⁴ L² A¹, the second ἰδίου omitted by Γ P⁵ Bk. || 34 τὸ Ald., τὰς P³
 T³ V² || 35 θαλάσσης M², θαλάσσης the other authorities Bk. Susem.^{1,2} || 36 αὐτὴν]
 αὐτὴν M² P³ Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand) || εἶναι .37 δὴ] εἰ κατ' εὐχὴν δεῖ καταναγκάσειν,
 τὴν θέσιν πρὸς τέτταρα * δὴ (δεῖ Schneider Susem.²) Susem.^{1,2}, wrongly, *si ad totum*

cited by editors. Moreover for §§ 11, 12
 generally see II. 6 § 14 n. (211). SUSEM.
 (886)

§ 13 26 εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν Compare
 the passages collected in n. (128) on II. 1
 § 1 SUSEM. (887)

μήτε ὁμοφύλων] So Plato *Leges* VI. 777 D
 cp. μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοὺς μέ-
 λους αὐτῶν δουλεύσαν ἀσυμφώνως τε εἰς
 δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα. Comp Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.*
 I. 5 §§ 5, 6, 1344 b 11 ff., esp. b 18 καὶ
 μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμογενεῖς πολλοὺς (Schneider).
 SUSEM. (888)

μήτε θυμοειδῶν] The same expression
 II. 5, § 25, 1264 b 9, see n. (182); there
 "men of spirit," here "passionate"
 Compare what is said of θυμός in notes
 on II. 16 § 1 (64), IV(VII). 7 § 5 (786),
 § 7 (790). SUSEM. (889)

28 δεύτερον δὲ] Comp. c. 9 § 8 n.

(815), also notes on II. 9. 4 (282) and
 Exc III. on the Cretan περιοίκου p. 338.
 SUSEM. (840)

32 διότι βέλτιον πᾶσι...ἐλευθερίαν] A
 new contradiction in Aristotle's theory of
 slavery. For slaves by nature, as in the
 best state actual slaves or serfs can only
 be, must logically remain slaves for ever.
 However comp Ps.-Ar. *Oecon.* I. 5 § 5 ff.
 1344 b 14 ff. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὀρίσθαι
 πᾶσιν· δικαίον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευ-
 θερίαν κτᾶσθαι ἄθλον. SUSEM. (841)

33 ὕστερον] an unfulfilled promise:
Introd. pp 49, 53 SUSEM. (842)

cc. 11, 12. The city: regulations in
 detail for the site, the water-supply, the
 plan of the streets, the fortifications, and
 the two Agorai. Cp. *Analysis* p. 115.

§ 1 36 εἴρηται πρότερον] In c. 5 § 3,
 4. SUSEM. (843)

37 τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέ- (X)
 § 2 ποντας. πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, πρὸς ὑγίειαν (αἷ τε
 γὰρ πρὸς ἑω τὴν ἔγκλισιν ἔχουσαι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πνεύματα
 40 τὰ πνέοντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνατολῆς ὑγιεινότεραι, δευτέρου δὲ
 κατὰ βορέαν· εὐχέλμεροι γὰρ αὐταὶ μάλλον). τῶν δὲ λοι- 3

oportet adhibere positionem, quatuor utique respicientes William, who doubtless translates a gloss || εἶναι omitted by P^a, [εἶναι] Bk.^a (perhaps rightly), εἰ δὲ Welldon, who transposes 37 εὐχεσθαι δεῖ to follow κατατυγχάνειν (wrongly). Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. suspects that κατατυγχάνειν is corrupt || 37 εὐχεσθαι ἀρχεσθαι M^a || πρὸς omitted by Π¹ (supplied by P¹) || δὴ omitted by Π¹ Bk., δὲ? Schneider, * * δὲ Susem.¹ || 38 αἱ τε] ἀρε P²-S¹ B, αἱ Π¹, αἱ [τε] Susem.¹, αἱ μὲν Κοραε (needlessly) || 40 δὲ <αἱ> Κοραε, certainly necessary, perhaps δ' αἱ is better || 41 καταβόρειον Landau; but Schneider shows that κατὰ βορέαν has the same sense || εὐχέλμεροι] νεαροὶ Susem.¹ in the text, recentiores William, εὐδερνοί Muetus, εὐδερνοί Bockei, approved by Susem.¹, —all resting upon misapprehension of κατὰ βορέαν

αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι . κατατυ-
 χάνειν...37 βλέποντας) The construction of the infinitives εἶναι, κατατυγχάνειν is disputed, and Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. suspects the latter word. Büttner (*op. c.* p. 17) compares (as Gotting had done) phrases like ἐκὼν εἶναι and the like. he thinks an object of the verb κατατυγχάνειν can be supplied without trouble from what follows. On the contrary, if κατατυγχάνειν is sound, it is on this verb that the accus. with infinitive τὴν θέσιν εἶναι must depend: this construction already given in Passow's lexicon has lately been proposed anew by Dr Jowett (= τοῦ θέσιν εἶναι). To this Susemihl objects: "at non hoc optandum est ut τὴν θέσιν accipiat ubi, sed τὴν ἐπιτηδεύαν θέσιν vel τὴν θέσιν ὡς δὲ, quod ut subdandi posset a verbis πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας, conbendum potius erat fecit sic. αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς θέσεως κατατυγχάνειν. Aut igitur lacuna deformatus esse videtur locus aut, quae est Bonitzii suspicio, κατατυγχάνειν corruptum. Omnia bene se habent, si < τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύαν > vel < τοῦ ὅταν δὲ > εἶναι legeretur, sed in 10 tam incerta praestat a coniectura abstinere." Mr Welldon's proposal is met by the inquiry, Can κατατυγχάνειν govern an accusative? and if it can, would it not be easier to omit εἶναι with I¹? (See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 407, of which the foregoing is an abstract.) SUSEM.

37 εὐχεσθαι] Another of the passages collected in H. (128) on II. I. 1. SUSEM. (844)

§ 2 38 αἱ τε γὰρ. 40 ὑγιανότεραι] Similarly Hippocrates *De aere* I. p. 525 ff.

Kuhn. In Greece, east winds bring rain, thus moderating the heat and purifying the air. cp *Meteor.* II. 6. 20, 36, b 19 f., *Problem.* xxvi 56, *Oecon.* I. 6. 9, 1345 a 31 ff., *Thuc.* III. 23 5 Aristophanes *Wasps* 265 speaks of the north wind as rainy, and so also Theophrastus *De ventis* § 4. like the trade winds, he adds, which are described sometimes as north-east and sometimes as north-west winds. Sociates in *Xen. Memor.* III. 9. 9 and Xenophon himself *Oecon.* c. 9 § 4 (a passage almost literally copied Pseudo-Arist. *Oecon.* I. c as Schlosser remarked) prefer a house with a south aspect (Eaton). SUSEM. (845)

Add Plutarch *De virtute* c. 1, 515 C: ὥσπερ τὴν ἐμὴν πατρίδα πρὸς ζέφυρον ἀνεμὸν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐρεῖδοντα δειλὴς ἀπὸ τοῦ Παρνασοῦ δεχομένην, ἐπὶ τὰς ἀνατολὰς τραπῆναι λέγουσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαίρωνος. The east wind is spoken of as warm *Probl.* xxvi. 31, 943 b 24 (Newman).

41 κατὰ βορέαν] Under the north wind, and so protected from it. i. e. with south aspect. Cp *Oecon.* I. 6. 8, 1345 a 33, κατὰβόρειος οὖσα, *Plato Critias* 118 A, B: πρὸς νότον ἐτέτραπτο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτων κατὰβόρειος (J. G. Schneider). Hippocrates however preferred a north aspect as next best to an east aspect. SUSEM. (846)

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν] What are the four points to be observed, a 36? Health first, a 38; two more are accounted for by the words, πρὸς τε τὰς πολικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν; the one which still remains is, in all probability, beauty

- 130 b πῶν * * πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς (X)
 § 2 ἔχειν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον
 εἶναι χρή, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερίληπτον,
 ὑδάτων δὲ καὶ ναμάτων μάλιστα μὲν ὑπάρχειν πλήθος (P. 11:
 5 οἰκίειον, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦτό γε εὐρηται διὰ τοῦ κατασκευάζειν
 ὑποδοχὰς ὁμβρίοις ὕδασιν ἀφθόνοους καὶ μεγάλας, ὥστε
 μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργομένους τῆς χώρας διὰ πόλεμον.
 § 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ περὶ ὑγείας φροντίζειν τῶν ἐνοικοούντων, τοῦτο § 3
 δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον ἔν τε τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πρὸς
 10 τοιοῦτον καλῶς, δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγεινοῖς χρήσθαι, καὶ
 τούτου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν μὴ παρέργως. οἷς γὰρ πλείστοις
 χρώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ πλειστάκις, ταῦτα πλείστον
 συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ὑγίαν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ
 § 5 πνεύματος δύναμις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν. διόπερ ἐν
 15 ταῖς εὐ φρονούσαις δεῖ διωρίσθαι πόλεις, ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ'

1330 b 1 <πρὸς μὲν τὸν κόσμον * *, τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν ἐστι τὴν θέσιν τῆς πόλεως> πρὸς, or something similar, ? Susem. || 2 μὲν after αὐτοῖς is omitted by IP and not translated by A1.; hence [μὲν] Susem.¹ || 4 δὲ IP² A1., τε M² P¹ IP² Bk. || 5 εὐρηται] εὐρήσθαι Lambin Bk.², but Schneider thought another verb required: τηρῆσαι for γε εὐρηται ? Susem.³, needlessly; cp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408 || 6 ὁμβρίους ὕδασιν M² P¹ 2-4 V² Ald., ὁμβρίους ὕδατος P², *aquarum imbrium* Willam, ὁμβρίου ὕδατος or ὁμβρίων ὑδάτων ? Susem.³ || 7 ἐπιλείπειν Koiaes Bk.², needlessly || εἰργομένους Madvig || 8 ἐπεὶ] ἔπερ Bocker, transposing ἔπερ .17 χρῆσθαι to precede τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν 1330 a 41 || 9 δεῖ <κα> ? Susem. || 10 καὶ τοῦτον <δεῖ> Schneider, <δεῖ> καὶ τούτου Welldon, 11 ἔχειν <δεῖ> Susem.^{1,2}. But if a verb is required (instead of understanding δεῖ in the apodosis from b 9 (the protasis) χρῆσθαι, <χρή> καὶ is more obvious || 11 τοῦτον] τούτων Welldon, wrongly || πλείστοις P^{2,4} || 14 τοιοῦτον IP² P² A1. Bk.

of situation. See ἥδην 1330 b 22, κόσμον b 31, εὐχαιρὶ 1331 a 36, καὶ τούτων τὸν κόσμον a 36. If the mention of this has been lost after λοιπῶν we may perhaps supply it, as suggested in the *Critical notes*, and render the whole: "of the remaining points, <regard for the beauty of the town is indeed important, but far more important> that it should be well situated for the needs of civil administration and for military purposes." See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 408. SUSEM. (847).
 § 3 1330 b 2 πρὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ] Again from the same point of view as c. 5 § 3, 1326 b 41: see n. (767). SUSEM. (848).

4 ὑδάτων] The water supply of Greek towns was often scanty enough (Mahaffy): that of Antioch was wonderfully good: Liban. i. 354 R. Strabo, too (p. 235),

commends the Roman for their attention to this requirement (Newman). Cp. Pl. *Lysis* 779 c.

5 τούτῳ γε εὐρηται] See *Oecon.* 11. 2, 22, 1350 a 17, εὐρέειν = ascerui, though τοῦτο is a little strange, the sense must be "thus what is required has been attained." Cp. c. 13 § 2, 1331 b 29. SUSEM.

7 'Recte Ridgewayas ὕδατα subiectum esse monet et εἰργομένους obiectum vei bi ὑπολείπει' *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 408 SUSEM. That this is Aristotle's regular use of the verb is plain from *Rhet.* i. 13. 20, 1374 a 33, ὑπολείπει γὰρ ὅν ὁ αἰὼν διατρέμονται, and III. 17. 21, 1418 a 35, οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος (Ridgeway).

§§ 4, 5. These suggestions are eminently sound and practical.

ὅμοια μὴτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἢ ναμάτων, χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς (X) τροφήν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν. περὶ δὲ 4 τόπων [τῶν] ἐρυνμῶν οὐ πάσαις ὁμοίως ἔχει τὸ συμφέρον ταῖς πολιτείαις· οἶον ἀκρόπολις ὀλυγαρχικὸν καὶ μοναρχικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' ὁμαλότης, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ οὐδέτερον, 10 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόποι πλείους. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσις ἡδίων μὲν νομίζεται καὶ χρησιμωτέρα πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις, ἂν εὖτομος ἢ κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον καὶ τὸν Ἰπποδάμειον τρόπον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς 25 ἀσφαλείας τούναντιον ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον· δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξεινοῖς καὶ δυσεξερευνητος τοῖς § 7 ἐπιτιθεμένοις. διὸ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέχειν (ἐνδέχεται γάρ, ἂν τις οὕτως κατασκευάξῃ καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργίοις ὡς καλοῦσί τινες τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας) καὶ τὴν μὲν 30 ὅλην πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν εὖτομον, κατὰ μέρη δὲ καὶ τόπους·

16 μὴτ' μηδὲ Κοίαιες, rightly || τοιούτων II P⁴ L^a and P⁸ (coll.), τούτων the other authorities Ar. Bk.¹ || 18 τῶν omitted by M² P¹, <τῶν> τόπων τῶν P⁸ V², τόπων τῶν Bk. with the other authorities || 21 ἰδίων οἰκείων M² and P¹ (1st hand, corrected in the margin) || 22 μὲν omitted by II², untranslated by Ar., hence [μὲν] Sussem.¹ || 23 καὶ inserted before κατὰ by II² P² Bk. || 24 [καὶ] Schneider Sussem.¹ 2, possibly right || Ἰπποδάμειον II² (in P⁴ & written faintly) P⁸ || 25 χρόνον] τρόπον I M² || 26 δυσέξοδος—δυσεξερευνητος] δυσεξερευνητος—δυσέξοδος Jackson || 27 ἀμφοτέρων ἀπὸ τούτων II² P² Bk., thus avoiding hiatus || 28 γεωργίαι Scaliger, γεωργοί I II A¹. Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text, γεωργοῖς Camerarius || 30 ὅλην] ἄλλην A¹. and P⁸ (1st hand, corrected by a later hand) || πόλιν after μὴ ποιεῖν II² P² Bk., omitted by P¹

§ 5 20 ἀριστοκρατικόν] This holds good of the best constitution also, since this is at once the true and the best form of aristocracy: VI (IV). 7. 2 n. (1232), cp. c. 2 § 1 (1133), § 4 (1141): II. 6. 17 n. (118): III. 7. 3 n. (536) and Exc. I. on B. III. For it is only in an aristocracy that fortified places are used solely as a protection against external foes, and the latter will plainly find the conquest of the city more difficult if they have to capture many such. Under a monarchy or an oligarchy the Acropolis, or single citadel, was also used for defence against popular insurrections; for this reason it is against the interests of democracy, because liable to become the rallying place of movements in favour of the tyrant or the oligarchs; in short usurpers may establish themselves there. These remarks are not disproved by the fact that democratic states like Athens itself retained their old Acropolis. SUSSEM. (849)

§ 6 23 κατὰ τὸν νεώτερον. τρόπον] See Exc. II. to Book II. p. 331. SUSSEM. (850)

24 πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολεμικὰς τούναντιον] Eaton remarks (that the surprise of Plataea (Thuc. II. c. 4) in ancient, and the second siege of Saguntum in modern, times, will illustrate the author's meaning. But "Aristotle probably has in view the experience of Perinthus, when besieged by Philip of Macedon. Philip after a hard struggle made himself master of the city-wall only to find himself in face of a close array of houses rising tier over tier up the slope of the hill, and parted by narrow lanes across which the besieged carried walls"; Diod. XVI. 76" (Newman). SUSSEM. (851)

§ 7 29 τῶν ἀμπέλων συστάδας] Unquestionably, vines planted in the fashion of a quincunx. SUSSEM. (852)

30 εὖτομον] Cut up, i.e. laid out, in straight streets: as Strabo says of Alex-

οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔξει καλῶς. (X)
 § 8 περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν ἔχειν τὰς τῆς ἀρε-
 τῆς ἀντιποιοιμένας πόλεις λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν,
 34 καὶ ταύτῃ ὀρόντες ἐλεγχόμενας ἔργῳ τὰς ἐκείνων καλλω-
 § 9 πιασμένας. ἔστι δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ὁμοίους καὶ μὴ πολὺ τῷ ὁ
 πληθεὶ διαφέροντας οὐ καλὸν τὸ πειρᾶσθαι σφῆζεσθαι διὰ (p 11
 τῆς τῶν τειχῶν ἐρυμνότητος· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ
 ἐνδέχεται πλείω τὴν ὑπεροχὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐπιόντων [καὶ]
 τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς, εἰ δεῖ σφ-
 40 ζεσθαι καὶ μὴ πᾶσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι, τὴν
 ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα τῶν τειχῶν οἰητέον εἶναι πολε-
 331 a μικωτάτην, ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένων τῶν περὶ τὰ
 βέλη καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν πρὸς τὰς πολιορκίας.
 § 10 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ τεῖχος μὴ περιβάλλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀξιοῦν γ

31 πρὸς before κόσμον omitted by Π² P⁵ Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 37 καὶ before
 συμβαίνει omitted by M², [καὶ] Κοιαιες; καὶ συμβαίνει transposed to follow 38 ἐνδέχε-
 ται Stahl || 38 καὶ untranslated by William, [καὶ] Spengel || 39 [καὶ] Spengel,
 wrongly || [καὶ τῆς] ἀρετῆς ἀνθρωπίνης <te> καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις Schmidt
 1331 a 3 τὸ τῷ S^b V^b and perhaps P⁵ (1st hand)

andria (p. 793) ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ὁδοῖς κατα-
 τέμνεται.

§ 8 32 οἱ μὴ φάσκοντες δεῖν κατ.]
 Plato *Laos* vi. 778 D ff.: περὶ δὲ τειχῶν
 θυγὴν ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἐμφερομένην τὸ καθεύ-
 δεῖν εἶναι τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τεῖχη καὶ
 μὴ ἐπανιστάμενα SUSSEK. (863)

34 ἐλεγχόμενας [ἐργῳ] Here no doubt
 he is thinking more especially of Sparta:
 see n. (554) on III 9. 10. SUSSEK. (864)

Grote asked how, if Sparta had had
 walls like those of Babylon, they could
 have procured for her any greater protec-
 tion than her strong position afforded in
 the first Theban invasion, 370—369. But
 in his last invasion, 362, Epaminondas,
 though he did not succeed in surprising
 it unawares, actually penetrated into the
 city, Xen. *Hellen* vii 5. 11, Polyb. ix.
 8. 5 Very obstinate resistance had been
 offered to Philip by Byzantium and Perin-
 thus (340), although Thebes, in spite of
 its walls, was carried by assault (335).

§ 9 36 οὐ καλόν] To skulk behind
 fortifications has been in all ages con-
 stantly with courage in the open field.
 So of the remark of Aischylos, which
 Cambrinus quotes from Plutarch, that at
 the sight of a catapult he exclaimed:
 ἀπώλετο ἄνθρωπος ἀρετῆ.

37 καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται] An

invasion which Mr Newman compares
 with II. 5. 27, 1264 b 18, μὴ τῶν πλεον-
 τῶν ἢ μὴ πάντων Translate. "but as it
 not only may but does happen that the
 superiority of the enemy is too much for
 the brave but not superhuman resistance
 of the smaller number, in such cases, if
 the defenders are to preserve themselves,
 and be free from indignity and injury, we
 must hold that walls of impregnable
 strength are a soldierly precaution, es-
 pecially when we consider the precision
 that has been attained in the manufacture
 of missiles and siege-engines."

1331 a 1 τῶν περὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ τὰς
 μηχανὰς] Possibly this indicates the two
 main divisions of Greek artillery *δρυβελεῖς*
 sc *καταβάλλαι* for discharging arrows
 chiefly, with a range of 400 yards, and the
 heavier engines *περρεβόλαι*; see A. Bauer
Greek Kriegsalterthümer in Iwan Mul-
 ler's *Handbuch d. A. 7. Alt.* iv. 1, p.
 310 ff. II. Diogenes *Kriegsalterthümer*
 p. 190—204.

§ 10 3 ὅμοιον γὰρ τὸ...ἀξιοῦν καὶ]
 "To insist on not building walls round
 cities is the same thing as to seek for a
 country easily invaded." for καὶ 'as' after
 ὅμοιον see II. 8. 27, 1269 a 6. With
 ἀξιοῦν cp. II. 8. 13, 1268 b 5, τὸ κρίνειν
 ἀξιοῦν.

καὶ τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν καὶ περιαιρεῖν τοὺς (X)
 5 ὄρειονους τόπους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἰδίαις οἰκήσεσι μὴ
 περιβάλλειν τοίχους ὡς ἀνάνδρων ἐσομένων τῶν κατοικούν-
 § 11 των. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦτό γε δεῖ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν
 περιβεβλημένοις τείχη περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔξεστιν ἀμφοτέρως
 χρησθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, καὶ ὡς ἐχούσαις τείχη καὶ ὡς μὴ
 10 ἐχούσαις, τοῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένοις οὐκ ἔξεστιν. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον §
 ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον περιβλητέον, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον, ὥπως καὶ πρὸς κόσμον ἔχη τῇ
 πόλει πρεπόντως καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας, τὰς τε
 § 12 ἄλλας καὶ τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς ἐπι-
 15 τιθεμένοις ἐπιμελὲς ἐστὶ δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν,
 οὕτω τὰ μὲν εὐρηται τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ
 12 τοὺς φυλαττομένους· ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἐπιτίθε-
 σθαι τοῖς εὖ παρεσκευασμένοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὸ μὲν πληθ-
 θος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν συσσιτίοις κατανεμεθῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ
 20 τείχη διειληφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις κατὰ τόπους
 ἐπικαίρους, δηλὸν ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευ-

§ ὁμοῦς Π³ P⁸ || ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις Π³ P³ Bk. || 10 τοῖς—κεκτημένοις A1.,
 ταῖς—κεκτημένας Γ II Bk.¹ || 11 [μόνον] ? Κοιαιες, wrongly (cp. Pl. *Sympr.* 179 B
 with Hug's note) || 12 τούτων] τῶν ὄντων ? Κοιαιες || 13 χρείας <αταρκοῦνται>
 ? Schneider, not badly || 16 δεῖ before ζητεῖν Π³ P⁸ Bk., omitted by P¹ (1st hand,
 supplied by corr.¹) || καὶ after φιλοσοφεῖν untranslated by William and Ar. (perhaps
 rightly) || 17 ἐπιχειρήσουσιν ? Schmidt || 21 δῆλον...22 φυλακτηρίοις omitted by Π¹
 (supplied in the margin by p¹) || αὐτὰ Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 125 a 35 f.), certainly right

§ The construction must be ὁμοῦς δὲ
 <ὁμοῦν ἐστι> . μὴ περιβάλλειν, this in-
 finitive being parallel to ζητεῖν.

§ 11 7 ἀλλὰ μὴν κτλ.] We had a
 similar mode of argument in c. 6 § 3 n.
 (771) with respect to a maritime site for
 the city. SUSEM. (888)

11 οὐχ ὅτι τείχη μόνον] μόνον is
 pleonastic.

12 τὰς νῦν ἐπεξευρημένας] Dionysius
 the Elder invented machines of this kind;
 Diod. xiv. 42 1, 50. 4 (Cameaiatus).
 Cp. Rustow and Kochly *Gesch. des griech.
 Kriegswesens* p. 207 f. Afterwards the
 campaigns of Philip and Alexander of
 Macedonia led to many fresh improve-
 ments in the siege-engines and heavy
 artillery: see Rustow and Kochly p. 264,
 307 f. "It is possible" (see n. 1589 on
 viii(v). 6. 13) "that Aristotle was ac-
 quainted with the work of Aeneas' Tacti-
 cus. (See c. 32.)" (Eaton.) SUSEM. (886)

See also H. Droysen *Kriegsalterthümer*

c. 9 p. 187 ff. The first casual mention
 of καταπάται at Athens circa Ol. 105 ol.
 106, 356—348: they were of course used
 by Philip in the sieges of Byzantium and
 Peinthus, 340, 339; and by Alexander
 against Halicarnassus 334.

§ 12 17 ἀρχὴν γὰρ οὐδ' ἐπιχειροῦσιν]
 This is equivalent to the Latin maxim:
 si bellum vitare vis, bellum para (Con-
 giveve) SUSEM. (887)

c. 12 § 1 19 τὰ δὲ τείχη...21 ἐπι-
 καίρους] So Xenoph. *Cynop.* vii. 5 § 12,
 towers for guard-towers ἀπὸ τῶν δὲ πολλοῦς
 πύργων, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλείοστα φυλακτῆρια εἴη
 and Polyb. viii. 17. 5 of Cretan mece-
 naries at Naulis συνέβαλε δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας
 πεπιστευθῆναι τι τῶν φυλακτηρίων τῶν κατὰ
 τοὺς ὁρισθῆν τόπους τῆς ἀκρας (J. G.
 Schneider). SUSEM. (888)

20 διειληφθαι] c. 7 § 1, 1327 b 22,
 διεληφται τοῖς ἔθνεσι.

21 αὐτὰ] Vahlen on *Pact.* c. 15 § 12,
 1454 b 17 out of several instances has

- ἀξειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρί-(X)
 § 2 οἷς. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τοῦτον ἂν τις διακοσμήσειε
 τὸν τρόπον· τὰς δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδοδομένας οἰκήσεις XI
 25 καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχέων συσσίτια ἀρμόττει τό-
 πον ἐπιτηδεῖόν τε ἔχειν καὶ τὸν αὐτόν, ὅσα μὴ τῶν
 ἱερῶν ὁ νόμος ἀφορίζει χωρὶς ἢ τι μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθό-(p 1
 § 3 χρηστον. εἴη δ' ἂν τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειάν τε ἔχει
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειννιώντα
 30 μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμυνοτέρως. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον α
 τὸν τόπον τοιαύτης ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἶαν καὶ περὶ
 § 4 Θερταλλίαν νομίζουσιν, ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν, αὕτη δ'
 ἐστὶν ἣν δεῖ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῶν ὀνίων πάντων, καὶ μήτε
 βάνανσον μήτε γεωργὸν μήτ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν τοιούτων παρα-

24 θεοῖς P⁴ A¹, θεοῖς the other authorities and Bk.¹ || 25 τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ? Susem., τὰ κυριώτατα <τὰ> τῶν Ridgeway (but see § 7, 1331 b 6 ff.) || ἀρχέων P⁴, ἀρχῶν P⁴⁻⁶ L¹ A¹ Ald., ἀρχαίων the other authorities || [συσσίτια] Spengel || 28 ἐπιφάνειαν—θεῖον—ἐπιφάνειαν Thomas Aquinas, approved by Chandler and Spengel, perhaps rightly. If so, τε must be bracketed or transposed to follow ἔχει πρὸς || 29 ἀρετῆς] ἱερατείας ? Jackson || ἀρετῆς θεῖον] θέσεως ἀρετῆς Lambin || θεῖον] ξεν. Gotting, ἔφεσιν Eaton, θεῶν Schneider. If this latter be accepted, either with Susem.¹ read [ἐπιφάνειαν τε] as a gloss, or with Bucheler transposse ἐπιφάνειαν τε to follow θεῶν || 32 νομίζουσιν Lambin, ἀνομάζουσιν T II A¹ Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text || 34 τῶν τοιούτων] τοιούτων M¹ II² P² Bk., also P¹ (coir) and apparently A¹. (perhaps rightly)

one similar. *De animia* II 4 § 12, 416 a 10 αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τρεφόμενον. Add *Pol.* III. 5. 4, 1278 a 14

Prof. Ridgeway says quite rightly: "Aristotle's idea is that the messes of the several divisions of the citizens shall be held at the immediate sphere of their employment. those of the φύλακες in the φυλακτήρια and πύργοι where they are on duty Similarly the common meal of the ἀρχοντες is in the town hall." Hence he proposes to read τὰ κυριώτατα τὰ τῶν ἀρχέων, which is open to the objection: non omnium magistratuum sed superiorum tantum praetoria circa forum superioris iacent. SUSEM.

§ 2 27 μαντεῖον ἄλλο πυθόχρηστον] Thus Aristotle places all the regulations for religion and 'cultus' in his ideal state under the Delphic oracle precisely as Plato does *Rep.* IV. 437 n (Congieue). SUSEM. (889).

§ 3 28 ἐπιφάνειαν τε κτλ.] Cp. Vitiuv I. 7. aedibus vero sacris, quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, in excelssissimo loco, unde moenium maxima

paucis conspicuati, aeneae distibuantur (J. G. Schneider). Quite similarly Plato *Laus* VI. 778 c, the temples to be built all round the Agora and the city around them πρὸς τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς τῶν τόπων εὐκλείας τε καὶ καθαρότητος χάριν: VIII. 848 n (similarly in the twelve κομμαι). SUSEM. (880)

Add Pausan. IX. 22 εὖ δέ μοι Ταναγραῖοι νομίσαι τὰ ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν Ἑλλήνων, χωρὶς μὲν γὰρ αἱ οἰκίαι σφίσι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ ἱερὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτὰς ἐν λαβαρῷ τε ἐστί καὶ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπων. Xenophon gives us Socrates' opinion: ναοὶ γε μὴν καὶ βωμοὶ χώρων ἐφῆ εἶναι περικυδοστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανεστάτη οὕσα ἀσπίς σπιδάτη εἴη, *Mem.* III. 8. 10.

31 περὶ Θερταλλίαν] Also, according to Xenophon's romance, amongst the Persians also: *Cyrus* I. 2. 3, ἐπὶν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθέρα ἀγορὰ καλούμενη, ὅθα τὰ τε βασίλεια καὶ τὰλλα ἀρχεῖα πεποιήται. SUSEM. (881)

See Blümner *Privatalte*.³ § 18 p. 134 n (2). ἀγορὰ was also used as a term for 'harbour' in Thessaly (Hesychius).

35 βάλλειν μὴ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων (εἴη δ' ἂν (XI)
 εὐχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
 § 5 ἔχουσι τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα· πρέπει γὰρ διηρηθῆαι κατὰ τὰς
 ἡλικίας καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς νεωτέ-
 39 ροις ἀρχοντάς τινας διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ
 § 6 τοῖς ἀρχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρου-
 σία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευ-
 1331 b θέρων φόβον)· τὴν δὲ τῶν ὠνίων ἀγορὰν ἑτέραν τε δεῖ ταύ-
 της εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς, ἔχουσιν τόπον εὐσυνάγωγον τοῖς τε
 ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης πεμπομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας
 πᾶσιν ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως διαιρεῖται εἰς ἱερεῖς §
 5 εἰς ἀρχοντας, πρέπει καὶ τῶν ἱερέων συσσίστια περὶ τὴν
 § 7 τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἔχειν τὴν τάξιν. τῶν δ' ἀρχέων

39 τὰς—πρεσβυτέρας Γ, τὰ—πρεσβύτερα apparently M*

1331 b 4 τῆς πόλεως after διαιρεῖται II² P² Bk., thus avoiding hiatus, "there must be some mistake" Congreve, ? πολιτεύματος Susem. || 5 <καὶ> eis Lambin Bk.², [eis] <καὶ> ? Susem. But if 4 τῆς πόλεως is right, ὅπλιντας or στρατιώτας must have been dropped and eis may be a trace of this, [eis] <καὶ> ἀρχοντας <καὶ ὅπλιντας> Welldon, combining these suggestions || τὴν omitted by II² (supplied in P² by corr.), untranslated by Ar. Perhaps rightly, if there is really a lacuna after οἰκοδομημάτων || τὴν—ὁ οἰκοδομημάτων τὰ—οἰκοδομήματα Ridgeway || ὁ χώρων inserted after οἰκοδομημάτων by Bas.³ It should be ἀγορὰν which may just as well be understood, οἰκοδομημάτων <χώρων εἶναι καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαῖς τὴν αὐτὴν> Spengel

§ 4 34 παραβάλλειν] Intiude upon, approach *N. E.* VII. 13 § 6, 1153 b 34 παραβάλλειν εἰς ἡδονὰς καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν: *Hist. anm.* VIII. 12 § 11, 597 b 15. ὅταν ἐκείθεν παραβάλλωσιν sc. ὄρνυται. *De gen.* anm. III. 11 § 31, 763 a 31, περὶ ῥέδον παραβαλόντος ναυτιλοῦ στρατοῦ

§ 5 39 ἀρχοντάς τινας] Either special magistrates: cp. VII(VI) 8 § 22 γυμνασιάρχια, πρὸς δὲ τούτους περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμελεῖα γυμνικοῦ καὶ διονυσιακοῦ with n. (1484)—οἱ τοὶ παιδονόμοι, for whom see c 16 § 12 n. (943), c 17 § 5 (958), § 7 (960), § 10 (963), § 12 (969)· VI(IV). 15 § 3 (1345), § 9 (1355), § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483) and *Introd.* p. 52 SUSEM. (862)

τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους] In order that they may be kept in check by the presence of the magistrates: *Introd.* p. 52. Comp. c. 17 § 9, 1336 b 11 f. n. (962). SUSEM. (868)

§ 6 1331 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ κατὰ] See c. 9 above. SUSEM. (864)

5 The repetition of εἰς before ἀρχοντας is not without parallel. But as the

soldiers form an important element of τὸ πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως, it is probable either that they were mentioned here (possibly the double εἰς conceals some corruption), or that πόλεως is itself a corruption of πολιτεύματος, the governing body. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 409—411. It is apparent from a comparison of II. 6. 2, 1264 b 32, εἰς δύο μέρη, τὸ μὲν εἰς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προσπολεμὸν μέρος, and *ibid.* c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 30 ff. διηρηταὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ, how much hairier the text is than would be the following e.g. τὸ μὲν εἰς ἱερεῖς τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀρχοντας.

With τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων understand, from b 1, ἀγορὰν as in b 11. See *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 410. This removes one of Prof Ridgeway's objections (*Transactions* II. p. 143), but it is still strange that ἱερῶν should be an adjective here when it is a substantive § 2, § 8.

6 ἔχων τὴν τάξιν = τετάχθαι, as § 4, 1331 a 37. So ἔχειν τιμὴν = τιμᾶσθαι,

- ὅσα περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια ποιεῖται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ τε γρα- (XI)
φὰς δικῶν καὶ τὰς κλήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τοιαύτην
διοίκησιν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀγορανομίαν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην
10 ἀστυνομίαν, πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ καὶ συνῶδφ τινὶ κοινῇ κα-
τεσκευάσθαι, τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν ἀγοράν ἐστι
τόπος· ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνω τίθεμεν, ταύτην δὲ
πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις.
§ 8 νευεμῆσθαι δὲ χρή τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν 4
15 χώραν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τοῖς ἄρχουσιν, οὓς καλοῦσιν οἱ μὲν ὕλωρους
οἱ δὲ ἀγρονόμους, καὶ φυλακτήρια καὶ συσσίτια πρὸς φυλακὴν
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν εἶναι νευεμη-
μένα, τὰ μὲν θεοῖς τὰ δὲ ἥρωσιν.
§ 9 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν νῦν ἀκριβολογουμένους καὶ λόγον- (p 11)
20 τας περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀργὸν ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ
τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι μᾶλλον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. διὸ περὶ

8 τὴν αὐτὴ ἄλλην omitted by M^a P¹, perhaps rightly, [τῇ] Susem.¹ || 10 καὶ
κάν ? Susem. || κατεσκευάσθαι P¹, κατασκευάσθαι S^b V¹, κατασκευάσθαι M^a ||
14 μεμμῆσθαι P⁸⁻⁹⁻¹⁰ S^b V¹ A¹ Ald. Bk.² and P²⁻⁴ (1st hand, *veve* in P² is written over
an *ερασσε*), νευεμῆσθαι P⁴ (coll.) || 16 ἀγορανόμους P⁸ S^b and P⁹ (1st hand, cor-
rected by a later hand)

1333 b 35; εχ. τὴν φύσιν = πεφυμένα, 1330 b 14; ἐπιμελεῖσθαι = ἐπιμελίσθαι, 1330 b 11; ἀσθον = ἀσθάνεσθαι, 1340 a 3 (cp 1253 a 17); not to mention various phrases ἔχειν δυσχερεῖν, μοχθηρίαν, δυσμενεῖαν, διαφορὰν, δυσκολίαν, which are equivalent to εἶναι δυσχερές, μοχθηρόν, δυσμενές, διάφορον, δύσκολον Comp Vahlen *Arist. Aufz* II p. 30 f.

§ 7 9 ἀγορανομίαν. 10 ἀστυνομίαν] Comp II 5. 21 n. (176 b), VI(IV). 15 9 n. (1354), § 22 n. (1373); VII(VI). 8 § 3—5 n. (1461, 1463, 1468) SUSEM. (866)

10 συνῶδφ] A¹ in II. 9 31, 1271 a 28 n. meeting, gathering. Cp. 1319 a 32

21 *πρὸς* has almost the meaning of a possessive gen., cp. c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 18.

§ 8 14 τάξιν is the so-called cognate accus after νευεμῆσθαι

15 οὓς καλοῦσιν, κτλ] Comp. VII(VI). 8. 6 n. (1465) for these wood-rangers or foresters Plato has the term ἀγρονόμοι *Λων* VI 760 ff. SUSEM. (866)

16 φυλακτήρια κτλ] Comp. Plato *Λων* VII. 848 D: for the twelve κώμαι, exactly as VI. 778 C for the Agora (Eaton). See the citation n. (866). SUSEM. (867)

§ 9 19 ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρίβειν κτλ] Cp. I

11. 5, 1258 b 34 f. τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρησίμων, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν.

20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν] Comp. c. 7 § 9, 1328 a 19 ff., n. (794). SUSEM. (868).

22 εὐχῆς ἔργον] Another of the passages cited in n. (128) on II. I. 1. SUSEM. (869)

This next chapter, c. 13, is preliminary to that detailed account of Education in the best state which forms the subject of the treatise from c. 14 to the (incomplete) termination of B V(VIII). We have here a string of remarks on the end of the state, and the best means to secure it by a given character in the citizens: remarks not very dissimilar to parts of cc. 1—3, or again to c. 14. For this reason the chapter has been bracketed by Congreve and Broughton, either wholly or in part See *Anal.* p. 115 f., *Introd.* p. 88 f. Prof. J. Cook Wilson's view, as there stated, is that c. 13 seems like a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15. "The chief difference is that c. 13, 1332 a 7—9, takes the definition of the Good in the general form given in *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 7 (or *Eud. Eth.* II 1), while cc. 14—15,

μὲν τῶν τοιούτων τό γε ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν,
 13 περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶν καὶ ποίων δεῖ XII
 25 συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν ἕσσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν καὶ
 § 2 πολιτευέσθαι καλῶς, λεκτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο ἐστὶν ἐκ, οἷς γί-
 νεται τὸ εὖ πᾶσι, τούτοις δ' ἐστὶν ἓν μὲν ἐν τῷ τὸν σκο-
 πὸν κείσθαι καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων ὀρθῶς, ἓν δὲ τὰς
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις εὐρίσκειν (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ
 30 ταῦτα καὶ διαφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμφωνεῖν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ
 ὁ μὲν σκοπὸς ἔκκειται καλῶς, ἐν δὲ τῷ πράττειν τοῦ τυ-
 χεῖν αὐτοῦ διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅτε δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ τέλος
 πάντων ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλος ἔθεντο φαῦλον,
 ὅτε δὲ ἐκατέρου διαμαρτάνουσιν, ὅλον περὶ λατρικὴν οὔτε [γὰρ]
 35 ποῖόν τι δεῖ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν εἶναι σῶμα κρίνουσιν ἐνίοτε καλῶς,
 οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ὄρον τυγχάνουσι τῶν ποιη-
 τικῶν δεῖ δ' ἐν ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ἐπιστήμαις ταῦτα ἀμ-
 φότερα κρατεῖσθαι, τὸ τέλος καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις).
 § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εὖ ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφλένται 2
 40 πάντες, φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἐξουσία τυγχάνειν,
 τοῖς δὲ οὐ, διὰ τινα φύσιν ἢ τύχην (δεῖται γὰρ καὶ χο-

23 ἐνικλεῖον P²⁻⁴ Ald., ἐπὶ πλεῖον P¹ (perhaps rightly) || 24 ἐκ inserted before
 ποίων by IP P² Ar. Bk.³, [ἐκ] Bk.³ || 25 συνεστάναι M² P¹ || 26 πολιτευέσθαι
 Korais Bk.², πολιτευσθαι II Bk.¹ || [ἐπεὶ δὲ δύο 1332 a 27 τέχνη] Congreve, who
 calls it an unnecessary interruption of the reasoning, [ἐπεὶ... 1332 b 11 ἀκούοντες]
 Broughton and Wilson, the latter considering c. 13 a shorter duplicate of cc. 14, 15.
 see *Introd.* p. 88 f. and *Comm.* III. (876, 879, 881, 948, 949) || 28 τῶν <ὀρθῶς>
 P²⁻⁴ S² V² L² || 31 καλῶς Γ P¹ || 32 οὔτε P⁴, ἐνίοτε P² Bk.³ || 34 γὰρ omitted by
 IP¹, inserted by IP² P² Bk.³ || 41 τύχην ἢ φύσιν IP² P² Ar. Bk. and perhaps M²

like *Nic. Eth.* x., distinguish between
 the life of moral virtue and the higher
 life of philosophic contemplation. In c.
 13 there is no consciousness of what
 seems implied in c. 15, that moral virtue
 does not belong so completely to the
 καλὸν as θεωρία. In the version of c. 13
 the language which follows the words
 φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς, 1332 a 7, has
 more affinity for the Eudemian than the
 Nicomachean Ethics" (*Journal of Phil.*
 x. 84 ff.)

§ 1 26—38 Eudemus reproduces this
E. E. II. 11. 3, 1227 b 19—22. The whole
 period b 26—1332 a 3 is excellently dis-
 cussed by Bonitz *Ar. Stud.* II. III. p. 94
 sq. SUSKEM.

§ 2 29 εὐρίσκειν=ascertain. See 1330
 b 5 n. So λαβεῖν=ascertain. Yet below
 b 38 κρατεῖσθαι=to be won, secured.

30 ταῦτα are (1) τὸ τέλος and (2) αὐ
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος φέρονται πράξεις. See b 38.

34 ὅλον περὶ λατρικὴν] References to
 Medicine have occurred II. 8. 18 n. (270),
 III. c. 6 § 7 n. (531), c. 11 §§ 10, 11, c. 15
 § 4 n. (638), c. 16 § 6 ff. Also IV(VII).
 c. 2 § 13 n. (726). SUSKEM (870)

35 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν εἶναι σῶμα] Note that
 εἶναι is transposed. The order is ποῖόν τι
 τὸ ὑγιαίνειν σῶμα δεῖ εἶναι, in what condi-
 tion the patient should be left, in order to
 be well.

§ 3 41 χορηγίας τινός] Certain re-
 sources, means, prerequisites, auxiliaries.
 For this meaning cp. *N. Eth.* I. 8. 15,
 1099 a 31—33, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
 προσδεομένων· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ βάσιμον τὰ
 κατὰ πράττειν ἀρχορρήγην ὄντα, I. 10. 15,
 1101 a 14 f. τὸν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγαθοῖς ἱκανῶς
 κεχορηγημένον, x. 8. 4, 1178 a 23 ff, § 9,

- 1332 a ρηγίαις τινὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς, τούτου δὲ ἐλάττωτος μὲν τοῖς (§ 4 μινεῖον διακεκμημένοις, πλείονος δὲ τοῖς χειρόν), οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἐξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκειμένον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἀριστ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο πόλις, ἀριστα δ' ἂν πολιτεύοιτο καθ' ἣν εὐδαιμονεῖν μάλιστα ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν· δηλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τί ἐστὶ, μὴ λαμβάνειν.
- § 5 φάμεν δὲ καὶ διωρισμένα ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, εἴ τι τῶν λόγων 3

1332 a 1 τούτου] τούτου Schneidei needlessly || 2 εὐθὺς] αἰθῆς Madvig, wrongly (αἰθῆς is not found in Arist.). || 4 ἐστὶν ἀρίστην M^p P¹ omitting τὴν, hence [τὴν] Sussem.¹ || 6 ἐνδέχεται M^p and perhaps P¹ || 8 διωρισμένα omitted by P² P³ A. Bk. || τ] τε M^p, τ] γε P¹ (con.¹). the word is untranslated by Wilham

1178 b 33 (Eaton). These are the auxiliary causes οἱ ἀνεπάρκτες conditions (see n. 795) of Wellbeing. SUSSEM. (871)

§ 4 1332 a 2 οἱ δ' εὐθὺς] The δὲ answers μὲν of 1331 b 40 'whereas others, with the means at their command, from the outset miss the right way to attain happiness.' For this sense of εὐθὺς comp. I. 5, 2, 1254 a 23 εὐθὺς ἐκ γυνεῖς Bonitz *Ind.* s. v. distinguishes (1) a temporal use, as in III. 16, 9, 1287 b 10, I 8, 9, 1256 b 9, κατὰ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, 40 VI(IV). 11, 6, 1295 b 16, εὐθὺς οἰκοθεῖν, and VIII(V). c 4 § 9, 1304 a 30, § 12, 1304 b 9, c. 5 § 3, 1304 b 32, c. 11 § 23, 1314 b 29 (2) a quasi-causal sense, *napte natura*, = φάσει εὐθὺς (ὁπάρχει), as in V(VIII). 5 23, 1340 a 40: (3) introducing, in a series of reasons, one which is at once perfectly obvious, as I 13, 6, 1260 a 4, III. 4, 6, 1277 a b, IV(VII). 14, 2, 1332 b 18, V(VIII). 2, 2, 1337 b 2.

3 ἐπεὶ 7 λαμβάνειν] It is pointed out in Exc. I. (p. 559) that the same expression has already been employed twice before, (1) in c. 1 § 1 ff. and (2) in cc. 8 and 9 (c. 8 § 4 f. 1328 a 35—39, with which must go c. 9 § 3, 1328 b 34—39, § 7, 1329 a 22). The first time this resulted in an independent investigation of the nature of Happiness, εὐδαιμονία, while on the second occasion Happiness was merely defined (as ἀρετὴ ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τέλει 1328 a 38), without further explanation and without reference either to the previous discussion of c. 1, or to the *Elthics*. Hence—assuming the genuineness of c. 13 and especially observing that in this present passage, too, the discussion of c. 1 is ignored—we inferred that the first chapter of our present book was

not intended, in Aristotle's final plan, to find a place in this work. Another difficulty, certainly, though a less serious one, arises from the fact that here the passage in cc. 8 and 9 is equally ignored. Had Aristotle put the finishing touches to his work, he would doubtless have inserted a reference to the *Elthics* there (i. e. in c. 8 § 4), and a short allusion to the previous passage (c. 8 § 4 f., c. 9 § 3, § 7) here. The difficulty is however much diminished by the reading adopted in c. 13 § 1, φάμεν δὲ καὶ διωρισμένα, where the present φάμεν should perhaps be again taken—as at 1328 b 18 n. (804), 1329 b 41 n. (831), 1331 a 19 n. (902)—in the sense of *εἰπαμεν*, and thus as referring back to cc. 8 and 9. Cp also n. (807) and I. 2. 8 n. (21) SUSSEM. (872)

§ 5 8 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς] *Nic. Eth.* I. 7, 9 ff., esp. § 15, 1098 a 15 ff., 1101 a 14 ff. Comp. cc. 6—8 SUSSEM. (875)

εἴ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὀφέλος] It is impossible to decide whether this parenthetical remark is due solely to Aristotle's love of qualifying and limiting expressions (see n. 401), or is to be explained, as Bernays supposes [*Dialogue*, p. 72], from his relations with practical statesmen as a half-sarcastic reference to the scornful way in which men like Phocion and Antipater would look down upon his philosophical treatment of such questions. SUSSEM. (874)

With far less probability Giese in an essay on the *Elthics* (in *Fragmenta* p. 133 f.) connects this passage with *Nic. Eth.* I. 3. 2 f., 1094 b 14 ff. and II. 2. 3—5, 1104 a 1—11 (παρὰ τὸν βιβλίου) as an indication of Aristotle's despair of reaching certainty, or securing any common agreement upon matters of ethics and politics (cp. 1337 b 2): 'that Aristotle regarded

9 ἐκείνων ὀφελος, ἐνέργειαν εἶναι καὶ χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείαν, καὶ (XII)
 § 8 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (p. 117)
 τἀναγκαῖα, τὸ δ' ἀπλῶς τὸ καλῶς· οἶον τὰ περὶ τὰς δι-
 12 καίας πράξεις αἱ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας καὶ κολλήσεις ἀπ' ἀρε-
 τῆς μὲν εἰσιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι δέ, καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως
 ἔχουσιν (αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων
 15 μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ
 § 7 τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσι κάλλισταί πράξεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ἕτερον κακοῦ τινος ἀναίρεσις ἐστίν, αἱ τοιαῦται δὲ πράξεις
 τοῦναντίον· κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσι καὶ γεννήσεις.

10 τούτων? Stahli, not badly || 12 αἱ <γὰρ> Reiz || διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας Jackson, δίκαιαι (δίκαιαι αἱ Γ Μ' and apparently Αι.) τιμωρία Γ II Αι Bk Sussem¹ || αἱ (before κολλήσεις) omitted by Γ Αι. || 13 καὶ before ἀναγκαῖαι omitted by P¹ II Π² Αι. Bk. (perhaps rightly) || 14 [μὲν] Koiaev, perhaps rightly || 15 δ' ἐπὶ] δὲ περὶ? Schneider || 16 εὐδοξίας? Spengel, προεδρίας? Jackson || κάλλισται] καλῶς? Spengel || 17 ἀναίρεσις Schneider, αἵρεσις Γ II Αι. Bk¹ Sussem¹ in the text. Cp. 1332 b 36.

the successful prosecution of ethical inquiries as all but desperate."

9 The grammatical subject of εἶναι is εὐδαιμονία. The definition in full is ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις ἀρετῆς τελεία, οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks l. p. 575 f., II. 385—401.

τελείαν] We may paraphrase—"matured and relatively permanent." See Rasmussen *Forschuungen* p. 116 ff. Happiness of too short duration is no true happiness, as Aristotle shows in the passage to which he refers. At the same time in expressing himself thus he is doubtless thinking of a certain immaturity in age: for a child has not yet attained to Well-being, because its virtue is not yet developed; *Nic. Eth.* I. 9. 10, 1100 a 1 ff., cp. *Pol.* I. 13. 11, n. (120). The corresponding negative term, too, ἀτέλεια, is used for the undeveloped and immature virtue and reasoning power, as well as for that of a commonplace man who has never attained full intellectual or social development. I 13. 7 f (cp. § 11), III. 11. 9 n. (572), V(VII). 5. 10 n. (1033). SUSSEM. (876)

10—21] Respondit haec Eudemus VII. 2. 43 (56), 1238 b 5 sqq. SUSSEM.

10 ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] This is not to be found in *Nic. Ethics*, but Aristotle adds it here to avoid any possible misunderstanding, if indeed, as I believe, n. (881), he is the author of this chapter. SUSSEM. (876)

There are no good English equivalents for these technical terms: 'conditional' (or contingent) and 'absolute' are attributes not very suitable to moral or virtuous activity, or goods in general.

§ 6 11 τἀναγκαῖα] On this passage see Dr Jackson's article, *Journal of Phil.* X. 311, to which should be added that he justifies "the rather abrupt use of the word τἀναγκαῖα for morality enforced by law and custom by a reference to Plato *Rep.* VI. 493 C: ἀλλὰ τἀναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ λαλᾷ, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακὸς εἴη ἢ γλ." Cp. c. 14 § 12, 1333 a 32· πρακτά=(1) ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα, (2) καλὰ; and *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 5, 1116 b 2 f. δεῖ δ' οὐδ' ἀνάγκη ἀνδρείον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι λαλῶν.

τὸ καλῶς] sc. *πραχθέν*. But below, a 13, τὸ καλῶς, sc. ἔχουσιν=nobleness or beauty as a quality of actions.

13 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν] 'They are of the character of a necessary evil' (Congreve). SUSSEM. (877)

14 τῶν τοιούτων, sc. τιμωρίων καὶ κολλήσεων.

15 ἐπὶ=to secure; the final sense of ἐπὶ c. acc. Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 268 b 59 ff., Eucken II. p. 58.

§ 7 17 ἀναίρεσις] Postgate defends the vulgar *alreosis*=choice, in the sense that of two evils we choose the less. For me this is too subtle. SUSSEM. (877 b)

αἱ τοιαῦται] sc. αἱ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς

χρήσαντο δ' ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ καὶ πενίᾳ καὶ νόσῳ καὶ
 20 ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μακά-
 ριον ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐστὶν καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διώριστα κατὰ
 τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ σπουδαῖος, ᾧ διὰ τὴν
 25 ἀρετὴν [τὰ] ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ
 τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαῖον σπουδαίας καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας
 25 ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζουσιν ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας αἷτια
 τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὥσπερ εἰ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν λαμ-
 πρὸν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιῶτο τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

22 δ' ἀρετὴν, omitting τὴν, M^a P¹ hence [τὴν] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly || 23 [τὰ]
 before ἀγαθὰ Reiz Bk.³ || δὲ Sepulveda, δ' I II¹ A¹. Bk.¹ Susem.² in the text || δὲ
 καὶ ἐστὶ apparently Γ (palam autem ei quod William) || 27 αἰτιῶτο <τὴν> P² Bk.³ ||
 ἢ λύρα Γ, perhaps rightly

19 χρήσαντο δ' ἂν] Comp. *Nic. Eth.*
 I. 10 11 f., 1100 b 18 ff., where this
 is presented as a special feature of Ma-
 gnanimity (cp. c. 7 § 7, n. 790) Again in
Polit. Analytica II 13. 18, 97 b 15 ff., this,
 τὸ δειάφοροι εἶναι εὐτυχοῦντες καὶ ἀτυχού-
 ντες, is mentioned as a second mark of the
 high-souled character (μεγαλόψυχος) along
 with that adduced in n. (790), τὸ μὴ ἀνέ-
 χεσθαι ὑβρισμένοι (Eraton). SUSEM (878)
 Cp. χρήσις in *N. E.* I 10. 12, 1100 b 27,
 χρῆσθαι § 13, 1101 a 4.

20 τὸ μακάριον] The decision in *N. E.*
 I 10 14, 1101 a 6, is ἀλλος μὲν οὐδέποτε
 γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε,
 ἂν Πριαμακῆς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. Cp. *id.* I
 10 3, 1100 a 16 f., and the abundant deliva-
 tion from χρίσιν, VII 11 2, 1152 b 7.

21 κατὰ τοὺς ἠθικοὺς λόγους] *Nic.*
Eth. II. c. 4 [c. 6, Bk.] esp. § 4, 1113
 a 25, τῷ μὲν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν
 (sc. βουλητόν) εἶναι c. φασὶν βουλητόν, α 33
 διαφέρει πλείονος ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ ἀληθὲς ἐν
 ἐκαστοῖς ὅδῳ. It is quite true the statement
 is not made there in so many words: this
 is much more nearly the case in the two
 curious treatises, *Ench. Eth.* VII. 15. 3,
 1248 b 26 ff., *Magna Moralia* II. 9. 14,
 1207 b 31 ff. SUSEM (879) Comp.
 also *Rhet.* I. 6. 2, 1362 a 24 ff.

22 τὰς χρήσεις] The plural as
 ἐνέργειαι. In fact χρήσις and ἐνέργεια are
 both opposed to εἶς. The use which
 from time to time he makes of these
 goods (not of their opposites) attests
 his absolute virtuousness and goodness.
 Hence to consider external goods the
 cause of Wellbeing is the same thing as
 to attribute to the instrument what is
 really the result of the player's skill.

25 διὸ. ...26 ἀγαθῶν] Because external

goods are just those which while abso-
 lutely good (ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ) are not good
 for every one, but only good at all times
 to the good man: *Nic. Eth.* V. 1. 9, 1129
 b 1 ff., ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεονέκτης ὁ ἀδίκος, περὶ
 τὰγαθὰ ἐστὶν, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα
 εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία, δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἀεὶ
 ἀγαθὰ, τῷ δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ, *Meta. Z.* (VII). 4. 2,
 1029 b 5, καὶ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν
 ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐκ τῶν ἐκαστῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν τὰ ὅλα ἀγαθὰ ἐκαστῶ ἀγαθὰ. SUSEM.
 (880) The distinction is drawn *N. E.*
 VII. 12. 1, 1152 b 26 f., τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεῖχθαι
 τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς τὸ δὲ τῷ. See *N. E.* I. 3.
 3, 1094 b 17 ff., wealth and strength are
 instances, since they have proved in some
 cases fatal (τῷ δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ ἀγαθὰ).

c 13 §§ 1—8. Congreve (see *Crit.*
note on 1331 b 26) enclosed in brackets
 the whole passage, §§ 2—8, from 1331 b 26
 ἐπεὶ δὲ. to 1332 a 27 τῆς τέχνης, as an
 unnecessary interpolation of the reasoning.
 "What was said" (a 28, τῶν εἰρημένων)
 would then mean what was said cc 4—
 12; and that would undoubtedly serve
 to explain what according to §§ 9, 10
 requires explanation ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. But
 then the following passage a 31 τὸ δὲ
 σπουδαῖον κτλ lacks all proper connexion
 unless it has been directly preceded by
 the statement that Wellbeing consists in
 the practice of virtue assisted by the re-
 quisite external conditions. This alone
 makes all follow in regular order: these
 conditions, we are now told, § 9, depend
 on Fortune, but if the external condi-
 tions are present it is the governing intel-
 ligence that produces virtue. Hence the
 fundamental idea of §§ 1—8 is indispen-
 sable for the context, and the aesthetics of
 that passage is not the right way to re-

ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, § 9 τὰ δὲ παρασκευάσαι τὸν νομοθέτην. διὸ κατατυχεῖν εὐχό-
 30 μεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὧν ἡ τύχη κυρία (κυρία
 γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τίθεμεν). τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν
 οὐκέτι τῆς τύχης ἔργον ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν σπουδαῖα γε πόλιν ἐστὶ τῷ τοὺς πολίτας τοὺς μετέχοντας
 34 τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι σπουδαίου. ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες οἱ πολῖται
 10 μετέχουσι τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτ' ἄρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀνὴρ γί-

29 κατατυχεῖν Κοιας, κατ' εὐχὴν Γ II A1. Bk Susem.¹ in the text, καὶ τυχεῖν
 Madvig, κατέχειν Schmidt, καὶ τὸ εὖ ἔχειν ? Jackson || 31 αὐτὴν inserted after γὰρ
 by P⁴ L⁴ A1. Ald W^b Bk, perhaps also by S^b || 32 τῆς omitted by P² P⁶ Bk. ||
 33 γε omitted by P² P⁶ Bk. || τῷ Γ Ald W^b and P² (corr.), τὸ M² P¹⁻⁴⁻⁶ S^b V² Ar.
 and P² (1st hand)

move the objection noticed in *nn* (687, 872), although we do not deny, and in *n*. (872) have clearly stated, that the present detailed discussion would doubtless have received a different character had the final touches been given to the work. With Congreve, square brackets do not necessarily imply an un-Aristotelian origin. Still it is all but inconceivable, if the connexion intended was that assumed by Congreve, that Aristotle himself should have spoilt it by the inverted passage. Apart from the connexion, the whole passage does not look un-Aristotelian. For, though we cannot stop to prove this here, of all Broughton's objections to the genuineness of c. 13 the only valid one is that mentioned in *nn*. (876, 879), which taken by itself is far from decisive, while the genuineness of the passage is supported by the reference back to it embedded in the context of c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f.; cp. *n*. (931). SUSEM. (881)

28 ἐκ It follows from what has been said: cp *n* on 1254 a 31.

τὰ μὲν = ἐκ τῶν καὶ ποῖον δεῖ συνεστάναι τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν = χρῆσις ἀρετῆς ἀπλῶς καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς. To this is opposed the work of the legislator as in I. 10. 1, 1258 a 21 ff., II. 5. 8, 1263 a 39, II § 15, 1273 b 21. The drift of §§ 9, 10, seems to be this. Of the two requisites, the one, *χρηγία*, is due to Fortune: the other, *ἀρετή*, is the legislator's task (*σκεπτέον*). Cp. 1333 a 14 *πραγματεύεσθαι*, viz. by education. 'Wisdom cannot create materials; they are the gifts of nature or of chance.'

§ 9 29 εὐχόμεθα] Another of the passages cited *n*. (128). SUSEM. (888)

30 τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν] The

structure of the state = the state we are constructing, or are to construct. We pray it may be fortunate enough to secure the goods at Fortune's disposal. The relative clause is the object of *κατατυχεῖν*.

κυρία γὰρ] For here we acknowledge that Fortune is supreme. Comp. c. 1 § 10, 1323 b 27 f., *nn* (707, 795, 871); Zeller⁴ *op. c. ii.* n. p. 333. SUSEM. (882)

32 ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαιρέσεως] The presence of virtue in the state is not then a matter of fortune, but of knowledge and purpose (will), the two conditions of all right action, the *εἰδὼς* and *προαιρούμενος* of *N. Eth.* II. 4. 3, 1105 a 30 f. (Congreve). On them depend virtue or vice, goodness or badness of character. See further *Nic. Eth.* III cc. 1—5, dealing with the intellect and moral action; also *n*. (121) on I. 13. 12. SUSEM. (884)

34 ἡμῖν δὲ πάντες] Here still more clearly than at c. 9 § 7, 1329 a 19, it is laid down that all the citizens of the best state have perfectly equal lights. Cp. *nn*. (816, 817); III. c. 1 §§ 9, 10, c. 13 § 12, *nn*. (440, 599). SUSEM. (886)

§ 10 35 πῶς ἀνὴρ γίνεσθαι σπουδαῖος] By this term Aristotle denotes only the man of developed and matured virtue and excellence. See III. 3. 3, *n*. (470), and *n*. (112) on I. 13. 6; further *Nic. Eth.* VI. 1. 7, 1139 a 15, 2 § 6, 1139 b 12 f. Comp. Walter *op. c. p.* 283 ff. In what sense the words *εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σκ. εἶναι μὴ καδ'* *ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν* are to be taken is clear from III. c. 11 §§ 2—4, 1281 a 42 ff., esp. b 4 f. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων *ἕκαστον μῦριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ γίνεσθαι σωφροδύτων ὥστερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον*, *n*. (565 b): c. 13 §§ 3, 4, 1283 a 37 ff. See further IV(VII). c. 1

36 νεται σπουδαίος. καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους (εἶναι, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἰρετώτερον· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ πάντας.

§ 11 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοὶ γε καὶ σπουδαῖοι γίνονται διὰ τριῶν. τὰ α
40 τρία δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ φύσις ἔθος λόγος. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι δεῖ πρῶ-
τον οἶον ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων τι ζῶον, εἴτα καὶ ἡ
ποιόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. ἔνια δὲ οὐδὲν ὀφέλος
133a b φῦναι· τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ· ἔνια γὰρ ἐστὶ διὰ
τῆς φύσεως ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον

§ 12 καὶ τὸ βέλτιον. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῶων μάλιστα μὲν γ
τῇ φύσει ζῆν, μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθουσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ
5 καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον· ὥστε δεῖ ταῦτα συμφῶ-

41 εἶνα P⁸ (late hand) and Lambin, οὕτω Π¹⁻² A¹ Susem.¹ in the text and P⁸ (1st hand) || 42 δὲ Γ, τε II A¹. Bk

1332 b 1 μεταβαλεῖν Π⁸ Bk. || ἔνια...3 βέλτιον observed to be defective by Conring || γὰρ] δὲ? Schneidei || ἐστὶ διὰ] ἐστιν εἴα Koraes || [διὰ] Gottling, bīa Lundan, against the sense || 2 φύσεως <καὶ> in the margin || <αὐτὰ διαγίνεται> διὰ? Susem., <αὐτὰ> διὰ and <λέγει> ἐπὶ Schmidt, ἐθῶν <δὲ μεταβαλλόμενα>? Conring, ἐθῶν * * or else [διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν] Thuiot || δὲ is added after διὰ by Alb. and Thomas || 3 βέλτιον <ἀγνοῦν> Schneider (who also brackets 1; 1 ἐστὶ), βέλτιον <ἀγόμενα> Welldon who also reads 2 διὰ <δὲ> τῶν ἐθῶν || 5 ὥστε. 6 ἀλλήλοις transposed by Bocker to precede 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν. see *Introd.* p. 89 Susem had observed that in its traditional place this clause is plainly inconsistent with 6 πολλά γὰρ. 7 βέλτιον || 5 μόνος Spengel (*solus* Ar.), perhaps right

§§ 11, 12 n. (708), VIII(V). 9. 12, 1310 a 18 f. n. (1642). SUSEM (886) As here the virtue of the whole state is unequally diffused through the citizens (as was doubtless the case in the existing democracies), so (II. 5. 27) we find unequal distribution of happiness discussed. For the antithesis πάντες) (ὡς ἕκαστος, see II. 3. 2, 1261 b 26 n. Add to the instances VIII(V). 8. 3, 1307 b 35 ll.

39 ἀλλὰ μὴν...40 λόγος] This is repeated c. 15 § 7, 1334 b 6 f., n. (931). Comp. *N. Eth.* x. 9. 6, 1179 b 20 f., γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοῖσι οἱ μὲν φύσει οἱ δ' ἐθει οἱ δὲ διδασκῶν. As in that passage λόγος, reason, is replaced by διδασκῶν, instruction, so in B II 5. 16, 1263 b 39, it is replaced by φιλοσοφία, culture. Comp. also II 8. 24, 1269 a 20. the coercive force of law is due to custom and involves time. SUSEM. (887)

41 εἴτα καὶ...42 ψυχὴν] For slaves by birth are still men, though incapable of real human excellence I. 5. 8, 1254 b 16 ff., I. 13. 2 f., 1259 b 22—28. In *Nic. Eth.* VI 13, 1144 b 1 ff., Aristotle treats

of these good or bad natural dispositions, or qualities (*αἱ φυσικαὶ ἕξεις*), as the necessary conditions for the future growth of the real moral and intellectual qualities or aptitudes (*ἕξεις*), which correspond to them. Comp. n. (1043), i.e. *Eth.* III. on B v(VIII). SUSEM. (888)

42 ἔνια is subject to φῦναι, but in the next line it must be the object governed by μεταβάλλειν.

§ 11 1332 b 1 ἔνια γὰρ...3 βέλτιον] That there is some flaw in this sentence will hardly be disputed. Aetius translates well enough to show the meaning, 'nam aliqua rei naturam ad utiutque apta per morem ad peius vel melius convertuntur'; but in this he can scarcely have followed any manuscript. SUSEM.

§ 12 3 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κατὰ] In form this sentence recalls *Mena.* I. 7. 3, 980 b 25—28, *N. E.* VIII. 12. 7, 1162a 19—22.

4 μικρὰ is accus., ἔνια nominative. The gender of μόνος is a parallel to τελεωθέν and χωρισθέν, I. 2. 15, 1253 a 32 f.

5 δεῖ ταῦτα συμφῶνέν] Habi should cooperate with natural endowment. This

νεῖν ἀλλήλοις. <τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζώων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει> (XII)

4 <ζῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἔναι καὶ τοῖς ἔθουσιν, ἀνθρώπος δὲ καὶ λόγῳ· μόνον>
<γὰρ ἔχει λόγον> πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τοὺς ἔθισμους καὶ τὴν φύσιν
7 πρῶτοντι διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πεισθῶσιν ἄλλως ἔχειν βέλτιον.

§ 13 τὴν μὲν τοίνυν φύσιν οἷους εἶναι δεῖ τοὺς μέλλον-
τας εὐχειρώτους ἔσεσθαι τῷ νομοθέτῃ, διωρίσμεθα πρότερον·
10 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἔργον ἤδη παιδείας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιζόμενοι
μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες.

14 ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόν· XIII
των καὶ ἀρχομένων, τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτέον, εἰ ἑτέρους εἶναι
δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἢ τοὺς αὐτοὺς διὰ
15 βίου· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεήσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν

8 *τοῖων* omitted and *δὴ* inserted after *φύσιν* by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹ in the margin): presumably *τοίνυν* and *δὴ* (*before φύσιν*) were variants. In Bk.³ *φύσιν* is omitted by mistake || 10 *ἐπιζόμενα* II³ || 13 *ἥδη* εἶναι P¹ (1st hand), *δὴ* II¹ P² Bk. and P¹ (cor.), possibly right || *ἑτέρους*—14 *τοὺς αὐτοὺς* Γ II A₁ Bk. Sussem¹ in the text, *τοὺς αὐτοὺς*—14 *ἑτέρους* Sussem.^{3,4} Madvig first suspected corruption, but proposed *ἀρχομένους*, [ῆ] || 15 *τὴν* omitted by P⁴ S⁴ V^b

is a satisfactory sense; see however p 89 for P¹ of Wilson's view (*ταῦτα*=reason, habit, natural endowment: all three).

§ 13 g *πρότερον*] In c 7. SUSSEM (889) 10 τὰ μὲν γὰρ] By habituation (*ἐπιζόμενοι*) arises moral virtue, by instruction (*ἀκούοντες*) intellectual virtue, *Nic. Eth.* II 1. 1, 1103 a 14 ff. These are the two sides of Education: *N. E.* II 1. 8, 1103 b 22 ff., X. 9 8, 1179 b 29 ff. (Eaton). SUSSEM. (896)

11 ἀκούοντες] Cp. *N. E.* X. 9. 7, 1179 b 27 οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσει λόγον Apparently *ἐπιζόμενοι ἀκούοντες* corresponds to τῷ λόγῳ. τοῖς ἔθουσιν c 15 § 7, 1334 b 18.

c. 14 *The distinction between rulers and ruled, whether absolute and life-long, or relative and temporary* c 7. §§ 1—5.

§ 1 12—16] Comp III 4. 8 n. (477) for the distinction in education SUSSEM. (891)

13 f. Against the proposed transposition (see *Crit. n.*) Di Jackson argues in the following note. 'Aristotle here contrasts (a) the permanent assignment of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that the man who rules never is ruled, the man who is ruled never rules, with (b) the alternation of the functions of ruling and being ruled, so that at one time X rules, Y is ruled, at another Y rules, X is ruled. Now a priori the phrase *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι* might be used to describe either of the contrasted systems: i.e. it might

be said that, when the functions are permanently assigned, "the same person always rules, the same person always is ruled", or again it might be said that, when the functions alternate, "the same person rules and is ruled." But although the phrase might be used in either sense, plainly it should not be used simultaneously in both senses. Sussemihl however, though he has altered the text in 1332 b 13, 14, so that the phrase *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι* bears the latter of the two meanings, above distinguished, nevertheless employs it in the former of those meanings in 1332 b 22. Thus the alteration creates an inconsistency. On the other hand, if the phrase is taken in both places in the former of the two meanings, the unaltered text is consistent and intelligible.'

What Jackson calls an inconsistency Sussemihl assumes to have been the cause of the alteration: 'vitium inde ortum esse videtur, quod deinde pro *τοὺς ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ἑτέροις εἶναι* διὰ βίου potius dicitur *ἀπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἀρχαν τοὺς δ' ἀρχεσθαι καθάπερ* (v. 22 v1) *εἰ πρὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι accuratius πάντας ὁμοίως λυναντὶν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχαν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι* (v. 26 vq.)" *Qu. crit. coll.* p. 412. Where the reasons on each side are so equally balanced, the traditional order in the text indicates no more than *non liquet*.

§ 2 κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν εἴησαν τοσούτων (X)
 διαφέροντες ἄτεροι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς
 ἥρωας ἡγούμεθα τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν, εὐθὺς πρῶτον
 κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πολλὴν ἔχοντας ὑπερβολήν, εἰτα κατὰ
 20 τὴν ψυχὴν, ὥστε ἀναμφισβήτητον εἶναι καὶ φανεράν τὴν
 ὑπεροχὴν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, δῆλον ὅτι
 βέλτιον αἰετὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς μὲν ἄρχειν τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι
 § 3 καθάπαξ· ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν 2
 Ἰνδοῖς φησι Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσούτων διαφέ-
 25 ροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας
 ἀναγκαῖον πάντας ὁμοίως κοινωνεῖν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος ἄρχειν
 καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. τό τε γὰρ ἴσον * * ταῦτόν τοις ὁμοίοις, καὶ
 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συνεστηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ
 § 4 δίκαιον. μετὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑπάρχουσι νεωτερίζειν
 30 βουλόμενοι πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν χώραν τοσούτους τε εἶναι

23 ὥσπερ] ὅπερ Reiz || 26 κατὰ μέρος transposed to follow 27 ἀρχεσθαι
 ? Schneider, [κατὰ μέρος] οἱ 27 [καὶ ἀρχεσθαι], οἱ else ἀρχεσθαι καὶ κατὰ μέρος
 ἀρχεῖν Spengel (the last the best suggestion) || 27 ἴσον <τῷ δίκαιῳ> Thuiot, ἴσον
 <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον> Susem. from Dubner's translation || 29 νεωτερίζειν βουλόμενοι
 transposed to follow 30 χώραν by Lambin and Thuiot || 30 βουλόμενων Vettori (in
 his translation), Reiz, rightly || τε] δὲ ? Spengel

16 κατὰ=in virtue of. Cp. κατὰ ταῦτα
 λέγεσθαι *Μέτα*. I. 6. 3, 987 b 9, Bonitz *ad loc.*
 Eucken p. 43. This construction with ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν is less frequent than the dative.
 But cp. *N. E.* II. 1. 8, 1103 b 23, κατὰ
 γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσαν αἱ
 ἔξεις, VII. 9. 6, 1151 b 34, καθ' ὁμοίτητα
 ἡκολούθηκεν, *Hist. Animal.* VIII. 2. 13,
 590 a 16, ἀκολουθοῦσαν οἱ βίαι κατὰ τὰς
 τὰς διαίρεσεις, a 18, III. 9. 2, 517 a 13
 (*Ind. Ar.* 26 a 36 has, what is rare, a
 double misprint, I 2. 517 a 3).

§ 2 εἰ μὲν τοίνυν κτλ] Comp. I. 5. 10,
 1284 b 34—36 with n. (47). SUSEM. (892)
 Strikingly similar to Pl. *Politicus* 301 D, 2:
 οὐδὲν δὲ γε ὅστις οὐκ ἐστι γυνώμενος, ὥς δὴ
 φαμεν, ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βασιλεὺς οἷος ἐν συμ-
 φωνίᾳ ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
 διαφέρων εἰς, δεῖ δὴ συνελθόντας ἐγγράμ-
 ματα γράφειν.

22 βέλτιον ἀεὶ κτλ] This has been
 affirmed II. 2. 6, 1261 a 38. It is the
 basis of the argument for Absolute Mon-
 archy III. 13. 13. See *III.* (601, 678).

§ 3 Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was
 sent by Darius Hystaspis to explore the
 mouth of the Indus, Herod. IV. 44. We
 may conclude with certainty from this
 passage that he published an account of his

expedition in a book of travels. But the
 geographical work, which has come down
 to us bearing the name of Scylax, *Περί-
 πλους τῶν ἐντὸς τῶν Ἡρακλέους στηλῶν*, is
 of much later date. SUSEM. (893)

Comp. Niebuhr in *Phil. Museum* I.
 245.

24 τοὺς βασιλέας κτλ] Cp. VI(IV). 4.
 4, n. (1165). In Ethiopia the kings were
 chosen for their stature. SUSEM. (894)

27 τό τε γὰρ ἴσον <καὶ τὸ δίκαιον>
 ταῦτόν] Where all the citizens are peers,
 equality is the same thing as justice.
 See III. 9 §§ 1, 2. SUSEM. (895)

Equality=τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρ-
 χεσθαι, cp. 1261 a 30. From VIII(V). I.
 11—13, 1301 b 26 ff., it is τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν
 ἴσον which is ἀπλῶς δίκαιον, while it is
 τὸ ἀρετῷ ἴσον which is ταῦτόν.

28 χαλεπὸν μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν...
 32 ἐστίν] This passage condenses the
 results of the inquiry into the stability and
 instability of governments in B. VIII(V)
 and VI(IV), especially recognising the
 criterion of VIII(V). 9. 6, 1309 b 16 ff.,
 and VI(IV). 12. 1, 1306 b 14 ff. *δπως*
κράττον ἐσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν.
 See n. (1307)

τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' εἶναι κρείττους τού- (p 115)
των πάντων, ἔν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ὅτι
γε δεῖ τοὺς ἄρχοντας διαφέρειν τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀναμφισβή-
34 τητον. πῶς οὖν ταῦτ' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μετέξουσιν, δεῖ σκέψα-
§ 5 σθαι τὸν νομοθέτην. εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον περὶ αὐτοῦ. ἡ γὰρ
φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαιρέσιν, ποιήσασα [αὐτῷ] τῷ γένει
37 ταῦτὸ τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, ὃν τοῖς μὲν ἄρ-
χεσθαι πρέπει τοῖς δ' ἄρχειν· ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ οὐδείς καθ'
ἡλικίαν ἀρχόμενος, οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, ἄλλως τε
40 καὶ μέλλων ἀντιλαμβάνειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἔρανον, ὅταν τύχη
§ 6 τῆς ἰκνουμένης ἡλικίας. ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄρχειν ὡς
καὶ ἄρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτέρους. ὥστε καὶ τὴν
333 a παιδείαν ἔστιν ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον, ἔστι δ' ὡς ἐτέραν
εἶναι. τὸν τε γὰρ μέλλοντα καλῶς ἄρχειν ἀρχθῆναι φασί
δεῖν πρῶτον. ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἴρη-
4 ται λόγοις, ἥ μὲν τοῦ ἄρχοντος χάριν ἥ δὲ τοῦ ἀρχομένου.
§ 7 τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν δεσποτικὴν εἶναι φαμεν, τὴν δὲ τῶν

31 τούτων after 32 πάντων P¹⁻² Bk || 36 διαίρεσιν Ar., αἰρεσιν Γ II Bk., cp.
1333 a 33 || αὐτῷ inserted by Ald W² Bk., αὐτῷ M² and Γ after τῷ, αὐτὸ P² 3 4 5
Ar. 5¹⁰ L², τῶν αὐτῶν Bas.², τὸ Spengel, omitted by P¹ Ar. || τῶν Ald. W² ||
37 ταῦτὸν Bk., ταῦτῳ M² and P¹ (1st hand, emended by con.¹), *eodem* Ar., un-
translated by William, omitted by Bas.² || τὸ—τὸ] τοῦ—τοῦ M² P¹ || 39 οὐδ'
εἰ νομίζει Sepulveda, οὐδ' εἰ νομίζει Κοινας, not badly || 40 τὸν τοιοῦτον] τούτων
τὸν II² P² Bk., perhaps right, *eundem* Ai
1333 a 1 ἔστιν] ἔστι μὲν Bk.²

§ 5 35 εἴρηται δὲ πρότερον] c 9 §§
4—6 see n. (812). SUSEM. (896)

41 ἰκνουμένης = προσηκούσης Bon. Ind.
Ar. 5. v. Pound with *Opera Probl.* xx. 14,
934 b 14, with *ἐξίς, ἐπιστήμη Πολ* vi(14).
I 2, 1288 b 16

*Education to be in one sense the same
for all, in another sense a different edu-
cation for rulers and ruled* §§ 6—8.

§ 6 1333 a 1 ἔστιν ὡς κτλ] The
education is the same and yet different
in so far as it has two different sides; it
teaches the governed to obey well, but only
in so far as this would seem to teach
them how to govern well in the future:
thus so far it really teaches the future
governors. Comp. Bonitz, in *Zeitach. f.
d. ostr. Gymn.* XVIII. 1867, p. 680 f.
SUSEM. (897)

2 τὸν τε γάρ] With this whole pas-
sage comp. III. 4. 10—14, 1277 a 25 n.

(490). This is one of the few instances,
in which *τε γάρ* = etenim, as is allowed
by Bonitz, who discusses the Aristotelian
usage of *τε γάρ* generally in the paper
just cited p. 672 ff., esp. p. 680. SUSEM.
(898)

English readers may consult Shilleto's
critical note to Dem. *De Falsa Leg.* § 176.
He cites Herod iv. 167, Aistoph. *Par*
402, Ar. *Rhet.* III. 7. 11, 1408 b 17, and
III. 11. 7, 1412 b 9, and further illustrates
the similar usage of *ὅτε γάρ*.

3 ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις εἴρηται λόγοις] I.e.
III. 6 §§ 6—10, 1278 b 30 ff. It is note-
worthy that reference is only made to this
passage, and not to the much more
similar one quoted in n. (898). However,
some such reference may have been lost,
where the following context is defective.
See n. (900); also n. (902). SUSEM.
(899)

ἐλευθέρων. * * διαφέρει δ' ἕνια τῶν ἐπιταττομένων οὐ τοῖς ἔρ-
 γοῖς ἀλλὰ τῷ τίνος ἕνεκα. διὸ πολλὰ τῶν εἶναι δοκούντων δια-
 κοινῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν νέων τοῖς ἐλευθέροις καλὸν διακο-
 νεῖν· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν οὐχ οὕτως δια-
 10 φέρουσιν αἱ πράξεις καθ' αὐτὰς ὥς ἐν τῷ τέλει καὶ τῷ
 § 8 τίνος ἕνεκεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ ἀρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν
 ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαμεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός, τὸν δ' αὐτὸν
 ἀρχόμενόν τε δεῖν γίνεσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἀρχοντα ὕστερον,
 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τῷ νομοθέτῃ πραγματευτέον, ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγα-
 15 θοὶ γίνωνται, καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, καὶ τί τὸ
 τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς.
 § 9 διήρηται δὲ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἔχει λόγον καθ' οὗ
 αὐτό, τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνά-

6 * * διαφέρει Coming, cp. B. III. c. 4 1277 a 29—b 30, and see Comm. n. (900) ||
 11 πολιτικοῦ Rasso, πολιτεία M⁹, πολιτου I⁹ P¹ A¹ Bk. Sussem.¹ in the text,
 πολιτου <ἀρίστου> Spengel || αὐτὴν omitted by P⁴ C⁹ (?) || 13 δεῖν over an
 erasure P⁴, δεῖ P² S² V² || 14 πῶς Schneidei, πῶς <ἀν> ? Kornee || 15 γίνονται
 P³ S² V² Ald. Bk.¹, γίνονται P², γίνονται ? Koriae

§ 7 6 ἐλευθέρων*] The passage which is wanting here, must have stated that in the government of the best state only the latter kind of rule can be in question, and that the power of ruling over slaves is not such as can only be learnt by previous corresponding service; on the contrary, the service of a slave is unworthy of a free man, and ought not to be learnt at all by the young sons of our citizens. Compare the discussion III. 4 §§ 11—14, which is analogous in other respects too, and where § 13, like § 7 here, contains a limiting clause:—"except sometimes of necessity and for their own use," 1277 b 5 ff. SUSSEM. (900)

6 διαφέρει δ' . . . 11 τίνος ἕνεκεν] See V(VIII) 2. 6, 1337 b 17 ff. with n. (983). SUSSEM. (901) The end-redeem and nobles apparently menial offices, as for a soldier to groom his own horse

§ 8 If the good officer, who has learnt to command by obeying, is also the good man, how are we to train up good men? By this section we are brought back to 1332 a 36. But the last clause τί τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς carries us back further, to 1332 a 7 on the beginning of c. 13, 1331 b 24 ff. How tortuous the course of the discussion is, may be seen from the fact that after the Unity of Education we take its two main branches, moral and intellectual Educa-

tion; next criticize Sparta; then after much repetition arrive at a similar halting place to the present, 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὲ θεωρητέον.

12 φαμεν] The present may well stand here also (see n. 804, 831, 872) in the sense of a past tense: if so there is certainly a reference to III 4 § 5. Comp. n. (471). SUSSEM. (902)

14 τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη . . 16 [αὐτῆς] The virtues which must be learnt by obedience are however only the moral virtues, not the intellectual ones, as in the case of φρόνησις has been clearly proved in III 4. 17. The question now to be considered is which of the two rank the higher; in other words—is development of character or of intellect the highest aim in education? Aristotle decides in favour of the latter. Cf. also V(VIII), 2. 1 n (977), also n. (1024) and Ex. 1. to B. V(VIII). Also *Introd.* p 48, p 50 ff. SUSSEM. (903)

Principle regulating the subordination of the semi-rational soul, the seat of moral virtue, to the properly rational soul, the seat of intellectual excellence. §§ 9—14. *Application of this to the criticism of states (like Sparta) which makes success in war the goal of education.* §§ 15—22.

§ 9 17 διήρηται δὲ κατὰ] See n. (40) on I. 5. 6 SUSSEM. (904)

- μενον. ὃν φαμεν τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι καθ' ἃς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς λέγε- (XII
 10 ται πῶς. τούτων δ' ἐν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τέλος, τοῖς μὲν οὕτως
 § 10 διαιρουσιν ὥς ἡμεῖς φαμεν οὐκ ἄδελον πῶς λεκτέον. αἱ γὰρ τὸ
 χεῖρον τοῦ βελτιόνος ἐστὶν ἕνεκεν, καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν ὁμοίως ἐν (p. 12
 τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν· βέλτιον δὲ τὸ λόγον
 ἔχον. [διήρηται τε διχῇ, καθ' ὅνπερ εἰώθαμεν τρόπον διαι- 7
 15 ρεῖν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ πρακτικὸς ἐστὶ λόγος ὃ δὲ θεωρητικὸς
 § 11 ὡσαύτως οὖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος διηρησθαι δηλον-
 ότι] καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐρούμεν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς
 τοῦ φύσει βελτιόνος αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγ-
 19 χάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἰρε-
 § 12 τώτατον οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου. διήρηται δὲ καὶ πᾶς ὁ
 31 βίος εἰς ἀσχολίαν καὶ εἰς σχολήν καὶ πόλεμον καὶ εἰρή-
 νην, καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρή-
 § 13 σιμα τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ καλὰ. περὶ ὃν ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν
 αἵρεσιν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξε-

20 πότερα M*, *quia* William || 24 [διήρηται... 27 δηλονότι] Susem. || τε] δὲ Γ || διχῇ <ὁ λόγος> Reiz, following Lambin's translation || 26 οὖν] δ' P¹ || καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος after διηρησθαι P¹ & P² Bk. || δῆλον ἐστι Bk, omitted by Ald. W⁴, while A¹ translates it after πράξεις. δῆλον <δ'> ἐστὶ Sylburg, <καὶ> δῆλον ἐστὶ Spengel. Both Sylburg and Spengel omit 27 δὲ, which neither William nor Ar. translates || 29 ἢ πασῶν ἢ <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Ed. Muller (*Gesch. der Kunsttheorie* II. p. 370), ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν δυοῖν Lintau, [ἢ] πασῶν ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν Ridgway, [ἢ] πασῶν [ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν] οἱ else [ἢ πασῶν ἢ] <τῶν> τοῖν δυοῖν Susem.: Schmidt however conjectures that *ὡς ὃν βούλονται* has been dropped after δυοῖν || 31 [καὶ] πόλεμον Reiz || 32 [εἰς τὰ] and 33 [εἰς τὰ] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 42 b 26 ff., 63 a 29 f. see however Vahlen *Ztschr. f. d. ostr. Gym.* 1872 p. 540 || 33 [περὶ] and 34 *διαίρεσιν* Schneider, wrongly

§ 10 24 διήρηται] Sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχον. The passage in brackets as far as 26 δηλονότι is in itself thoroughly Aristotelian, see n. (40), and it would be quite appropriate to raise here the further questions: In regard to Reason itself, is it the theoretical or the practical side that occupies the higher place? Is it the intellectual development of the former, or rather the cultivation of practical and political insight, which is the chief and final aim of Education? Yet these questions are not raised anywhere in the context and so the passage serves no useful purpose. What is worse, it interrupts the connexion in the most confusing manner: it must therefore be pronounced an interpolation by an alien hand SUSEM. (906)

§ 11 27 καὶ τὰς πράξεις] Cp. n. (712, 717, 731, 736, 743) on c. 2 § 1, § 6, c. 3 § 1, § 3, § 8. SUSEM. (906)

29 τοῖν δυοῖν] The isolation is expressed 1331 b 29, τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις.

30 οὐ τυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀκροτάτου] The highest within its reach, how determined is not explained. Cp. I. r. 1.

§ 12 30 διήρηται δὲ] As e.g. I. 5. 10, 1254 b 31. There is an echo of this division in Plut. *De lib. educand.* c. 13, 96 c παρ' ὃ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διήρηται (Newman).

32 τῶν πρακτῶν] Cp. 1332 a 10. With *χρήσιμα* comp. the utilitarian conception of a civic virtue as in Plato's *Phaedo*, *Protag.*, *Republic* and M¹ Archer Hind's *Phaedo*, Appendix 1.

§ 13 34 αἵρεσιν] The correlation of *αἰρετώτατον* a 28, so a 41, τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων αἵρεσεις=the choice of one action in preference to another. The estimate of value is the ground of preference. At

35 σιν αὐτῶν, πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν, ἀσχολίαν δὲ σχο-
 λῆς, τὰ δ' ἀναγκαῖα καὶ χρήσιμα τῶν καλῶν ἔνεκεν.
 πρὸς πάντα μὲν τὸνν τῷ πολιτικῷ βλέποντι νομοθετεῖον, ο
 καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις
 § 14 αὐτῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸς τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ τέλη. τὸν
 40 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοὺς βίους καὶ τὰς τῶν πραγμά-
 των αἱρέσεις· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολεῖν δύνασθαι καὶ πο-
 1333 b λεμῆν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν καὶ σχολάζειν, καὶ τὰ
 ναγκαῖα καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα [δὲ] πράττειν, τὰ δὲ καλὰ δεῖ
 μᾶλλον. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺτους τοὺς σκοποὺς καὶ παιδας ἔτι
 4 ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, ὅσαι δέονται παι-
 § 15 δεῖας. οἱ δὲ νῦν ἄριστα δοκοῦντες πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλ- 10
 6 λήνων, καὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ ταύτας καταστήσαντες τὰς
 πολιτείας, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαν-
 τες τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οὔτε πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς
 τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν
 10 πρὸς τὰς χρησίμους εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ πλεονεκτικωτέρας.
 § 16 παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν ὑστερόν τινας γράψαντων

40 πρακτῶν? SUSSEM. cp. a 32. Yet πραγμάτων gives a suitable sense || 41 αἱρέσεις Κοῖνες (cp a 34), διαίρεσεις (δὲ αἱρέσεις P¹) Γ II A1. Bk. SUSSEM.¹ in the text || μὲν omitted by Γ P², hence [μὲν] SUSSEM.¹

1333 b 2 δὲ before πράττειν added by Π³ Bk., before καὶ P², δεῖ? Stahr || 7 βελτίων Π² P² Bk., possibly right, βελτίων <καὶ τὸ>? Schneider || 8 πάσας omitted by Π¹

a later time αἰεῖσθαι, φεύγειν are technical Stoic terms, e.g. D. L. VII. 105.

35 πόλεμον] sc αἰρετὸν εἶναι οἱ αἰρεῖσθαι δεῖ.

ἀσχολῆαν δὲ σχολῆς] Comp. *N. E.* x. 7. 6, 1177 a 4 ff., Plato *Λαπρ.* I. 628 D (Eaton), and with the former passage *u.* (921) below. SUSSEM. (907)

37 βλέποντι] Goes with πρὸς πάντα: an instance of hyperbaton.

39 τέλει] Plural as in § 14 b 3 σκοποῦς.
 § 14 1333 b 1 μᾶλλον δ' εἰρήνην ἄγειν] Cp. again Plato *Λαπρ.* I. 628 D, ὡσαύτως τις οὐτ' ἂν ποτε πολιτικὸς γένοιτο' ὁρθῶς πρὸς τὰ ἔξωθεν πολεμικὰ ἀποβλέπων μόνον ἢ πρῶτον, οὐτ' ἂν νομοθέτης ἀκριβῆς, εἰ μὴ χάριν εἰρήνης τὰ πολέμου νομοθετοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἔνεκα τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης (Eaton). SUSSEM. (908)

4 τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας] What these are, is plain from 1260 b 15 f., 1277 a 16—20. See further *u.* (1024) on V(VIII). §. 4, 1339 a 29 f.

§ 15 5 οἱ ἐξ νῦν] Cp. II. 1. 1, *u.*

(128 b). SUSSEM. (909) The plural notwithstanding, it would seem as if Sparta and Lyncurgus alone were meant

7 οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον] A familiar criticism. Cp. II. 9. 34 *u.* (344 ff.), IV (VII). 2. 9 *u.* (719), V(VIII). 4 §§ 1—7, *u.* (1005) SUSSEM. (910) Add *Isocr.* IV. (*Ἰσακρυγ.*) 187, 188, 228 (Newman). With συντάξαντες comp. 1324 b 8, and 1271 b 2 (συντάξαι).

9 φορτικῶς] In a purely utilitarian, almost mercenary spirit.

§ 16 11 καὶ τῶν ὑστερόν τινας γρ.] Comp. VI(IV) 1 § 3 with *u.* (1123) and *Introd.* p. 20 *u.* 1. Here we again clearly perceive how slight is our knowledge of such political literature before Aristotle. It is highly probable that among the writers here alluded to were those too who were the first to set up the theory of a mixed constitution, see II. 6. 17, *u.* (219—221) and B. III. EXC. I. p. 449, since it was in the Spartan and Cretan constitutions that they found the realiza-

ἀπεφάναντο τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν· ἐπαινοῦντες γὰρ τὴν Λακε- (XII)
 δαιμονίων πολιτείαν ἀγανταὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου τὸν σκοπόν, ὅτι (p. 12)
 πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν. ἀ 11
 15 καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐέλεγκτα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξε-
 § 17 λήλεκται νῦν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζη-
 λοῦσι τὸ πολλῶν δεσπόζειν, ὅτι πολλὰ χορηγία γίνεταί

14 ἐνομοθέτησαν ΓΜ* || 16 νῦν omitted by Π¹, [νῦν] Susem.¹ || ζητοῦσι
 Camot Bk.³, certainly right || 17 τὸν Π² Γ² Bk. || πολλὰ ΓΜ* || γίνονται
 ΓΜ*, γίνεταί Π² Ρ² Bk.¹

tion of then ideal, 1265 b 33 with *u.*
 (129) Thimbron, or Thibron, according
 to another reading, is quite unknown to
 us. There can scarcely be a doubt that
 Aristotle was also thinking of the work
 on the Lacedaemonian constitution which
 bears the name of Xenophon. At any
 rate its author, i. e. f., makes the happi-
 ness which the Lacedaemonian citizens
 attained by obeying the Laws of Lycurgus
 consist chiefly in the fact that, in spite of
 their small number, they had proved
 themselves the most powerful and cele-
 brated state in Greece, and Aristotle's
 next remarks sound exactly like a po-
 lemic against the opening words of this
 little work ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐνόησας ποτὲ ὡς ἡ
 Σπάρτη τῶν ἀλιγανθρωποτάτων πόλεων
 οὕσα δυνατοτάτη τε καὶ ὀνομαστοτάτη ἐν τῇ
 Ἑλλάδι ἐφάνη, ἐθαύμασα ὅντι ποτὲ τρώσῃ
 τοῦτ' ἐγένετο ἐπὶ μέντοι κατανόησα τὰ
 ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, οὐκ ἐνὶ θαύ-
 μαζον. The suggestion would therefore
 be natural enough that Thimbron, and
 not Xenophon, was the real author; but
 the true authorship of Xenophon has
 been lately demonstrated with such cer-
 tainty by Naumann *De Xenophontis libro
 qui Lacedaemoniorum Politicis inscribitur*
 (Berlin 1876) that it is scarcely possible
 to adduce any tenable argument against
 it. Oncken's suggestion, too, of c. II. p.
 179, that Xenophon wrote it under the
 assumed name of Thimbron, is just as
 unsatisfactory as that of v. Leutsch (*Phi-
 logogus* XXXIII, p. 97) that he wrote the
 first part of the *Hellenica* under the name
 of Cratippus. Both these hypotheses
 themselves depend on an hypothesis, the
 falsity of which has been demonstrated
 by Nitsche (after Moius) in a dissertation
Über die Abfassung von X. Hellenica
 (Bonn 1871) p. 42 ff. This is the hypo-
 thesis, unquestionably dating from ancient
 times, that, according to his own statement,
Hell. III. 1, 2, Xenophon published his
Anabasis under the name of Themisto-

genes of Syracuse. But the right inter-
 pretation of the passage in question is
 that Themistogenes also wrote an *Ana-
 basis*, to which Xenophon refers because
 his own was not written at the time.
 Moreover there is no ground for the sup-
 position that Xenophon ever published
 any of his works under an assumed name.
 Thimbron or Thibron is a well-known
 Lacomian name, and the one alluded to
 here by Aristotle was doubtless a Lac-
 onian by birth, and this may have been
 the reason why Aristotle cites him by
 name, without mentioning Xenophon.
 SUSEM. (911)

v. Wilamowitz identifies the author
 Thimbron with the Spartan who com-
 manded in Asia Minor 399 B.C. (Xen.
Anab. VII. 6, 1, 8 24; *Hell.* III. 1, 4, IV.
 8, 17). His words are; "Next there
 appeared on the scene a champion of
 Oligarchy, Thibron, an ambiguous char-
 acter and incompetent official, but one
 of the ruling caste. He wrote in glorifi-
 cation of Lycurgus. Well might Agesi-
 laos request his literary agent, Xenophon,
 to draw up a new version of the story"
 of Sparta, "just as he had entrusted him
 with the task of justifying before public
 opinion the period from 404 to 388. . .
 The foundation for the common traditional
 view of Sparta was laid in the half cen-
 tury 403—350: its author was probably
 Demochidas of Megara" (*Homericche Un-
 tersuchungen* p. 273 f.). He conjectures
 in a note that possibly Plato's strange
 authority for Sparta in the *Lysis* [B. III.
 esp. 683—693] was Thibron.

14 τὸ κρατεῖν] Conquest, 'to win
 victory,' as § 19, b 30, 1271 b 3. We
 find ourselves in the midst of a discus-
 sion similar to that of c. 2 § 8 ff.

15 καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλέγλεται νῦν]
 Comp. II. 9 § 16 n. (308), § 34 n. (345);
 and n. (919). SUSEM. (912)

§ 17 πολλὰ χορηγία] As in II. 9 § 35,
 γίνεσθαι τάχα τὰ περιμάχητα δι' ἀρετῆς.

τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, οὕτω καὶ Θίμβρων ἀγόμενος φαίνεται (XII.
τὸν τῶν Λακωνῶν νομοθέτην, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος τῶν
10 γραφόντων περὶ <τῆς> πολιτείας αὐτῶν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ γεγυμνάσθαι
§ 18 πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους πολλῶν ἤρχον· καίτοι δῆλον ὥς ἐπειδὴ 18
νῦν γε οὐκέτι ὑπάρχει τοῖς Λάκωσι τὸ ἄρχεῖν, οὐκ εὐδαί-
μονες, οὐδ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἀγαθός. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ
μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος
15 πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζῆν κα-
§ 19 λῶς. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἦν
δεῖ τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν νομοθέτην· τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς
ἀρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ'
ἀρετῆς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὴν πόλιν εὐδαίμονα νομ- 18
30 ζεῖν καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐπαινεῖν, ὅτι κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐπὶ
τὸν πέλας ἀρχεῖν. ταῦτα γὰρ μεγάλῃν ἔχει βλάβην.
§ 20 δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ δυναμένῳ τοῦτο πεν-
ρατέον διώκειν, ὅπως δύνηται τῆς οἰκείας πόλεως ἀρχεῖν·
ὑπερ ἐγκαλοῦσιν οἱ Λάκωνες Πausanias τῷ βασιλεῖ, καί-
35 περ ἔχοντι τηλικαύτην τιμὴν. οὔτε δὲ πολιτικὸς τῶν τοιού-
των νόμων καὶ λόγων οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὠφέλιμος οὔτε ἀληθὴς ἐστίν.

18 θίμβρων Π³ P⁶ A¹ Bk. || 20 <τῆς> Schneider Bk.² || γεγυμνάσθαι M² P¹ ||
21 ἐπειδὴ γε νῦν M² P¹ || 23 ἔστι δὲ Congreve, ἔστι γὰρ Susm. || 26 δὲ M²,
omitted by P⁴ S⁴ V⁶ L¹ || 30 [κρατεῖν] Reiz, καρτερεῖν? Congreve, perhaps rightly
|| ἔσχεσεν Γ P⁴, ἡσχυσεν M² || 31 τῷ Scaliger Bk.² || 36 λόγων (omitted by
P⁴) καὶ νόμων Π³ P⁶ A¹. (?) and Bk.

18 Θίμβρων] See n. (911).

19 τῶν ἄλλων] To Thimbron and Xenophon we saw cause to add Ephorus n. (219): and perhaps Ciltias.

20 γεγυμνάσθαι] By the Agoge, the public training which constituted a Spartan citizen see Schomann *op. c. E. tr. p.* 255 ff.

§ 18 21 δῆλον] That is, on their own premises such eulogies are refuted. Aristotle fastens on the logical inconsistency of *post hoc propter hoc*.

23—25] As Mr Newman observes, there were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline in the Lacedaemonian state. (1) Many ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus, e.g. Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* c. 14, [Plut.] *Inst. Lac.* c. 42. (2) But Aristotle ascribes it to faults in them: cp. 1270 a 19. Possibly Plutarch's authority for the 'Life of Agis' adopted the first view, and was anxious to save the

credit of Lycurgus from Aristotle's criticism in B 11, and in the *Solites*. Thus Plutarch replies in effect that (a) Lycurgus was not in fault, but Epistadeus and degenerate Spartans: (b) Lycurgus had nothing to do with the Cyprean, or the treatment of the Helots, and (γ) it was not true that he had failed to subject the women to his training.

§ 19 27 τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς κτλ.] Comp. i. 5 § 2, n. (38 b); IV(VII). c. 3 § 2 n. (734). SUSM. (913)

§ 20 32 δῆλον γάρ] 'For on these same principles every single citizen, if he can, must aim at making himself supreme in his own state.' Certainly a very appropriate remark. SUSM. (914)

34 On Pausanias see VII(V). § 10, 7 § 2 n. (1498, 1506). SUSM. (915)

35 πολιτικὸς] Statesmanlike. The adjective of a 'noun' πολιτικός, exactly as in 1324 b 26 νομοθετικός stands to νομοθέτης.

- § 21 ταῦτ' ἂν ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ, τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην (XIII
ἐμποιεῖν δεῖ ταῦτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· τὴν τε τῶν 14
πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσιν οὐ τούτου χάριν δεῖ μελετᾶν, ἵνα κατα-
40 δουλώσωνται τοὺς ἀναξίλους, ἀλλ' ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ
δουλεύσωσιν ἐτέροις, ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς
1334 a ὠφελείας ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντων δεσπο-
τείας, τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν. ὅτι δὲ 15
§ 22 δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην μᾶλλον σπουδάζειν ὅπως καὶ τὴν περὶ
τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην νομοθεσίαν τοῦ σχολάζειν (p. 122
5 ἔνεκεν τάξῃ καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γινόμενα τοῖς
λόγοις. αἱ γὰρ πλείσται τῶν τοιούτων πόλεων πολεμοῦσαι
μὲν σφύζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπόλλυνται.
τὴν γὰρ βαφῆν ἀνιάσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγουν-
τες. αἷτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης οὐ παιδεύσας δύνασθαι σχο-
10 λάζειν.

- 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τέλος εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ κοινῇ καὶ 16
ἰδίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
τῷ τε ἀρίστῳ ἀνδρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀρίστῃ πολιτείᾳ, φανερόν ὅτι
δεῖ τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς ὑπερέχειν· τέλος γάρ,

37 ταῦτ' P³⁻⁴ L¹ V^b Ar., ταῦτα the other authorities, τὰ Spengel || ἵνα P²
Ald. || τὸν <τε> Thurot Sussem.³⁻⁴, <καλ> τὸν Congreve || 38 ταῦτα omitted
by P⁴⁻⁵ L², [ταῦτα] Bk.³ || ἀνθρώπων τὴν τε τῶν twice over in Π¹ || 39 πολεμῶν
Γ M^a || 41 δουλεύωσιν Γ⁴⁻⁵ S^b V^b || ζητῶσι Γ

1334 a 1 πάντως ? Oncken || 2 τρίτων] τοῦτο Joh. Blandis (*Rhein. Mus.* xi.
p. 596), not rightly || τῷ τῷ Vettori, τοῦ Κοραεῖ || 3 ὅπως.. 4 σχολάζειν omitted
by Γ M^a || 5 τάξει P¹ (1st hand) and probably Γ (*ordains* William), τέλει M^a || 8
ἀφιάσιν Π² P⁴ Bk., perhaps rightly || 11 δὴ ? Sussem., yet δὲ is also tenable || 14
ὑπερέχειν Sussem., ὑπάρχειν Γ Π Ar. Bk. Sussem.¹

§ 21 37 τὸν <τε> νομοθέτην] Cp.
n. (296) on II. 9. 12. SUSSEM. (916)
40 ἵνα followed by ὅπως. See P.
Weber *Absichtssätze* p. 20, who quotes
1267 a 2, 1301 b 6, 1320 b 11.

41 ἔπειτα ὅπως [ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγ.] This
is a curious admission, which proves that
Aristotle did not necessarily imagine his
ideal state without external dominion, but
rather as at the head of a group of allies,
whom it has conquered in war, and pro-
tecteth, but also to some extent rules; like
Athens, Sparta or Thebes. Only this
dominion ought to be generously exercised,
so that it may be of even greater service
to the governed than to the governing
states. Cp. also *Introduct.* p. 55. SUSSEM.
(917)

1334 a 2 τρίτον δὲ κατλ.] Comp 1 8.

12, 1256 b 23, with notes; also *nn.* (54,
75, 728) and 1. 7. 5, 1255 b 37, n. (65).
SUSSEM. (918)

§ 22 5 τὰ γινόμενα] So 1. 5. 1,
1254 a 21 ἐκ τῶν γινόμενων καταμαθεῖν.
A fuller phrase 1328 a 20, see n.

6 Ephorus apud Stabonem IX. p.
614: καθάπερ Ἑπαμεινώνδας ἔδειξε· τε-
λευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν
ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους, γενοαμέ-
νους αὐτῆς μόνον αἰτίων δὲ εἶναι τὸ λόγον
καὶ ὁμιλίας ἐλιγνοῦσθαι, μόνῃ δ' ἐπιμελη-
θῆναι τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρετῆς, *P. H. G.*
I. 254 (Newman).

9 αἷτιος δ' ὁ νομοθέτης] Cp. again
II. 9. 34, with n. (345). SUSSEM. (919)

c. 15 *Premittance of the virtues of
peace, though all virtues are alike indis-
pensable.* §§ 1—6.

15 ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, εἰρήνη μὲν πολέμου σχολή δ' (XII.
 § 2 ἀσχολίας χρήσιμοι δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἰσι πρὸς τὴν σχολήν 17
 καὶ διαγωγὴν, ὧν τε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ὧν ἐν τῇ
 ἀσχολίᾳ δεῖ γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν, ὅπως
 ἐξῆν σχολάζειν· διὸ [σώφρονα] τὴν πόλιν εἶναι προσήκει
 20 καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ καρτερικὴν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ
 σχολὴ δούλοις, οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κινδυνεύειν ἀνδρείως
 § 3 δοῦλοι τῶν ἐπιόντων εἰσίν. ἀνδρίας μὲν οὖν καὶ καρτερίας 18
 δεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀσχολίαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν,
 σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς χρό-
 25 νοις, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰρήνην ἄγουσι καὶ σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν

19 ἐξῆν ΓΜ*, perhaps Γ had σχολάζειν || [σώφρονα] Sussem.

§ 1 15 εἴρηται πολλάκις] c. 14 §§ 12, 13, 22. SUSSEM. (920)

§ 2 16 πρὸς τὴν σχολήν καὶ διαγωγὴν] Besides its general meaning 'mode, or condition, of life' and the more special sense, extending beyond the necessities of existence, 'refinement of life' (*Meta.* I. 1. 15, 981 b 18, I. 2. 11, 982 b 23), the word διαγωγὴ in Aristotle, with or without the attribute ελευθέρως (cp. v[III] 5. 8 with n. 1027) or some similar expression, οἱ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ "in a condition of leisure" (v[III] 3 § 3, § 8, cp. n. 993), means the occupation of leisure worthy of a really free man, such as he attains when his political duties have been performed, or such as he always possesses, provided he is peculiarly independent, and leads a life of true study or contemplation. The occupation of such leisure, i.e. in other words (see *Nic. Eth.* X. 7. 6, 1177 a 4, cp. n. 907, 548, and 922) the highest degree of human happiness and satisfaction, is however activity: according to Aristotle, the highest activity there is. It consists in the study of all branches of knowledge and the contemplation of all works of art: it confers the highest intellectual enjoyment and most nearly approaches to the divine blessedness, *Meta.* XII (Λ). 7 § 7, 1073 b 14 f. and above n. (702, 728). From this meaning of 'the highest intellectual enjoyment,' the word sometimes descends to the more commonplace one of mere occupation and especially 'social occupation or intercourse': *N.E.* IX. 11. 5, 1171 b 13, *Phys.* 90, 1493 a 28; cp. also e.g. *Po.* v[III]. 2 § 9 with n. (995). Then it is used in the plural for societies whose object is such intercourse, especi-

ally refined intellectual culture (III. 9. 13, 1280 b 37, where it might be translated "social clubs," cp. n. 558 and v[III]. 5. 11 with n. 1035) and even for regular feasts, gambling and drinking parties. *Nic. Eth.* X 6 § 3, § 8, 1176 b 12 ff., 1177 a 9. In such cases the word becomes identified with the amusement, sport, or pastime, undertaken for recreation (cp. *Nic. Eth.* IV 8 § 1, 1127 b 33 f.); though in the former and stricter interpretation, the two are sharply distinguished: v[III]. c. 3 §§ 3—8, c. 5 § 1 ff. § 9 ff., c. 7 § 3 ff., comp. n. (993, 995, 1023, 1024, 1027, 1032, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1041) and especially *Exc.* v. on B. v[III]. See also Schwiegler ad *Ar.* *Meta.* Vol. III. p. 19 f., Bonitz, *Arist. Meta.* II, p. 45, *Ind. Ar.* 178 a 26 ff., and especially Zeller² II. ii. p. 734 f. n. (5). SUSSEM. (921) In short, a term which may stand for any employment of leisure, even on vulgar amusement, receives a special application to (1) elevated intellectual enjoyments (1339 a 25); in particular (2) those of philosophy and art, including music.

20 οὐ σχολὴ δούλοις] Comp. n. (548) on III. 9. 6. Slaves do certainly need recreation, but leisure in Aristotle's sense of the word, as explained n. (921), is something quite different from recreation. SUSSEM. (922)

§ 3 23 φιλοσοφίας] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. refers this to the meaning 'investigatio,' as in III. 12. 2, 1282 b 23, or *Phys.* I. 2. 5, 185 a 20; and hence explains it as 'virtus intellectualis.'

25 ὁ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.] Comp. *Thuc.* III. 82, 2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὁφέλων τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βλαίος διδάσκαλος καὶ

γὰρ πόλεμος ἀναγκάζει δικαίους εἶναι καὶ σωφρονεῖν, ἥ δὲ (XIII)
 τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπολαύσεις καὶ τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης
 § 4 ὕβριστὰς ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. πολλῆς οὖν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης καὶ 10
 πολλῆς σωφροσύνης τοὺς ἄριστα δοκοῦντας πράττειν καὶ
 30 πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας, οἷον εἴ τινές
 εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ φασιν, ἐν μακάρων νήσοις· μάλιστα
 γὰρ οὗτοι δεήσονται φιλοσοφίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ δι-
 καιοσύνης, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον σχολάζουσιν ἐν ἀφθονίᾳ τῶν τοιού-
 § 5 των ἀγαθῶν. διότι μὲν οὖν τὴν μέλλουσαν εὐδαιμονήσειν
 35 καὶ σπουδαίαν ἔσσεσθαι πόλιν τούτων δεῖ τῶν ἀρετῶν μετέ-
 χεω, φανερόν. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος μὴ δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι (p. 123
 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἔτι μᾶλλον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ σχολάζειν χρῆ-
 38 σθαι, ἀλλ' ἀσχολοῦντας μὲν καὶ πολεμοῦντας φαίνεσθαι ἀγαθοῦς,
 § 6 εἰρήνην δ' ἄγοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀνδραποδώδεις. διὸ δεῖ 20

28 δέ] δύνανται (δέ over an easure), 29 δοκοῦντες, and 30 ἀπολαύοντες P⁶, *ināgent*
 —qui videntur—friu William || 29 σωφροσύνης <μετέχειν> Koiaes, more satis-
 factory, if any change is needed || 37 τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς omitted by P¹ (1st hand, supplied
 by a later hand), τοῖς ..χρησθαι omitted by M¹, ἔτι ..χρησθαι omitted by P³ Ar. ||
 τῷ P¹ P¹ (1st hand), omitted by P⁶ Bk., <αἰσχρόν> τὸ Koiaes, perhaps rightly

πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὁρὰς τῶν πολλῶν
 δημοῖ (Eaton). SUSSE. (923)

26 ἡ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας Comp Thuc.
 111. 29. 4, VIII 24. 4, Plato *Laon* VII
 814 π (Eaton). SUSSE. (924)

§ 4 29 δοκοῦντας] Poisson discusses
 this idiom, accus. not dat., in a note on
Orestes 659. It is not confined to Eur-
 ipides amongst Attic writers (Valekenær
 on *Hippol.* 23). See Aesch. *P. V.* 86, and
 the comic fragment apud Heiodianum
 Pierson, p. 450, *ἐνρυχρίας σε δεῖ*, as cited
 by Poisson

31 οἱ ποιηταὶ] First in the *Odysey*
 IV 561 ff., next the author of the episode
 on the ages of the world in Hesiod's
Works and Days 167 ff., then Pindar
Olymp. II. 60 ff., and others The Isles
 of the Blest, οἱ Elysium, are placed at
 the remotest ends of the earth: it is the
 land of privileged heroes who do not die
 but are taken alive from the earth: here,
 'where falls not hail or rain or any snow,
 where gentle breezes are ever blowing,
 they spend a most blessed life in undisturbed
 enjoyment of all good under the
 sway of Kronos or Rhadamanthus. See
 Preller *Griech. Mythol.* I. p. 635 ff.; cp.
 pp. 53, 69. SUSSE. (926)

μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτοι κτλ.] This is the
 moral of Plato's fine myth respecting the

children of Kronos, *Politics* 272 A—D.
 Indeed it is not there stated that the
 advantages of the golden age failed to
 confer greater happiness, there can be
 little doubt that this is Plato's meaning.
 Several expressions of the *Politics*, πα-
 ρόσης αὐτοῖς οὖν πολλῆς σχολῆς. κατε-
 χρώντο τοῖς ἐμπασιν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν...
 ἐμπιμπλάμκειν σίτων δῖον καὶ ποτῶν 272
 η, c, seem to find an echo here.

32 φιλοσοφίας] Culture, cp. II. 5. 15,
 1264 a 40. Intellectual aptitude, a habit
 of intellectual inquiry, to give occupation
 in leisure and save the citizens from rust-
 ing. Liberal and refined pursuits such
 as music, literature, philosophy in the
 restricted sense, must in leisure hours
 replace the active business of life, τὰ ἀναγ-
 καῖα καὶ χρήσιμα.

33 σχολάζουσιν] This conception of
 a life of cultivated leisure, distinct from
 work and recreation, as the ideal life (cp.
 1337 b 30), which only 'philosophy' can
 (aim us rightly to enjoy (cp. 1267 a 11),
 is of primary importance for the discus-
 sions in Book V(VIII). See esp. V(VIII).
 c 3 §§ 4—8 with notes

§ 6 39 ἀνδραποδώδεις] This term
 'slavish' means to Aristotle 'sunk like
 beasts in low sensual enjoyments.' Plato
 traces out exactly the same line of thought,

40 μὴ καθάπερ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλις τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν. ἐκεῖ- (XIII)
 νοι μὲν γὰρ οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν
 1334 b ταῦτ' αὖ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ γενέσθαι
 ταῦτα μάλλον διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς· ἐπεὶ δὲ μέζω τε ἀγαθὰ
 ταῦτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν * * .
 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν * * τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν, φανε-
 5 ρὸν ἐκ τούτων· πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται, τοῦτο δὴ θεωρητέον.
 § 7 τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον ὅτι φύσεως καὶ ἔθους x
 καὶ λόγου δεῖ. τούτων δὲ πολλοὺς μὲν τινὰς εἶναι χρὴ τὴν

1334 b 1 γίνεσθαι Schneider Bk.², γένεσθαι P⁴, γενέσθαι the other authorities Bk.¹
 Susem.¹ in the text || 2 ἐπεὶ ἐτι Welldon, who punctuates with a full stop at 3 ἀρε-
 τῶν, ignoring the lacuna || τε] τὰ P¹⁻⁶ || 3 ἢ (omitted by M⁴) || τὰ τοῦ (τοῦ
 omitted by M⁴) πολέμου added by I' M⁴ P⁵ before ταῦτα contrary to the sense, τὰ πολε-
 μικά, a similar addition, is presented as a gloss by P² || τῶν ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐτι] Cameira-
 rius first saw that the text was defective. Thuot placed the lacuna after, and Spen-
 gel before, the words τῶν ἀρετῶν, supplying it conjecturally as follows: τῶν ἀρετῶν
 <ὁπολαμβάνουσιν, ἐσφίζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἀρέαντες. ὅτι μὲν
 οὖν δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν> καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτὴν κτλ Thuot (op. II. 9 § 34,
 1271 b 3 ff.): τῶν <πολεμικῶν μέζω εἶναι ἀνάγκη ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸν νομοθέτην
 χρὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν εἰς τὴν σχολὴν> ἀρετῶν καὶ ἐτι δι' αὐτῶν, κτλ Spengel; mistak-
 ing the sense. Thuot's supplement requires a slight alteration to account for the
 loss: hence 4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ σχολάζοντας ἀσκεῖν τὴν ἀρετὴν,> καὶ ὅτι
 171 Susem. Welldon supplies <ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἀρετὴν δεῖ ἀσκεῖν> ||
 αὐτὴν αὐτῇ? Congieue || 6 [τυγχάνομεν. 12 ἤχθαι] Broughton, thinking it to be
 an interpolation by the author of the present redaction || δὴ] δε? Susem.

though in a different manner, in the first two books of the *Lysis*. See n. (43) on I. 5. 8. SUSEM. (926)

§ 6 1334 b 1 ταῦτ' αὖ τοῖς ἄλλοις μέ-
 γιστα] Namely the external goods. Compare for the Spartan convictions II. 9. § 24,
 1270 b 34, ὅστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ
 λάθρα ἀπολαύειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν,
 n. (328), and § 35, 1271 b 7 ff., νομίζουσι
 μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰ γὰρ τὰ περιμάχεται δι'
 ἀρετῆς κτλ with n. (346, 346 b, 347).
 SUSEM. (927)

2 διὰ τινὸς ἀρετῆς] That is, by means
 of valour or courage, which is a particular
 virtue: see II. 9 §§ 34, 35 n. (344, 347),
 esp. 1271 b 2 f. πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ
 πᾶσα συνταξίς τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ, τὴν πολε-
 μικήν· αὐτὴ γὰρ χρῆσιμος πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν.
 Comp. also IV(VII). I § 6, κτῶνται καὶ
 φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ'
 ἐκείνα παύσαι, n. (697). SUSEM. (928)

Mr Newman well observes that this
 correction of the one-sidedness of Lace-
 daemonian training tells just as much

against all systems which, like Stoicism
 and Punitanism, tend to develop some-
 thing less than the whole man.

ἐπεὶ δὲ μέζω. . . 3 ἀρετῶν] The passage
 is defective: we may supplement it from
 II. 9 § 34, 1271 b 4, thus. 'But as they
 esteemed these goods higher than the
 virtues, and the enjoyment of them higher
 than that of the virtues, <they maintained
 their state only while at war, and fell
 after they had acquired empire.> (Thu-
 rot.) SUSEM. (929)

4 <ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ] Thuot further
 suggests as the sense of this opening para-
 graph: <That virtue must be practised
 in leisure also,> and for its own sake, is
 clear from this. SUSEM. (930)

§ 7 6 διηρημένοι πρότερον] The re-
 sult of our previous analysis: 13 § 10,
 1332 a 39 f., see n. (887) and n. (881) on
 c. 13 § 8. SUSEM. (931)

7 τούτων] The citizens of the best
 state (Susemihl): cp. I 8 παιδεύεται, § 5,
 a 34; § 4, a 29, § 1, a 13.

φύσιν, διώρισται πρότερον, λοιπὸν δὲ θεωρῆσαι πρότερον παι- (XIII)
 δευτέοι τῷ λόγῳ πρότερον ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δεῖ
 10 πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνεῖν συμφωνίαν τὴν ἀρίστην· ἐνδέχε-
 ται γὰρ διημαρτηκέναι καὶ τοῦ λόγον τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
 8 θέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁμοίως ἡχθαι. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτό 23
 γε πρῶτον μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’
 ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους, ὁ
 15 δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος, ὥστε πρὸς
 τοῦτους τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν δεῖ παρασκευάζειν
 9 μελέτην· ἔπειτα ὥσπερ ψυχῇ καὶ σῶμα δι’ ἐστίν, οὕτω 23
 καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁράμεν δύο μέρη, τό τε ἄλογον καὶ τὸ
 λόγον ἔχον, καὶ τὰς ἐξεις τὰς ταύτων δύο τὸν ἀριθμόν,
 20 ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ σῶμα

8 παιδευταῖοι M^a, παιδευτῶν P² || 9 πρότερον omitted by II³ P⁵ || 10 ἀρίστην.
 <ἢ τοῖς ἔθεσιν> ? Jackson || 11 καὶ omitted by P², [καὶ] Koriaes Bk.²; Koriaes also
 suggested its transposition to follow τὸν λόγον || 12 ἐθνῶν omitted by II¹ (supplied
 in the margin of P¹ with γρ prefixed) || ὁμοίως P⁵ S³ V³ and in the margin of P¹
 with γρ. prefixed, ὁμοίους Δ1., ὁμοίων II^{1,2} || διὰ . . ἡχθαι τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὁμοίως
 ἀγωγὴν ? Schneider || 14 ἀρχῆς <ἀρχῇ> François Thurol, perhaps rightly, but (as
 Postgate observes) even this slight change is hardly needed || [τέλος] and ἀλλ’ οὐ
 C. Thurol, ἄλλο τέλος <ης> Spengel

8 διώρισται πρότερον] In c. 7. SUSEM.
 (932)

9 τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ] Parallel to c. 13
 §§ 12, 13, and to the more general dis-
 cussion of *Nic. Eth.* x. 9 §§ 1—12 (c. 10
 Bk., 1179 a 33 ff.).

11 διημαρτηκέναι τῆς βελτίστης ὑπο-
 θέσεως] To miss the truest (highest)
 conception or ideal: as is explained in c. 13
 § 2. See c. 4 § 1, 1325 b 35. Men may
 be led astray by habit as well as by reason.
 With ἡχθαι = drawn cp. *N. E.* i. 4.
 6, 1095 b 4. The sense of ὁμοίως is vir-
 tually, ‘amiss.’ ‘Götting is quite wrong
 in rendering “eodem perducī moribus
 quo perduxisset ἡ βελτίστη ὑπόθεσις.”

§ 8 12—15] Mr Newman thinks much
 light is thrown on this difficult passage by
De Part. Animal. II. 1. 6, 646 a 30 ff.
 πῶν γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ τινος καὶ εἰς τι
 ποιεῖται τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐπ’
 ἀρχῇ, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κινούσης καὶ ἐχού-
 σης ᾗδὲ τὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τινα μορφήν ἢ ται-
 οῦτον ἄλλο τέλος.

13 ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς] The sense
 of ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς is clear from c. 16 § 1, see n.
 (937): ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ
 ὅπως κατὰ. “Obviously birth is the first
 or earliest thing which demands our care,”

i.e. we begin with birth. The next words
 mean ‘the nearest or proximate end from
 any starting-point’—understanding ἐστὶ
 with the gen. ἄλλου τέλους, ‘belongs to
 [is referred to] another, or new, end.’
 The proximate end is but a means, sub-
 ordinate to a higher end; *Nic. Eth.* i.
 1. 4, 1094 a 14 ff. In our human nature
 this higher end is intellect and reason.
 SUSEM. (933)

16 τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν μελέτην] Somewhat
 stronger than ἐπιμέλεια, for which cp.
N. E. x. 9 §§ 9, 13—15, 17 (e.g. 1180
 b 23 δι’ ἐπιμέλειας βελτίους τοῦτο).

§ 9 18 δύο μέρη κατὰ] See c. 14
 § 9, 1333 a 17, n. (902), and esp. n. (10)
 on i. 5. 6. SUSEM. (984)

20 τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ὄρεξις τὸ δὲ νοῦς] In
 English, as in German, it is not easy to
 find two terms, mutually related as ὄρεξις
 and ἐπιθυμία. Striving, or effort in gen-
 eral, is the meaning of ὄρεξις [Hamilton’s
 conation]; ἐπιθυμία denotes sense-desire,
 or appetite, in particular. This explains
 why ὄρεξις alone denotes ‘the motive force
 of the rational soul’ (as I should trans-
 late *ἔξω*; characteristic possession, or at-
 tribute, is not strong enough), while
 within the soul *θυμός*, passion—see nn.

- πρότερον τῇ γενέσει τῆς ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἄλογον τεῦ- (XIII)
 § 10 λόγον ἔχοντος. φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο· θυμὸς γὰρ καὶ βούν
 λησις, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει τοῖς
 παιδίοις, ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς προϋούσιν πέφυκεν ἐγ-
 25 γίνεσθαι. διὸ πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ σώματος τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι προτέραν ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔπειτα τὴν
 τῆς ὀρέξεως, ἕνεκα μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ τὴν τῆς ὀρέξεως, τὴν δὲ (α
 τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς.
 16 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως XIV
 30 τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν

23 καὶ after δὲ omitted by Π³ P² Bk. || 24 πέφυκεν after ἐγγίνεσθαι (ἐγγίνε-
 σθαι Π² a⁴ q) P¹ Π² Bk. || 26 τὴν after ἡ omitted by P⁴ S² V² L¹ || 27 τὴν δὲ τοῦ τοῦ
 δὲ Π¹ || 28 τοῦ σώματος τοῦ τρίτου M¹ (huius autem eorum quae animae William) ||
 30 τὰ σώματα after βέλτιστα Π² P² Bk. || γένηται Π³ P² Bk.

(641, 786)—ἐπιθυμία, desire, and βούλησις, will, are distinguished: and further, why in I. 5. 6 the τὴν ὀρεξίς is first used, 1254 b 5, and afterwards 1254 b 8, τὸ παθητικὸν μέρος 'the emotional part,' see note (40). The same dichotomy of the irrational soul is also found in *De Anima* II. 3. 1, 414 b 1, III. 10. 3, 433 a 23 ff. (That these passages are not in conflict with *De Anima* III. 9. 3, 432 b 4 ff. and *Torques* IV. 5. 6, 126 a 12 f., if the statement ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἡ βούλησις be rightly interpreted, is shown by Susemhl *Zeit. f. Philol.* CXIX. 1879, p. 743 n. 17.) The spurious treatise *De Motu Animal.* c. 6 § 4, 700 b 22, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὀρεξίς εἰς τρία διαίρεται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, and *Eud.* Eth. II. 7. 2, 1223 a 26 f. βούλησις δὲ καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πάντα ὀρεξίς... ὥστε κινεῖ πρῶτον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ διανοητὸν, need not be taken into account. The Will appears, as the passage from *Eud.* Eth. more particularly proves, as ὀρεξίς=impulse, whether rightly or wrongly guided by reason, directed to real or apparent good, see *N. Eth.* II. 4 (II. c. 6 Bk.), while Desire (ἐπιθυμία) aims at what is pleasant, and Anger (θυμία) at revenge. See Walter *Die praktische Vernunft* pp. 194—212. Yet all this does not suffice to explain the present passage, which rightly denies to the child (at all events to the infant just after birth) the possession of any rational impulses. The difference between our passage and the two cited from *De Anima* is that here θυμὸς and βούλησις are again drawn closer together and opposed to ἐπιθυμία. Should

θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις be taken to mean 'aversion and liking'? In any case at b 22 βούλησις is used in what Zeller calls (*op. c.* II. II. p. 587, n. 3) a wider sense, or more precisely a weakened sense, denoting something more analogous to θυμὸς than to ἐπιθυμία. SUSEMHL (1938)

§ 10 We must then train the body first; next the impulses, the motive forces of the irrational soul; and lastly the reason.

25 πρῶτον μὲν. 27 ὀρέξεως] Here again Aristotle follows closely in the track of Plato, *Laos* II. 652 a—653 c. SUSEMHL (1938)

Add *Republic* 410 B, 563 A, 591 C ff.
 c. 16 *Precautions necessary on the part of the parents to secure healthy progeny.*

§ 1 29 εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτλ.] The expression is chosen with reference to the words at the beginning of c. 13 § 8, 1334 b 13, and as regards the *facies* also Aristotle takes up the same thread. Cp. n. (933). But in the further and decisive step, of making education begin not merely before birth but even before conception, Aristotle quite follows Plato's procedure *Laos* IV 721, VI 774—776, 783 D ff., 788 ff. (comp. *Rep.* V 458 E, *Politics* 310). It is in imitation of the Spartan model: see Xen. *De Rep. Lacadaem.* I. 3 ff., Plut. *Lyc.* 14 (Eaton). SUSEMHL (1937) Add *Critias*, Fr. 1, *F. H. G.* II. 68 (Newman).

δεῖ ὅπως] The remedy for a rather violent hiatus may be easily discovered by comparing 1320 a 33, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως κτλ.

ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ πολλοὺς τινὰς ὄντας (XIV)
χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν.

- § 2 δεῖ γὰρ ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς
35 ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνά-
μεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στά-
σεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφοράς). ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν
§ 3 τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι τὰ
40 τέκνα ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνυγτος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν
πρεσβυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν
1335 a πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι
(πολλὴν γὰρ ἔχει δυσχέρειαν· ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδὼς ἡττον ὑπάρ-
χει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις, καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν
§ 4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς). ἔτι δ', ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο
5 μετέβημεν, ὅπως τὰ σώματα τῶν γεννωμένων ὑπάρχῃ
πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα
§ 5 συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὄρισται τέλος
τῆς γονιότητος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον εἶπεν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ
τῶν ἱβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἑξαχτος, πεντήκοντα δὲ
10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν

37 πρὸς ἀλλήλους omitted by I^M, hence [πρὸς ἀλλήλους] Sussem.¹ || 33 γὰρ Sussem., δ' I II Ar. Bk. Sussem.¹ || <περὶ> ταύτην Vetton, perhaps rightly || 34 συζῆν I⁴ (coir.) || 37 γὰρ omitted by S^b V^b Ar. || 39 τῶν omitted by P^{2a} || λίαν omitted by II¹ || τὰ τέκνα after 40 ταῖς ἡλικίαις II² P² Bk.

1335 a 2 γὰρ after τε omitted by II¹ || 5 ὑπάρχει M^a P² || 6 σχεδὸν... I X τοῦ-
τους transposed to follow a 27 ἐτι <ἢ μικρόν> Sussem.^{2,3}. See *Introduct.* p. 89

32 γαμικὴν] 'Nuptial,' not 'con-
jugal'; cp I. 3. 1, 1253 b 9 π. Or, as
Prof. Gildersleeve puts it, γάμος = wed-
ding, not wedlock.

§ 2 33 κοινωνίαν] Comp. Eur. *Bacchae*
1277 ἐγένετο | Πένθει ἐμῇ τε καὶ πατρὸς
κοινωνίᾳ.

34 συγκαταβαίνωσι] For the vb. κατα-
βαίνει, § 5, 1335 a 11, see Schw. *Lex.*
Herod. It is used, like *κοινοῦσθαι* (cp. 1332
b 41), for 'to suit' properly 'to meet in.'
The compound with σύν = to come simul-
taneously to an end, so producing a con-
vergence or correspondence.

§ 3 Johnson *Rhetorics* c. 29 affords
a parallel. "From these early marriages
proceeds likewise the rivalry of parents
and children: the son is eager to enjoy
the world before the father is willing to

forsake it, and there is hardly room at
once for two generations.. Those who
marry at an advanced age will probably
escape the encroachments of their chil-
dren; but, in diminution of this advan-
tage, they will be likely to leave them,
ignorant and helpless, to a guardian's
mercy. From their children if they have
less to fear they have less also to hope."

41 ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων] The
gratitude due from their children. Cp.
Plato *Laws* IV. 717 B, C.

1335 a 1 βοήθεια τοῖς τέκνοις] Plato
Laws 717 C εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ἐκείνων with
Stallbaum's note: βοήθεια τῷ λόγῳ *Plato*.
128 C, *Alc.* I. 116 A, τοῖς φίλοις.

4 ἐγκληματικὸν τὸ πάρεγγυς] Near-
ness, i.e. equality in age, produces bick-
erings, misunderstandings (II. 5. 4).

§ 6 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συν-
 12 δασμὸς φαῦλος πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῖφος
 ἀτελῇ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον καὶ
 μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
 15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὕσαις γὰρ τῶν
 πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζει τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτε-
 § 7 λείδς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματα εἰσίν. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς τόκοις
 αἱ νέαι ποιοῦσί τε μᾶλλον καὶ διαφθεύρονται πλείους· διδ (p. 125)
 καὶ τὸν χρησμόν γενέσθαι τινὲς φασὶ διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν
 20 τοῖς Τροϊεῖσι, ὥς πολλῶν διαφθειρομένων διὰ τὸ γαμί-
 σκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν τῶν καρπῶν κο-
 § 8 μιδίην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην συμφέρει τὰς ἐκδό-
 σεις ποιεῖσθαι πρεσβυτέραις· ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ δοκοῦσι
 νέαι χρησάμεναι ταῖς συνουσίαις. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων
 25 δὲ σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἐὰν ἔτι τοῦ

11 [ἐστὶ] ἐτι Sussem.¹ in the notes, wrongly || 12 τῶν omitted by Π² P² Bk. ||
 13 ἔγγονα Π² P² Bk. || θηλυτόκα Cameracius (wrongly), θηλυτέρα Koras || 14 ταῦτ
 τοῦτο Π² P² A¹ Bk., hoc igitur Wilham || 16 ἐπιχωριάζει M^a and (after a lacuna)
 P¹, ἐπιχωριάζεται Π² P² Bk. p¹ (in the margin) and apparently T || τὸ τοῦ M^a P² ||
 18 αἱ νέαι ἐναι Π¹, ἄλλως αἱ νέαι p¹ in the margin || ποιοῦσι after τε M^a P¹ || 23
 εἶναι inserted after γὰρ by Π² P² Bk. Sussem.² || 25 δὲ omitted by Π¹, untranslated
 by Ar., [δὲ] Sussem.¹, wrongly

§ 6 13 θηλυτόκα] This point is not mentioned *Hist. Animal.* v. 12. 1 (v. 14 Bk.), 544 b 16, where the offspring are merely said to be weak and puny. SUSEM. (938)

We find it however, with the presumed physical cause, *De Gen. Animal.* iv. 2. 1, 766 b 29 ff., τὰ τε γὰρ νέα θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀρσενικῶν, καὶ γηράσκοντα μᾶλλον τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολείπει. Falstaff, *Henry IV.* Part II, Act 4 sc 2, humorously calls this one of the ill effects of water-drinking.

15 τεκμήριον δέ· γὰρ] If the *Index Ar.* s. v. may be trusted, this is the only instance of this usage in its normal form, the pronoun being omitted. We had σημειῶν δέ· γὰρ c. 7 § 6, 1328 a 1, and Bonitz id. 677 b 9 ff. cites ten other instances, including 1312 b 21, 1318 b 17.

16 ἐπιχωριάζει] Comp. v(viii). 6. 12, 1341 a 34. The verb appears in another sense in Pl. *Phaedo* 57 A. The supposed passive of the Lexx. (see *Crit. n.*) receives its coup de grâce from Kaibel, the last editor of Athenaeus, who at xiv. 619 f reads κατὰ τινα ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῦ...ἔδοντες, with the critical note

"παρ' αὐτοῦ < ἐστὶν > Wilamowitz, recte defendens ἐπιχωριάζεσθαι verbum medium."

συζευγνύναι] To pair, join in marriage: § 9, a 29.

§ 7 18 ποιοῦσι τε μᾶλλον] This statement reappears in the spurious B. VII. of *Hist. An.* c. 1 § 16, 582 a 20.

19 τὸν χρησμόν] A gloss cites the oracle in the form ἡ γῆ νέας ἀποκα, 'will not the flesh follow.' Götting proposed to alter νέας to νέας, thinking there was a play upon νεῶς which he took to be gen. of a supposed νεά-πινωλε, fallow land [for which νεός, Attic νεός, is the received form]. SUSEM. (938) Comp. Eur. *Phoen.* 18 σπέρθεν τέκνον ἀποκα, Soph. *Oed. T.* 1210 (Ridgeway); also *Antig.* 569 ἀρώσκει γὰρ χάρτων εἰσὶν γῆαι.

20 διαφθειρομένων] Comp. *Frags. Λόγου γαμικοῦ* of Clemens Alexandrinus p. 1022 P., III. 501 Dind. παρθένων φθορά λέγεται οὐ μόνον πορνεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρὸ καιροῦ ἐκδοσις, θάνατος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἄμωρος ἐκδοθῆναι τῷ ἀνδρὶ.

§ 8 24 Comp. Aristomenes Talent. *Fr.* 20, *F. H. G.* II. 278.

- σώματος ἀξαναομένου ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ γὰρ τούτου (XIV)
 27 τις χρόνος ὠρισμένος, ὃν οὐχ ὑπερβαίνει πληθύνει ἔτι <ἢ μι-
 κρόν.> § 4 a 6 <σχεδὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα γ συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν
 <ἐπιμέλειαν. § 5 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὠρίσται τέλος 8 τῆς γεννήσεως ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
 <πλείστον εἰπεῖν ἀνδράσι μὲν ὁ 9 τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς
 <ἔσχατος, πεντήκοντα δὲ 10 γυναιξίν, δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς συζεύ-
 <ξεως κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν 11 εἰς τοὺς χρόνους καταβαίνειν τούτους.>
 § 9 διὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν 8
 ἡλικίαν συζευγνύει, τοὺς δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα, ἢ μικρόν].
 30 ἐν τοσοῦτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσιν τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται,
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν παύλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται
 § 10 τοῖς χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς
 33 μὲν ἀρχομένους ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίνηται κατὰ λδ-

26 σώματος Γ Ar. and P² (corr.²), ἄλλως σώματος P¹ (in the margin), σπέρματος
 the other authorities || 27 χρόνος after ὠρισμένος P¹⁻² P³ Bk. || πληθύνει Bk.², πλη-
 Μ', *multum* William Ar.

6 δὲ Susem., δι' Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ || ταῦτα before πάντα M', untranslated by
 William

29 συζευγνύει P¹, συζευχθῆναι M' || 28 Ar., ἐπὶ all other authorities: *πότε*?
 Susem. from an earlier suggestion of Spengel's, see Comm. n. (940) || [ἢ μικρόν] Sepul-
 veda, transposed by Gottling Susem.²⁻³ to follow 27 ἐτι || 30 τοσοῦτῳ τούτω P³ P⁴
 Ar. and P¹ (corr.¹ in the margin) || ἀκμάζουσιν M', ἀκμάζοντα P⁴ S⁵ V⁶ || 31
 <συγ>καταβήσονται Susem.¹⁻² wrongly following William (*convenient*) || 32 ταῖς
 μὲν ἀρχομένους Ridgeway wrongly: see Exc. II. p. 567 || 33 ἀρχομένης Γ apparently
 (*puellante akmes* William) Bk. Susem.¹⁻² and P³ (corr.), perhaps rightly || γίνηται
 P² P³ Bk.², γέννηται P¹

26 καὶ γὰρ τούτου κτλ] Sc. τοῦ σώ-
 ματος: bodily growth has fixed limits of
 time which it does not exceed (or only to
 a small extent). Comp. note on v(III).
 I. I, 1337 a 13

§ 9 28 διὸ τὰς μὲν κτλ] In *Rep.* v.
 460 E Plato fixes the period for procrea-
 tion amongst his guardians from twenty
 to forty in the woman, and from twenty-
 five (apparently) to fifty-five in any case
 in the man. His regulations in the *Laws*
 are not consistent. The marriage of the
 sons is at one time enjoined when they
 are between thirty and fifty-five (IV. 721 A,
 VI. 785 B), at another time when they are
 between twenty-five and thirty-five at
 latest (VI. 772 D). Similarly the daughters
 are to marry before the age of twenty,
 but while the earlier limit is once fixed
 at sixteen (VI. 785 B), it is elsewhere
 raised to eighteen (VIII. 833 D).

In the spurious B. VII. of Aristotle's
Historia Animal. cc. 5, 6 there are state-
 ments about the limits of age for getting
 offspring in tolerable agreement with the
 present passage. The limit is said to be,
 as a rule, sixty in the man, forty in the
 woman, with occasional prolongation to
 seventy and fifty respectively. Xenophon
 (*Oecon.* 7 § 5, cp. 3 § 13) fixes the earlier
 limit in the wife's case at fifteen. SUSEM.
 (940)

§§ 9, 10 are treated by Prof. Ridgeway,
Transactions p. 145 f., D¹ Jackson *ib.* pp.
 116—118.

'Vide quae disserui in Herm. XIx.
 p. 592 sqq.; ubi etiam exposui, cur prius-
 sus recte olim Spengelium v. 29 πότε pro
 ἐπὶ postulasse nunc censeam' *Quaest.*
crit. coll. p. 414. The substance of the
 paper in *Hermes* is given in Exc. II. p.
 566. SUSEM.

γον εὐθύς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλι- (XIV)
 35 κίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτων ἀριθμόν. περὶ μὲν τ
 οὖν τοῦ πότε δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν σύζευξιν, εἴρηται· τοῖς δὲ
 περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ χρώνται καλῶς
 καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην.
 § 11 δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν τὰ τε
 40 παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν φυσικῶν·
 οἷ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσιν ἱκανῶς,
 1335^b καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοὶ, τὰ βόρεια τῶν νο-
 § 12 τίων ἐπαινοῦντες μᾶλλον. ποίων δὲ τινῶν τῶν σωμάτων
 ὑπαρχόντων μάλιστα <ἀν> ὄφελος εἴη τοῖς γεννωμένοις, ἐπιστή-
 σαι μὲν μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας,
 5 τύτῳ δὲ ἱκανὸν <δεῖ> εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν
 χρησῖμος ἕξις πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν

34 γέννησις Reis Susem.² || [τῆς ἡλικίας] Spengel || 37 δεῖ χρῆσθαι omitted by Π² P² Ar. Bk. thus avoiding hiatus || χρῆσθαι M² P¹ || οἷς] ὡς Π² P² Aa. Bk. || ὡς—καὶ νῦν καλῶς Schmidt || [δεῖ χρῆσθαι ὡς] Madvig || 38 ποιεῖσθαι after τὴν συναυλίαν Π² P² Bk. || συνουσίαν Zwinger Bk.² || 39 δὲ Π² P² Aa., δὲ P² (1st hand), δὲ other authorities Bk. and P² (later hand) || 41 λέγουσι after ἱκανῶς Π² P² Bk.

1335 b 3 μάλιστα <ἀν> Κοραῖς Bk.², μάλιστα ἀν M² (?), μάλιστα the other authorities and Bk. || 4 μᾶλλον τοῖς omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹) || ταιδέας Π² (corrected by P¹ in the margin) || 5 <δεῖ> Susem., possibly however it can be understood from 4 λεκτέον || οὔτε γὰρ ἡ omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹) || 6 ἕξις omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹) || οὔτε πρὸς εὐεξίαν inserted after εὐεξίαν by Γ M² || οὐδὲ Κοραῖς, οὔτε II || πρὸς omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied

§ 10 34 καταλελυμένης] On the analogy of καταλεῖν πλοῦτος, εἰρήνην, βίον, καταλείπει συμποσίον, στρατιᾶς, τμήματος (a crew), δήμου, πολιτείας, where 'breaking up,' 'dissolution' are the main ideas, we must render 'in the decline of their powers, or vigour.' So *fracta aetate* Victor, *aetate iam decrepita* Lambin.

38 χειμῶνος] more exactly, in the month Gamelion (January and February), which derived its name of wedding-month from the custom: Theophr. *Hist. Plant.* vii. 1 § 2. Pseudo-Hippoc. *περὶ ἀφῆρων* (iii. p. 12 Kühn), quoted by Eaton, maintains "that the sprug is the most suitable time." SUSEM. (941)

§ 11 41 καιροῦς] Favourable conditions.

1335 b 1 τὰ βόρεια] That the north wind is particularly favourable to male offspring is more precisely stated by Aristotle in different passages of his *Historia Animalium* and *De generatione*

Animalium: e. g. *H. A.* vi. 19 § 4, 574 a 1 καὶ βορείου μὲν δευόμενα ἀρρενοκεῖ μᾶλλον, νοτίου δὲ θηλυτοκεῖ. SUSEM. (942)

3 ἐπιστήσασιν] Intransitive, as if τὴν γνώμην had to be supplied: attentively. Cp. 1336 b 25, also Soph. *Ant.* 227.

§ 12 4 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας] Another reference to a discussion to follow, which is not to be found in the extant work: see c. 17 § 5 n. (958), § 7 n. (960), § 10 n. (963), § 12 n. (969), 12 § 5 n. (862); vi (iv). c. 15 § 19 n. (1355), § 13, vii (vi). 8 § 22 n. (1483). Also *Antistot.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 52. SUSEM. (948)

5 Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 168 a 54 ff. is in doubt whether δὲ might be mentally supplied from λεκτέον, or must be added. The sense is: id iam nunc dicendum est, quod est τῷτῳ ἱκανῶς. SUSEM.

5 οὔτε γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν κτλ.] Comp. Plato *Rep.* iii. 404 A (Eaton) and below v (viii). 4 § 1 n. (1004), §§ 7–9 n. (1015). SUSEM. (944)

- καὶ τεκνοποιῖαν, οὕτε ἡ θεραπευτικὴ καὶ κακοποιητικὴ λῖαν, (XIV)
 § 13 ἀλλ' ἡ μέση τούτων. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν (v. 136)
 ἔξιν, πεπονημένην δὲ πόνοις μὴ βίαιοις, μηδὲ πρὸς ἓνα
 10 μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν
 ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀν-
 § 14 δράσι καὶ γυναιξίν. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐγκύνους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὁ
 τῶν σωμάτων, μὴ ῥαθυμούσας μηδ' ἀραιὰ τροφὴν χρωμέ-
 νας. τοῦτο δὲ ῥάδιον τῷ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι προστάξαντι καθ'
 15 ἡμέραν τινα ποιεῖσθαι πορεῖαν πρὸς θεῶν ἀποθεραπεῖαν
 τῶν εὐληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γενέσεως τιμῇ. τὴν μὲντοι διά-
 νοιαν τοῦναντίον τῶν σωμάτων ῥαθυμοτέρως ἀρμόττει διά-
 γειν· ἀπολαύοντα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ γεννώμενα τῆς ἐχούσης
 § 15 ὥσπερ τὰ φυόμενα τῆς γῆς. περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ 1
 20 τροφῆς τῶν γενομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρωμένον
 τρέφειν, διὰ δὲ πληθὺς τέκνων ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν
 κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίσθαι τῶν γενομένων· ὥρισθαι γὰρ

by P¹) || *ὄγλαν* M¹ P¹⁻⁵ || *γ* *θεραπευτικὴ* M¹ and apparently P¹ (1st hand, corrected by P¹), *civis indigenus* William || *κακοποιητικὴ* M¹ and P¹ (1st hand, corrected by P¹), *male habens* William || 8 *ἔχειν* omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by P¹) || 9 *ἓνα* + + Susem.¹⁻³, *ἓν* as a gloss by corr.³ in the margin of P⁴ and Schneidei Bk.²; but *πόνοις* should be understood || 11 *ἐλευθέρων* Γ P⁴, *ἐλευθέρων* the other authorities Bk. Susem.¹⁻³ || *ταῦτα* Π² P⁵ Ar. Bk. || *καὶ* omitted by Π² P⁵ Bk. || 12 *ἐγκύνους* P¹ Ald. || 16 *ταῖς* εὐληχίαις Γ Ar. Susem.¹⁻⁵, perhaps rightly || 18 *ἀπολαμβάνοντα* M¹, *ἀπολαμβάνοντα* Γ and perhaps Ar. || *γενόμενα* Π² Bk.¹ || 19 *καὶ* added before *τὰ* by Π² Bk. || 20 *γενομένων* P¹, *γεννώμενων* P², *γενομένων* M¹ Bk.², *γγενομένων* Π² Bk.¹ || 21 *ἐάν* added after *τέκνων* by Π² P⁴ Ar. Bk. and P¹ (margin), *ἐάν* μὴ ? Scaliger. Schomann *Gr. Alt.* II. p. 517 n. (1) restores the passage thus: *τέκνων* (ἐάν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μηδὲν ἀποτίσθαι τῶν γενομένων) ὥρισθαι γὰρ δεῖ || *ἐθῶν* Γ P⁴⁻⁵ S¹ L¹ C¹ Ar. || 22 *κωλύει* P²⁻⁴⁻⁵ S¹ V¹ Ai. Ald. Bk. and P⁴ (corr.¹), *κωλύει* apparently P³ (1st hand), perhaps rightly, *κωλύσει* Susem., *καλὴ* ἢ (with preceding *ἐάν*) Schlosser || *γενομένων* Koraeis (who does not reject *γεννώμενων*), *γεννώμενων* Scaliger, *γενομένων* M¹ P¹ Bk.² Susem.¹ in the text, *γγενομένων* Π² P⁵ Bk.¹ || *ὥρισθαι* Γ Ar. P¹ (margin) and P² (corr.¹), *ὥρισθαι* M¹, *ὁρισθῆναι* P¹ (1st hand), *ὁρισθαι* P²⁻⁵ Π² Bk. P¹ (corr. in the margin) and P³ (1st hand, emended by corr.¹), *ὥρισθω* Spengel || *γὰρ* γὰρ Koraeis, γὰρ Schomann

§ 13 10 "If any word is needed, read *πόνοις*, but *ἓνα* refers to *πόνοις* with quite sufficient clearness. Similarly v(viii). 4, 2, 1338 b 15" (Ridgeway). Comp. however *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 415.

§ 14 14 *προστάξαντι καθ' ἡμέραν* τινά...16 *τιμῇ* Plato, too, *Laws* VII 789 E, prescribes in spite of ridicule, *ἀμα γέλῳτι φράζωμεν*, that when encircle the wife should take walks assiduously (Eaton). SUSEM. (948)

15 *ἀποθεραπεῖαν*] The force of the prefix is similar in *ἀφορεῖσθαι*, to discharge one's conscience. Here, 'to discharge her service.'

"18 *ἀπολαμβάνοντα*] Prof. Ridgeway takes this to mean that the foetus is a daimon on the woman's strength, just as plants draw the good out of the ground; τῆς sc. *ἐν γαστρὶ ἐχούσης*.

§ 15 22 *ὥρισθαι*. .. 23 *πληθὺς*] How this is to be brought about was stated II.

δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν δέ τιςι γίνηται παρὰ (XIV)
 ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶν,
 25 ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ
 § 16 διακρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν 11
 ἀρχὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ διώρισται, τότε ἀρχε-
 σθαι δεῖ τῆς συζεύξεως, καὶ πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρ-
 μόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιαν ὀρίσθαι. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων
 30 ἔκγονα, καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων, ἀτελῇ γίνονται καὶ τοῖς
 σώμασι καὶ ταῖς διανοαῖς, τὰ δὲ τῶν γεγενηκότων ἀσθενῇ.

23 δὲ Π¹ A¹. and P³ (1st hand), δὴ P² Π³ Bk. and P¹ (corr. in the margin) P³
 (a later hand): so Spengel || 24 συνδυασθέντων Spengel Sussem.^{1,2} from a misuse
 of William's translation *aliquibus... combinatis*, <τῶν> συνδυασθέντων? Korraes ||
 25 μὴ omitted by Π² P² || 28 δὲ] χρῆ Π² P³ Bk. || ἰστέως M¹ and P¹ (1st
 hand, emended by corr.¹) || 30 καὶ inserted after καθάπερ by Γ, if *sicut et minorum*
 (William) is an accurate translation || τὰ omitted by M¹, possibly by Γ || τῶν
 omitted by P¹ || 31 γερασκότων M¹ and P¹ (1st hand, corrected in the margin
 with γρ. prefixed)

6 § 12: see *nn.* (209, 211), also II. 7 § 5
n. (236). Plato, too, *Rhp.* v 460 D, 461 C,
 orders exposure in the case of weakly or
 deformed infants of the guardian class (as
 was remarked *n.* 140), and in the case of
 conception occurring where the law or the
 magistrates' orders have been infringed,
 abortion, or (presumably if this
 has been delayed) exposure. Indeed he
 goes further than this by condemning
 the offspring of inferior guardians: τὰ δὲ
 τῶν χειρόνων, καὶ ἐὰν τι τῶν ἑτέρων ἀν-
 ἡλικον γένηται, ἐν ἀπορήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδύλῳ
 κατακρύψουσιν, 460 C. But even in the
Timaeus 19 A his words convey the im-
 pression that he had not given any in-
 structions for exposing the children of
 less qualified parents, but meant simply
 a secret transference of them to the third
 class of the population. Under the guise,
 that is, of a mere repetition, he modifies
 his former regulation in this sense (see
 Zeller *Griech. Phil.* ed. 4 II. 1. 909 *n.* 2,
 ed. 3 pp. 771 *n.* 3, *Eng. U.* p. 478 *n.*
 55, Sussemihl *Plat. Phil.* II. p. 171). In
 the *Laws* (see *nn.* 192, 208) he drops
 the preventive means of abortion alto-
 gether, nor does he say anything about
 exposing illegitimate and deformed in-
 fants. Thus in the course of his own life-
 time Plato gradually attained to a more
 humane view. In this respect Aristotle's
 ideal state goes far beyond that of the
Laws in the stinginess and callousness,
 or rather, to give it its true name, the

abominable cruelty of its regulations. As
 to exposure, the example of Sparta has
 again had a determining influence on both
 thinkers. In all other Greek states it was
 left to the father's decision whether he
 would expose his child or not; but at
 Sparta a committee of the eldest members
 of the Phyle decided, and in accordance
 with their decision the deformed or weakly
 infant had to be despatched to the place
 of exposure ('*Αποθέτας*') on Taygeios
 See Schomann p. 270 f. (*Eng. tr.* 256).
Comp. also Introd. p. 52 f. SUSEM.
 (948)

Note that ἀποθεῖναι... πλῆθος is a virtual
 repetition of II. 6. 12, 1265 b 6 ff., just as
 c. 4 § 2, 1225 b 38 f. reproduces 1265 a 17,
 in both cases without the conventional *ὡς*
ἐργασίαι πρότερον (Newman).

23—25] Here the indignation of some
 honest reader found vent in the remark-
 able gloss on the margin of P², *τί λέγει ὁ*
δαμόνιος τοῖς τοῖς; Doubtless the same
 hand which scribbled *φλυαρεῖ, φλυαρία*,
 against 1269 b 26, 1272 a 23. Whether
 from this "thin end of the wedge" came
 the gradual depopulation of Greece, which
 Polybius (XXXVII. 9) deploras, is an-
 other matter. Cp. Thirlwall *Hist.* VIII.
 463 ff.

§ 16 28 Meisterhans ed.² p. 28 ff.
 shows that *ἀγροφυεῖν* is the true Attic
 form. The usurping *λετοουργεῖν* does not
 appear before the third century B.C.
 When this *ei* was pronounced as *i*, *λυ-*

- § 17 διὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμῇν. αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς (XIV)
 πλείστοις ἤνπερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινες εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες
 ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεν-
 35 τήκοντα ἔτων. ὥστε τέτταρσιν ἢ πέντε ἔτεσιν ὑπερβάλλοντα 13
 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην ἀφείσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γε-
 νήσεως· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ὑγείας χάριν ἢ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύ-
 § 18 τῆς αἰτίας φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμίλιαν. περὶ δὲ
 τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν
 40 ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσ- (p. 105)
 αγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας
 1335 a ἐάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρε-
 ποῦση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.
 17 γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων οἴεσθαι <δεῖ> μεγάλην εἶναι δια- XV
 φορὰν πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν τὴν τροφήν, ὅποια
 5 τις ἂν ᾖ. φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τε τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐπισκο-
 ποῦσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν οἷς ἐπιμελές ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τὴν

35 ὡς Π¹, but ὥστε P¹ (corr.¹) || 36 τὴν ἡλικίαν ταύτην omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 37 ὑγείας M^a P⁶, ὑγείας χάριν omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 38 τὴν omitted and a lacuna left by P¹ (1st hand, supplied by p¹) || 39 καὶ ἢ Π^a P⁶ Bk, perhaps rightly

1336 a 3 <δεῖ> Susem. Should it come before διαφορὰν? || 5 δὲ Γ P⁶ Ar., τὲ M^a, τὲ P¹ Π³ || 6 εἰσάγειν Γ P⁶, ἄγειν M^a P¹, δει Π³ Ar., ἀσκέω Koraez, ἐπάγειν ? Susem.

τοῦργία was written in inscriptions of the Roman period.

§ 17 33 τῶν ποιητῶν τινες] Solon *Frags.* 27. Aristotle virtually adopts this theory of successive stages in human life at c. 17 § 15 (cp. n. 971), and similarly in *Hist. Animal.* v. 12 § 2 (v. 14 § 3, 544 b 25 ff.), 17 § 16 (v. 20 § 3, 553 a 2 ff.), vi. 16 § 1 (17 § 2, 570 a 30 f.), comp. vii. 1 § 1, 581 a 12 ff., vii. 13 (vii. 12 § 2, 588 a 8 ff. quoted in the *Scholias* to Aristotle. *Buds* 494) Compare Hippocr. quoted in Philo *περὶ κοσμοποιίας* p. 71 Pfeif. and Censorin. *De die natali* 14 (J. G. Schneider). Congreve remarks that in *Rhet.* ii. 14 § 4, 1390 b 11 f. the forty-ninth year is more precisely given, not the fiftieth as here. SUSEM. (947)

36 τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γενήσεως] This means that if any license is taken, there must be recourse to abortion, so that no child is born. The key is furnished by *Rep.* v. 461 C, μὴδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφέρειν κήρυμα μὴδέν, 'to prevent any embryo which may come into being from

seeing the light' (J. G. Schneider). Comp. n. (946) and *Introd.* p. 63. SUSEM. (948)

§ 18 40 προσαγορευθῇ πόσις] "In the sense of *call* προσαγορεύω sometimes employed προσηγόρευσα and προσηγροῦσθην, though in the sense of ἀσάξομαι it had προσερῶ, προσεῖπον, and προσερρήθην" (Rutherford). See *New Phrygischus* p. 333 ff. with citation of [Dem.] *Adv. Boeotum de dote* xl. § 1, ὅταν τις ἀδελφὸς προσαγορευθῇ. Comp. i. 12. 3, 1259 b 13 (προσηγόρευσε), and for the use of πόσις, Soph. *Trach.* 550 f. μὴ πόσις μὲν Ἑρακλῆς ἑμὸς καλῆται τῆς πυνθέρας δ' ἀνὴρ (paramour).

c. 17 *Treatment and food of children during infancy.*

§ 1 1336 a 3 οἴεσθαι 5 ἂν ᾖ] "Our next case must be for the proper quality of the nourishment, since much depends upon this, as we are bound to believe, for the thriving of the body" Comp. Plato *Rep.* iii. 404 b ff., Xenophon *De Rep. Lac.* 2 § 5 (Eaton). SUSEM. (949)

πολεμικὴν ἔξω, ἣ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα τροφή μάλιστ' (XV)
 § 2 οἰκεία τοῖς σώμασιν, αἰονότερα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. ἔτι 2
 δὲ καὶ κινήσεις ὅσας ἐνδέχεται ποιῆσθαι τηλικούτων συμ-
 10 φέρει. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι τὰ μέλη δι' ἀπαλό-
 τητα χρώνται καὶ νῦν ἔνια τῶν ἐθνῶν ὀργάνοις τισὶ μη-
 χανικοῖς, ἃ τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ τῶν τοιούτων ἀστραβές. συμ-
 φέρει δ' εὐθὺς καὶ πρὸς τὰ ψυχὴ συνεθίζειν ἐκ μικρῶν
 14 παίδων· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πρὸς πολεμικὰς
 § 3 πράξεις εὐχρηστότατον. διὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἐστὶ τῶν βαρ-
 βάρων ἔθος τοῖς μὲν εἰς ποταμὸν ἀποβάπτειν τὰ γενό-
 μενα [ψυχρὸν], τοῖς δὲ σκέπασμα ψυχρὸν ἀμπύσχειν, οἷον
 Κελτοῖς. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐθίζειν, εὐθὺς ἀρχο- 8
 μένων βέλτιον μὲν ἐθίζειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς δ' ἐθίζειν.
 20 εὐφυῆς δὲ ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἔξις διὰ θερμότητα πρὸς τὴν τῶν

7 πληθούσα Vettori Bk., probably right || 8 νοσήματα] σώματα P⁴⁰ L² ||
 9 τηλικούτων Sussem.^{1,2}, tantillo William, τηλικούτων ? Sussem., τηλικούτων P⁴⁰ L² ||
 10 διαφέρειν M² and P¹ (corr.¹), διαφέρειν P¹ (1st hand), *differe* William, δια-
 στρέφεσθαι other authorities and P¹ (in the margin, with γρ. prefixed) || ἀπαλό-
 τητα M², ἀπλόγητα II² || 14 πρὸς before πολεμικὰς omitted by M¹ P¹ || 16 τοῖς]
 τῶν M² P¹ || γενόμενα Sussem., γενώμενα Scaliger, γινόμενα M¹ P¹ Bk.² Sussem.¹
 in the text, γινόμενα II² P⁴ Bk.¹ || 17 [ψυχρὸν] Sussem. || ψυχρὸν after σκέπασμα
 P¹ and P⁴ (corr.²), μερὸν the other authorities and Ar. Bk. || ἀμπύσχειν Bk. Sussem.¹
 and P⁴⁰ S² V² L² || ἀρχομένους P²⁰ Ald. Bk., ἀρχομένους ? Syiburg, ἀρχόμενον ? Spengel ||
 19 ἐκ...ἐθίζειν omitted by Ar. || 20 διὰ <τῆς> Jackson

8 δονοτέρα] Plato *Laus* II. 666 A forbids indulgence in wine before the eighteenth year (Götting). Comp. *Hist. Anim.* VII. 12 § 2, 588 a 5 ff. (Eaton); *De Somno* c. 3 § 9, 457 a 4 ff., § 14, 14 ff. SUSSEM. (980) Comp. L. H. Morgan *Ancient Society* p. 25 (Ridgeway).

§ 2 9 κινήσεις...τηλικούτων] "All the exercise possible at that early age." So also Plato *Laus* VII. 789 ff. SUSSEM. (981)

10 πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεσθαι] This passage, says St Hilahie, is the first germ of orthopedy. Cameraius understood it of cradles and swaddling clothes (cp. Plato *L. c.*): Vettori of lions to straighten the crooked knees of children, *serpentina* as Varro calls them *L. L.* IX. 5. 11. SUSSEM. (982)

§ 3 15 διὰ...18 Κελτοῖς] The same thing is said in an epigram first published by Brunck *Anai. vet. poet.* III. p. 150 XXXII, θαρσάλῳι Κελτοῖ ποταμῷ ἡλλήμονι ῥήψω | τέκνα τάλαντεύουσι, καὶ οὐ πάρος εἰσι

τοκῆσι | πρὶν πάλιν ἀθρήσωσι λελουμένον ὕδατι σεμνῷ....[οὕτω γὰρ γενέσθαι φέροντες, πρὶν γ' ἐσαθρήσῃ | κεκριμένον λουτροῖς ἐλεγε-
 γάμου ποταμοῖς; and by Nonnos *Dionys.* XXIII. 95, XXXVI. 5 (Götting). Further compare Statius III. 165, Galen *peri ὑγιανῶν* I. T. VI. p. 51 Kühn, and Kapp *Aristot. Staatshygie* p. 123 (Eaton). Galen however calls the people, of whom this is told, not Kelts but Germans. See on this point II. 9 § 7 with *Note*, p. 334 and IV(VII). 2 § 10 n. Comp. further Verg. *Aen.* IX. 603 f. There is a similar habit amongst the Belooches (Ridgeway). SUSSEM. (983)

§ 5 20 διὰ θερμότητα] Aristotle thus assumes that the vital heat, which by its gradual but serious decline causes old age, and by its extinction death, gradually becomes weaker and weaker from the moment of birth, so that it is most largely found in the embryo and the new-born infant, and in animals generally so long as, they are growing, because growth is

ψυχρῶν ἀσκησιν. § 8 a 34 <τὰς δὲ διατάσεις 35 τῶν παιδῶν κατὰ τοὺς (XV)
 <κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς
 <νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν. 37 γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον
 <τινὰ γυμνασίᾳ τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ 38 τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις
 <ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ 39 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παι-
 22 σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τοιαύτην τε καὶ τὴν ταύτῃ παραπλη-
 σίαν· τὴν δ' ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίαν μέχρι πάντε ἐτών, 4
 ἣν οὔτε πῶ πρὸς μάθησιν καλῶς ἔχει προσάγειν οὐδεμίαν
 25 οὔτε πρὸς ἀναγκαίους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αὐξήσιν ἐμποδί-
 ζωσιν, δεῖ [δὲ] τοσαύτης τυγχάνειν κινήσεως ὥστε διαφεύγειν
 τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωμάτων, ἣν χρή παρασκευάζειν καὶ δι'
 § 8 ἄλλων πράξεων καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς .
 παιδιδίαι εἶναι μήτε ἀνελευθέρους μήτε ἐπιπόνους μήτε ἀνει-
 30 μένας. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινας ἀκούειν
 δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, ἐπιμέλῃς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὐς καλοῦσι (π 198)
 παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς
 33 τὰς ὑστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιδίαι εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολ-
 § 8 λὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὑστερον σπουδασομένων. τὰς δὲ διατά-

1336 a 34—39 34 τὰς δὲ διατάσεις 39 διατεινομένοις transposed by Susem. to follow 21 ἀσκησιν, see *Introd.* p. 89 || 35 κατὰ Γ, καὶ II Ar. Bk. || τοὺς omitted by II² P⁶ Bk. || 38 πονοῦσιν] πνεύμοσι Ridgeway

21 πρῶτην <ἡλικίαν> ? Spengel, Schmidt would transpose 23 ἡλικίαν to this place; but it can as well be understood || 22 τὴν ταύτῃ τοῖς ταύτῃ V^b and P⁴ (corr.), ταύτῃ P²⁻⁶ L¹ and P⁴ (1st hand) || 23 ἐχομένην P⁶ S^b V^b and P⁴ (corr.) || 24 ἣν] in qua William || 26 δὲ omitted by II² P⁴⁻⁶ Bk., but it should perhaps be retained || 29 ἀγαν inserted before ἀνελευθέρους by P¹ || 31 τοὺς omitted by P⁴⁻⁶ S^b V^b and perhaps by S^b || 33 διὸ <καὶ> ? Susem. || 34 σπουδασομένων Korae,

conditioned by vital heat. Comp. *Probl.* III. 7, XI. 14, *De Inventis* etc. cc. 3, 4 (Eaton). SUSEM. (954)

§ 8 36 οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις] Plato *Laws* VII. 791 E ff. (Camerarius). SUSEM. (955)

38 Di Jackson defends τοῖς πονοῦσι by an appeal to Darwin *On the Expression of the Emotions* pp. 148, 236, 284.

§ 4 23 μέχρι πάντε ἐτών] Plato however in the *Laws* VII. 793 E ff. makes this second stage of education extend from the third to the sixth year (Eaton). Still this deviation is not material, since Aristotle makes education proper begin with the seventh year, §§ 7—15. SUSEM. (956)

28 καὶ διὰ τῆς παιδείας] Plato *l. c.* proposes for this age a kind of Kinder-

garten under the inspection of the nurses (αἱ τροφαί) who for the most part leave the children to invent their own games (παιδιὰ αὐτοφύει), but prevent them from growing too angry over them, the nurses themselves being under the control of a female Board of Inspection. SUSEM. (957)
 § 5 30 καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων] Comp. n. (970), and §§ 7—12 in regard to the παιδονόμοι: above c. 16 § 12 n. (943), c. 12 § 5 n. (862) with notes (960, 963, 969), and *Introd.* p. 52 f., also VI(IV). 15 § 9 n. (1355), § 13, VII(VI). 8 § 22 n. (1483). SUSEM. (958)

33 διὸ τὰς παιδιδίαι . . 34 σπουδασομένων] Comp. Plato *Laws* I. 643 B ff. SUSEM. (959)

35 σεις τῶν παίδων κατὰ τοὺς κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀπαγορεύου- (XV
 συν οἱ καλόντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αἰγι-
 σιν· γίνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ
 τοῦ πνεύματος κάθξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, δ
 § 7 συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατινόμενοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ
 40 τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ
 ὅπως ᾗτις ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλι-
 1336 b κίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τρο-
 φὴν ἔχειν. εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων γ
 § 8 καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὕλως
 μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο, δεῖ
 5 τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν
 τῶν αἰσchrῶν γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύννεγγυς), μάλιστα
 μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μη-
 § 9 δὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δὲ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων
 ἀπηγορευμένον, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσσως

σπουδασομένων or σπουδασθησομένων Γ apparently (*studendos* William) and perhaps Ar. (*guae fasces seio sunt faciendae*), σπουδασθησομένων P⁶, σπουδαζομένων M^a P² P³ Bk., σπουδασμάτων Ridgeway

39 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ Π Bk. Susem.¹ in the text

1336 b <τῶν> μέχρι ? Susem., but see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 109 b 44 ff. || 2 ἀπολαβεῖν Γ (*absumere* William) Susem.^{1,2}, ἀπολαύειν P² P⁶ Bk. || 3 ἀνελευθερίαν] τῶν ἀνελευθέρων P² L^a Ar. Ald. Bk.² and P⁴ (1st hand), τῶν ἀνελευθερίαν P⁴ (corr.) || 4 ὥσπερ] ἐπερ Lambin Bk.², wrongly || τι αἴτις ἄλλο (so avoiding hiatus) P² P⁶ Bk. || 7 μὲν οὖν] δὲ Susem., approved by Schmidt || 8 δὲ] δὴ Susem., μὲν οὖν Schmidt (with colon after 12 χέρων) 9 ἀπηγορευμένον] τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων P² P⁶ Ar. Bk. || ἐλεύθερον <μὲν> Korae

§ 7 41 ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται] Comp. § 9 n. (962). Here then Aristotle refuses to adopt the idea of common games for children, in which the children of aliens and slaves of this age also take part, as was proposed by Plato, here again the more humane of the two, and briefly mentioned in n. (957). His refusal is on the ground that by means of these infant schools Plato begins the public education as soon as the third year has been reached, while he follows the Spartans in postponing it to the seventh year: see Schoemann p. 271 (Eng. tr. p. 106). Further see § 5, n. (958). SUSEM. (960) 1336 b 2 εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν κτλ.] Thus and the two following sentences with the double use of μὲν οὖν gave occasion to many critical doubts, for which see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 540 b 55 ff., Vahlen *Poetics*² p.

190 f., Busse *op. c.* p. 28, Susemihl *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 416. Unquestionably ἀπολαβεῖν, which William of Moerbeke mistook, not only here but in 1335 b 18 and 1303 b 31, for ἀπράλαβεῖν (in pronunciation ν=ι, β=ν), is correct and means to derive influence of any kind, good or bad: Busse cites δέδοικα μὴ ἀπολαύσω τι φιλῶν Ισοκ. 8 81.

§ 8 4 ὥσπερ τι ἄλλο] With the utmost vigilance. A variation upon the more usual ἐπερ τι ἄλλο which recurs VIII(V). 8. 2, 1307 b 31 in the same order, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι, which II² gives here.

7 ἀκούωσι] Plut. *De recta ratione audiendi* c. 2, 38 b, εἰδὲ καὶ Ξενοκράτης τοῖς παισὶ μάλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἐκέλευε περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφωτίδας ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὅσα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ὅσα διαστρεφόμενα.

10 ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολλάζειν καὶ πλη- (XV)
 γαλιν, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἀτιμίαις
 ἀνελκυθέντος ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι⁸
 τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἡ
 § 10 γραφὰς ἡ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς
 15 ἄρχουσι μηδὲν μῆτε ἀγαλμα μῆτε γραφὴν εἶναι τοιούτων
 πράξεων μίμησιν, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ
 τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος· πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἀφίη-

10 [ἀτιμίαις] Buchelen Susem.²⁻³, rightly if ἀτιμία is not corrupt: ἐπιτιμία is or ἐπιτιμῶσι? Susem. formerly, αἰτίας? Schmidt who further approves [καὶ πληγαῖς] Schneider || 14 ἔστω P¹⁻⁵ Ar., ἐστι ΓΜ² II³ || 17 πρὸς...νόμος omitted in P⁴⁻⁵ S³ V³ || τοῦτους Reiz Bk.³ || παρήσιν P³ over an enclitic, ἐφίησιν Koraes

§ 9 11 ἀτιμίαις ἀνελκυθέντος] Meier, *De bonis damni*. p. 103, understands by this their exclusion from sacrificial festivals in which slaves could not take part, that is, from the state sacrifices (ἐπὶ δημοτελεῖ) proper, for which cp. Bockh *Staatskl.* 1^a. p. 269 (ed. 2, p. 298). SUSEM. (981)

12 ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν] "To punish him for his degrading conduct." Comp. c. 15 § 5 n. (916) and especially n. (43) on l. 5 § 8: and in regard to this whole section c. 12 § 5 n. (863), and more particularly *Introduct.* p. 52 n. (3) SUSEM. (982)

§ 10 14 ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν 16 μίμησιν] See v(VIII) 15 § 21 n. (1053), v(VIII). 7 § 3 n. (1084). The magistrates here mentioned are of course the Παιδονόμοι, as before; see n. (958). SUSEM. (983)

16 πράξεων=scenes, n. (1084).

εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισι θεοῖς 17 ὁ νόμος] As, for instance, Dionysos, Aphrodite, Priapos, Eileithya (Kapp). Aristotle himself, it is well known, traces the origin of Comedy to the worship of Dionysos, namely, to the improvised speeches added to the choral ode by the chief singer or leader of the chorus in the phallic songs; such phallic songs, he says, were still customary in many places (γενομένη ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά ἐξαρχόντων), *Introduct.* 4 § 14, 1449 a 11 ff. These improvised speeches certainly contained improprieties of the sort here mentioned. But that even in the phallic songs properly so called there was often much that was positively indecent might hardly be doubted, even apart from the specimen we have in Aristoph. *Ach.* 203 ff., where

Dikaiopolis sings a burlesque of one, as he himself says (261). Other facts relative to this matter are mentioned by Athenaeus XIV. 621 d—622 d, on the authority of Sosibios and Semos. Both writers mentioned certain reciters, called αἰτωλῶν βαλοὶ, who delivered monologues or even dialogues (μῆτρεις) from the stage crowned with ivy according to Semos, and were at a later date called ἱαμβοὶ, like their poems. It is beyond all doubt that Aichilochos, n. (788), found similar iambic lampoons in current use at the merry festivals of harvest and vintage, and therefore in the worship of Dionysos and Demeter, which was especially cultivated in his home of Paros and her colony Thasos, where Aichilochos settled. Comp. *Homer Hymn to Demeter* 496, Paus. X. 38. 1, Steph. Byzant. s. v. Πάρος, Hesych. s. v. Κάβαροι; Welcker *Kl. Schrift.* I. p. 87 ff. It was out of this natural popular poetry that he fashioned his own artistic iambic poetry. Aristotle himself mentions directly afterwards (§ 11) the recital of such artistic compositions (ἱαμβοὶ), which certainly took place at such religious festivals at Athens and elsewhere at the proper season, probably in contests between ihapsodes. For it would appear from the pseudo-Platonic *Ion* 531 A that a contemporary rhapsode might include Aichilochos in his repertoire; in any case his iambic poetry, on the analogy of the present passage: whether also his elegies, is doubtful. About that time also the burlesque epos and its recitation by rhapsodes were brought into vogue by Hegemon of Thasos, in contests at festivals of this kind. SUSEM. (984)

- σιν ὁ νόμος τοὺς τὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντας ἔτι τὴν ἱκνούμενην καὶ (XV)
 19 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλφεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς.
 § 11 τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας θεατὰς θετόν, ὁ
 πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ κατακλίσεως ὑπότρο- (p. 129)
 ξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων
 γινομένης βλάβης ἀπαθείς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.
 § 12 νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον·
 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ
 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ κατὰ δὲ τὸν
 § 13 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον. ἕως γὰρ οὐ¹⁰
 κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ὑπο-

18 τοὺς ἱκνούμενην M^s P¹, τοὺς ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν πλέον προήκουσαν Γ P³ Bk. (πλέον I⁸ over an erasure), *iam homines factos* Δγ., τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους Bas.³ in the margin, omitted by IP Bas.¹⁻³ and the text of Bas.³ || ἐτι] ἤδη? Susem., *iam* Αι., [ἐτι] Welldon || 19 αὐτῶν P¹⁻³, αὐτῶν Γ M^s IP || καὶ γυναικῶν omitted by IP (supplied by corr¹ in the margin of P¹), hence [καὶ γυναικῶν] Susem.¹ || τιμαλφῶν M^s P¹ || [τοὺς θεοὺς]? Susem. || 20 θετόν] θετητόν M^s, νομοθετητόν IP P³ Bk., <εἰς> *εἰς* τὸν Jackson, probably right || 23 ἀπαθείς M^s and apparently P¹ (1st hand) || πάντας suspected by Jackson, *πάντως*? Susem. || 24 νῦν μὲν οὖν. 27 ἀναγκαῖον transposed by Susem. to follow 35 *δυσμένειαν* || 27 [ἔως 37 αὐτοῦ] Bocker || 28 κακῶς Γ M^s || ἔλεγε suspected by Camiciarius, *ἔψαγε* or *ἤλεγχε*? Schmidt

18 ἐτι] The word cannot have arisen from ἤδη, nor is it likely to have crept into the text. However dissimilar, this must apparently be added to the passages in which *ἐτι* means *iam*. SUSSEM.

§ 11 20 οὐτ' ἰάμβων] See n. (964) and n. (788) IV(VII). 7 § 6. SUSSEM. (968)

21 κατακλίσεως ὑπότροξι κατ.] The term *μέθη* which recurs v(VIII). 5 § 2, n. (1019) denotes the advanced stage of the banquet, at which men's spirits were more elevated and they began to drink wine undiluted (*ἄκρατον*): cp. Plato *Lysis* II. 271 E, Ath. II. 40 A (J. G. Schneider). Comp. also v(VIII). 5 § 8, n. (1028), 7 § 13 f. n. (1067), also n. (113). But, as was remarked in *Introd.* p. 55, *κατάκλισις*, or admission into *ευστία*, in all probability commenced with initiation into military service from the seventeenth year onwards: see v(VIII). 4 § 9 Exc. 1. to B. v(VIII): but when recruits have a compulsory diet prescribed for them (Exc. to B. v(VIII)) they certainly have *syssitia* of their own, and only when their education has been completed, from their twenty-first year onwards, are they admitted to the *syssitia* proper, at first those of the soldiers, and allowed the

other liberties here mentioned. SUSSEM. (966)

22 καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων κατ.] Plato on the contrary even in the *Lysis* VII. 816 D, E, XI. 935 E wholly banishes comedy and lambos, and only permits comic dances by foreigners or slaves. SUSSEM. (967)

§ 12 25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας] Another point the discussion of which is missing. see *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4), p. 53 n. (1). SUSSEM. (969)

§ 13 28 Θεόδωρος] It is beyond all doubt that Theodorus is here treated as one deceased: but I fail to see that he is spoken of *Rhet.* III. 2 § 4, 1404 b 22 ff. as if he were still living and on the stage, as Zeller II. ii. p. 131 n. (1) maintains. From the latter passage it is very clear that he was the greatest tragic actor of recent times Aelian, *V. II.* XIV. 40, relates a story of the powerful impression which his acting made on the tyrant Alexander of Phœne. Plutarch mentions him along with Polos as a famous protagonist actor in leading parts in *De regum.* 21, 816 F, and with Nikostatos, Kallipides, Mymniskos, Polos in *De Gloria*

- κριτής· οὐδενὲν γὰρ πώποτε παρήκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ (XV)
 30 τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειομένων τῶν θεάτρων ταῖς
 πρώταις ἀκοαῖς· συμβαίνει δὲ ταυτό τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων.
 § 14 πάντα γὰρ στέργομεν τὰ πρώτα μᾶλλον. διὸ δεῖ τοὺς
 νέους πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν
 35 ἔχει ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμένειαν. !
 § 12 b 24 <νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐν παραδρομῇ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τὸν λόγον
 <25 ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ
 <26 πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ· κατὰ δὲ τὸν
 <27 παρόντα καιρὸν ἐμνήσθημεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖον.> 25 διελθόντων δὲ τῶν
 36 πέντε ἐτῶν τὰ δύο μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ δεῖ θεωροῦς ἤδη γίνεσθαι
 37 τῶν μαθήσεων ἃς δεήσει μανθάνειν αὐτοῦς.
 § 15 δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρησθαι τὴν παι- 11
 39 δειαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑπτὰ μέχρις ἡβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν

29 προσάγειν P⁴⁻⁵ L¹ Ald. W^b and probably P⁵ (1st hand) || <οὐδεν>, οὐδὲ Bothe (on Teient. p. 619) || 30 θεατῶν Π² P⁵ A¹. Bk. and (with γρ. prefixed) coir.² of P¹ in the margin || 34 ὅσα after αὐτῶν P¹⁻⁵ Π² Bk. || 35 δυσμένειαν Π Bk. Susem.¹⁻³ in the text, *inphaesione* Wilham, *improbabilitatem* Ar., *δυσγένειαν* Schmidt, Susem.³, *δυσχίρειαν* Koraes.

1336 b 24—27 24 τοῦτον P¹ and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) P⁴ Ald., τοῦτων Γ M^a Ar and (transposing it before ἐν παραδρομῇ) all other authorities Bk. || 25 διορίσαι P⁴⁻⁵ L¹ Ald. W^b || 26 πρῶτον πρότερον ? Koraes, needlessly

36 ἥδη omitted by Π¹ wrongly, [ἥδη] Susem.¹ Cp. 1268 b 21, 1280 a 6 || 38 τὴν omitted by M^a and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by coir.¹ in P¹), [τὴν] Susem.¹ || 39 μέχρι Π² Bk. Susem.¹

Athen vi. 835 f (cp. also *De Audiendis Poetis* 18 c). Demosthenes *De Falsa Leg.* § 246 f, p. 418, 4, mentions him along with another great protagonist of the time, Aristodemos, with the remark that both shone in the rôle of Sophocles' Antigone, but did not appear in the *Phœnix* of Euripides; that Aeschines acted under them as antagonist and had represented Creon in the *Antigone*. In his private life Theodorus appears to have been very wild, to judge by the nickname given him no doubt by the comic poets (see Hesych. s.v. *πελεθόβαξ* or *πελεθοβάψ*). An idea of his habits may also be gathered from Hesych. s.v. *Θεοδῶρου ἔλεγον οἱ κυμμοὶ τοὺς πρωκτούς, ἀπὸ Θεοδῶρου τινὲς οὐκ εὖ τῆς αὐτοῦ ὥρας χρησαμένον*. See also Hesych. s.v. *Ἀριστοδήμου οἱ κυμμοὶ τὸν πρωκτὸν, καὶ Θεοδῶρον καὶ Τιμησιάνεα ἔλεγον*. Diog. Laert. II. 104 calls him a tragic poet: but this must rest either on a

false reading or an error—more probably the latter, as Aelian also calls him ὁ τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητής. Comp. also Athen. XI. 482 D and Meineke *Fragmenta Com. Gr.* I. p. 523 f. SUSEM. (1908)

§ 15 39 μετὰ τὴν δ' ἡβης... 40 ἐτῶν] The first period is to be wholly taken up with gymnastic, three years of the second with the remaining subjects of youthful training, the following years again with severer bodily exercises; see V (VIII). 3 § 13, π. (1003), 4 § 9 π. (1015) Exc. Here Aristotle only partially follows Plato [see III. (1015, 1016)]. In the *Republic* the latter divides the educational course into three parts. The first begins with gymnastic, preceded by the narration of myths, legends and tales, such as Aristotle also prescribes (see § 20, π. 958): gymnastic is followed by music and poetry together with reading, writing and arithmetic, and certain elements of

40 ἀφ' ἧβης μέχρι τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐβδομάσι (X
 διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ κακῶς,
 1337^a δὲ τῇ διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη
 καὶ παιδεία τὸ προσλειτουργοῦν τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν.

40 ἐν P⁴⁵⁻⁶ S² V³ L¹ || 41 κακῶς Muret, καλῶς Γ II A1. Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text
 1337 a 2 τῆς φύσεως αὐτῇ βούλεται II² P³ Bk.

mathematics generally: this lasts until the seventeenth or eighteenth year. The next two or three years, until the twentieth, are to be spent in military exercises. The second course of ten years for the more highly qualified students is in the higher mathematics, pure and applied; the third or philosophical course, which is only for the most richly endowed natures, lasts five years longer, as we had occasion to mention in *κ* (182) on II. 5 § 25. See *Rep.* II. 376 *ε* f., III. 403 *ε*, VII. 534 *ε*—535 *Α*, 536—537 *Δ*, 539 *Δ* ff. In the *Laws* (see VII. 794 *ε*—795 *Δ*, 800 *ε*—813 *ε*, 817 *ε*—822 *Δ*, cp. 813 *ε* ff.). Plato prescribes the elements of gymnastic from the sixth to the tenth year (cp. *κ*. 956); reading and writing from ten to thirteen; music, singing, and at the same time the really severer instruction in dancing and gymnastic from 13 to 17; lastly, the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy—no doubt from seventeen to eighteen. It has been explained in *κ*. (193) on II 6. 5 that even in the *Laws* the better endowed natures were afforded opportunity, after the age of thirty, for the same higher education as that furnished in the *Republic* by the second and third courses, or at least for something similar to it. SUSEM. (970)

40 οἱ γὰρ... 41 οὐ κακῶς Cp. c. 16 § 8 *κ*. (947). SUSEM. (971)

1337 a 1 πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη 2 ἀνα-

πληροῦν] Eaton compares *Phys.* II. 8 § 8, 199 a 15 f. ὅπως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμῆται: "and in general it is art which either brings to completion what nature is unable to effect or else imitates nature": on which passage see Doing *op. c.* p. 81 ff. Further comp. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 15 (i.e. I. c. 4 Bk., 1097 a 5) where we are told of all arts and sciences that each seeks to meet a definite want, τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι. SUSEM. (972)

"The context here, in its reference to education, limits the scope of τέχνη to useful art. Useful art supplements nature and at the same time follows her guidance. He who would be a master in any art must first discern the true end by a study of nature's principles, and then employ the method which she suggests for the attainment of that end" (S. H. Butcher, *Some Aspects*, p. 241). He adds: "in the passage from the *Physics* also it is probable that the distinction is not, as would at first sight seem, between useful and fine art, but between two aspects of useful art. The sentence is not quite logical in form, but the meaning is that useful art on the one hand satisfies those needs of man for which nature has not fully provided, on the other hand its processes are those of nature."

EXCURSUS I.

Οἱ ἑξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

NOTE ON IV(VII). I. 2, 1323 a 22 (687).

It would take us too far out of our way to give a detailed or perfectly complete account, supposing it were even possible, of the meaning of this expression which recurs in III. 6. 5, 1278 b 32, and in six other passages¹. Inquiry has not by any means as yet disposed of the subject. The one point which has been conclusively established is that in general 'outside discussions' (or discourses) are opposed to strictly scientific discussions (*οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, III 12. 1, 1282 b 19, see n. 584). But whether they are (1) *discussions by others*, or by Aristotle himself: whether, in the latter case, the reference is to (2) Aristotle's *dialogues and popular works*, or to (3) *dialectical discussions*, in Aristotle's sense of the term dialectic as the tentative solution of problems², *in his scientific writings*, and whether they should be sought in another work or, as in *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31, in the same work³: whether in fact writings of any sort, or merely (4) *oral controversies and expressions of opinion* are intended, must on each occasion be decided from the context, if at all⁴.

Now here, as at III. 6. 5, n. (527 b), it appears to me that the only meaning which really suits the context is 'discussions in daily life' or 'in ordinary intercourse.' Aristotle appeals (see n. 689) to what has already become the common property of the ordinary cultivated consciousness and

¹ *Nic. Eth.* I. 13. 9, 1102 a 26, VI. 4. 2, 1140 a 31; *Metaphysics* XIII(M). 1. 4, 1076 a 28; *Physics* IV. 10. 1, 217 b 31; *Eud. Eth.* I. 8. 4, 1217 b 22, II. 1. 1, 1218 b 34.

² See Zeller *Philosophie der Griechen* II ii p. 242 ff., Thwaites *Études* p. 118 ff., Teggé *De vi ac notione dialecticae Aristotelicae* (Treptow 1877).

³ See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 105 b 16 ff.

⁴ This is a point quite rightly emphasized by Vahlen. But how is it consistent to say e.g. that 'the division of

'goods which follows has furthermore 'been laid down and explained in the 'outside discussions and does not require 'to be repeated in detail here' (cp. Vahlen p. 9), when Vahlen at the same time in this passage accepts as possible the interpretation of the phrase 'outside discussions' accepted by me? And how can the supposition of a previous explanation be got out of the words? They contain nothing but an appeal to what is universally admitted. Cp. n. (688).

has developed into a permanent conviction of universal validity; what is treated as a settled and generally accepted fact in the conversations and discussions on such subjects in educated circles¹. In other words he calls in good sound common sense. Bernays on the other hand, *Dialoge des Arist.* p. 69 ff, 158 ff, finds here a quotation from an Aristotelian dialogue and thinks that the very lively fluent style of this chapter, which presents a marked contrast to the remainder of the book, should be explained by assuming that Aristotle in the main borrowed and transferred it from that dialogue, reproducing even the very words. Vahlen², *Aristotelische Aufsätze* II. (*Phil.-hist. Sitzungsber. der Wiener Akad.* LXXII. p. 5 ff.) has conclusively shown how weak is the foundation for this hypothesis (cp. also the review by Susemihl *Philol. Anzeiger* v. 1873, p. 673 ff). He has not made another attempt on his own part to clear up this fact, but only remarked that this chapter forms a complete whole by itself, which must be retained or condemned as a whole—a statement which no one would be likely to controvert. Still for a right decision of the matter considerable importance attaches to his pertinent observation, that Bernays appears not to have fully met the difficulty of the surprise we naturally feel³ that for a question discussed in the *Ethics* Aristotle should quote his popular writings in preference to that treatise.

This difficulty remains the same, even though we substitute an appeal to the popular judgment for the appeal to popular writings. In the *Ethics* the whole investigation turns on the inquiry, "What is the best life, or human happiness?" and that this factor also should be utilized was perfectly in point. In the *Politics* Aristotle might have done in starting this inquiry what he has done on several other occasions (II 1. 5, III. 5 § 9, 7 § 1, VI(IV). 9 § 2, cp. IV(VII). 12 §§ 3, 4: see *iii.* 133, 545, 584, 873, 879, 1289); he might simply have referred to the results of the *Ethics*. But if he had intended to begin in this place a fresh discussion of the question over again in detail, and in such a manner that his investigation should not merely satisfy the requirements of science, but so far as possible compel the assent of ordinary opinion with its own peculiar assumptions and prepossessions, then at any rate, when the same subject comes up for discussion later on, it would have been impossible so utterly to ignore this exposition, to treat it as so altogether non-existent, as is actually the case.

¹ For Bernays' proof of the impossibility of this interpretation, though advanced with full confidence in its success, can be easily refuted. And Zeller *op. cit.* II II p. 119 n. (2) reads into this passage something very different from what is there. It does not state that ordinary opinion agrees with the outside discussions merely in holding that mental goods are required for the best kind of life, but it says:—"as we believe many of the statements current in ordinary conversation respecting the constituents of the best life

to be perfectly correct, we should in the present instance make use of them. For one thing at any rate is universally conceded, that there are three kinds of goods, and that all three are necessary to the best life, or in other words, to happiness. But of course our agreement with ordinary opinion (*ἐξοικειωτοὶ λόγοι*) goes no farther: for the ordinary view regards mental goods, i.e. the virtues, as subsidiary, whilst we make them the principal thing."

² And more recently Diels; see below.

³ See Krohn *op. cit.* p. 37.

Now already at c. 8 § 4, cp. *n.* (799), and at c. 9 § 3, § 7 Aristotle has returned to the position, that the state has for its aim the best possible life, and that the best constitution is the one by which the state attains the greatest happiness (cp. *n.* 806). In the first of these passages it is merely stated what constitutes the best life or happiness without any such addition as "according to our previous inquiry," and equally without any reference to the investigation of this question in the *Ethics*. In the second passage there is a reference, but apparently it is to the former passage, c. 8, and not to c. 1 at all; see *nn.* (807, 813). There is this further and more serious difficulty, that c. 13 (cp. *n.* 872) begins, just like c. 1, with the statement that, as the best constitution is that which enables the state in the highest degree to attain happiness, the precise nature of happiness must not be left obscure. For the general character of this transition is not in the least altered by the fact that c. 13 treats, not of the best life, but of happiness, and the happiness of the state in particular. But in this the non-existence of c. 1 is expressly implied; the other course—of a reference to the results of the *Ethics*—is quite gratuitously adopted, and thus the matter is settled. However if the genuineness of c. 13 is not quite above suspicion (see *nn.* 876, 879, 881¹), there only remain the other and minor objections to c. 1 in its present place upon which dependence can be placed.

But taking everything into consideration, are we to decide offhand that c. 1 is spurious? There is nothing in the following chapters which is materially inconsistent with it², and there is nothing to disturb the suggestion made in the *Introd.* pp. 12, 15, 48, that in his oral lectures on Politics Aristotle was accustomed to effect the transition to the description of the ideal state in the very words before us, however different may have been his procedure when committing his thoughts to paper. If this be so, we have before us in this chapter a portion of some careful hearer's notes which the editor has inserted, although it stands in no organic connexion with the rest of the work. Cp. also *n.* (711). SUSEM. (687)

The oldest view of this much disputed phrase, which implied a twofold form of the Aristotelian teaching, had long been felt to be unsatisfactory when Bernays, in 1863, in the work already cited, put forward the brilliant and attractive theory that the Aristotelian dialogues are meant. Subsequent writers were much influenced by this theory, but very unequally. Thus Grote, who discussed the expression *Aristotle* I. pp. 63—75, not content to understand by it 'discourses outside the subject,' thinks a negative character, dialectic not didactic, is intended, appealing especially to *Phys.* IV. c. 10 where all the difficulties which beset the notion of time are noticed and traced out. For this view, which is substantially that of Thurot, *Études* p. 213, he can cite Alexander in *Topica* διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ (the *Topics*) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς, 260 a 24 ed. Brandis. So too Simplicius, τὰ ἐξωτερικὰ=τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δι' ἐνδόξων περαιωμένα.

¹ On the other hand this is the very utmost that can be conceded: see *n.* (881).

² For the inconsistencies which Kriehn

thinks he has discovered are too deep for me to detect.

Grote then understands the term "extraneous to philosophy" (because dialectical) to include not merely oral debate but writings, whether Aristotle's own or the Platonic and other dialogues.

Zeller also in the third edition (1879) of his great work has advanced beyond his earlier standpoint, by recognising in *ἐξωτερικός* more than one primary meaning. First, simply 'extraneous,' as when applied to *σκέψις Pol.* I. 5. 4, 1254 a 33; equivalent to the phrase *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι*, II. 6. 3, 1264 b 39, and so unquestionably used by Eudemus who paraphrases Aristotle's own *ἀπορίαν*. *ἄλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον Phys.* I. 2. 9, 185 b 11, by *ἀπορίαν ἐξωτερικὴν Simplicius in Physica* 85, 26 Diels. But the word may also mean 'relating to what is outside,' and this again may bear more than one sense. Thus to suit *Phys.* c. IV. 10, Zeller adds the meaning (2) discussions 'that do not go deep into the subject,' and from *Eud. Eth.* II. 1. 1, 1218 b 33 compared with *Nic. Eth.* I. 8, 1098 b 10 *καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς*, (3) oral, not written, discussions. Lastly, he admits (4) that some lost Aristotelian writing of a more popular character is referred to in the six remaining passages, including those in the *Politics*, 1323 a 22, 1278 b 32.

In the view taken of these six passages we trace the influence exerted by the theory of Bernays, that the 'exoteric discourses' are Aristotle's own dialogues: a theory adopted, in the main, by Heitz and by Bonitz (*Ind. Ar.* 104 b 44 ff.). More recently this theory has been vigorously attacked by Diels in a paper entitled *Ueber die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles* reported in *Monatsberichte der Berl. Akad.* 1883 pp. 477—494, in its turn followed by a note from Hirzel, defending Bernays, *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIX. p. 178 f. n. 1, and an article by Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX. 1884, pp. 265—277. Diels insists that the term is a technical term in the Peripatetic school, and holds it to be indispensable that its meaning should be constant wherever it occurs. The explanation he gives is 'discussions carried on outside the Peripatetic school,' τὰ ἔξωθεν λεγόμενα, including such as were customary in the Academy or had been held of old by philosophers or laymen. He rejects the view of Grote (and Thurot) that the imperfect form or the dialectical character, is intended by 'exoteric,' arguing that if evidence from without confirms Aristotle, in what form it is stated or how obtained is not the essential point: though doubtless a Peripatetic will attach to it no more credit *a priori* than to *ἔνδοξα* generally. Moreover, if the difference of method is emphasized in the formula of citation, why is not the appeal to *λόγοι διαλεκτικοί*? (cp. *λόγοι ἐπιχειρηματικοί*, 451 a 19). Diels allows that when contrasted with *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι* all outside discussions present a character of their own. Not that they are all to be rejected: on the contrary the Peripatetics are unwearied in their use of the wisdom of the ancients, philosophers and famous men, verses of the poets, sophistic declamations: but in such *ἔνδοξα* we have only the raw material of knowledge; only true scientific method, viz. that in use inside the Peripatetic school, can properly test the alloy and extract the ore from it.

This view is based in the first instance on a detailed examination of our present passage and comparison with *Nic. Eth.* I. c. 8, where a similar in-

tention is announced, 1098 b 9 *σκεπτόν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων περὶ αὐτῆς*: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευθεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τἀληθές. The evidence got from the use of terms, from popular or philosophic views, is to be set side by side with the syllogistic conclusion and philosophic definition. Then follows the threefold division of goods, as in our *Politics* passage. Diels pronounces it a current Academic division, familiar to Plato (*Laws* III. 697 A, B), adopted by Xenocrates and his successors, and points triumphantly to the words 1098 b 16 ff. *ὅσπερ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γὰρ ταύτην τὴν δόξαν παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων*. "Thus he has found support for his definition in this old opinion. Observe the γὰρ: 'at least this *διαίρεσις* is wholly recognized': the particle recurs in *Pol.* IV(VII). I. 3, 1323 a 24, while the confidence in general recognition is repeated § 5, 1323 a 34, *ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὅσπερ πάντες ἂν συγχωρήσειαν*. That he had the *Ethics* in mind is shown by the words of 1323 b 39 *ἐτέρας σχολῆς*, and by the citation c. 13. Returning to 1323 a 22, we see that the emphasis is on *ικανῶς*:—believing that a sufficient account of the best life can be drawn from much of what is found in *Outside Discourses*, we must now also make use of it. καὶ νῦν, here in the *Politics* as before in the *Ethics*¹."

Working on these lines, the temptation becomes irresistible to find a parallel in the older literature for all the passages where the phrase (or *οἱ ἔξωθεν λόγοι* and the like) occurs. E.g. Alcmaeon (? Epicharmus) is suggested as the authority for the dichotomy of the soul in *N.E.* I. 13, 1102 a 26; Plato *Charmides* 163 A for *N.E.* VI. 4, 1140 a 3; Hesiod, Homer, or the Sophists for 1278 b 32 ff. Thus Diels succeeds in satisfying his own postulate of a technical term with constant meaning, and for consistency he is bound to infer that the *ἀπορίαι* concerning Time in *Phys.* IV. c. 10 have come down to Aristotle from his predecessors.

It may however be gravely questioned whether the interpretation in all passages should be so strict. "With the same fundamental meaning the phrase may have had different shades of meaning in different connexions: not only is it *external* and *referring to what is external*, but in contradistinction to *οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοι*, it would naturally be used for *non-philosophical discussions*²." What all men say may be a part of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* though it is not necessarily the whole. Certainly in *Eud. Eth.* II. 1 it is just—'what all the world says.' And this meaning makes both *Politics* passages, 1278 b 32 as well as 1323 a 22, more logical. But on the other hand with regard to *Meta.* 1076 a 32—28, *Eud. Eth.* 1217 b 22, and *Physics* IV. 10 it can plausibly be maintained that the reference is not so much to *λεγόμενα* as to something lying 'outside of philosophy' by reason not of its origin, but of its method⁴.

¹ *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 480f.

² *Susemihl Jahrb. f. Philol.* 1884, p. 267.

[³ Torstrick's rendering of another dis-

puted phrase *οἱ ἐν κοινῷ γινόμενοι λόγοι* *De Anima* I. 4, 1, 407 b 29, is *esse distributiones quales homines elegantiores instituerent solent*. Thus at least does justice to the present participle.]

NOTE ON IV(VII). II. 6, 1330 b 26.

δυσέξοδος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσξερεύνῃ τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις.

Aristotle here recommends the older sort of street architecture on the ground that it makes it difficult for strangers who are within to get out, and for enemies who are without to attack, thus echoing the latter part of the precept πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὰς πολεμικὰς αὐτοῖς μὲν εὐέξοδον εἶναι χρὴ, τοῖς δ' ἐναντίους δυσπρόσοδον καὶ δυσπερὶληπτον 1330 b 2, but at the same time amplifying it, in so far as account is taken of the case in which strangers are endeavouring to make their escape, as for example Thucyd. II 4. It seems strange however that, whereas the case in which the stranger or enemy wants to get out (1) cannot occur until he has first got in, and (2) is exceptional and comparatively unimportant, Aristotle should give it both precedence and prominence. Should we not expect *δυσείσοδος*? and if so, would it not seem that *δυσξερεύνῃτος* should correlate with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσείσοδος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*, rather than *δυσείσοδος* with *ξενικοῖς*, *δυσξερεύνῃτος* with *ἐπιτιθεμένοις*? I conjecture therefore *δυσξερεύνῃτος γὰρ ἐκείνη τοῖς ξενικοῖς καὶ δυσείσοδος τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις*. H. JACKSON.

EXCURSUS II.

THE AGE OF SUPERANNUATION.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς ἀκμῆς, εὖν γίνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτων ἀριθμὸν. IV(VII) 16. 10, 1335 a 32—35.

The sense is: Furthermore supposing the birth of children to follow upon the marriage as early as may reasonably be expected, the eldest (or only) sons will succeed their fathers at a time when the former (i.e. the children) begin to enter on their prime, while the latter are already in their decline towards their seventieth year.

Aristotle has in view simply the normal case: the eldest son, born nine months after the marriage, grows up to manhood. If the number given in the text, 1335 a 29, for the man's age at marriage (37) were correct, the eldest son would be only about 32 at the time when the father is about 70. But it is in the highest degree improbable that he should succeed to his father's civic rights (so I take *διαδοχῇ*) before he is himself permitted and obliged to marry. Besides, Aristotle approves (§ 17, n. 947) the division of human life into periods of seven years. Now suppose that, with Spengel, we replace 37 by 35: in that case, by the time the eldest son reaches 35 the

father's age will be, on the foregoing assumptions, $70\frac{1}{2}$ years. The father may then be relieved from active citizenship and give up the two family properties: his son steps into his place, while he as priest is superannuated, c. 9 § 9, 1329 a 30—34. It might certainly be supposed to be in favour of the number 37, that Aristotle demands the simultaneous cessation of the reproductive faculty for husband and wife and fixes the limit in the one case at seventy, in the other at fifty years. If a man of 37 marries a wife at 18, this calculation is fairly exact, since when the husband is 69, the wife will be 50: whereas if the man marries at 35 he reaches the limit three years before his wife. To this we may reply, that beyond all doubt a mere approximation is quite sufficient, especially as the husband is forbidden to have children after his 55th year (§§ 16, 17, 1335 b 26—38). In the whole question, the younger sons, if any are born, are left out of account: there is no place for them on Aristotle's scheme, except to fill the vacancies caused by death or to be adopted into childless families, where the head of the house finds himself after his fifty-fifth year without male offspring (§ 15, 1335 b 21—26, II. 6 10—13, 1265 a 38—b 16, cp. II. 7. 5, 1266 b 9 ff.). Further, the remark in *Introd.* p. 54, that the citizens do not serve on the jury-courts or become members of the popular assembly until they are fifty, requires now to be modified. Even as early as at thirty-five, it appears, they become qualified for these functions and must take them. But it may be doubted whether their obligation to military service ceases then, and unquestionably Aristotle intended to fix a higher age, presumably 50, as the qualification for serving on the Council and filling the magistracies (with the exception of military commands). What arrangements were to be made in case the heir did not attain the age of 35 until from one to twenty years after the superannuation of his father, or adopted father, is a matter which receives no elucidation either in our incomplete sketch of Aristotle's ideal of a state or elsewhere in his writings. The only conceivable solution is that the exercise of political rights in this family is dropped in the interval, and the family properties are managed by guardians, though not necessarily for the full term until the heir becomes thirty-five. If we remember that full civic rights are exercised only from the age of fifty to the age of seventy, it still remains true that their possessors are only a minority of the whole civic population, *π.* (817).

The above explanation premised, a word or two of criticism on the views of Ridgeway and Jackson. The former (*Transactions of Cambridge Philological Society* II. p. 146) would read *ταῖς μὲν ἀρχομέναις*, thus opposing the wife's physical prime to the husband's intellectual prime (about 49). That this is unsatisfactory is pointed out by Jackson (*ib.* p. 118), who in his turn retains *ἀρχομένης* (Γ and corr. P⁶), but, while rightly referring *ἀρχομένης τῆς ἀκμῆς* as well as *καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας* to the father, takes *τοῖς μὲν* to be the older, *τοῖς δὲ* the younger children by the same marriage, and explains *ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων* as the children's attainment of the age of puberty. Had this been the sense we should have expected *τῶν μὲν...τῶν δὲ* instead of the datives, and perhaps the addition of *τῶν πατέρων* after *τῆς ἀκμῆς* and of *ἐκείνων* after *ἡλικίας* would then have conduced to clearness. This however is a small

matter. The chief difficulty is the strange sense given to ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων; as if it meant that the children succeed (*not like their father but*) one another, i.e. they successively attain puberty between the thirty-eighth and fifty-sixth years of the father's age. This presupposes several children, comparatively speaking a large family: whereas the passage quoted above from B. II. as well as the whole of the present chapter make it abundantly clear that Aristotle is committed to the system of small families—in the normal case, one son and one daughter,—in order to keep the population stationary. SUSEM.

Θ.

§ 18 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον εἰ ποιητέον τάξιν τινα
περὶ τοὺς παῖδας, ἔπειτα πότερον συμφέροι κοινῇ ποιεῖ-
5 σθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον (ὃ γίνεσθαι
καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεω), τρίτον δὲ ποῖαν
γινὰ δεῖ ταύτην.

11 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τῷ νομοθέτῃ μάλιστα πραγματευτέον ἰ
περὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδείαν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀμφισβητήσκειν, καὶ
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο βλάπτει τὰς πο- (p. 13
§ 2 λιτείας (δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἦθος

1337 a 3 πρῶτον γ ταύτην first separated from B. 1v(vii) and rightly prefixed to
B. v(viii) by Spengel || γ δεῖναι M', δεῖ εἶναι Sussem.^{1,2} following William's trans-
lation (*oportet esse*) || 14 παιδεύεσθαι Ag., πολιτεύεσθαι Γ Π Bk., πολιτ < εἶναι παι-
δ>εῦεσθαι Jackson, yet at c. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1 Γ' M' have πολιτευομένοις τοι παιδευομέ-
νοις (cp. 1260 b 15, 1310 a 14)

B. v(viii) The same subject continued the true system of state educa-
tion.

This book joins on so closely with the preceding that it is not easy to make a parting at all. Undoubtedly Spengel's proposal to begin at πρῶτον μὲν is in full accordance with the usage of Aristotle. The same thing frequently happens at the commencement of a chapter. Aristotle recapitulates before stating a fresh subject. The worthy people who divided his books into chapters ignore this see e.g. cc. 3, 5, and 7 of this book, which more properly should begin at 1337 b 22, 1338 b 39, and at 1341 b 9 respectively. The alternative commencement has actually been marked in this edition at II. c. 12, p. 314, III. c. 2, p. 359.

c. 1. *Three points to decide.* (1) *Should there be a systematic education?* (2) *Should it be a public system?* (3) *What subjects should it include?* While (1) and (2) are soon settled in the affirmative, B. v(viii)

leaves off before we are far advanced with (3). Cp *Anal.* p. 118

§ 1 12 καὶ γὰρ Si nam et significat, pro altero καὶ a 18 post longam parenthesis adhibitum est ἐν δὲ, sed facilius fortasse καὶ γὰρ εἰσιμι esse sumemus: certe altera eorum inducta est his, altera ἐν δὲ particulis, et μὲν οὖν a 11 excipitur δ' conjunctione quae legitur a 21. SUSSEM.

13 οὐ γινόμενον τοῦτο] The neglect of this. in Latin, *hoc non servatum.* Cp. 1324 a 36 n., VIII(v). 8. 2, 1307 b 33 f.

§ 3 14 δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκάστην παιδεύεσθαι] What this means is explained VIII(v). 9 §§ 11, 12, 1310 a 12 ff. Cp. n. (1641). *Rhet.* I. 8. 6, 1366 a 12 f. (Baton): δέοι ἂν τὰ ἥθη τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκαστὸς ἦθος πιθανώτατον πρὸς ἐκαστὴν εἶναι. SUSSEM. (978)

τὸ ἦθος τῆς πολιτείας] As Plato in *Rep.* VIII. 544 D explains, any constitution (e.g. a timocracy) is due to the prevalence of a certain (e.g. timocratic) temper amongst the citizens. *ib.* 549 A, ἡ οἷα ἐκ

15 τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ φυλάττειν εἴωθε τὴν (I)
 πολιτείαν καὶ καθίστησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον τὸ μὲν δημοκρα-
 τικὸν δημοκρατίαν τὸ δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἀεὶ δὲ
 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος βελτίονος αἵτιον πολιτείας), ἔτι δὲ πρὸς 2
 πάσας δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ προπαιδεύεσθαι
 20 καὶ προσθίξεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστων ἐργασίας, ὥστε δῆλον
 § 3 ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τὸ τέλος
 τῇ πόλει πάσῃ, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ
 τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέ-
 λειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν, ὃν τρόπον ἔκα-
 25 στος νῦν ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ μάθησιν
 ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων. δεῖ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν
 § 4 ποιέσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκήσιν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς
 πόλεως, μῦριον γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως· ἢ δ' ἐπιμέλεια

18 βέλτιον M^a P^a A¹, βέλτιστον the other authorities (viz. Γ P¹ P²) and Bk.¹ ||
 24 [κατ'] Spengel, needless || ἕκαστος after 25 νῦν Π² P² Bk. || 26 γὰρ Susem.,
 καὶ M^a, δὲ the other authorities Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 28 αὐτῶν Γ, ἂν M^a
 || αὐτοῦ P², αὐτοῦ οἱ αὐτοῦ P², αὐτοῦ P² Π², αὐτῶ Γ P¹, αὐτῶ M^a || 29 μῦριον... πόλει
 omitted by Π²

δρῶς ποθεῖν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γί-
 νεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς
 πόλεσιν, ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ μέγαντα, τὰλλα ἐφελ-
 κούσῃται, Comp also *Rep* 541 A, *Latius*
 IV. 711 B. It is not the 'spirit of the
 constitution,' but the temper or character
 which originates and keeps up the consti-
 tution. Comp. the application of the term
 ἦθος to ἀρμονίαι καὶ ῥυθμοὶ c. 5 §§ 22, 23,
 1340 a 40, b 7.

18 τὸ βέλτιον ἦθος] The nobler temper.
 In other words, where the constitution is
 such as to permit the excellence of the
 individual considered as a citizen to coin-
 cide with his excellence considered as a
 man: cp. III. cc. 4—6 § 2, c. 14 §§ 7, 8:
 IV(VII). 6 § 1, c. 8 §§ 2, 5, c. 13 §§ 9, 10:
 VI(IV). 7 § 2 with *notes* (468, 471, 684,
 808, 1233). Also Plato *Latius* I. 641 B,
 αὐτὸ δ' ὅλως ἀνωτὸς παιδείαν τῶν παιδευ-
 θέντων, τί μέγα τὴν πόλιν ὀνύσσει, οὐ
 χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι παιδευθέντες μὲν εὖ
 γίνονται· ἀνδρες ἀγαθοί. SUSEM. (974)

As to the argument, it is much the same
 as in I. 5. 2 f. 1254 a 25. It is perplexing
 to determine whether it merely guarantees
 consistency in the use of the term βέλτιον,
 or is intended for a material inference
 ἔτι δὲ] answers a 12 καὶ γὰρ, alleging
 another reason.

19 δυνάμεις καὶ τέχνας] An Aristot-
 elian phraseology for the special sciences
 which has already occurred II. 8. 18, 1268
 b 36. Comp. III. 12 § 1, 1282 b 16, where
 ἡ πολιτικὴ δύναμις is one, the highest of
 ἐπιστήμαι καὶ τέχναι, b 14, which phrase
 is replaced in § 3, 1282 b 31, by ἐπιστήμαι
 καὶ δυνάμεις; also VI(IV). 1 §§ 1, 2, with
notes

21 καὶ πρὸς τ. τ. d. π.] Therefore
 there should be τάξις τις περὶ τοῦ παιδῆς:
 the first of the three questions is settled.

§ 3 21 ἐπεὶ δὲ] This corresponds to
 ἐτι μὲν οὖν of a 11.

25 τε καὶ] join ἰδίᾳ τε διδάσκων.

26 δεῖ γὰρ] This sentence gives one
 reason why the education is to be public.
 The second point is quickly dismissed, but
 the third takes up the whole of this book.

§ 4 27 ἅμα δὲ καὶ] The sacrifice of
 the individual to the state was carried out
 most completely at Sparta, but Periclean
 Athens did not fall far short in this re-
 spect. Aristotle accepts the principle along
 with the other fundamental postulates of
 the Greek state, and expresses it as clearly
 in I. 13. 15 as here. Comp. I. 1 § 12 H.,
 4 § 5, and Eucken *Methods* p. 80 f. Also
 the conception of rearing a family as
 λειτουργία, IV(VII). 16. 16.

30 πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν. (I) ἐπαινεῖσει δ' ἂν τις κατὰ τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ 3 πλείστην ποιοῦνται σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην.
2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθεητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινῇ ποιητέον, φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν παιδεία καὶ πῶς
35 χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λαμβάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται διὰ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μαθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον, οὐδὲ φανερόν· πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν
§ 2 πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος· ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμ- 4
40 ποδῶν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἢ σκένβις, καὶ δῆλον οὐδενὶ πότερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κρι-

31 κατὰ Sylburg, καὶ Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 32 κοινῇ οἱ κοινῶς Γ A1. (communiter), κοινῶς M^a, κοινῇ II² P² Bk., perhaps rightly || 36 διὰ περὶ II² P² Bk. and P¹ in the margin || 40 οὐδενὶ II² P², οὐδεν the other authorities and Bk. (this may of course be right) || 42 εἴληχε Reiz, needlessly

30 The order πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βλέπειν ἐπιμέλειαν would avoid the hiatus and conform to I 13. 15, 1260 b 14, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Cp. Plato *Laus* 903 B, C.

31 ἐπαινεῖσει δ' ἂν τις] Comp. *N. Eth.* X. 9. 13, 1280 a 24 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (978)

32 καὶ κοινῇ ταύτην] On the ἀγωγή or public training of Spartan citizens see Schomann *Eng* tr. I p. 255 ff.

It was the same for all vi(iv). 9. 7, 1294 b 22 ff. (except the kings' eldest sons or next heirs, Ps-Pl. *Alc.* I. 122 B, Plut. *V. Agesilaos* c. 1), and without it mere birth from Spartan parents did not constitute any one a citizen: cp. the well-known story of the hostages; ἑτεροκλήτῃ ἐφορούων εἶπε 'παῖδας μὲν οὐ δίδωμι, ἵνα μὴ ἀπαλευτοὶ γένωνται, τῆς πατρὸς ἀγωγῆς ἀνεκτιθέμενοι' οὐδὲ πολέται γὰρ ἂν εἴσαν, Plutarch *Agagath.* *Lac.* 54, 235 B. Cp. *Inst. Lac.* 21.

c. 2. Conflict of views as to what should be taught: divergent theories of the end of education: § 1, 2.

The knowledge needed for affairs of life must be imparted, but only within certain limits. Even in scientific studies there is much which a gentleman would not pursue, or only as means to a given end: §§ 3—6.

37 οὐτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν—ἀριστον] But Aristotle would not recognise any such dilemma as 'virtue or happiness, unless

we here limit virtue to mean moral virtue only. This limited meaning occurs in § 2, a 42, see M. (978) SUSEM (978)

38 οὐδὲ φανερόν—ἥθος] Cp. iv(vii) 14 § 8 ff with M. (903) and *Introd.* p. 45 ff., 47 ff. As here τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος, 'character of the soul' is a fuller form of expression for ἥθος, so also in c 5 § 16 we have τοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος cp. M. (1043). SUSEM. (977)

§ 2 39 τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας] From the standpoint of the ordinary, common education.

40 ταραχώδης = perplexing. ταραχῇ for ἀπορία in II. 8. 12, 1268 b 4. The three theories of the end of education are that it should be (1) directly utilitarian i.e. subservient to a livelihood, or (2) should cultivate (3) the moral, or (3) the intellectual faculties. They still find supporters in the modern controversies on the subject.

42 πρὸς ἀρετὴν] Here and in the following clause (b 1) ἀρετῇ is evidently substituted for 'moral virtue' combined with φρόνησις, practical wisdom. SUSEM. (978)

ἢ τὰ περιττά] The fragment which has come down to us does not include a discussion of the question whether and to what extent these higher sciences should also be taken into account in the education of the young, cp. c. 3 §§ 10, 11, with M. (999) and M. (1015), Exc. I; also *Introd.* 50 ff. SUSEM. (979)

εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτής τις] Have found

1337 b τὰς τινας)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐδέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμε- (P)

σιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκήσιν αὐτῆς).

- § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεισθαι τῶν χρησίμων, II
5 οὐκ ἀδηλον· ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων
ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν ὅτι τῶν τοιοῦτων δεῖ
μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
§ 4 βάνανσον. βάνανσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ
τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ
10 τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ
§ 5 σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν διὸ
τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα
χειρὸν διακείσθαι βανανσοὺς καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνι-

1337 b 4 δὲ omitted by Γ^M || 5 ἐλευθέρων? Schneider (perhaps the reading of Γ^{Δ1}.) and 6 ἀνελευθέρων P¹ and perhaps Ar.; both possibly right || 11 [ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] Susem. || 12 τε omitted by M^a P¹ and perhaps Γ, hence [τε] Susem.! || παρασκευάζουσι αὐτὴ τὸ σῶμα II² P² Bk.

partisans, supporters; literally 'umpires to decide for them.' The metaphor is clearly taken from the dramatic contests: cp. *Metaph.* I. 8. 5, 989 a 6 ff.

1337 b 2 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐδὴς πάντες] See 1332 a 2. and for the thought cp. *N. E.* I. 3, 1094 b 14 ff.

3 πρὸς) not περί, after διαφέρονται, as after ἀμφισβητεῖν in III. 13. 1, 1283 a 23, 24: 'with regard to' (cp. 1283 b 15).

What is ἀσκήσις ἀρετῆς? Learning by practice, practical training in virtue: cp. 1341 a 8, πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκ., 1333 b 30, 38, τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκήσεων . μελετᾶν

§ 3 The first theory is only partially accepted. Some 'utilitarian' studies are indispensable, but we must exclude all which bear the taint of βανανσοῖς.

4 By the really indispensable parts of useful knowledge he may be supposed to mean much what we mean by the three Rs. Here in fact we return to the starting-point, IV(VII). 14. 14, 1333 b 1-4. There is no need to limit the expression to τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἔργων as in I. 7. 3, II. 6. 5, III. 4. 11.

5 ὅτι δεῖ] 'There is nothing strange in the repetition of ὅτι after φανερόν. Comp. III. 13. 7, 1283 b 16 f., where ὅς is picked up by ὅτι, as also in *Phys.* I. 7. 9, 190 b 17, 19: other instances from *Phys.* VI. 2. 9, 233 a 13 f., VIII. 7. 1, 260 a 23, 25 (Bonitz). We may render "as to all not being required, in view of the distinc-

tion made between liberal and illiberal occupations, it is clear that such useful subjects only should be studied as will not degrade the student." τῶν τοιοῦτων limiting as in 1260 a 40.

§ 4 8 The article omitted with ἔργων, because ταῦτο is predicate.

11 ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν] If διάνοια is a part of the soul, we should expect ἥθους for ψυχῆν [cp. 1340 a b πρὸς τὸ ἥθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν]. But if it is the soul as opposed to the body (cp. *Plat. Theaet.* 173 B, τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κείναι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιθῆμει, ἢ δὲ διάνοια... πανταχῇ φέρεται), then ψυχὴν must be regarded as a gloss upon διάνοιαν, ultimately incorporated in the text. See p. 622 ff. SUSEM.

§ 5 13 βανανσοῦς] What is meant by παρασκευάζουσι χειρὸν διακείσθαι comes out in I. 11. 6, 1258 b 37 τὰ σώματα λωβάντα. See n. (103). SUSEM. (980) This is the best description of 'sordid occupations': see Newman I. p. 111 f.

τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας] "Trades plied for hire" including all kinds of paid labour, mental as well as manual. See *Notes* (102, 103). But in I. 11. 4, 1258 b 25, μισθαρνία is used in a different sense, = 'working for wage,' to denote merely the manual labour of artisans and unskilled labourers as distinct from ἐμπόρια and τοκεμῶς, i.e. all kinds of trade and commercial occupations (including usury). Comp. n. (101). SUSEM. (981)

κὰς ἐργασίας. ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τα- (II)
 15 πεινῇ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν ἕως μὲν
 τινὸς ἐνίων μετέχειν οὐκ ἀνελεύθερον, τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν λίαν
 8 πρὸς ἀκρίβειαν ἔνοχον ταῖς εἰρημέναις βλάβαις. ἔχει δὲ
 πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνας ἔνεκεν πράττει τις ἢ μαν-
 θάνει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δι' ἀρετὴν οὐκ
 20 ἀνελεύθερον, ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλὰς δι' ἄλλους
 θητικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἂν δόξειε πράττειν.

15 <μή> ἐλευθερίων οἱ ἀνελευθερίων? Gottling (wrongly), ἀνελευθέρων Ridgeway;
 but see Comm. n. (982) || 16 ἀνελευθέρων perhaps Γ Ar. || 16 τὸ 20 ἀνελεύθερον
 omitted by Π³ (supplied in the margin of P⁴) || τὸ δὲ προσεδρεύειν omitted and a
 lacuna left by P³ (1st hand), προσεδρεύειν δὲ (supplied by a later hand in P⁴) Bk. ||
 17 ἀκρίβειαν] τὸ τέλειον P⁵, *perfectiorem* William, *extremum* Δι., τὸ τέλειος Vettoi
 Bk || *εἰρημέναις*] *ρηθείσαις* P⁶ || δὲ] γὰρ? Susem. (a very doubtful suggestion) ||
 18 ἔνεκεν] χάριν P⁸ Bk. || 19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ P⁹ Bk. with hiatus
 in *φαντα* || αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ P⁴ in the margin, αὐ M¹ || τῶν inserted before φίλων by
 P⁶ || 20 ἀνελευθέρων perhaps Γ Δι. || πρόσσω Π² P⁶ cp. 1271 b 34, 35, 37,
 1327 a 16 || πολλὰς (πολλάς P⁴) after δι' ἄλλους Π² P⁶ Bk. || 21 ἂν (in P⁸ a cor-
 rection by a later hand) after δόξειε Π² P⁶ Bk.

15 ἔστι δὲ. 17 βλάβαις] The sense, which Gottling and Ridgeway have mistaken, is: "And even as to studies not in themselves illiberal, while (μὲν) there are some which it is liberal to pursue [ὡς ἐντιμώτερα ἔργα 1255 b 28] within certain limits, too close application to them with the aim of scientific mastery is subject to the drawbacks above mentioned." Aristotle is thinking more particularly of Gymnastics and Music, but also of Drawing and Painting. See c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), c. 5 § 8, n. (1029), c. 6 §§ 3—8, §§ 15, 16, nn. (1065, 1080). But on the other hand consult Fxc. 1. p. 619. SUSEM. (982) Of the two clauses introduced by μὲν and δὲ Bonitz's dictum holds: "primum sc. membrum, grammaticae coördinationis, re vera subiectum est alteri membro."

16 προσεδρεύειν] to work closely at: II. 5. 6, 1263 a 29; infra c. 4 § 4, 1338 b 25 Comp. ἀκριβολογίσθαι I. II. 5, 1258 b 34.

§ 6 17 ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν = πολλὴ διαφέρει, it makes a great difference; cp. II. 8. 25. Otherwise c. 6 § 1 below.

19 τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν κτλ.] Cf. III. 4. 13, n. (488), IV (VII). 4. 7 nn. (900, 901). SUSEM. (988)

20 ὃ δὲ ἀνελευθέρων] Comp. n. (103) and *Μεταφρ.* XII (Δ). 10. 3, 1075 a 19 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (984)

πολλὰς] This word goes with ἂν δόξειε while δι' ἄλλους (=in obedience to others) goes with πράττων as contrasted with αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων, and accordingly Π² have transposed it. But the hyperbaton is not stranger than in many other passages. Cp. 1255 b 3.

21 θητικὸν] Cp. 1341 b 14. The strict conjunction between βάναντος and δοῦλος is laid down I. 13 13, n. (122). The day labourer, *θής*, was mentioned III. 5. 4, 1278 a 13, 18, 22: see nn. (507, 486). The word is used in *De Rer. Ath.* of the lowest property classes, as reconstituted by Solon: τοὺς δ' ἄλλους θητικόν, οὐδεμίαν μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς. διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴν ἐρηται τὸν μέλλοντα ἀληροῦσθαι τιν' ἀρχήν, ποῶν τέλος τελεί, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς κείνα θητικόν: c. 7, c. f.: a very close parallel to II. 12. 6, 1274 a 21.

c. 3. Of the ordinary subjects of instruction Grammar (Letters), Gymnastic, Drawing have a practical value: § 1. A consideration of Music leads us to determine the higher end of all Education, which is the right employment of leisure: §§ 2—7, as Homer attests: §§ 8, 9. Recapitulation. §§ 10, 11.

The proper treatment of subjects of practical utility: §§ 11, 12. Gymnastics should precede: § 13. Cp. *Anal.* p. 118.

3 αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημένοι νῦν μαθήσεις, καθάπερ εἶρη- (II)
ται πρότερον, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἢ παι- 3
δεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ
25 τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν
ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὖσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ
γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρίαν τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν
§ 2 ἥδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ
πλείστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔταξαν ἐν παι-
30 δεῖα διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἶρη-
ται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύ-
νασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν
§ 3 εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ δ' ἄμφο μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ
αἰρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλους, ζητητέον (p. 132)

23 εἶρηται] ἐλέχθη IP² Bk. || 25 τὴν μὲν. γραφικὴν omitted by P¹ (supplied by P² in the margin) || 27 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν] περὶ δὲ τῆς μουσικῆς P² and perhaps, Γ (de musica autem duntaxat utique aliquis William) || 28 ἥδη omitted by P⁴, untranslated by William and A¹, [ἥδη] Susem.¹, et de² Kouacs, needlessly || 33 δ' Susem., γὰρ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text || 34 τῆς. 35 σχολάζειν omitted by P² (supplied in the margin of P⁴), τῆς ἀσχολίας over an erasure P², καλ...σχολάζειν omitted by Ar. || [τέλος] Susem.¹, perhaps rightly, τελευταῖον P², τέλος Vettori Bk.

§ 1 22 καταβεβλημένοι Here and 1338 a 36 used for ordinari, current i.e. τὰ ἐγκόκλια, οἱ ἐγκόκλιοι παιδεῖα. Apparently from καταβάλλεσθαι = 'lay down a foundation' mld. So Pl. Laws 803 A. Late writers use the passive in the sense of 'to be published,' committed to writing, so already N.E. I 5. 8, 1096 a 10: cp. Antigonos Causa De Nivariationis c 60 ἐβδόμηκοντα περὶ αὐτῶν καταβέβληται βιβλία.

23 πρότερον] In c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 39—b 2. SUSEM. (985)

ἔστι δὲ. 25 γραφικὴν] Comp. Plin. N. H. XXXV. 10. 77 (Vettori): huius (Pamphili) auctoritate effectum est Sicyone primum, deinde et in tota Graecia, ut pueri ingenui omnia ante graphicen, hoc est picturam in buxo, docerentur, recipere etique ars ea in primum gradum liberatum. Plato *Protag.* 325 D, *Crito* 50 D, *Rep.* II 376 E, *Lysis* VII. 795 D, Xen. *De Lac. Rep.* 2. 1, Pseudo-Plat. *Theages* 122 E (Eaton). SUSEM. (986) Under γράμματα came reading, writing, counting (λογιστική), and the elements of arithmetic. Most of the authorities given above recognize the threefold division e.g. Pl. *Protr.* I. c. (1) γραμμάτων τε καὶ (2) καθαρίσεων, both in the διδασκαλίαν (id. εἰς διδασκαλίαν πέμψοντες) and (3) physical training

(εἰς παιδοτροφίαν πέμπουσιν) at first in the palaestia. So *Theages* Lc. οὖν (1) γράμματα καὶ τε καὶ (2) καθαρίσεων καὶ (3) παλαίου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν.

§ 2 30 ζητεῖν] Nature, personified, is said to aim at a right use of leisure, as she is said to define, to make a division, to place at man's disposal: I. 8. 5, 1256 a 26 f, IV(VII). 14. 5, 1322 b 35 f., I. 10. 1, 1258 a 23.

πολλάκις] E.g. II. 9. 34, IV(VII). c. 14 § 9, c. 15 § 6. SUSEM. (987)

32 αὕτη] "This is the principle which determines all." The pronoun is attracted into the gender of the predicate. See IV(VII). 1. 8, 1323 b 15, n., Vahlen *Aufh.* II. p. 34. Another instance IV(VII). 7. 5, 1327 b 41.

πάλιν] That is, after 1333 b 1.

§ 3 33 δὲ] *Qui. ci. it. coll.* p. 418. Hoc loco γὰρ (Γ Π Ar. Bk.) plane absurdum est. Immo si Aristoteles omnino voluisset haec cum antecedentibus nexu causae et consecutionis coniungere, certe multo magis illa causa sunt, haec consecutio. Ut in hoc potissimum libro saepius peccatum est γὰρ et δὲ conjunctionibus propter compendiorum similitudinem inter se permutatis, ita hoc loco δὲ restituendum est. SUSEM.

35 δ τι δεῖ ποιοῦντας σχολάζειν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας· τέλος (II)
 § 4 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βίου τὴν παιδιάν ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο
 ἀδύνατον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀσχολαῖς χρηστέον ταῖς
 παιδιαῖς (ὁ γὰρ πονῶν δεῖται τῆς ἀναπαύσεως, ἡ δὲ παι-
 40 διὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει
 μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας), διὰ τοῦτο δὲ παιδιὰς εἰσάγε-
 σθαι καιροφυλακοῦντα τὴν χρῆσιν, ὥς προσάγοντα φαρ-
 μακείας χάριν. ἄνεσις γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς,
 138 a καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀνάπαυσις. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν ἔχειν
 αὐτὸ δοκεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ ζῆν
 § 5 μακαρίως. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ἀσχολοῦσιν ὑπάρχει ἀλλὰ τοῖς
 σχολάζουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσχολῶν ἕνεκά τινος ἀσχολεῖ
 5 τέλους ὥς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντος, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία τέλος ἐστίν, ἣν
 οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μεθ' ἡδονῆς οἴονται πάντες εἶναι.

35 δ τι Susem., τί Γ⁶ Bas.³ Bk., δτι the other authorities || δεῖ αἰεὶ ποιοῦντας
 Γ (if William has translated closely *quod facientes oportet velle*) Γ⁶ Bk. Susem.¹ in
 the text || 36 <ἀν> ἀναγκαῖον Schneidei, ἀναγκαῖον <ῆν> Spengel; one or other
 seems needed || 38 ἡ τε ? Susem. || 41 καιροφυλακοῦντας II³ P⁶ Bk., which may also be
 right, καιροφυλακτούσας P⁶ Bk. || προσάγοντας II³ P⁶ Bk., which may also be right
 1338 a 3 γὰρ Susem., δ' Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text

33—36] With the punctuation now
 adopted (comma after τέλος). "If both
 are necessary but leisure more desirable
 and more truly the end than occupation,
 we must next inquire what should employ
 our leisure. Certainly not amusement, or
 else amusement would be made the end of
 life." With ἀναγκαῖον there is the less
 need to express ἀν.

35 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπὶ Comp. Nic. Eth.
 x. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἡμεῖς ἢ
 εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄριστον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιάν καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν
 τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ καλεῖν χάριν (Eaton)
 Also *in* *h* c. 5 § 10, n. (1033), § 13 n.
 (1038). SUSSEM. (988)

§ 4 41 φαρμακείας χάριν Cp. *N. E.*
 VII. 14 § 4, 1154 a 26 ff., διὰ τὰς ὑπερβο-
 λὰς τῆς λύπης, ὥς οὐδὲν ἰατρίας, τὴν ἡ-
 δονὴν διώκουσι; §§ 6, 7, b 9 ff. ἐξελάνει
 δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἥδεα τὰ
 ἰατροῦντα (Eaton). See below c. 5 § 10,
 n. (1032). SUSSEM. (989)

43 ἀνεσις γὰρ . . τῆς ψυχῆς This is
 seen most plainly in the case of sleep,
 which is sweet because it affords pleasure
 of this kind: c. 5 § 3 (cp. n. 1021).
 Further comp. *N. Eth.* VII. 7. 7, 1150 b
 17 f. ἡ γὰρ παιδιὰ ἀνεσις ἐστὶν ἑκαστῶ ἀνά-
 παυσις 'amusement is recreation, and

consequently of the nature of relaxation '
 SUSSEM. (990)

1338 a 2 καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν] Here
 καὶ is explicative; translate, 'and indeed,'
 'and what is more.' For the pleasure
 here mentioned is not something apart
 from Happiness (i.e. Wellbeing), but is
 contained in it. It is incredible that
 Döring *op. c.* p. 155 (cp. p. 109 f.) should
 have been satisfied with the absurdity
 "happiness," or as he says, the life of hap-
 piness (which is much the same), "consists
 of happiness accompanied by pleasure."
 To complete the logical absurdity he
 should have added "together with the
 sense of existence." SUSSEM. (992)

§ 5 3 The violent hiatus—ὑπάρχει
 ἀλλὰ—can be removed by emendation, or
 we may elegantly the whole clause τοῦτο . .
 σχολάζουσιν to the margin.

6 μεθ' ἡδονῆς] Pleasurable. The
 use of μετὰ and a genitive as an equivalent
 for an adverb or adjective is noticed in the
 lexicons s.v. *Asi* II p. 310 f., Bonitz *Ind.*
As. 458 a 2 ff. Döring's difficulty (see
 n. 991) partly arises from overlooking the
 fact that Happiness is a misleading term
 for εὐδαιμονία. The English reader need
 not be reminded that Welfare, Wellbeing
 (of which 'well-doing' is the primary

ταύτην μέντοι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκέτι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθέασιν, ἀλλὰ (II)
 καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἕκαστος καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὐτῶν, ὃ δ' ἀρίστος
 § 6 τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι
 10 δεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολὴν μαυθάνειν ἅττα
 καὶ παιδεύεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τὰ παιδεύματα καὶ ταύ-
 τας τὰς μαθήσεις ἑαυτῶν εἶναι χάριν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν
 § 7 ἀσχολίαν ὡς ἀναγκαίας καὶ χάριν ἄλλων. διὸ καὶ τὴν
 μουσικὴν οἱ πρότερον εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν οὐχ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
 15 (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔχει τοιοῦτον) οὐδ' ὡς χρησίμους, ὥσπερ τὰ γράμ-
 ματα πρὸς χρηματισμὸν καὶ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν [καὶ πρὸς
 μάθῃσιν] καὶ πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις πολλὰς, δοκεῖ δὲ
 καὶ γραφικὴ χρησίμος εἶναι πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τῶν τε-

8 αὐτῶν P¹ Ald. and con.¹ of P¹, αὐτὴν M¹ and P¹ (1st hand) || 10 ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
 διαγωγῇ Κοῖνας, cf. § 8, a 22, [ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ] σχολὴν Spengel, ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ [σχο-
 λῇ] Jackson: but Postgate has satisfactorily defended the text || 16 [καὶ πρὸς
 μάθῃσιν] Susem 2^a, but more probably μάθησιν is corrupt, μαθηματικὴν ? Flach, hardly
 right || 18 χρησίμη P¹ 4-6 S¹ T¹ L¹

constituent), or even Real Interest, would often better express man's ultimate good, because these terms do not necessarily imply "a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings": Prof. H. Sidgwick *Methods of Ethics* p. 76 n. 1, *History of Ethics*² p. 48 n., p. 56 n. 2.

7 ταύτην μέντοι. 9 καλλίστων] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* 1 8. 10 ff., 1099 a 7 ff. (Congreve). I cannot understand how Doring p. 109 f. is able to prove from these words, that the pleasure which belongs as a necessary condition to the life of happiness is not the pleasure which arises from virtuous action and theoretical knowledge, but something which taken by itself is an integral factor of happiness. (To this view Doring's reviewer Walter, *Jen. Lits.* 1877 p. 29, rightly took exception.) From what other source can it arise? Every pleasure, as Aristotle rightly maintains (see Zeller *op. c.* 11 ii p. 617 ff.), can only be conceived as a consequence of some bodily or mental activity—even the pleasures of taste or the agreeable sensation of falling asleep: for eating and drinking are bodily activities, and the very act of falling asleep (inasmuch as the cessation of a movement is itself a movement) is also an activity. Doring is no less mistaken when he goes on to state that the pleasure which is introduced as an integral factor into the end of life itself contributes to the highest intellectual enjoy-

ment (διαγωγῇ), whereas the latter is really due to the cognitive faculties and the pleasure inseparably associated with their strenuous exercise. The thought of Aristotle is a very simple one that those activities alone can belong to happiness, which naturally produce the purest possible joy with the smallest admixture of pain. Comp further c. 5 § 10, n. (1032). SUSEM. (992)

§ 6 10 Dr Jackson writes: "in the face of τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ § 8, a 21, I cannot reconcile myself to this phrase. Is it possible that σχολὴν is the interpolation of a scribe, who, finding πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ did not see that with these words ἡδονὴν should be understood from the preceding sentence?" Dr Postgate *Notes* p. 15 defended both phrases, explaining this as 'our training must include certain studies available for leisure to be spent in rational amusement,' and a 21 as 'rational amusement to be pursued in leisure time.'

§ 7 14 εἰς παιδείαν ἔταξαν] Ranked under, with: so 1339 b 14 and *θετέον εἰς*, 1339 b 12. But § 8, 1338 a 23, ἐν ταύτῃ τάττουσαν.

17 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ γραφικῇ] "While drawing too has its use in making us better judges of works of art," so that we are less liable to be taken in when purchasing such works, c. 3 § 12, 1338 b 1. SUSEM. (994)

χρητῶν ἔργα κάλλιον, οὐδ' αὖ καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ πρὸς (II)
 10 ὑγιειαν καὶ ἄλκην (οὐδέτερον γὰρ τούτων ὀρώμεν γινόμενον
 § 8 ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς)· λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
 διαγωγὴν, εἰς ὑπερ καὶ φαίνονται παράγοντες αὐτήν. ἦν
 γὰρ οἴονται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐν ταύτῃ τάτ-
 15 τουσιν. διόπερ Ὁμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν (P 13)

25 ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖν,

§ 9 καὶ οὕτω προειπῶν ἑτέρους τινάς, οἳ καλέουσιν

δοῖόν,

27 φησίν,

ὃ κεν τέρψῃσιν ἅπαντας

28 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησιν Ὀδυσσεὺς ταύτην ἀρίστην εἶναι δια-
 γωγὴν, ὅταν εὐφραينوμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων

30 δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκούσονται δοιδῶ
 ἤμενοι ἐξείησε.

§ 10 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἦν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμη παιδευ- III
 32 τέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ὅλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν,
 φανερόν ἐστιν· πρότερον δέ μία τῶ ἀριθμῷ ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὖ-

25 οἷον Schneidei || μὲν is corrupt, μὴν ? Schneider, μὲν γ' ? Gottling, μὲν τ'
 ? Spengel, γε μὲν Weildon, μὲν εἰκοι ? Schmidt || καλεῖν (καλεῖσθαι ? Γ) αἰεὶ ἐπὶ
 δαῖτα Π³ || θαλεῖν P¹, θαλεῖον M³, congaudere Wilham || 26 οὗτ' ἀκούουσιν
 or οἱ ἀκούουσιν ? Spengel, rightly || 27 φησίν φῶσιν Γ¹ || δ] ὡς Π¹, εἰς P⁴ || 31
 χρησίμων P¹ || 32 ἀναγκαίαν P³, ἀναγκαῖον Π³ Bk. || 33 μίαν Π¹ || τὸν ἀριθμὸν
 Π³ P³ Bk., avoiding hiatus, and this may be right

§ 8 21 λείπεται τοίνυν πρὸς τὴν ἐν
 τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ. See n. (921).
 Aristotle seems mistaken in asserting
 that the only remaining end, which
 music can subserve, is to educate men
 for rational enjoyment in leisure. There
 is still the end of moral training, and be-
 low c. 5 §§ 1—8 he goes so far as to
 demonstrate that this is the only object
 to be considered in the education of the
 young. He has then expressed himself
 hastily and inaccurately. Comp. n. n.
 (1000, 1024). SUSSEX. (993)

23 διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐλευθέρων] In-
 tellectual enjoyment worthy of free men.
 So a 28, ἀρίστην διαγ. 389 11, in Aristotle's
Odyssey this line must have followed
 XVII. 383 (Spengel) SUSSEX. (996)

25 ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστι παιδεία τις ἦν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμη παιδευ- III
 32 τέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἀναγκαίαν ὅλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν,
 φανερόν ἐστιν· πρότερον δέ μία τῶ ἀριθμῷ ἡ πλείους, καὶ τίνες αὖ-

Our present texts give *delōon* instead of
ἅπαντας. SUSSEX (997)

We may conjecturally restore Aristotle's
 text as follows:

τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖναι καλεῖ ἀλλοθεν αὐ-
 τὸς ἐπελθὼν |
 383 ἄλλων γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοεργοὶ
 βασι, |
 <ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν τ' ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ
 δαῖτα θαλεῖν>
 384 μόνων ἢ ἐγῆρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα
 δοῦρων |
 ἢ καὶ θέσπιν δοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρψῃσιν
 ἅπαντας.

The discrepancies in the Homeric cita-
 tions (indicated by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v.)
 are numerous enough to exclude the hy-
 pothesis that slips of memory would suf-
 ficiently account for all of them. See
 Wachsmuth *De Arist. Studiis Homericis*
 p. 12 ff.

28 Ὀδυσσεὺς] *Odys.* IX. 7 f. With
 all this comp. n. (1021). SUSSEX. (998)

§ 11 ται καὶ πῶς, ὅστερον λεκτέον περὶ αὐτῶν. νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν (III)
 35 εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν, ὅτι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔχονέν
 τινα μαρτυρίαν ἐκ τῶν καταβεβλημένων παιδευμάτων· ἡ γὰρ
 μουσικὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖ δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ὅτι α
 δεῖ τινα παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρῆσινον,
 39 οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πολ-
 § 12 λὰς δι' αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεσθαι γίνεσθαι μαθήσεις ἑτέρας, ὁμοίως
 41 δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν οὐχ ἵνα ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὠνίοις μὴ δια-
 μαρτάνωσιν ἀλλ' ὥσιν ἀνεξαπάτητοι πρὸς τὴν τῶν σκευῶν
 1338 b ὄνην τε καὶ πρᾶσιν, ἣ μᾶλλον ὅτι ποιεῖ θεωρητικὸν τοῦ
 περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρή-
 σιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις.

36 * + ἐκ Conring, rightly, if, as Reiz and Schneiden thought, the passage needs any alteration: but this is extremely doubtful. <ὅτι τὸ καλὸν οὐκ ἐξέρχον> ἐκ ? Susem. || 37 τῶν χρησίμων after ὅτι δὲ Γ (if Wilham has translated accurately *quod oportet uti iis*) P² || 40 δι' αὐτῶν after γίνεσθαι (γίνεσθαι Bk.) II² P² Bk. (in P¹ ἐνδέχεσθαι is omitted) || 42 ἀλλ' ἢ Reiz || [ὥσιν... b i ἢ] Koiaes

1338 b i ἢ transposed by Postgate to follow μᾶλλον || ἢ] ἀλλὰ Ar. (?) Reiz Thurot || πρᾶσιν. ἢ μᾶλλον.. α κάλλους, Jackson formerly || θεωρητικὴν (θεωρητι-
 κῆν S²) II², θεωρητικὸς P² || 3 ἀρμόζει II² P² Bk. || ἐλευθέρους ? Susem.

§ 10 34 ὅστερον.] Another of the unfulfilled promises. See *Introd.* p. 49 n. (4). SUSEM. (999)

§ 11 νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον... 37 δῆλον] The sequence of thought here is liable to be misunderstood. In §§ 2—9 Aristotle has proved, or tried to prove, that the ancients had regarded poetry and music as being preeminently a means to intellectual training, which in his eyes is more important than moral training, and to the highest intellectual enjoyment associated with it. It is true the evidence he has produced suffices for no more than the inference that the ancients considered music and poetry in the light of higher rational amusements for men of riper age, but not that they adopted music in the education of the young with the view of training them for this rational enjoyment in the future: cp. *nn.* (993, 1024). He does not, in §§ 2—9, touch upon the question, see *n.* (993), whether this art may not be utilized for the development of character: this he discusses later on, c. 5 § 1, where he expressly states that he will resume the inquiry of c. 2 § 3—c. 3 § 11, which had been left incomplete, see *nn.* (1017, 1018). Hence he is here contrasting the intellectual and theoretical aim of education not with its moral aim, the

development of character, but only with the third and lowest aim, a knowledge of what is absolutely necessary and practically useful. All these aspects are more intimately concerned with the mental side of education. The third is disposed of in §§ 11, 12; in § 13 Aristotle reverts to the difference between intellectual and moral training, without however pursuing the inquiry more precisely into particulars, his attention being at present especially directed to the proper development of the body. SUSEM. (1000)

35 εἶναι] Lobeck in his ed. of *Phrynichus* p. 275 treats this as a case of the absolute inf. See *n.* on 1330 a 37.

§ 12 42 πρὸς] This preposition as in 1261 a 13, 1262 b 3, 1284 a 1, 1336 b 31, 1338 b 2.

1338 b 2 περὶ τὰ σώματα] The prepositional phrase an equivalent for the adjective 'corporeal.' So Plat. *Timaeus* 35 A, *Phaedr.* 246 D. See *Asi. Lex.* s. v. of whose exx. *Σόφρ.*, 251 C *πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως* = 'poverty in mental endowment' is perhaps the best.

τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν κατ'] See III. 8. 1, 1279 b 13 f., Eucken *Method* p. 35.

3 τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις] Editors comp. *N. E.* IV. 3. 33, 1125 a 11 f. SUSEM (1001)

- § 13 ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν πρότερον τοῖς ἔθεσιν παιδευτέον ἢ τῷ (III)
 5 λόγῳ εἶναι, καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα πρότερον ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν,
 δηλὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι παραδοτέον τοὺς παῖδας γυμναστικῇ
 καὶ παιδοτριβικῇ· τούτων γὰρ ἡ μὲν ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ τὴν
 ἔξιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τὰ ἔργα.
 4 νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμε-
 10 λείσθαι τῶν παιδῶν αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λω-

4 πρότερον P¹ (coll.¹), πότερον A¹. with all the other authorities || παιδευτέον
 after 5 λόγῳ II³ Bk. avoiding hiatus || 5 εἶναι omitted by II¹ || 6 <πρότερον>
 παραδοτέον ? Susem.

§ 13 4 πρότερον IV(VII). 15 §§ 6—10
 SUSEM. (1002)

7 τούτων γὰρ κτλ.] From what fol-
 lows, as well as from c. 3 § 1, compared
 with IV(VII). c. 14 § 9 ff., c. 15 § 8 ff., it
 is plain that instruction in gymnastics
 does not conduce merely to physical de-
 velopment, but also to the moral educa-
 tion of the mind in courage. For the
 difference between παιδοτριβικὴ καὶ γυ-
 μναστικὴ see also Galen *De valet. tuenda*
 II. 9, T. VI. p. 143 Kühn, where the rela-
 tion between trainer (παιδοτρίβης) and
 teacher (διδάσκαλος) is compared to that
 between a cook and a physician. See
 VI(IV). 1. 2 n. (1115), and for this pas-
 sage generally c. 4 § 7 ff. n. (1015), i.e.
 Exc. I. p. 619. SUSEM. (1008)

ποιάν τινα ποιεῖ] The phrase recurs
 c. 5 § 3, 1339 a 13 f., § 24, 1340 b 11,
 c. 6 § 16, 1341 b 18. Like τοιοῦτος (see
 n. 1. 8. 7, 1456 a 37) the precise import
 of τοιοῦτος = "of a definite character" is
 determined by the context in 1339 a 24
 = δυναμένῳ χαλεπὸν ὁρῶν (cp. 1339 b 24);
 in 1341 b 18 = βδανύων simply; while
 in 1340 b 11 it is as vague as ὀργαστικὰ
 καὶ πᾶσι γινώσκῃ 1340 b 3. In our present
 passage it is substantially βελτίῳ ποιεῖν,
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν (τὸ ἦθος) συντελεῖν; in short,
 παιδεύειν, "develops," "influence" A
 correlative phrase, τοιοῦτος γινώμεθα,
 occurs c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 7 f., where see
 note. Comp. N. E. I. 9. 8, 1099 b 31,
Rhet. I. 1. 9, 1354 b 20.

c. 4 *Athletic training. Two errors to*
avoid: we do not desire to make professional
athletes, or to realize the Spartan type:
 §§ 1—7. *Badly exercises to be relaxed in*
favour of other studies for three years
after puberty: §§ 7—9.

The census of an athletic training was
 passed IV(VII). c. 16 §§ 12, 13, 1335 b
 2—12. The culticism of the exercises of
 the Spartans widens into a condemnation

of their political system in general on the
 lines of B. II. c. 9, IV(VII). c. 14 §§ 15—
 22, c. 15 § 6

10 αἱ μὲν ἐμποιοῦσι] Some endea-
 vour to make their sons professional ath-
 letes. Aristotle evidently considers that
 such a career is βδανύων: cp. § 6, b 33,
 n. (1012), § 9, n. (1015), 1 c. Exc. I, and
 IV(VII). 16. 12, 1335 b 5 ff., n. (944).
 SUSEM. (1004)

In his condemnation of the mania for
 sports, Aristotle had predecessors in
 Xenophanes *Frag.* 2, Empirides *Autolyce.*
Pr. I, as well as Plato *Leq.* III. 404 A,
 407 B, 410 B—D, VII. 535 D, IX. 591 C.
 The judgment of poets and philosophers
 was confirmed by practical soldiers like
 Epaminondas and Alexander, and later
 Philopomen (Plut. *Vita Phil.* c. 3, p.
 357 c), by medical authorities like Galen
 (*Προτρ. λόγος* cc. 9—14, I. p. 20 ff. K.;
 cp. Plut. *De sauit. tuenda* c. 16, p. 130
 A ff.), and by the Romans. On the
 degradation of the athletic sports, see
 P. Gardner *New Chapters* pp. 300—303,
 Mommsen *The Provinces* I. p. 269, 287
 —289 Eng. II. The chief causes for the
 prominence of the professional element
 were (1) the increasing popularity of the
 heavier sports, boxing and the pancra-
 tium; (2) the change of diet, see n.
 (1015); (3) the progress made in the
 science and art of training. "But it was
 Hierocles of Selymbria who ruined ath-
 letics, by introducing elaborate rules for
 eating and drinking and exercise. He
 first discovered that the human body can
 by scientific tending be made, not healthy
 and beautiful, but muscular and adapted
 to this or that special service: he im-
 proved the speed of the races and the
 skill of the wrestlings, but spoiled ath-
 letics as a means of education for life
 and happiness" (Gardner). The evil
 increased until in Roman times no pro-

βώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὖξισιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ (III)
 12 δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θη-
 ριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὥς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν
 § 2 μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε (p. 13)
 15 πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον
 τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν· εἴ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρί-
 σκουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν
 ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ
 § 3 μᾶλλον τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦσιν. πολλὰ 4
 20 δ' ἔστι τῶν ἐθνῶν ἃ πρὸς τὸ κτείνειν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρω-
 ποφωγίαν εὐχερῶς ἔχει, καθάπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον
 Ἀχαιοὶ τε καὶ Ἡνίοχοι καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα,
 τὰ μὲν ὁμοίως τούτοις τὰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἃ ληστροικὰ μὲν ἔστιν,
 § 4 ἀνδρίας δὲ οὐ μετελήφασιν. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας

15 μίαν <ἀρετὴν> Suscm. (after Alb. and A1), μίαν <ἐξ> Ridgeway. It is better to understand ταύτην || 20 δ' r' or γὰρ Suscm., *que* A1 || 23 ληστροικὰ M^a P¹ L^a Ald., ληστροικὰ Bk with all the other authorities || 24 τοὺς omitted by P¹ L^a Ald.

vince of the empire possessed no many professional athletes, and none supplied so few soldiers.

12 The statement that the Spartans were prohibited from boxing and the panceratum is found in Plutarch *V. Lyciurg.* 19, *Απορήσεις*. *Lycurg.* 4, 189 E, Seneca *De Benef.* v. 3 1, Philostr. *De Gymnast.* 9, 58. It is not certain that it applies to classical times. Xenophon says καὶ γὰρ πυκτεύουσι διὰ τὴν ἐξον ὅπου ἂν συμβάλῃσι, *Rep. Lac.* 4 § 6. Epaminondas saw the difference between the corpulent athletic habit and that of a spare, wry soldier. Plut. *Απορήσεις*. *Ep.* 3, 192 C

13 τοῖς πόνοις] Cp. II. 9. 24, 1270 b 33, ὑπερβάλλει (ἡ δαίται) ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν.

§ 2 14 πολλάκις] II. 6. 34 μ. (34+), IV(VII). 14. 15 ff. μ. (910), c. 15 § 5, cp. IV(VII). 2 9, μ. (719) SUSCM. (1008)

15 With μίαν understand ταύτην· 'neither to this alone, nor to this principally' (Ridgeway). An omission of ἀρετὰς is to be found I. 13. 9, 1260 a 24.

19 λεοντώδεσιν] The character of the lion is given *Hist. Animal.* IX. 44. 2-6: 629 b 8 ff. ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατος ἐστὶ, μὴ παντὶ δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὸς πρᾶστατος, ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ἦθος οὐχ ὑπόπτως οὐδενὸς οὐδ' ὑφορώμενος οὐδὲν, πρὸς τε τὰ σπνροφα καὶ συνήθη σφόδρα φιλοπαγίων καὶ στερικτικὸς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς θήραις ὁρώμενος μὲν οὐδέποτε φεύγει οὐδὲ πτήσσει, ἀλλ' ἐάν

καὶ διὰ πλῆθος ἀναγκασθῇ τῶν θηριζώντων ὀπαγαγεῖν βάδην ὑποχωρεῖ καὶ κατὰ σκέλος, κατὰ βραχὺ ἐπιστρέφμενος. Plato, whom Aristotle here follows in the treatment and criticism of γυμναστική (see *Rep.* III. 404-412), gives the dog as an example of the 'spirited' temperament in *Rep.* II 375 c ff.; comp. also III. 410 E, to which Aristotle alludes in IV(VI). 7. 5, n (783, ff.). SUSCM. (1008)

§ 3 21 εὐχερῶς ἔχει] "are indifferent to (think little of) bloodshed and cannibalism." These wild races lead the 'natural' ληστροικὸς βίος of I. 8. 7 f., 1256 b 1 (Newman).

καθάπερ τῶν... 24 μετελήφασιν] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* VII. 5. 2, 1148 b 21 ff (λέγει δὲ τὰς θηριώδεις)... οἱσι χαίρειν φασὶν ἐνίοις τῶν ἀπηγριωμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ὡμοῖς τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέσσιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παῖδια δαεῖν εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰς ἐδωχίαν: Herod. IV 18, 106, Ἀνδροφάγοι δὲ ἀγριώτατα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι θήρα, οὔτε δικὴν νομίζοντες οὐτε νόμῳ οὐδενὶ χρεόμενοι, νομάδες δὲ εἰσι. Scylax *Periæol.* 75 f. p. 60 (Muller). Nevertheless the Greeks took these tribes to be of kindred origin with themselves: Strabo IX. 416 A (colonists of the Orchomenians, who had wandered thither with Ialmenus after the capture of Troy), XI. 495 f. φασὶ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰάπωνος στρατιᾶς τοὺς μὲν Φθιώτας Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν ἐνθάδε Ἀχαιῶν οἰκίσει (Eaton).

With courage, as with every other virtue

15 ἴσμεν, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὶ προσήδρευον ταῖς φιλοπονίαις, ὑπερ- (II)
 ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων, νῦν δὲ καὶ τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ
 τοῖς πολεμικοῖς λειπομένους ἑτέρων· οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοὺς νέους
 18 γυμνάξεν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον διέφερον, ἀλλὰ τῷ μόνον πρὸς
 μὴ ἀσκούτας ἀσκεῖν. 36 <δεῖ δὴ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν πρῶτερων 37 ἐργα-
 <κρίνειν ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν· ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς 38 παιδείας νῦν
 § 5 <ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.> 29 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ' οὐ τὸ θηρι-
 30 ὦδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θη-
 ρίων ἀγωνισαίτο ἂν οὐδένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μάλλον
 § 6 ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας

25 αὐτοὶ <μόνοι> Eucken; but why should not αὐτοὶ alone have the sense of
 μόνοι, as often? || 26 γυμνασίῳ Π³ P⁶ Bk || ἀγῶσι after 27 πολεμικοῖς Π³ P⁶ Bk.
 || 27 λειπομένοις M³ P³ || οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἀρα ? Susem. doubtfully || 28 μόνον τῷ
 Reiz || 36 δεῖ δὴ 38 εἶχον transposed by Susem and Döcker to precede 29 ὥστε
 36 ἑτέρων See *Introd.* p. 89 f. || 36 δὴ Susem., δὲ Γ II Ar Bk. Susem.⁴ in the
 text || *πρότερον* Spengel, needlessly

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ II¹, οὐ γὰρ II³ P⁶ Bk. || τι inserted after θηρίων by Vettori Bk.,
 Camoi inserted οὐδεῖς, Κοῖνες οὐδὲν || 31 οὐδένα] οὐδὲν Gotting, <οὐδὲν> οὐδένα
 ? Susem., but perhaps no change is needed

(see *Nic. Eth.* IV. 2. 7, 1122 b 6, and often), the motive must be purely the noble, the beautiful, the good: the virtue must be exercised τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, cf. § 5, n. (1009) See *N. E.* III. c. 7 § 6, 1115 b 19 ff., § 13, 1116 a 10 ff., c. 8 §§ 1—17 (Congreve). SUSEM (1907)

§ 4 Cp. Pl. *Protag.* 342 b, c, where Wroschel says: haec Platonis verba tangit, opinor, Aristoteles Pol. VIII 4.

25 αὐτοὶ] By themselves, alone: αὐτὸς = μόνος. Very near to this is the sense αὐτῇ (but is it right?) would be, II. 9 19, 1270 b 8 "I am per se" and I. 1. 2, 1252 a 14, I. 6. 4, 1255 a 18. SUSEM. Add 1335 a 39.

17 λειπομένους ἑτέρων] This criticism repeated from II. 9 § 16, § 34, IV(VIII). 14 §§ 16—18; see *nm* (308, 345, 912) SUSEM. (1908) The simple verb here in the sense of ἐπολείπεσθαι, IV(VII). 16. 3, 1234 b 39.

28 πρὸς μὴ ἀσκούτας] So Xen. *De Rep. Lac.* 13 § 5, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους αὐτοσχέδιαστας εἶναι τῶν στρατιωτικῶν, Λακεδαιμονίου δὲ μόνου τῷ ὄντι τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν.

§ 5 29 τὸ καλὸν] With this and b 30 καλὸν κίνδυνον, cp. n. (1007). SUSEM. (1909)

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος κτλ.] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* III. 8. 11, 1116 b 30 ff. (Eaton). SUSEM. (1910)

τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων] With this genitive should be compared I. 13 § 2, 1259 a 25, § 13, 1260 b 2, III. 5 § 7, 1278 a 27, 13 § 21, 1284 b 11 (if II¹ gives the true reading); 'genetivus putativus non addito e quo pendet vel quascos vel pronomine indefinitivo.' SUSEM

§ 6 32 οἱ δὲ λίαν κτλ.] In Sparta, reading and writing were not included among the subjects taught by the state. But this did not prevent individuals from learning them on their own account, if it seemed expedient to do so (Plut. *Lyc.* 16), and it is therefore a rhetorical exaggeration for Isocrates to make the sweeping assertion (*Panath.* § 209) that in the most ordinary education they were so backward as not even to know their letters (Schomann *Eng. tit.* p. 259). Yet the author of the *Hippias Major* (258 c) says very few Spartans understood figures (Eaton). Plato *Rep.* VIII. 548 n f. conclusively proves that they attached far greater importance to gymnastics than to music. Chamaeleon in *Athen.* IV. 184 d asserts that all the Lacedaemonians learnt flute-playing, but this cannot be accepted in the face of Aristotle's statement, c. 5 § 7 n. (1026), that they were not taught music. This disposes of Schomann's assertion to the contrary. And yet strictly speaking this would include singing as well; but the expression should probably

καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγούς ποιήσαντες, βαναύσους (III)
κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές, πρὸς ἓν τε μόνον ἔρ-
35 γον τῇ πολιτικῇ χρησίμους ποιήσαντες, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο χεῖ-
§ 7 ρον, ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, ἐτέρων. δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν προτέ-
ρων ἔργων κρίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἀνταγωνιστὰς γὰρ τῆς
παιδείας νῦν ἔχουσι, πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστέον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστέον, ὁμο- IV
40 λογούμενον ἐστίν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια
προσιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους
§ 8 ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὐξήσιν, σημείον
1339 α γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν ὅτι δύνανται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς
ἀλυμπιονίκαις δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὔροι τοὺς αὐτοὺς νενικηκότας
ἀνδρας τε καὶ παῖδας, διὰ τὸ νέους ἀσκούοντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι (p. 13
§ 9 τὴν δύναμιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων ὅταν δ' ἀφ' 3
§ 5 ἡβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γίνωνται, τότε
ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις κατα-

33 ἀπαιδαγωγούς P² Bk. Susem.¹⁻², perhaps rightly || 34 ἀπεργάζονται P¹ ||
40 μὲν omitted by Γ M², perhaps rightly, [μὲν] Susem.¹ || κουφότερα Γ M² A¹, κου-
φότερα P¹⁻² 3-4 T² V² L², κουφότερα Ald. W² || γυμνασία P², γυμνασία Γ M² T² V² Ald.
W², γυμνασί L²

1339 α 1 δύνανται Π¹ L² Ald. W², δύνανται P²⁻³ 4 S² T² Bk. || ταῖς Π² P² || 2
ἀλυμπιονίκαις P² and P³ (later hand) || ἀν' ἀνὴρ Π¹ (corrected by p¹) || 3 ἀσκούον-
τας] ἀκοντας Γ || 5 γίνονται Π¹ || 6 ἀναγκοφαγίαις] ἐρηφοφαγίαις Γ, from a gloss
which is retained as such in the margin of P² from coir.³

not be pressed. Singing, no doubt, formed part of the prescribed course of study. Many too must of their own accord have learned to play the lyre and flute, or else it would be difficult to explain how the choicest of whom Aristotle tells a story, c. 6 § 12, n. (1026), could have attained such mastery of the flute. From Aristotle's language c. 5 § 7, it may be inferred that the Spartans who simply listened to others, as well as those who could themselves play, held music to be a means of moral training, and not simply a source of pleasure and amusement. SUSEM. (1011)

33 The form ἀπαιδαγωγός appears N. E. IV. i. 36, 1121 b 11.
βαναύσους] Comp. νῆς. (102, 1004). SUSEM. (1012)

35 χεῖρον ἐτέρων] Comp. again the passages quoted in n. (1005). SUSEM. (1013)

§ 7 40 μέχρι μὲν ἡβης] Comp. Plato *Laos* VIII. 833 c: τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλή-
ματα διανοηθῆμεν, ἐν μὲν παιδικόν, ἐν δὲ

ἀγέλειαν, ἐν δὲ ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγέλειαν τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν τοῦ μήκους τοῦ δρόμου ὀψόμεν, τοῖς δὲ παιοῖ τὰ τοῦτων ἡμίσεα (Eaton). SUSEM. (1014)

To the "lighter" course are opposed the "heavy" or "violent" (*βία*) contests ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγωνίας ἐμπέδου τὰ μὲν κοῦφα ταῦτα στάδιον, δόλιχον, ὀπλί-
ται, δίαυλος, ἄλλα τὰ βαρύτερα δέ, παγ-
κράτιον, πάλιν, πέκται. πένταθλος δὲ ἀμ-
φοῖν συνηρμόσθη Philostr. *De Gymnastic.*
3. These terms are also applied to the athletes, 'heavy-weights', 'light-weights,' Galen VI. 487 K.

§ 8 1339 α 2 δύο τις ἂν ἢ τρεῖς εὔροι] The order is artistic; four short syllables
§ 9 6 ἀρμόττει] But 1338 b 3 ἀρμόζει
Π¹, ἀρμόττει Π².

ταῖς ἀναγκοφαγίαις] The compulsory diet of the athletes consisted principally of vegetable food: dried figs, porridge, cheese. Only in later times was meat allowed: Dromaeus of Sympylus in Arcadia is credited with the change, Pausan. VI. 7. 10 (according to Pliny

λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν, ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ (I) καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, τούναντίον γὰρ ἐκάτερος ἀπεργάζεσθαι πέφυκε τῶν πόνων, ἐμποδίζων ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματος πόνος τὴν διάνοιαν ὁ δὲ ταύτης τὸ σῶμα). 10 περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηγορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ 3 πρῶτον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαμβάνοντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ὡς ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται τοῖς λόγοις οὗς § 2 ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα 15 δύναμιν ἔχει ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελθεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδείας ἔνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα μέριμναν

11 διηγορήσαμεν P² Bk. || 13 ὡς M² P² Bk. || γίνηται? Susem., and so perhaps Γ Ar. || 14 εἴπειεν P², εἴπουν the other authorities || 15 δύναμιν after ἔχει P² Bk., allowing a slight hiatus (cp. 1341 b 2) || 16 ἔνεκα P², χάριν P² || 18 οὐδὲ οὐ οὔτε <τῶν καλῶν οὔτε> Reiz, rightly || ἅμα .19 αὐτῇ first use

N. H. xxiii. 7 (63). 121 and Diog. Laert. viii. 13 a traces named Pythagoras, δλεῖσθαι τὰν, not the philosopher). Cp. Favorinus in Diog. Laert. viii. 12, λελθὼν ἐξῆρας καὶ τυροῖς ὕπνῳ καὶ τυροῖς σωμασκούων. Plato Rep. iii. 404 A says that their mode of life made them sleepy, and that any deputime, however slight, from the prescribed regimen made them liable to long and serious illness. Aristotle himself states *De Gen. Animal.* iv. 3. 42, 768 b 29 ff., that a disproportionate and abnormal growth of certain parts of their bodies resulted from the large quantities of food which they consumed (Eaton). In *Problems* xxxvii. 5, 967 a 11 ff., viii. 4, 887 b 22 ff., they are described as pale and chilly (ἀχροὶ, ὀσσοί); and *Probl.* i. 28, 862 b 21 ff. it is said that athletes and all very healthy people seldom get ill, but when once they fall ill are very likely to succumb (Bonitz). With this passage generally comp. c. 4 § 1, n. (1004), iv(vii). c. 16 §§ 12, 13 n. (944) and Exc. i. p. 619. SUSEM. (1015)

7 ἅμα γὰρ. 10 σῶμα] Plato practically lays down the same principle Rep vii. 537 B. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τοῖσι τοῖς τε πόνους καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβῳ δεῖ ἂν ἐντρέχεσθαι τοὺς δεῖ φάληνται, εἰς ἀριμῶν τῶν ἐγκρίτων ... ἡλικά τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μετέχουσι. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἐάν τε δύο ἐάν τε τρία ἐτη γίνηται, ἀδυνατόν τι ἄλλο πράξει. κότος γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμοι. He differs slightly in his mode

of carrying it out, see iv(vii). 17. 15, n. (990) and Exc. i. SUSEM. (1016) cc 5—7 discuss the place of Music in education. See Anal. p. 119.

The corresponding passages in Plato are Rep. iii. 398 B—403 B, 404 B, 410 B—412 A, iv. 424 B, C, vii. 532 A; Laws ii. esp. 653—660 C, 664 B—671 A, vii. esp. 796 E—804 B, 809 B—813 A.

§ 2 11 καὶ πρῶτον] In c. 3 §§ 1—11. SUSEM. (1017)

12 καὶ νῦν ἀναλαμβάνοντας κτλ.] The discussion breaks off, c. 3 § 11, 1338 a 34 ff., with the sentence beginning νῦν δεῖ ποσοῦν ἡμῶν εἶναι πρὸ δύο ἢ γέγονεν οὗτο κτλ. See n. (1000) SUSEM. (1018)

13 ὡς] The variant ὡς M² P² is valuable for the treatment of elision and crasis in the manuscripts.

14 ἀποφαινόμενος] For the absolute use Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s. v. quotes i. 13 16, 1260 b 23, vi(iv). i. 5, 1288 b 35. With οὕτως 1289 b 5: with the direct object (τῇ αὐτῇ δέξαι), iv(vii). i. 4, 16, 1333 b 12. In II. 12. i, 1273 b 27, there is a variant.

§ 2 15 διελεῖν] As in iii. 13. 6, 1283 b 11, “decide.” Ex distinguendi significacione abut in notionem disputandi, exploiandam, explicandam: Bonitz s. v. who quotes 1299 a 12, 1300 b 18. Also iv(vii). 7. 2, 1341 b 31: but see note.

16 The first use: for amusement and recreation merely.

17 μέθης] See iv(vii). 17. 11, n. (966). SUSEM. (1019)

§ 3 παύει, ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ (IV)
 20 χρώνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνω καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ·
 τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὀρχήσιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον ἃ
 πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνει τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ
 ἢ γυμναστική τὸ σῶμα ποιοῦν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν
 24 μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιοῦν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαλ-

pected by Vettori, ἅμα παύει μέμναν Π³ P⁶ Bk.¹, avoiding hiatus, ἀναπαύει μέμναν Gotting Bk.³, not badly; ἅμα transposed by Schmidt to follow 19 διὸ καὶ: [ἅμα] here, but 19 f καὶ <ἅμα τούτοις> τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρώνται πᾶσιν [τούτοις] ὁμοίως Flach, not badly || 19 τάττουσιν <εἰς τάξιν ταῦτα τὴν> αὐτὴν Lambin, τάττουσιν αὐτὴν <ἐν παιδιᾷ> Reiz, τάττουσιν <ἐν> αὐτῇ Koras: cp. Comm. II, (1020 h) || 20 ὕπνω Ar. and a marginal note in a codex of William's translation, ὕπνω ἢ II Bk. || 21 οἰητέον (οἰητέον P⁴) after 22 μουσικὴν M² P¹, after 22 τείνει τὴ Γ || 21 ti after τείνει Γ, omitted by M² P¹ || 23 παρασκευάζει Γ M², perhaps lightly || [καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν] Flach, needlessly || 24 δύνασθαι omitted by Γ M², hence [δύνασθαι] Susem.^{1,2}

19 The quotation is from the *Bacchae* 381, ἀναπαύσαι τε μέμνας. The preceding line is μετὰ τ' αὐτῷ γελᾶσαι, and the choral ode continues ὁπότεν βότρυος ἔλθῃ | γάνος ἐν δαυτὶ θεῶν, | κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ | ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὄνουν ἐμφιβάλλῃ. SUSEM. (1020)

§ 8 διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν κατ.] The sense of this corrupt passage is quite plain. Laminus has perhaps made the best attempt at its restoration. Postgate would explain the text as it stands, taking τάττουσιν = prescribe, I recommend as in VI(IV). 2. 18: "and so it (music) is also appointed for the purpose of recreation alone, and all these things are employed in like manner." But then the words in italics have to be supplied. With Flach's transposition ἅμα τούτοις τάττουσιν = 'and so they rank music with all these, and employ them all alike.' SUSEM. (1020 b)

21 τὴν ὀρχήσιν] Reiz correctly quotes Ath. 1. 9 B ff. in illustration of the passage, but he should not have adduced *Od.* 1. 151 f., for in Homer's description of dancing and singing as "ornaments of the feast" (τὰ γὰρ τ' ἀνθήματα δαιρός) Aristotle perceives, c. 3 § 8 notes (995-998), a higher estimate of these arts as a means of refined amusement and the best intellectual enjoyment. In Ps-Plato *Alcib.* 1. 108 c the term μουσική is used in the widest sense to embrace the whole of the rhythmic arts, music, poetry, and dancing: but Plato himself only uses the word to include music and poetry. He makes dancing a part of gymnastics, *Lysis* II. 673 A, VII. 796 E, 813 A ff.; and distin-

guishes between imitative dancing and non-imitative, called 'gymnastic' dancing in the narrower sense of the term, 795 E τῆς ὀρχήσεως ἄλλη μὲν Μοῦσης λέξω μιμουμένων, ἡ δὲ μεγαλοσπεκτὸς φιλάττουσα ἅμα καὶ ἐκκόθρον, ἄλλη δὲ εὐθείας ἐλαφρότητος τε ἐνεκα καὶ κάλλους τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν (*Baton*). *Aristotle Poet.* 1. 5. 6, 1447 a 27 f. finds it necessary to lay special stress on the fact that either this first kind of imitative dancing—or artistic dancing properly so called—οἱ ἄλλοι (as I have assumed) all dancing belong, to the group of imitative arts of the rhythmical or musical class (the defective text of the *Poetics* admits of more than one explanation, and one explanation can be extracted from the words as they stand, see Vahlen *Beilage zu Arist. Poet.* 1 p. 3 [267]). As to sleep, see II. (990). SUSEM. (1021)

ἢ μᾶλλον] The second use, for moral training and formation of character, as gymnastic trains the body.

24 ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὁρθῶς] According to Aristotle's theory, which is diametrically opposed to that of Kant, moral virtue is only found where love of the good is present, and where the moral activities are really exercised with pleasure and delight. The main thing in the formation of character, as Plato teaches, *Lysis* II. 653 B, C, is to awaken and render habitual this right feeling of pleasure: see *Nic. Eth.* II. 3. 1, 1104 b 3 ff., X. 1. 1, 1172 a 10 ff., X. 9. 6 ff., 1179 b 23 ff., and below c. 6 § 17 ff. with II. (1044). Compare *Nic. Eth.* III. 9. 2 ff., 1117 a 32 ff., III. cc. 11 and 12, IV 1 § 13, 1120 a 26,

ἵσκειν ὁρθῶς, ἣ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς (IV) φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παλῶσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθισις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν τε παισὶν ἀρμόττει 30 καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐδὲ γὰρ § 5 ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἡ τῶν παι-

25 ἡ] ἡ P² Ald and P³ (late hand), ἡ <καὶ> Κοιὰς wrongly || καὶ πρὸς εὐφροσύνην Spengel, [καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν] Doing *Philologus* xxvii p. 704 f. So Heidenham (*De doctrinae artium Aristotelicae principibus* p. 49) who considers the words as a gloss upon 22 πρὸς ἀρετὴν. See Comm. n. (1013) || 29 τε παισὶν P² P³ (παι over an erasure) Bk.¹ Susem.¹ in the text, γε παισὶν P¹ Newman *Class. Rev.* vii. 305 n. 1, παισὶν M², *pueris* Wilham, [τε] παισὶν Bk.², *παισὶ* τε Flach, τοῖς παισὶν Reiz, τε <καὶ φρόνησιν> παισὶν ? Götting, ἀτέλειαν Schmidl Susem.² || 30 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν M¹ P¹, οὐδενί P² P³ Ar. Bk. Either may be right

§ 24, b 30, c. 2 § 8, 1122 b 7 f., and many other passages. In the same way the moral judgment is confused and moral perception hindered by the wrong and harmful feeling of pleasure and pain, see *Nic. Eth.* III. 4 + 4 f., 1113 a 29 ff., vi. 5, 6, 1140 b 12 ff., and even ordinary pleasures of sense, which are permissible and within due limits necessary, easily delude men into over-estimating their importance: see below § 13 f., 1339 b 31 ff., n (1039). Cp. Doing *op. c.* p. 106 f., 110 f. SUSEM. (1022)

§ 4 The third use: to promote rational enjoyment and the culture of the intelligence.

26 φρόνησιν] Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 831 b 4. φρόνησις latiore sensu, syn. γνώσις, ἐπιστήμη. The passages cited, amongst them 1388 b 22, 1289 a 12, are sufficient proof that the term is found in Aristotle with the meaning 'intellectual culture,' which is here appropriate, as well as in the kindred sense of 'knowledge' or 'science.' By this additional term Aristotle emphasizes the fact that rational activity as well as rational enjoyment is one element of our highest satisfaction: while c. 5 § 8 he can equally well emphasize the other element by inserting *ἐνημέριαν καὶ βελόν διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέρων*: see n. (1037). There is nothing therefore to justify alteration, bracketing, or transposition. Spengel's suggestion *εὐφροσύνην*, on the analogy of the second passage, is least open to objection: yet amusement, as well as music, is *εὐφροσύνη* and Aristotle would hardly have designated amusement as *ἐνημέρια*. SUSEM. (1022)

27 παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα] Comp. *Nic. Eth.* x. 6 §§ 3—8, 1176 b 6 ff.

28 μετὰ λύπης] But Happiness is οὐ μετὰ λύπης ἀλλὰ μετ' ἡδονῆς, c. 3 § 5, 1338 a 6. The inference is obvious. If learning is painful, teaching is difficult: a tacit contradiction of the Sophists' belief that education is no more than cramming: see Pl. *Rep.* 345 b, 518 c. and Aristotle's own comparison of the sale of ready-made commodities, *De Soph.* E1 33 § 17, 184 a 2—8 (Butcher). On the pleasures of learning see *Rhet.* I. 11. 21, 1371 a 31 ff., b 4 ff., also the application to art, *Poet.* c. 4 § 4, 1448 b 12 ff.

29 τε] See IV(VII). 3. 1, 1328 a 19, n.

30 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος] Doing p. 137 is right then in saying that the young are incapable of enjoying art either as an amusement (*παιδιά*) or by deriving from it the highest intellectual gratification although it is really only in the latter sense that the 'enjoyment' of art can be spoken of. For the rest of the passage cp. c. 6 § 2, n. (1063) In IV(VII). 14 § 9 ff., 15 § 1, cp. n. (903), Aristotle says intellectual training is the highest aim of education, and moral training only a means thereto; while V(VII). 3 6 he says that even for the highest intellectual gratification we need to be educated and to learn certain things, adducing (c. 3 § 2 f.) the fact that the ancients considered music in this sense a part of education: cp. n. (993), n. (1000). This inconsistency can only be reconciled by assuming (a) that in the passages from IV(VII), — *παιδευτέων* 1333 b 4, *τὴν τῶν ὁθῶν μελέτην* 1334 b 16, *τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν* 25—he does

δων σπουδὴ παιδείας εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ (IV)
τελειωθῆσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι
μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ (p. 136)
35 Μήδων βασιλεῖς, δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοῦντων μεταλαμβάνειν
§ 6 τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον
ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην
τῶν τοσούτων χρόνου ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.
εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν
40 ὄψων πραγματεῖαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν ἀλλ'
§ 7 ἄτοπον. τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη
βελτίω ποιεῖν ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ'
330^b οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὁρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν,
ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμῶς δύ-
νανται κρίνειν ὁρθῶς, ὥς φασί, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ
§ 8 χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐμε-

33 δέοι δει Π² (emended by coi¹.¹ of P¹) || 35 δι' omitted by P² Bk. || 36 καὶ
<ἀνευ> Sussem., [καὶ] Spengel, καὶ Madvig || 39 τὰ τοιαῦτα after δει Π² P² Bk. ||
40 ἂν omitted by Π¹

1339 b 1 καὶ transposed to follow δύνασθαι Spengel, perhaps rightly if § 3, a 24
δύνασθαι is to stand || 4 εἰ Π¹ P⁴, εἴη P² 3⁴ S² T^b Ar. Ald.

not use education in the exclusive sense in which it is applied to the education of the young up to their twenty-first year, and (β) that, as appears from c. 5 §§ 5, 6, π (1025), § 8, μ. (1027), § 11, μ. (1036), cp πμ. (1101, 1113), in his judgment Music, although as applied to the education of the young it directly influences character (ἦθος) only, at the same time indirectly serves to prepare them for the future enjoyment of music as a recreation and for the formation of correct musical taste. It thus would pave the way for the true artistic enjoyment of music of a high order, and consequently for that highest gratification which is to flow therefrom. See also § 7 π (1026), Εντυχισ 1, and μ. (875) on IV(vii). 13. 5. SUSSEM. (1024)

§ 5 32 παιδείας χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις] In itself this is really not inconsistent with Aristotle's own opinion: see c. 5 § 11, μ. (1036). SUSSEM. (1025)

35 βασιλεῖς] So Philip of Macedon: Plut. *Vita Pericles* c. 1, p. 152 s. f. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερεῖς ἐν τινὶ ποτὶ ψάλλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν "Οὐκ ἀσχένη καλῶς οὗτω ψάλλων," ἀρκεῖ γὰρ, ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀκροαθῶν ψάλλοντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μουσικαῖς ἐτέρον

ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεατῆς γιγνόμενος.

§ 6 37 ἀπεργάζεσθαι] The absolute use: give a performance. Note that πεποιημένους is perfect of the middle ποιέεισθαι (ἔργον).

39 τὰ τοιαῦτα] All such subjects as afford an amateur enjoyment.

40 ὄψων] We find ὀψοποιητικὴ an example I. 7. 3, 1255 b 26, and condemned as δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Comp. also III. 11. 14, 1282 a 17—23, III. 4 §§ 11—13, 1277 a 23—b 7; on the whole principle V (viii) 3 §§ 3—6.

§ 7 41 δύναται] The subject is ἡ μουσική, but to find it expressed we must return to § 3, a 22—24, though it is obscurely indicated a 37 by αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i.e. the execution.

1339 b 2 ἐκείνοι γὰρ κτλ.] See notes (1011, 1024); also c. 5 § 17 μμ. (1022, 1044, 1045). comp. c. 6 § 1 ff. with μμ (1061, 1066). SUSSEM. (1026)

§ 8 4 ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κτλ.] Here the concession already made with regard to amusement and recreation (§ 5, π. 1025) is extended to intellectual enjoyment, see μ. (1024); namely that musical instruction during youth may possibly

5 ρίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθά- (IV)
νεῖν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν· σκο-
πεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ
γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀεῖδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ
καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ
10 ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύνοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

§ 9 ἀλλ' ὥσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη V
ζήτησις ἐστὶ πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θε-
τέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παι-
14 δειὰν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται
§ 10 καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεως
ἐστὶ, τὴν δ' ἀνάπανσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδέϊαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ
διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τις ἐστίν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν
ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
19 ἡδονὴν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν).
§ 11 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φάμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψι-

6 χρωμένω] χειρουργούντων Flach || 8 ἀδεῖ P^a, ἀδεῖ Bk. || 13 παιδιὰν ἢ παι-
δεῖαν Vetton¹, παιδαρῶ ἡγῆλυ || 14 παιδιὰν] ἀρετῶν ? Jackson

serve as preparation for the elevated en-
joyment of music in later years. Cp. also
pp. (921, 1023). SUSSEX (1027)

7 ὑπόληψιν] See Bonitz ad *Meta* 1.
1. 2, 981 a 7, b 6, p. 41, p. 47 f.; Waitz
ad 66 b 19, *Org.* 1. p. 523. Such 'un-
proved assumptions,' like other *ἐνδοξα*,
contain a germ of truth.

8 ὁ Ζεὺς] Schlosser thinks that here
Aristotle has forgotten Apollo. On the
contrary the mention of Zeus, the highest
divinity, alone, is quite intentional. As
to representations of Apollo and other
gods with the cithara or lyre (cp. n.
1071), see particularly L. van Jan *De
músicis Graecorum* (Berlin 1859), pp.
17, 20 f., 24 ff. Zeus is not among the
number. SUSSEX. (1028)

ἀλλὰ καὶ κτλ.] See n. (982), Exc. 1.
to this book, and c. 6 § 4, c. 7 §§ 13, 14
with n. (1067). SUSSEX. (1029)

10 Plato *Laus* II 665 D f. πᾶς που
γενόμενος πρεσβύτερος ἄκουστος πρὸς τὰς
ψῆδας μεστὸς, καὶ χαίρει τε ἡττω πράττων
τοῦτο καὶ ἀνάγκη γενόμενος ἀσχοῦναι ἄν
μᾶλλον.

§ 9 11 ὕστερον] I.e. c. 6 § 1, 1340 b
20 ff. where this point is again taken up.
See n. (1060). SUSSEX. (1030)

13 παιδείαν] The end to which
Plato confined all poetry and all art.
see Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 317 ff.

"Aristotle allows that for childhood the
use of poetry and music is to convey
moral instruction" but "for the grown
man the poet's function is not that of a
teacher, he is only so by accident" p.
322 f

§ 10 17 ἰατρεία τις] This has been
set forth c. 3 § 4, *φάρμακας χάριν*: cp.
n. (989). SUSSEX. (1031)

18 μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν κτλ.]
The highest intellectual (or aesthetic)
enjoyment implies the highest nobleness
(τὸ καλόν), because it is the highest ac-
tivity of soul: it implies the highest plea-
sure, because from this highest human
activity flows the pleasure appropriate to
it: see n. (992) on c. 3 § 5. SUSSEX.
(1032)

19 ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων] Cp. c. 3
§§ 3, 4 (*μεθ' ἡδονῆς*), with n. (988, 991,
992): also IV (VII). 1. 6, 1323 b 1 f. τὸ
ἥν εὐδαιμόνους εἶναι ἂν τῷ χαίρειν εἶναι
ἀρετῇ εἶναι ἐν ἀμφοῖν, n. (698). SUSSEX
(1033)

§ 11 20 ψαλλῆν] Instrumental music,
unaccompanied by the voice: § 17, 1340
a 12 ff. *ἀκροῦμενοι...χωρὶς τῶν ὀργάνων καὶ
τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.*

Comp. *Nic. Eth.* 1. 9. 1, 1098 b 25,
IX. 8. 9, 1169 a 20—25: also VII. 11. 2,
1152 b 6, c. 13. 2, 1153 b 14 (Newman).

λὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι ²
βροτοῖς ἥδιστον ἀεῖδεν·

διὸ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνου-
²⁴ σιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ὑπολάβοι (p. 137)
^{§ 12} ἄν τις παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ
τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς
τὴν ἀνάπαιυσιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ὀλεγάκις γίνεσθαι, πολλακίς δὲ ἀναπαύονται
καὶ χρώνται ταῖς παιδιαῖς οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλεον ἀλλὰ καὶ
³⁰ διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη διαναπαύειν ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ

²¹ γὰρ Π¹, γούν Π² Bk., δὲ P³ || ²⁴ ὑπολάβοι after ²⁵ ἄν τις Π² P³ Bk., avoid-
ing hiatus || ²⁸ γενέσθαι ? Susem. || ²⁹ καὶ διὰ] δι' αὐτὴν Spengel, but the text
can give the same sense

²¹ Μουσαῖος] Not an historical char-
acter, but a mythical personage. Under
this name went a variety of ancient
poems, the real authors of which were
unknown, including (α) hymns—Pau-
sanias, IV. 1 4, maintain, that a hymn
to Demeter is by Musaeus, and is the
only genuine fragment of his which has
been preserved—(β) oiacular responses
(*χορημοί*); collected by Onomacritus
of Athens under the direction of
Hipparchus and esteemed of such im-
portance that Onomacritus was banished
from Athens for the interpolation of a
single line, which was discovered by
Lasus of Hermonoe: Herod. VII. 6, VIII.
96, IX. 43; also (γ) a gnomic poem ad-
dressed to his son Eumolpus, referred to
by Plato *Repub.* II. 363 C, called 'Eu-
molpia' by Pausanias, X. 5. 3, but 'Τρο-
θήκαι', 'Precepts' or 'Advice,' by Suidas.
SUSEM. (1034)

²³ διαγωγὰς] The plural has a con-
crete meaning 'social gatherings,' the
more playful forms of social intercourse,
approximating to παιδιὰς, from which δια-
γωγή is in general carefully discriminated.
Comp. *π.* (921), and *III.* 9. 13, *Nic.*
Eth. X. 6 § 3, § 8 these cited. SUSEM.
(1035)

²⁴ καὶ ἐντεῦθεν] In order that in
mature life they may find in music a
'recreation' cp c 5 § 5 with *μ.* (1024,
1025). The difficulty there raised, as to
why in that case boys should learn to
sing and play themselves, has been post-
poned for future discussion § 9, *μ.* (1030).
SUSEM. (1036)

The order of the words in Π¹ must be
modified. There is authority for ὅσοι

λάβοι τις ἂν, 1265 b 6; or we might
comp. 1277 a 32, *κάντεθεν ἂν κατέδοι*
τις. Yet as at § 14, b 39, all *μ.*, give
ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, we should probably adopt
the same order from Π² here.

§ 12 25 ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων] A Pla-
tonic conception: *Phil.* 51 A—52 B, 66 C,
Rep. II. 357 B αὶ ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς,
Laws II. 667 D, &c. The harmless plea-
sures, especially those of imitative art,
"conduce both to our great end, Happi-
ness, and to rest by the way. Few men
have the fortune to find themselves at the
goal. All, however, take frequent rest
and pastime" (Jebb).

²⁷ ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει γίνεσθαι] An un-
usual phrase, which must mean τὸ τέλος
τυχεῖν, to achieve that highest end of life.

Possibly the following is a banal view
of some encomium on music: εὐθὺς ἀπο-
λαβεῖ τῆς τέχνης ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μαρτυρεῖν, καὶ
ἅμα τε ἀρχεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐστίν, *Luc.*
De Parasito 14.

²⁹ ὅσῳ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλεον] "Not merely
for the sake of a good beyond it, but also
for the sake of the pleasure." Even the
man who spends his leisure in contem-
plative activity requires a change: the
most cultivated would then seek repose
not in difficult but in easy music, though
not perhaps such music as is described
c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 22 ff., cp *μ.* (1007—
1009). But Congreve is right in calling
attention to the fact that in *Nic.* *Eth.* X.
6. 3, 1176 b 6 ff., virtuous activities and
pleasant pastimes (αὶ ἡδέαι τῶν παιδιῶν)
are declared to be the only two things
which men pursue purely for their own
sakes and with no other end in view.
SUSEM. (1037)

- § 13 ταύτης ἡδοναῖς. συμβέβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδικὰς τέλους· ἔχει γὰρ ἴσως ἡδονήν τινα καὶ τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην, λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ταύτην ἐκείνην, διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει τῶν πράξεων
35 ἔχειν ὁμοιωμὰ τι. τὸ τε γὰρ τέλος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐσομένων χάριν αἰρετόν, καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν οὐδενὸς εἰσι τῶν

33 δὲ omitted in Π¹ (supplied by con.¹ of P¹) || 34 τῷ omitted by P⁴⁻⁶ S¹ L¹
Ald || 35 ὁμοίωμα (μὴ οὐκ εἰς εἰσιν) P², ὁμοιώματα Π²

31 ταύτης] τῆς μουσικῆς
§ 13 συμβέβηκε δὲ κτλ.] "It is incident to men to regard their pastimes as an end." The expression might have been altered slightly for clearness: 'but perhaps it is not right to do what is so often done, that is, to make amusements the end of life.' SUSSEX. (1037 b) The verb συμβαίνειν has before been used of awkward consequences which overtake an argument or an opponent. II. 3 5, 1263 b 4, II. 5 10, 1263 b 7.

32 ἔχει γὰρ. 37 λύπη] "The true end, no doubt, is sought with pleasure too,—though not of the commonplace sort. Pursuing the commonplace pleasure, men mistake it for the true pleasure, because it is a faint image of that to which all their actions tend. The true end is desirable independently of things to come after it. So it is with pleasures of this sort; they are desirable independently of what may come after them, and solely on account of what has gone before them, such as toil or pain" (Jebb).

With οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν cp. IV(VII). 9 8, 1328 b 17 (where πᾶσις οὐ τὸ τυχόν does not mean an extraordinary number, but a number definitely defined) and *Post.* c. 16 § 15, 1462 b 13, δὲ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποποιίαν) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην. Take τῶν πράξεων with τέλος. often in *N. E.* τῶν πρακτικῶν τέλος. Pleasures are πόνων ἑνεκον, because § 10, b 16 f., they heal the pain which comes of toils: in Pindar's words ἀριστος εὐφροσύνη πόνων κεκμημένων ἰατρὸς *Nem.* IV. 1: ἐκέρσσει τὴν λύπην· καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὐσης ἰατρίας, τὴν ἡδονὴν δύνανται *N. E.* VII. 14. 4, 1154 a 37 f.

34 διὰ τὸ τῷ τέλει ἔχειν ὁμοιωμὰ τι] One consequence of the similarity here explained is that men forget the essential difference, viz. that the higher intellectual pleasure contains its end in itself, whilst ordinary sensuous pleasure, so far as it is

harmless and necessary, has its end in recreation, becoming (when used at the right time and in moderation) something positively useful and not merely harmless. Cp. c. 3 §§ 1—4 with *N.* (988). Doing *op. c. p.* 107 f. points out the apparent inconsistency with the parallel passage *Nic. Eth.* X. 6. 6, 1176 b 27 ff., quoted in that note, but without attempting to clear it up. In the *Ethics* Aristotle says: Happiness does not consist in amusement. For amusement is closely connected with recreation, and man needs recreation because he is not capable of supporting unbroken exertion. Consequently recreation is not an end but a means to activity *οὐκ ἐν παύσει ἀρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ἀποποντὸν τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδιάν, καὶ πραγματευέσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παιζέω χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰσὶν ἐτέρου ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τέλος γὰρ αὐτῆς. σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδικὰς χάρας ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λανθάνον. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζειν, κατ' ἀνάγκην, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ εἰκοεν ἡ παιδικὰ· ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεις δέονται. οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας* Here the end of recreation is said to consist in the work to be done, not the work already done, and rightly enough: recreation is naturally to lead from the labour of the past to new labours. But although a man may know this very well, nevertheless, in the midst of recreation (if it is to be a real and enjoyable rest) he will forget the fact, and without any thought of future labour give himself up entirely to a feeling of satisfaction at having happily ended the past toils, for which the present holiday is a recompense and restorative. This appears to me to be the idea which Aristotle wishes to express in the *Politics* in contradistinction to the idea in the *Ethics*. Cp. also *N.* (1143). SUSSEX. (1038)

ἐσομένων ἔσκεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν γεγονότων, οἷον πόνων καὶ λύ- (V)
 14 πης. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ζητοῦσι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν γίνε-
 σθαι διὰ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν, ταύτην εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπο-
 40 λάβοι τὴν αἰτίαν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνοῦν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ
 διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς
 15 τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὥς ἔοικεν. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε
 40 τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ
 κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρεῖαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς
 ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσιν πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει
 γὰρ ἢ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις
 5 καὶ πᾶσιν ἦθεσιν ἢ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλής), ἀλλ'
 ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν.
 16 τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοῖ τινας τὰ ἦθη γινόμεθα δι'

37 οἷον omitted by Π¹ (supplied by corr.¹ in P¹), [οἷον] Suscm.¹ perhaps rightly
 || 39 εἰκότως αἰτεῖ ἂν τις Π¹ P⁵ Bk. || 40 τὴν αἰτίαν transposed by Flach to follow
 41 μόνον || 41 διὰ...42 ἔοικεν supposed to be defective. [διὰ] Spengel: Syllab
 conjectured a lacuna after 42 ἀναπαύσεις, Κοινὰς one after 42 ἔοικεν, Schmidt the loss
 of <φαίαν ἂν δαῖν> before 41 διὰ τὸ, Suscmihl of <φιλῶσιν αὐτῇ> after 41 μόνον.
 Yet it may be sufficient to understand ζητοῦσιν (αὐτῇ) from the preceding || <πάν-
 των μέλησιν> χρήσιμον or χρησιμώτατον Flach, perhaps rightly

1340 a 1 ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν P¹, ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ M² Suscm.¹⁻² || 6 πῃ] τ P¹ and
 P⁴ (corrector) || The second πρὸς is omitted by M² P¹, [πρὸς] Suscm.¹, perhaps rightly

§ 14 38 δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν κατ.] See
 § 3, 1339 a 24 f. n. (1022). SUSCM. (1039)
 Notice the repetition of αἰτίαν, and the
 omission of a verb with περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοι-
 νοῦν. It is best with Flach to repeat
 εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι, understanding
 ζητεῖσθαι or γίνεσθαι. See *Quaest. crit.*
coll. p. 419.

§ 15 42 μὴ ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέ-
 βηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' κατ.] For the use of
 μὲν=while, see n. (982) on c. 2 § 5, 1337
 b 15. "Let it be granted (that such ser-
 vice is incidental to Music. Still we must
 ask,—Does not the nature of Music range
 above this sphere of service?" (Jebb).
 The real complement to ζητητέον is the
 clause introduced by δέ.

1340 a 3 ἔχουσιν αἰσθησιν]=αἰσθά-
 νοῦνται Γ. 2 12, 1253 a 17.

4 διὸ πᾶσαις προσφιλῆς] Cp. c. 6
 § 8, 1341 a 15, τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, n.
 (1069). SUSCM. (1040) The pleasure is
 natural, i.e. it is κατὰ φύσιν. In this sense
 used of self-love II. 5. 8, 1263 b 1; and
 III. 6. 5, 1278 b 30.

6 εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει]
 "Whether Music has not somehow a
 bearing on the character." So c. 6 § 7,

1341 a 10.

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν] Evidently an
 emphatic expression, 'the soul's depths,'
 'the inmost soul.' For as the mere
 pastime of recreation music also affects
 the soul: it is the soul and not the body
 which feels pleasure [cp. *N. E.* x. 6. 3,
 1173 b 10, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν
 καὶ ἦδοιτο τὸ σῶμα ἄρα· οὐ δοκεῖ δέ]. Cp.
 n. (1043). But the transition is abrupt.
 After the preceding comparison between
 this sensuous pleasure and the highest con-
 templative enjoyment of elevated mental
 satisfaction, it is strange to find that
 nothing is said about the latter as an
 effect of music, but the question is raised,
 whether Music is capable of producing a
 higher ethical delight, as well as διαγωγή;
 and whether it is thus qualified to pro-
 mote the moral education of the young:
 for it is this with which Aristotle in the
 context is chiefly concerned. SUSCM.
 (1041)

§ 16 7 ποιοῖ τινας τὰ ἦθη] So c. 6
 § 16, 1341 b 18, ποιοῖν τινας τὰ σώματα.
 Cp. also II. 5. 23, 1264 a 39, where τὸ
 ποιοῖν τινας εἶναι τοῦτους=whether they
 are to be communists or not. The idiom

αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γινόμεθα ποιοὶ τινες, φανερόν διὰ τῶν πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους § 17 πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκρωμένον τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν· ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκε τὴν μουσικὴν εἶναι τῶν ἡδέων, (p 138) τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, <καὶ> δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ μαυθάνειν καὶ συνειθίζεσθαι μηδὲν οὕτως ὥς

8 ποιοί...9 δὲ καὶ omitted by P^o S³ T^o Ar. Ald. and P³⁻⁴ (1st hand, supplied in the margin of P⁴ and by a later hand in the margin of T⁴, afterwards erased) || φανερόν] δῆλον P^o || 9 ἐτέρων] ἄλλων P^o || 12 ἐτι δὲ] ἐπειδὴ Susem. who transposes 12 ἐπειδὴ...14 αὐτῶν to follow 23 τοιαύτων, a transposition approved by Spengel: see *Introd.* p. 90 || 14 ἐπεὶ δὲ] ἐτι δὲ with a change in the punctuation (a series of separate clauses replacing the one long protasis); or if the punctuation be retained, ἐτι δὲ <ἐπεὶ>? Susem || τὴν μουσικὴν αἰτεῖ εἶναι Π² P^o Bk. || 16 καὶ added by Susem. || δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ Γ P^o, δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι Bk., δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι M² Π² Ar and P¹ (corr.), δηλονότι P¹ (1st hand)

is used to include two alternatives, e.g. πότερον πρῶτον ἢ ὀργαῖοι, ἀνδρείοι ἢ δειλοί (Newman).

9 διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν] On this exciting ecstatic music, see Excursus II. p. 621 and c. § 74, 132 a 2, 8, 11. SUSEM. (1042)

10 ταῦτα γὰρ κτλ.] "It is undeniable that they rouse the soul to ecstasy, but ecstasy is an emotional state of the moral nature." On ecstasy and ungoeyable excitement generally as wrought by Greek music, see Excursus III. p. 622 ff. SUSEM. (1043)

§ 17 The clause ἐτι δὲ...αὐτῶν is not a further reason for inferring ποιοὶ τινες διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι it gives the ground for the reason already alleged in § 16. If the melodies of Olympus inspire ecstasy, that is because they express ecstasy: quod ihythmis et modulationibus eundem animi affectum exprimebant. And why does such an effect follow upon such a cause? 'Quia eodem omnino semper in auditibus omnibus excitant affectus, qui eis exprimentur, ihythmi atque modulationes': *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 420. Hence ἐτι requires emendation, and the whole clause finds a better place below. There is no difficulty in taking χωρὶς as an adverb: apart from the words, when the performance is instrumental solely (ψαλῇ). SUSEM. There is possibly a laconic correction of Plato who in *Laus* II. 669 κ condemns instrumental music

without words: ἐν οἷς δὲ παγκάλεσεν ἀνευ λόγου γινόμεσθαι ῥυθμῶν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας γινώσκων, ὅ τί τε βούλεται καὶ δοῦναι τοῖς ἀξιολόγοις μιμήσασθαι.

14 ἐπεὶ δὲ...13 γόνος] This is all one pointous period (*monstrum period*), perhaps the most extended in Aristotle, employed to formulate the second reason for the inference ποιοὶ τινες διὰ τῆς μουσικῆς γίνεσθαι.

The first clause ἐπεὶ...τῶν ἡδέων finds an echo § 25, 1340 b 15—17. The succeeding clauses are continually interrupted by parenthetical remarks: still the logical connexion, if harder to detect in a 14—18, is plain for the remaining links of the chain. Music can give most realistic imitations (ὑμῶματα) of certain feelings, love, hatred, courage, temperance, § 18; habituation to feel pleasure in the imitation tends to create sympathy with the realiter, § 19: it is peculiar to the sense of hearing that it can thus be the channel of a moral imitation (forms and colours are not expressions but only symbols, σημεῖα), §§ 20, 21: melodies are imitative expressions of character, § 22: hence, there is a definite affection of the soul produced by music, and if the music be rightly chosen it can be used to educate the moral nature, § 23.

15 τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν...μισεῖν] With this and what follows comp. π. (1022). Observe that moral, not intellectual, virtue is here intended. SUSEM. (1044)

16 δεῖ μαυθάνειν κτλ.] "and clearly

τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἡθεσι καὶ (V)
 18 ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν, ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ
 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς
 20 καὶ πραότητος ἔτι δ' ἀνδρίας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων
 τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον δ' ἐκ
 22 τῶν ἔργων μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι
 τοιούτων, 12 <ἐπειδὴ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μιμήσεων γίνονται
 13 <πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν
 19 <αὐτῶν>), 23 ὁ δ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ

12 ἐπειδὴ Susem., ἐτι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text. See *Comm. crit. coll.* p. 419 f. || ἀκροώμενοι untranslated by William, *ῥωόμενοι* omitted by the 1st hand of M¹, leaving a lacuna, supplied by a later hand || 13 τῶν before ῥυθμῶν omitted by Γ and M¹ (1st hand, supplied by a later hand), <τῶν λόγων διὰ> τῶν ²Susem.¹⁻², *πειθαρχῶς* rightly

no study, no self-discipline is so important as that of rightly judging and rejoicing aight in worthy characters and noble actions." Evidently the term *μανθάνειν* is used in a narrower sense here for the development of the intellect. Although we are only concerned with the education of ἦθος, character, still no ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ, no moral virtue = excellence of character, exists apart from φρόνησις, practical wisdom or insight, and the converse is true, *Nic. Eth.* VI c. 12 § 8—c. 13 § 6, 1144 n. 20—b 32. Also there is no true pleasure apart from a right moral and aesthetic judgment. But judging is a function of the intellect and not of the will. Comp. also c. 5 § 7, *N.* (1026), c. 6 §§ 1—4, *III.* (1061, 1066), and Excursus I. SUSEM. (1045)

17 τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς] Cp. *Nic. Eth.* X. 9 20, 1181 a 17 ff.: ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικῆν. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἑκάστα κρίνουσι ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα (results: in music, the performers).

χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν καὶ] Comp. *n* (1101), i.e. Excursus V. SUSEM (1046)

§ 18 However true it is that melody has an emotional import, a comparison of popular airs soon reveals a wide diversity in the means employed for its expression. Even in the rendering of joy and melancholy different races may be altogether opposed. Some prefer minor keys for joyous airs.

19 τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις] The real things, objects. As in 1256 b 14, γάλακτος φύσιν (see *n*), the content of φύσις is greatly reduced.

21 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν] Music can

give the fullest expression to all the moral virtues and vices, and to all the emotions without exception, e.g. fear and pity. Such is Aristotle's view (*Liberai*). Cp. Excursus III. and *n*. (1089). SUSEM (1047)

§ 19 Aristotle fully believes, as Plato had done before him, that an educated ear and correct musical taste are no inconsiderable aids to a right discipline of the emotions. On the other hand, the Epicurean Philodemus maintains a negative attitude to all the fundamental propositions of the Peripatetics and Stoics, respecting Music. He appears to be controveiting in his *De Musica* the arguments of Theophrastus and Diogenes of Babylon. He denies that Music is μίμησις and musical strains ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἡθῶν. He further denies that music can effect any change in character; fi. 55 Kemke τὰς δὲ μιμήσεις.. αὐτὸ πως ἀγειν καὶ κτείνε] τὸ πάθος ὥστ' ἐπεί καὶ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα τῇ] μουσικῇ καὶ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι ἐπ' αὐτῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν [ἐπι]φελὲς τῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ [με]τὰ τῶν μικρῶν μιμητικῶν] τῶν, διεφθαρμένων ἐδείκνυμεν, αὐτο B. IV. col. III. 23 ff. οὐδὲ γὰρ μιμητικὴν ἢ μουσικὴν, καθάπερ τινὲς ἀνειμῶντοισιν, οὐδ' ὅς.. οὗτοι [Diogenes, the Stoic] ὁμοίωτας ἡθῶν οὐ μιμητικὰς μὲν εἶχει, πάντως δὲ πᾶσας τῶν ἡθῶν ποιότητας ἐπιφαίνεται τοιαύτας ἐν αἷς ἐστὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ταπεινὴ καὶ ἀνδρῶδες καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ κόσμων καὶ θρασυ, μᾶλλον ἤπερ ἡ μαγικὴ (Kemke's restoration *De Musica* p. 65) Though we too have the saying, 'Let me make the songs of a country, and I care not who makes its laws,' the belief in a peculiar ethical influence of music is quite

χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν (V)
 25 τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ
 δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον
 20 τοῦτω καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,
 ἡδεῖαν εἶναι), συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς
 30 ἀπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἡρέμα
 (σχήματα γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθή-
 σεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα
 ὁμοιώματα [τῶν ἡθῶν], ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γινώμενα

27 καὶ κατ' M¹ P¹, καθ' Γ || αὐτὴν Γ, αὐτοῦ Αι. Lambin Scaliger Bk.², perhaps
 lightly || ἐκείνου Lambin Scaliger Bk.², perhaps lightly || οὐ after τὴν εἰκόνα M¹
 P¹ (thus causing hiatus). William translates 27 καὶ αὐτὴν . 28 εἶναι in this order:
illam visionem, cuius videt imaginem secundum se esse delectabilem || 32 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ
 μικρόν after 31 τοιαῦτα Γ Π Αι Bk. Susem.¹, transposed to follow 32 κοινωνοῦσιν by
 Spengel, Susem.²⁻³. Ed. Müller (pp. 348—353) discovered the ε101, but conjectured
 <οὐ> πάντες without any transposition. Welldon transposes 31 καὶ πάντες...
 32 κοινωνοῦσιν to precede 28 συμβέβηκε, wrongly || ἐτι δὲ Γ Π Αι. Bk. Susem.¹,
 ἐτι δὲ Heidenhain *op. cit.*, ἐπειδὴ Susem.², see Comm. n. (1050) || 33 [τῶν ἡθῶν]
 Flach Susem.²

foreign to the modern world. In fact, we suspect it to be based on an exaggerated estimate of the influence music has in its own sphere.

27 τὴν θεωρίαν (ἐκείνου) οὐ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ: the contemplation of the original must also give him delight.

§ 20 This is maintained even more strongly in the *Problems*: XIX. 29, 920 a 3, διὰ τὶ οἱ βυβλῶν καὶ τὰ μέλη φωνῇ οὕτω ἡθεῖον ἔχουσιν; ἢ ὅτι καθύστερ εἰσὶν ὡς περ καὶ πράξεις; ἥδη δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια ἡθῶν καὶ ποιεῖ ἥθος: 50 XIX. 27, 919 b 26 ff., esp. b 35 αὖ δὲ καθύστερ αὐταὶ πρακτικαὶ εἰσιν, αὖ δὲ πράξεις ἡθῶν σημασία ἐστίν. This points to an exaggeration of the rhythmical element: see Butcher *op. c.* p. 271 ff. Ordered movements reproduce the moral life which is itself an activity, i.e. a movement.

29 τοῖς ἡθεῖον For the meaning see Exc. III. p. 622 ff. Comp. also generally n. (1084). SUSEM. (1048)

30 ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς We may translate "The objects of sight do indeed, in a slight degree, [present] an image of moral affections"—since forms have this moral suggestiveness, and the perception of it is universal, though it does not go far. Besides, these forms are not *images* [of moral character]; forms and colours are rather symbols of the characters on

which they usually attend." It is not a little surprising to be told that the strongest impressions are not conveyed through the eye, but through the ear.

31—32 The words ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν are a poor qualification of τοιαῦτα, which they follow in the MSS. Moreover the next sentence needs some limitation, which fact led E. Müller to alter to οὐ πάντες. The slight transposition makes all right.

31 σχήματα There is no word which denotes all that is signified by σχήματα, viz. forms, gestures, bodily motions generally, including figures and attitudes in dancing (cp. σχηματίζειν). Statuaria, it should be remembered, imitates by forms only: painting by forms and colours, *Inst. a.* i § 4, 1447 a 18 ff. with n. (4) of my edition. Cp. also Athen. XIV. 629 b, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων θεμιουργῶν ἀγάλματα τῆς παλαιᾶς ὀρχήσεως λεγόμενα. SUSEM. (1049)

32 ἐτι δὲ To make this a second point of dissimilarity is awkward. The slight alteration to ἐπειδὴ makes it the explanation of the preceding unlikeness. SUSEM. (1080)

οὐκ ἐστι..ὁμοιώματα..ἀλλὰ σημεῖα "Painting and sculpture working in an inert material cannot indeed reproduce the life of the soul in all its variety and successive manifestations. In their living

§ 21 σχήματα καὶ χρώματα τῶν ἡθῶν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ (V)
 35 σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ
 περὶ τὴν τούτων θεωρίαν, δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσανος θεωρεῖν τοὺς
 νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γρα-

34 σχήματα omitted by S^b T^b and P⁴ (1st hand, added in the margin) || τὰδ' ἢ
 Π³ P³ Ar Bk, ταὐτ' Doring (*Kunstlehre des Aristot.* p. 151) wrongly || ἀπὸ ἐπὶ Π³
 P³ Bk. and p¹ in the margin || 36 παύσανος P³ S^b S^d S^b T^b L¹ Ald. and P⁴ (1st hand)

and arrested movement they fix eternally the feeling they portray. Still shape and line and colour even here retain something of their significance, and their meaning is helped out by symmetry, which in the arts of repose answers to rhythm." Butcher, *Some Aspects* p. 274 ff. The element lacking in painting and sculpture, but present in music, has been called "ideal motion." Plato, *Phaedrus* 250 A ff. makes the most luscious copies of the ideas to be apprehended by sight: Thompson *ad loc.*, "by ὅσα τίματα ψυχᾷς he seems to mean *moral* ideas, among which he proceeds to show that beauty alone has its clear antitype on earth."

34 χρώματα] Blushing and paleness would serve for examples, *Nic. Eth.* IV. 9. 2, 1128 b 11 ff. (E. Müller). SUSSEX. (1061)

καὶ τοῦτ' ὅσον πάθεσιν] I.e. in a state of emotion a man reveals his inner self by his outward appearance. These words are incorrect, explained by Doring *op. cit.* p. 150 f. and the text is slightly altered by him to suit the meaning. But he does well in calling attention to the fact that, whilst Aristotle rightly enough makes music and the creative arts excite in the spectator the same states and processes of feeling as are represented, on the other hand the emotions evoked by tragedy and epic poetry are fear and pity, the object for representation in both kinds of poetry being that which excites fear or pity (*Poet.* c. 11 § 4, c. 14 § 1), just as in comedy it is that which excites laughter (*γέλοισιν*, *Poet.* c. 5 § 1). Yet Aristotle nowhere expressly adds:—"and not fear or pity itself," or "and not that emotion itself which finds expression in laughter;" he nowhere expressly speaks of a difference in this respect between Tragedy, Epic Poetry, and Comedy on the one hand, and Sculpture, Painting, and Music on the other. It is therefore very doubtful whether he was ever conscious of this contrast, and Doring seems to have been the first to follow up this idea, suggested by Aristotle. However,

both Aristotle, in assigning to tragic and epic poetry as their only result the excitement of pity and fear, and Doring in insisting upon the difference between poetry and the imitative arts, have overlooked their similarity. Do we not, apart from fear and pity, take pleasure in the noble and high-minded characters brought before us? Does not the overpowering pathos of the emotions they exhibit take us out of ourselves, inspiring us with a faint measure of similar feelings? Take the charming scenes between Odysseus and Nausicaa, which form an essential part of the plot: what have they to do with fear and pity? Their charm consists rather in the vividness with which they call up before us the noble disposition of the maiden in all its shrewdness and naiveté, its natural innocence and sprightliness, and the hero's feelings under this severest test of his constancy, with the manly spirit, at once firm and tender, which he displays on this occasion. SUSSEX. (1062)

36 δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσανος...ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου] Polygnotus of Thasos, the creator of the 'art' of Greek painting, flourished after the Persian wars. Cimon brought him to Athens, and he became an Athenian citizen. Thus his work falls in that stirring period of all the rapidly unfolding promise of Attic art. Pausan was rather younger, as he is often ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Ach.* 854, *Thesm.* 949, *Plut.* 606. See *Poet.* c. 2 § 1, 1448 a 5 f. Πολυγνώτου μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσανος δὲ χειρότεροι, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἰκαζεν' the one was a master of ideal representation, the other of caricature. In *Poet.* c. 6 § 15, 1450 a 26 ff. οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφένων Ζεῦσις πρὸς Πολυγνώτου πένοντες' ὁ μὲν γὰρ II. ἀγαθὸς ἡθογρόφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεῦσιδος γραφὴ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἥδοι, Polygnotus is held up for praise in contrast to Zeuxis. It would seem his strength lay in the portraiture of characters and that he drew noble characters. We see then that a 38 ἡθικός must be understood in the sense proposed Exc. III.

φῆων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλατοποιῶν ἐστιν ἡθικός), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέ-
 § 22 λειν αὐτοῖς ἐστι μμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανε-
 40 ρόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούον-
 τας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον

41 ἔχειν after τρόπον P¹ and perhaps Γ, ἔχει P⁴

n. (1043) p. 624. As the originator of that 'ethical' style, pure and self-contained, of which the Parthenon frieze is the highest embodiment, Polygnotus, "the Raphael of antiquity," takes the same rank among painters as Pheidias among sculptors. Pausan however was not piecely a caricaturist, but he delighted in comic scenes of deformity and crime, on satirical pictures of low and vulgar subjects. As regards both painters, see Bünn *Gesch. des griech. Künstler* II⁴ pp. 14—46, 49—51; Vahlen *Aristoteles Lehre der Rangfolge der Theile Tragödie* in *Symb. Philol. Bonn* p. 159 ff. Comp. also IV (VII) 17, 10 with n. (963) and *Introd.* p. 52. SUBEM. (1068)

38 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλειν αὐτοῖς καὶ] "Melodies on the other hand contain in themselves imitations of character." Ptole. Butcher has written an able commentary on this *op.* c. p. 267 ff. Premising that upon the Aristotelian conception of fine art as *μίμησις* "a work of art is a copy or likeness of an original, and not a symbolic representation of it," he shows that "the various arts reflect the image from without by different means, and with more or less clearness and directness. Music in most of its forms was, by Aristotle, as by the Greeks generally, regarded as the most 'imitative' of the arts. It is a direct image, a copy, a reflection, of character. . . Not only states of feeling but also strictly ethical qualities and dispositions of mind are reproduced by musical imitation, and on the close correspondence between the copy and the original depends the importance of music in the formation of character." He forcibly contrasts the exactly opposite modern view. "We generally think of music quite otherwise. The emotion it suggests, the message it conveys, corresponds but little with a reality outside itself. It is capable of expressing general and elementary moods of feeling, which will be variously interpreted by different hearers. It cannot render the finer shades of extra-musical emotion with any degree of certainty and precision. Its expressive power, its capacity to reproduce independent realities, is weak in proportion

as the impression it produces is vivid and definite."

§ 22 40 ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν φύσις] Besides its general meaning of 'music,' 'musical sounds' (for which see § 25 below; the soul assumed to be a 'harmony') *ἁρμονία* has a special musical signification: scale, octave, definite succession of notes. Unfortunately 'harmony' in modern music has totally different associations; as a technical term in music it denotes the 'combination of simultaneous sounds' or parts—in fact, part-writing, something almost (not quite) unknown to Greek musicians, for which their word is *συμφωνία*. The best rendering for the technical term *ἁρμονία* is not 'key' or 'scale', but Mode, a term which still survives in musical treatises where Major or Minor scales are more correctly designated scales 'in the Major or Minor mode.' Comp the Miltonic description of the Dorian Mode, *Paradise Lost* I, 550 ff. 'to the Dorian mood | Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised | To heights of noblest temper heroes old | Aiming to battle, and instead of rage | Deliberate valour breathed, firm and unmoved | With dread of death to fight or foul retreat; | Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage, | With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase | Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain' See further EXCURSUS IV on Greek Music generally, p. 624 ff. SUBEM. (1054) Trans. "So essentially distinct in nature are the several musical modes that they produce a corresponding variety of mood and do not affect the hearers alike. Some, like the mixolydian, cast us into grief and gloom; others, the relaxed modes, soften the spirit; another will produce a sober and sedate flame of mind, an effect which seems peculiar to the Dorian mode; while the Phrygian excites to ecstasy." For the non-musical reader we may sum up thus: the Dorian was the old national minor scale of Greece; the Lydian and Phrygian two foreign major scales (from a modern standpoint abnormal), borrowed from their neighbours by the Greeks of Asia.

πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως (V)
 1340^b καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μίξολυδιστὶ καλου-
 μένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς
 τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς
 4 ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἢ δωριστὶ μόνῃ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθου- (P. 1)
 § 23 σιαστικούς δ' ἢ φρυγιστὶ—ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ ὅ
 τὴν παιδεῖαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ
 μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων—, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἔχου-
 9 σιν ἥθος στασιμώτερον οἳ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἳ μὲν

1340^b : *συνεστηκώς* T^a (1st hand), *συντετηκώς* Madvig, *συννεοφώς* Schmidt
 || *μικολυδιστὶ* M^a and perhaps Γ. Similarly b 4 *δωριστὶ* M^a P⁴ S^b T^b and perhaps
 Γ || 5 *φρυγιστὶ* S^b T^b M^a (1st hand) and perhaps Γ || 6 *παιδεῖαν* Ar., *παιδῖαν* Γ Π
 || 7 δὲ Π¹ P¹ P¹ 1815, 3042, γὰρ Π² P² Bk., untranslated by Ar. || 8 τὰ omitted by Π² P²
 and P¹ (1st hand, supplied by corr.¹), untranslated by A¹, [τὰ] Bk.² || *ἐχουσι* after
 9 ἥθος Π² P² Bk.

1340^b 1 *συνεστηκώς*] Affect the spirit with restraint, 'oppressively' For this effect of the mixo-Lydian mode Plato vouches and accordingly banishes it, *Rēp* 308 D f. *τίνας δὲ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας, Μίξολυδιστὶ, ἔρη, καὶ συντολυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαυτὰς τίνας. Ὀδοῦν αὐταί, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀφαιρέται· ἄχρηστοί γὰρ καὶ ἡνωαῖν, ἃς δὲ ἐπεικέεις εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι.*

2 *τὴν διάνοιαν*] Not the subject of the infinitive (*ἔχουσι* or *διατίθενται*) but the adverbial acc. after it.

3 *τὰς ἀνειμένας*] The modes called here "relaxed" are obviously those which Plato calls *χαλαραί*, *Rēp*. 308 E: *τίνας οὖν μαλακαί τε καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιών; Ἰαστί, ἣν δ' ὅς, καὶ λυδιστί, αἵτινες χαλαραὶ καλοῦνται.* The terms refer to pitch. *ἀνειμένη* (*χαλαρά*) = low, low-pitched, *σύντονος* = high, high-sung. See *Pistinas Frag.* 5. *μήτε σύντονον δίκαι, μήτε τὰν ἀνειμέναν Ἰαστί μουσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν... τῶν ἁρμονῶν αἰδίδιζε τῷ μέλει... πρέπει τοι πᾶσαν δοῖν αὐτὰ λαβράκτας Διολίς ἁρμονία* (Athen. xiv. 624 f). Plainly the Aeolian mode or 'key' is described as intermediate to 'high-pitched Ionian,' and 'low Ionian.'

§ 23 5 *οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδεῖαν ταύτην π.*] Amongst others, no doubt, Aristotle refers to Damon mentioned in *π.* (1054), i.e. *Exc.* iv p. 630, whose inquiry into the different effects (*ἥθος* and *ῥυθμός*) of the various modes and rhythms, probably a special work on the subject, is quoted as an authority by Plato *Rēp.* 111.

400 B (cp. iv 424 C). Also to the author of that arrangement of the Modes which he has adopted c. 7 § 3, (?) Aristoxenus, see *π.* (1082); probably also to his fellow-pupil Heraclides of Iliaclea in the Pontus Athen. xiv. 624 c, who preferred to call the three chief Modes by Greek names, Dorian, Aeolian, Ionian. Damon was also a politician, an associate of Peucles; most probably it was he who started the idea of providing pay for the Dicasts and Bouleutae (*μισθὸς δικαστικός, μ. βουλευτικός*), as Wilamowitz *Hermes* XIII. 1880, p. 318 ff. has shown. Cp. II. 12. 4, n. (408). See *Ἀθ. Πोल.* c. 27 § 4, p. 76, 5 ed. Kenyon: *πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὴν χορηγίαν (sc. τὴν Κίμωνος) ἀπολειπόμενος τῇ οὐσίᾳ, συμβουλευόντος αὐτοῦ Δαμωνίδου τοῦ Οἰθῆεν (ὃς ἐδίδκει τῶν πολιτικῶν εἰσηγητῆς εἶναι τῷ Περικλεῖ, διὰ καὶ ὑστέρησαν αὐτὸν ὄστερον), ἐπέτι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἡντιῦτο δίδναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰ αὐτῶν, κατεσκεύασε μισθοφόρον τοῖς δικασταῖς: also *Phae.* 364, 365 Rose in *Plut. Per.* c. 4, c. 9 and *Plut.* l.c. c. 4, Steph. Byz. s.v. *Ὀα. SUSEM.* (1055)*

Plutarch however may have confused Damon the musician with a Damonides, the politician (Gomperz).

7 *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κτλ.*] "As with the different Modes, so is it with the different times or measures. Some measures have rather a grave character, some a brisk one: of the latter, again, the movements are sometimes less, sometimes more refined." On Rhythms in Greek Music, see *Exc.* iv. p. 632. *SUSEM.* (1056)

- 10 φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας), (V)
 17 <καὶ τις εἶκοι συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις καὶ
 18 <τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν, οἱ
 124 19 <μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν)>· ἐκ
 11 μὲν οὖν τούτων φανερόν ἐστι δύναται ποιεῖν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
 12 ἥθους ἢ μουσικῆ παρασκευάζειν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν,
 13 δὴλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.
 § 25 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρμόττουσα πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλικαύτην ἡ δι-
 15 δασκαλία τῆς μουσικῆς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν
 ἀνῆδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἐκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν

10 *ἐλευθεριωτέρας* apparently Γ Ar. || 17 *καὶ τις* 19 *ἀρμονίαν* transposed by Böckel to follow 10 *ἐλευθεριωτέρας*. See *Introd.* p. 90 || 17 *cognatio ad animam* one codex of William's translation, as if Γ had <πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν> ταῖς ἀρμονίαις || 18 <ἡμῶν> εἶκοι Ar. <μετὰ τῇ ψυχῇ> εἶκοι Coning, <πρὸς ἡμᾶς> εἶκοι Reiz, <πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν> εἶκοι Bk.², adopting another conjecture of Reiz, perhaps the best || 14, ἔστι Γ P², ἔστι P¹, ἔχει all other authorities || γὰρ Suscm., δὲ Γ II Ai. Bk. Suscm.¹ in the text || ἀρμόττουσα P⁴ L² Ald. || 16 *ἀν ἡδυνων* P¹, *ἀν ἡ δυνατῶν* P¹ L²

17 *καὶ τις εἶκοι* 19 *ἀρμονίαν* The transposition is recommended by Böckel for the simple reason that the words in the traditional order do not suitably follow on the remarks immediately preceding, that music is adapted for the education of the young. If we could be certain that Aristotle always fitted in his notes at the right point, and never turned back to a subject he had just dismissed, this would be ample justification: see Böckel's own remarks p. 32 (cited above *Introd.* p. 95 n. 5).

17 *συγγένεια* Butcher compares Pl. *Tim.* 47 B, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φάρμα ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ περιόδοις 'Musical tones and measures have a certain affinity'—the context plainly shows the meaning to be 'with the soul' but the extraordinary brevity and allusiveness of Aristotle's style seem to have permitted the ellipse. The Aristotelian text books, ἐκ κατὰ φιλοσόφων λόγων, were composed, it should be remembered, for the members of the school; in their peculiar terminology, Diels observes, they resemble a system of shorthand to which only the pupils possess the key: and he compares (alen *De sophism.* xiv. 585 K. *σημῆες δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο τάχος τῷ φιλοσώφει καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σημείων ἐκφέρειν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀκηκόοντας ἡδὲ γράφειν*).

18 *πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν* This was a Pythagorean doctrine. After them two pupils of Aristotle, *Aristoxenus*, who had

previously been trained among the Pythagoreans, and *Dicaearchus* held this same view without any essential difference: see Zeller *Phil. d. Griechen* 1.² p. 444 (ed. 4 p. 413), II. n.² p. 888 ff Eng. tr. *Pro-Socratics* I. p. 476. *SUSEM.* (1057) The earliest evidence is Plato *Phaedo* 85 B, on which see the note of Mr. *Alcibi* Hind who thinks *Simmius* must be the exponent of a widely received opinion. The examination of this doctrine in *De Anima* I c 4 assumes that *ἀρμονία* = *κρᾶσις*, a blending of diverse or opposite elements (*λόγος τις τῶν μεγέθων ἢ σύνθεσις*) and so *Simmius* in one place of the *Phaedo* 86 B, though again he compares the soul to the music or tune i.e. something immaterial played upon the material lyre, which answers to the body. The present passage certainly favours the latter interpretation of the ambiguous term *ἀρμονία*.

19 *οἱ δ' ἔχειν ἀρμονίαν* Pl. *Phaedo* 93; the soul has in it virtue, which is a harmony. Cp. *Susemihl Plat. Phil.* I. p. 440 f., 443 *SUSEM.* (1058)

§ 25 11 *φανερόν ἐστι κατὰ* The problem of § 15, 1340 a b, is thus solved. And in b 16 we have an echo of 1340 a 14.

§ 25 14 *ἔστι γὰρ* Quae secundu causam afferunt, cur ad iuvenilem potissimum aetatem aptissima sit musicae exercitatio. Quare hoc quoque loco γὰρ πρὸ δὲ scribendum esse ceterisim. *SUSEM.*

16 ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει κατὰ "Music

ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. καὶ τις τοιαυτὴ συγγένεια ταῖς ἀρμονίαις (V) καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς εἶναι (διὸ πολλοὶ φασὶ τῶν σοφῶν οἱ μὲν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οἱ δ' ἔχουν ἀρμονίαν).

- 6 πότερον δὲ δεῖ μαυθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἄδοντάς τε καὶ χειροῦρ- VI
 21 γούοντας ἢ μὴ, καθάπερ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον.
 οὐκ ἄδηλον δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίνε-
 σθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν
 24 γὰρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας
 2 τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς
 παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτα πλαταγήν

17 ἡδυσμάτων ? Bywater || 20 τοὺς inserted before αὐτοὺς by Π¹ || χειροῦρ-
 γούοντας S^b T^b L¹ P² Ald., χρηραγωγούοντας P⁴ || 22 δὴ P¹ 23 perhaps rightly ||
 24 τοὺς inserted before μὴ by Susem.¹, and perhaps by Γ¹ || 26 ἀρχέτου P¹ P² Bk.
 and P¹ (corr.²)

has this sweet seasoning in its nature." Nevertheless we were told, § 4, that the actual process of learning even music is troublesome and painful. SUSEM. (1069)

c. 6 *Practical instruction in music is indispensable*: §§ 1, 2 *Nor is some measure of skill in execution unsuitable or degrading*: §§ 3—8, *provided wind-instruments and technical subtleties be excluded from the educational course*: §§ 9—16. Cp. *Anal.* p. 119.

§ 1 20 χειροῦργούοντας] Apparently only here and c. 7 § 3, 1342 a 3, in the sense of 'playing on a musical instrument,' 'becoming performers,' and so 23 κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, where ἔργα=musical performances, as below b 36 f and in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 20, 1181 a 20

21 πρότερον] C. 5 §§ 4—8. Comp 5 §§ 9, 10 with π. (1030). SUSEM. (1060)

22 πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν] See c. 2 § 6. Hence 'it makes a great difference' = it is a great advantage: multum prodest.

23 ἐν γὰρ π. κατ.] This is directly opposed to the Spartans' boast, c. 5 § 7, 1339 b 2 ff. cp. π. (1026, 1045). SUSEM. (1061)

25 κριτὰς] Amplified below, § 4, 1340 b 38 f. Cp. c. 5 § 17.

§ 2 26 διατριβήν] Occupation; somewhat analogous to a pastime for recreation, and still more like the highest intellectual pursuits of the adults, though in the case of boys neither the one nor the other is yet possible, c. 5 § 4, π. (1024). cp. Doering p. 137 SUSEM. (1062)

Ἀρχύτα] A famous Pythagorean phi-

losopher of Tarentum.—For the foundation of Tarentum, see VIII (v). 7 2 π. (1592), for its fortunes ib. 3 § 7 π. (1517), for its constitution VII (vi). 5. 10 π. (1441) also π. (141).—Archylas was a friend and contemporary of Plato, and also renowned as a mathematician, general, and statesman. He was seven times στρατηγός, the highest political and military office in his native city, an honour not usually conferred more than once upon the same citizen; he led the army to victory in several wars (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, 82) and was for a long time the leading statesman of Tarentum (Stiab. VI. 280). Plato made his acquaintance on his first voyage to Sicily, and it was through his diplomatic mediation that Dionysius the younger at last allowed Plato to depart in safety on his third journey (Diog. Laert. VIII. 79, III. 22). Archylas was a man of excellent character, and his interest in education as well as his kindness towards his slaves is shown by the story that he delighted to get their children about him and teach them himself (Athenodori in Athen. XII. 519 b). The rattle which he invented became proverbial (Athenodori. l. c.), cp. Aelian *Var. Hist.* XII. 15, Suidas s. v. Ἀρχύτας, Poll. IX. 127). No very definite opinion can be pronounced upon his merits as a man of science, since the writings bearing his name were for the most part forgeries. Fragments of several of them are extant: of these the fragments from the beginning of a work upon Mathematics can hardly be assailed, whilst the work upon Acoustics was cer-

οἰεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδῶσιν τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως (VI)
 χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν
 οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἀρ-
 30 μόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις τῶν παιδίων, ἣ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγῇ
 τοῖς μείζονσι τῶν νέων.

- § 3 ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοι-
 νῶναι τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ 2
 34 μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι, καὶ λῦσαι πρὸς τοὺς
 § 4 φάσκοντας βάνανσον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ, (p. 140)
 ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους
 μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους
 τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφείσθαι, δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ

27 γίνεσθαι Γ P¹, λέγεσθαι Κοιαes, wrongly || 29 ἀρόμττουσα after 30 τοῖς νη-
 πίοις Π² P² Bk. || 30 παιδίων P¹, παιδικῶν L¹ Ald., παιδιῶν with all other authorities
 Ar. Bk.¹ || 32 καὶ omitted by II¹, [καὶ] Susem¹ || 37 γενομένων Reiz Bk.², pei-
 hap² M¹, γενομένων P⁴, γινόμενοι with the other authorities Bk.¹ and perhaps Γ
 (factis William)

tainly not genuine, see Westphal *Mé-
 2. ed. i. p. 71*. But at any rate the
 science of Geometry was substantially ad-
 vanced by him (Procl. on Eucl. p. 19).
 In particular we know his interesting at-
 tempt at solving the problem of squaring
 the cube (Eudem. *Fr.* 110. Speng.
 Eratosth. quoted by Eutok. in *Alchim.*
De Sph. p. 135, 143, Ov. and Diog. *Laert.*
 viii. 83). He was also the first to treat
 Mechanics, methodically according to
 geometrical principles (Diog. *Laert.* l. c.,
 cp. Favor. in *Gell.* x 12. 9 f., Vitruv. vii.
 11a. f.) See Haistenstein *De Archytae Ta-
 rentini fragmentis philosophicis* (Leipzig
 1833), Gruppe 'On the Fragments of
 Archytas' (Berlin 1840), Zeller *op. c.* i.
 p. 267 iii. ii. p. 88 f., 91 f., 112 f.
 SUSEM. (1068)

The Doric form Ἀρχύτα, which was
 altered to Ἀρχότυ by coin.¹ in P¹ as well
 as by IP², make, another instance for
 Prof. Kildgeway: see II. on l. 2. 5 (p. 144).

29 οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν
 This remark is made by Plato / *συν.* ii.
 653 D: φησὶ δὲ [ὁ λόγος] τὸ νέον ἅπαν, ὡς
 ἐκείναι, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ τοῖς φωναῖς
 ἡσυχίαν ἀγειν οὐ δύνασθαι. SUSEM.
 (1064)

30 Learning to play an instrument
 will keep them out of mischief.

§ 3 33 τὸ δὲ πρέπον] The fortifi-
 cations of the city are to serve as an
 ornament, IV (VII). II. 11, 1231 a 13.
 The Lydian Mode suits youthful singers

διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον ἔχειν ἅμα καὶ παι-
 δεῖαν, c. 7 § 15, 1342 b 30 f. Aristotle's
 own account of Piopriety *Ἰδιότης* γ. 5 8,
 135 a 13, is vague: ταῦτόν ἐστι τὸ καλὸν
 καὶ πρέπον. The above usages in this
 treatise seem to justify the writer of *Edh.*
End (iii. 6. 1, 1233 a 34, τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 πρέπον ἐν κόσμῳ ἐστίν, cp. 1233 b 7 κατ'
 ἀξίαν ἐστίν) in making grace or charm
 the leading feature.

34 διορίσαι καὶ λῦσαι] Define and
 refute the objections of those who maintain
 that to take up music practically is de-
 grading. The absolute use of λόγος in-
 stead of λόγος λόγος, ἀπορίας occurs b 41;
 cp. *Méla.* N. 2. 5, 1089 a 3, λῶσις καὶ
 ὁμοίως βαδίζειν τῷ λόγῳ, *Rhet.* II 25. 1,
 1402 a 31, 26. 3, 1403 a 26. Aristotle's
 own explanation of this metaphor is
 explicit enough: ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐπορίᾳ
 λῶσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορομένων ἐστὶ
 λόγος δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δευτέρῳ
Méla. B. 1. 2, 993 a 28.

35 βάνανσον] Repeated § 5, b 41,
 § 6, 1341 a 7. Comp. *notes* (103, 982,
 1080). SUSEM. (1068)

§ 4 Some degree of skill in evocation
 is needed to make a connoisseur.

36 τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν] Comp. *III.*
 (1026, 1015, 1061). SUSEM. (1068)

37 πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους] *Κε-
 κοῖται* at a drinking party, or in jest c. 5
 § 8 n. (1027). See also c. 7 § 13, 14 with
 n. (1113); IV (VII). 17. 11 n. (966). Comp.
Introd. p. 56. SUSEM. (1067)

39 χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ νεότητι· (VI)
 15 περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως ἦν τινες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὡς ποιούσης 3
 τῆς μουσικῆς βαναύσους, οὐ χαλεπὸν λύσαι σκεψαμένους
 μέχρι τε πόσου τῶν ἔργων κοινωνητέον τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν
 12 παιδευομένοις πολιτικὴν, καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ῥυ-
 θμῶν κοινωνητέον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὀργάνοις τὴν μάθησιν
 36 ποιητέον, καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρειν εἰκός. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἡ
 λύσις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμῆσεως· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τρόπους τινὰς
 5 τῆς μουσικῆς ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθέν.
 φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι δεῖ τὴν μάθησιν αὐτῆς μήτε ἐμποδί- 4
 ζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις, μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βάνανυσον
 καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν
 37 τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὑστερον. συμβαίνει δ'
 10 ἂν περὶ τὴν μάθησιν, εἰ μήτε τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνι-
 κοὺς συντείνοντα διαπονοῖεν, μήτε τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ
 ἔργων, ἀ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, ἐκ δὲ τῶν
 38 ἀγῶνων εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα μέχρι περ
 ἂν δύνωνται χαίρειν τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς, καὶ
 15 μὴ μόνον τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἔνια ζῶων ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλήθος ἀνδραπόδων καὶ παιδίων.

39 γινομένην M^a P¹

1341 a 1 παιδευομένοις] πολιτευομένοις Γ' M^a || 9 μαθήσεις—χρήσεις Bojesen, χρή-
 σεis—μαθήσεις Γ' II Ar. Bk. Sumem.¹ in the text. But Spengel transposed ἤδη and
 ὑστερον, which is also possible. Schneider, who discovered the error, proposed to
 transpose 8 πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις and 9 χρήσεις, [χρήσεις] and [μαθήσεις]
 Gottling || 13 παιδίων M^a P¹ || καὶ inserted after ἀλλὰ by II^a P⁵ Bk., "probably
 right, though hard to interpret" Newman, ἀλλὰ <κατὰ> Madvig || 15 κοινωνῶ M^a
 P⁵ II^a (corrected by p³)

§ 5 The censure passed on music im-
 plies that the pursuit of excellence as a
 performer degrades the youthful citizen
 into a professional. It is remarked in
 Exc. 1. p. 650, that the feeling of the
 Greeks in the fourth century towards
 artistic specialists seems to have varied
 with the eminence of the artist much
 more than it does amongst us. While the
 artists of genius were recognised as great
 men, the ordinary artist was a mechanic,
 who had left the true political life for a
 bread-and-butter study.

§§ 6, 7 There must be no practising
 upon instruments which unfit the citizen
 for taking his part in war and in athletic
 exercises. Musical training must not be
 such as to fit the learner for contests of
 artists

1341 a 11 τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ]
 "Brilliant pieces of extraordinary dif-
 ficulty." Even in the present day it
 would be sound advice to leave these out
 of the musical education designed for the
 young. SUMM. (1968)

12 ἀ νῦν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας
 κατὰ] Comp. Athen. xiv. 629 b, καὶ τὰ
 σχήματα μετέφερον ἐντεῦθεν (sc. ἐκ τῆς
 χειρονομίας) εἰς τοὺς χοροὺς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν χορῶν
 εἰς τὰς παλαίστρας.

§ 8 13 τὰ τοιαῦτα] I.e. the practice
 of pieces not thus excluded, on instruments
 (such as the lyre) which are not prohibited
 μέχρι περ=only until.

14 Comp. with this stock phrase c 5
 §§ 17—19. This tends to form character.

15 τῷ κοινῷ τῆς μουσικῆς] Cp. c. 5
 § 15, 1340 a 4 with n. (1940) on τῇ

δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον. § 9 οὐτε γὰρ αὐλοὺς εἰς παιδείαν ἀκτέον οὐτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν ὄργανον, οἷον κιθάραν κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὅσα ποιήσει αὐτῶν ἀκροατὰς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τῆς μουσικῆς παι-

18 τι omitted by P³ P⁴ Ar. Bk. || 19 ἄλλο ἐστὶν Π', ἄλλο ἑτερόν ἐστὶν P⁴ (corr.), ἑτερόν ἐστὶν with all other authorities Bk. || 20 παιδείᾳ Γ M⁴


ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν. Aristotle means that sensuous charm, that tickling of the ears, produced by every kind of music, good or bad, simply as music by its native means of expression, harmony, melody, rhythm. A feeling for rhythm is, to a greater or less extent, innate in all men: *Poet.* c. 4 § 7, 1448 b 20 f. Comp. *Dbing* p. 114 f. *SUSK.* (1069) See *Probl.* xix. 38, 920 b 29—36. It will be seen, c. 7 § 6, that some scope is allowed to this inferior pleasure. Plato indeed, *Λατ.* II 655 D, shrinks from adopting the standard of pleasure: καὶ τοὶ λέγουσι γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι μουσικῆς ἀρδύτητα εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ ταῖς ψυχαῖς περιζύσαν δόναμιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν οὐτε ἀκρότης οὐτε ὅσιον τὸ παράπαν φθέγγεσθαι.

τῶν ἄλλων [ἐν τῷ] The limits of any such appreciation of musical sound by the animals are exactly defined *Eud.* *ἔλθ.* III 2. 8, 1231 a 2 ff.: οὐθὲν γάρ, ὅτι καὶ ἔξω λόγου, φαίνεται πάσχοντα [ὡς τὰλλα θηρία] αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκρόσει τῶν εὐαρμοστικῶν, εἰ μὴ τί που συμβέβηκε τερατώδες.


§ 9 18 αὐλοῦς] Usually translated by 'flute.' But in reality the instrument had a mouth-piece (ἔμφυτος), with a vibrating reed (γλῶσσα) fitted in it, so that it more closely resembled our 'clarinet.' The σύμφυτος μονοκέλαμος may have represented the modern flute. *Hom.* II. x. 13 mentions both, αὐλῶν συνῆγγαν τ' ἐνοπλήν. The αὐλὸς was always played in pairs (*Latin tibias*, cp. § 13, 1341 b 4, αὐλοῦς), the two instruments being connected by a leathern strap, φορβεῖα, worn round the mouth. *SUSK.* (1070) Consult further L. v. Jan *Alt. 'Flöten'* in Baumeister's *Denkschriften* and A. A. Howard in *Harvard Studies* IV. 1893, p. 1 ff.

οὐτ' ἄλλο τι τεχνικὸν κτλ.] By these words Aristotle excludes every instrument except the κιθάρα, or lyre, also called φόρμιγγις in *Ilion* (as L. van Jan conjectured to be the case before Westphal; though on insufficient grounds, as appears to me, he afterwards withdrew the conjecture, and pronounced κιθάρα and φόρμιγγις to be the same as κιθάρα but distinct

from λύρα). The lyre was the most ancient and the most easily handled of Greek stringed instruments: beside those here represented Jan gives (p. 45) other shapes of the lyre and κιθάρα.



Kepon a pupil of Terpander, *Plut. De musica* c. 6, 1233 c, invented the κιθάρα about 700 B.C. This was the ordinary instrument used by professional players and solo-singers. It possessed greater resonance, being of the shape here shown.



See Westphal *Gesch. der alten Musik* p. 86 ff.; cp. L. van Jan *De fiddle's Graecorum* p. 5 ff. *Plato Rep.* IV. 399 D permits both Lyre and κιθάρα to be used in teaching: on the other hand, he restricts the instruction to be given to a yet greater extent than Aristotle. *Comp. Lat.* VII. 812 c ff., and *infra* c. 7 § 9, n. (1105). *SUSK.* (1071)

20 αὐτῶν = ὀργάνων. The gen. πα-

δείας ἢ τῆς ἄλλης· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡθικὸν ἀλλὰ (VI)
 μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς
 χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύνатаι μᾶλλον ἢ μά-
 10 θησιw. προσθῶμεν δὲ ὅτι συμβέβηκεν. αὐτῷ ἐναντίον πρὸς
 25 παιδείαν καὶ τὸ κωλύειν τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι τὴν αὐλῆσιν. (p. 241)
 διὸ καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ
 τῶν νέων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων, καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρῶ-
 11 τον αὐτῷ. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γενόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας
 καὶ μεγαλοφυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔτι τε πρότερον

21 ἢ καὶ P¹ || ἔτι δὲ Γ II A1. Susem¹ in the text, ἔτι δ' Bk, ἐπειδὴ Susem.² ||
 δ αὐτὸς M^a, id ēratus William || 23 δύνатаι before κάθαρσιν Γ, after μᾶλλον Π² P²
 Bk., thus allowing hiatus || 24 αὐτῷ after ἐναντίον Π² P² Bk., avoiding hiatus ||
 28 γενόμενοι Schneider, γινόμενοι M^a P¹, γινόμενοι Π² P² Bk.¹ || 29 τὴν omitted by
 P² S^b T^b Ald. Bk.

δείας must depend on ἀγαθός: 'such only as will improve the hearers of them in respect of their musical or general education.'

21 The change of ἔτι δὲ to ἐπειδὴ is thus defended *Quaest. civi. coll.* p. 421: Aristoteles dixit quidem v. 17 sqq. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ τοῖς ὀργάνοις κτλ., sed nondum docuit cui hoc sit δῆλον ἐκ τούτων. Secuntur demum hae causae. Ergo hoc quoque loco non ἔτι δὲ scripsit, sed ἐπειδὴ. SUSEM

22 ὀργιαστικόν] I.e. it produces an ecstatic frame of mind, it intoxicates with excitement and elevation of the feelings. This appears plainly from c. 7 §§ 3, 4, 8, 9. Cp. also c 5 §§ 22, 23, Excursus IV. p. 628 *ms.* (1054, 1092), and especially n. (1107). SUSEM. (1072)

Since ἡθικόν = expressing character, ὀργιαστικόν should mean expressing vigour or fanatical excitement. It is because this wild, excited music inteprets the excesses of religious frenzy, that it also accompanies and stimulates them. See n. on c. 5 § 17.

ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους κτλ.] "Hence the flute should be used at such times when the effect of the concert is to purge the emotions and not to instruct."

23 κάθαρσιν] Here occurs for the first time the idea of purging or curing emotion by means of emotion. How is this effect of music related to the three already discussed (1339 a 16 ff., b 13 πρότερον παιδεῖαν ἢ παιδίαν ἢ διαγωγὴν sc. δύνатаι)? For the present we are only told that it differs from παιδεία, that pleasurable enjoyment which goes to form character. But we receive no informa-

tion as to its relation to the recreation which music affords (παιδεία, ἀνάπαυσις), or the full aesthetic enjoyment which belongs to διαγωγή, the highest intellectual gratification. See p. 638, Excursus v. n. (1101). SUSEM. (1072)

Besides its literal meaning *cleansing* (καθαίρειν) which is necessarily vague, κάθαρσις has two definite metaphorical senses: (1) religious, or rather liturgical, *purifying* = *lustratio*, *expiatio*; (2) medical (or rather pathological) *purging*. The latter metaphor is prominent in Aristotle, but his usage of the term constitutes a distinct application (3) in a psychological sense, *emotional relief* followed by *refinement* of the emotions. See the passages cited in the 'Note on κάθαρσις' p. 641 ff.

24 αὐτῷ ἐσθλῷ. "Besides, it happens to tell against the educational use of the flute, that playing upon it hinders singing." Here λόγος approximates to the meaning of *φωνή*, cp. n. (26).

26 Probably ἐκ implies that they not only 'disallowed its use' but excluded it or withdrew it from the hands of the young. So 1336 b 7, 1321 a 25.

§ 11 28 σχολαστικώτεροι] More fitted for leisure, qualified to use it intelligently. cp. VIII(v). 11 5 συλλόγου σχολαστικούς. 'Better fitted by their increased leisure for leisure, fired with loftier aspirations after excellence, even earlier as well as in the full flush of their achievements after the Persian wars they began to lay hold on every form of learning without distinction, pushing their research onward.' "To this stirring generation, active in striking out new paths, belonged Hippodamus" (Newman).

30 καὶ μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ φρονηματισθέντες ἐκ τῶν ἔργων, (VI)
 πάσης ἤπτοντο μαθήσεως, οὐδὲν διακρίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐπίζη-
 τοῦντες. διὸ καὶ τὴν αὐλητικὴν ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις.
 12 καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τις χορηγὸς αὐτὸς ἠύλησε τῷ
 χορῷ, καὶ περὶ Ἀθήνας οὕτως ἐπεχωρίασεν ὥστε σχεδὸν οἱ
 35 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μετείχον αὐτῆς· δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
 πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε Θράσιππος Ἐκφαντίδῃ χορηγήσας.
 ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη διὰ τῆς πείρας αὐτῆς, βέλτιον τ

31 ἤπτοντο M^a and apparently Γ, ἤπτοντο S^b || 33 αὐτὸς omitted by IP^a (supplied in the margin by p¹), [αὐτὸς] Suscm.¹ || 35 ἐλευθέρων Schneider, perhaps rightly || 36 ἐκφαντίδῃ P^a 2, ἐκφαντίδῃ L^a

§ 12 33 The χορηγός was a rich citizen, selected to defray the expenses incurred in the training and equipment of a chorus, whether for lyric poetry, or for comedy or tragedy. So a 36 χορηγός SUSCM. (1074)

τῷ χορῷ] This was undoubtedly a lyric chorus. For dramas proper do not appear to have been performed at Sparta. SUSCM. (1078)

34 ἐπεχωρίασεν] As in 1335 a 16 n. The flute was more at home in Boeotia, where it is recorded of Epaminondas, as something exceptional, that he had learnt to accompany his singing on the lyre

35 δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ πίνακος] There can be no question this appeal to the 'tablet' resembles that in 'Ab. πολ. c. 7 § 4 to the statue of Diphilus

36 πίνακος ὃν ἀνέθηκε κτλ.] The most ancient Attic comic poets of note were Chionides and Magnes, *Poet.* 3 § 5, 1448 a 34 (cp. 5, 2, 1449 b 3), the next in order Ekphantides and Cratinus, of whose poetry fragments were extant, the oldest of them being from the pen of Ekphantides, who on this account is erroneously described by the anonymous commentator upon Book IV of the *Nic. Eth.* (iv. 2, 20, 1123 a 23 f.) as the earliest poet of the Old Comedy. We only possess a few insignificant fragments of his, principally quoted by this scholiast; but we know the title of one of his works 'the Satyr' (Athen. i. 96 c). See Meineke *Fragm. com. Gr.* i. p. 35 ff., ii. p. 12 ff. At the time when Thrasyppus was his choregus, Ekphantides won the first prize. The word πίναξ refers to the custom which compelled the victorious choregus to dedicate in honour of himself and his tribe a brazen tripod, with an inscription upon the pedestal, either at the temple of Apollo near the theatre or at one of the

temples situated in the street leading to the theatre, which from this fact received the name of (τρίποδες) the street of tripods. The tripod was then as a rule erected upon the temple, but sometimes placed inside it. See Pans I 20. 1 f., cp. Plut. *Them.* 6, Demosth. xxi. 6. We possess a considerable number of inscriptions of this kind, which for the most part relate to dithyrambic (cyclic) choruses, and in these the names of the flute-player, the poet or chorus master, the archon, and sometimes the principal actor are mentioned, as well as the name of the tribe to which the chorus belonged and the species of drama represented. SUSCM. (1076)

See however Haigh *Attic Theatre* p. 52 f. "The memorials of victory erected by the choregi to the dramatic choruses appear to have taken the form of tablets (πίνακες). For instance, Themistocles after his victory with a tragic chorus erected a 'tablet' in honour of the event. It is a trait in the character of the mean man in Theophrastus, that when he has been successful with a tragic chorus, he erects merely a wooden scioil (*Chor.* 22 ταῦτα ἐξυλίσθη) in commemoration of his victory."

37 ὕστερον δὲ ἀπεδοκιμάσθη] Plutarch, *Vita Alcib.* c. 2, tells the story that Alcibiades threw away the flute in disgust, with the words αὐλίσσων οὐθ' ὀφθαλμοὺς παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλύεσθαι. He adds that both by jest and earnest Alcibiades tried to stop the practice of learning the flute· ὅθεν ἐξέτερε κομιδῇ τῶν ἐλευθέρων διατρίβων καὶ προσηλαστικῇ παντόπασιν ὁ αὐλός. The connexion of cause and effect can hardly be accepted. Still, no doubt the famous αἰληταὶ who were applauded at Athens were as a rule strangers, and two of the greatest, Antigondas and Timotheus, were Boeotians.

δυναμένων κρίνειν τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν (VI)
 13 συντείνουσιν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ὀργάνων τῶν ἀρχαίων,
 40 οἷον πηκτίδες καὶ βάρβιτοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα
 τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ
 11 b σαμβύκαι, καὶ πάντα τὰ δεδμενα χειρουργικῆς ἐπιστήμης.
 εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων 3
 μεμυθολογημένον. φασὶ γὰρ δὴ τὴν Ἀθηναίαν εὐροῦσαν ἀπο-
 14 βαλεῖν τοὺς αὐλοὺς. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει φάναι καὶ διὰ
 5 τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην τοῦ προσώπου τοῦτο ποιῆσαι δυσχεράνασαν
 τὴν θεὸν οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλλον εἰκὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν

38 καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν omitted by M^a and P² (1st hand) || 40 πηκτίδες P²,
 ποιητίδες P⁴, ποιητίδες P⁵, πηκτίδες Thomas Ar.

1341 b 1 σαμβύκαι Gottling, λαμβοί P¹, σαμβύκαι P² P⁵ Ar. and p¹ in the margin,
 λαμβύκαι Sussem.¹ || 2 αὐλῶν ὅλων Γ' M^a || 3 δὴ omitted by P¹, [δὴ] Sussem.¹ ||
 4 μὲν οὖν] *enim* William, οὖν omitted, a lacuna being left, in M^a (1st hand, supplied
 by a later hand) || 6 θεῶν P³ S^b T^b

§ 13 39 πολλὰ ἀρχαίων, sc. ἀπειρο-
 κιάσθη

40 οἷον πηκτίδες κτλ.] All foreign
 stringed instruments, on which consult
 Excursus IV. p. 632 ff. SUSSEM. (1077)

1341 b 3 μεμυθολογημένον] Comp the
 similar reference to legend II. 9. 8, 1269
 b 28, n. (288).

εὐροῦσαν ἀποβαλεῖν] The Satyr Mar-
 syas is said to have picked up the flute
 which Athene threw away, and to have
 played upon it; and for this the goddess
 punished him. The earliest extant allu-
 sion to this legend is in a dithyramb
 'Marsyas' by Melanippides *Frag.* 2. ἀ
 μὲν Ἀθήνα | τῶργαν ἔρριψεν θ' | ἱερὰς ἀπὸ
 χειρὸς | ἐπὶ τ' ἔρρετ' ἀσχεα, σώματι λόμα·
 to which the contemporary poet Telestes
 replied in his *Αἶγος* 1, ὅν σοφὸν
 σοφῶν λαβοῦσαν οὐκ ἐπέλπομαι νόβ' ὀρμητοῖς
 ὀρεῖσιν ὀργάνον | διὰν Ἀθήναν δυσὸφθαλμον
 ἀσχεα ἐκφροβήσαν αὐθὺς ἐκ χειρὸν βα-
 λεῖν, | νυμφαγενεὶ χειροκτόπῳ φησὶ Μαρσύᾳ
 κλέος. | τί γὰρ νιν εὐρησάτοιο κάλλεος δέξῃ
 θρῶς ἔπειρεν, | ᾗ παρθέναν ἄγαμον καὶ
 ἀπαυδ' ἀνέστημι Κλυθῶ; see *Athen.* XIV.
 616 e, f. (J. G. Schneider). In other
 legends the Phrygian Marsyas is himself
 the inventor of the flute, an enthusiastic
 singer and flute-player in the service of
 Cybele, he is, like all Satyrs and Sileni in
 Asiatic myths, one of the deities of rivers
 and fountains in the train of the Phrygian
 Dionysus. In this character he encounters
 Apollo, the representative of the music

of the κιθάρα, by whom he is defeated
 and punished. In Lydian legend Pan re-
 places Marsyas as the rival of Apollo and
 the teacher of Olympus. See Pieler
Griech. Afrihol. I. p. 176 f., 508, 510,
 576 ff., 585. Hyagnis also, a Phrygian,
 or Mysian, the supposed father of Mai-
 syas, was sometimes called the inventor
 of the flute and Olympus himself, who
 was believed to be the pupil of Marsyas,
 is at one time called a Phrygian and at
 another a Mysian, pointing to the origin
 of this kind of music in Asia Minor,
 whether in Phrygia, Mysia, or Lydia (see
 Exc. II and IV). The authorities to con-
 sult for the above are Plut. *De musica* 14,
 1135 B, Alex. Polyhist. *Fr.* 32 apud Plut.
 16 5, 1132 F, Heiacleid. *ib.* 7, 1133 E,
 Strabo X. 324, Schol. in *Aesch.* *Peisai*
 933, Suidas s. v. Ὀλυμπος. Comp. Pl.
Leptus III. 677 D, *Symp.* 215 C, Ps-Pl.
Minos 318 B; and for the whole section
 III. (288, 297). SUSSEM. (1078)

§ 14 6 οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κτλ.] "Not but
 what a more likely reason is the fact, that
 instruction in the flute contributes nothing
 to the culture of the intelligence. For
 to Athens we ascribe science and art."
 SUSSEM. (1078)

For διάνοιαν cp II. (1023) on φρόνησις;
 it has been opposed to *ἥδης* c. 2 § 1, and
 in III. II. 2, 1281 b γ. With *περιβάλλει*
 in this sense Bonitz joins *Rhet.* I. 9. 40,
 1368 a 29, *μέγεθος περιβάλλει* (ταῖς πράξεσι)
 'to invest exploits with importance.'

οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἡ παιδεία τῆς αὐλήσεως. τῇ γὰρ Ἀθηνᾶ τὴν ἐπι- (VI)
στήμην περιτίθειμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην.

- 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὀργάνων καὶ τῆς ἐργασίας ἀποδοκιμάζο- VII
10 μιν τὴν τεχνικὴν παιδείαν (τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθειμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πρᾶττων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται
ἡγάριον ὁρεθῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορ-
16 τικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,
15 ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν, καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι·
θεατῆς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴθε τὴν μουσικὴν, ὥστε
καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτοὺς
7 τὴν ποιούσιν τινὰς ποιῶ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις·
σκεπτέον [δ'] ἔτι περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, 2
10 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] πότερον ταῖς ἁρμονίαις πάσαις χρηστέον

7 γὰρ Susem., δὲ Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text, cum Ar. || 10 παιδῶν II¹ (emended with γρ. prefixed by p¹ in the margin) || 11 τῆς τὴν P⁴⁻⁶ L¹ Ald. || αὐτοῦ Γ, αὐτοῦ II || 13 ἐλευθέρων ? Susem. || 14 βαναύσων Κοινας, omitting the comma before καὶ || 18 ποιούς ? ποιοῦς Lindau (a very rare word), illius modi Ar. as if he had read τοιοῦτους for ποιοῦς τινὰς, τοιοῦτους ? οι φορτικοὶ ? Susem. || αὐτοῦ τε ποιούσιν τινὰς αὐτῷ δοκῶντας Flach || 19 δ' omitted by P⁶, [δὲ] Schneidei Susem.¹ 2, δὲ M¹ Reiz, δὲ P⁴, δὲ ? Susem. But it is a repetition of δὲ in the protasis || ἔτι ? P⁶, τὰ Reiz || 20 [καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν] Bonitz, παιδῶν ? Orelli *Aristot. Pädagog.* pp. 110—116 || ταῖς ἁρμονίαις αἰτεῖ χρηστέον II² P⁶ Bk.

§§ 15, 16 With these two sections cp. *nu.* (103, 982, 1065): also c. 7 §§ 6, 7 *u.* (1097), and *μῦθα* III. 11 2 f., 1281 b 5 *n.* (565 b). SUSEM. (1080)

12 φορτικῆς] Because the spectator is φορτικός, b 16 Comp. *Poet.* c. 26 § 1, 1461 b 27 ff. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἥττων φορτικὴ (sc. μῦθος) βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεωρῆς: also *Λαοῦ* II. 655 D (quoted in *u.* on 1341 a 15)

14 θητικωτέραν] *Σικρὰ* 1337 b 21 *n.* § 16 14 συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι] Cp. *οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει* κτλ c. 6 § 6, 1341 a 4 f.

17 αὐτοῦς τε] This is rightly opposed to τὰ σώματα. But whether ποιοῦς τινὰς 'of a certain character' should be emended to τοιοῦτους τινὰς = φορτικοὺς is altogether uncertain. See *Quaest. cii* coll. p. 421. SUSEM.

c. 7 Which musical modes and measures are to be accepted, (1) in general §§ 2—7, (2) for education, §§ 8—15. Which is more important for educational purposes, melody or rhythm (time). The latter question is not considered. Cp. *Ana.*

p. 120 The subject is discussed by Plato at *Rep.* III. 397—399.

§ 1 19 With *σκεπτέον* commences the apodosis corresponding to a protasis ἐπεὶ δὲ .κινήσεις, b 9—18 so that unless δὲ is changed to δὲ, it had better (with Schneidei and Bonitz) be omitted. *Qu. cr. coll.* p. 421. The difficulties of this long period are discussed by Bonitz *Arist. Stud.* III. pp. 95—99 (61—65). SUSEM.

Bonitz suggests b 20 the excision of καὶ πρὸς παιδείαν, (1) because no satisfactory sense can be given to καὶ, (2) because two questions are distinguished, and it is the second one, beginning at *ἐπειτα*, which has to do with Education. Further he is inclined to extend the period as far as b 32 *περὶ αὐτῶν*, reading ἐπεὶ δὲ αὶ 23, and making *νομίζαντες μὲν οὖν* begin the apodosis to this (secondary) protasis b 23 ἐπεὶ δὲ. 26 *εὐρύθμων*, on the ground that it is impossible for *ἐπειδὴ* to introduce a second protasis referring to the preceding apodosis *σκεπτέον*. *ἑτερον*.

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἡ διαιρετέον, ἔπειτα τοῖς πρὸς παι- (VII)
 δεῖαν διαπονοῦσι πότερον τὸν αὐτὸν διορισμὸν ἠήσομεν ἢ
 τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ, ἐπειδὴ τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ
 μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ' ἐκάτερον οὐ δεῖ λε-
 25 γηθέναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν, καὶ πότερον
 προαιρετέον μᾶλλον τὴν εὐμελῆ μουσικὴν ἢ τὴν εὐρυθμον.
 § 2 νομίσαντες οὖν πολλὰ καλῶς λέγειν περὶ τούτων τῶν τε νῦν
 μουσικῶν ἐνίους καὶ τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν
 ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας, τὴν μὲν
 30 καθ' ἑκάστον ἀκριβολογίαν ἀποδώσομεν ζητεῖν τοῖς βουλο-
 μένοις παρ' ἐκείνων, νῦν δὲ νομικῶς διέλωμεν, τοὺς τύπους

21 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς omitted by P^{4.6.8} S^b T^b L^a || 23 τρίτον δεῖ (δὲ P⁶ L^a)
 before τινα ἕτερον Γ II Bk., τρίτον δὲ with the transposition Sussem. δεῖ untranslated
 by Ar., [δεῖ] Koraeus; Bonitz (*Arist. Stud.* III. p. 95 ff.) showed the passage to be
 corrupt || 25 δύναμιν ἀνὰ ἔχει P^{6.8} II Bk., cp. 1339 a 15 || [καὶ] ? Sussem. ||
 § 2 νομικῶς in *genere* Ar., γενικῶς Bas.² in the margin, λογικῶς Koraeus, συντόμως
 Flach || διέλωμεν P⁴ S^b T^b and M^a (1st hand), διέλωμεν οι διέλωμεν apparently Γ

21 τοῖς .. διαπονοῦσι] The *dativus
 communis*, not the dative after τὸν αὐτὸν.
 "Whether for those whose work is edu-
 cational we shall make the same division."
 After this ἡ τρίτον δεῖ τινα ἕτερον Γ II seems
 hopeless. What, asks Bonitz, is to be un-
 derstood by τρίτον? Not to speak of the
 harshness, if not impossibility, of sup-
 plying an infinitive for δεῖ from ἠήσομεν

23 ἡ τινα ἕτερον, τρίτον δέ] Veram
 mihi emendandi rationem inventam esse
 spero, cum ea coniecerim. Si haec spes
 me non feellit, v. 25 καὶ significat "etiam,"
 et sic quidem ferri fortitan, sed vel sic
 elocare malim. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.
 SUSSEM.

25 καὶ πότερον καλ.] In the *Introd.*
 p. 49 (cp. n. 2) it is pointed out that the
 discussion of this question is no longer ex-
 tant in our present treatise. SUSSEM. (1081)

The whole passage may be rendered:
 We have still to consider the question of
 musical modes and rhythms: whether
 all the modes and all the rhythms should
 be employed or a distinction made be-
 tween them: secondly, whether the same
 distinction will serve for those whose work
 is teaching, or whether we shall make a
 new one: thirdly, as we find Music to
 consist of melody and rhythm, and the
 influence which each of them has upon
 education ought not to be overlooked,
 [also] whether the preference must be
 given to goodness of melody or of rhythm.

§ 2 27 Vahlen rightly calls attention

to the close similarity of phrase between
 this passage and IV(VII). I. 2, 1323 a 22

28 τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας καλ.] See III.
 (1055, 1083, 1103). Perhaps intended to
 intimate that Plato passed judgment on
 these matters without sufficient musical
 knowledge. See § 9. SUSSEM. (1082)

31 νομικῶς] 'Formally.' Idem forte
 significat αἰκε νόμον χάριν *Met.* XIII(M).
 I. 4, 1076 a 27: *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421.
 SUSSEM.

The passage from the *Metaphysics* runs
 thus: ἔπειτα μετὰ ταῦτα χωρὶς περὶ τῶν
 ὁσῶν αὐτῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὅσον νόμον χάριν.
 Here ἀπλῶς seems to mean 'in general
 terms,' much as καθόλου (so Eudemos
 συντόμως in the parallel passage *E. E.* I. 8,
 1217 b 19), and not with Bonitz=simply
 (a sense nearly akin to χωρὶς: quac-
 tionem de numeris et de principiis cum
 hac de ideis quacstione nondum vult con-
 iungi). The precise inference in *νόμος* too
 is disputed. Bonitz refers it to Aristotle's
 own practice of criticizing his predecessors:
 Bernays rendered νόμον χάριν by
dictis causa: Diels disapproving of this
 remarks that νόμος is not ὅσον, nor does
 the phrase=ὁσῶς χάριν, and prefers to
 render it "to comply with the prevailing
 custom, the fashion." It seems best to
 modify Bernays' interpretation a little.
 The original meaning is "only so far as
 to avoid a conflict with the law," i.e.
 'under compulsion and reluctantly.' Other
 authors use the phrase thus, of what is

3 μόνον εἰπόντες περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀποδε-
 χόμεθα τῶν μελῶν ὡς διαιροῦσιν τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,
 τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δ' ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες,
 35 καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν τὴν φύσιν πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων οἰκεῖαν

done grudgingly, only because it is expected of one, and so may be hastily despatched. e.g. Diphilus Ζωγράφου *Fr.* 1. 13 apud Athen. vii. 292 A: οὐδὲν ἡδέως ποιεῖ γὰρ οὗτος, ἀλλ' ὅσον νόμον χάριν, said of a stingy shipowner who has vowed a sacrifice in a storm, is reluctant to pay his vow, and certain to behave shabbily about it. See Benayns *Die Dialekte* p. 150, Forchhammer *Aristoteles und die exoterischen Reden* p. 51 f., Diels *Monatsh. der Berl. Akad.* 1883, p. 488, Susemihl in *Neue Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXIX 1884, p. 273. τοὺς τόπους] With the plural comp. *Mc. Eth.* x. 9. 1, 1179 a 34, ἰκοναῖς ἐρηται τοῖς τόποις instead of the more usual τόποι, 1276 b 19 n. "Contenting ourselves with a formal discussion in outline only."

§ 3 The construction is ἐπεὶ δὲ...ἀποδεχόμεθα...ὡς διαιροῦσιν...καὶ...τιθέσιν, φαμεν δ' οὐ μὴν...χάριν (καὶ γὰρ...ἀποταύσιν) all of which is the protasis, the apodosis beginning with φανερόν. Translate: "We accept the classification of melodies made by certain philosophers into *ethical, scenic, ecstatic* [literally, according as they represent (1) character, (2) action, and (3) ecstasy], as well as their statement that each class of melodies has a musical mode which is naturally appropriate to it. But we hold that there is more than one advantage in the use of music, its object being both educational and purgative—what we mean by *purification* will here be stated in general terms, a clearer explanation to be given hereafter in our treatise on Poetry:—while, thudly, it is a means to aesthetic enjoyment, to relaxation and recreation after exertion. This makes it evident that all the musical modes must be employed, though not all in the same manner. For educational purposes, only those with the most character; but those significant of action, and the ecstatic modes as well, when we listen to the performances of others."

33 τινες τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ] Beigk *Rheinis Mus.* XIX. p. 603 plausibly suggests that the reference is to Aristotle's own pupil Aristoxenus. Cp. also § 8 n. (1104). SUSEM. (1083)

34 τὰ μὲν ἠθικὰ κτλ.] This division

is based upon the threefold nature of the subject-matter of all imitative art, viz. ἦθος, πρᾶξις, πάθος: characters, actions, emotions (c. § 88 18—22, IV[VII]. 17. 10, cp. n. (963), *Poet.* c. 1 § 5, 1447 a 27 f.). For ecstatic modes and melodies do not merely give expression to enthusiasm pure and simple, but also to other painful emotions, see §§ 4—6, § 8 with *nn.* (1080, 1090, 1101), cp. *nn.* (1047, 1054). It may be questionable, to say the least of it, whether music can represent actions as such, as well as the feelings which produce and accompany action (e.g. the martial spirit), still the Greeks have, as a matter of fact, made attempts to represent the process of an action by the sequence of feelings excited by purely instrumental music, as in the case of the famous Pythian νόμος (see Hillel 'Sakadas the flute-player' *Rheinis Mus.* XXXI. 1876, p. 79 ff., Guhnauer *Der pythische νόμος Jahrb. f. Philol. Suppl.* N. S. viii. p. 309 ff.). This, one of the earliest instances of 'programme music,' depicted the sequence of incidents in the conflict between Apollo and the Python. In any case no doubt we must hold that the πρακτικὰ ἁρμονίαι express emotions, but they are of an energetic character, stimulating to vigorous action, and not of an enervating character such as those produced by the ecstatic Modes. Nor must we forget that πρᾶξις includes the idea of 'scene' as well as 'action,' and at times, e.g. IV(VII). 17. 10, 1336 b 16 is most correctly rendered by the former expression. SUSEM. (1084)

The second of the three classes (πρακτικὰ μέλη, πρακτικὰ ἁρμονίαι) has no direct English equivalent: we must be content to designate them 'modes and melodies of action.' Clearly the first is like ecclesiastical music now, calm and serious. the third the wild excited air, at once significant of, and fitted to stimulate the orgies of Dionysus or Cybele. But the second depicted some stirring action, as in the Pythian νόμος, or aiming for the fray, as in a lost tragedy: *Probl.* XIX. 48, ἦθος δὲ ἔχει ἢ μὲν υποφονεῖν πρακτικόν, διὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ Γηρόνῃ [cp. Nauck *Strag.* p. 762] ἢ ἑξέως καὶ ἢ ἐξέπληξις ἐν ταύτῃ πεποήσται.

ἄλλην πρὸς ἄλλο μέλος τιθέασι, φάμεν δ' οὐ μίᾱς ἔνεκεν (VII)
 ὠφελείας τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονων χά-
 ριν (καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως—τί δὲ λέ-
 γομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ
 40 ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σαφέστερον—, τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν,
 πρὸς ἀνεσίμ τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας ἀνάπαυσιν).
 342 a φανερόν ἐστι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὴν
 παιδείαν ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις, πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἐτέρων χει-

36 μέλος Tynwhit (on *Poet.* c. 6), μέρος Γ II Bk. Susem.¹ in the text; Koras sup-
 pects *τιθέασι* || 38 καὶ inserted before *παιδείας* by P¹ & P², *παιδίας* Π¹ P², *παιδίας*
 apparently P² (con.) || 40 τρίτον δὲ] καὶ ταῦτα Liepert (*Arist. u. d. Zweck der*
Kunst, Passau 1863 p. 13, n. 3), ταύτης δ' ἢ, οἱ at least ταύτης δὲ, Susem. See
 Comm. n. (1101). Spengel would transpose τρίτον δὲ to follow *διαγωγὴν*, wrongly
 || *διαγωγὴν* <καλ> Liepert and Susemihl, *διαγωγὴν* <ἢ> Susem.², which is better,
 and absolutely necessary if *ταύτης δ' ἢ* just before is right. See n. (1101). [*πρὸς*
διαγωγὴν] Welldon, wrongly || 41 [*πρὸς*] τὴν ? Susem.

1342 a 1 οὐ...2 χρηστέον omitted by Π¹ || 3 ἀκρόασιν] κάθαρσιν Paris, 2043 and
 Twining *Poet.* p. 243 (ed. 1), in p. 7 (ed. 2), decidedly right. see Comm.

39 πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς]
 Unfortunately this fuller exposition in the
Poetics is no longer extant. Vahlen gives
 good reasons for believing that it came
 after the discussion of Comedy now lost:
 see *Arist. Aufsatze* III. p. 13 s.f. (*Wiener*
Sitzungsber. LXXVII. p. 293 ff.) SUSEM.
 (1088)

40 τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν] At first
 sight there is a difficulty, if *κάθαρσις* and
διαγωγὴ constitute separate ends. What
 else than *διαγωγὴ*, as described above,
 see n. (1000), could express the aim of
 the concerts and musical exhibitions which
 are productive of *κάθαρσις* more than
μᾶλλον (c. 6 § 9)? Not to mention that
 it is strange to find, in the received text,
διαγωγὴ apparently explained by *ἀνάπαυσις*
 with which it is so often contrasted. Nor
 is it possible to reconcile the three ad-
 vantages attendant on the use of music
 here with the three ends of musical
 education enumerated c. 5 §§ 2-4 and
 easily recognisable c. 8 § 9. Comp.
 Bernays *Rhem. Mus.* XIV. 1889 p. 371 f.,
Ueber die tragische Katharsis (ed. 2) p.
 125 f. See however Exc. V p. 638. If the
 two passages in c. 5 refer exclusively to mu-
 sic as a means of education, all the three
 ends there given (*διαγωγὴ*, *παιδεία* = *ἀρετή*,
ἀνεσις = *ἀνάπαυσις*) are summed up under
 the single phrase *παιδείας ἔνεκα* of our
 context. That is, though preparatory to

διαγωγὴ (since those who have not learnt
 when young can never fully enjoy music),
 the educational use must be conceived
 as distinct. Then there is further the
 emotional or pathological use (*κάθαρσις*)
 now introduced for the first time. Plainly,
 that does not attend on the music em-
 ployed in education. It should be noted
 that Zeller (*op. c.* p. 771 n. 1) insists on a
 fourfold use here: he would separate from
 (3) *πρὸς διαγωγὴν*, the following clause
 (4) *πρὸς ἀνεσίμ τε καὶ ἀνάπαυσιν*.

1342 a 3 ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις] In this
 class the Dorian Mode stands first, as
 Aristotle says himself § 8. But from
 Excus. IV n. (1054) it seems strange he
 should speak of more than one *ἡθικωτάτη*
ἁρμονία, since only the Aeolian and per-
 haps the antiquated Locrian and Boeotian
 can go with the Dorian; indeed even the
 Aeolian forms a transition to the *ἁρμο-
 νία πρακτική*: cp. n. (1103). From
 Excus. IV it would appear that Lydian,
 Hypo-phrygian (Ionian), and possibly
 Hypo-lydian constitute the next group of
πρακτικά while the ecstatic are the
 Phrygian, Mixolydian, high-pitched
 Lydian and high-pitched Ionian (unless
 this was identical with the Mixolydian):
 see pp. 620, 631. SUSEM. (1086)

πρὸς δὲ ἀκρόασιν ἔρ. χ.] "But for
 listening to while other people play."
ἀκρόασιν is a conveniently general term

4 ρουγούντων καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς. δ (VII)
 5 γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχὰς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν (p. 143)
 πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον,
 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ

4 After ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς Reinkens (*Arist. u. Kunst* pp. 145, 156) supposes that a definition of *κάθαρσις* has been lost and the words following mutilated; wrongly

under which *κάθαρσις* and *διαγωγή* can be included.

4 καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς] Here καί= 'as well as.' For Aristotle would not separate from *πρακτικαὶ* and *ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ* ἀρμ. such others as, though ἡθικά, do not possess that character in the highest degree and so form the transition to one of the other two species. From Exc. IV these would seem to be the low-pitched Ionian and low-pitched Lydian. Since every painful emotion, though not of course every trace of emotion, is foreign to them, the ἡθικώταται would be exceptions: yet this is not expressly stated: much less is there any express statement that only 'ecstatic modes,' as Döring thinks, exert a cathartic influence, see n. (1101) p. 638 ff. (That this is my view and was maintained by me in *Fahrst. f. Phil.* LXXXV. 1863, p. 416 is admitted by Döring *Philologus* XXVII. p. 724, though I regret that in *Kunstlehre der Ars.* p. 283 he reprints unaltered an incorrect statement about it which appeared *Philol.* XXI. p. 501.) Not to mention others, the Doian melodies, apparently the most numerous of all, do not exert any cathartic influence. Further, the plural form in the mention of *πρακτικαὶ ἀρμολαὶ* should be noticed. Comp. Exc. IV. n. (1054), and § 5, τὰ μέλη with n. (1096). SUSSEX. (1097, 1098)

The important point to seize is that the ecstatic music had no direct ethical, but only a pathological, effect. In fact, the absence of a direct ethical effect prevents it from being used in education. Zeller, p. 774, n. (2).

§§ 4, 5 The link of connexion with the preceding seems to be that the public performance of music in the ecstatic 'modes' calls for justification. Döring differently (p. 256): "Every species of music has its special province, the 'ethical' music in *παίδειά*, the 'ecstatic' in *κάθαρσις* [see however n. 1007], the *πρακτικὴ* perhaps as military music. Besides this, every species of music may be used for enjoyment. This last proposition needs no further proof, so far as the first two

species ἡθικά and *πρακτικά* are concerned: in respect of ecstatic music it sounds a little startling. In order therefore to explain it, and the term *κάθαρσις* as well, Aristotle proceeds with §§ 4, 5. This enables him to give the explanation of *κάθαρσις* in general terms (*ἀπλῶς*) as the effect of certain melodies upon a form of religious frenzy, *κορυθαυσμός*." The fact last stated is partially corroborated by a passage from Aulus Gellius Quintilianus II. p. 157 Meib.; Döring p. 332. Translate: "For the emotion which violently affects some souls is present in all though in a greater or less degree. This is true of pity and terror, true also of ecstasy. Some persons are liable to seizure by this form of morbid excitement. Now as the effect of the sacred melodies we see that such persons, under the treatment of the melodies which excite frenzy in the soul, fall back into the normal state, as if they had undergone a medical cure or purgation." It is also possible to take ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν with *ἀρῶμεν*: 'we see from the sacred melodies etc.' Cp. Hengels p. 12 f.

7 οἷον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος] From the whole context it is more than probable that fear and pity are here adduced *not* with reference to their influence in Tragedy (see my *Introd.* to the *Poetics* pp. 36—67), but like ecstasy, with reference merely to the cathartic effect of music, so that the beneficial excitement of fear and pity by music expressing these emotions is here given by way of illustration. See c. § § 18 n. (1047), 7 § 3 (1084), § 5 (1096), § 8 (1101). SUSSEX. (1099)

With this view Mr Newman appears to concur: *Introd.* p. 366 "for though it might be thought that harmonies which arouse feelings of enthusiasm or fear or pity, and purge these emotions, are useful only to a few over-faithful spirits, this is not really so: all are more or less in need of music of this kind and relieved by it. The melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure."

Bernays in his usual manner completes the sentence thus: 'e.g. pity and terror

8 ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακάχημοι τινες εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν δ' (VI)
 10 ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιά-
 10 ζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυ-
 15 χόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν ε

8 δ'] δὲ before τῶν P⁴⁻⁶ L^a Ald. Bk., αἵτις 9 ἱερῶν P⁸ || 9 [ὅταν. .10 μελεσι] Susem.³, see p. 640 || 10 καθισταμένους II¹ P⁸ (collected by P¹) || τυχόντας M^a, τυχούσας possibly Γ || 11 [καὶ] Spengel, τῆς ? Ueberweg formally, <τῆς> [καὶ] Susem., see Comm. n. (1094) || δὲ Γ, perhaps rightly

(are violently present in those liable to pity and terror, but in a less degree in all men').

8 κατακάχημοι 'Liable to be possessed, attacked.' So also with ecstasy. Any one may be seized by slight frenzy, but in some it amounts to a disease, κορυβαντισμός. Plato uses κατακωχή for inspiration, *Phaedr.* 245 A, *Ion* 536 C. Cp. Zeller p. 777 n. 1. (Note that all the mss. agree here and 1269 b 30 in an irrational form. But in *Nic. Eth.* x. 9. 3, 1179 b 9 K^b gives κατακώχμων.)

ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν] Join with καθισταμένους, not with ὀρώμεν. See Burzian's *Jahresber.* LVII. p. 174 [and Bonitz *Inv. Ar.* 336 a 47]. These are assumed to be the same as the melodies of Olympus, mentioned c. 5 § 16. See Exc. II. p. 611. SUSEM. (1090)

9 ὅταν χρήσωνται] "When they have used the melodies" in the same sense in which we speak of using remedies. Cp. n. (1095), and p. 641 f. SUSEM. (1091)

Like κίνησις, καθίστασθαι, κομίζεσθαι, this is a medical term. Cp. Hippocr. III. 712 K. τῆσι φαρμακίᾳ χρῆσθαι, III. 859 κλυσιμῶσι χρῆσθαι, I. 82 τὴν αὐτὴν χρῆσιν (remedy, treatment) δεῖ προσδέχεσθαι (Doing). And this, notwithstanding the more general sense of τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι above, 1341 b 37. It might seem doubtful, from the context alone, whether the patient only listened to, or sang, the maddening strains. Aristides Quintil. implies that both were practised; *i.e.* κατασταλτέων (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν) φασὶν εἶναι τῇ μελωδίᾳ, ἥτοι καὶ αὐτοὺς μιμῆσαι τινὲ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἄλογον ἀπομαλισταμένους, .. ἢ καὶ δι' ἀκοῆς [δῶναι] φόβον τὸν τοῖνδε ἀποτρομένους, "the soul must, they say, be soothed by melody, either the patients themselves must appease its irrational state by a certain (musical) imitation (of the frenzy), or they must divert such terror from themselves by listening."

ἐξοργίζουσι] See ὀργαστικόν, 1341 a 23, n. (1072), and ὀργαστικὰ, 1342 b 3, n. (1107). SUSEM. (1092)

10 καθισταμένους] The expression pro-

perly means 'are cured,' 'recover' = return to themselves, as Düring has shown [see Steph. s. v. L. and S. quote only ἐκ τῶν καθ' Hippocr. 97, add I. 206, 208]. These terms however are not used of temporary, or palliative, restoration (such as is referred to here), but only of a permanent cure. In other passages of Aristotle καθίστασθαι simply means 'to calm oneself,' 'to settle down after excitement, with no suggestion of a medical sense: e.g. *De Memor.* c. 2 § 29, 453 a 271, διὰ καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ φόβου, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντικεινόντων πάλιν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, *De Somn.* c. 3 § 25, 461 a 25, ἢ δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μὴ νοσώδης (ἀναθυμίασις) καταφέρεται συνισταμένη. Even here this sense would be very appropriate. Cp. *κατάστασις Rhet.* I. II. 1, 1369 b 34. See also n. (1095), p. 640. SUSEM. (1093)

ὥσπερ ἰατρίας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως] The ὥσπερ marks the introduction of a metaphor: both ἰατρίας and καθάρσις then are metaphorical, the latter the more specific term (Bernays).

This does not hold in the case of those who are sound in mind and possess exactly the right measure of emotional excitability, not of those who are naturally too little disposed to emotion. As regards the former the medical analogy is only applicable in a precautionary sense, as when for instance a man of sound body must take bodily exercise to prevent illness, and in any case is refreshed and invigorated by a walk and finds pleasure and recreation in it. The latter are less susceptible to the power of music, and in so far as they are susceptible, it will be the excitable and not the purgative side of this homeopathy of the feelings which will be most prominent, that is to say the really homeopathic element will be least represented. SUSEM. (1094)

Comp. II. 7. 11, 1267 a 7 f., διὰ τὴν ταύτης (sc. ἐπιθυμίας) ἀδύνησιν ἰατρίας.

§ 5 "So too of necessity with those who are liable to pity and fear, and persons of emotional temperament in

καὶ τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς καὶ τοὺς δ' ὅλως πα- (VII)
θητικούς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιούτων
ἐκάστω, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κουφίζεσθαι
15 μεθ' ἡδονῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ †καθαργικὰ† παρέ-

12 τοὺς ἄλλους Α1., τοὺς <ἄλλους> ὅλως? Susem., ὅλως τοὺς Reiz not badly; but perhaps no change is needed. Doing (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 713) once conjectured [καὶ] τοὺς ὅλως now (*Épistémologie des Arts*. p. 257 n.) he prefers to accept the suggestion of Reiz || 15 καθαργικὰ Γ II Ar. Bk. Susem.¹ in the text and Thuiot, who assumed a lacuna before ὁμοίως needlessly, see Comm.; πρακτικὰ Sauppe

general, and with the rest of men in such measure as they are susceptible of this or that emotion; they have a like experience; they all undergo a purgation of some sort and feel a pleasurable relief." Under the former case (Corybantism) come only morbid patients: here the world at large are included. However slight the degree in which they are subject to pity and fear, still, so far as these passions have a hold upon them, they participate, in every-day life, in the same beneficial effect which frees the 'o'er-fraught heart' from its accumulation of emotion in critical moments. This is the normal effect of music and upon it attends the constant concomitant of normal activity, pleasure (*μεθ' ἡδονῆς*).

13 καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει In proportion to their susceptibility to such emotions. See 1260 a 19, 1261 b 35 n. Beinays p. 88 (188) shows that the cure of Bacchic delirium (Corybantism) was observed by Plato (*Lysis* VII. 790 f.), though he never applied it to anything but the nursing of infants. "Aristotle," observes Butler, "with his generalising faculty and his love of discovering unity in different domains of life, extended the principle to tragedy and hints at even a wider application." However, on the whole the two are violently opposed as to the treatment of emotion, Beinays p. 46 (164) ff.

14 τινα κάθαρσιν This implies that the *enthusiasis* is not in all cases, precisely of the same kind. The *catharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, that of 'enthusiasm' or morbid ecstacy. See the note on κάθαρσις p. 641. SUSEM. (1088)

κουφίζεσθαι For the medical sense see *Probl.* III. 17, 873 b 22 (of the disease); II. 22, 868 a 36, b 6; IV. 30, 880 a 33 (of the patient). Cp. Hippocr. I. 177, III. 715 K. (Dolling).

§ 6 15 τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαργικὰ] Thus

the authorities. Sauppe's emendation τὰ πρακτικὰ was adopted in Susem.². See Excursus V p. 638 f. especially p. 640 n. 1, and generally n. (1088). SUSEM. (1090)

In handling a *locus classicus* like this, excessive caution is no sin. Yet it must be allowed that the reading of the MSS. leaves the sentence enigmatical (1) Does it merely emphasize τὰ μέλη as opposed to ἀρμονίαι, a 4? This can hardly be, though apparently Mr Newman thus takes the passage (see the quotation given above after n. 1089). For μέλη are mentioned a 9 f., not to urge with Thuiot *Études* p. 103 that Aristotle as little distinguishes between ἀρμονίαι and μέλη as a modern critic between the keys in which music is written and the compositions themselves, passing naturally from the one to the other, and contrasting them indifferently with ῥυθμοί; see e.g. 6 § 5, 1341 a 1, 7 § 10, 1342 b 5 f. (2) Does it introduce a new species of airs? But surely, those treated in a 4—15 must be καθαργικὰ. The new species should be πρακτικὰ—of which nothing has been said. Unless indeed any one maintains, as against n. (1089), that the effect of tragedy is alluded to § 5, a 11—15, and thus apparently meaningless clause returns to the consideration of music. (3) Or does it introduce a new effect (καρὰ ἀδελφῆς) of the music whose cathartic effect has been described in 4—15? If so, the 'harmless delight' would be contrasted with the cathartic effect in which pleasure is blended with, and follows, painful emotions. Zeller p. 774 n. (a) says that music purges the παθητικόν, and affords enjoyment to all. Doing p. 260 finds a contrast between (1) the extraordinary, curative effect, κάθαρσις ἀπλῶς, of morbid patients (whether suffering from the malady of Bacchic frenzy, or hypochondria, through excessive pity and terror), and (2) the normal cathartic effect of ecstatic music heard at concerts under ordinary circum-

§ 6 χει χαρὰν ἀβλαβῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύ- (V
ταις ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεσι * * θετέον τοὺς τὴν
[θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ γ
θεατῆς διττός, ὃ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὃ δὲ
20 φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγ-
§ 7 κείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις
πρὸς ἀνάπανσιν· εἰσὶ δὲ ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ παρε-
στραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονικῶν

16 χάραν Π² (emended in P¹ by corr.¹) and P² (corr.¹) || 17 θετέον P² S^b T^b L¹ A¹.
Ald and P¹ (corr.¹) P¹ (1st hand, emended in the margin with γρ. prefixed), <χρη-
σθαι> ἐπείτεον Ed. Muller II. p. 63, <χρησθαι> θετέον Spengel, both plausible: Koias
detected the error: παιδευτέον Jebb || τοῖς P² S^b T^b and P¹ (in the margin, with
γρ. prefixed): omitted by M² || 18 θεατρικὴν written above the line as a gloss by
P², omitted by II¹ Ar. and P² (1st hand), added by Bk. with all other authorities ||
19 ἐλευθέριος ? Sussem. || 22 εἰσὶ ἐστὶ Bk.²

stances. Bernays translated (from Bekker's text): "now in the same manner as other means of *catharsis* the cathartic melodies procure for men innocent delight. Therefore it must be laid down by law that those who perform the music for the theatre" which is intended to provide innocent delight "should come forward with such modes and melodies." The objection to this is the forced meaning of *δυσίως*. The means of catharsis just mentioned are melodies: where is there a distinct suggestion of any other? Certainly not in τὰ τοῦτο πᾶσιν. Bursæ more-over *op. c.* p. 49 accepts the correction *πρακτικά*.

§ 6 "Hence it is such modes and such melodies that we must prescribe for the virtuosi, who take up music professionally, to employ in their performances. But as there are two types of audience, the one of birth and education, the other the vulgar audience of mechanics and day-labourers and the like, entertainments and competitions must be found to provide even these latter with recreation."

16 τοιαύταις] Namely, *καθαρικά*: see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 421 f.

17 θετέον] The construction with the dative would follow more smoothly if *χρησθαι* were supplied, or *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* in place of *ἀγωνιστάς*. Still the meaning is clear. In τοῖς...*μεταχειριζομένους* it is not hard to discover τοῖς αὐτῶ τοῦτο πεποιημένοις ἔργον καὶ τέχνην of c. 5 § 6, 1339 a 37. The care shown for the amusements of the lower class of citizens is worthy of Plato and the *Republic*.

20 ἐκ βαναύσων...*συγκείμενος*] As an attribute of *θεατῆς* this is curious. Perhaps we may cite as parallel Cic. *De Finibus* II. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus negotii est, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, ut *ad Alt.* IV. 15. 1, ut est ex me et ex te iunctus Dionysius M. Pomponius.

21. ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας] These musical contests and competitions seem to have excited the keenest interest, and to have led to brilliant pieces of extraordinary difficulty being practised even at school; c. 6 § 7, § 16.

§ 7 "Just as their souls are distorted from their natural state, so too amongst the musical modes there are some perverse forms and amongst melodies the high-strung and falsely coloured, but as its own natural affinity gives every class pleasure, we must allow the artists who perform before such an audience to use the corresponding style of music."

22 ὥσπερ αὐτῶν...*ἔξεως*] Comp. II. (103), and above c. 6 §§ 15, 16, II. (1080). But on the other hand see the praise of the great public as a critic in art II. 11. 2, II. (565 b). SUSSEM. (1097)

23 καὶ τῶν ἁρμονικῶν παρεκβάσεις] It is not easy to determine with certainty which modes are meant. Perhaps he was thinking of the 'wailing and mournful' music of the mixo-Lydian and high-pitched Lydian principally: it may have been of the 'lax and effeminate' low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian. See c. 5 § 2, also Exc. IV. II. (1054). SUSSEM. (1098)

παρεκβάσεις εἰςὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακε- (VII)
 25 χρωσμένα, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν
 οἰκεῖον, διόπερ ἀποδοτέον ἐξουσίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις πρὸς
 τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ χρῆσθαι τῷ γένει τῆς
 § 9 μουσικῆς)· πρὸς δὲ παιδεῖαν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν
 μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἀρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις. τοιαύτη
 30 δ' ἡ δωριστί, καθάπερ εἵπομεν πρότερον· δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ
 καὶ τινὰ ἄλλην ἡμῖν δοκιμάζωσιν οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς ἐν φι-
 § 9 λσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας. ὁ
 δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγιστὶ μῶντην

24 παρεκχωρημένα II¹ (emended by P¹ in the margin with γρ. misfined) and P²
 || 28 παιδῶν II¹ (emended by P¹ in the margin) and P² (1st hand, emended by corr.)
 || 30 δωριστὶ P⁴⁻⁵

24 παρεκχωρημένα] A technical term for varieties of the three *genera*—diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. See *Excursus* IV. p. 636. SUSKM. (1099)

25 ποιεῖ δὲ κατὰ] Apelt *Beitrag zur Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 325 (1) thinks this, in connexion with *N. E.* VII. 14. 2, 1154 n 12, points to a division of pleasures into *φυσικὰ* and *ἀναγκάσια*. He compares Epicurus' division of *ἐπιθυμίαι* and *ἡμετέριαι* *De Natura Hominis* c. 18 *περὶ ἡδονῶν*.

27 τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ] I.e. a corrupt, depraved style, in which 'colourings' and *nuances* i.e. transposed scales abound.

§ 8 28 ὥσπερ εἴρηται] In § 3, 1342 a 3, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδεῖαν ταῖς ἡθικοτάταις. See *Exc.* V. p. 638. SUSKM. (1100)

We have now reached the end of the long digression, §§ 4—7, following on the mention of modes suitable for public performance *πρὸς ἀκρόασιν ἐνέων χειρουργούτων*: we have in fact answered the first question of c. 7 § 1 *πότερον πάσαις χρῆσθαι*. The connexion of the whole passage, and the best way of meeting the difficulties presented by the text, is discussed *Exc.* V. p. 638 ff. SUSKM. (1101)

30 πρότερον] In c. 5 § 22, 1340 b 3 ff. *Comp.* II. (1054) p. 628. The previous statement (*ὥστε ἔχει μὲν μέσας καὶ καθόστηκός τις μάλιστα πρὸς ἐνέαν, ὅσον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δ. μὲν ἀρμονίαν*) is not quite to the same effect. In one sense it includes more than is found here; cp. II. (1109). What has been pointed out II. (1086) agrees with this. SUSKM. (1102)

δέχεσθαι δὲ δεῖ κατὰ] See II. (1086) for a conjecture as to the modes here intended. SUSKM. (1104)

31 οἱ κοινωνοὶ 32 παιδείας] Here the author of the division into three classes mentioned in § 3 is again most probably intended. See II. (1083). SUSKM. (1103)

Aristoxenus was at once a pupil of Aristotle's and an ardent musician, while on musical theory his *ἤλαι νομῆς* and the fragments of his *ῥυθμικὰ στοιχεῖα* are our highest authority. In Westphal's monumental work, the series *Theorie der musischen Künste der Hellenen* and the now completed edition *Aristoxenus, Melik und Rhythmik* (Leipzig, 1883 and 1893) everything has been done for this author. English readers unacquainted with Westphal's writings may with advantage consult Mr C. F. Abdy Williams' article on 'Ancient Metre' in *Classical Review* VII. p. 295 ff.

§ 9 *Socrates in the Republic is inconsistent: he rejects the flute, but tolerates the Phrygian Mode.*

ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σ.] This is the normal, explicit manner of referring to Socrates, the character in the dialogue 'The Republic,' and sufficiently accounts for the article in the abbreviated form δ *Σωκράτης*. Cp. II. on II. 1. 3, 1261 a 6.

The passage in *Rep.* III. 399 a runs thus: ἀλλὰ κινδυνεύει σοι δωριστὶ λήψεσθαι καὶ φρυγιστὶ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ἔφη ἐγώ, τὰς ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ λειπερὲς ἐκείνην τὴν ἀρμονίαν [i.e. the Dorian], ἣ ἐν τε πολέμικῃ πράξει ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἐν πάσῃ βίᾳ καὶ ἐργασίᾳ χρῆσθαι καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνησιν τε καὶ προσέβδιαν, καὶ ἀποτυχόντος ἢ εἰς τραγῆματα ἢ εἰς θανάτους ὄντος ἢ εἰς τινα ἄλλην συμφορὰν πεσόντος, ἐν πάσι τοῖσι παρατεταγμένοις καὶ κατεροπύτοις ἀρμονισμένοις τὴν τύχην· καὶ ἄλλην αὖ [the Phrygian]

- καταλείπει μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ὑποδοκιμάσας (VII
 1342 b τῶν ὀργάνων τὸν αὐλόν. ἔχει γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἢ
 φρυγιστὶ τῶν ἁρμονικῶν ἥνπερ αὐλὸς ἐν τοῖς ὀργανοῖς.
 § 10 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργαστικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ. δηλοῖ δ' ἡ ποίη-
 σις. πᾶσα γὰρ βακχεῖα καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις (v. 14
 5 μάλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς αὐλοῖς, τῶν δ' ἁρμο-
 νικῶν ἐν τοῖς φρυγιστὶ μέλεσι λαμβάνει ταῦτα τὸ πρέπον.
 οἶον ὁ διθύραμβος ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι δοκεῖ Φρύγιον.
 § 11 καὶ τούτου πολλὰ παραδείγματα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνε-
 σιν ταύτην ἄλλα τε, καὶ διότι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν

1342 b 2 φρυγιστὴ Γ || 8 δέγματα P⁴⁰ L¹

ἐν εἰρημικῇ τε καὶ μὴ βίᾳ ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκουσίῳ
 πράξει ὄντος, ἢ τινα τι πεποιητὸς τε καὶ
 δομῆναι, ἢ εὐχῇ θεὸν ἢ διδαχῇ καὶ νοου-
 τήσει ἀνθρώπων, ἢ τούτων ἄλλω δεσμένῳ
 ἢ διδάσκοντι ἢ μεταπειθόντι ἑαυτὸν ἐπέχο-
 ντα, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πράξαντα κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ
 μὴ ὑπερφάνως ἔχοντα, ἀλλὰ σωφρόνως τε
 καὶ μετρίως ἐν πᾶσι τοῖσι πράττοντά τε
 καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἀγαπῶντα. ταύτας δύο
 ἁρμονίας βίαιαν, ἐκούσιαν, δυστυχοῦντων,
 εὐτυχοῦντων, σωφρόνων, ἀνδρείων ἀνδρῶν
 φθόνους μίμνησται μάλιστα, ταύτας
 λέγει. As with the musical instruments,
 n. (1071), so in the case of the modes
 Aristotle is stricter than Plato, since in
 truth—see *met.* (1086, 1102, 1104, 1109)—
 the Dorian Mode is the only one which
 he retains for the purpose of moral
 education. SUSSEX (1106)

34 ἀποδοκιμάσας.....τὸν αὐλόν] Pl.
Rēp. III. 399 D: τὶ δέ, αὐλοποιὸς ἢ ἀθλη-
 τὰς παραδέξει εἰς τὴν πόλιν; ἢ οὐ τοῦτο
 πολυχρηστέον καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια
 αὐτὸν τυγχάνει ὄντα μίμημα; The ostensi-
 ble ground for its rejection is the com-
 plexity of its music. SUSSEX (1106)

1342 b 3 ἄμφω γὰρ ὀργαστικὰ καὶ
 We were told this before of the flute, c. 6
 § 9, 1341 a 22 ff., οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἡδὺν
 ἀλλὰ πολλὸν ὀργαστικόν; it has an in-
 intoxicating effect, tending not to form, but
 to purge, character. The Phrygian Mode
 again was described as relatively the
 most maddening and ecstatic, c. 5 § 22.
 The addition of the more general term
 παθητικὰ = 'passionate' here is a fresh and
 striking proof that the ecstatic modes, αἱ
 ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι, are not restricted
 to the expression or impression upon
 others of Ecstasy pure and simple. On
 the contrary, like the flute amongst musi-
 cal instruments, they are adapted gene-
 rally to portray and call up all emotions,

or at least all painful emotions—in the
 words of the text, 'all Bacchic frenzy and
 similar mental excitement.' Comp. *Esch.*
iv. p. 628 and *notes* (1089, 1047), also
 n. (1096) p. 643 SUSSEX (1107)

§ 10 *Phrygy shows this. When the
 subject is wild and delicious, as in a
 dithyramb, the music is set for the flute
 and the airs are in the Phrygian Mode.*
 The cogency of this illustration depends
 on the fact, which must always be borne
 in mind, that the Greek poet set his own
 words to music (precisely as in the Wag-
 neian opera): he also chose his own
 dance measures.

5 τῶν 8^ο ἁρμονικῶν ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι]
 See Thurot p. 103, (cited above p. 611
 upon § 6, 1342 a 15).

6 ταῦτα = βακχεῖα καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη κίνη-
 σις (subject).

§ 11 8 οἱ περὶ τὴν σύνεσιν ταύτην]
 An extraordinary phrase which we should
 expect οἱ περὶ ταῦτα συνελθόντες: i.e.
 musical critics, or connoisseurs. In Bonitz's
 words, σύνεσις is used 'oblique' = ἡ μου-
 σικὴ τέχνη.

9 Φιλόξενος] Of Cythra, born 459
 B.C., one of the most famous of the dithy-
 rambic poets. He lived for some time at
 the court of the elder Dionysius, who
 implicated him in the 'cone quaius' of
 Syracuse, where (according to one ac-
 count) he wrote his most noted dithyramb
Κύκλωψ. When brought out to listen to
 Dionysius' own compositions, he is said
 to have addressed the attendants in the
 words *ἔλτε λαοῦλας*, "Take me back to
 the quarries." See further respecting
 him Bernhardy *Gesch. d. griech. Littera-
 tur* II^e. p. 669 ff. (ed. 2), SUSSEX (1108)
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his criti-
 cism of the later dithyrambic poets, in-
 cluding Philoxenus, specially mentions

- 10 τῇ δωριστὶ ποιῆσαι διθύραμβον τοὺς μύθους οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν, (ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὴν φρυγιστὴ τὴν
12 προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν πάλιν. περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἡθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπα-
15 νοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φάμεν, ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἁρμονίας, φανερόν ὅτι τὰ Δω-
§ 13 ρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. (εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί, τό τε δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρόπον καὶ γὰρ τὰ δυνατόα δεῖ μεταχειρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ τὰ πρόποντα ἐκά-
20 στοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὀρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἄδειν τὰς συντόνους ἁρμο-

10 διθύραμβον τοῖς] διθύραμβικούς Ramus || Μουσὸς Schneidei Bk.², μούσους ? Schmidt, [τοὺς μύθους] Sauppe || 11 τὴν προσήκουσαν... 12 δωριστὶ omitted by P² || 12 δωριστὶ I', δωριστική Ald. || 17 τοὺς νεωτέρους Koiaes, possibly I', rightly || [εἰσὶ... 34 πρόπον] Susm.² Δ. see Comm. II. (1113) || 19 ἐκάστοις P¹, ἐκάστοις II.² Δ. || 21 χρῶν Μ², χρόνον P² Δ. II.² Bk., avoiding hiatus

their intermixture of styles and license in rhythm: αἱ δὲ γὰρ διθύραμβοι καὶ τοῦ τρόπου μετέβαλλον, Δωρίους τε καὶ Φρυγίους καὶ Λυδίους ἐν τῷ ᾠσμάτι ποιοῦντες καὶ τὰς μελωδίας ἐξέλλαττον... καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς κατὰ πολλὴν ἀδείαν ἐνεχουσιάζοντες διετέλουν· αἱ γὰρ δὴ κατὰ Φυλάξενον καὶ Τιμόθεον καὶ Τελεστήν· ἐπεὶ παρὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις τεταγμένοι ἦν οἱ διθύραμβοι, *De comico*. ενὶ 19, p. 131, 14 ff. ed. Reiske.

11 ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς] See § 13, 142 b 27, ἡ φύσις ὑποβάλλει also *Met.* 1. 3. 14, 984 b 9 f., ὅπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι ἐξήγησαν, and *Phys.* 1. 5. 6, 188 b 29 f.

§ 12 13 ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς οὔσης] See 1202 b 12 n. Comp. vi(14). 9. 7, 1294 b 20 The best explanation and parallels in I.obeck ad Soph. Aiac. 281. Frequent in Plato, e.g., *Phil.* 16 c, *Latius* 644 A, n. στασιμωτάτης] That the Dorian is the only mode which produces a sober and sedate frame of mind was said c. § 22, 1340 b 3. Comp. *notes* (1102, 1105). SUSM. (1109)

14 ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον κτλ.] See vi(14). 11. 4, 1295 b 3 f., ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτρον ὁριστὸν καὶ τὸ μέσον, n. (1290 b). SUSM. (1110)

15 ἡ δὲ δωριστὶ κτλ.] I.e. the Dorian melodies are principally of a middle compass. In contrast to this, melodies composed in the 'high-sung' (σύντονοι) and low-pitched (ἀνεμνέαι, χαλαραὶ) modes diverged from this middle compass to the

higher and lower parts of the octaves respectively. This is explained in *Excursus* III. n. (1054) p. 625. SUSM. (1111)

§ 18 18 σκοποί] πρὸς οὓς ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, 1341 b 15. That the choice of melodies must be regulated by what is practicable and what is becoming (sc. for the age and voice of the performers) is a truism, whoever enunciates it, see c. 6 § 3, n.

20 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα κτλ.] "But these conditions (viz. what is practicable and what is becoming) are defined by the age of the performers. For instance, it is not easy for those who are old and feeble to sing in the high-strung modes: nature suggests the low-pitched modes at their age."

21 διὰ χρόνον] διὰ c. gon. means (1) "after the lapse of some time" as in III. 1. 6, 1275 a 25, and vi(14). 15. 1, 1299 a 6, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμνήσκουσιν, αἱ δὲ δὲ ἐλάττωσι ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχαί. So in *Rhet.* 1. 11. 20, 1371 a 29 f., σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνον, a thing seen after an interval, an occasional enjoyment. Hence the distributive sense of διὰ τρίτον ἔτος 546 b 10, διὰ τρίτης (ἡμέρας) 594 b 21. (2) In διὰ βίον (4 times, cp. διὰ τινος χρ. 1272 b 13) it implies duration. With the accusative (as P² Δ. see *Crit.* n.) the sense is causal: those who fail by reason of age. This reading avoids the hiatus, which is in its favour. But the causal sense with gen. is admitted by Eucken p. 38, Hagfors p. 46: cp. 1337 a 36 (?), 1316 b 14 (αἰνῶν διὰ αἰών).

νίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνειμένας ἢ φύσις ὑποβάλλει τοῖς τηλι- (VII)
 § 14 κούτοις. διὸ καλῶς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο <τῷ> Σωκράτει τῶν περὶ 11
 τὴν μουσικὴν τινες, ὅτι τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας ἀποδοκι-
 15 μάσειεν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, ὡς μεθυστικὰς λαμβάνων αὐτάς,
 οὐ κατὰ τὴν τῆς μέθης δύναμιν (βακχευτικὸν γὰρ ἢ γε
 μέθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον) ἀλλ' ἀπειρηκυίας. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, δεῖ καὶ τῶν τοιού-
 § 15 των ἁρμονιῶν ἀπτεσθαι καὶ τῶν μελῶν τῶν τοιούτων. ἔτι
 30 δ' εἴ τίς ἐστί τοιαύτη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἢ πρέπει τῇ τῶν παλ-
 δων ἡλικίᾳ διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι κόσμον τ' ἔχειν ἥμα καὶ
 παιδείαν, οἷον ἢ λυδιστὶ φαίνεται πεπονθέναι μάλιστα τῶν

23 τῷ added by Wilson || 27 ὥστε <εἰ> Spengel || καὶ untranslated by Wil-
 liam, perhaps rightly: but 29 ἐτι δὲ may answer to this καὶ || 28 καὶ untranslated
 by William and Li., [καὶ] Κοιὰς || 30 ἢ Γ' Ald. || 32 παιδῶν C. E. Ch.
 Schneider (on Pl. Rep. III 399 A) || παιδείαν οἷον P² (1st hand, corrected by later
 hands), δίδουσι I² (οἷον added in the text and γρ. παιδείαν by p¹ in the margin of
 P²) and I² (corr.)

§ 14 23 <τῷ> Σωκράτει] I.e. in
 Plato Rep. III. 398 E: τίνες οὖν μαλακαὶ
 καὶ συμποτικαὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν; Ἰασί, ἢ δ'
 ὅς, καὶ λυδιστὶ, αἵτινες χαλαροὶ καλοῦνται.
 Ταῦτα οὖν, ὃ φησὶ, ἐπὶ πολέμοις ἀνδρῶν
 ἐστ' ἐτι χρήσιμα; Sussk. (1112)

25 ὡς μεθυστικὰς κτλ.] "On the
 assumption that this is drunken music,
 not in the sense of intoxication—indeed
 intoxication rather tends to excite mad
 revelry—but as being enervated." Bonitz
 is probably right in making 27 ἀπειρηκυίας
 acc. plur. Ind. A. 71 b 47, comparing
 24 τὰς ἀνειμένας ἁρμονίας: and so 'en-
 ervated,' languid, exhausted. Schneider
 preferred to regard it as gen. sing., but if
 that were so, surely we should expect
 αὐτῆς τῆς μέθης or some equivalent as
 the antithesis of τῆς μέθης ἀπειρηκυίας.

§§ 13—15 17 εἰσὶ δὲ . . 34 πρέπον] That this close of the chapter is a foreign
 addition is indicated by the square
 brackets, and must be admitted unless
 we choose to believe that Aristotle would
 again partially introduce by a side-wind
 the musical modes which he has already
 openly banished from education. Ais-
 tole recommends Dorian melodies for
 the instruction of the young on account
 of their middle compass: all other modes,
 'the most ethical' alone excepted, are
 excluded; also, he expressly warns us
 against any education for amusement, c. 5
 § 4. He distinctly forbids adults to sing

or play, c. 6 § 4, and consequently re-
 vives the introduction of 'practical'
 (πρακτικά) as 'ecstatic' Modes, as well
 as the less 'ethical' Modes, see n. (1087),
 to performances at which the citizens are
 auditors. The author of this addition,
 on the other hand, is anxious that the
 youth should also learn to sing in modes
 which, from the low compass of the melo-
 dies, are least suited to them and best
 adapted to be actually sung in their age.
 Now it is no doubt true that these low-
 pitched modes do not belong either to
 the 'practical' (πρακτικά) or to the
 'ecstatic' but to the 'ethical' class and
 appear to constitute the less ethical; see
 n. (1054, 1087). It is further true that
 Aristotle allows the citizens of his ideal
 state an occasional language for relaxation
 and recreation, IV(VI). 17. 11, cp. n.
 (966), and at such times probably also
 permits them the exceptional privilege of
 singing (see c. 5 § 8 with n. 1028, 1067).
 It is true that the description of the low-
 pitched keys here given (ἀπειρηκυίας)
 points, like Plato's Rep. 398 n, see n.
 (1112), to the appropriateness of their em-
 ployment on such occasions. Finally it
 cannot be denied that the idea of learning
 something in youth, which may afford
 amusement in later life, is not wrong in
 itself (c. 4 §§ 5—7), though in the present
 instance inadmissible, because for mere
 amusement it is not necessary to learn to

33 ἀρμονιών, ἡ * + δῆλον ὅτι τρεῖς τούτους ὄρους ποιητέον εἰς τὴν (VII) παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον * *]

33 ἡ after ἀρμονιών added by P¹ and P³ (coll.¹), omitted by all other authorities Ar Bk. || * + δῆλον Combing, δῆλον <ὄν> δτι Schneidei || τρεῖς after ὄρους M² P³ J¹ Bk. || τούτους Γ || οὗς ὄρους omitted by P¹ (1st hand), the lacuna left being filled in with another ink, ὄρους omitted by Γ P³ || 34 παιδὶν P², παιδὶν P¹ (1st hand, corrected by p¹ in the margin) || πρέπον * + William (*renduntur huius operis in greco nondum inventi*)

sing and play yourself, when you can get others to perform to you, c. 5 § 8: cp. *nm.* (1014, 1015, 1036) However, this is quite enough to condemn the proposed instruction of boys in melodies to be hereafter sung at drinking parties. Aristotle would have been much more concerned to practise the young in the 'practical' (*πρακτικά*) and esthetic melodies, in order to educate their taste for the end of the highest intellectual enjoyment. But he obviously thought: teach a boy to sing and play minor tunes, and amid the mirth and gaiety of a banquet he will surely, if so inclined, be able to sing melodies in the major modes, and appreciate them at musical performances intended for true aesthetic enjoyment.

And now let us consider for one moment the illogical sequence of the whole passage. The introduction "*but* in musical instruction, as in all else, we should keep in view what is practicable and what is fitting" stands in no conceivable logical connexion with what precedes. Has the previous restriction of musical teaching to the Dorian and the related Modes any other object except to secure for the young what is practicable and fitting, because suited to their capacity? Even the casual remark at the close, 1342 b 14 ff., that just on account of its middle compass the Dorian Mode is specially adapted to induce moral virtue, which is a mean between two extremes (see *n.* 1111), is directed simply to what is fitting. This the interpolator has failed to recognise, for he brings in the Mean as a third aim, different from the possible and the fitting. He has not then perceived that the medium compass of the Dorian Mode is only a secondary reason and not the sole reason for preferring it. Starting from the strangely perverse notion that this was the only reason, he felt bound to assign some part to propriety and the possible, and so he goes on to remark that not only the possible but also the fitting is determined by grad-

tions of age, a mere truism as regards the latter point, since the interpolator has expressly stated that by what is fitting for youth he understands (*κόσμος ἡμέα καὶ παιδεία*) grace (decorum) and moral culture. But, first, a word as to possibility or capacity. It might have been thought that according to this standard boys should be taught to sing in the modes best adapted to their age from the compass of the melodies. Instead of this exactly the opposite inference is drawn, that they require further instruction in those modes which are better adapted, or only adapted, to older people. Secondly, from the point of view of what is becoming for boys the Lydian Mode is especially recommended,—just as though Aristotle had not himself prescribed the Dorian Mode from the same point of view as almost the only one permissible. Had he intended to assign to the Lydian Mode a special place beside or next to the Dorian, he would have found an opportunity in § 8, 1342 a 30, instead of merely referring to the decision of professional musicians, who are at the same time philosophers, the question what modes, other than the Dorian, may be employed in the education of the young. As we shall see in *Evo.* IV, Aristotle himself probably did not reckon the Lydian among the ethical modes at all, but among the *πρακτικά*. The distinction made by the interpolator between outward decorum and inner moral culture, *κόσμον ἔχειν καὶ παιδείαν*, cannot appear genuinely Aristotelian to any reader of the *Ethics*, for in Aristotle's view the man of moral virtue and he alone behaves with outward propriety, and the habit of behaving thus even counts among the moral virtues: see *Nic. Eth.* IV. cc. 6—8 (12—14 Bekker). And is not decorum just as fitting for adults as for children? Or has *κόσμος* a different meaning from decorum? A further error of the writer is apparent from a lacuna in the text where even the sense cannot be supplied. The ἡ pre-

served in two MSS would seem to indicate (a) that he had discovered something else besides propriety and moral culture, which is more suitable to children than to adults, and had smuggled in a new mode to serve this purpose: or else (b) this η marks the transition from the possible and fitting to the Mean, τὸ μέσον, which, as well as τὸ δυνάμει and τὸ πρό-
παιον, is the subject of the last sentence with its mutilated commencement. In short, though in this book Aristotle has often been inconsistent and obscure, has

fallen into apparent or perhaps actual contradictions, as may be seen from *Notes* (993, 1000, 1003, 1015, 1024, 1027, 1038, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1045, 1059, 1062, 1067, 1079, 1094, 1096, 1098, 1101, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1109), yet all this goes beyond anything we can attribute to Aristotle himself. Indeed it would be paying the writer too high a compliment to look for him in the ranks of Aristotle's immediate pupils. He would seem to have been a Peripatetic of a later date. *SUSEM.*
(1118)

EXCURSUS I.

ARISTOTLE'S SCHEME OF EDUCATION.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστότεον τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστότεον, ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτιν (μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσουατέον)...ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἥβης ἔτη τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις μαθήμασι γίνωνται, τότε ἀρμόττει καὶ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς ἀναγ-κοφαγαῖς καταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἐχομένην ἡλικίαν. V(VIII). c. 4 §§ 7—9, 1338 b 39—41, 1339 a 4—7.

This passage furnishes most of the scanty information we gain respecting the education of the citizens as a whole. Aristotle distinctly states that gymnastic training must come first, c. 3 § 13, 1338 b 5 f. *n.* (1003). He makes the first easy course of gymnastics to extend from the seventh year, IV(VII). 17. 15, to the age of puberty, gives the next three years, from 14 to 17, to the remaining subjects of education, and then appoints a stricter course of military drill lasting to the twenty-first year, to fit the youth for service in the army. This arrangement differs materially from that of Plato, *n.* (970), in the longer period assigned to gymnastics as compared with the other subjects to be learnt. On the other hand, it has been shown in the *Introd.* p. 51, from a comparison of c. 3 § 10, 1338 a 31—34, with c. 5 § 4, 1339 a 29 f., *n.* (1024) that a higher scientific training was intended to follow, as in Plato's scheme, after the twenty-first year, especially in the principal subjects, most probably in pure and applied mathematics and finally in philosophy (*παιδεία διευθέριος καὶ καλῆς*). These are the higher sciences (*τὰ περὶ τὰς*) mentioned c. 2 § 2, 1337 a 42, *n.* (979), of which it is not true, as it is of other studies (or at any rate, most other studies, including even proficiency in gymnastics and music; see c. 2 § 5, *n.* 982) that, while not in themselves derogatory to a free man, they cannot be carried beyond a certain point without risk of *βαναυσία*.

Aristotle's ideal state is not therefore, like Plato's Republic, in the last resort a preparation for another world, for he ignores individual immortality. It is quite as much a school of intellectual study as of morality: it is in the former aspect that its highest end is attained, cp. *Introd.* p. 48 f. But in the sequel wherever the word *παιδεία* is employed, c. 5 § 9, 1339 b 12, c. 6 § 7, 1341 a 13, § 9, 1341 a 18, 20, c. 7 § 1 ff., 1341 b 25, 29, 38, 1342 a 3, 28, 32 etc., it almost always denotes the early training, in the narrower sense of the term, before the twenty-first year (even *μάθησις* is so used c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23), and hence that development of character of which the young are susceptible as they grow up, viz. the acquisition of moral habits, rather than that development of reason and the understanding which is only attainable

at a ripe age by instruction, experience, or personal reflection and inquiry. Nevertheless a certain tendency in this direction is clearly inseparable from the formation of character in the young, since without it even moral habits could not be acquired: see *u.* (1045). But Aristotle distinctly regards the speculative enjoyment, the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful creations of imitative art as one factor in that highest intellectual gratification which in his judgment constitutes the true end of life and the height of human happiness. The question arises then: Would he have prohibited the citizens of his ideal state from engaging in the creation of such works of art? That instrumental performers and solo-singers living by the practice of their art, indeed all professional musicians, would have been classed with *τεχνῖται* or paid professionals would be quite certain even if we had not his repeated assurances to this effect, c. 5 § 8, c. 6 §§ 4—8, 15, 16. Actors he would doubtless have treated in the same way, especially as in Greece they were all trained to dance and sing on the stage in solo parts. Nor would he have been likely to show more consideration to the rhapsodists. Even for the purposes of singing and dancing in the dramatic, as in most of the lyric choruses, some sort of professional training was required; while the leader of the chorus was certainly obliged to be a skilful solo singer. The prohibition to practise music in later life c. 6 § 4, 1340 b 37 ff., *u.* (1067) sounds so uncompromising that even the equally precise statement, "no well-bred gentleman ever sings or plays, unless it be over his wine or for a jest" (*καὶ τὸ πρᾶττον οὐκ ἄνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παύσαντος*, c. 5 § 8, 1339 b 9, *u.* 1029), barely justifies the inference that on exceptional festive occasions this prohibition ceases to apply. Of any further concession, permitting the citizens to sing in the lighter lyric choruses, no trace can be found. For all these arts, then, only strangers, aliens, and freedmen are available in the ideal state. Even creative artists, who live by their art, and similarly, no doubt, writers of comedies, farces, and the like, cannot be conceived as occupying a different position. But we need not hence infer that Aristotle would have objected to see amongst his citizens such masters of sculpture and painting as Polygnotus (c. 5 § 7), Pheidias and Polycletus (*Nic. Eth.* VI. 7. 1, 1141 a 10 ff.); or such tragic poets as Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Theocritus. Very possibly he may have hoped that his educational course would prove exactly fitted to produce just such men in his state, men who like the rest of his citizens are of course in easy circumstances, obliged, and at the same time competent, to renounce all thought of a return for their art in money or money's worth. "It is inconceivable," remarks Bradley, *Hellenica* p. 214 *u.*, "that Aristotle, with his high view of art, should have considered his account of *βαναυσία* applicable to Phidias; but probably the following typically antique passage would not have sounded so strange to him as it does to modern ears: 'If a man applies himself to servile or mechanical employments his industry in these things is a proof of his inattention to nobler studies': *καὶ οὐδεὶς εὐφύης νέος ἢ τὸν ἐν Πίλῳ θαλάσσης διὰ γενέσθαι Φειδίας ἐπεθύμησεν ἢ τὴν Ἑρᾶν τὴν ἐν Ἀργεὶ Πολύκλειτος, οὐδ' Ἀνακρέων ἢ Φιλήτας ἢ Ἀρχιλόχος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι τοῖς ποιήμασι*: Plutarch, *Vita Pericles* c. 2, p. 153 A." SUSEM. (1016)

EXCURSUS II.

THE COMPOSITIONS OF OLYMPUS.

τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, V(VIII). c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 9 f. Cp. ἐκ τῶν δ' ἑρῶν μελῶν ὁρώμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ἑξαργύξουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μάλιστα, καθισταμένους ὥστερ λατρείας χρύοντας καὶ καθάρσεως, c. 7 § 4, 1342 a 8—11.

Olympus, like Musaeus *n.* (1034), is not an historical character, but personifies in legend the earliest development amongst the Greeks, principally under Phrygian influence, of instrumental music for the flute: see Exc. IV. *n.* (1078). For apparently all the pieces ascribed to him which were preserved until Aristotle's times and later were purely instrumental compositions for the flute (see Bergk *Poet. Lyr.*⁴ p. 809 f.) or nothing but αἰλητικοὶ νόμοι, as they were called; cp. *n.* (17) to my edition of the *Politics*. Some of them were older than any other pieces of music, instrumental or vocal, then extant (Glaucus apud Plutarch. *De Musica* 5, 1132 E, F), and on this account Olympus was regarded among the Greeks as the originator of artistic music. Plut. *ῥ. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *ῥ. c.* 11, 1135 B: cp. Glauc. *l. c.* But others were of later date than Terpanides, and even than Thaletas⁵, see *nn.* (419, 788). Musical connoisseurs in antiquity, such as the tragic poet Piatinas, who easily recognized the difference, made an attempt to distinguish an older from a younger Olympus, the latter a descendant of the former, and to ascribe to the younger those νόμοι of Olympus which exhibited a more advanced artistic development, for example, a νόμος πολυκέφαλος, so called from the number of its preludes. Others went further and invented a pupil of this younger Olympus, Ciates by name, to whom they assigned the authorship of the πολυκέφαλος. Another of these airs (νόμοι), called ἀρμάτιος, of far older date, was admitted by all the critics to be the work of the earlier Olympus: see Plut. *l. c.* 7, 1133 D ff. Besides these we know of an air composed in the Phrygian Mode (see Exc. IV) in honour of Athens, called ἀρθεός, the prelude to which was in different time from the body of the air (Dio Chrys. I. ad init., Aristox. apud Plutarch. *ῥ. c.* 33, 1143 B; cp. Plat. *Crat.* 417 E), another in honour of Ares (Plut. *ῥ. c.* 29, 1141 B), a dirge upon Python, the earliest composition in the Lydian Mode (Aristox. apud Plutarch. 15, 1136 C), also compositions in honour of Cybele called μηρηφῶι (Plut. *l. c.* 29, 1141 B, Aristox. apud Plutarch. *ῥ. c.* 19, 1137 D).

¹ The reference to the oldest flute-players can only apply to Olympus and his school. There can be no doubt that, as Bergk and Westphal agree, αἰλητικῶν and αἰλητικῶν should be read in this passage, instead of αἰλητῶν and αἰλη-

τικῶν.

² For the introduction of the paeonian or crotic rhythm into artistic music is rightly ascribed to Thaletas, and in the prelude to the air in honour of Athens ascribed to Olympus this rhythm occurs.

As to the strange effect of these musical compositions, Plato says much the same thing, that they possessed a specially overpowering and extravagantly exciting character, and discovered such as feel a longing desire for the gods and their worship¹. Undoubtedly such airs and, in particular, those of them composed in the ecstatic Phrygian Mode (see Exc IV. p. 628 and *n.* 1107), are the 'sacred melodies' from which Aristotle c. 7 § 4, *n.* (1090), demonstrates the purifying effect of music in its most original form, since through the ecstasy which these airs awaken morbid ecstasy is expelled. This homoeopathic purgation from excitement is present to Aristotle's mind here, though all he alludes to is the arousing of the ecstasy by which it is effected. All the more noteworthy, then, is the inference here from this well known purgative (cathartic) effect of music to the possibility of a moral effect. However carefully they are distinguished (c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 21 f., c. 7 § 3 ff.), these two kinds of influence must have much in common. SUSEM. (1042)

EXCURSUS III.

ETHOS OR CHARACTER.

ὁ δ' ἐθουσιαισμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἥθους πάθος ἐστίν, V(VIII) c. 5 § 16, 1340 a 11 f.

Döring *Kunstlehre des Aristoteles* p. 335 ff. (*Philologus* XXVII. p. 705 ff.) has proved that in this passage, as well as in c. 2 § 1, 1337 a 39, *n.* (977), and elsewhere, the expression 'character of the soul,' τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς (or τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν) ἥθος, or 'character' only, must be taken to mean *not* the more or less fixed special state of a man in regard to moral virtue and vice generally, or to this or that virtue and vice in particular, and hence in regard to his relation to the emotions, but the moral nature² itself, the seat of desire and mental emotion, as the subject of the particular state in question: cp. *nn.* (40, 641, 786, 935, 790). But two things make it impossible to accept this explanation without modification. In the first place, if we look more closely, *n.* (1022), it appears that this 'oicetic' soul is also that within us by which we feel every kind of pain or pleasure, so that the influence of music upon the character in this sense might equally be said to consist in the recreative pleasure with which music tickles the ear. In the second place, the inference that "because music undoubtedly calls forth the primary emotion of ecstasy, it must therefore affect that part of the soul which is the seat of the emotions as well as of the moral virtues and vices" is quite sound, but does not in the least prove what Aristotle is anxious here to prove, namely, that music can

¹ Plato *Sympos.* 215 c: Σοκράτης ὡς ἡ Μαρσύνης; ὁ μὲν γὰρ δι' ὀργάνων ἐκφέρει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ στόματος δυνάμει, καὶ ἐστὶν νομὴ οἷον τὰ ἐκείνου αὐτῇ ἢ γὰρ Ὀλύμπιος ἡθλοῖται, Μαρσύου λέγω, τοῦ διδάξ-

αντος. τὰ οὖν ἐκείνου ἐάν τε ἀγαθὸς αὐλῆς τῆς αὐτῇ ἐάν τε φαύλης αὐλητρὸς, μόνον κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ θελοῖ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελευτῶν δεομένους διὰ τὸ θεῶν εἶναι.

² τὸ ὀικητικόν, the 'oicetic' soul.

be employed in the acquisition of the aptitudes or formed states (*ἕξεις*) called moral virtues. 'Influence upon the character' means here nothing more than the process of acquiring—or more correctly, assistance in the process of acquiring—those formed states, as is plain from the whole context, while it is also expressly laid down in the explanation that this influence makes us 'attain this or that distinctive state in respect of character'¹ through the intervention of music (cp. *Poet.* 6 § 12 f., 1450 a 19 f.)². Thus the phrase 'character,' or 'character of the soul,' cannot mean that part of the soul *in itself* but only (1) in so far as it already possesses those excellences or their opposites in the form of natural aptitudes, or favourable dispositions towards this or that virtue, or emotion, or their opposites,—*φυσικὰ ἕξεις*, *φυσικὰ ἀρετὰ* (καὶ κακίαι) as Aristotle calls them, *N.E.* VI. 13. 1 f., 1144 a 1—14 (cp. above *Pol.* IV [VII]. 13 11, n. 888), and (2) in so far as it already is gradually acquiring this or that moral virtue or its opposite, as they are concerned not simply with actions, *πράξεις*, but with emotional excitements or feelings (*πάθη*, *N.E.* II. 6. 10, 1106 b 16 ff.). From this it is apparent that the growth of moral 'habit' may be fostered by excitement of the feelings, and hence that the real inference to draw is this: "because music can undoubtedly call forth feelings, at least in the case of ecstasy, it must probably, if not necessarily, be capable of being employed to foster moral habits." Thus, according to Aristotle, emotion as a passive excitement belongs to the irrational soul just so far as the soul is capable of receiving, and does receive, a character, and can itself be called 'character' precisely as a man of bad, or strong, or brave, or just, or temperate character is said to be himself such a character. Even love and hatred are but emotions, and yet, as Aristotle immediately says, cp. *III.* (1022, 1044), all moral action is based upon love of good and hatred of evil. Take such a passage as Döring quotes from *Rhet.* II. 9. 1, 1386 b 12 ff., § 5, b 33 ff., to the effect that certain emotions belong only to a good, and others only to a bad character³: the simple consideration that courage is an emotion of the brave man and fear of the coward shows most plainly that Döring's explanation requires to be modified. It is only in this way that we can understand why Aristotle c. 5 § 18, cp. *n.* (1047), ranks the emotions, e.g. anger, among peculiarities of character (*ἡθικά*) side by side with the moral virtues, e.g. meekness, courage, temperance, and even proceeds to call these peculiarities of character §§ 20—22, cp. *n.* (1048) themselves characters (*ἡθῆ*), whilst in other places, such as c. 7 §§ 3—11, *Poet.* I. 6, 1447 a 27 f., cp. *n.* (1084), he holds fast by the difference so commonly recognized among the Greeks between emotion (*πάθος*),

¹ *ποιοῦντες τὰ ἡθῆ γινόμεθα*, 1340 a 7.

² *εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ ἡθῆ ποιοῦντες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τούτων-τίον' ὀδικοὺν ὅπως τὰ ἡθῆ μετασφρατίζονται πρᾶτ-τουςιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡθῆ συμπαράλαμβάνουσιν διὰ τὰς πράξεις.*

³ καὶ ἀμφὸς τὰ πάθη (sc. εὐδαίμων καὶ νε-μεσιῶν) ἡθῶν χρηστοῦ. [Döring argues thus: *πάθος* is in this and other passages ascribed to *ἡθῆ*, but *Nic. Eth.* II.

5. 1, 1105 b 20, *πάθος* is said to be *ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ*, while from *Rhet.* II. 12. 1, 1388 b 30, we gather that *ἡθῶς* (like *ψυχῆ*) includes more under it than *πάθος* only. Hence he considers himself justified in equating *ἡθῶς* with *ψυχῆ ἀρετικῆ*, and would explain *Pol.* V (VIII). 5. 16, 1340 a 6, as a case where the more special term *ἡθῶς* is combined with the more general term *ψυχῆ*.]

in the sense of a passing burst of feeling, and character (*ἦθος*) in the sense of a permanent moral state, which is the fixed and standing temperament of each man, composed of the various moral virtues and vices specially belonging to that particular individual. Döring p. 156 f. from his own line of thought finds this strange and cannot refrain from attempting to whittle away the meaning by forced ingenuity. Even at the end of § 21, cp. π. (1052), an artist 'full of character' (*ἡθικὸς*) does not mean a sculptor or painter who depicts emotions, but one who depicts characters in this narrower sense, who indeed, to speak still more accurately, represents noble characters, no matter whether in a state of emotion or free from emotion. Even the separate moral virtues are called 'characters' *Nic. Eth.* VI. 13. 1, 1144 b 4, or as we should say 'qualities of character.' The expression τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθους πάθος 'an emotion of the character of the soul' = ὁ πάσχει τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἦθος, suggests the radical meaning of πάθος 'suffering.' SUSEM. (1048)

EXCURSUS IV.

ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC: MODES, RHYTHMS,
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS, SCALES:
NOTES 1054, 1056, 1078, 1099.

MODES.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, ὡς πρὸς τὴν μισολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνουαν, ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, ὡς δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ θαριστὶ μόνῃ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοῖς δ' ἡ φρυγιστὶ.....) C. 5 §§ 21, 22, 1340 a 38—b 5.

"Melodies, on the other hand, give us substantive *imitations* of character. This is manifest. The temper of the several musical modes is so essentially distinct that the hearers are affected with a corresponding variety of mood. Some, such as the semi-Lydian, tend to wrap the spirit in grief and gloom; others, the luxurious relaxed modes, touch it to a softer case; the Dorian seems alone in producing a sober and sedate frame of mind; the Phrygian kindles enthusiasm."¹

We feel a similar difference in the impression made upon us by the major and minor keys, the only two species of keys we possess, which differ from each other in having a major and minor third respectively. In the scale without signature we take as key-notes only A (1a) and C (ut)², and

[¹ This version is largely indebted to Prof. Jebb: see *Translations* p. 121.]
[² *Do* is often used instead of *ut*.]

so obtain A minor and C major scales. But the Greeks must have taken every other note of the octave in turn for key-note; so that they obtained seven Modes, i.e. 'Harmonies' (*ἁρμονίαι*), or 'Species of Octaves' (*εἰδη τῶν τοῦ διὰ πρῶτον*)¹, as they were called by the school of Aristoxenus and by Ptolemy.—

- (1) BC D EF G a b², Mixolydian;
- (2) C D EF G a bc³, Lydian;
- (3) D EF G a bc d , Phrygian;
- (4) EF G a bc d e , Dorian;
- (5) F G a bc d ef , Hypolydian;
- (6) G a bc d ef g , Ionian;
- (7) A BC D EF G a, Aeolian.

The Aeolian Mode was by later writers on the theory of music called Hypodorian (Heracleid apud Ath. XIV. 624 E), and what they called Hypophrygian was to all appearance the same as Ionian. In this way there only remain three distinct names of Modes, Dorian, Lydian, Phrygian, and the Modes similarly designated Hypodorian, Hypolydian, Hypophrygian stand in exactly the same relation to the former three; the Hypodorian and the Dorian, the Hypolydian and the Lydian, the Hypophrygian and the Phrygian Modes are respectively the same, only with this difference that in each case a melody in the first named mode ends on the key-note (tonic) whilst in the last named it ends on the fifth (dominant). The first way of ending is usual with us, the latter an unusual exception, but among the Greeks on the contrary the latter was the normal ending, the former being considered subsidiary as is shown by the "hypo-," and it is therefore clear that the Lydian Mode, though it closely resembles our Major, yet by no means coincides with it. Lastly, the Mixolydian Mode according to Westphal⁴ and Gevaert⁵ was a Phrygian or Ionian ending on the third, and corresponding to it there was also a 'high-strung' Lydian, a second mode in A besides the Aeolian. We are not told whether the Dorian or Aeolian Mode was also modified in this way, which would have given rise to a second mode in C; Westphal thinks it possible that a Boeotian Mode mentioned in the scholia on Aristoph. *Eg.* 985 may be the one in question. Compositions of this kind must at any rate have been produced very seldom. The terms high-strung (*ὀνόρροια*) and low-pitched (*ἀνεμῆναι*) are only applied to the Lydian and Ionian, and if this is all correct, neither Hypolydian nor Mixolydian can have been the original designations for the modes of those names,

¹ Also called *ῥόποι*, but improperly so, because that is the word used for transposition-scales. [The word *species* itself is used in Dict. of Antiquities, Art. 'Music,' for *ἁρμονία* or *εἶδη τῶν τοῦ διὰ πρῶτον*: for *ῥόποι* the writer uses 'key.' As to 'key-note' see n. p. 637 f.]

² Where the interval is a full tone, the letters have been placed further apart;

for an interval of a semitone they are closer together.

³ ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si.

⁴ *Gr. Mus. i* 1st edition II. 1. p. 342 ff., second edition I. p. 266 ff., *Gesch. der alten und mittelalterlichen Musik* (Breslau 1865) p. 21 ff., 167 ff.

⁵ *Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité* (Gent 1875) I. p. 146.

but the first must have been called low-pitched Lydian, the second high-pitched Ionian, and as contrasted with the latter that which is known as the Ionic Mode would be low-pitched Ionian, although according to the analogy of the Lydian the names high Phrygian and low Phrygian would be expected to be applied to these two modes. The number of modes will thus be raised from seven to eight at least, and a further one must be added, a third mode in A, the Locrian (Pseudo-Eucl. *Harm* p. 18, Bacch p. 19, Gaudent. p. 20 Meib.), which was invented by Xenocritus of Locri (Callim. in Schol. Pind. *Ol.* XI. 117) about the time of Thaletas (see n. 419), commonly employed in the time of Simonides and Pindar, but afterwards fell out of use (Heraclid. in Ath. XIV. 625 E). As Gaudentius expressly states that the seventh species of octave admitted of a twofold division, according as either the fifth (as is the case with the Acolian or Hypodorian Mode) or the fourth is to be taken for the closing note, no doubt this second case represents the Locrian Mode. To the question, why the Mixolydian received that name, though it is a species of the Phrygian, Gevaert replies p. 188 ff., that, as the ancients observed (Plut. *De Mus.* 16, 1136 E), it was the counterpart of the low-pitched Lydian, since the sequence of intervals in the one is exactly contrary to that in the other, the Mixolydian scale having a sequence of a half tone, two whole tones, a half tone and three whole tones descending, the Hypolydian the same sequence in ascending :

BC D EF G A b, Mixolydian (ascending)
 b A G FE D CB, Mixolydian (descending)
 F G a bc d ef, Hypolydian (ascending),

and moreover, because in these two modes alone only a single division into the fourth and fifth is possible in the ascending scale, viz., in the Mixolydian into the fourth and fifth, in the Hypolydian reversely into the fifth and fourth, because in the former the first fifth, ascending B to F, is diminished, and in the latter the first fourth, F to b, is augmented :

Fourth	Fifth	
BC D EF	G A b,	Mixolydian,
diminished Fifth		
Fifth	Fourth	
F G a bc d ef,		Hypolydian,
augmented Fourth		

To this must be added the fact that the Mixolydian Mode ends the melody with the third, in common (not indeed with the low-pitched Lydian, but) with the 'highly strung' Lydian, and this, says Gevaert, appears to have been the really decisive analogy in the eyes of the ancients, for Plato (*Rep.* III. 398 E) says both these keys convey an impression of wailing and lamentation. Lastly in regard to the terms *σύντροποι* 'highly strung' and *ἀσυνέμεινοι* 'relaxed,' which in strictness can only mean raised and lowered in pitch (since the tightening of the string produces a higher note), Gevaert (p. 175) proposes to

explain them by saying that the high-pitched Lydian and the high-pitched Ionian or Mixolydian melodies seem to have principally employed the higher part of their compass and to have gone in this direction beyond their proper octave. In the case of the low-pitched modes, the Hypolydian and Ionian, the opposite would have to be proved, and Gevaert might have supported his theory by the statement made in c. 7 § 13 f, though not by Aristotle (see n. 1113), that men advanced in life could not manage the high-strung keys, but found the low-pitched ones naturally more suitable to them. But putting aside the Locrian Mode and the points in this explanation most liable to be disputed, viz.—whether the Hypolydian and low-pitched Lydian Modes, the Hypophrygian or Ionian and the low-pitched Ionian¹, the Mixolydian and the high-pitched Ionian are in each case one and the same, and whether the last together with the high-pitched Lydian Mode really differed

¹ That this cannot have been the case will be seen below. Still less can I agree in the views of another expert who has investigated this subject, C. v. Jan *Die Tonarten des Platon im dritten Buch der Republik, Jahrb. für Philol.* xcv. 1867, p. 815 seqq. According to him the high-strung and low-pitched Lydian are considered to be the two subdivisions of the Lydian as distinguished from the Hypolydian, just as the high-strung and low-pitched Ionian are subdivisions of the Ionian. Jan thinks that to obtain an Aeolian octave from the fundamental Dorian octave, of g a b c d e, all that was necessary was to tune the second string (*παρυρδρην*) half a tone higher (♯); to obtain a Phrygian it would be necessary also to tune the sixth half a tone higher (♯); for a Lydian you might either raise four strings (f♯, g♯, a♯, b♯) or lower three (b, a, b); and for an Ionian

there was a similar choice between raising three (f♯, g♯, a♯) or lowering four strings (b, a, b, a♯). A double method was similarly possible for obtaining a Mixolydian scale, either by raising six notes (c♯, f♯, g♯, a♯, c♯, d♯) or lowering b (*παρυρδρην*) to b♭, but only the first was called Mixolydian, and it cannot be decided how this came about. The Hypolydian, he thinks, could be derived in both ways, but had originally no special name, because it was not readily capable of practical employment owing to the augmented fourth f b. (In this assertion Jan has omitted to consider the fact that this mode occurs frequently in the ecclesiastical music of the middle ages, also in a Swedish national air still current at the present day, indeed Beethoven has composed a Canzonetta in this mode; see Gevaert, pp. 137 f., 172, 175.)

Mixolydian	E	F♯	G♯	A♯	B	C♯	D♯	E♯
[Low Hypolydian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E]
High-pitched Lydian	E	F♯	G♯	A	B	C♯	D♯	E
High-pitched Ionian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Phrygian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Aeolian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Dorian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
[High Mixolydian	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E]
[High Hypolydian	b	F	G	A	B	C	D	E]
Low-pitched Lydian	b	F	G	A	B	C	D	E
Low-pitched Ionian	b	F	G	A	B	C	D	E

The reason why I have not been convinced by this explanation, which has been carefully thought out, may be gathered from my exposition generally and the more detailed account of Gevaert, the main outlines of which I have repro-

duced, with the necessary reservations where I could not concur. Still in view of the difficulty of the subject I did not wish to withhold Jan's opinion from the reader. [See further Jan's article 'Musik' in *Baumgarten's Denkmäler* II 974-983.]

from the rest by ending on the third¹, this much is certain that there are only three main distinctive names, applied in the nomenclature of the Greek Modes, Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian, and that we must consequently assume only three fundamental Modes corresponding to them, the difference between them and the Hypodorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian respectively being no doubt that discovered by Westphal and stated above. With this explanation best agrees the fact that originally Hypodorian was called 'Aeolian' and Hypophrygian 'Ionian.' For we must credit Plato's statement (*Lach.* 188 D), that the Dorian Mode was the only original and national one, if we include under this name the Aeolian Mode, which Plato *Repub.* 1c omits to enumerate among the modes, because no doubt he regards it as forming one and the same mode with the Dorian. It is very characteristic that, on this supposition, the original key of the Greeks was a sort of Minor differing from our Minor in not having the sixth and seventh sharpened in the ascending scale :

A B C D E F G a=Aeolian;

A B C D E F# G#a=our A minor;

whilst in the descending scale the modern Minor agrees entirely with the Aeolian. This is in accordance with the description given by the ancients of the simple, calm, and manly character (*ῥῆσις*) of the Dorian Mode which, ending as it does on the fifth, would be least suitable for modern polyphonic music though it really furnishes the clearest and most distinctive harmonic relations, whilst the Aeolian as a Minor and the Lydian as a Major approach most closely to the spirit of modern music. This is also shown in the attempts of the ancients to describe the different impressions conveyed by the Aeolian and the Dorian. The Locrian too was of course a Minor. In addition to the original Dorian and Aeolian Modes of the Greeks two new ones were introduced from Asia Minor, the Phrygian or Ionian and the Lydian, in company with the wind instruments which had their origin there (see *nm.* 1042, 1078)². It can be easily understood that the Phrygian was also called the Ionian after the Ionians of Asia Minor who first adopted it, and that then the two names were used to distinguish the principal Mode and the subordinate Mode. These two new *ἀρμονίαι*, the Phrygian and Lydian, were of the nature of our Major Keys, the latter an augmented Major, so to speak, the former an undeveloped Major: the latter had a flat too few or a sharp too many, the former exactly the opposite; the Lydian had an augmented or tritone fourth, the Phrygian a diminished seventh :

F G a bc d ef =Hypolydian;

F G ab^b c d ef =F Major;

G a bc d ef g=Ionian (Hypophrygian);


G a bc d e f#g =G Major.

¹ [See note on p. 637 f.]

² We hear even of a Phrygian tetra-chord, d ef g, and a Lydian tetra-chord, c d ef, side by side with the Dorian tetra-

chord ef g a. See Helmholtz *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 405 [Eng. tr. by A. J. Ellis].

DORIAN GROUP (minor with no leading-note).



See lower.


Aeolian ? Boeotian Dorian (sc. final note of melody).

Hypodori.

Modern A minor.



PHRYGIAN GROUP (major with diminished seventh).



See lower.

χαλαρά 'Ιασρί

Hypophyg.

σύντροφος 'Ιασρί


Phrygian

Mixolyd.

Modern G major.



LYDIAN GROUP (major with tritone fourth).



See lower.

χαλαρά Λυδιστί συντροφολυδιστί Lydian

Hypolyd.

Modern F major.



There is a great contrast between the impressions which these groups convey. Moreover the Lydian melodies conform to the natural or *authentic* order, in which the final note is the lowest, the Phrygian to the so-called oblique or *plagal* order, in which the melody rises about as high above its final note as it descends below it, so that the final note is about in the middle of its compass. This explains the ecstatic and rapturous feeling (for which *πάθος* is a more correct expression than *ἡθος*) which the Phrygian melodies inspired in the ancients. Our 'major mode' is a development out of these two ancient modes as the proper mean between them. The Mixolydian Mode was first invented by Sappho, about 600 B.C. (Aristox. in Plut. *De*

Musica 16, 1136 C sq.) and was theoretically developed much later by Pythocleides of Coos, a musician living at Athens (Aristox. *ibid.*), or according to another more detailed account (Lysis *ibid.*) by another musician of somewhat later date Lampioclus of Athens, who like Pindar was a pupil of Agathocles (Schol. Plat. *Alcib.* 1. 118 C). The invention of the low-pitched Lydian was ascribed to the Athenian Damon, a contemporary of Pericles and Socrates, see *n.* (1055) (Plut. *ibid.* 1136 E). Aristotle designates the low-pitched modes as relaxed and effeminate, similarly Plato *Rep.* I. c. speaks of them as effeminate and intoxicating, which no doubt is rightly explained c. 7 § 11 (see *n.* 1113) to refer, not to the exciting, but to the soothing and weakening effects of intoxication. In c. 7 § 4 Aristotle mentions with approval a division of all the musical Modes into ἠθικαί, ethical, πρακτικά (Modes of action = scenic?) and ἐνθουσιαστικά, ecstatic; and allows the young for educational purposes to be instructed in those only of the first class. Here Gevaert has made a great mistake in assigning all those which end on the dominant, i.e. Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, to the first class 'ethical'; all those which end on the tonic, i.e. Hypodorian (Aeolian), Hypolydian (low-pitched Lydian) and Hypophrygian (Ionian or low-pitched Ionian), to the second class (πρακτικά); and all those ending on the third, i.e. the two mournful and high-pitched modes, Mixolydian (highly strung Ionian) and highly strung Lydian, to the third class 'ecstatic.' He is only right as regards the third class. But if the Boeotian was a Dorian Mode ending on a third, they might belong to the same class, and the same would hold good of the Locrian. Gevaert has been misled by the fact that Plato assigns a prominent place to the Phrygian only along with the Dorian, and yet according to his description of the Phrygian (*Rep.* 399 A ff.) as impetuous and warlike, it ought to be reckoned among the second class. But Gevaert strangely forgets that Aristotle c. 7 § 9 ff. (see *n.* 1107) strongly disputes Plato's assertion, and designates the Phrygian Mode as ecstatic above all others, putting it at the head of the third class. These would then be joined to it the two other 'high-strung' modes of a mournful character, inasmuch as all painful emotions imply something ecstatic, something carrying men out of themselves (cp. *nn.* 1047, 1072, 1084, 1089, 1095, 1096, 1101). In *Problems* XIX. 48 no doubt the Hypophrygian has the same adjective πρακτικός applied to it which is used of the second class of Modes here, but not so the Hypodorian; on the contrary it is called majestic and calm (ἡθὺς ἔχει μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ στάσιμον). It is simply an afterthought to class both together as πρακτικά, but even then only in opposition to the Phrygian Mode which is there also said to be ecstatic and full of Bacchic frenzy as the expression of passive emotions¹. The Hypodorian or Aeolian Mode must undoubtedly be assigned to the first class, although it forms a sort of transition to the second, and the Hypophrygian ought certainly to be put

¹ ἡ [ὑπο]φρυγιστί (ἐνθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βαρυντική). κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πρόσχωμέν τι...κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὑποδυριστί καὶ ὑποφρυγιστί πρὸς τὸν. The insertion of μάστιγα δὲ

ἡ μεξολυδιστί (from Gaza) before κατὰ μὲν οὖν, as recommended by Gevaert, appears to me quite a mistake. Cp. p. 607.

with the second, were it not for the statement both of Aristotle and Plato that the low-pitched keys are relaxed, effeminate and drowsy. There are only two possible solutions of this difficulty. either the author of this problem had a different idea of the character of the Hypophrygian from that of Plato and Aristotle, or else the Hypophrygian and low-pitched Ionian are not the same Mode. It is quite evident that drowsy and effeminate modes cannot be classed with those which inspire a bacchic frenzy. They can only come among those representative of character, *ῥηϊκά*, not in the position of the highest of those modes such as the Dorian and Aeolian, but as constituting a transition to the ecstatic. In this way the Lydian only would remain in the second class, but c. 7 § 15 it is curiously distinguished from all other modes, and would appear from the description given to belong to the first class. Still this passage, which cannot have proceeded from Aristotle's pen, is so strange in other respects that it need not be taken into account, see *u* (1113). Much more weight attaches to the circumstance that Aristotle evidently (see *uu*. 1088, 1096) assumes more than one mode of the second class, and this compels us to decide that the Hypophrygian or Ionian must really be a different mode from the low-pitched Ionian, and consequently that the low-pitched Lydian is unlikely to have been the same as the Hypolydian, so that this point remains quite obscure¹. Of course the Lydian Mode was also employed for mournful instrumental pieces upon the flute (see *u*. 1042), and in Tragedy was frequently adopted in the *κομμοί*, dialogues of lamentation between the leader of the chorus and actors (Catin. in *Ath.* XIV. 638 f.); for the latter purpose however the Dorian Mode was used in older times (Plut. *De Musica* 17, 1136 r), and it is very characteristic that Pindar in his odes appears to have employed only the Lydian Mode besides the Dorian and Aeolian. It is very interesting to notice the fact shown by VI(IV). 3. 4 (cp. *u*. 1159) that even among the ancients some theoretical musicians rightly perceived that the three fundamental modes might be reduced to two, which we call Major and Minor. For those who, as is stated in that passage, only recognized the Dorian and Phrygian as fundamental *ἀρμονίαι*, like the moderns, put all other differences into the background, and rested the main distinction entirely upon the minor or major third. In this way they might just as well have put Lydian for Phrygian, or better might have combined the words into Lydo-Phrygian. It is well known that the Greek modes passed to the Romans, and to the ecclesiastical and secular nations of all European nations until after the Reformation: they are still well represented in the older protestant hymn tunes and survive in Celtic, Swedish, Slavonic, and Flemish national airs. Even in the older periods of modern music we continue to find an excess of the Minor over the Major, followed later on by a balance between them. SUSEM. (1084)

¹ The explanations given by Susenmihl *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xcvi. 1867, p. 231 require

considerable modification in accordance with the foregoing.

MUSICAL RHYTHMS.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἦθος στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας. V(VIII) c. 5 § 23, 1340 b 7—10.

The Greeks had three kinds of time or metrie: (1) even or dactylic time, in which the two parts of the metrie are of even length, (2) double or iambic time, in which the prominent beat, arsis, is twice as long as the secondary, thesis, and (3) one-and-a-half or paeonian time, in which the arsis as compared with the thesis is in the proportion of $1\frac{1}{2} : 1$. The dactylic time, corresponding to our common time, conveys a quiet settled feeling; the iambic corresponding to our triple time, and still more the paeonian, a time of five beats which seldom occurs in our modern music, give an impression of unrest. The Ionic measure ~ ~ ~ ~, ~ ~ ~ ~ was considered specially wanting in nobility, loose and effeminate (Arist. Quint. p. 37 Meib., Demetr. *De eloc.* § 189, *Metr. Ambros.* p. 9 Keil, p. 262 Nauck, Mai. *Vict.* II. 8. 7, p. 122 Gaisf. p. 90, 19 sq Keil, Schol. A Heph. p. 190 Westph., Dionys. Halic. *De Demosth. vi admirabili* p. 1093). The Ionic monopody, dipody, and tripod correspond to our $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$ time. Cp. Westphal *Metrik* 2 ed. I. p. 534 ff. SUSK. (1086) See now the third edition of Westphal's work, *Griechische Rhythmik* (1885), p. 99 ff. esp. p. 156, *Aristoxenus* I. p. 35 ff. An example of (3) is the Delphian hymn to Apollo in $\frac{1}{8}$ time.

MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS: HARPS, ETC.

οἷον πεκτῖδες καὶ βάρβινοι καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συντείνοντα τοῖς ἀκούουσι τῶν χρωμένων, ἐπτάγωνα καὶ τρίγωνα καὶ σαμβύκαι. V(VIII). c. 6 § 13, 1341 a 40—b 1.


None of these stringed instruments were of Cyclic origin, and Aristoxenus (in Athen. IV. 182 F) speaks of the φοίνικες, πεκτῖδες, μαγάδιδες, σαμβύκαι, τρίγωνα, κλειψίλαβοι, σκινθαφοί, and ἐννεάχορδοι as uncommon (ἐκφυλά). The πεκτῖς was a Lydian harp (Hdt. I. 17, Pind. *Fr.* 102 in Athen. XIV. 635 D, Soph. *Fr.* 375, *ibid.* 635 C and IV. 183 E, Telestes *Fr.* 5, *ibid.* XIV. 625 F) of high register (Telest. *l. c.*, cp. Pind. *l. c.*). The first notice of it occurs in Sappho *Fr.* 122; then it is mentioned by Anacreon *Fr.* 17, 22, by Plato *Repub.* III. 399 C as being many-stringed, but apparently by Sopater, the composer of parodies, in Ath. IV. 183 B as a two-stringed instrument. Like

the magadis, it was played with the fingers without a plectrum (Aistox. in Athen. XIV. 635 B). Menaechmus asserts in Ath. 635 B, 2 that Sappho was the first to use¹ the instrument, stating that he follows Aristoxenus in regarding it as the same as the magadis, whilst others rightly make a distinction between the *μάγadis* and the *πηκρίς* (Ath. 636 A ff.). In all probability the explanation of this inconsistency must be sought with Jan in the fact that the *μάγadis* seems to have been a modification of the *πηκρίς*. At any rate the *μάγadis* also is termed Lydian by Didymus in Ath. 634 F and perhaps before him by Anacreon (*ibid.* Fr. 18), and the latter calls the *πηκρίς* (Fr. 17) and the *μάγadis* (Fr. 18 in Ath. 634 C, 635 C) his instrument, assigning to it twenty strings, a round number, as Posidonius thinks (*ibid.* 634 C, D), instead of twenty-one. But from the account of Aristoxenus (*ibid.* 635 B), who quotes Pindar *l. c.* in his favour, it appears that one-half of the strings gave the same notes as the other half, but in a higher octave, and that the instrument was used in accompanying antiphonal singing of men and boys, requiring therefore that it should be played with both hands, the one striking the higher, the other the deeper notes. When Telestes (Fr. 4 in Ath. 637 A) apparently describes the *μάγadis* as five-stringed, we must probably assume with Jan that he really means five tetrachords, that is to say twenty strings, and in the same way in the case of Sopater *l. c.* we must suppose that the *πηκρίς* had, not two strings, but two separate tetrachords, and therefore eight strings or a full octave. Phyllis however (*ibid.* 636 F) says the *πηκρίς* and *μάγadis* (which he distinguishes from one another), the *σαμβύκη*, *λαμβύκη*, *τρίγωνον* and *κλεψιλαμβος*, had all of them nine strings. According to Euphorion (in Ath. IV. 182 F, XIV. 435 A) the *μάγadis*—or rather the *σαμβύκη*, a modification of it (see below),—was most frequently used in Mitylene; and on the assumption of its development from the *πηκρίς* this fact entirely coincides with the mention of the latter and its employment by Sappho, the poetess of Lesbos. Yet the Spartan poet and composer Alcman, himself a Lydian by birth, had at a somewhat earlier date sung of putting aside the *μάγadis* (Fr. 91 in Ath. 636 F) and must no doubt have used the instrument.

Similarly the *βάρβιρον* (neuter), also *βάρβιρος* (masc. or fem.), was of foreign or rather Lydian origin. For Stabo X. 471 says that all the names *σαμβύκη*, *βάρβιρος*, *πηκρίς*, are foreign, and Pindar *l. c.* designates the *βάρβιρον* as an adaptation of the Lydian *πηκρίς*. Like this, it was a leading instrument in Lesbos much used by the lyric poets there. Pindar *l. c.* ascribes its invention, or more correctly its introduction, to Terpander. Horace (*Carm.* I. 1. 34) calls it 'Lesbian' and assigns its use to Alcaeus (*Carm.* I. 34. 5 ff.). Sappho also mentions it and must have used it in her songs; so too afterwards the Ionian Anacreon, a follower of Alcaeus and Sappho (Euphorion in Athen. 182 F=Sapph. Fr. 154, Anacr. Fr. 143). Critias calls the *βάρβιρον* Sappho's favourite instrument (in Ath. XIII. 600 C); Neanthes (Fr. 5 in

¹ So also Suidas s.v. Σαπφώ, where the mention of the plectrum in the received text is due to corruption.

Athen. 175 c) erroneously ascribes its invention to Anacreon¹. Jan (p. 15 f.) is then no doubt right in recognizing the instrument, with which Alcæus and Sappho are represented, as the Barbiton :



The only particular difference between this instrument and the λύρα consists in the greater length of the strings and of its entire structure. This is in agreement with the fact that it was an octave lower than the *πηκρίς*, as appears from Pindar *l.c.* Thus it continued down to about the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*R. A.* vii. 72) to be comparatively the commonest stringed instrument in Greece after the *κυθάρα* and *λύρα*, as may be gathered from the mention of them together Athen. 182 E and Pollux iv. 8 59, from the fact that Aristoxenus (see p. 632) does not place it among the uncommon instruments, and also from the numerous representations of it. It would seem to have been played by means of the plectrum, if we are to rely upon No. 59 of the so-called Anacreontea. Anaxilas apud Ath 183 B mentions only three strings, Plutarch *De Monach.* 4. 827 A, and Theocritus xvi. 45, speak of many strings, and Teuffel correctly observes (*Pauly's Realencycl.* iv. p. 1289 n.) that the number of strings may have varied very much, since we find on vases figures of *βάρβιτοι* with three, four, and six strings. The contrast which Aristotle here makes between *βάρβιτοι* and *πηκρίδες* on the one hand, and the other instruments mentioned by him on the other, shows that the latter were less in fashion than the *βάρβιτοι* and even than the *πηκρίς* and *μάγανος*. In vase paintings there often occurs the annexed triangular instrument, which represents no doubt either a triangle or a *συνβύκιον* :—

¹ Cp. Pseudo-Simonides *Fr.* 184, Anacreontea 2, 14, 23, 40, 41, 59.



The *τρίγωνον* or triangle is called by Juba (*Ar* 73 in Ath 175 D) an invention of the Syrians, that is probably of the Assyrians¹; by Ptolemy *Harm.* III. 7, p. 248 an invention of the Egyptians. Sophocles *l.c.* gives it the epithet Phrygian, and according to another tragic poet, Diogenes (in Ath. 636 A, see Nauck *Trag. Gr. Fragm.* p. 602 sq. ed. 2), it was common among the Lydians, and in Suidas (*σ υ* *Σίβυλλα*) its origin was traced to the Sibyl. It was triangular in form, as its name implies, and had a number of strings of unequal length, the shorter ones at the elbow, the longer at the base (Aelian apud Porphyry on Ptolem. p. 216 sq.), and it was therefore of some considerable size (Diog. *l.c.*, Arist. *Probl.* XIX. 23). The *σαμβύκη* was likewise triangular (Athen. 634 A, Suidas *s.v.* "Ιβυκος) and, the strings being short, had a very high register (Aristid. Quintil. p. 101, Athen. 633 F). Euphronion represents the instrument as being an adaptation of the *μάγαδus* (in Ath. 635 A); the same writer (in Ath. 633 F on the authority of a work of Pythagoras upon the Red Sea) states that it had four strings among the Pathians and Troglodytes, whilst among the Greeks it was many-stringed, according to Plato *l.c.* The statement of Skamion in Athen. 637 B that it was invented by Sambyx and first used by the Sibyl does not help us. Neanthes *l.c.* says either of the *τρίγωνον* or more probably (agreeing with Suidas *l.c.* and Schol. in Aristoph. *Thesm.* 168) of the *σαμβύκη*—which instrument is meant, is not clear—that it was invented by Ibykus, who probably was in fact the first to introduce it into Greek music, but Juba (*l.c.*) attributed the (?) *λυροφόρις* *σαμβύκη*², as well as the triangle, to the Syrians. Practically all the ancients, agreeing with Aristotle, were of opinion that the *τρίγωνον*, and more especially the *σαμβύκη*³, were only suitable for loose songs and melodies and persons of light character, and this would be in accord with the first adoption of the *σαμβύκη* by Ibykus. Compare the comic verses in Athen. 638 B⁴ and the phrases "ballet girl and player on the triangle," *τὴν ποδοκράτην τε καὶ*

¹ Herodotus *Aeth.* IV. 17 speaks of Phoenicians, who after playing the *πηνής* indulge in wild Assyrian dances.

² In Kaibel's edition of Athenaeus an hiatus is assumed at this place, 175 D, between *λυροφόρικα* and *σαμβύκη*.

³ Both were introduced into Rome,

Dionys. Hal. *R. A.* I. 33, Ath. 183 C, Liv. XXXIX. 6.

⁴ *ὁ δὲ Γρήσικτος ἐστ' ἀκούει
ὅς νικητὴν εἶρε μισχοῖς ἀελοματ' ἐκ-
καλεῖσθαι
γυναικας ἐχούσας λαμβύκην τε καὶ τρί-
γωνον.*

τριγωνίστριαν (Lucian *Lexiph.* 8), χαμαϊούπαις καὶ σαμβυκιστρίαις (Plut. *Anton.* 9), ἄγοντα σαμβυκιστρίαις καὶ κιναιδούς (Plut. *Cleom.* 35), κιναιδούς ἄγειν καὶ σαμβύκας (Polyb. v. 37. 10) and others (Tib. *Gracch.* in Macrob. *Sat.* 11. 10, Ainosb. 11. 42). This explains what Eupolis meant by mentioning triangle-playing (*Fr.* 1 in Ath. 183 c, v) in his comedy of the *βάτται*, directed against Alcibiades and his companions, who are represented in the play as celebrating indecent orgies in honour of the Thracian goddess Cotytto. Presumably such instruments were introduced simultaneously with the wild rites of foreign deities. The right reading is therefore undoubtedly *σαμβύκαι*¹ and not *λαμβύκαι*, which I had adopted in my larger edition from the indications of the better family of manuscripts. The *λαμβύκη* was the instrument used by Archilochus and other older iambic poets in declaiming their verses when sung, the *κλεψίλαμπος* being used when they were melodiamatically² recited (Phyllis *l.c.*, cp. Hesych. and Suidas s.v. *λαμβύκη*). Aristoxenus, as has been mentioned, gives the *κλεψίλαμπος* among the unusual instruments. Upon the whole question consult Bockh *De metr. Pind.* p. 260 ff., Lobeck, *Aglaophamus* p. 1014 ff., L. v. Jan, *De fidiis Graecorum* pp. 15 sq., 26 ff., Baumeister *Denkmäler* III. p. 1444 ff. SUSRM. (1877)

SCALES.

τῶν μελῶν τὰ σόντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, c. 7 § 7, 1342 a 24 f.

The "colour" of notes (*χρῶμα*) denotes the distinction between the three varieties of scale, or 'genera' of octaves, one of which is itself called the chromatic, the two others being the diatonic and enharmonic, and their subdivisions. The most simple form of the diatonic scale embraced all the notes of the octave in their usual order e f g a b c d e. Terpander omitted c, whilst the oldest instrumental composers for the flute included under the name of Olympus (see Exc. II.) omitted d and probably g (Aristot. *Probl.* XIX. 32, Aristox. apud Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 33). The latter arrangement would give the following succession of intervals:

e f a b c e

semitone, major third, tone, semitone, major third; and this was the older form of the enharmonic scale. Later on the interval of a semitone was split up into two quarter tones (*δίεσις*):

e f* g* a b c* d* e

so that the intervals became: quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third, whole tone, quarter-tone, quarter-tone, major third; and this was the second kind of enharmonic scale. The diatonic scale on the other hand even in its irregular forms had no intervals either so large or so small. Its two regular varieties correspond to our so-called natural scale and scale of even temperament.

¹ The suggestion, which D. Volkmann *De Suidae Diogr.* p. 14 makes à propos of this passage, that Aristotle was the first (perhaps in the Dialogue *On Poets*) to attribute the original employment of the

πηκρίς, *τρίγωνον*, and *σαμβύκη* to Sappho, Ibycus, and the Silyl, is based upon very slight evidence, as he himself in part admits.

² See n. 10 on the *Poetics* (ed. Sussem.).

In the case of the former there is between *f* and *g* rather more than a whole tone ($\frac{3}{2}$), and between *g* and *a* rather less than a whole tone ($\frac{1}{10}$), whilst in the case of the latter, as on our tempered pianoforte, the intervals of a whole tone are all equal. Besides these the Greeks also had two irregular forms, (3) one with an excessive whole tone ($\frac{3}{2}$) and a diminished whole tone ($\frac{2}{3}$), a tone being inserted in the minor third B D in the place of the C omitted by Terpander, which was separated from D by the first, and from B by the latter interval, whilst at the same time in the other minor third E G the intermediate tone F was likewise exchanged for a corresponding inserted tone; the other (4) with an excessive and a diminished whole tone, the latter being inserted in the major third in the place of the notes G and D, omitted in the older Enharmonic, that is to say an excessive F \sharp and C \sharp . Finally the chromatic scale shares with the irregular forms of the diatonic the omission of C, and with the enharmonic the omission of G, and with both the compensation for these tones by an insertion, but differs from both in making the greatest interval always more than an excessive whole tone, and the two other intervals more than a quarter of a tone. The regular form of this class, which is also employed in our present chromatic and was older than the enharmonic (Plut. *De Mus.* 11, 1134 F, 20, 1137 E), has only the usual whole tones and semitones:

efg \flat abb \flat de

semitone, semitone, minor third, semitone, semitone, minor third, whole tone. The irregular forms have quarter tones and excessive minor thirds or excessive quarter tones and half tones or diminished minor thirds etc. These subdivisions of the three scales were called their shades or *nuances* (*χρῆμα*) of sound. It appears therefore from what has been said that what we call chromatic and enharmonic in our music is something quite different from the chromatic and enharmonic scales of the Greeks. The quarter tones are something quite strange to us, but the augmented whole tones we can reproduce, and even the occasional attempts to work with them in composition have, since Beethoven, succeeded. The later enharmonic scale had gone out of use even as early as the time of Aristoxenus, but he defends it with great spirit (Plut. *De Musica* §§ 37—39). On the other hand the chromatic and the irregular diatonic were in Ptolemy's time still extensively used by soloists in vocal and instrumental music. But for chorus-singing even among the ancients only the regular diatonic scale was employed. The scales may be defined generally to be the different methods of arranging the intervals between the four tones of a tetrachord or the eight of an octave. See Westphal *Met.*³ I. p. 412 ff., Gevaert p. 269 ff., also Helmholtz p. 403 ff. By unnatural 'colouring' Aristotle probably means all the kinds of irregular diatonic and chromatic scales and also, differing in this respect from Aristoxenus, the later enharmonic scale. SUSEM. (1099)

NOTE.—The assumption of Modes in which the melody ended on the third, i.e. the third above the key-note, is beset with peculiar difficulties, p. 628 n. 1. For if only the melody ended on the third, while the accom-

paniment ended on the key-note, how can we account for the fact that the chord of the third was held by the ancients to be semi-dissonant, *παράφωνον*, like the tritone? While if Gevaert is right in supposing accompaniment and melody alike to end on the third, then the assumed key-note is *not* the final note: what data then are left for determining the key-note of an ancient composition? On p. 625 this is taken to be the *ᾠδή*; compare now Th. Reinach in *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* XVII. 1893, p. 597 ff. In the article MUSIC in the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) Mr D. B. Monro pertinently remarks, "the chief difficulty is the want of any direct statement regarding the tonality of the ancient modes, or the note in which the melody ended." The hypothesis, that the *μέση* of each mode was its key-note (Grundton, Tonica), based upon Ar. *Probl.* XIX. 20 (cp. Dio CHRYS. 68, 7) and doubtfully accepted by Helmholtz, *Lehre der Tonempfindungen* p. 367 ff. (cp. p. 412), is only true, as explained above p. 625, of the Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian Modes.

A protest against Westphal's assumption of 'Modes ending on the third' appeared in *Allg. Musik. Ztg* for 1878 p. 737. Ultimately Westphal withdrew his assumption in the preface, dated 1890, of the posthumously issued second volume of his *Aristoxenos' Melik und Rhythmik* (Leipzig 1893). C. v. Jan, to whom the concession is due, treats it in his review (*Berliner philolog. Wochenschrift* XIII 1893. 1285) as terminating a controversy which has lasted since 1863.

EXCURSUS V.

SUGGESTIONS ON THE TEXT AND INTERPRETATION OF V(VIII). C. 7

§§ 3—8, 1341 b 32—1342 a 29.

With a view to answering the question, whether all the musical modes are to be used, Aristotle first (§ 3, b 32) gives the threefold division of them into the *ethical* (*ἠθικαί*), those relating to *action* (*πρακτικά*), and the *ecstatic* (*ἐκθουσιαστικά*). Next, in so far as the answer must vary with the various ends of Music, he goes on to enumerate these various ends. At this point recurs the distinction between the end of *catharsis* and that of the moral training of the young, a distinction already mentioned c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 23 f. (*ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία καθάρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μόδον*). But now the question there left unsettled (sec n. 1073) has to be considered: the relation, namely, of *catharsis* to the two other ends previously recognised, recreation (*ἀνάπαυσις*) and the highest rational enjoyment (*δυσωγυή*). According to the *tertius receptus* both are distinct from the end of purgation, and are combined together to form a third end¹. But it is a conclusion reached independently by Liepert and Susemihl that this last cannot be the case, for several reasons (1) In the preceding chapters *δυσωγυή* and *ἀνάπαυσις* have always

¹ See the translation of the *tertius receptus* p. 607.

been opposed to each other; and (2) they really have nothing in common, except the element of enjoyment. but this they undoubtedly share with the other ends of 'moral training' (*παιδεία*) and 'purgation' (*κάθαρσις*): consequently this does not justify their being combined together in contradistinction to these other ends¹, even if an attempt be made to keep them apart as two opposed members within the same combination by the insertion of the necessary disjunctive particle (b 40, *πρὸς διαγωγὴν <ἢ> πρὸς ἀνέσιν τε καὶ*). But (3) in addition to this, it is just as impossible, as Liepert has seen, to exclude from purgation (*κάθαρσις*) the elements of *διαγωγὴ* and *ἀνάπαισις*: and (4) grammatically the change from *ἐνεκα* with the two first ends to *πρὸς* with this alleged third (*τρίτον δὲ πρὸς*) throws suspicion upon *τρίτον δὲ* also. For in reality, whether it has a moral or a *cathartic* effect, music can only influence either the character or the emotions: and further how is it conceivable that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction? In any case then we require in the original text a statement that, regarded as an end of music, *catharsis* is only a means to one or other of these two ends; to *διαγωγὴ*, or to *ἀνάπαισις*. Such a statement is furnished by my conjectural restoration *ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἀνέσιν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συνωνίας ἀνάπαισιν*.

This is plainly confirmed by the subsequent course of the exposition. The next step is the division of the three classes of Modes (again according to the *textus receptus*) between the moral training of the young and the other ends of music, the most ethical being assigned to the former, those relating to action (*πρακτικά*) and the ecstatic (together with the less ethical) to the latter. But the explanation of *κάθαρσις* (§ 4 f.), which had been previously promised (§ 3, b 38 *τί δὲ λέγομεν καὶ*) and is now added in the form of a reason (*ὅ γάρ περὶ ἑνάς καὶ α 4 ff.*), proves by the very form in which it is cast that *catharsis* is to take the place of the other ends, or at least that by 'listening to the performances of others' (*ἀκρόασις ἑτέρων χειρουργούστων*) merely this is meant². It is the ecstatic modes and those of action which are said to be specially appropriate for *catharsis*, and it is to the ecstatic melodies that the explanation as given applies: the otherwise meaningless final remark *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέλη τὰ καθαρτικὰ παρέχει χάρην ἀβλαβῆ, α 15*, can

¹ Zeller is so sensible of this that, as mentioned in n. on § 3 b 41, he would combine *ἀνέσις* and *ἀνάπαισις* as a *fourth* end from *διαγωγὴ*, which he makes the third.

² Even this suggested solution, which leaves the main question unaffected, appears untenable. For even if we understand *ἀκρόασις ἑτέρων χειρουργούστων* to mean *κάθαρσις*, yet the very term *ἀκρόασις* implies the absurdity that the Greeks heard only melodies of action and ecstatic melodies (together with the less

ethical) played and sung by others: that they never listened in this way to the most ethical, i.e. to the Dorian. Were this implied, it would seem necessary to admit the correction *κάθαρσιν* for *ἀκρόασις*. But then arises the question whether 134 a 4 *καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς* should not simply be translated 'both those of action and the ecstatic', especially as, when afterwards *κάθαρσις* comes to be discussed and explained, these two classes of musical modes and melodies are alone taken into account.

only be set straight by substituting, with Sauppe, the word *πρακτικά* 'melodies of action' for *καθαρτικά* 'melodies of purgation'.¹ In passing, there is the further suggestion to record that § 4, 1342 a 8 ff., the words *ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργάζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλῃσι* may be a gloss upon *ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν* which precedes².

From this investigation into the nature of *catharsis* it is inferred that the proposition³ it was adduced to prove is really correct (*διὰ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύτας κατὰ §§ 6—8, a 16—29*). The previous directions for the moral training of the young are simply repeated § 8 (sec. *π* 1100), in a less strict form, *τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις* a 28 f., i.e. *ethical* modes replacing the 'most ethical,' *ταῖς ἡθικωτάταις*, of § 3, a 3. The further instructions relative to *ἀκρόασις* ἑτέρων χειρουργούντων, i.e. to *catharsis*, are developed into a more precise statement that all the remaining Modes together are only appropriate and necessary for the recreation of the populace (the great mass of citizens, day-labourers, &c., who are not citizens in the best state), because this populace with its depraved taste takes most pleasure in artificial and complicated musical modes and "chromatic" scales. The more refined and cultivated public, consisting of the citizens in the ideal state, is distinguished from this populace, and obviously only the noble musical modes are selected to afford this public the highest intellectual gratification. It is quite certain Aristotle cannot mean that this public is never to listen to *ethical*, and more especially to *Dorian* melodies. Such melodies, if they no longer serve for moral education, must surely contribute to that moral enjoyment which in this case is the basis for the intellectual element in the highest mental satisfaction (*διαγωγή*). And on the other hand, are we to suppose that Aristotle meant wholly to exclude adults from the moral enjoyment of melodies of action and ecstatic melodies? Yet in c. 5 §§ 17, 18, 1340 a 12—23, he speaks (cp. *π* 1046) not only of the pleasure awakened by the noble characters which music represents, but also of the worthy actions for which it finds expression. **SUSEM. (1101)**

¹ With this change the words will mean: "so also the melodies that impel to action afford an innocent delight." It is much to be regretted that Aristotle has not more fully explained how this is. For the 'ecstatic' (*ἐκθουσιαστικαὶ*) modes and melodies include such as produce and express not only ecstasy, but painful emotions of all kinds, as was remarked *π*. (1084), with which *notes* (1084, 1089) should be compared: hence it is not immediately clear how a similar cathartic i.e. homeopathic effect is to remain over for modes and compositions "of action." Manifestly, it is the more joyous and energetic emotions, love and courage, to which these latter correspond. Yet no doubt the expression of some painful emotions, e.g. anger, cannot be excluded.

SUSEM. (1096) Cp. *Rhet.* II. 5. 21, 1383 b 7, *θαρραλέων γὰρ ἡ ὁρχή*. If *Hierocleides* is rightly reported *Athen.* XIV. 625 x, *δαὶ δὲ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἶδος ἔχου ἥους ἢ πάθους*, he confined music to the expression of character and emotion. He may have found the difficulties presented by *πρακτικά μελῃ* insuperable. Cp. however *π*. (1084).

² See *Bursian's Jahrbuch.* LVII. p. 174. Both expressions *ἐκὰς μέλη* and *τὰ ἐξοργάζοντα τὴν ψυχὴν* must refer to the melodies of Olympus: cp. *Pl. Symp.* 215 c quoted p. 622 *π*. 1.

³ The proposition *φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστέον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, ὃ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστέον ἀλλὰ κατὰ § 8, 1342 a 1—4.*

NOTE ON ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΣ.

καὶ γὰρ παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ καθάρσεως [sc. φαρμὴν τῇ μουσικῇ χρῆσθαι δεῖν]—
τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν
σαφέστερον. V(VIII). 7. 3, 1341 b 38—40.

ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς, τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ
δὲ ἥττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, ὅσον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἔτι δ' ἐνθουσιασμός. καὶ
γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατακόχμοι τινες εἰσὶν· ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μέλῶν ὁρῶμεν
τούτους, ὅταν χρῆσινται τοῖς ἑοργιάζουσιν τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεισι, καθισταμένους ὥσπερ
λατρείας τυγχάντας καὶ καθάρσεως. § ταῦτό δὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πᾶσιν καὶ τοῖς
ἐλεξιμονας καὶ τοῖς φοβητικοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὄλως παθητικοῖς, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους καθ' ἑσὸν
ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐκάστῳ, καὶ πᾶσι γίνεσθαι τινα κάθαρσιν καὶ κομφίζεσθαι
μεθ' ἑδωῆς. c. 7 §§ 4, 5, 1342 a 4—15. Comp. ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῷ
[sc. τῷ αὐλᾷ] καιροὺς χρῆστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν δύναται μᾶλλον ἢ μέθυσιν·
c. 6 § 9, 1341 a 22 f.

Underlying this whole argument is the analogy of the homœopathic
treatment for bodily ailments in vogue amongst Greek physicians of the
time and usually called by them *κάθαρσις*. in regard to this it is sufficient to
refer to the Introduction of Susemihl's edition of the *Poetics* p. 44 f. and to
the fuller investigations of Döring¹. Two points have been properly empha-
sized by Döring: in the first place he has brought out the strong medical
colouring which a number of Aristotle's expressions bear²; and secondly,
that with the single exception of sufferers from the malady known as
κορυβαντισμός, Corybantian or Bacchic frenzy, who are really insane with
fanatical excitement (§ 4), Aristotle is not thinking of the cases where excess
of emotion has actually reached the pitch of madness, but only of emotional
subjects with a strong tendency to ecstasy, fear, pity, etc while on the other
hand the subject of treatment by the musical *catharsis* is not compared
to a patient with a strong tendency to bodily disease but to one who is
actually suffering from it. Even the term *κατακόχμοι* (§ 4, a 8), though it
reminds us of 'possession' and kindred ideas, does not mean anything more,
as Döring points out, than 'liable to be attacked' by a certain form of excite-
ment. So too the phrase *ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχᾶς ἰσχυρῶς*, a 4,
"the emotion which occurs with especial violence in some minds," in itself
ambiguous, denotes in this context the tendency to, but not the actual seizure
by, a morbid excess of emotion. And this is natural enough: for Aristotle's
chief concern is not with the insane and the means of their recovery, but
with convalescents who in time attain to perfect mental health (cp. n. 1094),
and with their æsthetic enjoyment; and what he has chiefly to deal with
here is not emotion already actually excited but the matter of emotion lying

¹ *Aristotelische Kunsttheorie* p. 319 ff.
(*Philologus* XXI. p. 624 ff., XXVII. p.
714 ff. cp. p. 712 ff.).

² See 1342 a 8 κινήσεως and the notes on
κατακόχμοι, a 9 χρῆσινται, a 10 καθιστα-
μένους, a 14 κομφίζεσθαι.

dormant in their minds. The cure of morbid insanity is only of importance to him as a starting-point, as the foundation for his theory of the æsthetic catharsis, though it also gives him the right to make a new application of the medical technical term to this species of æsthetic effect.

This affords a further indication, as against Doring and others, within what narrow limits the medical, or pathological, analogy is confined. But at all events the term *πάθος* itself recalls τὸ πάσχειν, suffering or ailment¹, a suggestion quite lost in the usual rendering "emotion"; see EXCURSUS III. n. (1043), p. 624. Aristotle no doubt distinguishes pleasurable and painful "emotions," but if the form of his remarks would oblige us to assume that all "emotions" without exception are included, this is, as Doring rightly saw, only an inaccuracy of expression. In the case of the pleasurable *πάθος* (e.g. *φύλα Rhet.* II. 4. 1, 1380 b 33 ff., *θάπρος*, II. 5. 16, 1383 a 12 ff.) what analogy can there possibly be with bodily healing? And consequently how can there be cathartic, i.e. æsthetic, enjoyment, which is plainly described as a pleasure springing from pain? Pleasurable states (*πάθος*), on the contrary, are taken up with the moral feeling of pleasure at the successful musical imitations of noble characters and their emotions. To be quite accurate, Aristotle should have restricted his remarks here to painful emotions. Even the 'violent occurrence' (*συμβαίνει λυγρῶς*) of the emotion reminds us, what has been said notwithstanding, of bodily disease: the 'employment' of melodies by those suffering from corybantism (§ 4) recalls the employment of remedies for bodily disorders, as was pointed out in n. (1093): it is to patients suffering from such disorders that the medical terms *καθίστασθαι* = recover (but see n. 1093) and *ἰατρῆα* = regular course of treatment, are applied. Lastly, the mental relief (*κουφίεσθαι* 1342 a 14) in the one case has its counterpart in the bodily 'relief' which is spoken of by the Greek physicians. With this exception however the medical terms are mainly used with exclusive reference to patients really delirious or insane. To render *κάθαρσις* by 'homœopathic purgation of emotions' (and thereby preserve the ambiguity of *κάθαρσις παθημάτων Poetics* 6. 2, 1449 b 27) does not imply that the emotions are purged, but that they are purged away: the emotion which music æsthetically awakens expels the every-day emotion of kindred name. The reader is referred to the Introduction to my edition of the *Poetics* p. 54 for further explanation why this view must be taken, and why of the two terms I prefer "cleansing" to "purgation." There also, p. 44, I have argued that in all probability long before Aristotle's time the treatment here described, whereby the priests employed the so-called melodies of Olympus to exert a soothing influence upon the minds of patients suffering from Corybantian frenzy, received the name of *κάθαρσις* "cleansing" in a religious (or lustral) as well as in a medical sense, because from a religious point of view such patients were considered to be defiled. SUSSEX. (1098).

¹ Bonitz *Arist. Stud.* v. p. 44: mental emotion has the term *πάθος* applied to it

as being the counterpart of bodily ailment or disorder (*πάθος = νόσημα*).

Katharsis as simple cleansing.

The etymology of the term, its literal meaning and the connexion of its manifold applications, cannot be better explained than is done by Plato in the *Sophist* 226 D—231 E. The Eleate stranger starts with the every-day operations of sifting, straining, winnowing as contrasted with such other processes as carding, spinning, weaving, and he infers that their object is to separate, not like from like, but better from worse. Cleansing (*καθαρισμός*) is the general name for any such process¹. Having thus determined the genus he goes on to divide it into its several species. When applied to animate bodies, such cleansing includes not only (a) the *internal* purge effected by gymnastic or medicine—here we approach the well established medical usage of the term, see below—but also (b) the merely *external* washing effected by the aid of sponge or bath; while inanimate objects undergo a similar treatment at the hands of the fuller or 'dress-reviver'. With these literal corporeal cleansings the Eleate is less concerned than with the intellectual process, (c) the riddance of false opinions, whereby he is ultimately enabled to define the Sophist as *καθαρός*, and the clenchus as a *puge*.—an application of the term to which we shall recur later on (p. 647).

The liturgical or religious sense: lustration.

It is generally admitted that as a technical term *κάθαρσις* was earlier and more widely used in this than in its medical application². Amongst the Greeks the conception of impurity and ceremonial purification was elaborated from very simple and humble beginnings, as we see in Homer, where prayer and sacrifice are preceded by corporeal ablution and Achilles rinses carefully a goblet that is to be used for libations. At all times indeed the cultus of Greek religion laid special stress upon external, ceremonial purity: there must be running water near a temple and *περιρραντήρια* for worshippers. The opening scene of Euripides' *Ion*, 101 ff., reminds us of the importance attached to keeping the temple itself pure and clean. All the contingencies of individual life—birth, marriage, death—were attended by casual impurity which lustrations were needed to remove. The Ecclesia was cleansed before a debate: upon one occasion, when news arrived of a horrible massacre, it was cleansed afresh. A whole community might become defiled and require the intervention of some prophet, like Epimenides, to prescribe by what ceremonies the taint could be removed or absorbed.

¹ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διακρίσις (sc. ἡ καταλείπουσα μὲν τὸ βέβηλον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβάλλουσα) λέγεται παρὰ πᾶντων καθαρμῶν τις, *Sophist* 226 D. Hence the definition Ὅροι 415 D, καθαρσις ἀποκρίσις χειρόνων ἀπὸ βεβηλῶν. In the simple literal sense, there seems no distinction between *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρισμός*.

² τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ εἶδη καθάρ-

σεων...τὰ τε τῶν σώων (a) ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ γυμναστικῆς λατρικῆς τε ὁρῶς διακρινόμενα καθαίρονται, καὶ (b) περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος μὲν φαῖλα, ὅσα βαλανευτικῇ παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων, ὧν γνωφευτικῇ καὶ ἐξωπασσα κοσμητικῇ τῇ ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη. .πολλὰ ἐνὸματα εἶχε, *Sophist* 226 E f.

³ Döring *Kunstlehre* p. 251

The crude materialism at the basis of these usages is shown by the very nature of the rites; the deilegents (περιψήματα) used to 'suck up' the pollution¹, the care taken to bury or cast into the sea, or a river, all these καθάρματα (καθάρσια), i.e. objects loaded with the taint. Gradually however higher conceptions were introduced. The need of moral purity was emphasized in the words graven in the court of at least one temple². In nothing is the elevation of idea more striking than in the treatment of homicide. It is well known that in the Homeric age the taint of blood-guiltiness was unknown. Theoclymenus, a homicide, is even present at a sacrifice, *Odys.* xv. 222 ff., 256 ff. The notion of guilt being wholly absent, the only atonement for murder is the price paid to the kin of the murdered man. Traces of a new order of thought can be discerned in the later epics. In the *Aethiopis* of Arctinus, Achilles, having slain Thersites, goes to Lesbos, and there, after sacrifice, is cleansed by Odysseus. This earliest instance presents all the essential features of the remarkable beliefs so familiar to us in the story of Orestes and his trial on the Areopagus: the temporary exile, because the land is defiled by bloodshed, the ceremony of purification, the return when the angry gods and the manes of the dead are presumed to have been appeased. Precisely similar ideas and ceremonies are attributed to the Lydian king Croesus when he purifies the Phrygian Adrastus, Herod. i. 35.

Lustration as a cure for madness.

But along with instances in abundance of lustration for the removal of casual impurity and the taint of blood, there is some not inconsiderable evidence that καθάρσις, in this ceremonial sense, was extended to the healing of disease, more especially of mental disorders, an application which serves as a transition to the well-defined medical use of the term. We need not dwell on the perfect congruity of this application with the beliefs of a time when the 'medicine man' is also a soothsayer, and cures are wrought by charms and spells³. The complete parallelism between the mental and the bodily treatment, which is involved in the application of the terms καθάρσις and καθάρμους indifferently to both, is asserted in the strongest terms in Plato's

¹ Compare also Διὸς κώδιον ὃν τὸ λεγόμενον Διὶ πέθναι...χρόνται δ' αὐτοῖς...πρὸς τοὺς καθάρμους ὅπως τρανυόντες αὐτὰ τοῖς ποσὶ τῶν ἀναγών (Suidas), ἐφ' ὃ οἱ καθάρμους ἐστῆκεσαν τῷ ἀριστέρῳ ποδί (Hesychius).

² Porphyry. *De Abstinencia* ii. 19: δὲ τοῖς καθαρμαμένοις τὸ θεὸς λέγει δόσαντας...ἐν γούρῳ ἐπιδαῖον προεγγράπτο: ἀγνὸν χρὴ παρὶς θυέσσης ἐνὸς λόγῳ ἐμμεναι: ἀγνείη δ' ἐστὶ φρονεῖν δόξα. The quotation from Bernays *Theophrastus über Enomiosgeist* p. 67 f.

³ θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν (Ζάμολξις) ἐφ' ἐπιδαῖσι τισι, Pl. *Charm.* 157 A. Not only ἐνθουσιασμοὶ but lumbago and epi-

lepsy were said to be cured by music: Theophrastus περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, *Fr.* 87: οἱ δὲ καὶ νόσους λέγει μουσικὴ Θεόφραστος ἐστέρησεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ, ἰσχυρὸς φάσκων ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖν εἰ κατανήσοι τις τοῦ νόσου τῇ φρονήσει ἀμυνεῖ (Aët. xiv. 624 B), *Fr.* 88 G. ἐν τῷ περὶ Ἐνθουσιασμοῦ...φησὶ...τὴν μουσικὴν πολλὰ τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα γυγνομένων παθῶν ἐστέρειν καθάπερ λιποθυμίας φόβους καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ μακρὸν γυγνομένας τῆς διαβολῆς ἐκστάσεις. λέγει γάρ, φησὶν, ἡ καταβλήσις καὶ ἰσχυρία καὶ ἐπιδαῖσιαν (an instance is appended, Apollon. *Hist. Mirab.* c. 49).

The main features of this celebrated form of worship, at once a revel and a mystery, are vividly presented by the authorities whom Lobeck has collected with all his learning and acumen in *Aglaophamus*, p. 1150 ff. To the Platonic dialogues we are indebted for some of the most graphic touches, portraying various accompaniments of the weird scene of music and dance which was apparently far better adapted to produce madness than to take it away. First and foremost, the incessant piercing melody of the pipe¹, which haunted the patient until he had ears for no other sounds²; then the wild frenzied dances³, the music meanwhile drowning the cries of the patient⁴, causing palpitation of the heart, while the tears started from his eyes⁵. To other writers we are indebted for hints and allusions which fill in some details⁶, but the philosophic reflexions in which Plato himself sums up the total effect, *Laws* 790 C—791 B, leave little more to be said: "this is the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and likewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music. The reason is obvious. The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is an emotion of fear which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent

τὸ μὲν οὖν κινήτικόν τι καὶ παθητικὸν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἑμποικῶν ἢ ἱατροῦσαν τὰ πάθη τῆς παρατροπῆς, καὶ τὸ μεθίσταναι τὰς τοῦ σώματος κράσεις ἢ διαθέσεις τὴν μουσικὴν, καὶ τὸ ἄλλοις μὲν μέλουσιν ἀναβακχεύεσθαι, ἄλλοις δὲ ἀποπαύεσθαι τῆς βακχείας, καὶ πῶς αἱ τούτων διαφοραὶ πρὸς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκείνας διαθέσεις προσαρμόττονται, καὶ οὗτοι τὰς ἀστατον καὶ ἀκατάστατον μέλος πρὸς τὰς ἐκτάσεις οἰκτεῖν, οἷα δὲ δοτὶ τὰ Ὀλύμπου, καὶ θεατοιαῖτα λέγεται, πάντα ἄλλοτρίως μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν Iamblich *de Mysteriis*, 3, 9.

¹ *Ions* 536 C, οἱ Κορύβαντες ἐκεῖνον μόνον αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μέλους ὁξέως ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ οὗτο ἂν λατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸ μέλος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσι.

² *Crito* 54 D, ταῦτα εἰ ἴσθι οὗτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν ὥσπερ οἱ Κορυβαυτιῶνες τῶν ἀλλῶν δοκοῦσαν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἤχη τούτων τῶν λόγων βαμβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν.

³ *Ions* 533 E, οἱ Κορύβαντες οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται.

⁴ *Laws* 790 E, αἱ μητέρες.....ἀπεχνῶς καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βαγγεῶν ἰδέας ταύτη τῇ τῆς

κινήσεως ἅμα χορεύει καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεται. From the expression βαγγεῶν ἰδέας Douing *op. c.* 252 it strangely infers that the religious or liturgical signification of the phenomena must be rejected. Quite the contrary: in the same context 790 C we find αἱ τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰδέματα τελοῦσαι; τελεῖται are joined to καθαρμοὶ in *Phaedr.* 244 E (cited above, p. 645 n. 2); and Dionysus in the legend is not 'only' 'cleansed' but instructed in the Bacchic rites (καθαρεῖς ὑπὸ 'Ρέας καὶ τὰς τελετὰς ἐκμαθὼν p. 645 n. 4). The common belief attributed Bacchic frenzy to the fact that the god had himself been driven mad by his step-mother: *Lampr.* 672, λόγος τις ἅμα καὶ φήμῃ ὁπορεῖ πως, ὡς ὁ θεὸς οὗτος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἑρας διεφορήθη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν γυναικῇ, διὰ τὰς τε βαγγείας καὶ ἄσας τὴν μαυκὴν ἐμβάλλει χορεύειν τιμωρομένο, i.e. in retribution.

⁵ *Sympr.* 215 E: πολὺ μοι μάλλον ἢ τῶν Κορυβαυτιῶνων ἢ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται.

⁶ *Lucian Deor. Dial.* XII, 37, *De Salt.* c. 79, p. 167, *Plut. Amat.* XVI, 7, p. 758 B, 12, 759 A, *Strabo* X, 21, p. 473, all cited by Lobeck p. 1152 ff.

internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they remain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their frenzy¹." Corroborative testimony is borne by Aristides Quintilianus, in the passage cited above p. 609, f.²

Κάθαρσις as purification or purging of impurity.

In the applications of the term hitherto considered the object has been the person (or occasionally the thing) cleansed. In some of the metaphorical uses, however, and in the technical medical sense, the object of καθαίρειν is not the person but the impurity removed. With this construction the verb means not merely to *purge* [the system] but to *purge away* [what is noxious]; accordingly *kátharsis* denotes riddance and removal of impurity. The term has a wide range of metaphorical applications: e.g. 'separation' Plato *Phaedo* 67 C³, and moral 'purification,' which is a sense frequent in the *Phaedo*⁴. In the *Sophist* the elenchus is termed a purge. Socratic education, aped by the younger Sophists, was directed to ridding the pupil of that "false conceit of knowledge," which is the primary hindrance to the acquisition of true wisdom⁵. Other usages, e.g. λύσεις τε καὶ καθαρμοὶ ἀδικημάτων (*Rep.* 364 E, cp. *Phaedo* 82 D), support this meaning of riddance or removal. From Plato it passed to the Neo-Platonists. In Stobaeus *Ecl. Phys.* I c. 49 § 65 there is an extract, probably from Iamblichus *περὶ ψυχῆς*,

¹ *Laus* 790 C—791 B, Jowett's translation. Ed. Müller *Gesch. der Theorie der Kunst* I. 121, II. 70 (cp. *Jahrb. f. Kl. Phil.* CI. 1870, p. 405 f.) called attention to this passage in connexion with *kátharsis*. Especially noteworthy is 790 E f. *ὅταν οὖν ἐξωθέν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πάθεισι σείσμον, ἢ τῶν ἐξωθεν κρατεῖ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἐντὸς φοβεράν ὄσαν καὶ μανικὴν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δὲ γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀπεργασμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γενομένης ἐκείστων πηδύσεως, παντάπασιν ἀγαπῆναι τὴν τοῦ μέν ὅπου λαγχάνει ποιεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἐργαργότας ὀρχομένους τε καὶ αὐλομένους μετὰ θεῶν, οἷς ἂν καλλιροῦντες ἑκάστοι ὀδῶσι, κατεργάσαστο ἀντὶ μανικῶν ἡμῶν διατάσεων ἔξαις ἡμέφρονος ἔχειν.* An objection made by Döring p. 252 to the whole idea of a 'lustration' of Bacchic enthusiasts as involving a contradiction, since the votary of the god, full of his enthusiasm, cannot possibly be unclean, οἱ μὴ ἀνδ in need of consecration, is fully answered by this and similar passages.

² *De Musica* II. p. 157 M. διὸ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ οὕτως ταῦτα παραπλήσιοι λόγου τῶν ἐχέσθαι φασιν· ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτόησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μελωδίαις τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἄμα παιδαίῃ ἐκκαθαίρηται, cited and explained by Döring p. 332, cp. Bernays *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 128.

³ *kátharsis*.. τὸ χωρίζειν οὐ μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν Cp. *Soph.* 227 C, *ψυχῆς καθαρμός* = κακίας ἀφαίρεσις, i. e. λύσις τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ τὸ φλαῖνον.

⁴ E.g. 69 B τὸ δ' ἀληθεὶς τῷ ὄντι ἢ καθαρσις [sc. τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν τοιούτων πάντων...καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρὸς τις ἦ: "whereas in truth it is really a purgation from all such things...and wisdom itself is probably a mode of purification." See also 69 C ὁ κεκαθαμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος, 113 D, 114 C.

⁵ τὸν ἐλεγχον λεπτέον ὡς δὴ μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθαρσέων ἐστὶ, 230 D. The *sophist* is δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήματα περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρῆς, 231 E. The analogy to the medical treatment is brought out fully 230 C—E.

which fully explains in what sense *kátharsis* was a technical term¹. It denoted in fact practical virtue, moral activity generally, regarded as one stage in the ascent of the soul, which must be purged from everything corporeal in order to attain to the divine likeness. Between this ethical and ascetic application, on the one hand, and Aristotle's pathological application, on the other, there is nothing in common: they are totally opposed, a fact which gives peculiar value to the evidence of Iamblichus and Proclus to be hereafter considered.

The usage of the medical writers : purgation, discharge.

It remains to consider the most important extension of the meaning riddance or removal. In Hippocrates and Galen *kátharsis* as a technical term denotes 'purgation,' i.e. expulsion of diseased humours from the system. Foësius has well defined it: *kátharsis* purgatio absolute dicitur Hippocrati, cum humores prava qualitate affecti et noxii vacuantur, sive id natura molliatur, sive sponte fiat, aut medicamento. To understand this definition fully, a slight acquaintance is required with the pathological theory of the father of medicine. The school of Hippocrates base their treatment upon the assumption of the four 'humours,' blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile². Health depends upon the due proportion of these vital fluids: disease is caused by their undue excess or defect, especially by their morbid accumulation in the frame³. If they are disordered, the more they accumulate the worse the disease becomes. In such a case the task of the physician is to aid nature to discharge from the system the accumulation of peccant humour, lest it become corrupt. preparatory to a discharge it must however be

¹ Πλωτίνος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν ἀπόθεσιν τῶν παθῶν καὶ τῶν μορφωτικῶν διαγνώσεων, δόξῃ τε πάσης ὑπεροφίας [τε] καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων διανοήσεων ἀπόστασιν, πλήρωσιν τε ἀπὸ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ἀφομοιώσιν τε τοῦ κατανοουμένου πρὸς τὸ κατανοεῖν τὴν τελειωτέην κάθαρσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν p. 454, 10 ed. W. He goes on to distinguish κρίσις, κρίκη, κάθαρσις, and on the authority of οἱ ἀρχαῖοι assigns as the end of the last ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν, ἀπόδοσις τῆς οἰκίας οὐσίας, τελειότης, ἀποπλήρωσις, αὐτέρεκα, ἀνοδος ἐπὶ τὴν γεννησαμένην αἰτίαν: whereas others confine it to the humbler functions of λύσις ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ἀπαλλαγὴ τῶν κατωτέρων καὶ φθορᾶς ἐλευθέρωσις καὶ γενέσεως ὁφείσεσι. Plotinus discusses the relation of κάθαρσις to the virtues in *Enn.* I. 4 περὶ ἀρετῶν, and decides (I. 6. 6) that κάθαρσις is not a means to virtue, but identical with virtue. Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Hierocles, and Ammonius agree in placing the cathartic virtues above the civic (πολιτικά) and below the intellectual (θεωρητικά ἀρεταί): see Zeller *Phil. d. Gr.* III. ii.

661, 711, 757, 819 n. 4. It is only in this neoplatonic sense that the word admits of the rendering "purification," so common hitherto and so unhappily ambiguous.

² τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ αἷμα καὶ φλέγμα καὶ χολὴν ξανθὴν τε καὶ μέλαιναν, καὶ ταῦτά ἐστι αὐτῷ ἡ φύσις τοῦ σώματος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἀλγύνει καὶ ὀγκύνει, Hipp. *De natura hominis* II. 3 p. 83 (I. p. 352 K.).

³ ἢ c. ὀγκύνει μὲν οὖν μάλαστα, ὁκόναν κερρίως ἔχει ταῦτα τῆς πρὸς ἄλλα κρήνης τε καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ μάλαστα μεμυμένα ἢ ἀλγύνει δὲ, ὁκόναν τι τοῦτων ἔλασσον ἢ πλεον ἢ ἡ χωρισθῇ ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ μὴ κεκράμενον ἢ τοῦτο ἐμπέσει. Plato has a similar theory in his *Timaeus* cc. 39, 40, 82 A ff. except that he has transfigured the 'unnatural excess and defect' and the 'displacement' in the last resort to his four elements (air, earth, fire, water) rather than to their secondary formations, the four humours. Still he follows the Hippocrateans in referring fevers to the bile and catarrhs to phlegm (*Tim.* 85 n).

reduced and softened. Three stages may therefore be distinguished: (1) presence of crude humours, τὰ μὴ καθαρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, (2) their reduction, πέψις, itself a species of transformation, οἱ μεταβολή, (3) their expulsion, κρίσις. Of these stages, (2) and (3) are promoted by artificial means, as explained by Plutarch in the case of hellebore: an insufficient dose, he says, excites disturbance (ταράττει) without however effecting a purge¹. The inducement of excitement (ταραχή) is somewhat of a parallel to homeopathic remedies in modern medicine, while the stimulated ἐνθουσιασμός in the Corybantian worship corresponds to it in so far as in both cases the remedy adds fuel to the flame². The medical process (ταραχή) goes on until the reduction (πέψις) is complete. Thereupon it remains to rid the body of the disturbing alien matters.

Here it is important to insist upon the distinction which Galen emphasizes between the sense of καθαρισμός and of κένωσις in the Hippocratican corpus: the latter a depletion or total evacuation of humours,—it may be of healthy but surplus humours—the former the partial removal of morbid elements, whose presence causes active annoyance: κένωσιν ἀπλῶς εἰσθε λίγειν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ὅταν ἅπαντες οἱ χυμοὶ³ ὁμοτίμως κενῶνται, καθαρισμὸν δὲ ὅταν οἱ μοχθηροὶ κατὰ ποιότητα. This distinction is rendered prominent in such phrases as καθαρισμὸς χολῆς, κ. αἵματος, where the result is not merely the loss of blood, etc. but, as what is removed is bad, what remains is absolutely clarified and refined; it is purged but not altogether purged away.

From the medical writers this usage found its way into the language of every-day life. Thucydides treats it as a technical term in his description of the plague⁴. Demosthenes allows a singularly naive and unsophisticated client to employ the word⁵. Aristotle appears to have generally adopted the medical terminology as well as the theory of humours from the Hippocrateans⁶, but in the biological works he has specialized this word in a slightly different sense⁷. Nor can it be said that the distinction enforced by

¹ ὁ γὰρ ἐλλείβορος ἀρχὴν τοῦ καθαίρειν ἔχει τὸ ταράττειν τὸν ὄγκον, ἀλλ' ἤν ἐλάσσων τοῦ μετρίου δοθῇ, ταράττει μὲν οὐδὲν δὲ καθαίρει. Plut. *Quaest. conv.* III 8, 8, p. 656 ν.

² Comp. Plato's reflexions on the Corymbant rites, *Lysis* II. 790 c ff. as quoted above p. 646 n. 4.

³ Galen *Commi. in Hippocr. De Humor.* v. 12 (xvi. 105 K.). Compare also καθαρισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν λυσιγόντων κατὰ ποιότητα κένωσις Galen *Commi. ad aphor.* a. 1. i (xvii. 3, 358 K.); καθαρισμὸν γὰρ εἰσθε ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ὀνομάζειν οὐ μόνον τὰς ὑπὸ φαρμάκων γενομένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως *In Exordium*. (xviii. B. 167 K.); ὀνομάζειν δὲ κένωσιν μὲν τῶν οὐκείων, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ τῷ πλήθει, καθαρισμὸν δὲ τῶν ἄλλοτριων κατὰ ποιότητα *Commi. in pragm.* (xviii. B. 134 f. K.). Here Galen is speaking in his own

person. Other passages are cited by Siebeck *Zur Katharsisfrage* in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxxv. 1882, p. 225 ff.

⁴ ἀποκαθάρσις χολῆς πᾶσαι, ὅσαι ὅπῃ λατρῶν ὀνομασμέναι εἰσιν, II. 49.

⁵ c. *Conon* § 12, εἰ μὴ καθαρισμὸς αἵματος αὐτομάτῃ μοι συνέβη *Or* 54, p. 1260, 24.

⁶ Laitré ed. of Hippocr. I 73: plus on examine comparativement les écrits hippocratiques, ceux de Platon et d'Aristote, plus on trouve de conformités entre eux et de points de comparaison. Douing *op. c.* p. 319 ff. collects a few instances of κενεῖν, κινεῖν, ταράττειν, ταραχή—e.g. 450 b 1, 70 b 9 ff., 1106 a 4, 1388 a 21, 1386 b 19, 23, 865 a 6, a 15 ff., 864 a 2, 873 b 31 f. Add *Probl.* I. 42, 864 a 34 (quoted below p. 650 n. 8).

⁷ See Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* s.v. 354 b 28 'syn τὰ καταμύθια.' The references adduced take up rather more than a column

Galen between *κένωσις* and *κάθαρσις* is much observed by unprofessional writers¹.

Kátharsis as an æsthetic term.

The foregoing survey will serve as an introduction to the usage of *kátharsis* in reference to Music in the *Politics*, and in the famous definition of Tragedy in the *Poetics*². All are agreed that Aristotle is employing the term in a metaphorical sense of his own, at once novel and calling for elucidation³. Whether this æsthetic sense was derived from the liturgical or the medical usage of the term is not absolutely demonstrated⁴: whichever it was, we may acquiesce in Zeller's opinion⁵ that the new application is a wide departure from the original intention. On the one hand there is no doubt that the theory which Aristotle puts forward rests upon the facts to which he himself appeals—facts which, however remote from our experience, were less uncommon in Greece and in the East—the cure of the Corymbantian frenzy in the manner above described⁶. On the other hand the occurrence of medical terms in the context⁷, certain points in the process of relief⁸, and the consideration urged by Bernays⁹ that a pathological effect on the mind would be more naturally elucidated by reference to the effect of medicine on the body, all make in favour of regarding the medical metaphor as prominent.

"Are we to imagine," it has been asked, "that when writing upon art, Aristotle was primarily thinking not of Plato's 'psychiatry' in the *Laws*, but

(64 lines), and those for all other meanings less than 20 lines (one of these latter is *De gen. anim.* II. 4. 11, 738 a 28 K. τῶν περὶ τῶν αἰσθημάτων). Bernays *op. cit.* p. 91 (191) is able to adduce the parallels ἀπόκρισις τῶν καταμνηνίων, ἐκκρισις.

¹ E.g. Pl. *Phædo* 69 c *kátharsis* = total removal.

² μύησις πρᾶξις σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης ἡδυσμένη λόγῳ χωρὶς ἐκαστοῦ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινουσα τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν *Poet.* 6 § 2, 1449 b 27.

³ *Pol.* v(viii). 7 § 3, 1341 b 38. We have lost the full exposition of the *Poetics* (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς ἐροῦμεν σφαιρότερον, cp. 11. 1085).

⁴ Very few authorities now support the former view. Ed. Müller argues for it *Jahrb. f. Phil.* ci. 1870, p. 404 ff. The view taken in the text follows Susemihl *Intr. to Poetics* p. 44.

⁵ *Phil. d. Griech.* 11², ii. 775.

⁶ P. 642. Ed. Müller *loc. cit.* p. 406 n. (190) insists that the similarity in means employed, subjects treated, effects produced in the cases mentioned by Plato *Laws* 790 b ff., and Aristotle *Pol.* v(viii). is so great as to be unmistakable (τῶν

ἐκφρόνων βαρχειῶν ἰδοῖσι in Plato, ὡς περ ἱατρίας τυχεῖν καὶ καθάρσεως in Aristotle; ἔχεις ἐμφρόνας ἔχειν in the former, καθίστασθαι in the latter). That the priestly cure was actually called *kátharsis* is, however, an inference resting on slender evidence (see above p. 644 f.) and only checked out by general considerations of the primitive identity between drugs and charms, cleansing from ceremonial impurity and healing of mental disorders, which, as Susemihl remarks *Jahrb. f. Phil.* xciv. 1867, p. 234, attached a taint to the patient.

⁷ See the notes *ad loc.* p. 610 f.

⁸ The operation of drugs is the subject of *Probl.* I. 42, διὰ τί τὰ φάρμακα καθαρὰί; The illustration conveyed in the words οὐ πεφθότα δὲ ἀλλὰ κρατήσαντα ἐκπίπτει φέροντα τὰ ἐμπόδια αὐτοῖς καὶ καλεῖται τοῦτο κάθαρσις 864 a 32—34, is very apposite. Cp. Pl. *Soph.* 230 c νομίζοντες γὰρ οὐ καθάρωντες αὐτοὺς, ὡς περ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἱατροὶ νοσημασσι μὴ πρότερον ἀν τῆς προσφορομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἀν τὰ ἐμπόδια ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ. The relief follows upon excitation which is temporarily an aggravation of the disorder.

⁹ *Zwei Abhandlungen* p. 13 (143).

of Hippocrates' emetics and purges?" The incongruity is only apparent: it is just the assimilation of the mental effect to the bodily cure, the attempt to explain the 'psychiatry' on the analogy of the purge, that constitutes Aristotle's original contribution to Aesthetics.

The treatment to which the priest subjected those suffering from Corybantic frenzy may be loosely said to have been of a homeopathic nature¹: that is, under the stimulus of the music, with all its exciting accompaniments (p. 646), the frenzy was accelerated and heightened until it had worked itself off. It is this excess or outburst of quasi-religious fervour, and the subsequent exhaustion, of which Catullus presents so astonishing a picture in the *Attis*. A fragment of Theophrastus practically endorses this view of the power of music². Plutarch too describes the effect of the flute, the instrument on which the melodies of Olympus were played, in language which shows a striking agreement with the cathartic method of the *Politics*³. Lastly, there is the passage from Aristides Quintilianus already cited (p. 610).

Not quite so clear is the operation of tragedy: "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude, by means of language embellished with each of the different kinds of embellishment, which are separately employed in the several parts; in the form of action not of narrative; effecting through pity and fear the proper purgation of these emotions⁴." If we are to choose between Lessing and Bernays, between "the conversion of the passions into virtuous aptitudes" and "the relief of disburdening the emotional tendencies"—there can be no question that the former is an eunomic view and the latter, in principle, right. The whole hypothesis is pathological; tragedy has, directly at least, no moral effect. In the *Poetics* we are told in so many words that tragedy creates a specific aesthetic enjoyment, a pleasure peculiar to itself⁵: about its moral or educa-

¹ Comp. above p. 645. The assertion that homeopathic treatment is intended by Aristotle was made, as Bernays points out p. 95 (193), by Milton in the preface to his *Samson Agonistes*. "(Tragedy) said by Aristotle to be of power, by raising pity and fear, or terror, to purge the mind of these and such-like passions; that is, to temper or reduce them to just measure with a kind of delight stirred up by reading or seeing those passages well imitated. Now is Nature herself wanting in her own efforts to make good his avocation, for so, in phsyck, things of melancholic hue and quality are used against melancholy, sour against sour, salt to remove salt humours."

² *μὴ δὲ φόβος τῆς μουσικῆς, κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ κατὰ ἀνδάνυσιν γυγνομένη τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν* *De ag.* 89 cd. Wimmer. He made ecstasy one of the three primary constituents of music (ἀρχαὶ μουσικῆς λύπην ἡδονὴν ἐνθουσιασμόν) *Ib.* 90.

³ In *Quaest. Conv.* III. 8 Plutarch is

discussing the effect of wine; 2 § 10, 656 ff. εἰκὸς δὲ πού καὶ ταῦται τὴν περὶ τὸν ἀκροβώρακα ταραχὴν, ὅταν ἀκινῆθαι λάβῃ, μαλαίνεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο συνεργεῖν τὸν οἶνον· πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσελθόντες τὸ σῶμα συνεξέκαυσεν καὶ καταγάλωσεν τὸ μανιώδες τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνησιβία καὶ ὁ ἐπικηθῆναι αὐτὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [*cp.* p. 646 n. 5], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἴκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαίρει καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδως ἐν τῷ οἶνῳ κτλ. With *μαλαίνεσθαι* *cp.* *Pol'* V (VII), 7 14, 1342 b 27, ἀπειρηκίας. Again the assuaging effect, but not the previous excitement, is mentioned *Sym'* τὰς κοίταις, 13, 156 C. at δὲ Μοῦσαι καὶ παντάπασιν [μέμψαντο] ἀν' ἡμῶν] εἰ νομίσειεν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι λισθᾶν καὶ αἰδοῦς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ παιθεῖναι τὰ ἥθη καὶ παραγορεῖν τὰ πάθη τῶν χρωμένων μέλει καὶ ἀμυνεῖν.

⁴ *Iof.* Butcher's translation, *op. c.* p. 348. The Greek is given p. 650 n. 2.

⁵ *Poet.* 14 § 4, 1453 b 10: οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν

tional influence we learn nothing. Such good effect as the drama exerts must, on the Aristotelian theory, be indirect. But so soon as the attempt is made to define more precisely the nature of this purgation, of the emotions that are purged, and the pity and fear through which their purgation is effected, there arise difficulties which have not yet been wholly surmounted. For there may be a total or a partial removal, a 'purging away' i.e. expulsion, or 'purging' i.e. refinement (by release of painful elements)¹: further, it is possible to ask whether the emotions purged are those already existing in the spectator, or such as are excited in him by the action of the piece. Nor is it inconceivable that Aristotle has unduly pressed the medical analogy. How can the emotions correspond to the *materia peccans*? They are never expelled, and to speak of them as 'separated' is an outrage on language. We more properly regard them as either suppressed or indulged, and in the latter case as running their course, culminating in the thrill of pity, the shudder of horror, the transports of enthusiasm, until sated with over-indulgence they at length subside. While fully sensible then that every one of the following positions has been a matter of protracted controversy, we incline (1) to interpret the *purgation* of the emotions to mean their gratification, their relief by indulgence² (though perhaps the outlet thus afforded for emotional excess necessarily involves a qualitative change, viz. the loss of an impure element, what is painful and oppressive either in the emotion itself or in its manifestation in actual experience): (2) to discriminate³ between the emotions relieved, i.e. the pity and fear of real life, and the emotions which effect this relief, viz. those artificially excited by the action of the drama⁴: (3) to

δὲ ἡγεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αἰσίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ φόβου διὰ μίσησιν δὲ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν..., 26 § 15, 1462 b 13 δὲ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχεύουσαν ἡδονὴν ποιῶν αὐτὰς [sc. τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν ἐποποιίαν] ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημένην.

¹ Siebeck in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1882, p. 225 ff., Baumgart *Poetik* p. 435 f.

² Comp. Plut. *De imm. util.* 10, 91 D. τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἀποκαθάρσεις "indulging [lit. venting] these feelings upon his enemies." Bernays thought he could distinguish πάθημα, the disposition or permanent tendency (παθητικὴ ποιότης), from the πάθος its transient manifestation. It is impossible to follow him here, for Bonitz, *Arist. Studien* v, has shown that the two terms are absolutely convertible in Aristotelian usage. While if we say that the 'painful emotion' of fear and pity is removed, we are reminded that the definitions in the *Rhetoric* (II. c. 3, c. 8) make each of these—fear itself and pity itself—'a sort of pain' (λόγη τις), although the emotions generally are defined as οἷς ἐμεταί: *λόγη καὶ ἡδονή Rhet.* II. 1. 8, 1378 a 21, *Nic. Eth.* II. 5. 2, 1105 b 23.

³ The distinction between tragic fear and pity and these emotions in real life was first drawn by Ed. Müllel *Gesch. der Kunstth.* II. p. 63 ff. Unless this distinction be drawn it is impossible to avoid the difficulties which those followers of Bernays encounter who interpret τὴν τῶν τοιοῦτων παθημάτων καθάρσιν in the definition of tragedy as the "expulsion," i.e. purging away, of the emotions in question. Bernays himself escaped this difficulty only by distinguishing πάθος = emotion, from πάθημα = disposition, tendency to emotion:—a distinction which in view of Bonitz' careful investigation (*Arist. Studien* v) cannot be maintained. See II. (2). But there is no reason why the phrase should not mean the *purgation* of the emotions, i.e. the freeing them from what is superfluous, the diminution of the whole by the expulsion of what is noxious, and consequent clarifying or refinement of what is left.

⁴ The best proof that they are distinct (which has often been denied) is that in real life fear of imminent ill is incompatible with pity, i.e. sympathy with others: *Rhet.* II. 8. 6, 1385 b 33, οὐ γὰρ

associate the cure of the overburdened heart with that universalising element of the drama in virtue of which Aristotle regards it as an idealisation of experience¹.

These are the general outlines of the pathological interpretation of *katharsis*. The erudition of Bernays discovered some slight confirmation for it in subsequent writers. Iamblichus (or whoever was the author of *De Mysteriis*), defending the least decorous of ancient rites, after adducing the now familiar argument that "suppression of the passions serves only to strengthen them, whereas judicious gratification quiets them" proceeds as follows: "hence it is that in comedy and tragedy by the spectacle of others' emotions we still and moderate and purge our own" and similarly by seeing and hearing things unseemly in the temples we are freed from the harm which actual contact with them would bring². If this is too vague, we learn a little more from Proclus, who in his dissertation on the tenth book of the *Republic*—presumably expounding the Peripatetic view as the opposite of Plato's—speaks of Tragedy and Comedy as enabling us to compound with the emotions (*συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφροσίων τῶν παθῶν*) which need to be excited just so much as will secure us from future annoyance. Again he says "it is possible to afford the passions a moderate satisfaction, and when they are thus treated to find in them effective aids towards education, when once the inconvenience they cause has been remedied³." From the Platonic standpoint Proclus then proceeds to refute the defence of poetry he has sketched⁴, and in a final sentence contrasts his own neoplatonic ascesis with the compromise proffered by Aristotle⁵. But while the dim outlines of the

ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει: § 12, 1386 a 22 f., τὸ γὰρ δεῦν ἐτερον τοῦ ἐλεεῖν καὶ ἐκρουστικόν τοῦ ἐλεῖν. Whereas the drama excites both pity and fear: *Poet* 14 § 2, 1453 b 3, ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ φόβειν καὶ ἐλεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀπερ' ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδипοῦς μῦθον, § 5 τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλεῖν καὶ φόβου. Cp. c. 13 § 4, 1453 a 2 ff.

This distinction affords the best possible explanation of τῶν τοιοῦτων in the definition (Reimkens *op. cit.* p. 161): τοῦτων would have postulated the complete identity of the two. Compare Ed. Müller *Gesch. d. Kunsttheorie* II. p. 63 ff.

¹ Bernays *Zwei Adh.* p. 72 (181) ff. with whom E. Müller, Blandis, Zeller, Susemihl, and Reimkens substantially agree. See Butcher *Some Aspects* p. 366 ff.

² ἐν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλήτρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἴσταμεν τὰ οἰκεία πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν· ἐν τε τοῖς λεροῖς θεήμασι τοῖς καὶ ἀκούσμασι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν [c.g. τῶν φωνῶν] ἀπολυμνισμὸς τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἀπ' αὐτῶν συμμιγνύσεως βλάβης I. II. p. 403. I'rtthey. Again in 3. 9, p. 119, 14 ἀπέρασιν

δὲ καὶ ἀποκαθαρσιν λατρίαν οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ [sc. τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπίπνοιαν] κλητέον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρῶτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται theie can be no doubt that these are Peripatetic technical terms which are rejected.

³ τί δήποτε τὴν τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὴν κωμικὴν οὐ παραδέχεται καὶ ταῦτα συντελούσας πρὸς ἀφροσίων τῶν παθῶν, ἀ μῆτε παντάπασιν ἀποκλίνειν δύνασθαι μῆτε ἐμπιπλάναν πάλιν ἀσφαλῆς, δεδομένα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως, ἣν ἐν ταῖς τοῦτων ἀπεράσεσιν ἐκπληρουμένην ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ χρόνῳ ποιεῖν (p. 360 ed. Bas.):—ἐπερ διὰ τοῦτων δυνατὸν ἐμμέτρως ἀπομιμνᾶν τὰ πάθη καὶ ἀποπλήσαντας ἐνεργᾶ πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἔχων, τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας (p. 362).

⁴ διευλαβησόμεθα μὲν.. ἀπὲρ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πάθη μετρίας ἀφροσύσεως ἔξιν ποιηρᾶν καὶ δυσέκνιπτον ἐντήκωσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς (Ibid.).

⁵ δεῖν μὲν οὖν τὸν τοιαυτὸν διαμνηχανθῆναι τὴν τῶν παθῶν τοῦτων ἀπεράσει καὶ ἡμεῖς φηρομεν, ἀλλ' <οὐχ> ὥστε τὰς περὶ αὐτὰ προσπαθεῖας συνείναι· τὸναντίον μὲν οὖν ὥστε χαλινῶν καὶ τὰς κινήσεις αὐτῶν ἐμμελὲς ἀναστῆλιν, ἐκείνας δὲ δρᾶ

theory can be recognised, and here and there an obviously genuine phrase or two (*ἀπείρασις*, *ἀφούσιος*, *ἐμμέτρως ἀποσιμῶναι τὰ πάθη*), the rest is so coloured in passing through this unsympathetic medium that there is considerable uncertainty whether it does not reflect the neoplatonic, rather than the Peripatetic, meaning of *κάθαρσις*.

It remains to pass under review another possible source of information: the utterances and indications of Plato's own æsthetic views in his dialogues¹. Plato, too, held pity and fear to be the effect of tragedy². His reason for banishing the drama is that, like poetry in general, it feeds that emotional nature which ought rather to be starved³. In a celebrated passage the indulgence of sentimental pity in the theatre is thus condemned as mischievous: "If you consider that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and desire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling which is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose because the sorrow is another's...Few persons ever reflect that from the evil of other men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling of sorrow which has gained strength at the misfortunes of others is with difficulty repressed in our own."⁴ Here unquestionably is the view from which that of Aristotle is a reaction. That the passions are sources of possible danger, both philosophers agree: but granting this, Aristotle provides, while Plato sternly refuses, the means for their relief. Even Proclus is sensible of the antagonism of principle which has deduced from common bases of ethical belief so divergent a practical treatment. It would be a rash, but not exactly inadmissible proposal, to equate 'the feeling kept under control in our own calamities' with the pity of real life, and that which is 'satisfied and delighted by the poets' with the pity which (in Aristotle's definition) is the means of its purgation.

To Poetry and Art generally Plato allowed two and only two functions:

τὰς ποιήσεις...πολλοὶ δὲν εἰς ἀφούσιον εἶναι χρησίμους· αἱ γὰρ ἀφούσιαι οὐκ ἐν υπερβολαῖς εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν εὐνοσταλμέταις ἐνεργείαις [the neoplatonic view], συγκρῖν ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἐκείνα ἔχουσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀφούσιαι (ibid.). In this and the previous citations from Proclus the corrections of Bernays (*op. c.* pp. 46—50) are given.

¹ See C. Belger *De Aristotele etiam in arte poetica commendanda Platonis discipulo* (Berlin 1872), esp. p. 58 ff., Siebeck *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXXY. 1882, p. 226 ff.

² *Phædr.* 268 C, *ῥήσεις ποιεῖν...οἰκτρὰς καὶ τοῦναντίον αὐτοῦ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικάς*, *Rep.* x. 606 A.

³ τρέφει γὰρ πάντα [τὰ ἐπιθυμητικά] καὶ λυπηρά καὶ ἥδεια ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀρδουσα, δέον αὐκμεν, καὶ ἀρχοντα ἡμῶν καθίστασι

δέον ἀρχεσθαι αὐτὰ, 606 D. Cp. *Latius* 790 E.

⁴ 606 A, B: *εἰ ἐνθυμιοῖο, ὅτι τὸ βίβη κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκταῖς ἐμφυρεῖς καὶ πεπινηκὸς τοῦ θαρβεῖναι τε καὶ ἀποθούρασθαι ἱκανὸν καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ἐν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότε ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεμπλάμενον καὶ χαίρειν· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτεστον ἡμῶν, ὅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένοι λόγῳ οὐδὲ θῆναι, ἀνέησι τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνηδὸς τούτου, ὅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν...λογίζεσθαι γὰρ, οἶμαι, ὀλίγοις τιμὴ μέτεσθαι, ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκία· θρήψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐκείνων οὐ βέβαιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν. The translation is Dr Jowett's. The last remark is endorsed by Aristotle *Poet.* v (viii). 5. 19, 1340 a 23.*

(1) to convey truth 'in a glass darkly,' as he himself does in his myths, and (2) to conduce to moral edification by presenting fair models and inculcating by force of sympathy proper sentiments. The latter is Aristotle's *παιδεία* habituation to feel pleasure and pain at the proper objects. Now the Aristotelian *κάθαρσις* is something wholly distinct from this. It might be defended as producing a harmonizing and elevating effect on feeling and so transporting the audience into a state where they are more susceptible to sympathy with men as men, and to admiration for virtue. But this is only an indirect result. Or again we may regard it as a preventive: it might be urged that we are thus inoculated against the temptation which Plato has specially in view and regards as so formidable, the abuse of emotion and maudlin sentimentality. In any case this is one more hint which Aristotle has borrowed from his master. He has developed in a special direction the principle of 'that indispensable minimum' of gratification which even Plato does not refuse to the lower nature of man. The temperate sage of the *Republic*, who would fain stimulate and quicken the activity of the reason before he betakes himself to rest, is well aware that if he is to pursue, without let or hindrance, his aspirations after higher knowledge, his passions must be allayed and his appetitive nature indulged neither too much nor too little but just enough to send it to sleep¹.

In an Eudemian book of the *Ethics* an even more advanced position is taken up: the pursuit of pleasure to excess is exonerated from blame; where the pleasures pursued are harmless (cp. 1342 a 16 *χαρὰν ἀβλαβήν*), even artificial means of stimulating them to excess are not condemned, such 'intense' pleasures being natural remedies for pains². But that Aristotle was not blind to the danger of excessive sentimentality is shewn e.g. by his care for the education of the feelings in youth³.

Besides this insight into the main motive and genesis of the pathological theory which Aristotle put forward in defence of the drama we gain from the Platonic writings many indications which serve to clear up particular points in the exposition. In the *Philebus* (47 ff.) there is an interesting and valuable analysis of the mixed states, partly pleasurable and partly painful, which attend the spectators of comedy. From this analysis Aristotle would seem to have borrowed not a little where he traces the pleasurable concomitants of various phases of emotion⁴. We have every reason then to

¹ *Rep.* IX 571 ε f. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδείξι δούη μήτε πλημμονῇ, ὅπως ἀν κοιμηθῇ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θορυβὸν τῷ βέλτεσι-
τῳ χαίροντι ἢ λυπούμενῳ, ἀλλ' ἐφ' αὐτὸ
[sc. τὸ βέλτεστον] καθάρσει μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι τοῦ καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν. ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς παρὰ-
νας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν κεκυημένῳ
τῷ θυμῷ καθόδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τὸ ὄσο
εἴη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας οὕτως ἀναπαύ-
εται. It seems then that while ἀποτυμ-
πλῆναι is prohibited as immoral, ἡσυχάσαι
is a condition essential to the efficient

working of the rational soul. Of course the two philosophies differ wholly as to the application of this principle.

² *N. E.* VII. 14. 5, 1154 b 3: αὐτοὶ γοῶν αὐτοὺς δίδωσι τῶς παρὰσκευάζουσιν θῆαν μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτηδεύοντες. b 13 f. ἐλεῖναι δὲ ἡδονὴν λύπην ἢ τ' ἑναντία καὶ ἢ τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά

³ See V (VIII). 5 17, 18, 1340 a 12 ff. (cp. 1341 a 13 f.).

⁴ See Bernays *op. c.* p. 142 f. Esp. cp. 1378 b 1 (πάσῃ ὀργῇ ἐπεσθαι τινα ἡδονήν) with *Phil.* 48 A and the Homeric citation

conclude that the facts had already been collected and the psychological problem not only stated but approximately solved before Aristotle, who did not share his master's condemnation of the drama on grounds of morality, came to formulate his own theory of its effect.

common to the two: also *Pol.* v(viii) 5, 12, 1339 b 25 ff. with *Phil.* 51 A ff. But the detailed analysis in respect of comedy appears inadequate, and of tragedy little

is said beyond the remark τὰς γὰρ τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμα χαίροντες κλέωσι, μέμνησθαι, *Phil.* 48 A. Cf. 50 B.

ADDENDA.

INTRODUCTION.

Page 1, line 3. The statement that there are no manuscripts earlier than the fourteenth century has been falsified by the discovery of the Vatican fragments of the tenth century. See p. 454.

P. 2, note 1 After *θυσίας* add: and 1271 a 27 (1272 a 3, b 34) *φύλτρα* Π¹ *φύλτρα* Π².

P. 7, l. 17. As Plutarch *Περὶ Εὐγενείας* is a fabrication of the renaissance, of which a Latin translation was first published in 1536 (Lugduni apud Seb. Gryphum), the citations from the *Politics* would not in any case have carried us far back: although, if at the time the *foigei* himself used a manuscript, or even emended the text on his own conjecture, his readings deserve mention. But they are not even entitled to such authority as they would have possessed in the case assumed, for though the Latin translation gives those citations in full, the manuscript from which in the year 1724 J. Christophel Wolf edited the tract in Greek exhibited blanks where the citations should have stood, and Wolf himself is responsible for the text of the passages which he copied out, probably from the first edition of Victorius. In his preface to Vol. IV of *Anecdota Græca* (Hamburg: 1724) Wolf says of the manuscript of the *Περὶ Εὐγενείας* which he obtained from Joh. Gramm, Professor at Copenhagen, "membranæ illæ uno alterove ante inventam typographiam sæculo, meo iudicio, luculente quidem, sed non sine frequentibus oscitantis libelli indicibus exaratae. Veterum scriptorū loca, a Plutarcho allata, omissa in his penitus erant, asterisco vicem eorum supplente .. Eleganter et crudite illa (Latina Arnoldi Ferroni interpretatio) confecta est, atque veterum testimonia integra Latine, sed sine additis, ubi exstarent, locis exhibet. Atque hanc ipsam . cum Græcis in lucem profecto, additis si pauca exceperis, auctorum testimonis, quæ non sine cura aliqua ex monumentis eorum adhuc exstantibus conquisiveris." Compare his footnote p. 196 [it should be 296]: "Aristoteles lib. I. c. VI Politicor. p. 37 edit. Victorii. In hoc loco vitando libentius versatus Interpretas" i.e. Ferron "nisi in opusculo Plutarchi eum alia quaedam legisse censeas, quam quidem hodie apud Aristotelem exstant. In ms. hic loc^{us} deest"

P. 9, l. 29. Add: *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* I 165 ff. (Berlin 1885).

P. 9, l. 3 from end. Add: *De Politicis Aristotelis Quaestiones criticae* Lipsiae 1886 (reprinted from the Supplement to *Jahrb. f. Philol.* Vol. XV. pp. 329—450, often hereafter cited as *Quaest. crit. collatae*). *Quaestionum Aristotelicarum criticarum et exegeticarum* Pais I Gryphiswaldine 1892. Pais II ib. 1893; Pais III ib. 1894: and *Prolegomena* II pp. XXVIII—XLIII of the 'nova impressio correctior' of the third edition in Teubner's series (Lipsiae 1894) Articles in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXLVII. 1893, pp. 817—824: Buisson's *Fahresberichte* I 592 f., III. 372 ff., V. 278 ff., IX. 354 ff., XVII. 279 ff., XXX. 66 ff., 97 f., XXXIV. 40 ff., XLII. 36, 253 ff., I. 12, LXVII. 137 ff., LXXV. 102 ff.

P. 10, last line. Add: *Zu Arist. Pol.* ibid. CXXIX. 1885. 544.

Jowett. Translation with Introduction and notes; Oxford, 1885.

Gompers. *Beiträge zur Kritik und Erklärung griech. Schriftsteller*; Wien, 1890.

Diels. Article in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* IV. 1891. 484.

Haberlin. Article on *Arist. Pol.* II. 9 in *Rhein. Mus.* XLV. 1890. 311 ff.

Maahly. Article in *Philologus* LI. 1893. 197.

Zeller. In *Archiv f. Gesch. der Philos.* VI. 1893. 153 n. 1.

Stoehr, Engel, Widemann, Schmidinger, Vogel. *Curae criticae in Ar. Pol. in Commentationes philologicae Monacenses*, 97—114: Munich, 1891.

Niemeyer. Article in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* CXLIII. 1891. 412 ff.

V. Wilamowitz. *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 64—71, 187 f. n. (3).

P. 11, n. 1. Add references to Zeller in *Hermes* XV. 1880. 547—556, Dummlic in *Rhein. Mus.* XLII. 1887. 179 ff., Shute *History of the Aristotelian writings*, Oxford, 1888, esp. c. 8, Newman *Introduction* to edition of the *Politics* I. 478—492, II. pp. xxx—xl, v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff. The discovery of the *Constitution of Athens* has called special attention to the connexion between the *Politics* and the *Polities*.

P. 14, n. 3. Add a reference to Birt *Das antike Buchwesen* p. 459. The safest inference to draw from the absence of correspondence between the opening of one book and the close of the preceding is that the two were independently elaborated. Notice the δὲ inserted after τῶν by P² and P³ (corr.) at 1323 a 14. Compare Newman *op. c.* II. p. xxi ff. xxvi f.

P. 15, n. 2. At the end of this note add (on p. 16): The total would now (1894) be slightly increased by the atheism of the last clause of B. I. c. 13 § 16, 1260 b 24 f. [καὶ πρὸς τὸν .πολεμικόν], II. c. 6 § 13, 1265 b 12—17 [φειδῶν...πρότερον], § 22, 1266 a 22—25 [ἀν...σκήψι], V (VIII). 7. 4, 1342 a 9 f. [ἐταν...μὲντοι], although these passages are not, in this edition, enclosed in square brackets, and Mr Hicks is not convinced: further, by VII (VI). 2 § 5, 1317 b 23 [ἡ δυνάμει], 8 § 24, 1323 a 6—9 [τῶν δημοτικῶν]. As regards II. c. 6 § 15, 1265 b 21—23 [ἐπει...τινός], with which must go c. 7 § 4, 1266 b 5—8 [Πλάτων...πρότερον], P. 10. Susemihl is not altogether convinced: while he is inclined to spare II. 6. 15, 1265 b 24—26 [καὶ...οὐκ], the discrepancy between this passage and IV (VI). 10. 11, 1330 a 9—23 may be accounted for by a change in Aristotle's opinions, if he wrote B. II. after B. IV (VI)—as well as II. 7. 16 f., 1267 a 28—37 [δὲ...πολιτικῶν] in spite of note (246). On most of these passages see Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeget.* Pars III, p. lii. Possibly even VIII (V). 12 §§ 1—6, 1315 b 11—39, is genuine as Diels contends *Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philos.* IV. 1891, p. 483 f.

P. 16, n. 3. Had Aristotle completed the work, there is a balance of probability that he would have arranged the books in this order: A. Γ. B. H. Θ. Δ. Z. B. Of these H. Θ. (and probably A. Γ.) were written earlier than the *Constitution of Athens*, the other four almost certainly later.

P. 16, n. 4. Add that Newman declines to accept the second transposition, suggesting a merely mechanical cause for the first; II. p. xxxix f. It is much to be regretted that he has increased the existing confusion by a new nomenclature, Book 7 (5)=VIII (v) and B. 8 (6)=VII (vi) of St Hilaire and Bk.³.

P. 18, n. 3. Cicero's acquaintance with the *Politics* has come up for discussion in several recent works, especially Schmekel's *Die mittlere Stoa* (Berlin 1892) pp. 47—85. The investigations of Schmekel enable us to dispense with the assumption that Tyrannion provided Cicero with extracts from Aristotle: for a comparison of Cicero

De Republica with Polybius vi. cc. 3—10 shows that both used a common authority, doubtless a political work by Panaetius. The suggestion was first made in a thesis appended to the dissertation published by P. Voight *Sorani Ephesi lib.* (Greifswald 1882). See Susemihl's edition of *Arif. Oeconomica* p. ix n. 16, *Griechische Litteraturgesch. in der Alexandrinischen Zeit* (Leipzig 1892) Vol. II. p. 75 n. (57), p. 180 n. (184). Direct acquaintance with the *Politics* is thus established for Panaetius whose life (circa 185—170) nearly covers the century between Hermippus and Apellion of Teos: a result confirming the line of argument adopted on p. 18.

As for Polybius, see also v. Scala *Die Studien des Polybios* I. (Stuttgart 1890) p. 102 ff., 222 ff. who endeavours (pp. 128—151) to prove that Polybius had himself read Aristotle's *Politics*. This hypothesis is combated by Susemihl *Litteraturgesch.* II. p. 81 n. (4), p. 106 n. (97 b), p. 127 n. (147).

P. 18, n. 7. The definite quotations contained in this list require to be distinguished from the more numerous traces of acquaintance with Peripatetic political doctrine which may or may not imply actual use of the treatise. The former may be slightly extended as regards the commentators on the *Ethics*: see now the academic edition Michael Ephesius ed. Heylbut 504, 8 ff., 520, 31 ff., 521, 5 ff., 610, 7 ff., 16 ff., 611, 10 ff., 615, 20 ff., 616, 6 ff., 619, 14 ff., 18 ff., 620, 10 ff., Anon. p. 190, 4 f., p. 214, 36 ff.

The latter must commence with the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*, the parallels being fully given in the footnotes to Susemihl's editions (Leipzig, 1883, 1884). Similarly with the *Oeconomica*: see again Susemihl's ed. (ib. 1887) p. v n. (1) for Book I and p. x n. (25) on the expansion in Book II of the idea suggested, and partly worked out, in the *Politics* I. II §§ 7—13, 1259 a 3—36. The beginning of this passage is clearly referred to at 1346 a 27—29: but this again has a bearing on the genuineness of *Politics* I. c. 11. See below.

M. Newman has compiled in Vol. II. p. x—xix, a list of similar parallels from *Rhetorica ad Alex.* 3, 1424 a 12 ff., b 3 ff., *De animal. motu* 7, 701 b 24 ff., [Plato] *Erastus* 135 c, 138 c, Aristoxenus *Fr.* 19, 20, Philodemus *De Musica* (ed. Kemke) besides B. 3, *Fr.* 24, 52, 53, 54, 65, 66 noticed by Kemke and Gomperz, B. 1, *Fr.* 16, 17: B. 3, *Fr.* 45, 55: B. 4, col. 3, 23 ff.; 15, 5 f., 16, 17 ff. Plutarch *Vita Crassi* c. 2, p. 544 A (esp. the words *τὴν γὰρ οικονομικὴν ἐν ἀνθρώποις χρηματιστικὴν οὐσαν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικὴν γυγνομένην ὁρώμεν*, though this is nowhere said by Aristotle), *Moralia* 9 C, 527 A, 787 C—D, 812 B, D ff., 825 A—C: Dio Chrysostom, 3, 115, 7, 267, 14, 439, 36 83 R. All of these include the possibility of indirect use of the treatise. Prof. Susemihl holds that Plutarch was certainly acquainted with the *Politics*, but hardly with the *Politica*. Even his direct acquaintance with the *Ἀθ. Πολ.* is denied by some: e.g. v. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893) I. pp. 299—303.

P. 20, n. 1. Add references to Blass *De Antiphonte sophista* (Kiel 1889), Dümmler *Prolegomena zu Platons Staat* (Basel 1891), Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 161 ff., esp. 169—185.

P. 22, n. 2. Gilbert's hypothesis, that Ephorus used the *Politics* of Aristotle, is rendered untenable by the discovery of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*, which contains very precise indications of having been compiled between 329 and 325 B.C. The same treatise slightly strengthens the probability that Aristotle may have made use of Ephorus (or his authorities) in part of his works. At any rate he is in the *Ἀθ. Πολ.* under considerable obligations to another of Isocrates' pupils, Andotion. See A. Bauer *Forschungen zu Arist. Ἀθ. Πολ.* (Munich 1891) p. 155. v. Wilamowitz is again sceptical *op. c.* I. p. 306.

P. 37, n. 1. The opinion here expressed, that the first part of B. II. c. 12 is genuine, the latter part a spurious addition, seems to have been strengthened rather than weakened by the discovery of the *'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία*. See Diels in *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* iv. 1891, p. 485. P. Meyer has indeed argued in *Des Arist. Politik u. d. 'Αθ. Πολ.* (Bonn 1891) p. 13 ff. that the *athetesis* should be confined to 1274 b 9—15, with perhaps the addition of 1274 a 32—b 5 *ἦν...ἐκλήρων*, and 1274 b 23—26 *ἐνέvero...δὲ*. Against this view see Sussemlil *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi f.

P. 66, ix. The date of the *Politics* has recently been discussed with much vivacity. Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens*, the appearance of general agreement combined with occasional discrepancy which the two works present, has not unnaturally stimulated inquiry into its cause. The first suggestion made, on the assumption that Aristotle wrote both works, was that the *Constitution*, which can confidently be dated *circa* 329—325, is separated by an interval of years from the *Politics*. Thus Mr Newman notes (in *Class. Rev.* v. 162) that in the first part of the *Constitution of Athens* "we are sometimes inclined to ask whether the *Politics* is not already in existence and known to the writer. Has not the writer" of *'Αθ. Πολ.* c. 41 § 2 "*Pol.* 4. 4, 1292 a 4—37 before him?" Similarly Bruno Keil in *Die Solonische Verfassung* (Berlin 1892) confidently assigns the *Politics* to the period 350—335 B.C. long before the completion, at any rate, of the *Constitution*. Tempting as such conjectures are, in the absence of positive evidence it is still necessary soberly to restate the grounds before us for dating the larger treatise; and this is what Prof. Sussemlil has done *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* II. p. x—xii, III. p. iii ff. His conclusion is that the *Ethics* and *Politics* were undoubtedly written later than the *Physica*, *De Caelo*, *Meteorologica*; that though they may conceivably have preceded the psychological, physiological and zoological works (and would then fall, say, about 332—330), it is far more likely that they were the latest sections of the *Encyclopaedia* with the exception of the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric* and *Metaphysics*. If this latter alternative be accepted, we may suppose the *Ethics* to have been finished before 327 B.C. About the *Politics* we cannot be so certain: for unquestionably the treatise consists of different component parts, written at different times with different aims, though ultimately incorporated in a single scheme. Of the portions anterior to the *Constitution of Athens*, i.e. say, to 327 B.C., we can point with confidence to Books IV (VII), V (VIII): possibly also to Books I, III. The rest of the treatise, B. II, no less than Books IV—VI of the old order, may with a balance of probability be assigned to the years 325, 324, 323, when Aristotle was also at work upon the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, *Metaphysics*, while under his editorship the Peripatetic school was issuing the remaining *Politics* (other than that of Athens), the *Νόμια βαρβαρικά*, the *διδασκαλία*, and other similar works.

v. Willamowitz assumes that from the earliest times when he lectured at all, Aristotle repeatedly gave courses of lectures on *Politics*. While admitting that the present condition of the treatise does not permit a sharp separation of the different layers, or a general application of the indications which certain passages afford as to the date, he finds it hard to believe that Books II & III were composed after "the comprehensive historical studies on which *AEZ* are based." I.e. he thinks that *AEZ* are later, or at least not earlier, than the *Politics*, which according to him they presume: *Aristoteles u. Athen* I. 355 ff.

P. 68, n. 3. Add a reference to Newman II. p. xxxi: Aristotle "had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean *Ethics*, and

yet he framed no fresh one to take its place;" a most important admission. Comp also Bitt *op. c.* p. 459 f. If the transition from B. I is an editor's addition, and δ² an insertion of the family II³ in 1260 b 27, the place of B. II itself becomes doubtful, as Susemihl remarks Prolegomena II to the revised impression of the Teubner text: "nisi tamen admodum fallor, Aristoteles totum opus si ita, ut voluit, perfecisset, etiam libros II. III. VII sic retractasset, ut II^{um} locum magis idoneum inter III^{um} et novi ordinis IV^{um} (veteris VII^{um}) invenisset." (This view is further developed in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. 111 ff., as explained above.) v. Wilamowitz *op. c.* I. 360 n. defends the genuineness of 1181 b 12—15, παραλιπόντων...τελειωθῆ as quite indispensable, and is not disinclined to accept the rest.

P. 71, n. 4. M¹ Newman examines the *Vetus Versio op. c.* II. pp lxi—lxv. With the whole of section x compare below p. 454 ff, Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* CXXXIII 1887 801—5, CXLVII. 1893. 817—824, *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* I. II., and for the other side Newman *op. c.* II xli ff and in *Class. Rev.* VII. 304 ff.

P. 74, n. 4, line 5. After ἀποκράτωρ insert 1287 a 39 πεισθέντας. See *Corrig.* and *Addenda to Critical Notes* ad loc.

P. 90, n. 4. M¹ Newman admits that VI (IV) cc. 1—4 "are little better than a chaos." See his appendix, Vol. I. p. 565 ff and compare Vol. II. p. xxvi, xxxviii, lv, lxvii.

P. 96, n. 2. Inexplicable as the subsequent delay may appear, the printing had proceeded thus far (indeed pp 1—448 had been struck off) before the appearance of M¹ Newman's volumes I. and II.

CRITICAL NOTES.

- P. 139, line 1. 1252 a 14 ἀνὸς Tyrrell (cp. Eur. Troad. 1208).
 P. 140. 1252 a 22 λέγειν and 23 διαρεθέντων Maehly, not rightly.
 P. 141, line 2. 1252 a 33 [ταῦτα] and (for τοιῶν) διαπορεῖν Gomperz.
 P. 142. *Add.* No M¹ gives the second article 1330 b 1 τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς some omit it 1261 b 25.
 P. 143, line 2. 1252 b 14 ὁ μὲν Χαράνδας] Χαράνδας μὲν II³ Bk. Newman ||
 Ib. line 5. *Add:* Shilleto followed Giphanius (p. 22 f.), who however preferred ἐμοκάπνου.
 P. 144, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. κατὰ φύσιν after εἵκει Γ M¹ Susem.^{1.2} ||
 P. 146, line 3. After 28 insert. ἡδὴ Γ P¹.
 P. 147, line 5. 1253 a 2 Stohi *Comm. phil. Monac.* p. 97 f. comparing 1253 a 2, a 7, 1278 b 20, *Eth. Nic.* 1097 b 11, 1162 a 17, 1169 b 18, *Eth. End.* 1242 a 22 would read ἀνθρώπος. See Dem. *Olynth.* I. 3, *In Mideam* § 198 ||
 Ib line 6. See *Corrigenda*. 1253 a 3 ἐστὶ after ἡφον added by Γ M¹ Susem.^{1.3} ||
 P. 149, line 1. After Bk. *add:* avoiding hiatus.
 P. 153, line 2. 1253 b 15 πρῶτον.. 1254 b 39 σώματος noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* Δ f. 55^a, p. 190, 4 f. Heyl. ||
 P. 157, line 9. After ἀπὸ *add:* See Hagfors *De praepositionum in Aris. Politicus etc. usu* (Berlin 1892) p. 5.
 P. 160, line 1. See *Corrigenda*. After Bk. *add:* Susem.³
 P. 161, line 1. After Bk. *add* (ἐστὶν Bk.³).
 P. 163, line 1. *Add:* See however *Addenda* to p. 7 above.

P. 176, line 1. *After* Ar. *add*: (but two Oxford mss. of Aretinus have *genitus*: Newman II. p. 71).

P. 180, line 7. *After* Susem. *add*. Diebitch would omit $\omega\acute{\nu}$ altogether.

P. 188, line 1. 1257 b 12. *For* $\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta$ Newman cites 1293 a 8, 1297 b 7.

P. 190, line 2. c. 11, 1258 b 9—1259 a 36, is considered by a friend of Mⁱ Newman a later addition.

P. 194, line 8. 1259 a 31 $\delta\rho\alpha\mu\alpha$ Campbell, but see Dem. *Prooeni*. 55, p. 1460, 26: $\delta\rho\alpha\mu\alpha$ τοῦτο ἐποιεῖτο ὁ δῆμος, *In Aristocr.* xciii. § 19 ($\delta\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon$), etc.

P. 197, line 2. 1259 b 32. See *Corrigenda*. *After* Γ M^a *add*: bracketed by Susem.^{1,2}

Ib. line 3. 1260 a 4. Cod. Oxoniensis (Coll. Corp. Chr. 112) had in the margin $\alpha\rho\chi\eta\sigma\tau\omega\upsilon\kappa$ *kal*, afterwards erased.]

P. 203, line 4. 1260 b 20—24 [$\alpha\delta\sigma\tau'$... $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\lambda\alpha$] bracketed by Bitl, as an addition of the publisher. Cp. Susem.³ *Prolegomena* p. xli: Neque tamen ἰππὶ Ἀριστοτέλει hac ratione succurro, sed compositor, qui perperam ultima libri Γ venia 1260 b 23 ψ . *kal* $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omega\kappa$ *κατὰ* adiecit

P. 232. 1263 a 2. The change in punctuation ($\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota$ $\pi\alpha\sigma\iota$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, see *Corrigenda*) is due to Mr Newman.]

P. 252. 1265 a 40 *Add to line* 12: $\delta\eta$ for $\alpha\upsilon$ Mⁱ H. Richards *Class. Rev.* vi. p. 339.

P. 261. 1266 a 31 [$\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\phi\omega\upsilon\kappa$] Zeller (*Aischy f. d. Ges. d. Philos.* vi. 153 n.): i.e. he would read $\alpha\tau$ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\beta\iota\omega\tau\omega\upsilon\kappa$ $\alpha\tau$ $\delta\epsilon$ *καὶ* $\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\iota\alpha\omega\upsilon\kappa$.

P. 269, last line. On the genuineness of 1267 b 20—28 see now Susemihl in *Jahrb. f. Phil.* cxlvii. 1893, p. 192.

P. 270. 1267 b 26 $\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\sigma\tau\epsilon$ $\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\alpha\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau$ O. Apelt.

P. 274. 1268 b 1 $\gamma\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\gamma\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\epsilon\omega\rho\gamma$ < $\delta\epsilon$ $\alpha\iota\kappa$ > $\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota$ Mⁱ A. G. Peskett (1891).

P. 289, line 2. *Add*: Comp. *Crit. Notes* on 1329 a 34.

P. 290, line 2. 1270 b 8 M^a P¹ omit $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ ||

P. 294. 1271 a 7 [$\tau\delta$] $\delta\omega\upsilon\kappa$, $\alpha\iota$ $\tau\iota$ $\delta\omega\upsilon\kappa$ C. Habellin ||

P. 298. 1271 a 20. Comp. $\delta\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\eta\kappa$ $\epsilon\iota$ $\gamma\epsilon$ 1276 b 18, $\delta\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$ $\mu\eta\kappa$ $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\upsilon\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota$ $\gamma\epsilon$ 1277 a 25 (Newman).

P. 305. See *Corrigenda* to 1272 b 9. $\delta\upsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\upsilon\kappa$ II¹ Susem.^{1,2} ||

P. 312. See *Corrigenda* to 1273 b 6. $\alpha\pi\omicron\lambda\iota\alpha\upsilon$ Γ M^a Bk. Susem.^{1,2} ||

P. 314, line 2. *After* Götting *add*: Benays (*Ges. Abh.* i. 172), Böckh (*Staatshaush. d. Ath.* i. p. 295, 580 d).

P. 318, line 8. *Dele* probably rightly. *καὶ* $\Theta\epsilon\mu\sigma\tau\omicron\kappa\lambda\eta\varsigma$ Diels, *possibly* (in *Aischy f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* iv. p. 484 n. 1).

P. 317, line 8. 1274 a 18—20 *After* Diels *add*: But comp. Susemihl *Jahrbuch.* xlii. p. 255 n. 36.

Ib. last line. 1274 a 20 Wilamowitz defends $\tau\rho\iota\tau\omega\upsilon$ $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, but hardly with success, *op. c.* i. p. 69 n. 41.

P. 320, line 1. 1274 b 9—15 [$\Phi\alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon$ $\alpha\delta\chi\eta\sigma\tau\omega\upsilon\kappa$] Newman followed by P. Meyer and v. Wilamowitz. See however *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* i. p. xvi f.

P. 354. V^m is P¹ of Susemihl's notation for the Vatican fragment in the Teubner text of the *Politics* (Susem.³ nova impressio correctior 1894), so that our fr. = V^m.

P. 356. 1275 a 23 $\kappa\rho\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota$ *καὶ* defended by Wilamowitz *op. c.* i. p. 205 n. 32.

P. 362. See *Corrigenda*. 1276 a 10—13 ($\tau\omicron\tau\epsilon$... $\sigma\upsilon\mu\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega\upsilon\kappa$) *εἴτε* the parenthesis and punctuation Niemeyer (in *Jahrb. f. Philol.* cxliii. 1891, p. 412 ff.).

P. 363. 1276 a 14 [*καὶ*] Niemeyer || *τις* $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ and comma *αἵτις* $\tau\rho\iota\tau\omega\upsilon$ Niemeyer ||

- P. 363. 1276 a 15 ταύτης (before τὰς) defended by Niemeyer ||
 Ib 1276 a 16 τυραννίδος; (with interrogation) Niemeyer, partly following Koiares ||
- P. 364. 1276 a 26. See *Corrigenda*.
- P. 366 B. III. c. 4 is vaguely referred to by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 214, 36 ff. ed. Heylb
- P. 369. 1276 b 39—40 [ἐπειδὴ πολλὰς] Widemann.
- P. 371. 1277 a 30 [καὶ] Spengel ||
- P. 372. 1277 a 32 τοῦτον Π² fr Bk
- P. 374. 1277 b 17—25 noticed by Anon. in *Eth. Nic.* v. p. 231, 38 ff. Heylb.
- P. 379. 1278 a 31 ἀσώτων Cod. Beol. Hamiltonianus 41 (merely on conjecture; the MS., of the xv century, is one of the worse species of Π². Possibly even in fr. the reading is conjectural).
- P. 380. 1278 b 8 See *Corrigenda*. καὶ εἰ Γ P¹ Sussem.^{1,2} (omitted by M²).
- P. 381 1278 b 10—15 noticed (amongst other passages) by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* IX f. 157^a 504, 8 ff. ed. Heylb.
- P. 383. 1279 a 8—16 [διὸ...ἀρχὰς] Stohi (hardly right).
- P. 397. 1281 a 41 ἔχει (with colon after λένεσθαι) Weldon (hardly adequate).
- P. 401, last line. Add. But see Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 539 b 18 ff.
- P. 402. 1282 a 27. Mr Wyse prefers μέγιστον as avoiding hiatus. It is however in *φαισα*.
- P. 411, line 1. 1283 b 15 Insert. δόξαιαν P¹.
- P. 412, line 3. Dele Plutauch.
- P. 421, line 10. See *Corrigenda*. That 1287 a 39 πεισθέντας is right (*persuados* William) was seen by Schneider and has recently been demonstrated by Engel in *Comm. phil. Monach.* p. 103.
- P. 442. 1287 b 30 f. [τοὺς ..συνάρχους] Widemann (not rightly).
- P. 442, line 5 1288 a 13. If Heylbut's conjecture be accepted, the punctuation will be changed. ἦτος πολέμικόν, δυνάμενον ||
- P. 473, line 3. 1323 b 8. Vahlen's conjecture requires εἰς τι. See Hagfors *op. c.* p. 43.
- P. 475. See *Corrigenda*. 1323 b 18 καὶ added by Γ M² Sussem.^{1,2} ||
- P. 481. 1324 b 4 f. The order of Γ M² is retained because neither the order of P¹ nor that of Π² will stand without Congreve's emendation. Besides it is best suited by the context.
- P. 489. 1325 b 34 [καὶ περὶ.. πρότερον] would be bracketed even if the preceding chapter were allowed to be by Aristotle.
- P. 490. 1326 a 9—b 24 noticed by Mich. Ephes. in *Eth. Nic.* IX. f. 161^b, p. 520, 31 ff (cp. 521, 5 ff.) Heylb.
- P. 498 1326 a 40 εὖν. 41 σταδίων noticed by Mich. Ephes. *ubi supra* p. 520, 35.
- P. 495. 1326 b 39 f. The punctuation (δὲ, ἐμπείρους) is due to Mr Wyse
- P. 497. 1327 a 23 [πρὸς] Aegyriades, rightly, in *Διορθώσεις εἰς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους Πολιτικά*. A¹ (Athens 1893).
- P. 503, line 5. 1328 a 16. See *Corrigenda* πέρα...πέρα Nauck, perhaps rightly || οἷδε Gompeiz, of δὲ with all other authorities Bk. Sussem.^{1,2}
- P. 521 1330 b 30. See *Corrigenda* μὴ ποιεῖν ἀφαι πόλιν Γ M² Sussem.^{1,2}
- P. 529. 1332 a 13. See *Corrigenda*. καὶ inserted before ἀναγκαῖα Γ M² Sussem.^{1,2}
- P. 535 1332 b 31. See *Corrigenda*. πάντων ἀφαι 32 τοῦτων Γ M² Sussem.^{1,2}
- P. 537 1333 a 26. See *Corrigenda* διηρῆσθαι ἀφαι μέγος Γ M² Sussem.^{1,2}

- P. 541. 1334 a 8. See *Corrigenda*. ἀνίσιν Γ Μ* Sussem.^{1.3}
 P. 546. 1334 b 24. See *Corrigenda*. ἐγγίνεσθαι αἰεὶ 25 πέφυκεν Γ Μ* Sussem.^{1.3}
 P. 549. 1335 a 27. See *Corrigenda*. ὠρισμένος αἰεὶ χρόνος Γ Μ* Sussem.^{1.3}
 P. 559. 1336 b 34. See *Corrigenda*. αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ὅσα Γ Μ* Sussem.^{1.3}

COMMENTARY.

P. 139. 1252 a 8. Add after *note* (2): The identity of βασιλική with πολιτική is asserted Pl. *Euthyd.* 291 c and *Politeus* 259 n. The question, What is the object of this science, which in *Euthyd.* is left open, is answered in *Politeus*. That στρατηγική is subordinated to it, is asserted *Polit.* 305 a as in *Euthyd.* 290 c, d (Bonitz).

P. 140. 1252 a 17 τὴν ἐξηγημένην μέθοδον. Mr Newman is inclined to take this participle against Bonitz here and c 8 § 1, 1256 a 2, in a middle sense. 'the method which has led the way.' Mr Wyse has independently proposed this same sense.

Ib. 1252 a 18. This method implies the examination of the ultimate species separately, cp. *De part. animi*. I. 4 § 4, 644 a 29, ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἶδει άτομον, κράτιστον, εἰ τις δῖνατο περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστον καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν χωρὶς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ περὶ θρύου (Newman).

P. 141 f. 1252 b 2. Mr Newman suggests that the Delphic knife may well have served "not only for killing the victim (σφαγὴς Eur. *El.* 811) but also for slaying it and cutting it up (κοτὴ *ibid.* 837)."

P. 143 1252 b 8. Add after *note* (12): Eu. *Hel.* 246 τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ὁνός.

P. 143 f. 1252 b 15. Add after *note* (17): Mr Newman, like Dittenberger, defends ὁμοκῆτους, meeting the objection respecting the quantity with the suggestion that the term may have occurred in a prose treatise. But the letter of Epimenides to Solon on the Cretan constitution, Diog. Laert. I. 112, was undoubtedly a forgery later than Aristotle's time: see Hillel in *Rhein. Mus.* XXXIII p. 527 f.

P. 144 1252 b 16. See again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 332. As in b 10, so here πρώτη must be predicative, = as the first, primarily: συνεστηκυῖα being understood from b 13. "From these two relationships the family is first formed.... From a number of families the society first formed with a view to something beyond the needs of every day is the village." Both passages should be omitted from the examples given by Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 652 b 53 ff.

P. 145. 1252 b 18. The literature bearing upon ὁμογλᾶκτες and ὀργῶνες is continually increasing: see the authorities cited in Burck *Gr. Gesch.* I¹. p. 390 ff. esp. pp. 394—398 with *notes*, K. F. Heumann *Lehrbuch d. gr. Alt.* Vol. I. *Staatsalterthümer* ed. V. Thumser § 58 [98] pp. 313—324, Töpffer *Altische Genealogie* p. 20 ff. For the later organization consult *C.I.A.* II. 596, 597, 605, 'Bf. *Arch.* 1883. 83.

Mr W. R. Paton, *Class. Rev.* v. p. 222, thinks that ὁμογλᾶκτες=those whom it was possible for two generations to suckle, i.e. two generations.

Many years ago Mr Wyse asked "What of the *present* tense (οὐν καλοῦσι τινες ὁμογλᾶκται)? For from Philochorus *Fr.* 94 (Suid. s.v. ὀργῶνες)... τοὺς ὁμ. οὐς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν we see the older term was extinct in his time. Was it current in Aristotle's time? I have my doubts. It seems at any rate possible that, if the passage cited by Suidas occurred in the account of the διαψήφισις ἐπὶ Ἀρχίου Ἀρχοντος 346/5 B.C.,

Philochorus cited and explained in this context the ancient laws which as we know from Lysias needed interpretation even early in the fourth century. May Aristotle refer then either to the authors of ancient Athenian statutes or to lawyers? I do not think the word occurs in the Orators, having been expelled by *γενήσθαι*. It manifestly assists Aristotle's argument if the word is a relic from old times, not in use among the Athenians of his day (and Pollux vi. 156 remarks *ἴδιον τῶν Ἀττικῶν*).... As to the remark," p. 145 Comm. left col., l. 25, "that no place in the development is found for 'associations for common sacrifices and religious festivals,' was not this just the aspect under which the *γένος* presented itself to an Athenian of the fourth century? The *γένος* implied *κοινωνία τερῶν*."

P. 148, right col. To the note on *διδ* add. Aristotle follows Plato in arguing that the primitive form of government must have been monarchy, because the primitive family, supposed independent anterior to the rise of any government, is accustomed to the rule of its senior member. The Cyclopes are adduced as evidence of this earlier state of society (*σποράδες*) without any king, patriarchal or other, not of course 'to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times,' but rather to justify the particular statement made 1252 b 19 (*ἐκ βασιλευμένων*).

P. 146. 1252 b 28 The place of *τῶν* illustrates Dr Jackson's remark that by normal Aristotelian usage part of a complex epithet may be placed after article and substantive (hyperbaton).

P. 148. 1253 a 7. Add to note (25): comp. Becq de Fouquières *Œuvres des Anciens* p. 372 ff.

P. 150. 1253 a 22 Add to note (28) a reference to the note on p. 212, and to *Quaest. crit. coll.* pp. 334—336, 449 f.

Ib. 1253 a 26. Add to note on *χωρισθῆναι*. Possibly Aristotle has in mind Soph. *Phil.* 1018 *ἀφίλον ἔρημον ἀπὸλον ἐν ᾧδων νεκρῶν* (Newman).

P. 151. 1253 a 34. This note has suffered from undue compression. A fuller discussion appears in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 336 f. The main points are: (1) the weapons are not prudence and [virtue], or else they would have been expressed by the accusative, *φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετήν*. (2) Prudence and [virtue] are the qualities at whose disposal the weapons are placed. (3) The weapons are the various safeguards and aids necessary if any action, whether just or unjust, is to be performed with safety: prudence and perseverance (on Susemihl's conjecture), prudence and skill (on Freudenthal's)¹.

Against those who, with Jowett, by *φρονήσεις* understand *δεινότης* (*N. E.* 1144 a 23 ff.) and by *ἀρετῇ φυσικῇ ἀρετῇ* or *ἔξω* (*N. E.* 1144 b 1 ff.), it is urged 1.1. that (1) such a use of *ἀρετῇ* is unexampled and (2) that the natural germ of virtue is not peculiar to man but is found in the lower animals: *N. E.* 1144 b 8, *Hist. an.* i. 1 § 32 ff. 488 b 12 ff., VIII. 1, IX. 1.

Spengel, who understands by *ἀρετῇ* intellectual virtue, is met not only by the invaluable usage of the phrase *φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή*, but also by the fact that *φρόνησις* is probably the only intellectual virtue which has to do with conduct. There is also the improbability that the term *ἀρετῇ* would be used of a quality liable to abuse when

¹ Quamvis recte monuerit Montecanus, si Aristoteles prudentiam homini et virtutem tamquam arma data esse dicere voluisset, scribendum ei potius fuisse *φρόνησιν καὶ ἀρετήν*, quid impedit, ne prudentia et id quod sub corrupto vocabulo

ἀρετῇ latet non ipsa arma sed res sint, quibus arma offerantur, armis autem praesidia illa varii generis atque adiumenta significantur unicuique necessaria, quotiescunque opus vel iustum vel iniustum tute perpetrare velit? *Qu. cr. coll.* p. 337.

Aristotle himself says *Rhet.* I. I. 12, 1355 b 4: τοῦτό γ' (i.e. above) καὶνόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς.

Benary again *Zwey Abh. u. d. aristot. Theorie* (Berlin 1880) p. 113 f. who adopts Montecatino's explanation (aima homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem), quotes Seneca *De ira* I. 17: Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illi bene utatur, pro aimis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, cum deponique possent inuentis arbitrio. haec aimia, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnans, non exspectant manum, et habent, non habentur. But the passions are not peculiar to man: and surely they are not more dangerous in man because, as Benary interprets the words, they are 'aims for insight and virtue.' Not to mention the objection, stated on p. 151, that ἀδικία ἐχοντα ὅπλα shows the aims must be used by φρόνησις and ἀρετή, not in order to procure them.

[Mr Newman suggests 'language' as one of these weapons, and admits that if 'certain emotions, anger especially' are included, Aristotle must then have regarded these emotions as peculiar to man.]

P. 151. 1253 a 37. Add after *note* (28 c): Perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in mind: cp. *Plut. Praec. vitæ. ger. c.* 13, p. 807 c: ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἀριστοτέχνης τις ὢν κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ δημιουργὸς εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης (Newman).

P. 152. 1253 b 3. The laxity here noted may be particularized as the omission not only of ἐστὶ but of ἐκείνων the antecedent to ὅσα. But in Greek idiom the genitive case is appropriated to related terms, so that in the sentence 'The parts of Economic are of the constituents of the Household' the meaning of the words supplied *are of* is 'correspond to,' or 'relate to,' and not 'treat of.' Mr Newman compares 1258 b 27 (but this is doubtful), and refers to Bonitz *Index Ar.* 533 b 6—13, with Wutz on *Anal. Pr.* I. 46, 52 a 29 there quoted.

Id. 1253 b 9. It would have been sufficient to say that the ordinary sense of γαμωτός is 'nuptial' and not 'conjugal': cp. *n.* on 1334 b 32, p. 547.

P. 153. 1253 b 20. Lest the expression 'speech delivered' in *note* (81) should be misunderstood we add that the Μεσσηνιακός was a pamphlet cast in the form of a speech, like the 'Aichdamus' of Isocrates, treating the same theme from the opposite side, and advising the Spartans to make peace with Messene (1397 a 11 ff.): cp. Blas *Attische Beredsamkeit* II.³ pp. 350, 389.

Id. 1253 b 21. Zeller *Pre-Socratics* Eng. tr. II. p. 477 n. (3) observes that νόμος γὰρ ἐστὶ μὲν δοῦλος ἐς δ' ἐλεύθερος forms a trimeter, so that under τοῦ δέ, b 20, a poet may be included.

P. 158 f. 1253 b 23 ἐπεὶ οὖν .33 ὑπηρέτης. The commentary may again be supplemented from *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 339 f. Various critics have treated this whole passage as one loosely constructed sentence, but without agreeing how much of it is apodosis to the sting of protases which they suppose to be introduced by ἐπεὶ. As οὖν introduces the apodosis to ἐπεὶ in I. 10. 3, 1258 a 31—34, so in the present passage, according to Eucken *De Aristotelis dicendi ratione* I. p. 29 f. (Götting. 1866), the apodosis begins at b 30 οὖν καὶ τὸ κτήμα. Spengel *Ar. Stud.* III. p. 5 (57) f. and Thurot *Études* p. 5 ff. proposed that it should begin two lines lower down with b 32 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος (to which Spengel by his punctuation ὀργάνων ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος would add the preceding word ἐστὶ). Eucken's punctuation is as follows: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κηθεὶς μέρος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτηνικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δίδωσιν καὶ ἴσθαι καὶ εἰ ἴσθαι), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οὐκ εἶδη ὄργανα, εἰ μὴ διὰ ποτελευσθήσεσθαι τὸ θρῆνον, οὖν καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ¹, τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ

¹ sc. ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν τὰ οὐκ εἶδη ὄργανα presumably.

μὲν διψυχα τὰ δ' ἐμψυχα (ὅσον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οὐαξ διψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶτος ἐμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπερέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἰσὶ ταῖς τέχαις ἐστίν¹). οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτήμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζῷον ἐστί, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων² ἐστί, καὶ ὁ θεὸς κτήμα τι ἐμψυχον, καὶ ὡς περ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς δὲ ὑπερέτης.

The criticism of these conflicting views suggests the result adopted in the text.

P. 155. 1553 b 35. τοῦ=the Homeric Hephaestus (Bywater). "Aristotle's rule is to prefix the article to the names of personages in a poem or dialogue." Cp. note on 1261 a 6.

P. 156. 1554 a 12. To the 1ef. from *Eth. Eud.* add *Magna Moralia* I. c. 34, 1194 b 18 τοῦ γὰρ δεσπότου τί ἐστιν ὁ οὐκ ἐστίν.

P. 159 f. 1554 b 8. Add to note (40): What is called *δρεξίς* in 1554 b 5, and τὸ δρεπτικὸν *De Anima* III. 7. 2, 431 a 13, is plainly that which is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μέριον: comp. III. 15. 5, 1286 a 18. Here as in IV(VII). 15. 9, 1334 b 18 ff, νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ μέριον τὸ λόγον ἔχον αἰε opposed to *δρεξίς* and the irrational part (τὸ δλογογόν 1334 b 18 and 1560 a 7, here τὸ παθητικὸν μέριον). But in *N. E.* I. 13. 15, 1102 b 13 f., the latter is called φύσις δλογογος μετέχουσα πῃ λόγου.

P. 161. 1554 b 23. Cp. again *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 343, where it is suggested that if λόγῳ be kept, the genitive λόγον may be understood from it as the object of αἰσθανόμενα, while both datives αἰε governed by ὑπερετής. Comp. however for the ellipse of the copula IV(VII). 14. 9, 1333 a 17 f. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔχει μὲν καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὁπακοῦεν συνδμένον.

P. 162. 1554 b 32. συμβαίνει δὲ πολλὰς κτλ. "But often the contrary also occurs so that [where this contrary occurs] the one have [only] the bodies, the others [only] the souls of free men" [and hereby the former αἰε after all natural slaves, and the latter natural free men]. This is the translation of Prof. Susemuhl's second edition and the words inserted should have sufficiently indicated his position, which is that τοὺς μὲν = actual slaves who have the noble erect frames which Nature intended freemen to have, and τοὺς δὲ = actual freemen who have not such bodily excellence but only the souls of freemen.

P. 163. Add after Excursus II: and the addenda to p. 209 below.

Ib. 1255 a 8. With τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = juristsconsults Dittenberger compares οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις = dialecticians *Meta.* IX. 8. 20, 1050 b 35, οἱ περὶ φύσεως = physical philosophers 1006 a 2, 1050 b 24, 1053 b 14, 1062 b 26. Nor does καὶ before a 11 σοφῶν make any real difficulty in taking τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις = qui de legibus philosophantur; for not all who engage in philosophical discussions are really philosophers. (From *Quaest. cr. coll.* p. 344.)

P. 165. 1255 a 15. With ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθὸν τιμὸς comp. III. 12. 2, 1282 b 24, κατὰ πᾶν τὸς ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθὸν explained by κατὰ χρῶμα, κατὰ μέγεθος.

P. 166. 1255 a 20, 21 ὡς οὐ δέ. Comp. Plato *Sympos.* 216 b ἀντιλέγει μὲν οὐ δυναμένην ὡς οὐ δέ ποτε αὐτοῖς κελύει, [Dem.] XXXIII. § 27, p. 901, 9' καὶ οὐκ ἔσχημαί τῳ νόμῳ ὡς οὐ δέ με δίκην δοῦναι, εἰ ἡγγυσησάμην.

P. 170. 1255 b 25. Note that ἀγκύλιος is an epithet of ἀρχαί in c. 26 § 2, and of διοικηταί in c. 43 § 1 of the *Ἀθ. πολ.* (routine offices, routine of administration).

P. 172 f. 1256 a 13—19. See additional remarks on this passage, *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 349 ff.

¹ οὕτω...ὑπερέτης is the apodosis of Eucken [and Newman].

² ἐστί καὶ ὁ θεὸς...ὑπερέτης is the

apodosis of Spengel, καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὑπερέτης of Thumot.

P. 174. 1256 a 36. To note (71) add, that Aristotle is speaking of Etruscan piracy (Bywater). See *Journal of Philol.* II. p. 60 ff., *Frag.* 60 in Rose's last edition (partly given 1480 b 31 ff.).

P. 175. 1256 b 13. Mr Newman aptly compares Plato *Menex.* 237 E, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ τεκὸν τροφήν ἔχει ἐπιτηδεύειν ὅ ἂν τέκῃ· ὃ καὶ γυνὴ δόλῃ τελευτᾷ τε ἀληθῶς καὶ μὴ, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, εἰς μὴ ἔχῃ πηγὰς τροφῆς τῷ γεννωμένῳ.

P. 176. 1256 b 19. τῆς τροφῆς] Mr Newman thinks it possible that Theophrastus apud Porphyrius *De Abstinētia* II. c. 12 had this statement in view and intended to continue it.

Ib. 1256 b 23. Add a reference to the fuller discussion *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 346 ff.

P. 179. 1257 a 3 ἐκείνης "This last," comp. VIII(v). 6. 10, 1306 a 10· σημεῖον δ' ἢ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία· ἐκείνοι γὰρ δόλῃσι ὄντες πολλῶν λόβοι εἰσι (Illyric).

P. 180. 1257 a 18 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀλλαγὰς. There is another way of taking this sentence: ἀναγκαῖον = ἀναγκαῖον ἂν, "For otherwise exchange would have been necessarily confined to the satisfaction of the exchangers' own wants": and so Benays and Jowett translate "Thus retail trade is proved not natural because, if it were, an absurdity would follow. The historical explanation of the imperfect given in the note appears the simpler and deserving of preference (1) because of the historical tendency throughout the context, and (2) because the direct proof is much more natural than the indirect and apagogic.

P. 182. 1257 b 7 ff. On various changes proposed in order to avoid the vicious circle in the reasoning of § 10 see *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 353 f. As it stands, 1257 b 5 διδ=διὰ τὸ καπηλιακὸν γενέσθαι; "owing to the growth of Retail Trade Cinematistic is (erroneously) supposed to be concerned with money, because, (really) productive of wealth: for wealth is often defined as a stock of money because Cinematistic and Retail Trade are concerned therewith." At the best, the words in italics are a clumsy and inexact restatement of the fact contained in διδ.

P. 185. 1257 b 37. Add to note: comp. IV(vii). 5 § 2, 1326 b 36, where see note. Mr Newman, to whom this reference is due, also adduces Plutarch *De cupid. divit.* 8, a fragment of a dialogue preserved in a slightly fuller form in Plutarch *Vita Pelopid.* 3, 279 B: τῶν γὰρ πολλῶν οἱ μὲν οὐ χρεώνται τῷ πλοσθῶ δια μικρολογίαν, οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται δι' αἰσῶτιαν κτλ. See *Frag.* 56 ed. Rose (Teubner 1886).

P. 186. 1258 a 10. Comp. *Magna Moralia* I. c. 25, 1192 a 16 ff. (c. xxiv § 2 ed. Susem.).

Ib. 1258 a 11—13. Athenian generals in the fourth century were obliged to make their 'ait' a means of gain, for the state was rarely in a position to find pay. Hence the author of *Oeconomica* B. II. cc. 23, 25, 26 records the devices of Timotheus, Chabrias, and Iphicrates for obtaining money 1350 a 23 ff., 1350 b 33 ff. Chares is another instance given by Mr Newman: Theopompus apud *Athen.* 532 B, *P. II. G.* I. 297.

P. 187. 1258 a 21 f. ὥσπερ γὰρ καί...οὕτω καὶ] So c. 2 § 15, 1253 a 31 f., II. 8 § 22, 1269 a 9, c. 9 § 25, 1270 b 40 ff. Similarly καθάπερ καί...οὕτω καὶ VIII(v). 9 § 4, 1309 b 12 ff.

P. 188. 1258 a 24. Mr Newman takes ἐκ τούτων=starting with this food.

P. 190. As explained in the Addenda to Critical Notes, Mr Newman has examined with some care, Vol. II. pp. 196—198, the doubts thrown on the genuineness of c. 11 by a friend of his. Comp. p. 468.

Ib. 1258 b 10. Add to n. (99) that others, as Jowett and Newman, take the

meaning to be that philosophers may speculate on these occupations, but to embark upon them is seivile. In any case compare V(VIII). 2. 5, 1337 b 15—17.

P. 190. 1258 b 11. Prof. Tyrell holds that in every case where *ἐλεύθερος* is of two terminations, the adjective = *liberalis*.

Ib. 1258 b 12. In the island of Carpathus mules are called *κτῆματα* (quoted by Newman from J. T. Bent *Journal of Hell. Studies* vi. p. 241).

Ib. 1258 b 12—20. Mr Newman thinks that Plato *Laws* 843 c, d may have suggested this passage.

P. 191. 1258 b 21. On the subdivisions of *μεταβλητική* see Büchschutz *Beitrag u. Erwerb* p. 455 ff, who supports Cope's view respecting *φορηγία*. Prof. Susemihl is not convinced.

Ib. 1258 b 27—29. Mr Newman takes this differently, supposing the same ellipse as in 1253 b 3 *τρίτον εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς <ἐστὶν ἐκείνων> ὅσα κτλ.*

P. 193. 1259 a 5 *δεῖ συλλέγειν*. This has been done by the author of *Oeconomica* B. II; see Susemihl's ed. (Leipzig 1887) Preface p. ix ff n. (25), and for the age of the writer (*circa* 260—200 B.C.) p. xii.

P. 194. 16 f. The same construction *ἐπιθεῖναι δεῖ* is found 213 a 25, *Ind. Ar.* v. v.

P. 197. 1260 a 3. Prof. Susemihl, defending the reading *ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων* which Mr Newman rejects as nothing more than a conjectural emendation, writes as follows: As the principal family of manuscripts of Vet. Transl. has *quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum* (and so i.e. bl), this is what William of Moerbeke must have written. Whether he took the reading *ἀρχόντων καὶ* from the text or the margin of his Greek manuscript, we cannot know for certain but the question is superfluous, for the reading is even in the latter case older, in fact considerably older, than all extant manuscripts. Those who, like Dittenberger and Newman, set down all that is of value in Vet. Transl. to mere conjecture, will attach no importance to this: but then they should not appeal to the Vatican Fragments or in consistency should pass the same judgment on the two correct readings which they present. Further they should remember that the seventy odd right readings of K^b in the *Nicomachean Ethics* might with just as good reason be entitled 'conjectures.' If the oldest authorities are thus impugned how are we to come to a decision as to the goodness of any old manuscript? And do the good readings of the Vet. Transl. look at all like Byzantine corrections of the eleventh or twelfth centuries? Had this been the procedure of Byzantine grammarians in those times we should have found more of their interpolations (say rather emendations) in the text. There seems therefore no reason for rejecting this reading, which best suits the sense, in favour of exegetical subtleties. Moreover, of what avail are these latter? If we do translate *ὥσπερ* by "corresponding," we obtain no real correspondence: for the differences between those who are naturally ruled do not correspond to the differences between the value of the rules and the virtue of the ruled: it is at the most the differences between the *virtues* of the different persons ruled that correspond, in so far as the wife is nearer to the ruler, the slave in complete opposition to him and the child in an intermediate position. This would lead to the conjecture *καὶ <τῶν> τῶν*. Why not then follow the more suitable reading of the Vet. Transl.? Had he intended the other sense Aristotle would more naturally have written: *τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν τῶν ἀρχομένων*.

P. 201. 1260 a 33. With *ὁ ἡγουμένος* leader, chief, qui principem locum obtinet, comp. Dem. c. *Aristocr.* XXIII. § 113 *δυὸν ἀγαθῶν... τοῦ μὲν ἡγουμένου καὶ μετρίτου πᾶντων*, Plato *Laws* ix, 875 B, *τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἡγουμένον τρέφον ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὸ δὲ ἕκον*

ἐπόμενον τῷ κοινῷ, Xen. Cyr. IV. 1. 8 τὸ ἡγουμένον τῆς στρατιᾶς ὁ ἴππας = (the leading corps of the whole army).

P. 202. 1260 b 4. Mr Newman opposes the insertion of τῶν: the concluding part of the sentence would, according to him, apparently ἰσχυρὰ ἔχοντα τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀρετῆν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικῆν, "it is from the master's *qua* master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess." But (1) if so, ἀλλ' οὐχ <ᾗ> would be required. (2) It should be remembered that c. 7 § 2, 1252 b 22 ff., teaching slaves their duties (διδασκαλική) is called δουλική ἐπιστήμη as opposed to teaching the equitable commands which is δεσποτικὴ καὶ διδασκαλική (ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιτάττειν). It is no part of a master's business to teach slaves their duties, but merely to educate them to the moral virtue indispensable if their duties are to be rightly performed.

Ib. 1260 b 5. Against the view adopted by Mr Newman, following Bonitz, that λόγος here = reason, it would be superfluous to urge that (1) Plato does not suppose to withhold reason from the slave, and that (2) while reason forms no proper antithesis to ἐπιτάττει 'rational conversation' does.

P. 206. Το ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΝ 1 on Epimenides add: Niese's conclusions can no longer be accepted. Compare now 'Ab. πολ. c. 1 § 1. 'Ἐπιμενίδης δ' ὁ Κρήσις ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἐκδήρησε τὴν πόλιν, which is also decisive evidence for the earlier of the two dates assigned to him (circa 600 B.C., not circa 500 B.C.). See H. Diels *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Akademie* 1891 p. 387, Busolt *Gr. Alt.* p. 136 n. 1.

P. 209. Addenda to Exc. II. Mr Newman's view of c. 6 is given Vol. II. p. 150 f. (1) He distinguishes the objections to slavery here mentioned (1255 a 8 πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις) from the Abolitionists of 1253 b 20, who hold all slavery to be conventional and contrary to nature, thinking that the former probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks. In fact he restricts the dispute to the validity of the law or convention actually in force at the time, by which captives of war become slaves of the victors. (2) At 1255 a 20 he (like Dr Jackson) explains ἀρετοὶ λόγοι as a true plural: "the other line of argument on which (A) and (B) must then fall back, supposing they gave up their common standing-ground"—the principle that 'Force is not without virtue.' "Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force and those who connect it with mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue: but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate." (3) At 1255 a 21, Mr Newman takes *δίκαιον* with *δικαίαιον*. The connexion of 1255 a 21—b 3 with the foregoing he makes out as follows. "We shall arrive at exactly the same result"—that what is solid in the contending views is the principle, that superiority in virtue confers on the master the right to rule—"if we examine another view. We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits, but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is *ipso facto* just."

Prof R. V. Tyrell has published remarks of his own and of the late Dr Maguire on the Slavery passage in a review of Mr Newman's edition published in *Hermaena* Vol. VI., No. 14 pp. 342—345.

P. 212. The suggestion in the second paragraph of the note on 1253 a 20 ff., made

independently several years ago, does not greatly differ from Mr Newman's explanation, except that ἡ makes τοιαύτη=probably λιθίνη, not ὁμιονόμως λεχθεῖσα. He translates: 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its οὐσία) 'will be no better than a stone hand.'

P. 218. 1260 b 30. After 'Nic. Eth. I. 13. 3' add '1102 a 10 ff., Plato *Rep.* 544 C, *Protag.* 342 A.'

P. 215. 1261 a 12 οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνει. To be rendered with Mr Newman "evidently does not result" (not, as in the note on a 11, does not appear to result). Comp 1266 a 5, 1270 a 33 n.

Ib. 1261 a 13. The adverbial πρὸς is found in Aristophanes e.g. *Frogs* 415 κἀγωγε πρὸς, 611 κλέπτοντα πρὸς τὰλλοτρία, 697 πρὸς δέ, τοῖσι τοῖς ἐκὸς ὑμᾶς. παρῖναι, *Ach.* 1229, *Knights* 578, *Pax* 19, *Lysistr.* 665 ἀλλ' ὅφ' ὑμῶν διαλυθῆναι προσέτι κινδυνεύομεν. Also in Demosthenes *Adv. Lept.* XX. § 112 s f. p. 491, γ πρὸς δέ καὶ οὐδὲ δίκαιον, *Adv. Leontaeum* § 13, p. 1084, 12 πρὸς δέ καὶ ἐκ γυναικῶν.

P. 216. 1261 a 17. Mr Newman prefers to render μία μάλλον by 'more and more of a unity.'

P. 219. 1261 a 35. ὥσπερ ἄν] According to Mr Newman the ellipse is thus to be supplied: "as (all would be shoemakers, i.e. in turn) if shoemakers and carpenters interchanged occupations."

P. 220. 1261 b 2. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 360 f.

Ib. 1261 b 7. On πέφυκε Vahlen observes that the meaning is given by the Platonic equivalent, φύσιν ἔχει. Thus *Rep.* 473 A' ἡ φύσιν ἔχει πᾶξιν λήξως ἦντων ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι; 489 B οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δέσθαι ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Comp. Demosth. XIV. 30 τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν, and for *At. Politics* VI(IV). 12. 3, 1296 b 26 ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν.

P. 222. 1261 b 18. Mr Newman translates κατὰ τὸν λόγον in connexion with (or 'in') the expression i.e. τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἅμα τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ. Perhaps however it is more nearly parallel to § 4, b 32, τὸ λεγόμενον=the scheme in question. For plainly τὸ λεγόμενον, *de quo sermo est*, i.e. τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν, is not 'the expression' itself but 'the general adoption of the same expression': and so too with κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 1261 b 24. Complete the reference to Plato *Rep.* 462 E by adding the words ἐνὸς δῆ, οἷμαι, πάσχοντος τῶν πολιτῶν ὅτιον ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ τοιαύτη πᾶσις μέγιστά τε φήσει εὐνοῆς εἶναι τοῦ πάσχον, καὶ ἢ ξυνησθήσεται ἢ ξυλλυπησεται.

Ib. 1261 b 26. Besides 1281 b 2 and 1292 a 11 f (quoted in the note) the ambiguity of πάντες is prominent also in IV(VII). 13. 10, 1332 a 36 ff.

P. 224. 1262 a 1 ff. Add a reference to the fuller discussion in *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 361 ff.

P. 225. 1262 a 7. After (Thucot) add: Or this may be another instance of μὲν without δέ following; see 1270 a 34 and Susemihl's Critical Edition (Susem¹) Index grammaticus J.v.

P. 226. 1262 a 19. Ἰθὺς περίοδοι had been written by Hecataeus and others before Herodotus: the allusion may be to one of them (Bywater).

Ib. 1262 a 21 f. καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων. Probably γυναῖκες='females' both here and in the passage from *Hist. Anim.* 586 a 12, quoted in n. (143): εἰσι δέ καὶ γυναῖκες εὐκρίτα αὐταῖς γενέσθαι, αἱ δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλει Ἰππος ἡ Δικαία καλούμενη. Mr Newman prefers to take καὶ. καὶ=both. and He also prefers to derive the name of this famous mare from her special quality, comparing Xen. *Cynop.* VII. 3. 38.

P. 227. 1262 a 32. For obvious reasons, the last sentence but one of the note on *Λόσει* should run "are not mentioned by Homer."

P. 230. 1262 b 23. The connexion between the two meanings of *ἀγαπητόν* is given by Plato *Ευθῡδ.* 304 B τὸ γὰρ σπένδιον, ὃ Εὐδοδότῃ, τίμιον.

P. 232. 1263 a 1. For the clause τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν *φρ.* (*Quaest. civ. coll.* 1, 365 f. Mr Newman is quite right in taking *πᾶσι* with *ἔχει* in the next line.

P. 235. 1263 a 26—28. The subject of a 28 *ἐπιδίδωσιν* is not, as Nonitz and Mr Newman think, αὶ ἐπιμελείαι, but as all other commentators and translators have seen οἱ ἀνθρώποι ὧν αὶ ἐπιμελείαι εἰσι διαγρημέναί: for the increased trouble and attention which private ownership brings, with it (1261 b 33 ff.) have this compensating advantage that they are merely means to the owner's increased advantage. The reading *ἐκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντες* with this construction alone, the other reading *ἐκάστῳ προσεδρεύοντος* (adopted in the reprint of *Suicem.* 1894, see *Corrigenda*) would agree with either, but it may have arisen from erroneously taking αὶ ἐπιμελείαι as the subject to ἐπιδίδωσιν.

Ib. 1263 a 31. Add from Aristotle himself the ex. in the *Ἠθικά*, 182 a 2, 431 a 10.

Ib. 1263 a 36 f. The difficulty in the text as it stands, which appears to have escaped some critics, is that *καὶν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοβίων = καὶ τοῖς ἐφοβίοις, ἀν ταύτων δεηθῶσι*, sc. *χρῶσται κοινῶν*. 'In case they need provisions on a journey' implying that they have none of their own 'they share them in common.' Whose? we may ask with Sydney Smith.

P. 239. 1264 a 2. Comp. Dem. 36 § 64, p. 960, 24 *ἔρτσι καὶ χρόνους ὅστερον*. For Beana's ingenious correction *ἔθνεσι*, which has M. H. Watson's approval, see now *Ges. Abhandlungen* I. p. 177.

P. 240. 1264 a 10. καὶ νῦν. "In his verbis νῦν male de tempore intellegunt, quo factum est, ut Spengelius interrogaret, nonne semper Helotas id fecerint, Victorius novum non vetus institutum civitatis Laconicae hoc μὴ γεωργεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς fuisse Aristotelem affirmare crederet; Schneider contra ea Giphantium secutus diceret a philosopho etiam sui temporis Lacedaemoniis retinendi illius instituti studium tribui, sed studium tantum (ἐπιχειροῦσι), iam enim eos coepisse a vetere more desistere, sed si hoc Aristoteles voluisset, dicendum ei fuit non καὶ νῦν veniri *ἔτι καὶ νῦν*. Quae cum ita sint, alia explicanda ratio probanda neque nimis longe ea quaerenda est. Nῦν enim saepissime id significat quod revera extat"; *even as it is, even as things are, actually*. "Fictae igitur Platonis civitati haec opponuntur. Sed quid sibi vult illud ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, pro quo expectas ποιοῦσιν? Ni fallor, ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦν non de eis duntaxat, qui aliquid facturi sunt, sed de eis quoque dici potest, qui tempore aliquid faciunt, si ea ipsa actione dubiae rei experimentum instituunt et quam bene ipsae haec res procedat et sibi et vel nolentes simul aliorum in usum experiuntur": 'make the experiment.' "Quae loquendi ratio hoc loco eo aptior est, quo magis Aristoteles rei, de qua loquitur, institutionem, qualis apud Lacedaemonios invenitur, minime optimam esse ipse postea demonstravit, c. 9. 1266 a 34—b 10." *Quaest. civ. coll.* p. 367. Comp. the limiting expression Isaeus VIII. § 1: *ὅπερ καὶ νῦν οἱ τοῖς ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι* 'which is just what my opponents are doing in the present case.'

P. 241. 1264 a 15. With ἡ καὶ 'or again' cp. *De Gen. Anim.* I. 18, 723 a 29, 724 b 5 (Newman).

P. 242. 1264 a 27. *Ἀφ' ὧν πολλοῖς* is predicate add: αὶ ἀρχοντας in § 25, 1264 b 7, αὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας.

P. 243. 1264 a 33. ἀποφορὰν. Add the eff.: Plutarch *Lyc.* 8, *Inst. Lac.* 40.

P. 246. 1264 b 33. *ἐκ τούτων*. Mr Newman aptly compares *De Part. Anim.* II. 1 § 4, 646 a 20 *δεντέρα δὲ σῶσταις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσει*, and Plato *Philæus* 27 n *πρώτων μὲν τούτων ἀπειραν λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτα' ἐκ τούτων τριῶν μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν*.

P. 249. 1265 a 13. *πλήθος*] Mr Newman has here an admirable observation. "In the criticism on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, οἱ at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the *υποθέσεις* of the State—the number of citizens and the extent of the territory, cp. 1325 b 38." On the relation between criticism in B. II. and construction in B. IV(VII), see *Introd.* p. 32 n. (2), p. 33 n. (8).

P. 250. 1265 a 18. To *π.* (203) add the reference: *Laws* 625 c (Newman).

P. 251. 1265 a 28 ff. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 368 f.

P. 252. 1265 a 40. On *ἄν* with future participle see Goodwin *Moods and Tenses* §§ 197, 208, 216. He concludes: "The possibility of such a construction is open to a certain doubt and suspicion." See also Mr H. Richards in *Class. Rev.* VI. p. 339.

P. 253. 1265 b 7. Add to *note* (209): Aristotle's suggestion in b 7—10 much resembles that of Plato *Rep.* 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλήθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ποιεῖσθαι, ἐν' οἷς μάλιστα διασφίσει τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολλοῦς τε καὶ ὀλίγους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοπούντες (Newman).

P. 255. 1265 b 29. After "adapted" insert "of all constitutions." With this meaning of *κοινωτέρων*=most suited to, within the reach of, cp. 1265 a 3.

P. 258. 1266 a 5. *οὐδ' ἔχοντα φάβεται*=obviously presents no monarchical element either. Cp. *Addenda* to 1261 a 12.

Id. 1266 a 7. After VIII(V). 7. γ add: 1307 a 21 (cp. II. 11. 5, 1273 a 5 *ἐκ-κλῆναι*). In 'Αθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2 occurs the compound *παρ-εγκλῆναι*.

Id. 1266 a 8. To the references at the end of *π.* (223) add: *Laws* 945 B. As is now clear from the *Constitution of Athens*, c. 8 § 1, Plato in the *Laws* is merely reviving an old feature of Solon's constitution. Dr Sandys *ad loc.* has collected confirmatory evidence from Isocr. *Areop.* 22, *Panath.* 45, [Dem.] c. *Neerani* and *LX.* § 75.

Id. 1266 a 11. After 2 § 6 add: 1261 b 2 (cp. 1329 a 9—11).

P. 259. 1266 a 14—20. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 370 ff.

P. 263. 1266 b 17. Add a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alterthümer* p. 137 n. 3.

P. 265. 1267 a 3 ff. "Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch *De isepid.* 306c, 524 A" (Newman).

P. 268. 1267 b 2. Add to *π.* (245): As to the form, although *διωβολία* occurs in the papyrus of 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28, yet Meistenhans^a p. 18 shows that the proper form is *διωβέλια*. On Attic inscriptions *ὀβελός* itself occurs only once with *ε* (in an inscription of date before 444 B.C.): but the derived forms preserve the older *ε*, unless the ending (as -βολον) includes an *ο*. Hence *ὀβελίσκοι*, *ὀβελεία*, *διωβέλια*: on the other hand *τριώβολον*, *πεντώβολον*, *δεκώβολον*.

As to the introduction of the *θεωμῶν*, cp. now the passage referred to above, 'Αθ. πολ. c. 28 § 3, where it is ascribed to Cleophon (ὁ λυροποιός, *ὃς καὶ τὴν διωβέλιαν ἐπόρισε πρώτος*), not (as Plut. *V. Perikl.* 9 might lead us to conjecture) to Pencies. The increase in the grants must be due to the increased number of shows, for Dem. *De Corona* § 28, ἐν ταῖς δυοῖν ὀβολῶν, shows the price to have been only two obols in 330 B.C. First mentioned on an inscription of the year 410 (C. I. A. I. 1. 188 where the Treasurer of Athens pays *διωβέλια* from the funds in hand, *ἐτένια*), just about

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time when Cleophon was a prominent politician. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 10 of *chedomos*, 405 B.C., ὁ τοῦ δῆμου τότε προσιστηκώς καὶ τῆς διαβολῆς ἐπιμελούμενος.

P. 270. 1267 b 28. λόγιος=πολιτιστῶν] ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ λέγειν καὶ βηλοῦ οὐ τιθέσασιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ ἔθνεϊ ἐπιχόρια ἐξηγουμένου περὶ τῶν: Phrynichus p. 198 Loebck, p. 284 Rutherford.*

P. 272. 1268 a 9. Add to the note on οὐδὲν: Comp. Pl. *Symp.* 222 c, ὡς οὐ πάντα ἴσταν ἕνεκα εἰρηλῶς.

Ib. 1268 a 10. Add to n. (259): The regulation in force at Athens, which 109. Laet. i. 54 ascribes to Solon, is thus alluded to in the *Constitution of Athens* 24 § 3 καὶ ὁρθαῖοι. Ἀπασὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἢ διοικησὶν ἦν. M¹ Wyw fees to C. I. A. i. 1, C. I. A. iv. p. 3, 4 an inscription not later than 460 B.C.

Ib. 1268 a 12. "ἔμμου δ' ἐπολεῖ τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως is awkward because the word is often used of the poor only as in 1265 b 39, 1270 b 25" (Newman).

P. 274. 1268 b 5. Here ἀπλῶς ought to have been rendered "couched in simple terms," and similarly in b 19 (275) ἀπλῶς δικαίως="duly framed in an unqualified form."

P. 275. 1268 b 19 f. M¹ Newman observes: "It is possible that Hippodamos, in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one, the indictment of Socrates was of this nature. There is much force in Aristotle's view, that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer."

P. 276. 1268 b 24 f. Add the case of Theramenes as given in *Lysias* xii. 68, 70.

P. 277. 1268 b 41. Add to note (271) the reference: Plato *Lysis* 841 D (Newman).

P. 278. 1269 a 2. παρασχέσθαι is technical of witnesses: see Antiphon 5 §§ 20, 21, 24, 28, 30.

P. 279. 1269 a 21. Comp. Plato *Lysis* 798 A, B οἷς γὰρ ἂν ἐντραφῶσι νόμοις ἔβηται καὶ φοβέσθαι πάντα ἢ ψυχῇ τό τι κινεῖν τῶν τότε καθεστῶτων. Prof. Sidgwick has observed that this discussion shows what difference there is between Aristotle's political ideas and ours. In the modern European view the Constitution fills the place which the Laws (νόμοι, νόμοι) hold for him.

P. 282. 1269 b 20. This use of κατὰ is not uncommon: e.g. Dem. xxiv. § 109 ἀτὰ πάντ' ἀδικεῖ.

Ib. 1269 b 21. With τοιοῦτοι comp. c. 5 § 8, 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται οἰοῦνται.

P. 284. 1269 b 38. The view of Bernays [and Newman] is quite possible. In fact it may be said that Aristotle would otherwise have written <καλ> ἐν ἐτέραις. See 1094 b 13, 14 οὐχ ὁμοίως ὡς περ οὐδ'. But Mr Newman's reference to b 34 ᾧ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων is by no means decisive. Here the question is of utility not ᾧ τὰ ἐγκύκλια, but πρὸς πόλεμον. It is true that the 120 baking-women were of service at Plataea, but Thucydides' judgment on the Spartans is implicitly contained in III. 74, where he says of the Coezyraeans: τολμηρῶς ξυμπελάβοντο. παρὰ φύσιν πομένουσιν τὸν θόρυβον.

P. 285. 1270 a 8. Note that § 12 is strikingly like the language of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 9 i. f. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐκ τῶν νῦν γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ἀλλης πολιτείας θεωρεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.

P. 287. 1270 a 34. Add to note (300) a reference to C. v. Holsinger in *Philologus* xii. p. 86.

P. 281. 1270 b 11. Add to note (317): Mr Newman suggests, with great

plausibility, that the events of 333 B.C. are referred to, "In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon. We have no record of any negotiations while the fleet was at Andros; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid. The news of Isus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud. If, as is probable, the Ephoroi sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to running their country. See A. Schäfer *Demosthenes* 3. i. 163 who refers to *Albian* 2. 13. 409: *Curt.* 4. i. 37." If this is correct, not only would this show that the passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to 333 (as Mr Newman points out) but also that its date is earlier than 330 B.C., when more complete ruin overtook the Spartans at the 'battle of Mucæ' in Aicadia.

P. 294. 1271 a 8. With *οὐ τοῦτον* comp. 1267 a 15 *οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ τύραννον*.

P. 295. 1271 a 9. Add to *note* (333) a reference to the election of the *Genusia* of the Ninety at Elis VIII(v). 6 11, 1306 a 15 ff. *τὴν δ' αἰρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερουσίων*.

P. 296. 1271 a 22. Add to *note* (339) a reference to Busolt *Gr. Alt.* 3 p. 118 n. (6).

P. 298. 1271 b 8. Add to *note* (346) a reference to *Rhet.* I. 6. 23, 1363 a 8 ff. *τὸ περιμάχητον φανόμενον* (sc. *ἀγαθὸν ἐστί*). *οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἐπλεοντα τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἔν*.

P. 300. 1271 b 24. Add to *note* (352) a reference to *F. H. G.* I. 249.

Ib. 1271 b 30—40. See also *Quaest. 1st. coll.* p. 377. Add to *note* (355) a reference to C. v. Holzinger in *Philologus* LII. p. 58 ff. He thinks (p. 96) *διὰ καὶ οὖν καὶ* a marginal note of date later than 320 B.C., comparing Polyb. IV. 53. See however against his assumption Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III. p. v f.

P. 301. 1271 b 35—39. This is Ephorus again (*Fr.* 61) as quoted in the geographical poem of Scymnus Chius, *F. H. G.* I. 249, *πρώτους δὲ Κρήτας φασὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς | ἀρεῆς θαλάττης, ἅς τε νησιωτίδας | πόλεις κατασχῶν, ἅς τε καὶ συνοικίσει | αὐτῶν Ἐφορος εἰρηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε | ἐπάνωσαν τῇ νῆσον ἀπὸ Κρήτης τινας, | τοῦ δὲ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθονος* | πλοῦν ἡμέρας ἀπέχου δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς. Mr Newman, to whom the discovery is due, adds. "The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3—4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus."

P. 303. 1272 a 18. *φόρων οὐ φέρουσιν*] "The word *φόρος* need not have political associations. It can mean *rent for land* and nothing more: here probably 'rent paid to the owners of private lots by the serfs who cultivate them.' See the inscriptions in *Bull. Corr. Hell.* v. (1881), p. 108 ff. and for the fact *Domadas* apud Athen. IV. 142" (Wyse).

Ib. 1272 a 22. Supplement (and in part correct) this *note* by a reference to Plato *Laws* 677 E, where Epimenides' device (*μυχάθηρα*)—apparently *ἐλμοι*, i.e. pemmican—is mentioned (see Stallbaum *ad loc.*), and to *F. H. G.* II. 30, III. 40 (Newman). To the next *note* (367) add a reference to Plato's strong censure *Laws* 835 B—841.

P. 307. 1272 b 30. Mr Newman keeps *ἐχουσαν* sc. *τὴν πόλιν* and for the ellipse appeals to 1266 b 1, 2, where however it presents no such intolerable harshness.

P. 308. 1272 b 37. The meaning of *ἀριστιδὸν* here is clear from the antithesis to *ἐκ τῶν τοῦχόντων*: 'to this office they elect for merit.' Writers on Greek Antiquities have favoured a different view, that *ἀριστιδὸν αἰρεῖσθαι*=election from privileged families. But while fully recognising the close connexion between good birth and

'merit' or 'capacity,' as shown by such passages as Isocr. *Areop.* § 37 of καλῶς γηγονότες καὶ πολλὴν ἀρετὴν ἐν τῇ βίῳ ἐκθεσεν γένεσι, Philochorus *F. II. G.* i. 394 πρωτόκωτονες ἐν τῇ γένει καὶ πλοῦτι καὶ βίῳ χρηστέῳ (whose πρωτόκωτονες echoes ἀρετὴν-δην) we surely have no right to give the Aristotelian technical term any other meaning than that attested by Timaeus, κατ' ἀδυναμίαν ἀρετῶν.

P. 309. 1273 a 9. The text presents τούτων καὶ ὁ δῆμος where all the authorities give καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆ., and the change was defended by Prof. Tyrell in *Hermathena* Vol. vi., No. 19 p. 31 f. (cp. No. 14 p. 334). Though the grounds for the change seemed imperative, it would perhaps have been more consistent to leave καὶ τούτων in the text and print the conjecture in spaced type in the critical notes. For M¹ Newman has shown that it is not impossible to give a sense to καὶ τούτων: "over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion" (between *Shofetes* and *Senate*), "as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity." But would the writer have left all this for his readers to supply from conjecture? In any case, even this suggestion is not inevitable: M¹ Newman has an alternative assumption that *ὁμογνώμονοι* = are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.

P. 318. 1273 b 15—15. Comp. *Quaest. crit. coll.* p. 380 f.

1273 b 13. κοινότερον τε κτλ.] M¹ Newman, retaining the manuscript order, would render "for it is not only *fairei* to all, as we said" sc. 1261 b 1.

P. 314. Add to the references for c. 12 and the Solonian Constitution: the *Constitution of Athens* cc 5—12 (cp. c. 41) to which historical commentaries will be found in Mr Kenyon's and Dr Sandys' editions. Amongst the numerous publications which deal with the relations of this treatise to the *Politics* may be specially mentioned Mr Newman's review in *Class. Rev.* v. 155—164, Mr R. W. Macan's in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* xii. 17—40, P. Meyer *Des Aristoteles Politik u. die 'Aθ. πολ.* (Bonn 1891), B. Keil *Die Solonische Verfassung nach Aristoteles* (Berlin 1892), U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf *Aristoteles u. Athen* (Berlin 1893). See also the second editions of the *Griechische Alterthümer* of Busolt and Gilbert, the *Gr. Gesch.* of Busolt, and the 6th edition of K. F. Hermann *Lehrbuch d. griech. Alterthümer* Bd. 1. Theil II. *Der athenische Staat u. seine Geschichte* edited by Thunberg (Friburg 1892).

It is worth noting that while the recent discovery largely supplements the commentary on B. II. c. 12 there is nothing in it to cancel, except the incautious mention of *Alcistides* p. 317 for which M¹ Hicks is alone responsible.

Id. 1273 b 36 *ἔτι μὲν οἴονται...* b 41 *εἴκοι δέ...* 1274 a 3 *δὲ καὶ μέφονται τινες...* a 11 *φαίνεται δέ...*] In general structure this whole account may instinctively be compared with two criticisms in 'Aθ. πολ. (1) c. 9 § 2, *οἴονται μὲν οὖν τινες... οὐ μὲν εἰκός* (cp. *εἴκοι* above)... οὐ γὰρ... (2) c. 6 §§ 1—4, *ἐν οἷς περὶ τῶν τινος διαβάλλουσιν... οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ πιθανώτερος ὁ τῶν δημοτικῶν λόγος*... οὐ γὰρ εἰκός... ταύτην μὲν οὖν χρὴ νομίζειν ψευδῆ τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι. Provisionally we may identify the *ἔτι* of 1273 b 36 with ὁ δημοτικὸς of 'Aθ. πολ. c. 6. F. Dümmler in *Hermes* xxvii. p. 267 ff. would refer *μέφονται τινες* to Critias who, he thinks, wrote on the constitution of Athens.

P. 315. To note (400) add a reference to the summary of Solon's constitution in 'Aθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2: *τρίτῃ δ' ἡ μετὰ τὴν σάσαν* (cp. 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 ad inil.) sc. μεταβολή, ἡ ἐν Σάλωνος, ἀφ' ἧς ἀρχὴ δημοκρατίας ἐγένετο: and to c. 2 § 3, *πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης* sc. Solon.

Id. 1273 b 37. *λαὸν ἀκρατον* κτλ.] Compare 'Aθ. πολ. c. 2 of the times preceding Draco and Solon: *ἦν γὰρ [τότε] ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἐλιγαρχικῇ πᾶσι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδόξαν οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις... ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ἄλλων ἦν* κτλ.: c. 4 s. f.,

c. 5 § 1 τῶν πολλῶν δουλευόντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, c. 6 § 1 τὸν δῆμον ἡλευθέρωσε, and (what were undoubtedly the writer's authorities for his facts) Solon's verses copied in c. 12 § 4.

Ib. 1273 b 38. δημοκρατίαν τὴν πάτριον] Comp. the use in 'Αθ. πολ. c. 19 § 3 of οἱ πάτριοι νόμοι οὓς Κλεισθένης ἐθήκεν with the comment subjoined ὥς οὐ δημοτικὴν ἀλλὰ παρὰ πάτριον εἶσαν τὴν Κλεισθέους πολιτείαν τῇ Σόλωνος; also c. 34 § 3, τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν (bis). Unquestionably πάτριος had become at the end of the fifth century a synonym for Solonian.

Ib. 1273 b 41. δικαστήριον] Fully explained by 'Αθ. πολ. c. 9 § 1, which for its importance we subjoin in full, though strictly only the third of the three democratic elements is here in point: δοκεῖ δὲ τῆς Σόλωνος πολιτείας τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ δημοτικώτατα πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον τὸ μὴ δυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς σύμμασι, ἔπειτα τὸ ἐξέναι τῷ βουλευμένῳ [γινωσκεῖν] ὅπῃ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, τρίτον δέ, <ψ> μάλα τὰ φασιν ἰσχυκέραι τὸ πλῆθος, ἢ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἐφασίς' λόριος γὰρ ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου, κόριος γίνεσθαι τῆς πολιτείας.

Ib. δοκεῖ] This, like εἰκοῖς 'Αθ. πολ. c. 6, c. 9 cited above, indicates a mode of argument common with the writer of the *Constitution* and not unknown in the *Polities*. In default of direct testimony, in criticising current tradition or suspicious evidence, the method of reconstruction is employed, by which from the present we infer the past, and from a given state of institutions reason back to their origin or a previous state. See Mr R. W. Macan in *J. H. S.* XII. p. 37 f., who calls attention to the 'signals of this method' in style.

Ib. 1274 a 1. τὴν βουλήν] That this was a pre-existing institution in Solon's time is placed beyond all reasonable doubt by the *Constitution of Athens*. It confronts us in the sketch of the ἀρχαία πολιτεία c. 3 § 6; ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλή τὴν μὲν τᾶς εἰς τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, δικάζει δὲ τὰ πλείεστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ ζημιούσα πάντας τοὺς ἀκοσμοῦντας κυρίως. It was then filled up from ex-Archons (ib.) Under Draco's constitution it was made φύλαξ τῶν νόμων and received complaints of their violation (ἐλεσγγεῖλια), c. 4 § 4. Before Solon (the statement is vague as to time) it appointed the magistrates, c. 8 § 2. Solon confirmed its censorship, its powers of general superintendence, of inflicting fines, and holding trials for treason by the νόμος ἐλεσγγεῖλιας, c. 8 § 4.

Ib. 1274 a 2. τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρεσιν] According to 'Αθ. πολ. c. 8 § 1 the mode of choice enacted by Solon was a combination of selection with sortition, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησεν κληροῦντας ἐκ προκλήτων, a statement which sets in a proper light the tolerably correct (but hitherto neglected) conceptions of the Solonian practice found in Isocrates *Areop.* §§ 22, 23, *Panath.* § 145, and [Dem.] c. *Neaerami* LIX. § 75. Since the lot was limited by the previous selection (or nomination by election) Aristotle can perfectly well speak of the people, here and in 1281 b 33, as *electing*.

Thus Aristotle's own qualifications of the democratic panegyrics passed upon Solon's constitution amount to this: "Solon did not found the Areopagus Council, though he confirmed it in its censorial prerogatives, and he did not introduce the election of magistrates." The exact sense in which the last comment is to be taken is not quite clear. The little we know of the mode of appointment prior to Solon's reform comes from 'Αθ. πολ. In c. 4 § 2 it is implied that under Draco the civic body (which at the time consisted of those able to provide themselves with heavy armour) used to elect the nine archons: ἀπεδόθη (not ἀπεδόθη ὑπὸ Δράκωντος) μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς ὅπλοι παρεχομένοις· ἡροῦντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐνέα ἀρχοντας. But the authority of this chapter is doubtful and in c. 8 § 2 it is said vaguely that in olden time the Areopagus

used to summon and appoint fit persons to the various annual offices: τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πύργῳ βουλὴ ἀνακαλεσάμενη καὶ κρίνασα καθ' αὐτὴν τὸν ἐπιτήθειον ἐφ' ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν τὰς ἐνιαυτὸν διατάξασα ἀπέστειλλεν.

1b. τὰν δὲ δῆμιον καταστήσαι κτλ.] The importance of the appeal to the law court where the people intervened (the laws is emphasised) Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἀπλῶς μηδὲ σαφῶς... ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβήτησεις γέγενεσθαι καὶ πάντα βραβεύειν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια τὰ δικαστήριον. So also Plutarch *V. Sol.* 18 (τὸ συνέκληται δὲ καὶ δικάζειν) κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐδὲν ὑστερον δὲ παμμέγεδες ἐφάνη τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστα τῶν διαφορῶν ἐνέπαιπτον εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς (namely through ἀμφισβήτησις from the sentences of the magistrates). Comp. Busolt *Gr. Alt.*² p. 150 n. (5).

F. 316. 1274 a 3. μέμφορται τινες] These critics are probably the same as those mentioned in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 6 §§ 1, 2 (πειρώνται τινες διαβδύλλειν αὐτὸν οἱ βουλλόμενοι βλασφημεῖν). Aristotle's acquaintance with them is probably due to an oligarchical pamphlet, perhaps of the time of the Four Hundred or the Thirty: see Wilamowitz *op. c. i.* p. 74, p. 165 ff.

1b. 1274 a 8. Ἐφιάλτης ἐλόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς] The most remarkable novelty contained in Ἀθ. πολ. is the circumstantial account of the plot of Ephialtes and Themistocles to overthrow the usurped powers of the Areopagus: c. 25. The plot ascribed to Themistocles seems unhistorical, for as the usurpation of the Areopagus lasted 17 years after Salamis (c. 25 § 1) this story would place Themistocles in Athens circa 462 B.C., whereas various lines of evidence converge in making him escape to Persia circa 466 B.C. See Mr E. M. Walker in *Class. Rev.* vi. 95 ff. Few at any rate will approve the suggestion to erase Pericles' name in order to invent that of Themistocles.

In dealing with the statement in the *Politics* we have to decide whether one or two attacks on the Areopagus are intended. Dr Sandys *Constitution* p. 100 prefers to identify Pericles' action with the later occasion (Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 § 1, τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν ἐνια παρέρησε) when some of its remaining privileges were taken from the Council. In this way the statements of *Politics* and *Constitution* would be reconciled. Prof. Susemihl however is inclined to adopt what is certainly the more natural interpretation, that in the *Politics* Pericles (not Themistocles) is associated with Ephialtes in the famous attack: *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* III p. 19. He goes on to infer (1) that it is more likely the correct account is later than the incorrect, and therefore B. II. of *Politics* later than the *Constitution of Athens* (comp. above *Addenda* to p. 66), and (2) meets the possible objection from the silence observed in the genuine part of B. II. as to Diaco's constitution by reminding us that B. II. only professes to deal with εὐδοκίμοις πολιτεῖαι, 1260 b 29, 1272 b 24, 1273 b 25. These inferences apart, the conjunction of Ephialtes and Pericles in the attack of 462 B.C. will remain, in spite of the romancing of the *Constitution of Athens*, a plausible hypothesis in view of the facts (1) that Ephialtes atoned for his share in it with his life, and (2) that Pericles succeeded Ephialtes in the leadership of the party of reform.

1b. 1274 a 9. Add to note (408): See now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 27 §§ 3, 4 with the story of Damonides' advice (the source apparently of Plutarch *V. Cim.* 10, *V. Pericl.* 9), Busolt *Gr. Alt.*² p. 168 n. (4). The whole tone of § 4 and particular expressions can be paralleled from Ἀθ. πολ. cc. 27, 28 §§ 1—4, c. 41 § 2 (the 7th and the 11th μεταβολαί): while the exclusion from Solon's intention of merely accidental results (1274 a 11 φαίνεται δὲ κτλ.) agrees with the defence of Solon in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 s. f.

F. 317. 1274 a 14. Add to note (410): Compare Ἀθ. πολ. c. 26 § 1; μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβησαν ἀνίστασθαι μέλλων τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθέμους δημαγωγούοντας. The

mention of Aristides as a leader of the Moderates is particularly unfortunate: for in 'Ab. πολ. c. 28 § 2 he finds a place on the list of *προστάται τοῦ δήμου*: (1) Solon, (2) Peisistratus, (3) Cleisthenes, (4) Xanthippus, (5) Themistocles and Aristides, (6) Ephialtes, (7) Pericles, (8) Cleon, (9) Cleophon; and in c. 23 § 3 ff., c. 24 a greater share of activity is assigned to Aristides than to his colleague Themistocles in the transformation of Athens into an imperial city. According to c. 26 § 1 the Moderates had no leader in the period just before Cimon.

Frag. 369 mentioned in this note is of course Plutarch's careless paraphrase of the eulogy of Theramenes in 'Ab. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

Ib. 1274 a 15. *To* note (411) *add.* This is supported by 'Ab. πολ. c. 7 § 3, τοῖς δὲ τὸ θητικὸν τελοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον. Under the old oligarchy the Thetes had no civic rights at all: 'Ab. πολ. 4 § 2, 5 § 1. The second of the two alternatives presented in π (411) is nearer the truth, neither is exactly right.

Ib. 1274 a 17. No notice is taken of *εὐθύνειν* in 'Ab. πολ. Nor is *εὐθύνειν δικὰς σκολιάς* technical where it occurs in Solon's fragments. It is tempting to regard 1274 a 15—19 as neither more nor less than a plain prose paraphrase of the famous lines *Δῆμος μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκε κτλ Fraggs.* 5 and 6 Beigle.

Ib. 1274 a 19. *To* note (414) *add.* From 'Ab. πολ. c. 4 § 3, c. 7 § 3 it would appear that these four classes are earlier than Solon: for even if c. 4 be rejected as an interpolation, there is the clause *καθάπερ δὴρρητο τὸ πρότερον* when Solon's *τιμήματα* are first discussed. Comp. Busolt in *Philologus* L. 393 ff.

P. 318. 1274 a 21. Note even the verbal similarity to 'Ab. πολ. c. 7 s. f. τοὺς δ' ἄλλους [sc. *ἔδει τελεῖν*] *θητικόν, οὐδεμιὰς μετέχοντας ἀρχῆς*. See p. 573 *note* on 1337 b 21.

Ib. 1274 a 22. *Add* to note (415): In *Frag.* 505, 1561 a 5, Zaleukos is called a shepherd and slave. This is hardly to be reconciled with *πολιτευθέντες αὐτοί, § 1, 1273 b 31*.

Ib. 1274 a 23. *Add.* The laws of Charondas (probably another form of the same name) were in force in Cos, see Herondas 2 48: from Strabo XII. 539 we know that they were in force in Mazaka, in Cappadocia. In a decree found near Teos, Dittenberger *Sylloge* n. 126 lines 61, 65, 121, 123, Antigonos permits the people of Lebedos and Teos to introduce the laws of Cos for the projected union of the two cities. Hence v. Wilamowitz (I. 65 n.) conjectures that the laws of Charondas, introduced deliberately when in 366 B.C. the state of Cos was refounded, had spread from that place as a centre.

Ib. 1274 a 25. *τινὲς* Mr Newman adduces reasons why Ephorus cannot be intended. (1) Ephorus (Strabo VI. 260) states that Zaleucus borrowed his laws from Crete, Lacedaemon, and the Areopagus. He could not therefore have made Zaleucus and Lycurgus contemporaries. (2) We should expect him to trace laws to a Cretan origin, to Rhadamanthus or Minos. (3) He would hardly have committed such an anachronism in regard to the Locrian Onomacritus, if indeed he be the same as the oracle-monger of Peisistratid times. Mr Newman inclines to assign the tradition to a Locrian origin, cp. Scymnus Chius v. 314 ff.

Ib. 1274 a 30. *To* note (419 b) *add.* Comp. the similar exposure of a chionological error in 'Ab. πολ. c. 17 § 2: *φανερῶς ληροῦσιν οἱ φάσκορρες . . ὡ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ἐν τις ἀναλογίζηται τὸν ἑκατέρου βίον καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἀπέθανεν ἀρχόντος*. Comp. Mr Newman's remarks in D¹ Sandys' edition of the *Constitution* p. lvi.

P. 319. 1274 b 7. *Add* a reference to D¹ Sandys' *note* in his Demosthenes *Private Orations* Vol. II. p. 115, and the *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) s. v.

P. 320. 1274 b 14. ταῦ] In *Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos.* II. 504 Prof. Hyswater remarks that τοῦ is the only form recognised by the Attic inscriptions. Undoubtedly the preponderance of masculine forms of the dual is very great, τοῦ θεῶν at least 30 times in inscriptions: yet ταῦ θεῶν does occur, see *C. I. A.* II. 3, n. 1559. In the diamutatis there is no instance of τοῦ, τοῦτων as feminine; but Μενανδρίη Fr. 520 K. γίνεταί ταῦν ἀδελφῶν ταῦν θυῶν ταύτων. On the other hand τῶ, τοῦτω, τῶδε, αἰῶν, δέ, ὥτινε, are found as feminine, although τῆ, αὐτή, ταύτη, τῶδε, with substantives of the final declension, do occur. In the prose writers the results so far differ that τῆ, ταύτη, are nowhere attested, while τοῦ is found more often than ταῦ, e.g. in Plato τοῦ six times, ταῦ four times. The Scholiast on Aristoph. *Thesm.* 566 has τῶ θυῶ] ὡς τῶ χεῖρε, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦν θεῶν ἀλλὰ ταῦν θεῶν. In Isaeus ταῦν occurs six times, in Aischyrophanes six times, in Sophocles, Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Hyperides once each.

See Röper *De dualismo Platónico* (Danzig 1878) and E. Ilanico *Ueber den Dual bei Xenophan u. Thucyd.* (Bartenstein 1889), *Ueb. den Dual bei den attischen Dialektikern* (Bartenstein 1891), also in *Festsch. f. Philol.* CXLIII. 1891 p. 416 ff.; S. Kack *Ueb. d. Dual bei den gr. Rednern* (Wurzburg 1882).

P. 321. 1274 b 15 f. Δράκωντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσι, πολιτεία δ' ὀπαρχοσύνη τοῦ νόμου ἐθηκεν. Add to note (427): Possibly the writer felt it incumbent upon him to account for Aristotle's omission of Draco (the real reason being, as explained above, that Draco's was not one of the εὐδαίμονιστοι πολιτεῖαι), especially in view of 1273 b 34 οὗτοι γὰρ (Λυκοβργος καὶ Σόλων) καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. Assuming that the sentence is a spurious addition it is not surprising that it is irreconcilable with *Δθ. πολ.* c. 4. Those recent authorities who do not reject it as spurious (and they include Newman and v. Wilamowitz) have to account for a glaring discrepancy with the detailed account of the Draconian constitution given in that chapter, which v. Wilamowitz considers to have been a hasty insertion in *Δθ. πολ.* at the last moment. See again *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvi, III. p. III ff.

ib. Add to note (428): See now *Δθ. πολ.* c. 4 with the increasing literature upon the Draconian constitution, beginning with the doubts of Mr J. W. Hendlam and Mr E. S. Thompson in *Class. Rev.* v. 161 ff., 336, and M. Th. Reinach in *Revue Critique* 1891 p. 143 ff., to whose attacks replies have been made, amongst others by P. Meyer *op. c.* p. 31 ff. and Busolt in *Philologus* L. p. 393 ff. In the opinion of v. Wilamowitz the Constitution of Draco first appeared in Theaetetes' oligarchical pamphlet, 404 B.C.: it was reconstructed from the θεσμοὶ of Draco, upon inferences to which Theaetetes was led in the course of his inquiries into old and obsolete laws for the purpose of the revision of the laws and constitution instituted by the Thirty.

As to the absence of evidence for any such constitution, Busolt argues that since Draco's laws, with the exception of those relating to homicide, were abolished (*Δθ. πολ.* c. 7) and only the laws on homicide remained in force, people easily came to the conclusion that the latter comprised the whole of Draco's work. For a possible reminiscence he points to Pseudo-Plato *Axiarchus* 365 B: ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ Δράκωντος ἢ Κλεισθέους πολιτείας οὐδὲν περὶ σε κακὸν ἦν.

P. 324, line 18. Add: Mr Barclay Head *Hist. Num.* p. 372 states plainly that a federal coinage implies other federal institutions, and that in spite of continual dissensions something more than a mere tradition of political unity was kept up in Arcadia during the period of the coinage 550—400 B.C.

P. 330. To note (8) of p. 329 add after σύνθητες: This evidence is disputed by Mr F. B. Jevons *Kin and Custom* in *Journal of Philol.* xvi. 1887 p. 104 n. 1. According to him Polybius and Caesar were mistaken in attributing polyandry to

Spartans and Celts respectively, the 'Joint Undivided Family' having given rise to the misapprehension.

P. 334, line 5. To note (250) add: O. Apelt *Beitrage zur gr. Philosophie* (Leipzig 1891) p. 382 ff. suggests that Hippias of Elis was a pupil of Hippodamos [Hegesiasimos apud Suidam].

P. 336, note 1. Add a reference to the excellent article by C. v. Holzinger *Aristoteles u. Herakleides' lakonische u. kretische Politien in Philologus* LII. p. 56 ff.

P. 337, line 18. See *Addenda* to p. 303 above.

P. 339, note 1. 'Oxen' would appear to be meant by *καρταίποδα*, 'cattle' ('sheep.'

P. 340. Excursus IV. The detailed account of the Calthagnian constitution implies a later date than the researches necessary for the Greek Πολιτεῖαι and the Νόμματα βαρβαρικά. The bearing of this fact upon the date of B. II. (at least in its final form) is pointed out by Prof. Susemihl *Quaest. Ar. cr. et exeg.* III. p. iii f.

P. 352. To note (403) add: Since the publication of the *Constitution of Athens* the Solonian origin of the popular law courts is placed beyond question. see 'Αθ. πολ. c. 7 § 4, c. 9.

P. 355. 1275 a 10. To note (435) add: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 59 § 6, καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τὰ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι κυροῦνται, καὶ τὰς δίκας τὰς ἀπὸ συμβόλων εἰσάγουσι, where οὗτοι = οἱ θεσμοθέται.

P. 356. Commn. left col. line 17 add: Meier u. Schomann *Attische Process* ed. Lipsius pp. 994—1006, *Dict. of Antiquities* (ed. 3) II. 734 ff. Also Roberts *Int. to Greek Epigraphy* I. p. 355. In the absence of σύμβολα the only right was the right of reprisals, *σύλαν*; cp *σύλην διδόναι κατὰ τινας*, Dem. *adv. Lacritium* XXXV § 26 p. 931, 21.

Id. 1275 a 15. ἐγγεγραμμένους. Comp 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42 § 1.

P. 357. 1275 a 25. οὐκ ἔστιν] The rule at Athens in the fourth century is thus laid down 'Αθ. πολ. c. 62 s. f. Ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἔστιν πλειονότης, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμία πλὴν βουλευσθαι βίς. Comp. c. 31 § 3, and *Politics* 1299 a 10, 1317 b 24.

P. 359. 1275 b 8. At Aciasgas and Melite σύγκλητος was the name for the Council as opposed to the popular Assembly: Swoboda *Die griechischen Volksbeschlüsse* p. 307.

P. 360. 1275 b 22. πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν] See below, *Addenda* to p. 379. That this was the practice at Athens in the fourth century can be seen from 'Αθ. πολ. c. 42, μετέχουσιν μὲν τῆς πολιτείας οἱ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γεγονότες ἀστών.

P. 361. 1275 b 30. ἀπλοῦν] Comp. Plato *Politic.* 306 c πότερον οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ τοῦτο, ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔχει διαφορὰν.

P. 362. 1275 b 8—16. See the discussion of this passage in *Quaest. Ar. crit. et exeg.* I. p. xvii, following Niemeyer in *Festsch. f. Phil.* cxliii. 1891, p. 412 ff. With the changes indicated in the *Addenda* to *Critical Notes* the passage runs thus: ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινας πόθ' ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε καὶ τότε οὐχ ἡ πόλις, οὐκ ὅταν ἐξ

ἐλιγαρχίας ἡ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία (τότε γὰρ οὔτε τὰ συμβόλαια εἶναι βολύονται διαλύνειν, ὡς οὐ τῆς πόλεως ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυράννου λαβόντος, οὐτ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τυράντων, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν τῷ κρατεῖν οὕσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον)· εἴπερ οὖν [καὶ] δημοκρατοῦνται τινας τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέον εἶναι [ταύτης] τὰς τῆς πολιτείας ταύτης πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἐλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος; "Some raise the question when the state is, and when it is not, responsible for public acts, for instance after the establishment of a democracy upon a previous oligarchy or tyranny. some under such circumstances would repudiate obligations, holding that they were not contracted by the state but by

the tyrant, and would decline many other such responsibilities on the ground that the basis of certain forms of government is superior strength and not the public interest: suppose now men to be somewhere living under a democracy of this origin, is the state just as responsible for the acts of this government as for those of its predecessors, the oligarchy or tyranny?" In a 14 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον is explained by a 9 ὅταν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. The question should more properly have been put in the reverse way: is the state as responsible for the acts of the deposed oligarchy or tyranny as it is for the acts of the democracy which succeeds them? But Aristotle's inexactness in such matters is notorious. Νίμωφρα remains the τῶντι bracketed above, as if the question concerned the identity of the state: more probably the alternative is, are the acts of the preceding tyranny to be attributed to the city or to the tyrant?

P. 364 f. 1276 a 36—38. On the divergent spellings *atel* *del* see Meisterhans, *Grammatik d. a. Inschr.*² p. 25 n. 2; Chitt's preface to ed. of *Δεσφύμεια* (Teubner series) p. xv, who cites the variants in the mss. at 986 b 17, 1016 a 15, 1026 a 21. The whole question of orthography is complicated by the discrepancy between (1) the best manuscripts and (2) the inscriptions. Prof. Susemihl, who has hitherto been content to reproduce faithfully the best manuscript evidence, now writes: "In rebus orthographicis sequi fontes optimos...non pigeat fortasse in nova editione, sed suadente Staphileo ad Meisterhansii grammaticam inscriptionum me accommodarem semperque scriberem non solum, id quod nunc feci, μικρόν, μικρότης, νουν etiam μέγρον, γήγροσθα, πλέον et forsitan etiam δυόν, αἰών, breviores comparativorum species in *ous* et *u* desinentes semper iaciperem." See Staphes *Ἀγρί. Studien zu Arist. v. i. Seele* (Landsbut 1890) p. 7 ff. On the same rational principles Mr Hicks is inclined wholly to disregard the manuscript evidence on such points as the avoidance of hiatus by elision, and the retention of obsolete or incorrect spelling (θαλάσση 1271 b 34, 35, 37, 1227 a 16, πρόσσων 1237 b 20, Μικυληναίοι 1285 a 35). v. Wilamowitz, *op. c. l.* 319, sees in Aristotle's Greek traces of Ionicism.

P. 368. *To* note (467)—comp. n. (455) p. 363—*add*: See now 'Αθ. πολ. c. 39 s. f. (τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ἐδανείσαντο εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς) and c. 40 § 3 (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα λαμβανόμενοι, ἃ οἱ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔλαβον, ἀπέδοσαν κοινῇ, κελευουσὼν τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐκατέρους ἀποδοῦναι χωρὶς) which now informs us that there was a special clause about the loan in the terms of reconciliation (διαλύσεως) agreed upon between the two factions in 403 B.C. It is with justice that in the 'Αθ. πολ. the notice of the repayment is followed by the comment ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οὐχ ὅτι προστιθέσιν τῶν αἰκλίων οἱ δῆμοι κρᾶτίζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνάστατον ποιοῦσιν.

P. 368. 1276 b 33. *To* note (470) *add*: M^r Newman (i. p. 363) understands ἀγαθὸν as the predicate with εἶναι.

P. 369. 1277 a 6. For εὐθὺς cp. Aristoph. *Clouds* 878 εὐθὺς γὰρ τοὶ παιδάρων δὲ τῶν νεανῶν ἐπὶ λατρεῖν ἐνδον οἰκίας.

P. 370. 1277 a 11. From Dem. c. *Mid.* p. 533 it appears that there were several κορυφαῖαι and a ἡγεμὼν κορυφαίων.

P. 373. 1277 b 12. *To* note (490) *add*: A trace of it is retained in M. Antoninus xi. 29 ἐν τῇ γράφῃ καὶ ἀναγνώσκων οὐ πρότερον ἀρξείη πρὶν ἀρχεῖν. The excellence of the Spartan military system is thus brought out by Thucydides v. 66 s. f. σχεδὸν γὰρ...ἀρχόντες ἀρχόντων εἰσι.

P. 375. 1277 b 34. ὡς ἀληθὺς γὰρ σο. ἀπορεῖται.

P. 377. 1278 a 14. With φανέν cp. 'Αθ. πολ. c. 32 ὡς ἐφάνη τὰ μέταλλα.

P. 379. 1278 a 30 We owe to 'Mr Wyse the proper antithesis to γνήσιος πολίτης, viz. νόθος πολίτης' see *Schol. in Euripidem* ed. Schwaitz i. *Orest.* 903 καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος ἦν [see the line] εἰς τοῦτον βλέπει [sc. Κλεοφῶντα]. θέλει γὰρ εἶπεν Ἀθηναῖον οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ νόθον πολίτην παρόσαν Θράξ ἦν ὁ Κλεοφῶν. Again in *Schol.* on l. 904.

Ib 1278 a 31. Mr Wyse suggests an alternative meaning for χρώνται = thus *affrily* the law.

Ib. 1278 a 32. παραιροῦνται = (virtually) disfranchise: so 1285 a 16, 1311 b 6.

Ib. 1278 a 34. *Add to note* (516): By 'Aθ. πολ. c. 26 § 4 this famous law of Peisicles is assigned to the year 451/0 ἐπὶ Ἀντιόχου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, Περικλέους εἰπόντος, ἔγνωσαν μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως δὲ ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῶν ἄστον ἢ γεγονός. An error in the date is not so serious as to have maintained (with Duncker, Schenk, Buermann and at one time Busoll) that no such law could have been proposed by Peisicles. For the practice at Athens in the fourth century see c. 42 § 1 cited in *Adelphiada* to p. 360. Cp. 1275 b 21. *Add a reference* to the reverse process *at Byzantium according to *Oecon.* 11. 2 § 3, 1346 b 26 ff. ὅντος δὲ νόμου αὐτοῖς μὴ εἶναι πολίτην δὲ ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἄστων ἀμφοτέρων ἢ, χρημάτων δεσθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο τὸν ἐξ ἐνός ὄντα ἄστον καταβαλόντα μὲν τριάκοντα εἶναι πολίτην.

P. 381. 1278 b 20. Comp. *Eud. Eth.* 1242 a 6, and *note* in Sussemitz's ed.

Ib. 1278 b 22. See p 457 n. 4. *Add to the note* on 1278 b 23. Dubito. Not that the personal use is not sufficiently attested: cp. Demosth. *De Corona* § 254, p. 132, 2 τὸ ἐπιβαλλὼν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς μέρος: but it may well be that δον agrees with μέρος, the order being changed to avoid hiatus. See however Bonitz *Ind. Ar.* 269 b 9 ff who apparently favours the personal usage of the verb by arranging the present passage with *Pol.* IV (VII) 1. 10, 1323 b 21 and after adding 'inde explicandum videtur 1260 a 41' proceeds to the unmistakable usage ὅταν ἐπιβῇ. ἡ σκέψις 1266 a 25.

P. 382. 1278 b 27. ἂν μὴ κτλ = unless existence is outweighed with ['exceeds too much in'] the evils of life.

P. 385 1279 a 26. *Add a reference* to n. (523).

P. 386. Comm. left col line 32. For "409 (oi 408)" it would perhaps be better to read "410": payment for public services seems to have been restored soon after the battle of Cyzicus.

P. 389. c. g. Many of the fine thoughts here are borrowed from the myth in Plato's *Protagoras* (Spengel).

P. 391. 1280 a 24. *λευθερίᾳ* Free birth, the abstract noun answering to *ελεύθερος* = free born. See Newman i. p. 248 n. 1. Compare 1281 a 6 *λευθερίαν* καὶ γένος, 1283 a 33 *οἱ δ' ελεύθεροι καὶ ἐγγεσθῆς ὡς ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων*, 1290 b 9 ff. *ἂν οἱ ελεύθεροι ὅλγοι ὄντες πλείονων* [καὶ μὴ ελευθέρων] ἀρχωσι; lastly, the *locus classicus* which establishes this meaning, 1291 b 26 τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ελεύθερον = the freeborn who have only one parent of citizen birth. He further quotes Plato *Comicus Hyperbolicus* 3, 4 for *ελεύθερος* (ξένος, and refers to *Diog. Laer.* vi. 1 and vi. 4 for *Antisthenes*.

P. 396. 1281 a 17. Mr Newman (ii. 145) understands this differently: "taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty" like ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

P. 400. 1281 b 31. With *βουλευεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν* cf. 1274 a 15 ff and *reff.* there.

P. 402. 1282 a 21. Mr Newman cites *Phys.* II. 2, 9, 194 a 36: δύο δὲ αὖ ἀρχοῦσαι τῆς θλῆς καὶ αὖ γνωρίζουσαι τέχναι, ἡ τε χρωμένη καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. The ship-captain, representing ἡ χρωμένη, ποῖόν τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιδάττει.

Δεωκράτους· περὶ δὲ τούτου Ἀνδροτίων ἐν τῷ β' φησὶν ὅτι συγγενὴς μὲν ἦν Παισιστράτῳ τοῦ τυράννου καὶ πρῶτος ἐξωστρακίσθη τοῦ περὶ τὴν ὁστρακισμὸν νόμου τότε πρῶτον τεθέντος διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν περὶ Παισιστράτου, ὅτι δημογωγὸς ὦν καὶ στρατηγὸς ἐτυράννησεν. The coincidence of language is unmistakable, cp. VIII(V). 5. 6, 1305 a 7.

P. 417. To note (609) add: A more correct account of the earlier position of these three islands is given in Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 2. τοὺς συμμάχους δεσποτικωτέρως ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Σίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων· τούτους δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὥστε τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχαι ὡς ἐτυχον ἀρχοντες. From this privileged position the Samians and Lesbians were not dislodged until they revolted. Comp. Mr Newman in *Class. Rev.* v. 162.

P. 423. 1285 a 16. Add: Busolt *Die Lakadaimonier* p. 141 ff. compares the Tageia in Thessaly, the βασιτεία of Aicadia (which is also a στρατηγία), and the 'Herzogthum' of the ancient Geimans.

P. 424. 1285 a 35 et al. Note that according to Meistertans *Grammatik* p. 23 n. (132) the true spelling is Μυνηναῖοι.

P. 426. 1285 b 14. Cp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 § 3 ἀρχαὶ δ' ἐνθημοὶ μὲν ὑπερβίοιοι δέ.

Ib. 1285 b 15. παριέντων In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 3 the word is παραχωρεῖν.

Ib. 1285 b 16. Add to note (629)· Foi βασιλεὺς at Athens cp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 3 § 2 ἐπικρατοῦσα ἡ πολεμικὴ διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τινὲς τῶν βασιλέων μαλακοῦς. But as to the 'shadowy kingship' see now J. G. Frazer *Golden Bough* i. 44 ff., 118 ff., 158—165, 217—235, an epoch-making work which is calculated to shatter many fond beliefs.

P. 428. 1285 a 3. Add. This is the distinction between τάξις and θεσμός in Dion. Halicar. *Ant. Rom.* v. 167 a.

P. 431. 1287 a 38 In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 35 § 3 πρὸς χάριν happens to occur.

P. 434. 1286 a 30 f. The sentiment perfectly agrees with that of Ἀθ. πολ. c. 41 § 2; after mentioning the absolute personal sway of Demos (ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψήφισμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατὺν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύδασι) the writer continues καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὁρθῶς· εὐδιαφοροῦτεροι γὰρ <οἱ> ἄλλοι τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν καὶ κέρδει καὶ χάρισιν.

P. 438. Comm. left col. line 1. After turn out insert anyhow 1 c.

P. 439. 1287 a 6. Comp for this sense of διοίκησις, 1331 b 9· also 1330 a 7 foi διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν, and Ἀθ. πολ. c. 24 s. f. ἀπασι γὰρ τούτοις ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἡ διοίκησις (maintenance) ἦν.

P. 442. 1287 b 19. περιληφθῆναι In Ἀθ. πολ. c. 9 § 2 περιλαβεῖν.

P. 454. Add to Excursus II.: See further remarks on the date of Pittacus, in reply to Beloch, by Toepffer in *Rhein. Mus.* XLIX. 1894, pp. 230—246.

P. 467, line 5. See *Corrigenda*. Delete the sentence: Again, one might...πολιτεία.

P. 464 ff. The statistical results here given have been again and again revised by Prof. Susemihl in *Quaest. crit. et exeg.* II. (1893) and *Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1893, p. 817 ff., the latter article a rejoinder to Mr Newman's presentation of the statistics in *Classical Review* VII. 1893, pp. 304—309. In such enumerations mistakes are apt to creep in, and an editor's judgment will from time to time be modified by the greater or less degree of probability which a combination of assumptions seems to present: hence neither the statistics of the text nor the modified results of the articles published in 1893 can be regarded as final. Both sides have made concessions, either from change of view (as when Prof. Susemihl admits that 1272 b 9 Mr Newman has rightly accounted for the variant δυναστῶν by δυναστεία in the next line, and accordingly

returns to $\delta\upsilon\pi\alpha\rho\omega\upsilon\iota\iota$ II², and Mr Newman 1263 a 23 now accepts $\epsilon\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$ II¹ in place of $\eta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota$ II²) or from the laudable desire to do all possible justice to the opposing view (which may account for Prof. Susemihl's surrender of 1256 b 1 $\lambda\omicron\mu\lambda\iota\omega\tau\alpha\iota$, 1258 b 1 $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\omicron\lambda\alpha\kappa\eta\varsigma$, 1258 b 7 $\nu\omicron\lambda\epsilon\mu\mu\alpha$ $\epsilon\kappa$ $\nu\omicron\lambda\epsilon\mu\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$ in *Quæst.* II. p. 17. although he would still regard these three passages as extremely uncertain, and similarly for Mr Newman's omission to count 15 passages on the side of II², for which see *Class. Rev.* VII. p. 306 n. 1, p. 308). It only remains to state and compare the competing statistical tables in their latest form.

Let us start with Book I. where "II¹ is certainly wrong 15 times" (text p. 464, line 40): deduct *three* of these 1257 a 22, 1258 b 27, 1260 a 26 which fall back into the uncertain class, and add *seven*, viz. 1254 b 14, 1256 a 10, 1257 a 6, 1259 b 31 together with the more properly uncertain cases 1256 b 1, 1258 b 1, b 7: this brings the total of errors in II¹ to 19. But again, in B. I. "II¹ is right 24 times" (text p. 464, line 3 from below): this should have been 23 for only 23 variants are enumerated. Of these *five* are very slight changes and Prof. Susemihl now refrains from counting them: viz. 1252 b 28 ($\eta\theta\eta$), 1256 b 8 ($\delta\epsilon\delta\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\eta$), 1258 b 40 ($\chi\alpha\pi\eta\tau\iota\delta\eta$), 1259 b 28 ($\delta\epsilon$), 1260 a 37 ($\delta\omega\epsilon$), but he adds *five* in their place, viz. 1253 a 32, 1253 b 33, 1254 a 10, 1260 a 26, a 31: the total remaining 23. Thus in B. I. the problem works out in favour of II¹ by 23 to 19.

Mr Newman does not agree with this statement of the case, but instead of a detailed criticism he contents himself with objecting to five of the 23 variants claimed as right readings for II¹ on the ground that words are omitted, and that this is the besetting sin of II¹: these five omissions are 1252 a 9 ($\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\alpha$), b 20 ($\sigma\upsilon\tau\eta\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon\sigma$), 1253 b 33 (δ), 1257 b 7 ($\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\alpha$), 1260 a 31 (δ). If these five claims were struck out, the balance in favour of II² would be destroyed.

In B. II. the alleged superiority claimed for II¹ is still disputed. Mr Newman accepts its authority in 35 variants and does not definitely pronounce against it in the 13 other readings, while at the same time rejecting it in favour of II² in no less than 64 cases.

Prof. Susemihl again has altered his result (p. 465) in favour of II¹ over II² from 69: 40 to 67: 48. It is clear that while opinions continue thus widely to differ, as to which variants are decisive for the one or the other side, the facts require extremely cautious and delicate manipulation.

The changes in Susemihl's figures for Book II. are thus explained. "II¹ has changed the right reading at the most only 40 times" (p. 465 line 32): deduct 9 of these, viz. 1261 a 35, 1265 b 39, 1266 b 39, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 21, a 27, 1272 a 1, 1273 a 9, 1274 a 4, in return add 17 others: 1261 a 22, 1264 a 16, 1265 a 22, 1268 a 6, a 17, a 34, 1269 a 38, b 21, b 28, 1270 a 23, b 12, 1272 a 3, b 9, b 28, b 34, 1274 b 8, b 9, b 14: the new total of the errors of II¹ is 48. Again of the 69 passages claimed as right readings for II¹ (p. 465 line 23) Susemihl is now disposed to omit *nine*, viz. 1263 a 12, 1266 b 31, 1267 a 40, 1270 a 22, b 19, b 32, 1274 a 5, a 21, in place of which he advances 9 others, viz. 1261 b 30, 1263 a 23 ($\kappa\alpha\iota$), b 5, 1264 a 15, b 31, 1265 a 16, 1268 a 6 f., 1269 b 14, 1273 a 35: the total would thus remain at 69, but on reflection he counts the variations of one passage, 1261 b 2 f., not (as on p. 465) as *five*, but only *two* (or three at most). This brings out the final result for B. II.: II¹=67 (or 68 at most), II²=48.

Mr Newman's divergent results are thus obtained. Of the 67 he accepts 35, but transfers *nine* others to the opposite side and reckons them to the credit of II² (viz. 1260 b 27, 1261 b 4, 1263 b 7, 1268 a 3 all cases of omission by II¹, together with

1265 b 11, 1267 a 35, b 26, 1269 b 6, 1271 a 20) the remaining 23 he leaves doubtful, though strongly of opinion that they also should be counted for Π^2 . Thus Π^1 falls with him from 67 to 35; and Π^2 rises by the addition to the 48 (which Susemihl finally admits) of seven other variants, which Susemihl regards as doubtful: viz. 1264 a 21, 1265 a 12, 1268 b 17, 1267 a 40, 1273 b 32, 1274 a 4, b 6. This makes the total for $\Pi^2=55$. Add the 9 variants above enumerated which Susemihl reckons for Π^1 and Newman for Π^2 and we get the result, $\Pi^2=64$, $\Pi^1=35$.

On the question of the text generally we quote with pleasure Prof. Tynniell's opinion as expressed in 1888, *Hermathena* Vol. VI No. 14, p. 335 "The course taken by recent criticism illustrates one of Aristotle's rules for attaining the mean, ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου. Bekker having completely neglected Π^1 and Γ , Susemihl's recoil carried him perhaps too far from Bekker's method, and now Busse and Dittenberger—"may we not add Newman?"—seem to be dragging him too near it again. Without free emendation and transposition we can have no readable text."

P. 517. 1330 a 14. After note (835) add: Comp. Plato *Cratylus* 112 B: ψέειτο δὲ [sc. prehistoric Attica] τὰ μὲν ἔξωθεν, ὅπ' αὐτὰ τὰ πλάγια αὐτῆς, ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν γεωργῶν δοιοὶ πηλοῖον ἐγείρουσι· τὰ δ' ἐπάνω τὸ μέγιστον αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον γένος περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηναίων Ἡφαίστου τε ἱερὸν καταψέχουσιν, ὅσον μᾶς οἰκίας κῆπον ἐνὶ περιβόλῳ προσπεριβεβλημένοι. τὰ γὰρ πρὸς βορρᾶν αὐτῆς ἔκουν οἰκίας κοῦας καὶ ἐυσόστια χαιμερῶν κατασκευασμένοι (Wysc).

Id. 1330 a 15. ὅνα ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων πάντες μετέχουσιν] No one can fail to notice the striking similarity between this sentence and the following in the account of Cleisthenes' local tribes. δυνὺς ἐκάστη μετέχῃ πάντων τῶν τόπων, Ἀθ. πολ. c. 21 § 4.

P. 520. 1330 b 11. Φοι μὴ παρέργως see now Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5 τοῖς μὴ παρέργως ἀποφαινομένοις.

P. 522. 1331 a 3. After 1269 a 6 add: and III. 3. 2, 1276 a 14 ff.

P. 525. 1333 a 2. After οὕτε γὰρ. add: Comp. *Nie. Eth.* V. 1. 5, 1129 a 19 ἐάν τε γὰρ ἡ ἐξέλιξις and X. 7. 2, 1177 a 21 (where Bywater brackets τε).

P. 529. 1333 b 12. With ἀπεφάνησαν comp. the passage cited in *Addenda* to p. 520 above, from Ἀθ. πολ. c. 28 § 5.

P. 540. 1333 b 34. Τὸ note (915) add. Comp. Ἀθ. πολ. c. 23 § 4.

P. 541. 1334 a 5. Compare the parallel phrase of *Metaph.* I. 2. 11, 982 b 22, μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός.

P. 570. 1337 a 27. Comp. Pl. *Crito* 50 v etc. and Dem. *De Corona* § 205 (οὐχὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι).